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But others include an under-resourced
diplomatic service, an unwillingness to
take strong positions on international
issues, a weak military and a sense of
exceptionalism which means that little that
is done overseas – such as driving in lanes,
or global norms of insurance of nuclear
reactors – is seen as having much
relevance to India itself. This latter belief
may be partially justified – south Asian
problems usually require south Asian
solutions – but it doesn’t help India engage
globally and win arguments. This lack of
power projection also means India is badly
misunderstood. The image of the US
overseas incorporates hard elements (a
willingness to use military force or to
impose trade agreements favouring US
businesses) with softer elements (film and
TV, music, hamburgers).
It will mean a lot of arguing, and some
serious rethinking, in the chancelleries of
Paris, London &Washington. One of the
consequences of India’s profound lack of
hard power is that its image is defined
almost entirely by soft elements:
Bollywood, Mahatma Gandhi, curry, films
such as the Last Best Marigold Hotel or
Slumdog Millionaire, and the country’s
reputation as a global information
technology hub. This distorts the reality
This distortion is reinforced by the focus
on India’s democratic institutions, the
widespread use of English and even the
enthusiasm for cricket. One result is a
sense among many western commentators
and politicians that India is a “natural
ally”. Yet there is no immediately obvious
reason why a colony that was exploited for
200 years before winning its
independence, and that has since
maintained an ambivalent relationship with
Washington, has been close to Moscow
and, at one point, made considerable
efforts to befriend Beijing, should align
itself with western powers.
Obama and Narendra Modi, the Indian
prime minister who won a landslide
victory in 2014, have made apparently
successful efforts to establish some kind of
rapport. And Modi’s visit to London last
year was largely viewed as a success. But
Modi himself represents, literally and
figuratively, a strong conservative,
nationalist, Hindu majoritarian strand in
India that has existed for at least 150 years,
yet barely affects the image of the country
overseas
Some have claimed Modi was elected
primarily through the support of
industrialists and sections of the media.
This is not the case. He won because his
nationalist rhetoric and his promise of
development was attractive to a large
number of his compatriots. This link will
not weaken as India’s economy grows and
with it, however haphazardly, its influence.
The nation is likely to behave on the
international stage much like any other
power: with a strong sense of its own
interests and that its foreign policy goals
are legitimate and attainable, with or
without western approval. This does not
mean violent clashes, or active animosity,
but it will mean an awful lot of arguing,
and some serious rethinking, in the
chancelleries of Paris, Washington,
London and elsewhere.
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