A collection of scientifically-inspired articles written by the students of the course Immigration in Electoral Democracies at the Humboldt - Universität zu Berlin (Summer Semester 2015)
Immigration
in Berlin
A collection of scientifically-inspired articles
written by the students of the course
Immigration in Electoral Democracies
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Summer Semester 2015
Edited by
Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca
Jondis Luise Schwartzkopff
Contents
Demographics
Immigrants in Berlin and their
characteristics
Younes Rifaad
.........................................................page 3
Immigration
Asylum seekers in Germany, where do
they come from?
Yoann Vincent
.........................................................page 5
Asylum seekers: official responses and
original initiatives
François Malgorn
.........................................................page 5
The daily road and life of refugees in
Berlin
Nathalie Tric
.........................................................page 7
Integration
Are Berliners friendly? A survey on
discrimination
Itzel Rangel Romero
.........................................................page 8
Integration on a “first-come, firstserved”
basis
Marie Belland
.........................................................page 9
Voices no one hears – who is entitled
to be heard?
Anna Stockmar
.......................................................page 1 1
Second-generation immigrant cinema :
representations of women
Lucinda Sheedy-Reinhard
.......................................................page 1 2
Dominant identities among Muslims in
Berlin
Ilya Sogolov
.......................................................page 1 4
Social movements
The rise of the PEGIDA movement
Léone Garnier
.......................................................page 1 5
Local newspaper reporting on refugee
activism – the case of Ohlauer Straße
Jondis Luise Schwartzkopff
.......................................................page 1 7
“Die Toten kommen” – the
politicization of illegal immigration
Carla Böttinger
.......................................................page 1 9
Public opinion
Public perception of immigration
between 201 2 and 201 4
Franziska Keß
.......................................................page 20
Imagined immigration: the image of
immigration delivered by the press
Marie Cohuet
.......................................................page 22
1
Editorial
Political participation
Immigrants’ electoral behaviour in
Germany and Berlin
Mireia Casado Olivas
.......................................................page 24
Political parties
The effect of participation in
government on migration policy
Luis Jachmann
.......................................................page 25
Does Berlin’s multiculturalism show in
party programs?
Torbjørn Svanevik
.......................................................page 26
Why local politicians run for migrant
votes
Silvia Mayr
.......................................................page 28
Immigration, integration and parties –
CDU and SPD
Alisha Archie
.......................................................page 30
Representation
Turkish representation in Kreuzberg
and Wedding
Els Rutten
.......................................................page 32
Over the past decades the city of Berlin has
grown increasingly multicultural. Immigrants
coming from numerous nations, and settling
over a broader swath of the city than ever
before, are changing the ethnic and cultural
city landscapes. According to the Statistics
Bureau of Berlin-Brandenburg by the end of
201 4 about 497,000 foreigners lived in Berlin,
and 832,000 Berlin residents were citizens of
immigrant origin in 201 3. The sheer variety of
foreigners include large groups of Guest
workers that arrived after World War II,
emigrants from the Eastern Bloc, refugees
fleeing zones in conflict, and citizens of the
European Union and other industrialized
countries such as the United States. A rich mix
of ethnic and cultural groups that are
reshaping Berlin’s character and ultimately
redefining what it means to be a Berliner.
In this report we are pleased to present a
collection of articles devoted to the study of
immigrants and immigration in Berlin. These
articles have been written by the students of
the class “Immigration in Electoral Democracies”
that I taught in 201 5 at the Humboldt-
Universität of Berlin and aim at providing with
interesting insights of Berlin’s transformations
in the age of migration. These address
questions related to immigrants’ integration,
the organization and mobilization of immigrants
and of social movements opposing
migration, public opinion formation and
change, the position of parties on immigration
policies, and the participation and representation
of citizen of immigrant origin. The
articles use diverse methodologies that prevail
in political science including statistical analysis,
content analysis of newspapers and party
manifestoes, face-to-face and on-line surveys
and interviews with politicians, activists, artists,
and citizens of immigrant origin.
Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca
2
Demographics
1 4% of Berlin residents do not
have German citizenship. 1
Immigrants by region of origin 1
Share of immigr
Reinickendorf
P
Foreigners by residency status
and region of origin 2
Spandau
Charlottenburg-
Wilmersdorf
Mitte
Fried
Kre
Tempelhof
Schöneber
Steglitz-Zehlendorf
0% 50%
Migrants from Turkey
represent 1 7.2% of the foreign
population and are the largest
immigrant group. 1
3
Demographics
Immigrant share
by age groups 1
ants by district 1
ankow
More than 40% of
immigrants stay for 20
years and longer. 1
richshainuzberg
Lichtenberg
Marzahn-
Hellersdorf
The unemployment rate
among foreigners in Berlin
is 29.4%, while among
German workers
it is only 1 2%. 2
-
g
Neukölln
Treptow-
Köpenick
The average income of
immigrant workers is 9%
lower than the average
income of Germans
workers. 3
Data:
1 ) https://www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de/produkte/Jahrbuch/BE_Kap_201 4.asp (Accessed
21 /07/1 5)
2) http://www.integrationsmonitoring-laender.de/tabellen (Accessed 27/07/1 6)
3) https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online (Accessed 21 /07/1 5).
Younes Rifaad, Erasmus exchange student from Vrije Universiteit Brussel, BA in Sociology, 3rd year
4
Immigration
Asylum seekers in Germany,
where do they come from?
Although the German international policy is
usually well scrutinized, the changes in the
German asylum policy go mostly unnoticed –
even though Germany is the most popular
country among asylum seekers in Europe. In
201 4, Germany received 202,000 demands for
asylum in comparison to France, the second
economy in Europe, which received 64,000.
In 201 5, the German government is expecting
a drastic rise of the number of demands, up to
400,000. In the circumstances, every
modification in the policies can have a huge
impact on a large amount of people around
the world.
In 201 4, the countries of former Yugoslavia
counted 1 5% of all the asylum demands in
Germany. Even though a seeker from Kosovo
only had 1 .5% chances to see his case granted
by the government, Angela Merkel’s government
proceeded in a policy change with the
effect of cutting down those chances to 0%.
This change of interpretation in the asylum
pro-cedure, which stipulates that poverty itself
is not a reason to seek for asylum, concerned
more than 1 0,000 persons in Kosovo alone.
Without surprise, the majority of the demands
come from regions of the world confronted
with war or civil war. It is for Syrians that the rise
of the demands has been the most drastic in
the last few years. In 201 3, about 1 0,000 Syrians
were seeking asylum in Germany. A year later,
the number had risen up to reach more than
50,000 demands. Afghanistan, Irak and Pakistan
are the three countries that followed Syria
in the number of demands.
Yoann D. Vincent, Erasmus exchange student
Asylum seekers: official
responses and original initiatives
The increase of asylum applicants in Berlin
sets the question of the limits of the city's
accommodations policies for migrants.
Original responses can be found among
citizens who offer the migrants a better living.
Germany’s authorities expect to receive around
400,000 applications for asylum during the year
201 5. That amount has doubled in only one
year, with the arrival of 35,000 Syrians fleeing
war for the only five first months of 201 5.
This increase has led the government to vote
the new Safe State of Origin Act that limits the
official recognition of political refugees to
migrants whose lives would be threatened in
their home country. This law appears as an
evident response to the arrival of 35,000
Serbians and Albanians in the beginning of
201 5. The federal government expects the
Land of Berlin to offer accommodations to at
least 5% of the asylum seekers in Germany.
However, the eleven centers for asylum
seekers in the city are already full, and the
amount of asylum applicants there is around
1 7,400. In order to respond to this situation of
emergency, the Senate of Berlin has implemented
new policies to find accommodations
for the applicants.
5
Immigration
For the families with young children, some flats
have been proposed in the east of Berlin, and
new temporary centers have been opened in
the same area. But this cohabitation between
migrants and original inhabitants is not as easy
everywhere as it is in the neighbourhoods of
Kreuzberg or Friedrichshain where many
“Refugee welcome” signs are written on the
walls. The arrival in the less economically
favored neighbourhoods of the city has been
used by extreme-right movements that play on
the fear of criminality among the inhabitants.
of emergencies for the next years. Now it has
to be determined how the NGOs and the
public can work together to end this situation
of dealing with emergencies every day by
finding ways for the migrants to live in less
precarious situations. Original initiatives can
be found on the internet: The “Give
something back to Berlin” initiative proposes,
for instance, to meet with the asylum seekers
by volunteering as English or German
teachers, sport companions or law advisers for
some hours per week. Another example is the
This is why the senate of Berlin works with
non-governmental organizations in order to
inform and communicate with the most reluctant
Berliners, whereas German courses are
offered to the youngest migrants in the aim of
helping them integrate and participate in the
city‘s economic life.
The work of non-governmental organizations
includes also the mobilization of the press
during demonstrations to push the authorities
to allocate more resources to cope with the
increase of asylum procedure applicants. This
political activism can enter in conflict with the
police force when it comes to the question of
migrants‘ expulsion from inhabited facilities
that are very common in Berlin. Indeed all the
data given by the NGOs and the Senate of
Berlin converge in predicting a continuous
increase of the arrival of migrants in situations
recent “Flüchtlinge willkommen” website that
proposes to combine flat sharing and helping
refugees by offering a room to a migrant,
financed by crowdfunding. The senate of Berlin
has offered to pay a part of the rent.
These last examples prove that the situation of
the refugees is not just an administrative issue,
but the concern of all of those living in the
same city, as it is a part of their duty as a citizen
to get in contact with the migrants in order to
live better together.
Data:
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge,
statistics from 201 3, 201 4 and 201 5
François Malgorn ,
Erasmus exchange student
from Sciences Po Lille, France.
6
Immigration
The daily road and life of
refugees in Berlin
Facts about refugees in Berlin
Berlin takes 5% of the total refugee population
coming to Germany. Nowadays about 3.5
million people live in Berlin. Refugees make up
less than 1 % of the total population of the city.
On the 8th of January, 201 5, according to the
statistics of the Berliner accommodation
headquarters (Statistik der Berliner Unterbringungsleitstelle),
1 3,580 refugees were living in
Berlin in 57 different accommodations. Since
the summer 201 4, 1 3 new installations have
opened and the global welcome capacity has
reached 3,750 new places. The 1 3,500 places in
accommodation and the further places in the
two airport halls and sport halls are not sufficient
anymore.
Selected interview with a refugee
met in a Lager
Name: Muhammad A.
Age: 24
Gender: Male
Nationality: Syrian
Place of living in Berlin: First in a sport hall
of the “Freie Universität” in Dahlem, now
in a small apartment in Berlin-Friedenau
thanks to German friends. His friends from
Syria are still are still living in “Lagern” in
Spandau or Lichtenberg.
