Army - Messing With Molecules

Sullivan Warns Cuts Weaken Force Page 21
The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army
ARMY
June 2016 www.ausa.org $3.00
Messing With Molecules
The Search for Tougher, Lighter, Cheaper Armor
600,000 Leaders Later,
ROTC Reaches 100
Page 50

ARMY
The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army
June 2016 www.ausa.org Vol. 66, No. 6
DEPARTMENTS
ON THE COVER
LETTERS....................................................5
SEVEN QUESTIONS ..................................7
WASHINGTON REPORT ...........................8
NEWS CALL ..............................................9
FRONT & CENTER
Military: Arbiters of National Morality?
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.
Page 15
By Any Other Name, War Is Still War
By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.
Page 16
Look to the Past for Lessons
By Maj. Joe Byerly
Page 18
SHE’S THE ARMY....................................20
THE OUTPOST........................................67
SOLDIER ARMED....................................69
69
FEATURES
Sullivan Farewell: Army Has
Changed, Not for the Better
By Rick Maze
As he prepares to step down as
president and CEO of the Association
of the U.S. Army, retired Gen. Gordon
R. Sullivan is deeply concerned about
the future. Not his, but the Army’s.
Page 21
21
A Call to Armor: Army
Explores Stronger, Lighter,
Cheaper Protection
By William Matthews
In the constant search for better armor,
Army laboratories and scientists are
diligently examining new materials and
manufacturing methods, and analyzing
performance. Page 40
Cover Illustration: Graphene, a honeycombed
layer of bonded carbon atoms,
is strong enough to absorb a microbullet
traveling at supersonic speed.
Rice University/Jae-Hwang Lee
SUSTAINING MEMBER PROFILE ...........71
HISTORICALLY SPEAKING.....................72
REVIEWS.................................................75
FINAL SHOT............................................80
25
Soldiering Is Evolving:
Dry Erase Board Era Almost Over
By Capt. Mark A. Yore
It’s imperative to balance the art of Mission
Command with the science of control. To
accomplish this effectively, leaders must
understand the capabilities, purpose and
application of digital systems. Page 25
June 2016 ■ ARMY 1

Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force:
A Readiness Multiplier
By Col. George P. Coan Jr., USA Ret., and
Richard Lim
To sustain the all-volunteer force, it’s
necessary to provide all soldiers and the
supporting cast of families, and military
retirees and veterans and their families, a
quality of life commensurate with their
sacrifices. Page 28
32
Get Maximum Rotation: Coming
Fully Prepared Has Benefits at JRTC
By Maj. J.D. Pritchett
Units that strengthen command post
capabilities, define leadership duties and
arrive with a desire to learn get the most
benefit from a rotation at the Joint
Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.
Page 32
Megacities: Military Operations
There Not Business as Usual
By Col. Mark Wallace, USA Ret., and
Lt. Col. Martin McCleary, USA Ret.
Operating in vast urban environments
may require new or modified approaches
across all warfighting functions to account
for the tremendous scale, complexity and
interconnectedness of modern cities.
Page 36
28
Capturing Good Ideas Before
They Vanish
By Maj. Wayne Heard, USA Ret.
Creating and installing an effective afteraction
review program will prevent
learned lessons from “walking out the
door” with every retirement, permanent
change of station, or expiration-term of
service. Page 46
46
Spouses Balance Work, Family, Army
By Rebecca Alwine
Army spouses find ways to juggle
demanding careers with the challenges of
family and the military lifestyle. Page 56
Cross-Culture Chemistry: Joint
Service Environment Brings Out Best
By Col. Richard D. Hooker Jr., USA Ret.
As one Marine leading a team of mostly
Army Reserve officers and NCOs proved,
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
taught us to work closer and better with
our sister services. Page 58
Russia’s New-Generation Warfare
By Phillip Karber and Lt. Col. Joshua Thibeault
With the military conflict between Russia
and Ukraine now in its second year, there
are 10 critical lessons the U.S. Army must
learn from it. Page 60
Miracle Man: 26 Years After
Near-Death, Former Soldier
Meets Doctor Who Saved Him
By Chuck Vinch
When a former Army specialist heard a
doctor relaying a story about a memorable
trauma case, “I got chills all over my body,”
he said. The reason: The soldier in that
story sounded very much like … him.
Page 65
50
ROTC Turns 100: Future Leaders Trained; the Nation Benefits
By Brig. Gen. Sean A. Gainey
More than 600,000 men and women have earned a commission through the
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps since the program was established in 1916.
They’ve played a critical role in the numerous challenges that the U.S. and the
Army have faced both at home and abroad. Page 50
36
Training, Education at Heart of Program
By Lt. Col. Greg Lane, USAR Ret.
The U.S. Army Cadet Command is producing quality officers and training high
school students to be better Americans. Page 53
2 ARMY ■ June 2016

Army Birthday
2016
4 ARMY ■ June 2016

Letters
Focus on Language Mission
■ First Lt. Nicholas B. Naquin’s excellent
article (“Multinational Success Requires
Multilingual Troops,” April) sets
the proposition clearly that more capability
in world languages will be needed
within our nation’s military forces. He
postulates that two months of basic language
instruction plus six to 10 months of
immersion study abroad will increase language
proficiency throughout the force.
Such intensive training will help, but
the current policy and practice in commissioned
and NCO assignments will
need to be redirected and enforced to
permit a career focus on specific partner
or potential-threat countries and nonstate
actors.
Because the language mission will be
an additional duty, service policy and
practice must also provide for repeated
and timely exposure to current usage, lest
language skills atrophy. The proposed
bootstrap language program will mitigate
but not resolve the military’s shortfalls in
the professional level of language knowledge
and cognitive skills required for interpretation,
translation, translanguage
negotiation and intelligence.
Today, these important language services
are often provided by foreign personnel
in contractor service in the absence
of qualified U.S. citizens. A corps
of professional-level military interpreters,
translators and transcommunicators is
needed to facilitate negotiations in partnership
or confrontation with military of
other countries. The Defense Language
Institute Foreign Language Center provides
the best basic language education
in the world for about 3,500 service
members from four services in one of
about 60 of the world’s less commonly
taught languages. Every year, about the
same number of members separate after
first or second enlistment terms, most
often because of limited career opportunities
to use and grow their language
knowledge and skills.
A professional military language corps
is needed to capitalize on the significant
taxpayer investment in basic foreign language
education provided by the center,
and also to provide the career incentive
and rewards necessary to grow to professional
status in service to national security
needs. The corps, with close affiliation
to or managed under an expanded
mission of the center, would provide for
permanent, temporary or online assignment
of skilled translators, interpreters,
language analysts and translanguage
communicators to meet the needs described
in Naquin’s article.
Glenn H. Nordin
Alexandria, Va.
‘Everyman’ Review Pleases
■ I enjoyed retired Maj. Gen. Robert
H. Scales’ review of Stephen E. Bower’s
biography of Lt. Gen. Timothy J.
Maude (“‘Officer Everyman’ Overcame
Bad Career Start,” April). Even though I
have not read the book yet, the review
was particularly meaningful to me for
several important reasons.
Maude and I were lieutenants together
in the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in
Vietnam in 1967. He was a brand-new
second lieutenant, and I was getting
ready to be promoted to first lieutenant.
We became fast and good friends, mainly
because we were the two worst lieutenants
in the brigade.
Thirty years later, I learned that Maude
was a major general serving in Germany.
I was an Army Reserve major general in
Georgia. When we made contact after all
those years, we were both stunned that
we had made it so far.
When Maude was reassigned to the
Pentagon, we saw each other several
times when I was there for meetings. On
Sept. 10, 2001, I happened to be at the
Pentagon for four days of meetings. As I
was waiting in front of the building for
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June 2016 ■ ARMY 5

Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret.
President and CEO, AUSA
Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, USA Ret.
Vice President, Education, AUSA
Rick Maze
Editor-in-Chief
Liz Rathbun Managing Editor
Joseph L. Broderick Art Director
Chuck Vinch Senior Staff Writer
Toni Eugene
Associate Editor
Christopher Wright Production Artist
Laura Stassi Assistant Managing Editor
Thomas B. Spincic Assistant Editor
Contributing Editors
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.;
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.; Lt.
Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret.; and
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret.
Contributing Writers
Scott R. Gourley and Rebecca Alwine
Lt. Gen. Jerry L. Sinn, USA Ret.
Vice President, Finance and
Administration, AUSA
Desiree Hurlocker
Advertising Production and
Fulfillment Manager
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the United States Army. ■ ARTICLES appearing in
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Articles are expressions of personal opin ion and should not
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my ride back to my hotel that afternoon,
Maude just happened to step out of his
sedan. We greeted one another and
spoke for a few minutes. Never would I
have believed then that it would be the
last time I would ever see him.
The next day, after so many of us
evacuated the Pentagon to wherever we
could assemble, we discussed our relative
proximity to where the airplane hit. That
was when I learned that the plane had
flown directly into Maude’s office. What
a sad ending to the life of a great soldier
and a friendship that we had the opportunity
to renew after more than 30 years.
I look forward to reading Bower’s
book to fill in the blanks of the career of
that great soldier and friend.
Maj. Gen. David R. Bockel, USA Ret.
Smyrna, Ga.
Soldiers: Heart of the Nation
■ You don’t realize it when you are a
soldier and living in a barracks full of
them, but those guys in your squad are
young. Most are in their teens. There is
also the just-over-20 squad leader; 24-
year-old platoon sergeant; and second
lieutenant platoon leader just out of West
Point, Officer Candidate School or
ROTC. That captain company commander
who’s 27 or 28 years old; the battalion
commanding officer, a lieutenant colonel
just over 30; and your major general division
commander, in his late 30s or very
early 40s don’t strike you as what they are:
the backbone of this country, that small
percentage of this nation that holds back
the wolves and lets all others sleep safe at
night. It takes decades to see it. You are an
old man before you know it to be fact.
Monthly, I read ARMY magazine front
to back, page by page. The articles are
ARMY magazine welcomes letters to
the editor. Short letters are more
likely to be published, and all letters
may be edited for reasons of style,
accuracy or space limitations. Letters
should be exclusive to ARMY magazine.
Please send letters to Editor-in-
Chief, ARMY magazine, AUSA, 2425
Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201.
Letters may also be faxed to 703-
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written by legends of history, from over
90-year-old retired Gen. Frederick J.
Kroesen, the first OCS graduate to become
a four-star general; to a retired
colonel named Richard D. Hooker Jr.
writing about his pride while serving in
Afghanistan with his son, a private.
There’s stuff about Maj. Gen. William
T. Sherman and Gen. George S. Patton
Jr., West Point, and a multitude of articles
and wisdom including the historic
and just-entering-the-Army heroes who
are heroes just for enlisting to offer themselves
to a service faced with cutbacks and
added commitments. These soldiers are
entering careers at the same time we are
ending the careers of others who have
given one-half to three-quarters of their
time to earned retirement and four or five
combat tours. Some have been notified of
involuntary separation while they are
leading units in combat zones.
Is that not dedication? Without these,
how would we survive as a nation? Think
about that.
Capt. Daniel J. Hill, AUS Ret.
St. Augustine, Fla.
Editor’s note: The author of this letter was a
regular contributor to ARMY magazine.
He died in October.
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ARMY (ISSN 0004-2455), published monthly. Vol. 66, No. 6.
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6 ARMY ■ June 2016

Seven Questions
He’s Changing Things That Can Be Changed
Maj. Jason “Jay” Main, 47, is a recovering alcoholic who last
year ended more than three decades of heavy drinking and now offers
support to other soldiers. Main is knowledge management officer
for the Asymmetric Warfare Group, part of the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Meade, Md.
1. What were your days like when you were drinking?
During the week, I was a highly functional alcoholic. If I
had a big meeting with the boss, it would be only six beers the
night before, just to chase the monsters away. I was drinking
30 beers a day on the weekends.
I was diagnosed with cancer back in 2000, and I even drank
after my first chemotherapy treatment. It was so much a part
of my life.
2. Did your drinking ever get you into trouble?
I got a DUI in 1996 when I was in the National Guard, in
Massachusetts. There, they let you plead nolo contendere—
not admitting guilt but agreeing to accept punishment. I had
to go to 10 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and an eightweek
alcohol abuse education program, pay exorbitant fines,
and I lost my driver’s license for three months. But the day after
they let me go, I was drinking again.
3. What was the turning point?
Last summer, I had an overwhelming sense of dread and
despair. For a while, I had to stop drinking during the week
because I was getting sick, having problems with my liver and
pancreas, and my enzymes were through the roof. In 2011, I
had a stent put in my heart.
The straw that broke the camel’s back was when my liver
failed. We have a close family friend—an alcoholic legend,
back where I’m from—and I knew he was in AA.
I called him and said, “Jimmy, I think I’m done.” He
laughed and said, “I’ve been waiting for you to call me for
years.” He told me to just go online, find a meeting, and ask
for help.
4. What did you do?
I went to a meeting the next day; June 14 is my sobriety day.
I said, “My name is Jay. I’ve got 23 hours sober. What do I do
now?” AA suggests new members attend 90 meetings in 90
days. At about 40 days, I had attended 72 meetings. I was going
to two, sometimes three a day on weekends. I got a sponsor,
but I knew I needed a lot more help. The not-drinking
part was working, but something else was—I couldn’t put my
finger on it, but knew I needed more help.
5. Was that when you found the Army Substance Abuse
Program?
Yes. Every installation has one. A counselor told me about a
28-day program at Fort Belvoir, Va. I could have taken leave.
TRICARE would’ve covered it, and no one would have
known. But I went to my command, and they signed off on it
that day. They were beyond supportive. A week later, in early
August, I checked into Fort Belvoir Community Hospital.
The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) involves
both group therapy and individual counseling. Some guys are
there because their command told them to go, and then there
are guys like me who tell their command, “Hey, listen, I need
to do this, I need your support.”
For me, ASAP is a godsend. Once you’re in, you sign a
contract and agree to go for a year. They can shorten or extend
Maj. Jason ‘Jay’ Main
it, depending on how you do. Lots of guys relapse because
they can’t let go. You have to trust completely. If you can’t,
eventually it will trip you up.
6. How are you sharing what you’ve learned?
We have a new class that just came through Asymmetric
Warfare Group—14 students—and I addressed them for
about 10 minutes. I told my story and said, “Statistically, one
of you needs the kind of help I got and statistically, half of you
know somebody who needs the kind of help I got.” I told
them the warfare group is here for them if they need that help.
I talk to soldiers in conjunction with the ASAP program on
post maybe twice a quarter. My unit also has regular resiliency
training, and my boss lets me get up and do a quick spiel. My
goal is to let them know that if they need help, it’s here for
them: Here’s my name, here’s my number; shoot me an email,
and I’ll point you in the right direction.
7. What’s your life like today?
The last 8 1 ⁄2 months have been an absolute game-changer. I
know that no matter what happens, I’ll be all right. It just as
easily could have gone the other way. I could be in prison—or
worse. I am so grateful. And it’s only going to get better.
—Chuck Vinch
Courtesy Maj. Jason Main
June 2016 ■ ARMY 7

