LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq
prepared for the unique aspects of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Efforts to solve
this problem—the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program, for example—were
insufficient and came too late to have a profound effect. Moreover, these efforts
were inorganic adaptations, something apart from the normal unit activities.
This devalued their potential contributions. 169 The intelligence system was of
little help here. The need for information aggregation stands as an equal to
classical all-source intelligence. This problem calls for a whole array of fixes,
from improving language training, predeployment training, and area expertise
to reforming the intelligence/information apparatuses.
Character and Conduct of War
When conventional warfare or logistical skills were called for, the U.S. Armed
Forces usually achieved excellent results, but the military was insensitive to the
needs of the postconflict environment and not well prepared for insurgency in
either country. Military gains were not connected to political objectives. The
lack of preparation for dealing with irregular conflicts was a result of failing to
learn and internalize post-Vietnam lessons. Military performance improved
over time. Indeed, field-level innovation on counterinsurgency showed an admirable
capacity for learning and innovation. Later on, the development of
Army and Marine Corps doctrine on counterinsurgency and its inculcation
of the doctrine in the force were excellent examples of systemic adaptation
under fire. In a similar manner, with great fits and starts and lots of managerial
attention, the DOD acquisition system was able to create, field, and deploy
the equipment needed to turn the military that existed into the military that
was needed to fight these wars. The focus on preparation for future wars can
retard warfighting adaptations in the near term. Even with bureaucratic resistance,
however, the speed of battlefield learning and technological innovation
in these wars was admirable. 170
A prudent great power should avoid becoming a third-party expeditionary
force in a large-scale counterinsurgency. Large-scale foreign expeditionary
forces in another country’s insurgency have almost always failed, except when
the foreign power was the de facto government and the local insurgents had
no sanctuaries. 171 At the same time, it should also be remembered that the U.S.
participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan did not begin as insurgencies
but evolved in that direction. It is not possible for a superpower to disregard
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