Reasons for immigration: War and poverty
Description of everyday situation: Asylum
seek was not granted yet and, waiting
everyday for an answer. Constantly having
to arrange with the German authorities:
registration, insurance issues…
Future perspective: Wants to settle in
Germany and find a job.
What happens to refugees coming to Berlin?
Refugees arriving in Berlin have to register and
apply for asylum at the “LaGeSo” – central
service facility for asylum seekers – located at
Turmstraße in Moabit. The German Federal
Office for Migrants and Refugees first has to
verify that the person has not entered or
already seeked asylum in another country of
the Schengen area, because in these cases the
person can be sent back to the country where
he/she has entered or seeked asylum. An
asylum seeker has to prove that his/her
demand is justified and that he/she is
persecuted in his/her own country of origin
and provide tangible proofs.
The asylum seeker is then accommodated in a
special center. These centers, or “Lager”, are
located all over Berlin, but most of them are
situated at the periphery of the city. Some of
the “refugee villages” can welcome several
hundreds of people. These villages are
composed of containers disposed in a
pragmatic way. When the refugees arrive in
these villages, they are divided by religion and
language. Rooms can accommodate two beds,
two cupboards, two chairs, a table and a
fridge. Every family gets a room on their own,
but often people who do not know each other
have to share one. Essential needs like clothing
and food are provided there.
Concerning work, asylum seekers have very
strict rules to follow: In Germany, they cannot
work within the 1 2 first months of their stay.
After that, they have to ask for a special
authorisation which is hard to obtain. The
money granted to refugees is determined by
the law fixing services granted to refugees.
Accordingly, households receive 362 euros per
month. Refugees receive health and medical
care only in urgent cases.
7
Immigration/Integration
Selected interview with a refugee
met at Orianenplatz
Name: Damba (changed by editors)
Age: 35
Gender: Male
Nationality: Uganda
Place of living in Berlin: Neukölln
Reasons for immigration: His strong belief
in the freedom of movement of people,
the limited freedom of expression in
Uganda - he was put in jail for publically
speaking out against corruption. His
bisexuality was an additional factor why he
felt rejected in his country.
Immigration background: Arrived by plane
to Berlin, ended up in a “Lager” in Passau
and felt that his freedom was restricted
again. He asked the German state for
asylum. After one year and 3 months, his
case was rejected. Without papers and no
possibility to move around, he decided to
give up the legal frame and to become
politically active.
Everyday situation: A lot of stress. No
identity, no real consideration, no useful
occupation. Life in the “Lager” is eating,
sleeping, interacting with other refugees,
repeat. Also, every day is a threat of
deportation. Once a week the police take
people to send them back to their country.
Future perspective: Continue struggling,
especially against the “Lager”.
Data:
1 ) fluechtlingshilfe.berlin/informationen-zu-fluechtlingenin-berlin/
2) berlin.de/sen/gessoz/presse/pressemitteilungen/201 5/
pressemitteilung.249458.php (accessed on 23.07.201 5)
3) berlin.de/sen/gessoz/presse/pressemitteilungen/201 5/
pressemitteilung.249458.php (accessed on 22.07.201 5)
4) bamf.de/DE/Infothek/Statistiken/statistiken-node.html
(accessed on 24.07.201 5)
5) lejournalinternational.fr/Allemagne%C2%A0-pas-dedroits-pour-les-refugies_a1
349.html (accessed on
28.07.201 5)
6) dw.com/fr/lasile-un-droit-bien-difficile-à-obtenir/a-
1 5538924 (accessed on 25.07.201 5)
Nathalie Tric, Erasmus exchange student
Are Berliners friendly?
A survey on discrimination
The German Capital is known for housing a
large amount of immigrants. The Turkish
community is the most well known one, but
there are people coming from all around the
globe. That is why it is important to know
how natives react to the newcomers, and if
these newcomers feel welcomed by society.
A very usual comment or thought is “Berliners
are not friendly, hard to say if this is because of
my background or just their way of relating to
the world.” But, is this true? How do foreigners
think in general of the city? In order to shed
some light on this topic, an online survey was
conducted.
Two main questions were answered by 243
people from 67 different countries (or with
migratory background), with the purpose of
finding out if immigrants feel discriminated
against. Discrimination can be understood as a
negative or different behavior towards an
individual because he or she belongs to a
certain group.
The results show that 61 percent of the
respondents think that Berliners are somewhat
respectful and friendly towards immigrants,
and 24.5 percent believe that they are very
respectful and friendly towards immigrants.
When the results are observed by country of
origin or citizenship, there is no big variation.
In general, it is possible to say foreigners have
a positive view of Berlin’s community regardless
of their origin. However, almost one third
8
Integration
of the respondents have been subject of verbal
attack or insults. Those respondents perceive
Berlin as less immigrant friendly.
Some qualitative information suggests that
immigrants that have been attacked are not
always certain that the attack had racist
or discriminatory reasons.
Sometimes attacks are
gender related or aimed at
an indiscriminate audience,
gathering Germans and
foreigners.
Data:1 0 question online
survey conducted on July
21 st and 22nd, 201 5.
Itzel Rangel Romero,
exchange student from
Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas,
México, 4th year BA in
Political Science and
International Relations
Integration on a “first-come,
first-served” basis
The integration and German courses offered
by the Volkshochschule (VHS) of Berlin-Mitte
have proved their effectiveness, but the resources
are so limited that they can only be provided
to a minority of the concerned migrants.
It is everybody’s interest to do everything so
that the refugees “integrate fast into the job
market”, declared the head of the Employer’s
Confederation Ingo Kramer in June 201 5. This
is exactly what the biggest VHS of Berlin offers
to any new-comer in the district of Mitte: “We
help them to learn German as much as
possible and to qualify with German skills to
find a job more easily”, explains Jens Höft,
from the Information Office for Integration and
German courses.
The program is meant as a “sponsorship” of
the German state for the asylum seekers,
worker migrants and their families, beneficiaries
of social benefits and any person
willing to improve their German skills. Migrants
are sent to their district’s VHS, which offer just
like any other VHS in Germany 600 hours of
language courses from levels A1 to C2 and 60
hours of orientation classes, as well as a
recognized evaluation for the sum of 1 .20
euros a lesson.
Besides the price, another advantage of the
classes is the diversity of the offer. The VHS of
Mitte also provides alphabetisation courses,
courses for parents with children in kindergarten
and primary school pupils of Mitte, joboriented
courses for 1 8 to 26-year old workers,
a focus on language and health, a discovery of
art and museum, and special classes for Turkish
women to help them with their everyday life.
The courses are desgined for helping the
migrant populations of the district integrate.
The program of the VHS is cheaper, better
organized and offers more opportunities and
9
Integration
recognized skills than the private schools that
do not offer any class for less than 5 euros a
lesson. Jens Höft points out that the VHS
program is “much cheaper and allows you to
get examinations for free, and if you finish the
B1 level within two years, you can have another
have a much higher unemploy-
ment rate than native German inhabitants of
Berlin (1 5% against 26%) and are also underrepresented
in professional formations. On the
other hand, the 2,850 asylum seekers who
arrived to Berlin only in the month of June
201 5 are very likely to need these integration
courses.
sponsorship in
you get half of the
money back”.
which
The various courses
provided by the
VHS program largely explain
its succes. The classes are particularly popular
among young workers up to 35 years old.
According to Jens Höft, the VHS-program
“cares about those who are building up their
lives here, who are in the construction of their
life situation, who have learned a job in a
foreign country and try to work here in their
profession” – but the VHS-Mitte also welcomes
elderly students up to 80 years old this year.
“We are teaching here and in
every of our buildings from 8:30
to 22:00, sometimes with two or
three classes in one room right
after another.”
Höft. This also affects the recruitment of new
students, because the program does not need
any other advertisement than a word-of-mouth
recommendation to fill its classes.
The saturation of the integration and German
courses at the VHS of
Mitte have to be
considered in a
context in which
the non-German
inhabitants of Berlin
As a result, all the courses for the coming
semester were already booked three months in
advance. The VHS of Mitte is slightly bigger
than the one in Neukölln and organizes classes
for 2,000 students, but has reached its full
capacity regarding the range of opening hour,
the number of teachers, the available space in
the building and its budget.
Courses with 20 to 22 students are running from
8:30 to 22:00 without interruption every day,
which makes a total of 50,000 lessons a year. At
the same time the VHS-Mitte also finds itself to
be the only suitable option for many migrants
from different places in Berlin. Students from
other districts, such as Pankow, have applied
for classes in VHS of Mitte as well due to the
lack of lessons available in their neighborhood.
As a reaction to this situation, the VHS of Mitte
uses a “first-come, first-served” policy to attribute
the free places, but refuses to choose
which migrant should have the priority, except
for the ones sent by the state: “If somebody is
here, standing in front of our door and asking
to have a place for the next three months, I
only ask him what I can offer him”, says Jens
Note:
Volkshochschule (VHS) is a community college
Data:
1 ) „Mitteldeutsche Zietung“ article „Wirtschaft will
Flüchtlinge schneller in Jobs bringen“ on June 1 5th
201 5, Ingo Kramer declares that it is everybody’s
interest everything to do so that the refugees „zügig
in den Arbeitsmarkt integrieren können“
2) In-depth interview with Jens Höft in charge of the
information office for the Integration and German
course at the Volkshochschule Mitte on the 21 th
June 201 5
3) Department of Statistic in Berlin-Brandenburg on
December 31 th 201 4
4) Department of Statistic in Berlin-Brandenburg on
December 31 th 201 4. Non-German inhabitants of
Berlin represent 4,9% of the people taking part in
professional formation but 1 4% of the inhabitants
5) Berliner Morgenpost: „Im Juni kamen mehr als
2800 Flüchtlinge nach Berlin“, June 9th 201 5
Marie Belland,
Erasmus exchange student
from Sciences Po Toulouse, France.
1 0
Integration
Voices no one hears –
who is entitled to be heard?
People who are not in possession of a
national status need to be given a voice. In
Berlin, one million people lack access to
institutionalized channels to articulate their
needs.
In times of global migration flows caused by
war, terror and environmental disasters, but
also due to global market movements, it
seems strange that even in big democracies
like Germany there are no institutionalized
channels for giving a voice to people without a
registered national status.
Taking Berlin as an example, where 1 2,000
refugees came in 201 4 (around twice as much
as in 201 3), the process of treating the
application for asylum still takes 6 months.
1
There are half a million people living in Berlin
who are not in possession of the German
citizenship, all different kinds of migrants. This
means that almost every sevenths person in
Berlin does not have the right to vote 2 (in
national elections - citizens of the EU have the
right to vote in local and European elections).
To become a German citizen, one still has to
live in Germany for at least six years 3 . During
this period, people are not political subjects.
But even more substantial is the fact that these
people have no voice in order to reach out to
the public and get political attention and
get their needs heard.