Washington Report
Size of Army Depends on Bending Budget
The size of the Army and the size of soldiers’ 2017 pay raise
will be determined by the willingness of Congress to bend budgetary
rules and diverge from Obama administration priorities.
Initial work on the fiscal year 2017 budget began in late April,
but negotiations are expected to continue until fall.
Responding to fears by Army leaders and the Association
of the U.S. Army that the continuing force structure drawdown
was leading to unacceptably high national security risk,
efforts are underway to stop the drop. The House Armed
Services Committee, the first congressional panel to weigh in
on the fiscal year 2017 budget, moved to prevent additional
losses in the Regular Army, Army National Guard and Army
Reserve.
Their version of the 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act calls for 480,000 active-duty soldiers, 350,000 Army
Guard soldiers and 205,000 Army Reserve soldiers. These
combine to be 45,000 more than the Pentagon requested, and
20,000 more than the fiscal year 2016 authorization. Total
Army strength would remain above 1 million soldiers under
the committee plan. The Army has been scheduled to dip below
1 million by 2018.
The Senate Armed Services Committee is working on similar
legislation to slow, stop or maybe even reverse the drawdown.
The House committee lawmakers partly pay for the added
soldiers by taking $1.1 billion from the overseas contingency
operations account and applying it to the Army personnel budget.
The full cost of the added soldiers is estimated by Army
officials to be about $2 billion. If correct, that means enactment
of the House committee plan might require the Army to come
up with about $900 million to divert from other accounts to
cover the personnel costs.
Army personnel is not the only nonwar expense the House
panel would fund from the war-related contingency budget. Of
the $58.8 billion in the overseas contingency budget, $23.1 billion
is being used for nonwar expenses. The cut is so big it is
possible the contingency budget would run dry in six months,
requiring additional war-related funding by June 2017.
“There will be a new president, who undoubtedly will review
the operational activities proposed by President Obama as well
as the funding levels for them,” said Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-
Texas, the House Armed Services Committee chairman. “The
new president and the new Congress will have the opportunity
to make adjustments.”
Another question of budget priorities involves the 2017 military
pay raise. DoD budgeted a 1.6 percent raise, an amount
that is half a percentage point less than the military raise mandated
by law. If approved by Congress, this would be the
fourth consecutive year that increases in basic pay and drill pay
did not keep pace with average private sector pay increases.
The House committee provides for the full 2.1 percent increase
to match the raise called for under the Federal Pay
Comparability Act.
The Senate Armed Services Committee is concerned about
the $330 million cost in the 2017 budget, and is also concerned
about the cumulative $2.2 billion cost over five years of the
slightly higher raise.
Kiowa-Filled Sky
Thirty-two OH-58 Kiowa helicopters of the U.S.-based 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment set what may be a world record for the largest helicopter
formation as they have a final flight on April 15 over Fort Bragg, N.C. After a deployment to Korea, the squadron will switch to AH-64 Apache helicopters
as part of the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative. The single-engine helicopters have been used by the Army since 1969 for direct fire support,
observation and general utility; with service in Vietnam, Operation Just Cause in Panama, and Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
DoD/Kenneth Kassens
8 ARMY ■ June 2016

News Call
Retired NCO ‘Plays’ It Forward to Help Others
As ice hockey excitement peaks with
the Stanley Cup finals this month,
medically retired Spc. John M. Laursen
plans to take time off from recreational
goalkeeping and charitable fundraising
to watch the sport he says saved him
from suicide.
Laursen is a civilian contractor for the
U.S. Army Research, Development and
Engineering Command at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Md., where he has
worked since January 2015. But in
March 2014, when he had to medically
retire from the Army, he was in crisis.
“Overnight, my entire life, my career,
everything I worked for felt like it was
pulled out from under me,” he said. “I
was lost. I didn’t know what to do, what
I was going to do. All I knew is that
everything I knew was gone.”
Laursen, who grew up in Brick, N.J.,
decided in the eighth grade that he
would join the Army after his father, a
New York Port Authority police officer
who worked in the Twin Towers, lost
dozens of colleagues in the Sept. 11,
2001, terrorist attacks.
Laursen enlisted in 2008 and was assigned
to the 10th Mountain Division at
Fort Drum, N.Y. He deployed to Iraq in
2009 and served as a motor transport operator.
In his spare time he skated with the
Mountaineers Hockey Club, a private
nonprofit organized in June 2010 on
Fort Drum, at one point serving as team
captain. “I skated for the first time when
I was 2, and never really took the skates
off,” Laursen said.
Retired Spc. John M. Laursen
He began combining hockey and fundraising
in the summer of 2011, when he
encouraged the Philadelphia Police Department
hockey team to make the fivehour
drive north for a game that raised
more than $1,000 for the Wounded
Warrior Project. A match organized
against the Syracuse, N.Y., Police Department
raised funds for Defending
the Blue Line, an organization that
U.S. Army/Conrad Johnson
helps military children play hockey.
In 2013, Laursen deployed to Afghanistan.
After about three months running
combat logistic patrols in Paktika Province
in Regional Command East, he
started having trouble swallowing food.
Despite his resolve to ignore the problem
so he could remain on duty, he soon
couldn’t get down even liquids and had
severe chest pain. He was evacuated first
to Germany, then to the U.S.
Specialists at Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center in Bethesda,
Md., determined Laursen had a chronic
inflammatory disease of the esophagus
called eosinophilic esophagitis, which
can narrow the swallowing tube to the
point of medical emergency. Every couple
of months, Laursen requires an endoscopy
to keep his esophagus open.
However, he feels “blessed that’s the
biggest issue I have.”
Laursen had planned to serve 20 years
and then retire to be a policeman like his
father. Having to retire early devastated
him. “My life as I knew it was gone,” he
said. The commander of his Warrior
Transition Battalion played hockey and
told Laursen about the USA Warriors, a
team based in Rockville, Md., that’s
open to wounded and disabled service
members.
Laursen, a goalie, joined the hockey
team in 2014 and said it “truly saved my
June 2016 ■ ARMY 9

life.” Playing and “just being around” his
teammates “is something special,” he
said. “It’s that military bonding you just
can’t get anywhere else.”
Laursen continues to skate for charity.
For the past three years, he has organized
a fundraising hockey game between
the USA Warriors and a team of
special-needs children in his hometown
of Brick. In October, he organized the
Columbus Day Classic, a hockey game
with a focus on fundraising to benefit a
special-needs school in Baltimore. The
event raised $9,000 and led to an affiliation
with the St. Baldrick’s Foundation,
which funds childhood cancer research.
To show his solidarity for children
who lose their hair during treatment,
Laursen raised more than $1,600 getting
his head shaved at a fundraising event in
March. In April, the Warriors raised
money playing the Washington Ice Dogs
Special Hockey Team. Laursen is already
planning a second Columbus Day Classic,
with a fundraising goal of $12,500.
Noting that the USA Warriors welcomed
him and restored his sense of
family, Laursen said service members
and veterans “need to have each other’s
backs, not only downrange but on the
home front, which is the biggest battle.”
—Toni Eugene
Study Tackles Unappetizing Topic
With MREs already evaluated on nutritional
value, taste and stable shelf life,
Army researchers now are exploring the
role of those operational food rations in
so-called gut health.
The U.S. Army Research Institute of
Environmental Medicine in Natick,
Mass., is recruiting volunteers for a study
of how the human gastrointestinal tract’s
population of bacteria—known as gut
flora, or gut microbiota—responds to
MREs. A total of 60 people will complete
the study, with half eating only
MREs for 21 days and the other half
consuming what they normally would.
Both groups will meet with researchers
three times a week to give fecal, blood
and urine samples. “We use these samples
to assess if the MRE is impacting
bacteria and whether that interaction
influences health,” said J. Philip Karl, a
nutrition scientist in the research institute’s
military nutrition division and
SoldierSpeak
On Promotions
“We have some of the lowest promotion rates that we’ve had in a while. We’re going
to reduce those [retention control points] back down to where they were … to stimulate
promotions,” said Sgt. Maj. of the Army Daniel A. Dailey, speaking to 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) soldiers at Fort Campbell, Ky.
On Cheap Solutions
“If the Army supports and funds the ability for that infantry platoon leader on the
ground to rapidly fabricate a solution with his organic elements … then we can save
lots of time and money,” said Capt. Brent Chapman, a member of the Strategic
Initiatives Group at the U.S. Military Academy’s Army Cyber Institute, who built
a drone-stopping rifle for $150 in parts.
On Being Part of a Team
“One of the things I have come to count on most in this life is that those who try to
run alone often fail to succeed,” said Maj. John Grauer, U.S. Army Garrison-
Hawaii, who teamed with three other Army chaplains to run an ultramarathon. “As
a team we can endure what we never could as individuals; we encourage each
other to be better, push harder and to endure.”
On Joint Education
“We need to expose our junior noncommissioned officers and petty officers sooner
to better opportunities for joint education. What we get by broadening that leader
is a better asset to the service as well as the joint force,” said Army Command Sgt.
Maj. John W. Troxell, senior enlisted advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, in an address to the crew of the aircraft carrier George Washington in Norfolk,
Va.
On the Islamic State Group
“This enemy has proven time and again its ruthlessness, its barbarity, its willingness
to destroy everything from human life to civilian supporting infrastructure to …
cultural artifacts,” said Col. Steve Warren, spokesman for Combined Joint Task
Force Operation Inherent Resolve, during a Pentagon press briefing, “with absolute
disregard for history, for humanity, or anything that approaches decency.”
On Brain Training
“Training the brain is really the gateway to improved readiness and performance.
We’re demanding creative thinking in the Army Operating Concept, but we’re not
actually teaching it. It actually can be taught,” said Col. Benjamin Solomon, a neurologist
in the Army Surgeon General’s office, during a Human Systems Conference
sponsored by the National Defense Industrial Association.
On Innovation
“Innovating is not simply buying new equipment to better fight the enemy. The
Army doesn’t need million-dollar solutions to $100 problems. We need $10 solutions
to $100 problems,” Gen. David G. Perkins, commanding general of the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, said during AUSA’s Global Force Symposium
and Exposition.
On Hard Work
“My heart started racing and I just got all excited and happy because it’s an unbelievable
feeling to finally see all your hard work has paid off,” said Pvt. Brodie Weinberg
after losing more than 120 pounds and passing the Army’s “tape test” so he
could enlist.
10 ARMY ■ June 2016

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Darron Salzer
Guard Winners Make Time
Staff Sgt. Erich Friedlein, left, of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard and Capt. Robert Killian of
the Colorado Army National Guard are on their way to winning the Best Ranger Competition for
the Guard for the first time since the annual event began 33 years ago. The 2016 contest took place
at Fort Benning, Ga., in April.
the study’s lead investigator.
Much research in recent years has
linked good gut health to overall wellness.
“The bacteria in our guts can digest
the foods we cannot,” Karl said. “The
byproducts of that digestion are often
beneficial for health. They improve the
integrity of our intestinal wall, which
helps prevent unwanted compounds
from getting into the bloodstream. They
also create an environment in the gut
that’s conducive to the growth of healthy
bacteria.”
The food and beverages we consume
can affect gut flora balance. When that
balance gets out of whack and bad bacteria
outnumber good, Karl said, gastrointestinal
illnesses and other ailments can
occur that negatively impact health, performance
and readiness.
“A recent explosion in technology now
allows us to study the trillions of bacteria
living in our gut in ways we never have
been able to before,” Karl said. “We
GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES*
Maj. Gen. R.L.
Cloutier Jr. from
CG, U.S. Army
Training Ctr. and
Fort Jackson, S.C.,
to CoS, AFRICOM,
Germany.
Maj. Gen. G.J.
Franz III from CG,
INSCOM, Fort
Belvoir, Va., to
Dir. of Ops., J-3,
CYBERCOM,
Fort Meade, Md.
Maj. Gen. C.K.
Haas from Dir.,
Force Mgmt. and
Development, US-
SOCOM, MacDill
AFB, Fla., to DCoS,
Ops., RSM,
NATO/USF-A, OFS,
Afghanistan.
Maj. Gen. W.E.
Phipps Jr. from
Senior Advisor to
the Ministry of
Defense, USF-A,
OFS, Afghanistan,
to Dep. CG for
Ops. and CoS,
IMCOM, JB San
Antonio.
Maj. Gen. W.E. Piatt
from Dir., Ops., Readiness
and Mobilization,
G-3/5/7, USA,
Washington, D.C.,
to Dir. of Ops. and
Dir., Rapid Equipment
Fielding, Army
RCO, OASA (ALT),
Washington, D.C.
Maj. Gen. M.R.
Quantock from
DCoS, Intel., RSM,
NATO, and Dir., J-2,
USF-A, OFS,
Afghanistan, to Dir.,
J-2, CENTCOM,
MacDill AFB.
Maj. Gen. R.P.
White from DCoS,
G-3/5/7, FORSCOM,
Fort Bragg, N.C., to
CG, 1st Armored
Div. and Fort Bliss,
Texas.
Brigadier Generals: S.W. Ainsworth, USAR, from CG, TPU, 94th Training Div., Force Sustainment and Dep. CG for Mobilization and Training, IMA, CASCOM, Fort Lee, Va.,
to Cmdr., TPU, 7th MSC and Dep. CG, 21st TSC, Germany; R.A. Bassford, USAR, from Dep. CG, TPU, 88th RSC, Fort McCoy, Wis., to Cmdr., TPU, 95th Training Div., IET, Fort
Sill, Okla.; W.M. Burleson III from Dir., MCCoE, CAC, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., to Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Defense, USF-A, OFS, Afghanistan; C.G. Cavoli from CG,
JMTC, USAREUR, Germany, to CG, 25th Inf. Div., Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; D.J. Christian, USAR, from Cmdr., TPU, 95th Training Div., IET, Fort Sill, to Dep. Cmdr., TPU,
412th TEC, Vicksburg, Miss.; D.C. Crissman from Dep. CG, Spt., 3rd Inf. Div., Fort Stewart, Ga., to Dep. CG, 3rd (U.K.) Div., U.K.; E.J. Deedrick Jr. from Cmdr., SOCKOR, ROK,
to Dep. CG, USASFC (A), Fort Bragg; J.R. Evans Jr. from Dep. CG, Spt., 2nd Inf. Div., Combined, Eighth Army, ROK, to CG, USASOAC, Fort Bragg; M.R. Gervais from Cmdt.,
CBRN School, MSCoE, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., to Dep. CG, CAC, Fort Leavenworth; K.L. Kamper from CG, OTC, Fort Hood, Texas, to Dep. CG, 4th Inf. Div., Fort Carson,
Colo.; (P) M.E. Kurilla from Dep. Dir. for Special Ops. and Counterterrorism, J-3, Jt. Staff, Washington, D.C., to CG, 82nd Abn. Div., Fort Bragg; H. Lopez, USAR, from CoS,
IMA, Eighth Army, ROK, to CG, TPU, 94th Training Div., Force Sustainment and Dep. CG for Mobilization and Training, IMA, CASCOM, Fort Lee; D.S. McKean from Cmdt.,
U.S. Army Armor School, MCoE, Fort Benning, Ga., to Chief, OSC-I, CENTCOM, Iraq; J.L. Milhorn from CG, Pacific Ocean Div., USACE, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, to Asst. CoS, G-3,
USARPAC, Fort Shafter; E.C. Peterson from CG, USASOAC, Fort Bragg, to Dir., Army Aviation, ODCoS, G-3/5/7, USA, Washington, D.C.; B.E. Winski from Dep. CG, 82nd
Abn. Div., Fort Bragg, to Dir., Ops., Readiness and Mobilization, ODCoS, G-3/5/7, USA, Washington, D.C.
■ Abn.—Airborne; AFB—Air Force Base; AFRICOM—U.S. Africa Cmd.; CAC—U.S. Army Combined Arms Ctr.; CASCOM—U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Cmd.; CBRN—
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear; CENTCOM—U.S. Central Cmd.; CG—Commanding General; CoS—Chief of Staff; CYBERCOM—U.S. Cyber Cmd.; DCoS—
Deputy Chief of Staff; FORSCOM—U.S. Army Forces Cmd.; IET—Initial Entry Training; IMA—Individual Mobilization Augmentee; IMCOM—Installation Management Cmd.;
INSCOM—U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Cmd.; Intel.—Intelligence; JMTC—Joint Multinational Training Cmd.; MCCoE—Mission Cmd. Ctr. of Excellence; MCoE—Maneuver
Ctr. Of Excellence; MSC—Mission Support Cmd.; MSCoE—Maneuver Spt. Ctr. of Excellence; OASA (ALT)—Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology); ODCoS—Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff; OFS—Operation Freedom’s Sentinel; Ops.—Operations; OSC-I—Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq; OTC—Operational
Test Cmd.; P—Promotable; RCO—Rapid Capabilities Office; ROK—Republic of Korea; RSC—Regional Support Cmd.; RSM—Resolute Support Mission; SOCKOR—Special
Operations Cmd.-Korea; Spt.—Support; TEC—Theater Engineer Cmd.; TPU—Troop Program Unit; TSC—Theater Support Cmd.; USA—U.S. Army; USACE—U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers; USAR—U.S. Army Reserve; USAREUR—U.S. Army Europe; USARPAC—U.S. Army Pacific; USASFC (A)—U.S. Army Special Forces Cmd. (Airborne); USASOAC—U.S.
Army Special Operations Aviation Cmd.; USF-A—U.S. Forces-Afghanistan; USSOCOM—U.S. Special Operations Cmd.
*Assignments to general officer slots announced by the General Officer Management Office, Department of the Army. Some officers are listed at the grade to which they are
nominated, promotable or eligible to be frocked. The reporting dates for some officers may not yet be determined.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 11

think we can leverage those bacteria to
have a favorable effect on warfighters out
in the field and in garrison.”
COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR and SERGEANTS MAJOR CHANGES*
Briefs
Repair Backlog Hits $7 Billion
The Army has a $7 billion and growing
backlog of infrastructure maintenance
and no current plan to address it,
Katherine Hammack, the assistant secretary
of the Army for installations, energy
and environment, has warned Congress.
Twenty percent of the Army’s infrastructure
is in “poor or failing condition,”
she said, but without money the backlog
will just keep increasing and “facilities
will fail faster.”
Maintenance and repairs are being
done on a worst-first basis, she said, but
there is little chance of making any significant
headway considering the entire
2017 construction budget is $1.3 billion,
an amount 18 percent less than in 2016.
“We are taking significant risk in installations
and creating a bill for the future
by the underfunding that we are
forced to live under in the restricted budget
environment,” she said.
Sgt. Maj. A.L.
Barteky from G-3,
I Corps, JB Lewis-
McChord, Wash.,
to HQDA, G-3/5/7,
Pentagon, Arlington,
Va.
Command Sgt.
Maj. H.M.
Hodgkins from
USAG Yongsan,
Korea, to U.S. Army
CBRN School, Fort
Leonard Wood, Mo.
Command Sgt.
Maj. D.M. Clark
from USMA, West
Point, N.Y., to HQ,
USF-A/Resolute
Support, Kabul,
Afghanistan.
Sgt. Maj. R.
Johnson from
CAC-Training, Fort
Leavenworth, Kan.,
to Command Sgt.
Maj., First Army,
RIA, Ill.
Command Sgt.
Maj. W.E. Engram
from USAIS, Fort
Benning, Ga., to
BMC, Fort Bliss,
Texas.
Command Sgt.
Maj. G.M. Lott from
44th Medical Bde.,
Fort Bragg, N.C., to
CAC-Education, Fort
Leavenworth.
Command Sgt.
Maj. J.W. Foley
from 188th Inf. Bde.,
Fort Stewart, Ga.,
to 94th AAMDC,
JB Pearl Harbor-
Hickam, Hawaii.
Command Sgt.
Maj. B.A. Parsons
from FA Bde., 1st
Cav. Div., Fort
Hood, Texas, to
USAFAS, Fort Sill,
Okla.
■ AAMDC—Air and Missile Defense Cmd.; Bde.—Brigade; BMC—Brigade Modernization Cmd.; CAC—Combined
Arms Ctr.; CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear; FA—Field Artillery; HQDA—Headquarters,
Department of the Army; JB—Joint Base; RIA—Rock Island Arsenal; USAFAS—U.S. Army Field Artillery
School; USAG—U.S. Army Garrison; USAIS—U.S. Army Infantry School; USF-A—U.S. Forces-Afghanistan;
USMA—U.S. Military Academy.
*Command sergeants major and sergeants major positions assigned to general officer commands.
Financial Complaints Detailed
Debt collection continues to be the
biggest financial gripe of service members,
veterans and their families, according
to the Office of Servicemember
Affairs at the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.
The office’s fourth annual complaint
report said about 46 percent of the
19,200 complaints it received in 2015
from the military community pertained
to debt collection, up 2 percent from
the previous year and at nearly twice the
rate of the general population. Service
members may be more concerned about
debt than their civilian counterparts because
it could impact their careers, said
Holly Petraeus, assistant director of the
Office of Servicemember Affairs.
Second were complaints about mortgages,
15 percent of the total and up 10
percent since 2014. Credit reporting followed
at 11 percent. Perhaps reflecting
economic worries, consumer loans totaled
only 7 percent of the total complaints
but were up a whopping 59 percent,
most pertaining to managing loans,
leases or lines of credit. ✭
SENIOR EXECUTIVE
SERVICE
ANNOUNCEMENTS
D. Markowitz,
Tier 3, from Asst.
DCoS, G-3/5/7, to
Asst. DCoS, G-8,
HQDA, Washington,
D.C.
K. Miller, Tier 3,
from Asst. DCoS,
G-4, to Asst. DCoS,
G-3/5/7, HQDA,
Washington, D.C.
B. Butler, Tier 2,
from Exec. Dir.,
ILSC, TACOM
LCMC, to Dep. to
the Cmdr., TACOM
LCMC, Warren,
Mich.
J. Lyle, Tier 2, from
Assoc. Dep. Asst.
Secy. (Contracting),
OASAF/AQ, Washington,
D.C., to
Dep. to the Cmdr.,
ACC, AMC, RA, Ala.
R. Maxwell, Tier 2,
from Dir., Resource
Mgmt. (J1/J8),
AFRICOM, Stuttgart,
Germany, to Dir.,
Resource Mgmt.
and Material, OCAR,
Washington, D.C.
■ ACC—U.S. Army Contracting Cmd.; AFRICOM—U.S Africa Cmd.; AMC—U.S. Army Materiel Cmd.; DCoS—Deputy Chief of Staff; HQDA—Headquarters, Department
of the Army; ILSC—Integrated Logistics Support Ctr.; OASAF/AQ—Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); OCAR—Office of the Chief, Army
Reserve; RA—Redstone Arsenal; TACOM LCMC—U.S. Army Tank Automotive Cmd. Life Cycle Management Cmd.
12 ARMY ■ June 2016

2016 AUSA
ANNUAL MEETING
AND EXPOSITION
A Professional Development Forum
3-5 October 2016 | Walter E. Washington Convention Center | Washington, D.C.
All ticket purchases will be held for pickup at the Ticket Pickup Counter of the Walter E. Washington Convention Center.
A government-issued photo identification will be required for pickup.
Payment must accompany this order • Please print or type
No refunds for ticket orders cancelled after 16 SEPTEMBER 2016
Cancellation in writing only
AUSA MEMBERSHIP NUMBER

14 ARMY ■ June 2016

Front & Center
Commentaries From Around the Army
Military: Arbiters of National Morality?
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired
Aheadline on a recent opinion column
in The Washington Post caught my
attention: “The military wouldn’t disobey
President Trump’s illegal orders.” It
troubled me. The column, by Georgetown
University Law Center professor
Rosa Brooks, a former Pentagon official,
postulates that if Donald Trump were
elected president, he would bring back
torture, specifically waterboarding; the
bombing of women and children, specifically
the families of terrorists; and probably
other war crimes.
The column includes what Trump
said when he was asked during a March
Republican presidential candidate debate
in Detroit what he would do if the military
refused to obey his orders to adopt
such illegal practices: “Believe me. … If I
say, ‘Do it,’ they’re going to do it.”
That statement is followed by paragraphs
establishing that although the
military is told they must not follow “illegal
orders,” they cannot be counted on
to resist. The George W. Bush administration
is charged with ordering torture
(waterboarding), telling DoD that
the Geneva Conventions would not apply
for Taliban captives. The administration
also provided assurances that the
White House was “preserv[ing] flexibility”
and “reduc[ing] the threat of domestic
criminal prosecution under the
War Crimes Act.” The administration
then ignored objections expressed by
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the military lawyers who opposed
some of those decisions and practices.
The column then opined that resistance
regarding violations of domestic
criminal law and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) was limited to
exchanges of memos among military
staffs. “No one staged a coup; no senior
officer resigned in public protest … and
military brass followed orders from their
civilian masters,” Brooks wrote.
Enough of the indictment. But who
appointed the generals and admirals as
arbiters of the national morality? Why
are they the ones who should resign in
protest or the ones to bring charges
against their superiors? Shouldn’t the
CIA, charged with conducting such nefarious
practices, have some responsibility?
Don’t defense officials have a role in
overseeing the legality of military operations?
How about the State Department,
attorney general, or justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court?
The expectation that military leaders
ought to have such a role becomes
ludicrous when one considers that the
government—both the executive and
legislative branches—has eroded the
authority of military leaders to exercise
any form of judicial responsibility once
considered normal in conforming to the
rules of the UCMJ. Field grade officers
and commanders once conducted courtsmartial;
that authority now rests with the
Judge Advocate General’s Corps, which
runs trials more related to civil than military
law.
Commanders were once entrusted to
conduct operations in conformance with
internationally established laws of war,
but that authority now rests with lawyers
as well. And all are governed by the
ubiquitous “rules of engagement” decreed
from the offices of the same people
accused of issuing illegal orders.
The authority of generals and admirals
is, first, to execute the laws, decisions and
plans directed by the president, the secretary
of defense or Congress to prepare
for and conduct military operations.
When asked, they may offer military advice
and counsel regarding those duties.
They are then responsible for the adherence
of the forces to the UCMJ and the
Who decides legality, and when is that decision promulgated?
laws of war that have been adopted as
national policy. Nowhere in the charter
was there a requirement to judge the legality
of policies or decisions of governmental
superiors until the post-World
War II laws requiring military personnel
to not obey illegal orders.
Who decides legality, and when is
that decision promulgated? The law
protects the higher echelons who can
avoid blame for actions later determined
to be illegal as they cite those in the
lower echelons as responsible for transgressions,
but it is a law unfair to the
lieutenant or sergeant who is told to attack
a building where there might be
women and children.
P.S. After finishing this column, an e-
mail headlined “The Castration of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff” from U.S. Defense
Watch, a conservative commentary website,
expressed more dissatisfaction with
our military leaders, this time concerning
their responsibilities for their services,
not the morality of the nation. It is a savage
attack on a former chairman along
with an expression of concern that the
current chiefs have accommodated too
readily to the social changes that have
been ordered.
It is a thought-provoking and tellingly
critical read but again, provides no acknowledgement
or understanding of the
limitations and restrictions under which
the chiefs operate and has no condemnation
of the officials who issued the controversial
decrees being discussed. Food
for future thought?
■
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., formerly
served as vice chief of staff of the
U.S. Army and commander in chief of
U.S. Army Europe. He is a senior fellow
of AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 15

By Any Other Name, War Is Still War
By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. Army retired
Imagine trying to explain Little League, have adopted a “spectrum of conflict” approach.
college ball and Major League as a distinct
each, without understanding they On one hand, taking this approach
are all forms of baseball. Each is slightly makes eminent sense. Armed humanitarian
assistance, peace enforcement,
different, but their commonalities help
explain their differences.
peacekeeping, peace support, counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, counterinter-
It seems that too many civilian strategists
and military leaders have been trying
to do just that when it comes to war. operations, stabilization operations, convention,
hybrid, irregular war, gray zone
To be sure, there are different forms of ventional war, and the many other types
war, but each variety of war cannot be of conflict on the spectrum do differ
understood separately from its common from one another. Further, the specifics
source. All forms of war reflect war’s essential
nature and arise from particular political, economic and security details
of local and regional geographic, social,
circumstances. Each form, therefore, is matter both in understanding the conflict
and in structuring approaches that
different, but all are war nonetheless.
This intellectual deficiency has been going
on for a long time and hinders our On the other hand, this approach di-
have a reasonable probability of success.
ability to understand the current war and minishes—perhaps even hides—what
how to succeed in it.
each of these uses of military force has in
For example, I wrote in a 1994 Armed common: They are all reflections of war
Forces Journal International essay, “War as a total phenomenon. This approach
In All Its Forms,” that Americans define also hides the fact that any solution suggested
for a particular form of war along
war as the armies of one nation-state or
groups of nation-states fighting those of the spectrum cannot be contrary to war’s
another. Then we draw a line, and everything
else is operations other than war. I One of the mistakes we have made,
essential nature.
argued that this kind of understanding of starting in the recovery from the Vietnam
War, is this: In separating the vari-
war is dangerous because it suggests the
conditions required for success in war eties of uses of force, we have created an
differ from those labeled other-thanwar.
The particulars of any given use of have come to believe that each point
intellectual environment in which we
military force are important, but any situation
in which violence is being used to point, therefore, requires its own doc-
along the spectrum is unique. Each
compel the submission of an opponent trine; its own training methodology; and
to attain a specific political purpose is its own strategic, operational and tactical
war and must be approached as such. approach.
Carl von Clausewitz made the point Again, there is partial truth and utility
even stronger: Any solution to a particular
war that runs contrary to war’s nature we have told ourselves this story and em-
in so categorizing the uses of force. But
increases the likelihood of being wrong. phasized the differences among points of
This is part of what he means when he the spectrum for so long that we are lost
says in On War that statesmen and commanders
must not mistake the war the forest.
in the trees, unable to navigate through
they’re in for, or try to turn it into, In his 2013 book, The Direction of
“something alien to its nature.”
War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical
Unfortunately, the main line of Perspective, British historian and strategist
Hew Strachan calls this intellectual
thinking in the U.S. has followed a different
path. Instead of using Clausewitz mistake—the separation of war from all
to cultivate an understanding of war as other uses of military force—the “binary
an overall phenomenon and acknowledging
that war has many varieties since more like another than it is like any other
vision of war.” He writes, “One war is
part of war’s essence is being “more than human activity, and that is sufficiently
a chameleon,” for the past 22 years we true across time for us to identify the nature
of war as possessed of enough enduring
characteristics to be a common
phenomenon.”
He acknowledges that “those who
study war as a practical business” have to
“bridge the divide between the nature of
war more generally and the specific character
of each war in particular.”
But, he cautions, this “binary vision of
war has two illogical consequences. First,
it treats current operations as exceptional,
as deviations from the norm of
major war.”
We set ourselves up for failure when
we convince ourselves that a particular
use of force requires less upfront thinking,
planning, preparation or organization
because it’s “not war”; that our aims
need not be as clear as they would be in
“real war”; or that we need not think
through the ends-ways-means or the
tactical-operational-strategic relationships
as completely as we would if we
were waging a “war.”
Perhaps the end of the Cold War as
well as the emergence of the Information
Age also encouraged this kind of binary
thinking. This period was taken by some
as the end of history, though not in the
sense that Francis Fukuyama intended in
his book The End of History and the Last
Man. Everything was new. With respect
to war, we could now “lift the fog of
war.” War as we knew it was over. The
revolution in military affairs would usher
in wars whose nature would be substantively
different from the past.
The U.S. responded to the 9/11 attacks
with just this view in mind: Network-centric
warfare and air-delivered
precision munitions would obviate the
need for large numbers of ground forces.
Or so we thought.
Certainly, the tools of the Information
Age have changed some aspects of how
wars are fought. But as the last 15 years
of war have proven, they have neither
changed all aspects of warfighting nor altered
the nature of war.
“This will be a different kind of war,”
President George W. Bush announced
after the 9/11 attacks. He was right in
one sense, and that’s Strachan’s point.
The nature of war hasn’t changed, so
16 ARMY ■ June 2016