A striking example for the lack of this kind of
representation is the protest of refugees in
201 4 living in a school in Berlin-Kreuzberg. In
order to make people listen to their needs,
they finally had to choose hunger strike and
threat to suicide.
In order to cope with the democratic deficit, in
2009, an initiative called “gib mir eine stimme”
connected people willing to yield their second
vote for the German national election to a
person without the right to vote, but who had
lived in Germany for at least three years 4 .
To overcome this situation there is the need for
a deep debate over the question of whether
the link between political participation and
citizenship as it is established in existing
nation-states is still up to date when millions of
immigrants are excluded from participation in
elections.
Data:
1 ) http://www.berlin.de/aktuelles/berlin/3826056-958092-
zahl-der-fluechtlinge-im-1 -vierteljahr-v.html)
2) https://www.statistik-berlinbrandenburg.de/publikationen/Stat_Berichte/201
5/SB_A0
1 -05-00_201 4h02_BE.pdf)
3) http://www.einbuergerungstest.biz/sonderregelungen/
sonderregelung-fluechtlinge)
4) http://www.gib-mir-eine-stimme.de/infos.php?page=1 )
Chart:
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bev
oelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendBevoelkerung20
1 02001 47004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
https://www.statistik-berlinbrandenburg.de/publikationen/Stat_Berichte/201
5/SB_A0
1 -05-00_201 4h02_BE.pdf
Anna Stockmar,
BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
1 1
Integration
Second-generation immigrant
cinema: representations of women
The voiceless female immigrant popular in
immigrant cinema during the 70s and 80s is
out-dated for second-generation immigrant
film directors who undermine the onedimensional
stereotypes of females to
provide a realistic representation of life.
Aysum Bademsoy addresses issues of female
victimisation in her documentary Ehre (201 1 ).
Bademsoy examines the notion of honour in
relation to honour killings within the context of
patriarchal systems that are present both
socially and institutionally in modern day
German cinema during the
1 970s and 80s saw the
burgeoning of a new kind of
cinema, one focused on the
outskirts of German society and
the migrants who lived in these
margins. These new narratives
were characterised by what
Burns (2007) calls “the cinema
of the affected” in which
migrants were portrayed as
exploited, uneducated victims
in a space between two cultures
that were mutually exclusive
(Burns, 2007).
The 1 990s saw the development of a new form
of immigrant cinema that rejected the Turkish
patriarch and his victimised and obedient wife
or daughter. Fatih Akin, Aysun Bademsoy and
Serap Berrakkarasu, as second-generation
immigrant directors, follow narratives that
explore exclusion and integration for women.
The three directors attempt to unravel the
conflation of Turkish culture, patriarchy and
feminism. Their portrayal of integrated secondgeneration
females aims to shift expectations
of victimisation and move away from the idea
of absolute otherness. Akin, Bademsoy and
Berrakkarasu convey that the ethnic background
of female immigrants does not present
as the biggest issue or central theme in
migrant cinema as was common in the preunification
era. Rather they present a realistic
representation of integration through narratives
that ultimately celebrate cultural hybridity.
“Wir haben hier viel gefunden, aber unser Verlust ist auch sehr groß...!”
(Seriban in Töchter zweier Welten, 1 990)
Germany. Furthermore she explores cultural
codes that are often simplified within film to
challenge the polarization that occurs around
the issue of honor killings, a sight that typically
symbolizes failed integration.
The documentary provides a juxtaposition
between a group of young male, thirdgeneration
immigrants who are involved in
anti-violence training and the institutional
actors such as police officers, lawyers and
program staff who work with them, all
coincidentally male. For the young men,
honour is contingent to the protection and
behavior of female family members and central
to their identity. However, the documentary
does not feature any women, and Bademsoy
does this “to capture [the] absence that these
women have left behind” (Bademsoy in
Naiboglu, 201 4). Bademsoy adopts and then
hyperbolizes the stereotype of the silent
female by absolutely excluding her. She shows
1 2
Integration
that in both the setting of the young men and
the institutional state systems, reproductions of
patriarchy and masculinity are evident
(Naiboglu, 201 4). Ehre (201 1 ) articulates that
patriarchy is not simply an immigrant problem.
so represents a conscious shift away from the
“cinema of the affected”.
For Bademsoy, Berrakarsu and Akin, the
voiceless female of the 70’s and 80’s has
become a representation to adopt, recreate
Serap Berrakkasu strived for a similar objective and reject. Bademsoy entirely excludes
two decades earlier, focusing almost exclusively females in order to draw attention to their
on what Bademsoy victimization within conliberal
Germany. Berra-
chose to leave absent. “today we no longer tell servative patriarchal
In Töchter zweier our stories from the margins, structures operating in
Welten (1 990), Berraranged
marriage, spou-
form for both young and
but from the center of society”
karasu explores ar- (Akin in Der Spiegel, 2007)” karasu provides a plat-
sal abuse and gene-
old generations to begin a
rational change through focusing on Meral, an
empowered young German-Turkish woman
and her conservative Turkish mother Seriban.
Berrakarasu underscores that parents are also
subject to their own upbringing and the
narrative emphasises that tradition and
socialization play important roles in generational
change and integration. Meral is not a
victim and although she must contend with the
conservatism of her parents, this does not
define her. The film looks at the reality of
hybridity and spaces of confrontation and
reconciliation, localising these issues by
conveying them through the broken relationship
of a mother and her daughter.
Gegen die Wand (2004) is a fictional film by
Fatih Akin that brings together the
experiences that Berrakarasu and Bademsoy
documented. The fictional drama challenges
and complicates the stereotype of the
oppressed woman through the empowered
and rebellious protagonist Sybel, an integrated
second-generation immigrant. For Sybel, life is
not simply a complication of family patriarchy
and honour and her identity is flexible to the
point of defying categorization. Throughout
the film, Sybel is positioned as the deviant and
sexually liberated female as well as the good
and rational woman and mother. This shifting
and imperfect representation is important as it
rejects the silent female that is victim to a
controlling patriarchal system. Akin presents a
modern and realistic narrative of immigrant life
in modern Germany for women and in doing
1 3
conversation around understanding difference
and reconciling the following conflict that
emerges. Akin brings these issues together
and further complicates the portrayal of
tradition and patriarchy in a modern German
context. The three directors respectively
explore spaces of confrontation for female
immigrants to counter the stereotype of the
voiceless female that emerged in the 70’s and
80’s with the conflation of Turkish culture,
patriarchy and feminism. Subsequently the
audience is provided with a nuanced and
complex portrayal of who female immigrants
are and what they experience in generational
change within two cultures in Germany.
Bibliography:
Burns, R. (2007). Turkish German Filmakers and Alterity.
Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe,
1 5(1 ), 3-24
Beier, L-O., Matussek, M. (2007, September 28). Spiegel
Interview with Director Fatih Akin: From Istanbul to New
York. Spiegel.de. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/spiegelinterview-with-director-fatih-akin-from-istanbul-to-newyork-a-508521
.html
Naiboglu, G. (201 4). A room to breathe between the
images: an interview with Aysun Bademsoy. Studies in
European Cinema, 1 1 (2), 1 06-1 1 5
Naiboglu, G. (201 4). Beyond representation: The ethics
and aesthetics of change in Turkish German cinema after
reunification (upublished doctoral thesis). The University of
Manchester, Manchester, England.
Lucinda Sheedy-Reinhard,
Exchange student in Social Sciences
from the University of Melbourne
Integration
Dominant identities among
Muslims in Berlin
In a face-to-face survey conducted in Berlin
the Muslim identity prevails above other
identities among people with Islamic
migratory background.
How do migrants feel about their identity? This
question may never be precisely answered, but
the following article may shed some light on
this complex question. A face-to-face survey
was conducted in two neighbourhoods in
Berlin. We chose Wedding and Kreuzberg as
the sites to conduct the survey for its large
share of Muslim migrant residents (Spielhaus/
Färber, 2006).
People with Muslim migratory background in
this article are defined as first or second
generation migrants from countries with a
Muslim majority population. The survey
addressed the identities of the migrants. The
identity of the country
of origin is referring to
the personal country
of origin or the one
which the parents
came from. The “Berliner”
identity was
meant as a selfdefinition
as belonging
to Berlin (Terlouw,
2009). At last the selfdefinitions
as “German”
and as “Muslim”
were evaluated.
The interviews offered
us a narrow window
into the identities and the tendencies of
Muslim migrants in Berlin. With only 35
participants and a short 2 pages questionnaire
the data we collected may not represent the
Muslim population in Berlin and in Germany as
a whole to a very precise level, but can be
used to prepare future researches and studies.
Since the country of birth was one of our first
questions, the participants are easily dividable
into first and second generation migrants. The
participants were asked about their religious
orientation as well, and the interview was
proceeded till the end only in the case when
participants had a migratory background of
countries with a Muslim majority. The frequency
of mosque visits was addressed in one
of the questions as well.
The identities described above were evaluated
on a scale of 1 –1 0. The demographic data
reveals that most of our participants live in the
areas closest to where the survey was
conducted. The average age of the first
generation migrants with 44.3 was significantly
higher than the 27.3 among second
generation immigrants.
When considering mosque
visits we find almost no
significant differences between
first and secondgeneration
immigrants
with the exception that
second-generation migrants
have a doubled
percentage of visiting the
mosque “only on special
occasions” with 21 .4 for
second generation and
only 9.5 percent for
first-generation migrants.
In the general population
86.1 percent agreed
to the statement: “I feel German”. Amongst
people with migratory background this number
is, with 76.5 percent, not much different
(Foroutan et al, 201 4 p. 25). In our results the
“German” identity is the weakest among the
four with an average score of 5.4 out of 1 0.
Dominant identities
1 4
Integration/Social movements
The old nationality of the migrants amounts to
an average of 6. The local or “Berliner” identity
is 7.4 points on average and the “Muslim”
identity dominates the charts with 8.1 7
point in average.
To the question “How often do you visit the
mosque?” a third replied with the option
“Once a week”. Second-generation migrants
in our study visit the mosque “on special
occasions” more than any other group (28.5%).
21 .4 percent of second-generation migrants
never visit the mosque while this percentage
among the first-generation is as high as 38
percent. Roughly a third in total never visits the
mosque.
Within our capacities of data gathering the
validity of the data is neither absolute nor
decisive but rather an invitation to investigate
more. The questions about identities leave
room for additional topics and comparison
factors. It may be valuable for example in a
similar research add a European identity to the
set of questions, as well as a possible “Global
citizen” identity. The religious identity is clearly
the dominant one in our data set, though it
does lose its high position among those who
rarely attend the mosque in favor of their
“Berliner” identity. These conclusions lead to a
possibly more interesting set of questions
about the understanding of Islamic values and
their interpretation by people with a Muslim
migratory background. More research is needed
in the field of Muslim identities among
migrants and the question whether they
reduce other forms of identities or coexist with
them.