many aspects of fighting and waging war
remain constant; and every strategy, policy
or other approach suggested must
comport with that nature.
When Clausewitz says the first task of
statesmen or commanders is to figure
out the kind of war on which they’re
embarking, he does not mean figure out
at which point on the spectrum of conflict
this war fits, then put a label on it.
Rather, he means look at what the enemy
is trying to do, the various ways
they are trying to achieve their goals,
what they are using as means, and how
much effort they’re willing to expend to
achieve their aims. This kind of intellectual
and analytical work produces an understanding
of the kind of war one is in.
Then, Clausewitz continues, don’t try to
change that understanding to fit preconceived
notions.
If we were to follow this logic, we
would be clear that our enemies are waging
a global, revolutionary war, and we
wouldn’t keep trying to make it something
it’s not—a set of counterterrorist
actions.
Strachan describes a second, peacetime
consequence of the binary approach to
war: “It can make many long-term procurement
projects look irrelevant and
sometimes irrational.” The logic of this
seduction goes: The most likely form of
war is ______ (fill in your favorite point
along the spectrum of conflict). Therefore,
the logic continues, we need only the
capabilities necessary for that form of war.
Of course, this logic is extreme, but one
can also see its presence in today’s strategic
discussions concerning both the size
of the U.S. military and its composition.
What this logic forgets is that war, in
any of its varieties, is more unitary than it
is divided. Also, when war starts at one
point on the spectrum, it often jumps to
another. Further, many wars combine
points on the spectrum. Finally, given
the nature of war, optimizing the armed
forces of a nation toward one variety of
war is simply folly.
There are constants in all forms of
war, in all uses of military force. Some
examples are:
■ Tactical actions, whether military or
nonmilitary, must be combined sequentially
and simultaneously into military
and nonmilitary campaigns that serve to
achieve strategic aims.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 17

■ Aims, strategies, policies and campaigns
must be sufficiently coherent and
flexible to adapt to the ambiguity of war’s
unfolding.
■ Domestic and coalition organizational
structures must be put in place to
make initial decisions among a host of
agencies; adapt those decisions over
time—again, in response to war’s dynamic
nature; and produce and sustain
sufficiently constant unity of effort in execution.
■ The legitimacy of the war must be
accepted by the community that wages it
and, in most cases, by the international
community as well.
Also constant is that war is the realm
of fear, fog, friction, chance, emotion
and uncertainty as well as the realm of
judgment, leadership, courage, reason
and skill. Every point along the spectrum
of war shares these and other characteristics,
and any so-called solution for a particular
form of war that does not recognize
these commonalities is likely to
make things worse or fail altogether.
Continuity and change are two sides of
war’s coin—another constant.
Civilian and military leaders must get
back to understanding war as a total
phenomenon first; then understanding
how each variety of war both reflects
war’s nature and arises from particular
circumstances. As Strachan concludes,
“Embracing the unitary nature of war as
a departure point is not a substitute for
hard thinking about the character of
wars” that are either imminent or in
hand, but it does mean that the hard
thinking “rests on a secure, rather than a
superficial, foundation.”
A new administration offers an opportunity
to reassess and redirect. When
such a reassessment occurs, it should rest
on a more secure foundation than it has
for the past 15 years.
■
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.,
Ph.D., is a former commander of Multi-
National Security Transition Command-
Iraq and is a senior fellow of AUSA’s
Institute of Land Warfare. He has a
bachelor’s degree from Gannon University;
a master’s degree from the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College;
and a master’s degree and Ph.D.
from Johns Hopkins University.
Look to the Past for Lessons
By Maj. Joe Byerly
As military professionals, one of the
most critical components of our personal
growth is the time and energy we
spend on self-development. Whether it is
through reading, reflection, or deliberately
placing ourselves in experiences that
force us out of our comfort zones, we
must be relentless in this endeavor. The
men and women we lead need us to be
the most competent and confident versions
of ourselves.
So how can we improve our leadership
abilities? By looking to the past. History
is a landscape full of commanders who
led soldiers through extreme conditions
and faced great fear and uncertainty yet
accomplished amazing feats. Their leadership
made the difference, and we can
improve ourselves by studying their successes
as well as their failures.
Some might argue that we get enough
leadership training and development from
our everyday experiences in the military.
They believe these experiences provide
enough of the raw materials to build ourselves
into better leaders. This can be evidenced
by a claim that Lt. Col. Drew
Steadman recently made on his blog at
TheMilitaryLeader.com, arguing that
we’ve taken leadership out of leader development.
I believe this is why many
military professionals rarely pick up a
book. I’ve met several officers through the
years who read only during professional
military education courses. They’ve been
platoon leaders, squad leaders or company
commanders; what more do they need?
I see three problems with viewing our
narrow experiences as enough to maximize
our leadership potential.
Time
In the grand scheme of things, we do
not have a lot of time to perfect our
leadership abilities. For most of us, positions
of leadership come quickly and
then are gone in a blinding flash. We’re
leading platoons—bam! We’re an assistant
S-3. We’re leading companies—
bam! We’re preparing slides for the next
day’s brief on a brigade staff. Let’s face
it: For officers, command is the exception,
not the norm.
Now let’s examine our time in actual
leadership positions. We spend the first
couple of months figuring stuff out. Then,
we get in a groove and an event or person
happens—a lost weapon, a death, new
boss, troubled subordinate—that consumes
us. We shake it off and get back in
our groove, and then we finally feel like
we’ve got this leadership thing down.
Time’s up; now, we must begin prepping
for the next person to take over our organization.
We start looking toward the
handover to make sure it goes smoothly.
We say goodbye to our squad, platoon or
command. It’s over; back to staff.
It is for this reason we need to arrive
prepared, ready to hit the ground running
when we are in charge, and make
the most of our time leading others. One
way to do this is to think about the type
of leader we want to be ahead of time.
Nothing helps drive introspection better
than studying past leaders.
Additionally, we can come loaded with
vicarious experiences that will greatly improve
our decisionmaking abilities.
British Field Marshal Sir William Slim
can help us think through the value of
calm and cool-headed leadership when
we are up against insurmountable problems.
Gen. George S. Patton Jr. can
teach how aggression on the battlefield
affects enemy decisionmaking. Finally,
Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant can prepare us
to effectively exercise Mission Command
when one of our subordinates is a Maj.
Gen. William T. Sherman and the other
is a Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren.
Whatever investment we make ahead
of time in self-development will ensure
that we arrive better prepared to lead our
formations. Additionally, the interplay of
the leadership experiences of others mixed
with our own will help us quickly develop
into the leaders our organizations need.
Great and Horrible Bosses
We learn a lot from and are largely influenced
by the leaders we encounter in
the military. Most of the bosses I’ve
worked for have been good, and I consider
myself fortunate to have served under
them. But in 12 years, I can give the
title of “great” only to a limited few. The
same goes for horrible bosses; I’ve had
18 ARMY ■ June 2016

only a small number along the way.
Just like we need a harsh winter to appreciate
a wonderful summer, we need
both great and horrible leaders in our
lives to help mold us into the best version
of ourselves. We don’t run into too many
of these in our careers. This is the second
reason we must turn to military leaders
from the past to help shape our leadership
identity.
Great leaders such as British Vice
Adm. Horatio Nelson can inspire us to
truly achieve Mission Command in our
organizations. Gen. George Washington
teaches about the importance of selfstudy
and the character required to lead
in the face of friction and uncertainty. Sir
Winston Churchill’s early career was rife
with failure; he teaches that failure does
not have to define us but can develop us.
And Maj. Gen. Fox Conner, who was a
role model to then-Maj. Dwight D.
Eisenhower, highlights the importance
of mentorship.
While I’ve learned a great deal from
the leaders listed above, I’ve also learned
much from the horrible bosses of history
as well as rising stars who fell from grace.
Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, who was permanently
dismissed from the Continental
Army, is a great example of what happens
when we fail to follow others and let
our personal flaws go unchecked as we
are given more responsibility. The careers
of Gens. George McClellan and Douglas
MacArthur should help us reflect on ego
so we may keep ours from clouding professional
judgment. British Gen. Sir
Redvers Buller, from the Boer War, exemplifies
what happens when we fail to
develop our intuition through self-study.
Combat Experience
Finally, war is a phenomenon that
breaks down the best systems, the best
plans and the best armies with a vengeance.
As Carl von Clausewitz noted in
On War, this is overcome only with exceptional
leadership.
There are several books that when
paired with the study of individual leaders
can help us think through leadership in
combat. Karl Marlantes’ What It Is Like to
Go to War can aid in preparing for the
moral struggles we will face from prolonged
combat. We can learn about the
effects war has on an organization’s discipline
in Jim Frederick’s Black Hearts: One
Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s
Triangle of Death. Peter Hart’s Voices from
the Front: An Oral History of the Great War
brings the day-to-day realities of largescale
warfare into clear focus. Finally, we
can learn to avoid many of the failures of
past leaders by reading Eliot A. Cohen
and John Gooch’s Military Misfortunes:
The Anatomy of Failure in War.
When we study the leaders who came
before us, we begin to reflect on the
leadership traits we want to develop in
ourselves.
The choice is ours. We can either be
shaped and influenced by our narrow experiences,
or we can allow leaders from
over 5,000 years of combat to mold us
into the great leaders our subordinates
deserve.
■
Maj. Joe Byerly is an armor officer and the
operations officer for the 2nd Squadron,
1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade
Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division,
Fort Carson, Colo. He holds a bachelor’s
degree from North Georgia College
and State University, and a master’s degree
from the U.S. Naval War College.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 19

She’s The Army
Rallying Soldiers to Get Out and Vote
The November presidential election may be coming up, but
getting out the vote is a year-round job in the Army.
That effort is led by Rachel Gilman, Army voting action officer
of the Army Voting Assistance Program, part of the U.S.
Army Human Resources Command at
Fort Knox, Ky. The program is a bipartisan
outreach and assistance program that
helps soldiers around the world figure out
how to vote, where to vote and when to
vote, and answers any questions they may
have. “We try to make it as easy as possible,”
Gilman said.
“I would hope that more people get out
and vote,” Gilman added. “I hope that our
younger generation thinks it is important
to vote. And I hope many of them understand
it is not just important to vote in a
presidential election, but it is important to
vote in all elections. Voting makes a difference
in your hometown, where you live.”
Or, as her email signature urges, “Be
Absent but Accounted For!”
Gilman has been at her job for five years.
“I’ve been a military wife for 25 years, and
Rachel Gilman
I’ve lived all over the world. I’ve also voted all over the world.
When I accepted this job, I thought it was going to be exciting,
but I had no clue how much I was going to love it.”
Gilman, who has a bachelor’s degree in social work and an
MBA, had managed the Military Personnel Division for the
U.S. Army Garrison in Yongsan during husband Fred’s deployment
to South Korea. When they changed stations to
Fort Knox, she applied online for a human resource specialist
position and was selected to manage the Army Voting Assistance
Program.
The program “is here to actively assist soldiers and other eligible
individuals,” Gilman said. “We educate voters about the
importance of voting. We provide forms and show them how
to go online. We help them if they have questions, and help
them locate their local election office. The program makes
voting registration, information, materials and assistance readily
available to them. Wherever they are in the world, they’ll
have the opportunity to cast a ballot if they want.”
While Gilman administers the program by herself under
the leadership of Brig. Gen. James Iacocca, the adjutant general
of the Army, the Voting Assistance Program has about
4,000 voting assistance officers (VAOs)—soldiers who are
tasked as their unit’s representatives for the program—plus 25
senior VAOs; and 64 installation voting assistance officers
(IVAOs) who are responsible for installation voting assistance
offices throughout Africa, Europe, Asia and the U.S.
VAOs and IVAOs help soldiers in myriad ways. They assist
with absentee ballots, provide up-to-date voting information
on local primary elections and presidential elections, and encourage
troops and family members to
make their vote count. They are “the true
assets of the program,” Gilman said.
“Without them, I would not be able to do
this by myself.”
No matter where a soldier is, there is
someone nearby who can provide voting
assistance, said Bill Costello, U.S. Army
Resources Command public affairs officer,
who works indirectly with Gilman on the
program.
“When the 101st Airborne sent soldiers
to fight Ebola in Liberia, there was a voting
assistance officer on their team,” he
said. “If a soldier has a question about voting
and they’re in a different country, there
is a resource for that soldier to go to.”
Gilman is excited for this year because of
the upcoming presidential election. “This
will be my second presidential election” in
her role. She said she personally votes in all elections for which
she is eligible to participate.
To magnify the Voting Assistance Program’s abilities to
reach as many soldiers and dependents as possible and to always
present the most accurate information, it works with the
Federal Voting Assistance Program. All VAOs are trained
through the program before providing assistance to soldiers
and their families. Gilman also uses social media platforms
and a newsletter to spread information.
“We work with the Federal Voting Assistance Program and
publicize when the state primaries are. We publicize when the
governor’s elections are. We use Facebook and Twitter. I also
have a newsletter. We use as much as possible to spread the
information and get it out to the people,” she said.
Gilman’s passion for helping people vote is something that
she focuses on daily, she added, and hopes to keep the program
as successful as possible in reaching those who need assistance.
“The voting program goes all year around and it
never stops,” she said. “We want every eligible family member
to have the ability to vote.”
“Helping someone vote who hasn’t voted in a couple years,
showing someone how easy it is to vote or helping someone
vote for the first time, shows me how grateful I am to run this
program,” she said.
—Staff Report
U.S. Army
20 ARMY ■ June 2016

Sullivan
Farewell
Army Has Changed,
Not for the Better
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Laura Buchta
By Rick Maze, Editor-in-Chief
‘We may be living a tragedy,’ says retired Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, who is stepping down as president and CEO of the Association of the U.S. Army.
As he prepares to step down June 30 as president and
CEO of the Association of the U.S. Army, retired
Army Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan is deeply concerned
about the future. Not his, but the Army’s.
“We may be living a tragedy,” said the 78-year-old Quincy,
Mass., native, who worries about an undermanned and underresourced
Army being called upon to send soldiers into battle
who may be less than fully prepared, less than fully armed, and
at less than full strength. “The Army has changed, and I am
not sure it is for the better,” Sullivan said. “I see the Army being
emasculated.”
Sullivan spent more than 36 years in the Army, rising to become
the 32nd Army chief of staff. He then spent more than
18 years heading AUSA, an educational nonprofit dedicated
to being a voice for the Army and its soldiers. Retired Army
Gen. Carter F. Ham is Sullivan’s successor at AUSA.
He’s Seen This Before
Sullivan speaks with experience when he expresses trepidation
about the Army’s future. When he was chief at the end of
the Cold War, he was ordered to oversee what amounted to a
40 percent reduction over four years in the Total Army. He
did this while attempting to maintain morale and a sense of
purpose while also seeing the Army deploy on unexpected
contingencies to Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and the Balkans; and
also with Hurricane Andrew, then the most destructive hurricane
in U.S. history.
One of his goals throughout that process in the 1990s was
to prevent the Army from losing combat prowess by turning
to technology, tactics and training to keep soldiers sharp.
Sullivan described his role as chief, and that of his immediate
successors, as cutting Army spending so the money could
be used for something else. “I don’t know where it went,” he
said. “It went somewhere.”
“At some point, we are going to have to accept the fact that
we cannot do what we are being asked to do without more
manpower,” Sullivan said. Also, “we are not modernizing.
There is no money to modernize the Army.”
“I believe the essential nature of the Army has remained
constant since the beginning. It is the soldier. The soldier is
the weapon. He or she is the answer. They are the ones who
adapt on the battlefield,” Sullivan said. “Ultimately, success
will rest on the shoulders of the men and women who had the
courage to serve. I believe that.”
Shake-ups, not Breakups
Sullivan also believes current Army leaders are facing today’s
challenges as well as can be expected, but he worries
about putting too much strain on the force. “The real challenge
is to hold it together spiritually,” Sullivan said.
Cutting the Army between wars is akin to an American
pastime, like baseball and hot dogs. “It is almost built into the
American character. When you’re not at war, they don’t like
the Regular Army,” he said of politicians. “It’s almost an
American precept that we do not keep a big Regular Army.”
Today’s Army is very different. “The Army is not big
enough,” he said, and part of the burden is falling on families.
“We are no longer forward-based. We are projecting power
June 2016 ■ ARMY 21

from the U.S., and that is adding a burden to the Army and
especially to Army families who are not going with them. It
seems like we are always on the move or getting ready to go, or
we are retraining when we get back to go again.”
“I liked those guys,” he said, recalling the NCOs who were
his instructors during basic armor officer training at Fort Knox,
Ky. “The glue that connects all of it together is the noncommissioned
officer,” Sullivan said. “We have a world-class Noncommissioned
Officer Corps, and we’re very fortunate to have it.”
In April, Sullivan became the first person to be named an
honorary Sergeant Major of the Army in a ceremony that left
him greatly touched. “This really means something to me,” he
said. Sgt. Maj. of the Army Daniel A. Dailey said Sullivan deserves
the recognition because he is “a great mentor, a great
leader and a great soldier through his entire life, who still to
this day represents who we are and what we stand for.”
Sullivan Joins AUSA
Sullivan became AUSA’s 18th president in 1998, about two
years after retiring from the Army and after he tried a corporate
job. “I didn’t like it from the outset, frankly,” he said of
the job. “I just wasn’t satisfied.” Working for AUSA, however,
“was what I wanted to do with my life.”
“People get to choose how they live their life. This is how I
wanted to live my life, as a soldier,” Sullivan said.
He stayed with AUSA because he liked the work and the
mission, especially the educational development aspects. “But I
think it’s time for me to go, because most of the people” he
knew “are all retired. I am an ancient artifact. I don’t want to be
known as a guy who didn’t know when it was time to leave.”
Leaving doesn’t mean sitting still, however. Sullivan is the
chief organizer of an AUSA-sponsored initiative called Guiding
Principles for the 21st Century. The idea is to create a bipartisan
framework for U.S. domestic and foreign policy,
similar to what the 1941 Atlantic Charter did in crafting foreign
policy objectives for the U.S. and Great Britain and ultimately,
for the other nations that signed onto the principles.
The goal is to create a list of about eight policy goals that
would strengthen the U.S. role as a global leader and shape
the future. They include respecting national sovereignty, supporting
the right of people to choose their own form of government,
and supporting human rights. A working draft addresses
support for peaceful resolution of international
disputes; and international cooperation to reduce crime, corruption,
terrorism, genocide, famine and pestilence.
The hope is to have approved guiding principles available
for review this summer, in time to be shared during the presidential
elections.
Permanent Home for Army Story
Additionally, Sullivan’s post-AUSA life will involve a fulltime
effort to get the National Museum of the U.S. Army built
at Fort Belvoir, Va., bringing to an end a 202-year effort to
have a place to showcase the Army’s role in American history.
Without the museum, “we don’t have a way to tell the Army
story,” said Sullivan, chairman of the board of the Army Historical
Foundation. “You can’t think of the history of the
United States of America without thinking about the Army.
We have been here in one form or another since before there
was a United States of America.”
Groundbreaking is expected later this year, with the entire
museum project completed in 2019. “I have already raised a
hefty amount of money to put on top of what’s already there,”
Sullivan said. “I’m finding there actually are people who are
equally committed to having this museum.”
He said the Army’s story “is so complex that it is hard for
anybody to understand it unless you see some things,” which
is the purpose behind building a museum. Army Chief of
U.S. Army/Spc. James Seals
Sgt. Maj. of the Army Daniel A. Dailey, right, and five former sergeants major of the Army congratulate retired Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan after he was
named the first honorary sergeant major of the Army.
22 ARMY ■ June 2016

Sullivan’s Service Includes Sharing Stories of Heroes
During his many decades of service both in Army uniform
and as president and CEO of the Association of
the U.S. Army, retired Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan has met
and spoken to a countless number of soldiers.
Some stand out in his mind more than others. As Sullivan
prepares to retire from AUSA, he talked about two
soldiers who made indelible impressions on him.
One is former Sgt. Christopher Reid, whom Sullivan
met in late 1993 at Fort Drum, N.Y. Reid’s unit in the
10th Mountain Division was being welcomed home from
Mogadishu, Somalia, just a couple of months after helping
to rescue other U.S. troops following a helicopter crash in
the city.
“They come into the gym,” Sullivan recalled. “The families
are there, the signs—everybody is charged up. I was up
on a little stand, and I noticed down to the right, a soldier
comes into the formation on crutches. So we had a short
ceremony, then I went down and found
this kid.”
It was Reid, a fire team leader who
had been severely wounded in Somalia
when a rocket-propelled grenade blew
off his right hand and shredded his
right leg. He told Sullivan he was
compelled to come to the ceremony to
stand “one last time” with the men he
fought with.
“Then he said, ‘You know, sir,
knowing what I know now, I’d do it
again,’” Sullivan recalled. “And I said
to myself: ‘Where do we find these
guys?’”
Another soldier who made an impression
on Sullivan also was wounded
in Mogadishu. He was an “E-4 named
Ly, a Vietnamese kid, weighed about
98 pounds soaking wet,” Sullivan said.
They met in October 1993 when
U.S. troops wounded in Somalia were
returning home through Andrews Air Force Base, Md.
“He’s laid out on a stretcher; he’s got on an Army T-
shirt flecked with blood,” Sullivan said. “I reached down
and looked at his wound tag and said, ‘Hey, Ly, I see you’re
a member of the 41st Engineers. What’s it like to be a
combat engineer?’ He said: ‘Sir, I’m not a combat engineer.
I’m a sapper.’”
“I’m there in my greens, all my medals, my stars, everything.
And I said to myself: This kid could give a sh-- less.
God love him … the American soldier.”
After he spun a few such stories earlier this year during a
visit to Fort Bragg, N.C., Sullivan said a listener asked,
“How many people do you know?”
“I said, ‘I don’t know how many people I know. But
what I do know [is that] the Army is people. … If you
don’t tell their story, nobody’s going to tell their story.’”
—Chuck Vinch
Then-Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan visits an injured soldier in the early 1990s.
ARMY Magazine Archives
Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley “doesn’t have a place where he can
take people, visitors, and say, ‘Look, this is what the Army
has done for America.’”
Sullivan said the Army was good for him. “I came to grips
with who I was and who I wanted to be,” he said. “Did it hit
me like a lightning bolt? No. It came over time.”
A graduate of Norwich University, Vt., Sullivan was commissioned
as a Reserve officer but quickly realized he wanted to become
a Regular officer and stay for a career. “I was really starting
to think this Army was great,” he said of the point in his career
when he became a tank platoon leader in Korea. “I loved it because
it was soldiering 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”
The big jump in his career came after his second tour in
Vietnam, with consecutive assignments as G-3 for VII Corps
under one of his mentors, Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton Jr., and
later as a brigade commander at Fort Riley, Kan.
“It was all part of the education of Gordon Sullivan to the
complexity of command at the top, and how it is a team effort,”
Sullivan said. “It is where I began to learn what it meant
to say ‘team.’ So what is the secret sauce? It’s no mystery. The
Army is people. And if you aren’t willing and able to listen to
people … and by the way, listening may require dialogue to
bring out the real issue.”
✭
Senior Staff Writer Chuck Vinch contributed to this article.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 23

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Soldiering
Is Evolving
Dry Erase Board
Era Almost Over
By Capt. Mark A. Yore
As the Army adapts to multiple operational environments
and a constantly evolving enemy threat, so
must our leaders and leadership development. Understanding
and having the ability to implement
Mission Command, and balancing the art of command with
the science of control, is imperative in an ever-changing Army.
To accomplish this effectively, current and future leaders
must understand the capabilities, purpose and application of
the Army’s digital systems. The ability to communicate plans,
battle track and forecast sustainment needs through these systems
is expected. The days of dry erase boards may not be
over, but their time is fleeting.
Leader Development
Much of the Army’s early leader development is focused on
the principles of leadership and learning what characteristics
comprise a good leader. The relationship between platoon leader
and platoon sergeant, and delineating their respective responsibilities,
is a common discussion among junior leaders. Overarching
subjects such as this are important and should continue to
remain among leader development in the Officer Education
System and Noncommissioned Officer Education System.
A missed opportunity for additional development is with
digital systems from the Digital Training Management System
to the Command Post of the Future.
Digital systems training has been
integrated into courses such as the Resident
Logistics Captains Career Course,
but the earlier in their careers that leaders
and soldiers are exposed to these systems,
the better. It may be challenging
to add to or incorporate additional
training in the current curriculum for
the Basic Officer Leader Course, Warrant
Officer Basic Course and Basic
U.S. Army/Spc. Kathleen Embrey
U.S. Army/Andrea Sutherland
Above: Spc. Melissa Pearson, an intelligence
analyst, operates a Command Post of the Future
console; left: A trainer helps soldiers at Fort
Carson, Colo., navigate digital training systems.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 25

At Fort Gordon, Ga.,
Sgt. Nirundorn Chiv
readies a network.
Army National Guard/Sgt. Erica Knight
Leader Course, but the reward to soldiers would outweigh
the costs.
The 1st Infantry Division, specifically the 1st Combat Aviation
Brigade, has accepted this challenge; the benefits have
been immediately noticeable. The brigade has seized the opportunity
to send many individuals to the Digital Master
Gunner Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The training received
was put to the test in a recent command post exercise,
where the brigade was able to exercise distributed Mission
Command and synchronize staff actions for simulated decisive
action aviation operations.
While tactical digital systems enable us to implement Mission
Command, administrative and training management
systems are at the forefront of daily operations, affecting mission
readiness. In-depth instruction on the Digital Training
Management System and other systems that’s tiered at each
level of the officer and NCO education systems would allow
leaders to spend more time planning and executing rather
than inputting data.
Commander’s Tools
Maj. Gen. Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., commanding general of
the 1st Infantry Division, has conveyed to soldiers and leaders
that the division’s No. 1 priority is “building and maintaining
mission readiness.” To accomplish this seamlessly, company
commanders are provided several tools to enable them to effectively
manage and track mission readiness.
The Digital Training Management System is the primary
tool with which we manage and track training. We also utilize
it to manage elements of readiness such as Army physical fitness
test records and weapons qualifications. Systems such as
the Electronic Profiling System, Medical Protection System,
Electronic Military Personnel Office, Commander’s Risk Reduction
Dashboard, Unit Commander’s Finance Report and
Dental Readiness Classification System are also essential in
systematically ensuring that soldiers are mission-ready. From
determining financial hardships to preventing high-risk behavior,
commanders are charged with understanding how to
leverage these systems to provide soldiers every opportunity to
succeed and remain deployable.
In addition to mission readiness, myriad systems such as the
Force Management System Website, Global Combat Support
System-Army and Logistics Support Activity/Logistics Information
Warehouse assist commanders with managing property
and force structure. A comprehensive plan to incorporate
training on each system with the length of time weighted on
the most commonly used systems would better posture precommand
company grade officers for success. Great opportunities
to provide this training in a somewhat time-protected
environment are the Company Commander and First
Sergeant courses.
Army at Forefront
The Army has always been on the leading edge when it
comes to adapting and implementing new techniques. Whether
it be with the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention
program or the Modern Army Combatives Program, the
Army is constantly seeking ways to improve and win. As we
continue to acclimate to digital systems, it is imperative that we
provide the protected time the officer and NCO education systems
allow to become familiarized with the systems in a manner
in which we can positively affect the fight.
Albert Einstein said, “The measure of intelligence is the
ability to change.” The U.S. Army’s ability to adapt and overcome
is what makes us the finest military force in the world.✭
Capt. Mark A. Yore is the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters
Company, 1st Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Infantry
Division, Fort Riley, Kan. He has a bachelor’s degree from
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, and is a graduate of
the Transportation Basic Officer Leaders Course and the Combined
Logistics Career Course.
26 ARMY ■ June 2016

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
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Sustaining the All-Volunteer
Today’s challenges are complex; threats are global in scope and unpredictable. Sustained engagement of the nation’s
all-volunteer force and its Army is the norm. The heart of the Army is its people—the bedrock of readiness.
The quality of life of soldiers and those who support them is inextricably linked to that readiness. Reforms aimed at
maintaining short-term readiness must not mortgage future readiness—recruiting and retaining the best and brightest.
Soldiers should not have to choose between the profession they love and the families they cherish.
—Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret., AUSA president and CEO
28 ARMY ■ June 2016