Data: The interviews were conducted on
thursday, 9/7/201 5 in Wedding district from
1 1 :00 till 1 3:00 and on thursday, 1 6/7/201 5 in
Kreuzberg district.
Bibliography:
Fleischmann, F. & Phalet, K. (201 1 ): Published online:
Integration and religiosity among the Turkish second
generation in Europe: a comparative analysis across four
capital cities, Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 35 No. 2
February 201 2 pp. 320341
Foroutan, N. et al (201 4): Deutschland postmigrantisch I:
Gesellschaft, Religion, Identität. Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin
Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2004): Sacred and Secular:
Religion and Politics Worldwide, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Spielhaus, R. & Färber, A. (2006 ): Islamisches
Gemeindeleben in Berlin, Der Beauftragte des Senats von
Berlin für Integration und Migration, Berlin
Terlouw, K. (2009): Rescaling Regional Identities:
Communicating Thick and Thin Regional Identities Studies
in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 9, No. 3
Ilya Sogolov,
4th semester BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
The rise of the PEGIDA
movement
For a few months now, Germany has been
witnessing the rise of the movement PEGIDA.
This article discusses its origins and claims, as
well as the impact of the movement on the
population.
On the 1 5th of January 2005, Manfred Rhous
created the movement “Pro Deutschland”.
The movement is said to be an independent
political organization “which fights to preserve
the occidental trait of Germany”. Two years
later, “Pro Berlin” (the Berlin group of “Pro
Deutschland”) sets up a petition against the
accession of Turkey to the EU. The same year,
some groups come together to show their
disagreement with Berlin’s project of building a
mosque in Charlottenburg. In 2006, a similar
debate rises up concerning the project of
building of a mosque in Pankow-Heinersdorf.
An important detractor, the CDU-politician
1 5
Social movements
René Stadtkewitz, explains his opposition arguing
that building a mosque is against the
rule of integration, because while a person can
be integrated, a religion cannot, especially not
Islam in a Christian country such as Germany.
The rise of PEGIDA
Thus anti-Islamism is not a new phenomenon
in Germany and this context allowed for the
creation and the expansion of PEGIDA. This
movement, which means “Patriotic Europeans
Against The Islamization of the West”
(German: “Patriotische Europäer Gegen die
Islamisierung Des Abendlandes”) was created
on October 20th, 201 4 in Dresden with a
Monday-demonstration and 500 persons were
present on the first demonstration. Quickly,
this movement took off and 1 0,000 persons
marched on the PEGIDA-demonstration in
Dresden in early December 201 4.
Charlie Hebdo attack
After the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris on
January 7th, 201 5, PEGIDA and other anti-
Islam movements throughout Europe used this
events to “prove” their arguments were valid.
On January 1 2th, 201 5 there were 25,000
persons in Dresden and 200 in Oslo. In Prague,
there were 600 persons and in Vienna, 400. It
looked as if PEGIDA’s influence was rising fast.
The exploitation of the fear after the terror
attack did not help the government to calm
down the rise of the movement. In Angela
Merkel’s New Year Speech she had denounced
PEGIDA’s slogan “We are the people” by
saying “[they] are the people!” – even though
in the eyes of PEGIDA migrants might not fit
their idea of the people of Germany. In
January, the chancellor repeated that “Islam
belongs to Germany” and that she is the
chancellor of all Germans, no matter where
they come from. Thomas de Maizière reacted
as well and declared that the fact that PEGIDA
used this shattering event to promote its ideas
proved it was “shabby” and “infamous”.
Germans’ opinion
The most alarming fact in the rise of PEGIDA is
the opinion of the general population in
Germany. One out of two Germans understands
PEGIDA and its claims; three out of four
Germans fear an islamization of Germany.
While 25% of the population disagree with the
idea of diversity because of their belief in a
homogeneous culture, a vast majority of the
population overestimates the rate of Muslims
in Germany, as they represent only 5% of the
population .
Before/After ”Licht aus für Rassisten”
Anti-PEGIDA movements
Like in other cities such as Cologne (KöGiDa)
and Leipzig (LeGiDa), Berlin created its own
PEGIDA movement called BärGiDa. On the
first days of January 201 5, to oppose the
demonstration of KöGiDa and demonstrate its
opposition to anti-Islam movements in
Cologne, the Cathedral’s lights were turned
off. Berlin followed this idea and turned off the
lights of Brandenburg Gate, creating the
movement “Licht aus für Rassisten”. But if the
movements of PEGIDA and all of its local
groups rise, the anti-PEGIDA movements are
important as well. In January 201 5, in
1 6
Social movements
Dresden, 1 8,000 people were demonstrating
for a cosmopolitan society in Germany. In
Berlin, the figures are not as impressive and yet
relevant: 5,000 people were demonstrating
against the 300 militants of BärGiDa. Until
today, BärGida continues to demonstrate on
Mondays – with anti-movements there to oppose
them.
Data: Newspaper articles
Image: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia
/commons/2/2f/Berlin_schaltet_Pegida_das_Li
cht_aus.jpg
Léone Garnier,
Erasmus exchange student in Geography
from the University of Rennes 2, France
Local newspaper reporting on
refugee activism – the case of
Ohlauer Straße
As the difficult negotiations between activists
and politicians proceed, the attention of the
media expands, as does the strength of
opinion: The anger at politicians from all sides
and levels grows. Federal German as well as
EU laws and politics are no exception. The
activists’ methods are framed ambiguously.
On December 8th, 201 2, a group of refugees
from Africa and their supporters occupy an
emtpy school building in Ohlauer Straße/
Reichenberger Straße, Kreuzberg. They had
walked to the German capital from the south
of Germany in the fall, protested for weeks in
camps at the famous Oranienplatz and in front
of the Brandenburg Gate. The refugee activists
demand guaranteed asylum for all, the
abolition of residential obligation, the rights to
free housing choice, acces to health care, the
labour market and education.
The district, governed by the leftist green
party, lets them stay in the school – initially
until the end of the extremely cold winter. But
the occupation of the public building endures,
more and more people move in. Then, on June
24th, 201 4, the largest part of the residents is
moved to asylum seeker residencies in other
parts of the city. But some 40-80 occupiers
remain in the building, threatening to jump off
the roof in case of an eviction. For a week, a
daily police force of 1 ,800 officers restrict the
passage to a large area around the school for
residents only – passersby, tourists, and
journalists are kept outside.
While the local politicians keep trying to
convince the occupiers to move out, a game of
political profiling begins between the CDU-led
Department of Interior and Sport, Kreuzberg’s
green government, and its leftist local
opposition. Meanwhile, the solidarity with the
occupiers grows, as shown in demonstrations
or online, not only among Kreuzberg’s liberal
residents, but also Berlin-wide, nation-wide,
even internationally.
Three local daily newspapers report differently
How is this development reflected in the
media? For examplifying purposes, the
reporting of the three biggest local daily
newspapers, Berliner Morgenpost, Berliner
Zeitung and Tagesspiegel, was analysed in
terms of their mentions of specific issues. A
neutral mention did count, because the other
newspapers sometimes decided not to
mention the topic at all. A negative mention
means, the newspaper writes about an issue or
actor in a criticising way. A positive mention
means that the journalist uses positive words
to describe, or assesses an issue or action as
legitimate or correct.
1 7
Social movements
The main finding is that the attention grows
over time: The articles reporting on the
occupation in December are mainly neutral
news pieces, a reportage in the Tagesspiegel
highlights the cold and the snow that make the
protesting difficult. The Berliner Morgenpost
speculates on the refugees‘ supporters
being related to the
correctly and provide safety. The Berliner
Zeitung acknowledges that they are not
responsible but “forced“ to “undemocratic“
action due to the politicians’ inactivity. The
Tagesspiegel dedicates a whole article on the
incomprehension of the residents who say the
police resemble “paramilitary forces“.
extreme-left wing [The refugees] don’t differentiate
Antifa. The Berliner between municipality and federal state,
Zeitung portrays between Germany and Europe.
them as “arrogant“,
“uncoope-
the competences of a district. [...]
They don’t know about EU laws and
rative“ with the
We will have to bend the law to give
police and “unable
these people a minimum of humanity.
to cope“ after an
(S. Fehrle, chief editor of Berliner Zeitung,
incident in late De-
1 /7/1 4, on the „moral right to asylum“)
cember when two residents
are stabbed with a
knife in the kitchen of the school. The Tagesspiegel
focuses on the peaceful and wide
support of the refugee protests among the
Kreuzberg residents.
Attention is bigger when a symbol for
protest is attacked
One and a half years later, the occupied
Gerhart-Hauptmann-Schule has become a
symbol for refugee protest and activism, as
well as the “home“ (Berliner Zeitung) for its
residents. The media attention and style of
reporting following the first clearing of the
building is similar to that following the
occupation: Mostly neutral; some sceptical
mentions of the big police presence – “how
voluntary was the moving out really if 900
policemen were needed?“. Berliner Zeitung
and Berliner Morgenpost mention the
“catastrophic hygiene situation“ of the school
(it had one shower for about 200 residents).
Some of the supporters are hard-core activists
and “try to prevent a peaceful solution“
(Berliner Zeitung).
But then, the last occupiers remained on the
roof. Down in the streets the massive police
security annoyed residents and shop owners,
but also journalists who felt the freedom of the
press being violated. Only the Berliner
Morgenpost finds that the police do their work
Political struggle
reflected in the
reporting
The occupiers
want asylum
which the dis-
trict administration
cannot
give them and
the CDU-led Senate
does not want to
give them. Opinion differs whether the Senate
should stay strong against “blackmail“
(Tagesspiegel) or whether the refugees have a
“moral right to asylum“ because they have
been treated dishonestly by everyone (Berliner
Zeitung); whether the occupation was
illigitimate and blackmail (Berliner Morgenpost)
or whether human dignitiy cannot be
extorted, because it has to be guaranteed to
everyone by a social democracy such as
Germany (Berliner Zeitung).
The newspapers agree in one aspect: Local
politicians should know their limits, activists
should not use refugees for their purposes.
Tagesspiegel and Berliner Zeitung connect the
powerlessness of the municipalities with the
EU border countries – in the end, German
federal laws and EU agreements can be made
responsible for such dramas.
Data:
Original newspaper articles related to refugees’
occupation of the Gerhart-Hauptmann-Schule in
Kreuzberg, taken from online archives (Berliner Zeitung,
Tagesspiegel) and from LexisNexis (Berliner Morgenpost),
between December 8, 201 2 and December 29, 201 2 as
well as June 24, 201 4 and July 1 5, 201 4.
Jondis Luise Schwartzkopff,
4th semester BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
1 8
Social movements
“Die Toten kommen” – the
politicization of illegal immigration
On Sunday June the 21 st, 201 5, at the corner
of Charlottenstraße and Unter den Linden, a
crowd of people gathered, most of them
wearing black clothes and holding makeshift
wooden crosses. This demonstration, called
“Die Toten kommen” (“The dead are coming”)
and organised by the “Zentrum Für Politische
Schönheit” (Center for Political Beauty) 1 , took
the form of a protest march through the heart
of the German capital.
The aim of the protest
was to create a
fake cemetery on the
lawn in front of the
chancellery. For a
few years now, more
and more immigrants
(mostly from
Africa and the
Middle East) have
died trying to reach
the coasts of Europe,
with the hope of
finding a better life.
In 201 5 we reached macabre records; in six
months more than 1 ,800 people have drowned
in the Mediterranean Sea. The European Union
is overwhelmed by this situation and tries to
close the borders in order to stop this massive
flux (in the first semester of 201 4, it has been
estimated that more than 21 6,300 people have
started a procedure in order to receive the
status of refugee in the 28 member states) 2 .
These new immigration policies are disputed
in the whole of the EU and the protest against
them takes different forms. The one organised
by the Zentrum für Politische Schönheit, which
qualifies itself as “an assault team that
establishes moral beauty, political poetry and
human greatness while aiming to preserve
1 9
humanitarianism”, aims to sensitize the civilian
population as well as the politicians by
creating a one-of-a-kind artistic protest and
thus showing the concern and the grief of a
part of the public opinion.
The objective of this paper is to highlight how
the issue of illegal immigration in Europe is
politicized in Berlin. By doing this, I concentrate
myself on
the way a social
movement illustrates
the concern
of a part of the population
about the
“immigration issue”.
More precisely, we
will see to what
extent this demonstration
represents
the interest of a part
of the Berliner public
opinion on the
issue of immigration
in the European
Union; we will show first that it is a civilian
political movement, and then how this
movement disagrees with the governmental
and European policies.
A symbolic wooden cross buried in front of
the German Parliament (Credit: Elena Guyader)
By creating a huge false cemetery (it has been
estimated that there were almost a hundred
graves, together with flowers and candles
planted on the lawn) 3 in front a the German
Parliament and close to Angela Merkel’s office,
the Zentrum für Politische Schönheit tried to
reproduce symbolically the tragedy of the
death of thousands of refugees trying to reach
the coasts of southern Europe. Around 1 0,000
people attended this event (the police
estimate around 5,000 participants) 4 whose aim
was to demonstrate that even though the
Social movements/Public opinion
population of Berlin cannot directly influence
European policy in regard of the illegal immigration
issue, they are nonetheless concerned
about what happens and try to alert the rest of
the public as well as showing the politicians
their disagreement with the current immigration
policy.
This demonstration follows a week of different
forms of protest in Berlin; for example on June
1 6th, a Syrian woman, who died on the shores
of Italy trying to escape the atrocities
happening in Syria right now, was buried in
Berlin – the militants came in contact with her
family, who is currently living in Berlin and who
gave their agreement, and organized the trip
from Italy to Berlin as well as the funeral 5 . This
movement has emerged in Berlin and has
spread out all over the continent; it shows how
deeply this part of the population is concerned
about this issue and disagrees with the current
policies.
Indeed, one of the most important aims of this
demonstration was to criticize the current
German and European politics concerning the
illegal immigration issue. According to the
manifestants, the European Union is responsible
for the disaster in the sense that the
richest countries, and especially Germany, do
not give enough opportunities to asylum
seekers to travel safely from their homeland to
Europe, for example by delivering visas. The
placement of the graveyard was at the same
time strategic and symbolic; strategic because
they knew it would bring a lot of attention
doing it on the heart of German politics, and
symbolic because it is one of the places where
the most important decisions concerning European
immigration policies are taken. The
political responses of this demonstration were
prompt; the association of the Left party in the
Bundestag wished to keep the symbolic graves
as a daily reminder of the tragedies until the
European refugees politics change their position
to a more humanistic one 6 .
Data:
1 ) http://www.politicalbeauty.com
2) http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4aae621 d75d.html
3) http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/protestaktion-dietoten-kommen-vor-bundestag-50-demonstranten-beimmarsch-der-entschlossenen-festgenommen/1
1 946694.html
4) http://www.taz.de/Debatte-Zentrum-fuer-Politische-
Schoenheit/!5205803/
5) http://www.nytimes.com/201 5/06/1 7/world/europe/
migrants-funeral-in-berlin-highlights-europes-refugeecrisis.html?_r=0
6) http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/polizei-justiz/dietoten-kommen-linke-graeber-auf-reichstagswiese-alsmahnung-erhalten/1
1 95051 6.html
Carla Böttinger,
BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Public perception of immigration
between 201 2 and 201 4
A content analysis of 1 70 newspaper articles
reveals that the public perception of migration
turned more negative between 201 2
and 201 4, which only partly correlates with
actual migration movements during that time.
The daily glance in the newspapers gives a
good insight into what the public in Berlin is
thinking about. According to the agenda setting
theory, media form the public agenda; not
by “tell[ing] you what to think, but what (…) to
think about” (Davie, 201 0). Especially in times
when political circumstances are shaky, public
perception of migration movements is very
interesting to observe. Is the public afraid of
migrants moving to Berlin or does it rather see
immigration as social enrichment?
When in 201 4 the unrestricted free movement
for workers in the EU came into force for Bul-
20
Public opinion
garia and Romania, its consequences were
widely discussed in Berlin, accompanied by a
lot of media attention. On the other hand
there are countless other reasons for people to
move to Berlin: The financial crisis in 2008 and
its high youth unemployment rates all over
Europe, the global circumstances which force
more and more people to leave their countries
and flee to Germany, or the simple fact of
family unifications for migrants are just some
examples. The question is: How do the media
report on migration? Which of those movements
is perceived the most and in what
manner? Key-words mentioned in headlines of
articles published between 1 2/201 2 and 06/
201 4 suggest that the reporting on migration
in Berlin became more skeptical. Therefore the
question in focus is whether the perception of
migration became more negative within this
period of time and if it correlates with actual
statistical data about people moving to Berlin.
For the research the following hypothesis was
formulated:
H1: The public perception between 12/2012 –
06/2014 became more negative towards
immigration.
Furthermore the results of the content analysis
were compared with statistical data covering
this period of time. 1 76 articles from two local
newspapers between December 201 2 and
June 201 4, which were published with the keywords
“immigration” and “migration”, were
investigated. The articles were put in four time
blocks: A (1 2/201 2 – 01 /201 3); B (05/201 3 –
06/201 3); C (1 2/201 3 – 01 /201 4); D (05/201 4 –
06/201 4). Using MAXQDA 1 1 all articles were
investigated and a word frequency list was
generated. Based on the word frequency list
and a theoretical framework three main
categories and corresponding search items
were defined. The search items helped to
categorize the
articles: Articles
that contained
positive position
towards immigration
(“positive”),
being
“gradualist”, or
“problematizing”
contents.
Less than one
third of the
articles contain
positive position
towards immigration
Overall, the most
prevalent words
were “refugees”,
“work”, “Bulgaria” and “Romania”. Most of
the articles were published in the period
1 2/201 3 – 01 /201 4, and almost 95% of those
were problematizing immigration, especially
poverty migration. In the summer periods
there was always a higher percentage of
positive articles than in the winter period and
in summer 201 3 the percentage of positive
positions was the highest (44,1 2%). Nevertheless
overall not even one third of all articles
contained positive positions towards immigration
and there is not even one article that
contains only positive position towards
immigration.
Between 1 2/201 2 and 06/201 3 the percentage
of positively positioned articles is higher than
21
Public opinion
between 1 2/201 3 and 06/201 4. Furthermore
the percentage of gradualist and negative
articles is higher in the second period of time.
This confirms the hypothesis that the public
perception became more negative.
Negative presentation of migration causes
headlines and could fuel public resentments
Compared to actual statistics two things can
be seen: Firstly, the high percentages of
articles about asylum seekers (48,3% of all
articles) can partly be explained by actual
events in Berlin at that time (e.g. refugee
protest camps). Secondly, the high amount of
problematizing articles about migrants from
Bulgaria and Romania is disproportionate. In
1 2/201 3 – 01 /201 4 more than 70% of all the
articles were about poverty migration in a
critical manner, the actual data however reveals
that between 1 2/201 2 and 06/201 4 the
percentage of Bulgarians living in Berlin barely
increased (0.03%) (Amt für Statistik 201 2, 201 4).
As communication sciences have found out,
negative headlines usually cause more attention
than positive ones (Streber, 201 3). So
according to media logic the growing negativity
in public perception of immigration is
reasonable, but it runs the risk of fueling public
resentments towards immigration. In a further
step it would be interesting to compare these
findings with a public opinion poll, to see how
the public perception of immigration differs
from media articles.
Data: Content Analysis of 1 76 newspaper articles
between 1 2/201 2 – 06/201 4 from “Berliner Zeitung”
(http://www.berliner-zeitung.de) and “Der
Tagesspiegel” (http://www.tagesspiegel.de).
Bibliography:
Davie, G. (201 0). Agenda Setting Theory [Web log post].
Retrieved from: http://masscommtheory.com/theoryoverviews/agenda-setting-theory/
Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg (201 2):
Einwohnerinnen und Einwohner nach LOR und
Migrationshintergrund OT_A8.2 – 31 .1 2.201 2. Retrieved
from: https://www.statistik-berlinbrandenburg.de/publikationen/otab/201
3/OT_A08_02_00
_1 92_201 202_BE.pdf
Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg (201 4).
Einwohnerinnen und Einwohner nach LOR und
Migrationshintergrund. OT_A8.2 — 30.06.201 4. Retrieved
from: https://www.statistik-berlinbrandenburg.de/publikationen/otab/201
4/OT_A08-02-
00_1 92_201 401 _BE.pdf
Streber, T. (29.1 0.201 3): „Schlechte Nachrichten sind
glaubwürdiger“. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved
from: http://www.faz.net
Franziska Keß,
BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Imagined immigration:
immigration in the press
The image of immigration given by the media
in Berlin, confounding refugees and asylum
seeking with immigration in general, is
distorted and diverges largely from “real”
immigration pictured by statistical estimates.
The starting point of my investigation was an
article of Scott Blinder entitled “Imagined
Immigration: The Impact of Different Meanings
of ‘Immigrants’ in Public Opinion and Policy
Debates in Britain”, in which the author presents
a study showing that public perceptions
of immigration – “imagined immigration” – are
very different, though related, from “real
immigration” as pictured by government
statistics. Furthermore, the authour shows that
“cognitive representations are necessary precursors
to judgments (…), such as the decision
to support reduced or increased immigration”
(Blinder, 201 3, p. 81 ).