Force: A Readiness Multiplier
By Col. George P. Coan Jr., U.S. Army retired, and Richard Lim
The all-volunteer force is a national treasure and the
foundation of America’s national defense. Since 1973,
the force has successfully safeguarded the nation’s
freedom, prosperity and way of life. In large part, this
success is built on long-term investments in the readiness of
the force to meet challenges to American security.
While that readiness requires investments in organizing,
More than 100 soldiers with the 10th Transportation
Battalion (Waterborne) re-enlist during a ceremony
at the College of William and Mary, Va.
equipping and training, the most fundamental investment is in
the men and women of the force. People are the primary component
of readiness. To sustain the all-volunteer force (AVF),
it is necessary to provide soldiers—Regular Army, Army National
Guard and Army Reserve—and the supporting cast of
families, and military retirees and veterans and their families, a
quality of life commensurate with their sacrifice.
Today’s complex and unpredictable operating environment
demands a high level of Army readiness. However, budgetary
pressures—increasing requirements coupled with the uncertainty
of future funding—have forced senior leaders to make
difficult choices from among different components of readiness:
people, training, equipping and leadership development.
This trend, if not reversed, will leave the military unable to
provide an adequate quality of life, degrading its ability to recruit
and retain the finest individuals and depriving the nation
of ready forces. Sustaining the AVF is a readiness multiplier.
U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class Kelly Jo Bridgwater
Quality-of-Life Reforms
Soldier pay and retirement. The president’s fiscal year (FY)
2016 budget increased basic soldier pay by only 1.3 percent,
continuing a recent trend of historically low service member pay
raises. According to the Employment Cost Index, this is 1 percent
less than private-sector wage growth; by law, soldier pay
raises must match those of the private sector. The president’s
FY 2017 budget submission would continue this trend with a
1.6 percent pay raise, which is about 50 percent of the index.
The new and newly proposed low pay raises come after military
retirement reforms were included in the FY 2016 budget
based on the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization
Commission’s recommendations of January 2015.
The reforms will reduce annual pensions from 50 percent of
final basic pay to 40 percent beginning in 2018—a 20 percent
reduction in the actual amount of the pension.
The reforms also created 401(k)-style investment accounts
that shifted retirement risk and responsibility from the government
to the service member. The success of the new system relies
on service members contributing to their own retirement
nest egg. However, with smaller pay raises, service members
will have less disposable income to invest in a 401(k)-style plan.
Health care. Factors affecting health care include access,
cost, and quality of care. Since these factors are interwoven,
increasing one often comes at the expense of others. The president’s
FY 2017 budget submission proposes reorganizing the
existing TRICARE system into two plans: TRICARE Select
and TRICARE Choice. The former would be a health maintenance
organization-type program, similar to TRICARE
Prime and limited to areas around military hospitals and clinics.
The latter would be modeled on the TRICARE Standard
fee-for-service plan.
Working-age retirees and their families who pay enrollment
June 2016 ■ ARMY 29

fees for TRICARE Prime would also pay these fees—referred
to in the FY 2017 budget proposal as participation fees—in
the new TRICARE Select plan, although the fees would increase
for individuals, from $350 to $450; and for families,
from $700 to $900. While TRICARE Standard does not contain
enrollment/participation fees, the new TRICARE
Choice plan would require these fees in addition to meeting
deductibles and paying cost shares. Under both plans, the fees
would be indexed to the per-capita annual National Health
Expenditures (projected to have grown 5.4 percent in 2015) in
addition to current cost shares.
Similarly, in the president’s FY 2017 budget submission,
Medicare-eligible military retirees and their spouses using
TRICARE for Life would begin paying enrollment fees that
increase yearly from 0.5 percent of gross retired pay to 2 percent
in 2021 and would be indexed to the per-capita annual
National Health Expenditures after FY 2020. These new enrollment
fees for TRICARE for Life are over and above the
already established monthly per-person (retiree and spouse)
Medicare Part B means-tested premiums. Those retirees already
using TRICARE for Life on the date of enactment
would be exempt from the new fees. The FY 2017 budget
submission would also continue increases in copays for pharmaceuticals
until FY 2026.
Basic Allowance for Housing. The FY 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act introduced a 1 percent out-of-pocket housing
expense for service members that will increase annually by
1 percentage point until 2019, when it will be 5 percent. Thus,
effective Jan. 1, out-of-pocket expenses were set at 2 percent
and will rise to 3 percent in 2017, 4 percent in 2018, and 5
percent in 2019. The stability of Basic Allowance for Housing
funding is what attracted private industry to partner with DoD
to improve on-post dwellings; for example, the Residential
Communities Initiative. Fluctuations in the allowance funding
could impact future public–private partnerships.
Other proposals have been considered to modify this allowance.
Before passing the FY 2016 budget last year, the
U.S. Senate considered limiting dual-military couples and cohabitating
service members to one housing payment; this proposal
was not passed. In addition, the Veterans Employment,
Education and Healthcare Improvement Act, which passed in
the House of Representatives on Feb. 9, would cut in half the
housing stipends provided to military dependent children per
the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008—
the so-called Post-9/11 GI Bill. Since then, the bill has been
received in the Senate and is being reviewed by the Senate
Veterans’ Affairs Committee.
Military construction. The president’s FY 2017 budget submission
proposes a reduction to $7.6 billion in DoD’s total
military construction funding from the $8.2 billion enacted in
FY 2016—a decrease of over $554 million. The Army’s total
construction budget would decrease from the $1.1 billion enacted
in FY 2016 to $838 million in FY 2017, a reduction of
more than $269 million. These figures include both base and
overseas contingency operations funding. The lack of sufficient
funding requires the military to retain facilities beyond
their expected service life, thereby increasing maintenance
costs in an era of smaller budgets.
Commissaries. The FY 2016 National Defense Authorization
Act mandated that the Defense Commissary Agency plan
for a system that achieves budget neutrality by Oct. 1, 2018.
Specifically, DoD was to submit a report by March 1 on potential
savings from privatization, store closures, and consolidation
of the commissary and exchange systems; Congress has
not yet received this report.
The president’s FY 2017 budget submission seeks to cut
$200 million from commissary funding; Congress likely will
have the report in hand before evaluating the $200 million reduction.
This cut could impact grocery prices; the number of
hours and days commissaries will be open; and the number of
commissary employees, many of whom are military dependents.
Adequate pay, a fixed retirement, TRICARE coverage,
housing allowances and commissaries help mitigate the risks
that soldiers and their families incur when they join the Army.
Soldiers and their families, and military retirees and veterans
and their families, have earned this compensation through
their sacrifice to the nation.
While these increased expenses may appear negligible when
viewed individually, in the aggregate they undermine this
carefully crafted, earned deferred compensation and pose even
greater risks to the future of service members and their families.
Ultimately, they undermine the security soldiers have
earned for their careers and their retirement.
Effects on Readiness
Shrinking pool of potential recruits. Long-term trends are also
compounding the challenge of recruitment and retention. Recent
studies show that only 17 percent of Americans ages 17
to 24 are “qualified military available,” which means they are
not enrolled in college and are able to meet military enlistment
standards without a waiver. Further, only 4 percent of the 4.1
million Americans who turned 18 in 2015 are both qualified
and willing to serve. In a time when the pool of potential recruits
is shrinking and demand for the Army remains high, the
military cannot afford to reduce its incentives to join the AVF.
Retention. The failure to retain those who do join will prove
costly in multiple ways. To develop an NCO, the Army must
invest a minimum of five to eight years of training; for an experienced
pilot, 10 years; for a battalion commander, 18 years.
This investment cannot be surged, as these skills require multiple
and constant iterations of exercises at the individual and
collective levels. Without incentives for soldiers to remain in
the AVF, the military will lose the long-term investment it
has made in each recruit.
Military families. The recent reforms and proposals are already
having an impact on military families’ perceptions. Recent
surveys find that 78 percent of military families—compared
to 48 percent of the general population, the median
result of surveys from September 2015 to January 2016—expect
to be at least somewhat financially impacted by recent
fiscal cuts. In addition, 86 percent of military families are taking
precautionary measures, such as reducing everyday spending,
to deal with cuts.
Moreover, a recent survey indicates a preference for the
current retirement system. About 78 percent of military families
prefer being grandfathered into the current retirement
30 ARMY ■ June 2016

In a German castle, 53 soldiers reaffirm their oath to serve the U.S.
system rather than participating in the recently passed military
retirement reform. This is an increase from 70 percent in
September.
Surveys such as these indicate that the new reforms and cuts
are creating pressures on military families, reducing their incentive
to remain in the AVF. It is not surprising, then, that
the president’s FY 2017 budget submission encourages Congress
to consider modifying the retirement reform. These
modifications include delaying matching contributions to junior
soldiers in an effort to improve retention, extending
matching contributions to senior leaders, allowing the services
more flexibility on continuation pay, and increasing the maximum
matching contribution.
Retirees. Some have argued that these new reforms and proposals
do not specifically impact service members but instead
focus on military retirees, especially those who are still of working
age, and their families. Surveys suggest, however, that as
many as 80 percent of service members come from families in
which a parent or sibling is also in the military. Military retirees
and their families are a key source of support for their children
and other relatives who serve. If these retirees do not receive
the compensation they have earned, this will impact the perceptions
of their family members, a major recruiting pool.
These potential recruits will have less incentive to join the military
or, if they do join, they will be less likely to remain.
The Way Ahead
The Total Army’s collective strength originates from quality
individuals recruited from communities across the nation. The
Army builds readiness by training and developing those recruits
into ethical and competent soldiers who are mentally
and physically fit and thus, able to withstand the intensity of
ground combat.
In addition, families of soldiers make sacrifices for the nation
that contribute to Army readiness and play an important
part in achieving mission success. As a result of the dedication
and sacrifices of soldiers and their families, together with the
support and advocacy of military retirees and veterans, the
AVF remains a vital part of America’s security.
The current operating environment is imposing a high demand
on the Army. In a world of limited resources, the Army
has responded by investing in the readiness of the current
force. However, recent fiscal trends are leading to unrealistic
tradeoffs and imposing burdens on end strength and on the
future force. They have led to shortsighted reforms that are
having a negative effect on military families and retirees.
While these tradeoffs may appear mutually exclusive, together
they will degrade recruitment and retention. Indirectly,
budget reductions targeted toward military retirees diminish
the advocacy and support for the Army. Today’s soldiers are
tomorrow’s retirees and veterans—and they, too, are watching.
Ultimately, these reforms, aimed at maintaining readiness
in the short term, are mortgaging the military’s future readiness,
thus achieving the opposite effect in the long term.
Consequently, they could prevent the military from sufficiently
manning the AVF with the quantity and quality of
soldiers required to be ready for tomorrow’s threats. Reforms
and proposals that shift risk from the government to former,
present and future soldiers cause even greater risk to the sustainment
of readiness of the all-volunteer force. The quality
of life of soldiers and those who support them is inextricably
linked to readiness.
✭
This article was adapted from AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare
April Torchbearer Issue Paper.
Col. George P. Coan Jr., USA Ret., is AUSA’s director of national
security studies. Richard Lim is AUSA’s national security
analyst.
U.S. Army/1st Lt. Hannah Morgan
June 2016 ■ ARMY 31

Get Maximum Rotation
Coming Fully Prepared Has Benefits at JRTC
By Maj. J.D. Pritchett
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Jared N. Gehmann
On the attack: soldiers of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La.
32 ARMY ■ June 2016

It is Day No. 6 of the 13-day crucible known as a Joint
Readiness Training Center rotation. Your unit is tired and
every element, from the staff working on the next battle
update brief to the private guarding his unit’s perimeter, is
stressed to the maximum. On edge, you wait for the next attack,
whether by direct or indirect fire.
This is usually the time that the battalion’s top leaders—the
S3 (operations and training officer), executive officer, commander,
command sergeant major and operations sergeant
major—ask themselves and the observer/controller trainers,
“Did we do everything we needed to do to best prepare ourselves
and our unit for this?”
Usually a curt “no” is the correct answer. One has to swallow
a big lump of damaged pride, clear the mind and then
look inside. The questions continue. What could we have
done differently? Why can’t we talk to all our units? Why are
we not using the standard operating procedures we validated
back at home station? What leader development would have
better prepared us and our soldiers for these events? Did we
come into the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) ready
to learn and get better as a unit?
Building a Home-Station Calendar
When the brigade S3 constructs the long-range training
calendar, his or her staff may dissect it into quarters. Here, we
will use a brigade combat team from the 82nd Airborne Division
as an example. In building the fiscal year 2016 calendar,
the brigade S3 constructed an annual training brief that was
submitted to the brigade commander and then to the division
commander. In this brief, the S3 highlighted the unit’s vision;
the brigade campaign plan; the unit’s current mission-essential
task list assessment; the long-range training calendar overview;
a leader development overview; and the brigade’s road to Fort
Polk, La., and the JRTC.
The team’s approach looks the same for most units getting
ready for the JRTC. They identify the “way ahead” and then
try to fit all their identified key events into the available space
on the calendar. It is not a blank canvas; indeed, garrison events
compete with training events. That competition is what makes
the preparation stage of a JRTC rotation extremely hard.
The brigade combat team began by clearly identifying their
objectives. These included equipment reset; preparation for outload
support battalion operations; individual training to include
Expert Infantryman Badge; paratrooper essential task list; and
the “big 5” of airborne proficiency, physical fitness, medical,
marksmanship and small-unit battle drills. The brigade also
wanted to execute exercise evaluations and live-fire exercises up
to the platoon level along with battalion Mission Command.
With all these objectives, the team’s end state was stated as
follows: The platoons are live-fire certified and prepared to execute
company-level collective training; battalion staffs are
trained and prepared to conduct brigade combat team-level
Mission Command training; and the brigade combat team has
re-formed a team of fit, disciplined, adaptive paratroopers prepared
for future collective training in the next cycle.
Applying Training
The end state prescribed everything needed to succeed.
However, the problem most units face at the JRTC is actually
applying their training to the decisive action training environment.
It raises the question of whether the home station training
was effective.
Bradley Fighting Vehicles from the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division at the JRTC
U.S. Army
June 2016 ■ ARMY 33

82nd Airborne Division paratroopers
at the Joint Readiness Training Center,
Fort Polk, La.
Most units can execute team, squad, platoon and companylevel
training as discrete events. The JRTC, however, is a
brigade collective training center. That means all those subunits
must work as one to enable a battalion to successfully
conduct operations. Unit home station training does not or
cannot replicate what the units encounter here.
Take, for example, Mission Command and the unit’s command
post.
Field Manual 6-0: Commander and Staff Organization Operations
defines the command post as a unit headquarters
where the commander and staff perform their activities. The
headquarters design and robust communications give commanders
a flexible Mission Command structure consisting of
main and tactical command posts; and a command group for
brigades, divisions and corps.
The manual also states that the functions of a command
post include tasks such as maintaining running estimates; controlling
and assessing operations; and coordinating with
higher, lower and adjacent units. The command post also provides
a facility for the commander to control operations, issue
orders and conduct rehearsals.
Command Post Is Critical
A unit command post is one of the most crucial elements
in executing successful operations at the JRTC. Successful
units integrate command posts into their training plans at
home station. As noted earlier, a command post is the location
where commander and staff perform their activities.
These activities revolve around planning operations and
then executing those operations, all while planning for future
operations simultaneous to running the current fight.
This can be done only by mastering the operations process
through the development of a synchronized battle rhythm
and training on the military decisionmaking process.
Units sometimes lose sight of the importance of their command
post in a garrison environment. I know I did as a battalion
S3 and executive officer. Units should integrate command
post capabilities into every training event. Use the external
command post as much as possible because it will strengthen
the staff in it and test the systems you use to run your organization.
This is important because it builds a knowledge base
within each staff section on assigned tasks and information
that needs to be tracked in order to feed the battalion information
requirements.
More often than not, a unit will report to the JRTC and establish
a command post, only to experience issues with planning,
executing and tracking because the command post is not
functional with Mission Command structure. This is not to
say it’s the first time the unit has established a command post.
Usually, the unit has used theirs at home station and considered
it functional. In truth, it was not organized in a way to
maximize output.
So how is output maximized? It boils down to what the
commander needs to make clear and deliberate decisions. The
command post should be organized with that goal. Are the
right personnel in the right positions to make the unit better?
Have strengths and weaknesses been analyzed as they relate to
personnel and systems? Have standard operating procedures
been developed and validated? The S3 and executive officer
must first ask all these questions as they develop their training
plan for a JRTC rotation. The training they then devise must
result in affirmative answers.
‘Workload Fratricide’
Once these questions are answered, the S3 and executive officer
should clearly organize roles and responsibilities. In garri-
34 ARMY ■ June 2016