The goal of this research was therefore to know
whether media in Berlin are delivering a realistic
image of immigration. 237 articles of Bild
22
Public opinion
and 1 38 articles of Berliner Zeitung (articles
published in a one year period) containing
either the word “Migration” or “Immigration”,
“Immigrant (-innen)” were analysed in order to
know which category of immigration the au-
thor was referring to. They were then classified
in five categories: asylum seekers or refugees,
international students, workers, people migrating
for familial reasons and articles in which
the category of immigration was not clearly
identified or which were not pertinent for my
research. The results found were compared
with official statistical estimates.
It was observed no real difference between the
two newspapers, even though their editorial
lines are not the same. The results were
striking: 94% (Bild) and 97% (Berliner Zeitung)
of the articles with immigration or immigrant as
main subject are as well about asylum seekers
or refugees. On the other hand, 0.4% (Bild) and
0% (Berliner Zeitung) of the articles are about
international students. However, official statistical
estimates published in the annual report
about migration in Germany show that only
23.1 % of immigrants in 201 3 from non-EU
countries can be considered as belonging to
the category of refugees or asylum seekers,
and that 1 4.3% of immigrants from non-EU
countries are coming for the purpose of study.
The quantitative analysis is confirmed by a
qualitative analysis of one article describing
“what Germans think about Immigration”,
which mentions only the relationship that
Germans have toward asylum seekers (Merholz,
201 5). The image of immigration given by
the media in Berlin is therefore distorted: the
Bild and the Berliner Zeitung tend to confound
refugees (“Flüchtlinge”) and asylum seekers
(“Asylbewerber”) with immigrants in general.
The same way, the term “Immigration” is
mentioned almost exclusively in articles concerning
asylum seekers and refugees. Other
purposes of immigration
are either
not mentioned or
not characterized
as such. Workers,
international students
and migrants
following their families
are almost not
mentioned. Furthermore,
in many articles,
the term “illegal immigration” is
confounded with asylum seeking and refugees:
these three terms are forming a kind of an
undefined conglomerate used in the articles to
talk about any topic concerning migration.
As a conclusion, the image of immigration
delivered by the written press in Berlin is unrealistic
and focused only on one category of
immigration. Knowing that the cognitive representations
we have of immigration form our
judgment, it could be interesting to conduct
further research in order to know in what way
media shape the cognitive representations of
the public opinion.
Data:
Bild and Berliner Zeitung online archives, [consulted on
28th July 201 5], articles containing the words “Migration”
or “Immigration”, “Immigrant (-innen)” between 28/7/201 4
and 28/7/201 5.
Migrationsbericht des BAMF im Auftrag der
Bundesregierung 201 3, Nürnberg: Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge.
Bibliography:
Blinder, S. (201 3). Imagined Immigration: The Impact of
Different Meanings of ‘Immigrants’ in Public Opinion and
Policy Debates in Britain. Political Studies.
Merholz, A. (201 5). So denkt Deutschland über
Zuwanderung. Bild-Online: http://www.bild.de/politik/
inland migration/so-denkt-deutschland-ueber-migration-
392031 36.bild.html [consulted on 28/7/201 5]
Marie Cohuet,
Erasmus exchange student
from Sciences Po, Paris
23
Political participation
Immigrants’ electoral behavior
in Germany and Berlin
Electoral behavior from immigrants within
Germany, and compared to the capital Berlin
who claims to be different from the country, is
not different at all.
Berlin is a city with more than 800,000 people
with migratory background, but it is not the
city with most migratory background in
Germany, as would be expected being the
capital. Despite the large population with
migratory background, does a city that claims
to be different from the rest of the country also
have a different behavior when it comes to
voting for those migrants? I will try to give an
answer to this question trying to explain it from
different social group perspectives such as
gender, age or level of studies, with the data
collected from the European Social Survey
201 2, Germany, N = 542, and compare it to
literature on the same topic in the city of
Berlin.
What stands out when analyzing voting
behavior in Germany is that most migrants
vote for parties that the European Social
Survey classifies as “Other”, which probably
are parties that do not classify themselves in a
traditional way, making them neither right nor
left-wing parties. With a 57.2% it is the most
voted category no matter the range of age the
migrant is in.
However, trying to analyze the electoral behavior
from a gender or a household income
perspective does not have any effect on the
ideology of the voters.
Is Berlin really different?
So is Berlin different from the rest of the country?
In this case, and despite the categories
given by the ESS, we can still observe that
most of the migrant voters prefer to vote leftwing
parties (23.8 % of immigrant voters) over
right-wing ones (1 9% of immigrant voters), and
this goes in the same direction as the voters in
the capital city, where 65% of immigrant voters
vote for either SPD or Die Grünen, against 8%
who voted for the CDU. In conclusion, we
cannot really say that the behavior is different
in Berlin than in the rest of the country, on the
contrary: it is similar probably because these
left-wing parties defend the social rights for
immigrants, unlike right-wing parties.
Bibliography:
Jonas-Correa, M. (1 998) “Different Paths: Gender
Immigration and Political Participation” International
Migration Review. Vol.32, No. 2, 326-349
Loch, D. (201 4) “Immigration, segregation and social
cohesion: is the German model fraying at the edged?”.
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 21 :6, 677-
692
Parry, G. Moyser, G. Day, N. (1 992) Political Participation
and Democracy in Britain. (First Edition). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Rytz, H. (201 1 ) “Ich bin ein Berliner – The immigrant vote in
the Berlin elections of 201 1 ” taken from
http://www.aicgs.org/issue/ich-bin-ein-berliner-theimmigrant-vote-in-the-berlin-elections-of-201
1 /
Mireia Casado Olivas,
Erasmus exchange student from
Universitat de Barcelona,
BA in Sociology, 4th year
24
Political parties
The effect of participation in
government on migration policy
The way political parties promote their
attitudes toward immigration related issues
not only depends on their ideological points
of view but also on their participation in
government. This study demonstrates that
the leftist party in Berlin increased their call
for the liberalization of migration policy after
leaving the federal government in 201 1 while
the conservatives, now in government, keep
on favoring a restrictive position.
The elections for the House of Representatives
in Berlin in 201 1 have wiped the leftist party
“Die Linke” off the federal state government
after five years of being the junior partner of
the social-democrats. While the social-democrats
remained in power, the leftists were
replaced by the conservative party “CDU”.
When comparing the
attitudes about immigration-related
issues
of the conservatives
with those of the leftists
immediately before the elections in 201 1 , one
gets an impression of contrarian party
strategies on migration policies. But how did
the leftists’ new status as an opposition party
and how did the new participation of the
conservatives in government change their
central points of view in migration policies?
Cultural diversity vs. common German identity
The leftist party, whose central issue can be
described as social justice, also focuses a lot
on migration issues. Considering the leftists as
a rising party that is not mainstream yet, they
use another strategy to catch votes: “In
addition to promoting previously marginalized
or ignored issues, the rising parties further
differentiate themselves by limiting their issue
appeals” (Meguid, 2005, p. 4). Being a conventional
mainstream party, the conservatives outline
the issue as one among others. Therefore,
25
those citizens who regard immigrant-related
policies as the main issue rather felt addressed
by the leftists but “issue ownership affects the
voting decisions of only those individuals who
think that the issue is salient” (Bélanger/
Meguid, 2007, p. 1 ) so that the common relevance
is refuted.
Due to rising immigration this issue has
become more salient since 201 1 . Both parties,
the conservatives as well as the leftists, cannot
avoid to deal with this subject. Irrespective of
their participation in government some characteristics
of the party’s general attitudes about
migration policy have to be shown: The leftists
strive for the liberalization of migration policy.
The CDU stresses the required competences
and duties of immigrants while Die Linke
claims that skills and
abilities of immigrants
have to be
recognized more intensively.
The conservatives
focus on assimilation and the requirement
to identify with Germany whereas
the leftists put emphasis on the uniqueness
and individuality of immigrants. It is striking
that the leftists predominantly regard Berlin
citizens as an elementary unit whereas the
CDU draws a line between Berlin-born and
immigrants. But how do both parties differ
among themselves depending on whether
they are in power or in opposition?
“People are integrated if they have the
same rights to participate in society […] they
are enriching Berlin’s cultural diversity”
(DIE LINKE deputee Hakan Tas).
Leftists complain about structural deficits, conservatives
expect personal contribution
Even in power the leftist have been quite dissatisfied
with the migration policy but as junior
partner in government they could not
implement all their reform acts such as anonymous
health insurance certificate and the
intercultural openness of the administration.
Now being in opposition furthermore they
Political parties
adhere to those calls by campaigning for the
immigrants’ right of participation: “The government
didn’t react as to our plans on how to
provide refugees with housing” (Tas, 201 5).
According to them the prohibitions of
formation, of employment and of education
have to be abolished. The conservatives have
linked most of the immigrant-related issues
prior to the elections in 201 1 to problems:
immigrants burden the welfare system, they
are associated with so-called parallel societies
and their unemployment share is disproportionally
high. Therefore the conservatives’
objective was to fight those problems. Four
years later, now being in power, the conservatives
accentuate the common goal to
strive for a German identity as the interlinking
element of all the immigrants: “The immigrants
have to identify with Germany to
strengthen social cohesion” (Dregger, 201 5).
Different perspectives – different political
outcomes
To conclude, conservatives and leftists in Berlin
differ enormously in their attitude about
immigration policies: Whereas Die Linke
demands the recognition of immigrants’ skills,
In addition to some mentions of immigration
throughout the programs, all four programs
have own parts devoted to the topic of
immigration and multiculturalism. These parts
are the ones that will be talked about in the
next paragraphs. The CDU/CSU national
program (“Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschthe
CDU expects the immigrants to make
efforts to integrate. Being in power the
conservatives try to evade those topics, but as
soon as the leftists are in government they can
stress the issue of migration so that the CDU
has to react to a certain extent. And of course
the rising immigration figures make a contribution
to the saliency of the issue as well.
Bibliography:
Bélanger, E./ Meguid, B. (2008): Issue salience, issue
ownership, and issue-based vote choice. In: Electoral
Studies. Vol. 27, Issue 3, p.477-491
Interviews with CDU-deputee Burkard Dregger and with
LINKE-deputee Hakan Tas (201 5, interviews conducted in
German, quotations translated in English by the authour)
Meguid, B. (2005): Competition between unequals: The
role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success.
Cambridge University Press: American Political Science
Review. Party manifestoes of CDU and DIE LINKE, Berlin
201 1
Rölle, Daniel (2000): Wahlprogramme: Richtschnur
parlamentarischen Handelns. In: Zeitschrift für
Parlamentsfragen. Vol. 31 , No.4, p.821 -833
Luis Jachmann,
4th semester BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Does Berlin’s multiculturalism
show in party programs?
The position on immigration CDU and SPD
have taken in Berlin are both strengthened
versions of the positions taken by their
national parties.