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Jared N. Gehmann
Maj. J.D. Pritchett is a task force S3 at the Joint Readiness
Training Center, Fort Polk, La. As the battalion operations officer
and battalion executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, 505th
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team,
82nd Airborne Division, he deployed on an advise-and-assist
mission to Iraq in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. He
holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Louisiana at
Monroe, and a master’s from the University of Arkansas.
son, the roles of the S3 and executive officer are clearly defined
and seldom overlap. In the decisive action training environment,
however, S3s and executive officers often commit workload
fratricide. They have a hard time defining their roles because
the training involves operational situations where the
workload is intermixed between a future operations cell and a
current operations cell.
Field Manual 3-21.20: The Infantry Battalion states that the
battalion executive officer’s primary duties are to exercise command
in the absence of the commander, and to integrate and
synchronize the staff’s activities to optimize control of battalion
operations. The executive officer accomplishes this
through supervising and overseeing the command post while
ensuring the synchronization of information flowing into and
through the battalion.
In comparison, the manual describes the S3 section as the
commander’s primary staff for planning, coordinating, prioritizing
and integrating all battalion operations. The S3 section
runs the battalion main combat post, under the executive officer’s
supervision. The S3 is generally the senior staff member
of the tactical command post—commonly called the TAC—if
the commander employs one.
The manual describes the operations section’s main duties
as planning, preparing and producing battalion operations orders;
controlling current operations; and coordinating critical
support operations, as required, with the other staff sections.
Additionally, the operations section develops and synchronizes
the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection
plan. They also manage the battle rhythm of the TOC, or
main combat post, to include orders production, battle tracking,
operations updates and briefings, rehearsals, receipt of reposts,
and reports to higher headquarters.
It’s About Attitude
Now that a prerotational training plan has been developed
and staff has been configured to maximize the output required
to succeed here, it is time to focus on probably the most important
aspect of training at JRTC: attitude.
It does not matter whether yours is a National Guard, airborne,
Ranger, special forces or Stryker unit. We see units that
have trained relentlessly for this event, only to squander their
opportunities within the first week because they did not have
the right attitude upon their arrival. Units fail to realize that
they are not coming to JRTC to “win.” To be quite honest,
units will not defeat the opposition force. The cards are
stacked against you whether you realize it or not.
So what does the right attitude look like? A unit reports
to the JRTC with a learning approach to the rotation and a
will to get better. Soldiers and leaders in the organization
are open to candid feedback, and they focus on daily improvement.
These traits serve as the pillars of a successful unit. A unit
must also be able to capture lessons learned to improve their
standard operating procedures as well as their training management
systems following the rotation. The climate of the
organization must be one of a willingness to learn and improve
combat readiness, not on defeating the opposing force. ✭
June 2016 ■ ARMY 35

Megacities
Military Operations There Not Business as Usual
Megacities are the extreme manifestation of an ongoing
global urbanization trend. Operating in
these vast urban environments may require new
or modified approaches across all warfighting
functions to account for the tremendous scale, complexity
and interconnectedness of modern cities.
Megacities have been defined by the Chief of Staff of the
Army’s Strategic Studies Group and the U.N. as an area or
city with a population of 10 million or more inhabitants. Their
sheer size and density impose a tipping point in our established
doctrinal approaches and historical experience dealing
with operations in urban terrain. What worked in past military
urban operations may not work in the future.
The problem is that the Army doesn’t know for certain
what the tipping point is. The reasons offered for avoiding the
problem vary from “the Army won’t go there” to the unsubstantiated
“there’s nothing new in the problem set.” Some argue
that recent Army urban operations—such as in Baghdad,
with a population of 6.5 million; Sadr City, Iraq, 3.5 million;
and Fallujah, Iraq, with more than 250,000—validate traditional
doctrinal approaches.
Not so fast.
Responding adequately to military operations in a megacity
is not business as usual; finding cogent solutions is not merely
a one-and-done exercise. No two megacities are alike. Considerable
analysis and study are required to thoroughly understand
the scope and magnitude of the problem and subsequently
identify the capabilities necessary to address it.
The concern is that our hasty decisions to meet budgetary
and programmatic deadlines or agendas often result in illdefined
problems that, in turn, lead to premature answers that
may not withstand scrutiny or cost lives and treasure down
the road. The upside is that the Army has tremendous opportunities
as long as we get the problem definition right on the
front end.
Size Matters
Words and size matter, particularly in this problem set. The
relatively recent replacement of the defined term “megacity”
with “dense urban area” was not helpful. Dense urban area is a
doctrinal term and does not clarify the problems of scale or
language precision necessary to plan, prepare, execute and assess
operations. Substituting dense urban area for megacity either
deliberately or inadvertently shifts the focus away from
the suspected uniqueness of the megacity problem and complicates
analytical efforts. For both analytical and operational
purposes, the term megacity should be retained to single out
the uniqueness of these operational environments.
As the U.S. Army takes a closer look at the problem, the
population tipping point where the Army is forced by circum-
Pixabay/Unsplash
36 ARMY ■ June 2016

By Col. Mark Wallace, U.S. Army retired, and Lt. Col. Martin McCleary, U.S. Army retired
June 2016 ■ ARMY 37

39th Infantry Regiment soldiers rehearse room
clearance at Fort Jackson, S.C.
stances to operate differently may be
lower than the 10 million threshold for
megacities. More work is necessary
across the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command to do the hard
thinking and critical examination to ensure
the Army has the megacity problem
statement correct. Once there is an accurate,
clear, accepted definition, meaningful
work can begin on a focused approach
to identify and resolve the
challenges of doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, facilities and policy
(DOTMLPF-P).
This will require the efforts of combatant commands and
the national intelligence agencies to identify, validate, prioritize
and describe the candidate cities, both mid- and far-term.
The Army should conduct megacity war games and experimentation
to explore and validate nonstandard approaches,
improved capabilities and new operating concepts to figure out
precisely what does and does not work in these complex, adaptive
environments.
Understanding the Problem
Prior to its deactivation in 2011, U.S. Joint Forces Command
conducted a series of intensive investigations into the
urban problem. These culminated in several products, including
a Joint Urban Operations Master Plan, joint integrating
concept and a joint capabilities document. It appears all that
work has been neglected, though there is some recent evidence
that it may be resurrected for reference.
There was much of value in these products that is still of
value in this effort. From fiscal years 2014 to 2015, the Chief
of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group conducted an
examination of the megacity problem. In October 2015, the
chief of staff assigned responsibility for continuing study of
the problem to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
for helping the Army determine future requirements.
The U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center supports
the commanding general of the Training and Doctrine Command
as the Army’s capability developer in the design, development
and integration of force capability requirements for
the Army. The center is responsible to the secretary of the
Army and the chief of staff for determining and integrating
force requirements and synchronizing the development of
DOTMLPF-P solutions across the Army.
The center conducted a preliminary examination of megacities
during the Unified Quest 2014 exercise. The summary
findings were that future land forces require the capability and
capacity to gain situational understanding of complex megacity
environments (physical, human and information); and
that access and freedom of movement in and around megacities
will be a primary concern requiring new approaches to
sustainment and other enablers.
Although Unified Quest was a good start as an introduction
to the challenges presented by megacities, the exercise barely
scratched the surface and did not identify specific required capabilities.
There have been no Army war games since then
dedicated to examining combat in the megacity environment
and what capabilities are necessary to set conditions before
and during combat operations.
U.S. Interests Likely at Stake
Although predominantly a ground force problem, the
megacity issue has significant joint force implications. DoD
must acknowledge that the world’s population is rapidly urbanizing.
At some point, beleaguered governments will lose
control of their backyards. U.S. national interests will likely be
at stake; protection of those interests will require deployments
U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton
38 ARMY ■ June 2016

short of war or even full-scale combat operations. Without
DoD’s recognition of the problem, the responding priorities,
resourcing and integration efforts will not be addressed.
U.S. joint forces are extremely capable of fighting conventional
forces in wide-open spaces; however, the joint force is
not prepared to operate in megacities. Joint intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance would be at a distinct disadvantage,
especially in a standoff against these environments. All
too often in war games, the assumption is that the U.S. and its
allies have access. This is unlikely to be the case in many instances.
Failure to act now to address potential theater collection
and production gaps will result in joint forces that are unprepared,
and ultimately will jeopardize mission success.
The U.S. Army, as part of a joint force, must identify
DOTMLPF-P capability gaps through realistic and methodical
examination of the complexity of the megacity environment
through war games, experiments, exercises, analysis and
study—in short, all the means of learning at our disposal.
Intelligence Dilemma
Military operations are routinely described in terms of joint
phases 0–5. Phase 0 “Shape” is the point in time where many
of the activities necessary to set conditions for future missions
are conducted. This is particularly true for the intelligence
community as it determines what has priority for collection
and analysis. If the intelligence community doesn’t accomplish
the requisite foundational work in Phase 0, then the conduct
of subsequent intelligence and maneuver operations can be severely
impacted. It is precisely here that the largest deficiency
exists in our approach to future urban operations, particularly
those involving megacities.
The intelligence community does not thoroughly understand
these environments, nor do we devote much effort to understanding
them as distinct entities. Until the larger intelligence
community has conducted a thorough assessment of these locations
and their potential impact on the planning, preparation,
execution and assessment of operations, the Army and
joint force will be at a distinct disadvantage. To achieve situational
awareness, the intelligence community must have the
right collection and analysis tools.
The intelligence community has considerable capabilities to
address megacity intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
requirements; however, these concepts and diverse capabilities
must be tested and validated. Until then, the Army and its
supporting intelligence warfighting function has only limited
general and hypothetical knowledge, and no validated answers
to required capabilities.
Army intelligence should lead the way in providing awareness
leading to commanders’ situational understanding for
megacities. It also should push to arrive at Training and Doctrine
Command consensus as to what the actual problem is for
the Army and the joint force. It may be a long, hard debate
over competing priorities and will require thorough analysis to
make the case. What is done in Phase 0–1 to provide situational
understanding may make or break future Army operations
in this environment.
To successfully study the megacity challenge in its entirety,
the Army should strive for an environment conducive to the
examination of doctrine as part of a joint force performing a
wide spectrum of megacity missions. Unfortunately, this environment
does not exist today. Ideally, we are suggesting a program
of war games, experiments and exercises staged within legitimate
contingency plans in and around identified megacities.
These war games, experiments and exercises need to address
all phases of a joint operation in permissive, semi- and nonpermissive
environments to include both limited objectives and
sustained combat operations in a large city. The threat should
be realistic. But the larger effort will fail without the support of
the combined arms commands for division and above, and the
Maneuver Center of Excellence for brigade and below.
No Panacea
There likely is no panacea for operating in a megacity. It is
probably the most dynamically complex environment imaginable
in which Army forces may operate. However, to gain the
necessary knowledge and forward movement on this problem
and subsequent DOTMLPF-P solutions, the Army needs to
recognize and embrace the notion of an urban operating environment
as a complex, adaptive system, and visualize it as a
system that is multidimensional and interdependent. This
knowledge, in turn, will provide the depth of understanding
that will lead to more efficient operations and solutions.
The Training and Doctrine Command concept development
effort may decide to adopt the following steps as an approach
framework:
■ Conduct concept research, seminars and study (starting
with the previous Joint Forces Command work).
■ Coordinate and approve scenarios and operating concepts.
■ Conduct war games, exercises and experiments.
■ Perform concept evaluation (Red Team and after-action
reviews).
■ Conduct functional needs analysis and functional solutions
analysis as required.
■ Implement validated, capabilities-based assessment solutions.
Success requires the Army to take a long-term approach to
both building a strategic appreciation and framework addressing
the uniqueness of the megacity environment; and developing
regionally focused, urban competent forces for the particular
regions and cities where they will operate. Understanding
how these environments may become magnets for international
instability and demand military intervention will aid
military planners in avoiding future strategic surprises. Failure
to focus attention on these places today will create strategic
vulnerability for the U.S. tomorrow.
✭
Col. Mark Wallace, USA Ret., is a contract senior intelligence analyst
in concepts at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence.
He served in the Army as a military intelligence officer. He has
a bachelor’s degree from Western Illinois University; a master’s
degree from Webster University, Mo.; and a master’s degree in
strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. Lt. Col.
Martin McCleary, USA Ret., is chief of intelligence concepts at the
Intelligence Center of Excellence. He served in the Army as an armor
officer. He has a bachelor’s degree from Towson State University,
Md., and a master’s degree from Troy State University, Fla.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 39

Cover Story
A Call to Armor
Army Explores Stronger, Lighter, Cheaper Protection
By William Matthews
Rocky Research didn’t set out to create a new type of armor—far from it.
When the new material first slid out of the company’s production oven, it
caused considerable consternation. A worker responsible for cutting the
material into usable shapes for a high-tech heat dissipation system found
that it couldn’t be cut with ordinary tools.
Wondering just how strong this new material was, he took it to a shooting range
and discovered that bullets couldn’t pierce it, either. The material proved so durable
that “we had to laser-cut it,” said Uwe Rockenfeller, president and CEO of Nevadabased
Rocky Research. “That’s when the concept of using it as armor came about.”
The company called the material COMBAM, for Coordinative Molecular Bond
Armor Material. Using a high-temperature process to grow metal inorganic crystals on
the fibers in a woven fabric, Rocky Research scientists invented an exceedingly tough
textile. They had set out to make material tough enough to prevent heat from deforming
the heat exchangers in special refrigeration systems. Difficulty in processing the
material led to the serendipitous creation of COMBAM as a ballistic material.
When multiple layers are pressed together and sealed with epoxy, the material resembles
a combination of fabric and ceramic armor, but it’s lighter and cheaper than
the body and vehicle armor the Army currently uses, Rockenfeller said.
COMBAM provides “25 to 30 percent higher velocity protection than other materials,”
he said. That means it will stop bullets or shrapnel traveling 25 to 30 percent
faster than stopped by current armor. Or, expressed another way, to provide the
same degree of protection as today’s body armor, COMBAM would be 25 to 30
percent lighter.
Constant Search for Improvements
The Army is constantly searching for better armor. Its laboratories and scientists
diligently examine new materials and manufacturing methods, and analyze armor
performance. There’s no shortage of claims by companies and academic researchers
that they have developed innovative materials that will make armor lighter, more
flexible, stronger and cheaper.
Retired Army Col. Bruce Jette is familiar with the assertions. Now president and
CEO of Synovision Solutions, he headed the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force during
the early years of the global war on terrorism, when the Army was desperate for better
body armor and vehicle armor. More recently, he participated in a study of armor
with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine’s Board on
Army Science and Technology.
Often, it turns out, “the materials that are offered up don’t provide overall improvement”
to the armor the Army is already using, Jette said.
But COMBAM may be different. The Army’s Aviation and Missile Research,
Development and Engineering Center is testing the material for use as armor in the
40 ARMY ■ June 2016