28.6% of Berlin’s inhabitants have an immigration
background (Amt für Statistik Berlin-
Brandenburg, 201 5, p. 1 2) – meaning that they
were either born outside Germany themselves,
have a foreign citizenship, or are born to at
least one parent who was born abroad or has a
foreign citizenship – compared to 20,3 % for
Germany as a whole (Statistisches Bundesamt).
Therefore, it is interesting to see whether this
has an effect on the party programs of the two
main German parties, the social-democratic
SPD and the Christian-democratic CDU. The
two parties’ Berlin programs have been
compared to those of the national parties to
see whether they deal with the questions of
immigration, integration and multiculturalism
in a different manner. This has been done by
means of rhetorical analysis supported by
quantitative content analysis.
26
Political parties
land”) presents the subject of immigration and
multiculturalism under the title “Diversity enriches
– accomplishing a culture of welcome”
(CDU/CSU, 201 3, p. 63) – i.e. a rather positive
title for the subject. The different parts of the
subject are presented under rather positivesounding
subtitles, although some of the
things said can be considered as quite
negatively inclined toward immigrants (CDU/
CSU, 201 3, pp. 63-66). However, there is not
very much generalising of immigrants, some of
the negative sentences include reservations,
one example being: “Those that refuse to learn
German have no chances of a future in our
country” (ibid. p. 65). In one
paragraph, the program addresses
religious or cultural
traditions, and specifically
mentions “Muslims” three
times. Other religions are
not mentioned at all. One
of these mentions can be
considered negative (talking
about “Muslim special
courts”) while the two
others only call on more
cooperation with Muslim
organisations (ibid. p. 66).
The tone taken by the
Berlin CDU in contrast is quite a different one.
The program (“1 00 Lösungen damit sich was
ändert für Berlin”) is organised as 1 00
problems, with the CDU’s answers to these
questions. Seven problems concerning immigration
and multiculturalism are grouped
together – making this the clear “immigration
part” of the program. Together with these
seven problems are some problem-answers
providing additional material on the matter.
The titles of the problems are quite tabloid
and hard sounding, especially those that are
negative toward immigrants (CDU Berlin, 201 1 ,
pp. 51 -57). Examples include: “Some immigrants
seal themselves off, ‘parallel societies’
come to existence” (ibid. 52) and “Migrants
dominate the criminal statistics” (ibid. 54).
Especially this last one is also very generalising.
A harsher tone than the one taken on
the national level can therefore be seen
27
Position of CDU/CSU and SPD in their
national programmes from 2013. The position
is the percentage of statements in the
program negative towards multiculturalism
subtracted from the percentage of statements
positive towards multiculturalism. As seen,
the SPD has a much more positive position
than the CDU/CSU. The research on the
municipal programmes indicates that the
positions in Berlin are even further away from
the neutral position (0).
Source for the national numbers: Manifesto Project Database
in the Berlin program. The theme of immigration
is also mentioned over two paragraphs
in the introduction to the program, some of it
in quite negative terms (ibid. 5). The national
SPD program (“Das wir entscheidet”) presents
the theme of immigration, integration and
multiculturalism under the title “Equal rights to
participation: For a modern integration policy”
(SPD, 201 3, p. 58). Generally, it can be
perceived in a positive tone, with the opening
statement being: “Germany is an open
country” (ibid.). Diversity is mentioned as a
resource of the future. Religious diversity is
mentioned, however no religions are mentioned
specially. The SPD
program can therefore in
general be perceived as
more positive than that of
the CDU, and with no specific
mention of any single
group (ibid. pp. 58-60) .
The Berlin program (BER-
LINprogramm) of the SPD
presents the topics of immigration,
integration and
multiculturalism at two main
places (SPD Berlin, 201 1 , p.
1 1 ; pp. 38-39). The content
is presented under neutral
or positive titles (ibid.). The tone is, generally
speaking, quite similar to the one taken by the
SPD in their national programme, however,
there are signs of taking it all one step further
– for instance saying that they “want a change
of mentality in regard to immigration into a
culture of recognition” (ibid. p. 38). The only
mention of a specific religion is that they want
a professorial chair for education in Muslim
theology (ibid. p. 39).
What the analysis shows is that both parties’
Berlin programs reflect the position taken by
their national counterparts. However, in the
cases of both parties, the position of the
national party has been strengthened in the
Berlin program. Taking into consideration that
the position on immigration in the national
program of CDU/CSU can be considered slightly
negative in the attitudes toward immigrants,
Political parties
multiculturalism and the likes of it – although it
has some positive remarks (as supported by
the analysis by the Manifesto Project) – the
Berlin program can be considered more negatively
inclined on the same subjects, although
with some positive notes. The national
program of the SPD can be considered
positive on the same subjects, although with
some negative remarks (also supported by
data from the Manifesto Project). The Berlin
program of the same party, however, can be
regarded as almost completely positive on the
same subjects. This means that in the parties’
position on immigration they have both
drifted further away from a neutral position in
the Berlin programs than in their respective
national programs.
Torbjørn Svanevik,
Erasmus exchange student
from the University of Oslo,
BA in Political Science, 4th semester
Data:
Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg (201 5); Statistischer
Bericht A I 5 – hj 2 / 1 4;
Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Potsdam. URL: <
https://www.statistik-berlinbrandenburg.de/publikationen/Stat_Berichte/201
5/SB_A01
-05-00_201 4h02_BE.pdf /> [Last checked 5th of August
201 5]
Statistisches Bundesamt Migrationshintergrund [Internet],
Statistisches Bundesamt. URL: <
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaa
t/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrun
d/Migrationshintergrund.html /> [Last checked 5th of
August 201 5]CDU/CSU (201 3);
Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland.
Regierungsprogramm 201 3-201 7; CDU/CSU. URL: <
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu//down/originals/41
521 _201 3.pdf/> [Last
checked 31 st of July 201 5]CDU Berlin (201 1 );
1 00 Lösungen damit sich was ändert für Berlin; CDU Berlin.
URL: < http://www.cdulvberlin.de.k1 41 5.imsfirmen.de/image/inhalte/file/Wahlprogramm_CDU_KIOSK_
80Seiten.pdf /> [Last checked 31 st of July 201 5]
Why local politicians run
for migrant votes
Is the well-being of migrants especially important
for politicians in constituencies that
have a high number of potential migrant voters?
Surprisingly, the analysis of campaign
programs in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg has
shown that not the share of migrant voters
but rather personal identities determine the
pursuit of migrant-relevant topics.
Migrants as a targeted voter group
As can be observed in various political
campaigns, candidates set focus on special
issues when they compete for votes. The
issues they choose can be decisive as they
attract the electorate’s attention. Moreover,
these issues will give hints on what policies
those candidates will support when elected.
As many citizens in Berlin are first or secondgeneration
migrants – the number rising – a
central question evolves: How well are migration-related
issues represented in a politician’s
campaign? Is their vote seen as
important enough? And therefore, will
candidates address specific issues that target
migrants? Anthony Downs (1 957), known for
his rational choice theory, suggests that a
candidate’s primary goal is to maximize votes.
Following this, candidates seek to target as
many voters as possible, also marginalized
groups and therefore migrants, and can do so
by addressing the issues those groups care
about. To answer the question whether more
migrants in a candidate’s constituency actually
lead to stronger proposals of migrant-relevant
issues, we will take a closer look at a famous
Berlin district and its political leaders.
The Green Party, the candidates and their
migrant voters in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg
The most variegated district and famous for its
28
Political parties
multiculturalism is Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg. Here, more than 35%
of the population have a migration
background. Politically, the district
is divided into six constituencies,
in which the Green Party is the
most successful. In the latest state
parliamentary elections in 201 1 ,
the party won a direct seat in five
of the six constituencies. Prior to
the election, every candidate developed
an individual campaign
program that focused on specific
issues, but remained within the
general party program. Concerning
the issues of migration
and integration, the Green Party points out
several proposals which should help migrants
to integrate, offer them political participation
and improve the living together of all in a
multicultural society.
In the six constituencies the percentage of
voters with migration background varies
strongly, as do the candidates’ personal profiles:
Constituency One: 1 6,9% of voters have a migration
background, campaigned by Heidi
Kosche (62), chemical engineer and teacher
for natural sciences
Constituency Two: 1 6,5% migration background,
Dirk Behrendt (39), judge
Constituency Three: 26,9%, highest share, Dr.
Turgut Altug (45), Turkish born agronomist
Constituency Four: 5,5%, Clara Herrmann (26),
geographer and youngest candidate
Constituency Five: 4,6%, Canan Bayram (45),
lawyer born in Turkey
Constituency Six: 4,5%, lowest share, Marianne
Burkert-Eulitz (38), lawyer
Bayram
Herrmann
Burkert-Eulitz
Behrendt
Kosche
Altug
have a similar share of migrants in their
electorate, but differ strongly in their saliency
of migrant-relevant topics. Exceptional are
especially the campaign programs of Bayram
and Kosche. Bayram, who has one of the
lowest shares of voters with migration
background, offers the highest saliency with
23,8%. She demands concrete policies, e.g. a
municipal electoral law for non-German
citizens and also sets a special focus on
helping refugees. Kosche on the other hand
does not mention migrant-relevant issues. Her
saliency adds up to only 2,5% which is by far
the lowest, even though 1 6% of her voters
have migration background. She rather focuses
strongly on environmental policies. The
only one to target his migrant voters directly is
Altug. He states that education serves as the
best integration opportunity and demands,
among other things, school expenditures that
set special focus on children with migration
background. With 21 ,3% saliency his result is
the only one being proportional to the share
of migrants in his constituency.
Importance of migrant votes
To analyze the impact potential migrant voters
have on a candidate’s campaign program,
each candidate’s individual program was
examined and the saliency of issues relevant
for migrants was calculated according to the
Manifesto Project method. The outcome is
quite surprising: The assumed trend did not
occur. Bayram, Burkert-Eulitz and Herrmann all
Migration background supports migration
background
Overall, the results in the table show: Whether
a candidate’s voters have migration background
or not does not influence the topics of
his or her campaign. It can be observed
though, that the candidate’s personal profile
and position in the party may determine the
issues the candidate campaigns with. Altug
29
Political parties
and Bayram were both born in Turkey and
Bayram holds the position as spokesman for
integration, migration and refugees of the
Green Party. Kosche focuses on issues
resembling her professional career. Herrmann,
who was the youngest member of parliament
in 2006, demands policies that target young
voters and students.
Therefore, in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg migrants
are represented by Altug and Bayram,
who both have a migration background themselves.
Party position and personal strengths
or experiences seem to determine a local
candidate’s campaign more than the share of
migrants in their electorate.
Data:
Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg (Hg.) (201 1 ),
Statistischer Bericht. Wahlen zum Abgeordnetenhaus von
Berlin und zu den Bezirksverordnetensammlungen 201 1 .
Online verfügbar unter https://www.wahlenberlin.de/wahlen/be201
1 /strukturdaten/SB_B7-2-1 _j05-
1 1 _BE.pdf.BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Hg.) (201 1 ): Eine
Stadt für alle. Das Wahlprogramm zur
BerlinerAbgeordnetenhauswahl 201 1 . Online verfügbar
unter https://gruene-berlin.de/sites/grueneberlin.de/files/gemeinsam/Wahl201
1 /wahlprogramm_onli
ne.pdf.Downs, Anthony (1 957): An Economic Theory of
Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Silvia Mayr,
BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Immigration, integration and
parties – SPD and CDU
Two diverging fundamental attitudes towards
immigration and integration became apparent:
Whereas the CDU handles integration as
appropriation of “German” culture and
values, the SPD stresses multicultural cohabitation
and cultural self-determination.
Berlin has more than 3.5 million inhabitants.
28.6 percent of those, more than one million,
have an immigration background (Office for
Statistics Berlin-Brandenburg 201 5; status: December
31 , 201 4). Consequently, the topic of
immigration is of great importance and
presence in Berlin politics. However, since the
city is not only one unit but consists of twelve
different districts with each of them having
their own administration and district parliament
ruled by different parties, the question of
differences in the position towards immigration
between Berlin parties emerges. Currently,
SPD and CDU together make up more
than half of the seats in the Berlin state
parliament and thus have vast political power.
For this reason, these two parties were chosen
as the objects of investigation in this research.
More precisely, the objective was to find out
in which way the Berlin CDU and SPD differ in
their attention and position towards immigration.
In this work, a comparative analysis of the party
programs of the CDU and the SPD for the 201 1
Berlin parliamentary elections was conducted
with a focus on saliency, position and content
concerning the topic of immigration. First, in
both programs all sentences in total and then
the number of sentences focusing on
immigration were counted. After this, the
sentences were grouped into positive and
negative statements and in a last step, the
fundamental attitude and the key statements
on immigration were examined. The method is
derived from the Manifesto Project (cf. Werner
et al. 201 4).
It was found that with 1 3.9 percent of the
sentences dealing with immigration, the CDU
mentions immigration almost twice as much as
the SPD (7.2 percent). However, the SPD’s
statements on immigration are positive
without exception, whereas the CDU mentions
immigration nearly equally in a positive and
30
Political parties
negative manner – with one sentence more,
the positive sentences outweigh the negative.
Focusing on the content, the SPD repeatedly
mentions all Berlin citizens including immigrants,
the shared commitment for immigrants,
for the diversity of cultures and against
all forms of discrimination, right-wing extremism
and racism. In the CDU election program
benefits and accomplishments of immigrants
are valued, too, for instance integration efforts
and high qualification – however, the overall
picture remains negative: Above all, immigration
is problematized, with the CDU then
SPD Berlin
by examining the election programmes it
becomes obvious that immigration constitutes
an important topic for both parties and Berlin
politics in general, but also that parties, in this
case the SPD and CDU, differ in their position
and in the importance they attach to the topic.
For the two parties examined in this article, a
fundamentally different attitude towards immigration
and integration can be found: The
CDU’s statements create a picture of integration
as appropriation of “German” culture
and values, whereas the SPD stresses multicultural
cohabitation and “cultural self-determination”
(SPD regional association Berlin,
CDU Berlin
giving proposals for support and advancement.
In addition, strikingly negative, even populist
headlines and attributions are used. The effect
of such headlines as “Migrants dominate the
crime statistics” (CDU regional association
Berlin, 201 1 , p. 54), or ”Too much immigration
into the social security systems – too few
qualified immigrants” (ibid. p. 52), and
problematizing immigration without giving
contextual information or explaining causes
and background must be considered.
Furthermore, it has to be noted that the comparison
of both programmes is not without
problems since they have different designs:
The CDU uses a problem-answer system,
whereas the SPD uses a continuous text
organized in sections for specific topics. If not
the sentences of the CDU program, but the
problem-answer sections are counted, the
result changes: Then, a percentage of 66.7
negative messages on immigration and only
33.3 positive messages can be found. All in all,
201 1 , p. 38). Which party is in power can thus
have a profound effect on immigration and
integration policies in Berlin.
Data:
CDU regional agency Berlin (201 1 ): 1 00 Lösungen für Berlin.
Berlin. Available online http://www.cdulvberlin.de.k1 41 5.
ims-firmen.de/image/inhalte/file/Wahlprogramm_CDU_
KIOSK_80Seiten.pdf, last seen 22/07/201 5.
SPD regional association Berlin (201 1 ): BERLINprogramm.
Berlin. Available online http://www.spd.berlin/w/files/spdparteitage/berlinprogramm_201
1 -201 6.pdf, last seen
22/07/201 5.
Werner, Annika; Lacewell, Onawa; Volkens, Andrea (201 4):
Manifesto Coding Instructions. 5th revised edition.
Available online
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/papers/handbook_
201 4_version_5.pdf, last seen 22/07/201 5.
Alisha Archie,
BA student in Social Sciences,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
31
Representation
Turkish representation in
Kreuzberg and Wedding
The feelings of political representation on a
personal and community level differ between
Kreuzberg and Wedding. Immigrant origin
citizens in Kreuzberg feel personally better
represented and feel that the Turkish
community is better represented.
In Berlin there are about 573,000 people with a
non-German nationality, who come from 1 90
different countries around the world. This
means that 1 6% of the population of Berlin is
of non-German background. The biggest
migrant community in Berlin is formed by
citizens with a Turkish migration background;
the size of this group is about 200,000. This
also means that this Turkish community is the
biggest one outside of Turkey. The fact that
Turks form the biggest migrant community in
Berlin made this group the topic of this
research. Because they are so many, the idea
came to mind to conduct fieldwork and
perform face-to-face surveys with Turkish
migrants in Berlin. So, where to start when one
wants to investigate
the Turkish
community?
By finding out
where they live
and where the
Turkish communities
within the
city actually are.
Through
data
from the city of
Berlin we found
out that two of
the areas in
Berlin where a
lot of Turkish
migrants live are Wedding and Kreuzberg. The
idea of this research is to compare Turkish
people in Wedding and Kreuzberg on the
topic of political representation and see if
people feel more represented in either one of
these areas.
In order to research political representation
the method of face-to-face surveys was used.
First basic demographic questions such as
age, zip code and occupation were
questioned. Then, moving on to the part of
political representation, people were asked if
they were eligible to vote and if they had
voted in the last local elections. The feeling of
representation was measured by asking people
whether they personally felt represented
by the government of Berlin on a scale from 1
to 1 0 4 . The same question was asked about
whether they felt that the Turkish community in
Berlin is well represented. Lastly people were
asked whether they knew any Turkish
representatives in Berlin and if they could
name them 4 .
The conducted questionnaire was used twice.
First in the area of Wedding, where 1 8 people
filled it in.
After that we
(me and two
other students)
went to Kreuzberg,
where
we also asked
1 8 people.
This means
that the total
sample was
36. Some of
the respondents
who
filled in the
questionnaire
did not have Turkish roots, so the sample
which is usable for this research is 20 people.
Representation in Kreuzberg and Wedding
We can now take a look at the results of the
32
Representation
survey. In Wedding, the average age of the
respondents was 41 . The question about
personal representation by the city of Berlin
gave an average of 5.4, which means that
people feel represented, but that representation
could be a lot better. The results
for the representation of the Turkish community
as a whole gave similar results, the
average here was 4.8. 7 out of 1 0 respondents
could name a Turkish politician in Berlin, and
Cem Özdemir (head of the Green Party,
member of the federal parliament) was named
the most often.
Secondly we take a look at the results of
Kreuzberg. The average age of the sample was
36. The question about personal representation
was answered more positively than in
Wedding, the average was 7.4, which means
people personally feel well represented. And
again, results for the representation of the
Turkish community as a whole gave similar
results, the average here was 7.2. Lastly, 9 out
of 1 0 respondents could name a Turkish
politician, names mentioned varied greatly.
Data:
1 ) Berlin.de, the representative for integration and
migration in Berlin. Migration to Berlin.
http://www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/migration/index.en.html
2) Statistik Berlin Brandenburg, Statistischer Bericht.
Einwohnerinnen und Einwohner im Land Berlin. 31 -1 2-
201 2, https://www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de/
Publikationen/Stat_Berichte/201 3/SB_A01 -05-
00_201 2h02_BE.pdf
3) BZ Berlin. Hier leben die meisten Migranten.
http://www.bz-berlin.de/artikel-archiv/hier-leben-diemeisten-migranten
4) Questionnaire on demographic information, religion,
identity and feeling of political representation. Conducted
in Wedding on 09-07-201 5 and in Kreuzberg on 1 6-07-
201 5.
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1 zeOezxIf5JoD2
01 ARkeFHBqaqXOT649neIXMB-0g724/edit#gid=0
What can be concluded from the results
extracted from the questionnaires? First of all
that there is a difference between the samples
in Wedding and Kreuzberg. People in
Kreuzberg feel a lot better represented on a
personal level and they also feel that the
Turkish community is represented better. The
age difference between the two samples is
relatively small, so this probably does not
cause the difference in the feelings of
representation. What might be a factor in the
positive responses in Kreuzberg is that this is a
much more touristic area then the area of
Wedding. The respondents were more open
and were in a way much more enthusiastic
about participating in the survey then people
in Wedding, which might be a factor in the
positive feelings in the survey. An important
comment to this research is obviously that the
sample was only 20 people. In order to actually
say something about the populations of the
two areas, much larger research should be
performed.
Els Rutten,
Erasmus exchange student
from the University of Amsterdam ,
BA in Political Sciences
33
About us
Luis Jachmann
The class visiting the “Beauftragte des Senats von Berlin für Integration und Migration“
Photo: Luis Jachmann
Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca , Teaching Fellow
is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Varieties of Democracy Institute
at the University of Gothenburg. She is also a research associate at
Sciences Po Paris and at the Pathways to Power Project, which investigates
the political representation of citizens of immigrant origin in Europe. She
completed her doctoral thesis entitled “Voters, Parties and Representation
in European Multicultural Democracies” in 201 5 at the University
of Mannheim.
Jondis Luise Schwartzkopff
is a BA student in Social Sciences at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin since
201 3. She has lived in France, Spain and Mexico and likes Berlin for its
open and international atmosphere. In 201 6, she spent a semester at
Sciences Po Paris. In the course of her studies she has focused on
comparative politics and political institutions. For this issue, she has
learned a lot about immigration in Berlin, editing and layout.
Photography on cover by Jondis Luise Schwartzkopff, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, CC BY-SA – mw238 – flic.kr/p/nRqNXV
The articles in this issue represent the views of the authors and not necessarily the views of the editors or of the university.
For any question please contact constanzasanhueza@me.com.
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