A University of Delaware
researcher uses an ice pick
to test the puncture resistance
of fabric treated with
shear thickening fluid.
University of Delaware
June 2016 ■ ARMY 41

The material known as COMBAM can be molded into any
shape and is more bulletproof than Kevlar.
Rocky Research
Rocky Research
protective containers that store rockets and missiles. The armor
would shield Hellfire; Tube-launched, Optically tracked,
Wire-guided; Joint Air-to-Ground; and other missiles during
storage and transportation so bullets or shrapnel don’t penetrate
the cases and ignite the missile propellants.
COMBAM is the first material that actually meets the
Army missile container armor standards, Rockenfeller said,
adding that the process used in today’s armor does not, so it
requires a waiver.
The rectangular missile containers are about 6 feet long
and made of thin aluminum, Rockenfeller said. They need armor
to protect a 2-foot-long section that surrounds rocket
motors. Lengths of 1.5-inch-thick COMBAM, which “look
like boards,” would be attached to the inside of the container
where the motor lies. The U.S. Army may need as many as
20,000 protective shield inserts per year; global demand might
be 50,000 units, he said.
That would be good for Rocky Research, and also good for
the Army. “Cost is one of the real bright spots of COM-
BAM,” Rockenfeller said. Between 30 percent and 50 percent
of the “high-cost fiber material” used in today’s armor would
be replaced by “low-cost crystalline substance,” Rockenfeller
said. “Aramid [fiber such as Kevlar] or polyethylene is replaced
by roughly 10 times lower-cost metal inorganic salts.”
Besides rocket motor protection, COMBAM could be used
in body armor, helmets, vehicle armor and truck-mounted
shelters, Rockenfeller said.
‘Liquid Armor’ Turns Solid
While Rocky Research worked on COMBAM, Army and
university scientists spent nearly a decade studying another innovative
type of protection: “liquid armor,” which promises to
be lighter and more flexible than today’s armor yet offer
greater protection.
The key ingredient is a liquid that turns solid when it is
struck hard by a bullet, shrapnel or blade. The liquid is shear
thickening fluid (STF). It’s a thick solution that consists of
microscopic particles suspended in liquid; often, silica particles
are suspended in polyethylene glycol.
Because of their chemistry, the particles repel each other. So
when they’re suspended in liquid, they disperse evenly. Even
when closely packed, each particle naturally keeps space between
itself and those around it. In that state, STF behaves
like a liquid.
But when it is struck, the particles are forced together,
clumping into a solid that’s strong enough to stop a bullet.
The transformation from liquid to solid is instantaneous.
This phenomenon is not new. It has long been observed in
the manufacturing of products including paper, toothpaste and
paint. Mostly, it was a nuisance. Thick liquids would suddenly
solidify, clogging factory pipes and shutting down production.
But in 2002, researchers at the University of Delaware saw
other possibilities for STF, said Norman Wagner, a chemical
and biomolecular engineering professor at the university.
Working with the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Wagner’s
team demonstrated that high-strength fabrics such as Kevlar
can be made more bulletproof and stab-resistant when impregnated
with STF.
When Kevlar is soaked in STF that has been thinned by a
solvent, the fluid seeps into the tiny gaps and crevices between
the Kevlar fibers. The Kevlar is then placed in an oven to
evaporate the solvent, leaving the STF. The fluid remains a
waxy liquid until it is struck. Then it becomes solid, and the
fabric becomes virtually impenetrable. The STF remains solid
momentarily, then it returns to its liquid state and the fabric
becomes flexible again.
An Army video shows an ice pick can easily penetrate multiple
layers of Kevlar. But when Kevlar is treated with STF,
the ice pick can barely dent the outside layer. Additional tests
demonstrated that four layers of Kevlar treated with STF were
as effective at stopping bullets as 10 layers of untreated Kevlar.
Once the basic research on STF was completed, the university
and the Army turned the technology over to defense giant BAE
Systems to develop a usable liquid armor. In 2010, the company
42 ARMY ■ June 2016

announced it would make “liquid” body armor that would be 45
percent thinner and much more flexible than existing armor.
That never happened, however. After progress at BAE
stalled, the university terminated the company’s license and issued
a new one to fabric manufacturer Barrday Corp.
Meanwhile, interest in liquid armor has spread. Wagner
said “a lot of people” are now working on it, including researchers
in South Korea, China, Russia and Poland.
New Materials and Protection
As for the Army, its STF researchers have turned their attention
to another kind of armor: football helmets. The Army
Research Lab received $500,000 in 2014 in a competition by
the National Football League—and could receive $1 million
more—to develop helmets that will better protect players from
brain injuries.
Army scientists have designed a lightweight harness of
stretchy tethers that connect players’ helmets to their torsos or
waists. The tethers act as shock absorbers to protect players’
heads. The tethers are elastic straps embedded with shear
thickening fluid. Most of the time, the tethers permit normal
head movement. But when players are hit suddenly and powerfully,
the shear thickening fluid in the tethers seizes up, and
the tethers prevent violent movements of the head that cause
brain injuries such as concussions.
That same helmet technology could reduce head injuries in
paratroopers, said Eric Wetzel, an Army research scientist who
leads the helmet project and led previous Army work with
shear thickening fluid. It is “well-documented that the concussion
rate for paratroopers is about twice that of a normal
soldier,” Wetzel said.
At the University of Delaware, Wagner is also using STFinfused
straps to engineer new types of prostheses. The straps
appear to be promising replacements for missing tendons.
“Think of the Achilles tendon,” Wagner said. “If you move it
slowly it stretches out, but when you move fast it is tight,” reacting
like an STF-enhanced strap.
Prosthetic legs built with STF straps would respond more
naturally to running, walking and climbing steps, Wagner
said. Current prostheses “don’t feel natural,” and this often results
in awkward gaits that lead to muscular and skeletal problems.
Moreover, prostheses built with STF materials could be
“tuned” to match the wearer’s size, weight and athletic ability,
Wagner said.
Plastics Absorb Bullets
Shear thickening fluid is a rather prosaic blend of plastics
producing another promising type of new armor, according to
scientists at Rice University in Houston. It’s a type of clear
polyurethane that not only stops bullets, but also seems to absorb
them.
Edwin “Ned” Thomas, a materials and nanoengineering scientist
and dean of Rice University’s George R. Brown School
of Engineering, illustrated using a clear plastic disk about 5
inches across and 1½ inches thick. Buried halfway through it
were three 9 mm bullets.
There were no cracks or other damage to the disk. And
while the bullets looked as if they had been carefully encased
in the plastic, they actually were shot there with a gun.
“This would be a great ballistic windshield material,”
Thomas said.
The polyurethane is made from a combination of two inex-
Rice University/Tommy LaVergne
Rice University’s Edwin ‘Ned’ Thomas holds a
polyurethane disk containing bullets it stopped.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 43

Paola D’Angelo, a research bioengineer at the
U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development
and Engineering Center, Mass., is working on
‘second-skin’ fabric for chemical and biological
protection.
pensive, everyday plastics: clear and brittle
polystyrene—“think inexpensive drinking
cups,” Thomas said—and polydimethylsiloxane,
“the rubbery stuff that we all use
to caulk around the edge of our bathtubs.”
Combined, the two materials “spontaneously
arrange into glassy and rubbery
layers,” Thomas explained. When
struck by a bullet or shrapnel, the layers
don’t break or crack. Instead, they bend
and engulf the penetrating object.
In addition to ballistic glass, researchers
say the polyurethane could be
combined with other materials, such as Kevlar, to make better
body armor; serve as cladding to protect spacecraft and satellites
from micrometeorites; or as a coating to protect jet engine turbine
blades.
Carbon Proves Promising
Carbon is another promising material for armor, at least in
the form of graphene. Graphene is essentially an atom-thick
layer of carbon atoms bonded together in a honeycomb pattern.
When clumped together in tens of thousands of layers or more,
the graphene becomes the rather mundane material graphite.
But at the molecular level, graphene is exceptional. It is able to
“absorb kinetic energy from a high-speed projectile twice as
well as Kevlar, and 10 times better than steel,” Thomas said.
Working with graphene on a microscopic scale, researchers
have discovered that it is surprisingly stretchy, enough to dissipate
much of the energy of a microscopic bullet. By stretching,
layers of graphene could spread out a bullet’s impact. “The
game in protection is getting the stress [of the impact] to distribute
over a large area,” Thomas said.
Because it is strong and lightweight, graphene should be
able to make better armor for people as well as for vehicles and
aircraft, he said. However, it’s not yet possible to produce
graphene in the large quantities that are required for making
armor.
Not all of the roadblocks for new armor are scientific ones.
For example, the Army is interested in a fiber called Dyneema.
Its maker, Royal DSM, claims Dyneema is “the strongest and
most durable fiber in the world.” It’s 45 times lighter than
aramid fibers such as Kevlar, the company said, and 15 times
stronger than steel. Dyneema is already being used in body armor
and vehicle armor, but not by the U.S. military.
“It’s a very good product,” Jette said. However, Dyneema
maker Royal DSM is a Dutch company, whereas Kevlar is an
American-made product. Kevlar is protected by “buy-American”
legislation passed by Congress. According to U.S. law,
“when you buy a product for soldiers that includes fibers in it,
they have to be American-made fibers,” Jette said.
DSM has set up a production plant in North Carolina that
might help it skirt the buy-American restrictions. Another
plus: Several companies hoping to develop the Army’s future
“soldier protection system” have proposed armor that uses
Dyneema. So far, the Army has not selected manufacturers.
Other armor innovations include:
■ Fish-scale armor developed by the Technion-Israel Institute
of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) uses tough armor plates that overlap like fish
scales and lie atop a soft, elastic material to provide protection
while enabling flexibility. “It’s not hard to make plates that
will stop a bullet,” Jette said, “but you have to put them together
so that they are flexible but don’t offer a seam for the
bullet to enter.” Invariably, the seams are the flaw, he said.
■ “Second skin” is fabric the Army is developing to be sewn
into protective suits for troops operating around chemical and
biological weapons. The fabric contains a layer of “responsive
polymer gels” that sense the presence of chemical or biological
agents and close the pores of the textile to keep the agents out.
Army, Air Force and MIT scientists are working to develop
polymers that will sense mustard agents, detect and deactivate
nerve agents and blister agents, and sense and kill anthrax
spores and bacteria.
■ Armor for women: With combat positions now open to
women, the Army needs armor that better fits female soldiers.
In the past, women have had to make do with ill-fitting armor
designed for small men. The Army has hired a New York
company, Body Labs, to turn 14,000 scans of female soldiers
into 3-D avatars whose shapes and movements can help designers
create better-fitting armor for women. ✭
William Matthews is a freelance writer who specializes in military
and technology issues. In addition to writing for magazines and
websites, he has been a staff writer for Defense News, Federal
Computer Week, Army Times Publishing Co. and several
newspapers. He is based in suburban Washington, D.C.
U.S. Army/David Kamm
44 ARMY ■ June 2016

Capturing Good Ideas
Before They Vanish
By Maj. Wayne Heard, U.S. Army retired
When the late Lt. Col. Robert L. Jackson was a
battalion commander in the 25th Infantry Division,
he would announce any launch—a combined
arms live-fire exercise; deployment from
Oahu, Hawaii; construction of the squad live-fire assault
course; the reorganization of the 25th from an infantry division
to a light infantry division—the same way: “The after-action
review starts now!”
As a company commander in the division from 1982 to
1984, I had the opportunity to study Jackson’s after-action review
process up close and personal. Jackson provided the vision
and set the tone that the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry
Regiment would be a learning organization.
It is often suggested that lessons are never learned, only observed;
and that with every retirement, permanent change of
station, or expiration-term of service, lessons “walk out the
door.” Jackson disagreed and would not allow this perception
to seep into the minds of 19th Infantry leaders. He showed us
how to create a learning organization and how to install an effective
lessons-learned program.
Actually, I had the privilege of bearing witness to two great
lessons-learned programs during my time in uniform. The
first formal effort in which I participated occurred on Smoke
Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg, N.C. The team leaders and team
sergeants of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group were
instructed to report to a classroom for a meeting. No one
knew what to expect.
At the appointed time, in walked a first sergeant who
46 ARMY ■ June 2016

Soldiers of the U.S. Army Reserve’s 308th Civil Affairs Brigade conduct an
after-action review in South Dakota.
looked as much like a senior IBM executive as he did a soldier.
His name was Joe C. Alderman, and he would go on to retire
as a master sergeant. A quick review of his online biography
should impress you with our good fortune and the importance
of this meeting.
‘Tips of the Trade’
For what was too short a time, we sat transfixed, not unlike
Moses receiving wisdom from the burning bush, as Alderman
reviewed “the tips of the trade”—lessons learned in Special
Forces operations in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.
The tips were written for easy consumption and organized for
immediate retrieval, consisting of a list of critical “do’s and
don’ts” for successful operations, both general and specific.
Alderman was committed to transferring the lessons of 10
years in combat to the next generation of Special Forces warriors.
Everyone who was there or attended other meetings he
conducted, or who stumbled on a copy of the tips at some
point during their careers, can attest to the nature of this document
as solid gold.
Unlike the heavy tomes that can serve as after-action reports
in some organizations, the tips were contained in a document
of about 25 pages. “Do this. Don’t do that.” (Today, we could
hyperlink lessons to the complete after-action reports from
which unit lessons are drawn.)
It was probably at this time that I experienced a paradigm
U.S. Army/Pfc. Jessica Hurst
shift in how I thought of lessons learned. Instead of placing
emphasis on the noun—lessons—I began understanding the
term as a verb—learned.
While discussing lessons learned with a combat service support
officer who served in Vietnam, I was surprised to learn
that this structured process for collecting lessons was not limited
to the combat arms community. As this second lieutenant
processed into his unit in 1968, he was handed a three-ring
binder with the unit’s standing operating procedures and
lessons-learned reports. After one month in country, he was
reminded to submit his platoon’s lessons learned; it would be a
monthly requirement while he was in Vietnam. He admitted
that the task caught him flat-footed the first month; he had a
difficult time remembering anything good or bad that offered
a significant lesson.
Mental Ordeal
After that mental ordeal, his mind was alert for improvements
or cautions. Much like lean manufacturing processes
encourage gradual and continuous improvement, he was now
attuned to discover ways to improve operations.
My experience with Alderman reflects the tail end of an effective
lessons-learned program. In the 19th Infantry, I observed
the entire process from inception.
With his imperative that “the after-action review starts
now,” Jackson would provide specific guidance to his subordinate
leaders and staff regarding his expectations. In our leader
notebooks, we were told to set aside a special section to capture
good ideas and processes, or identify issues that needed to
be addressed.
Occasionally, during a staff meeting, Jackson would randomly
call on company commanders or staff officers and ask
them to read their notes aloud so we might discuss the key insights
they had collected so far. The first time that happened,
there was an uncomfortable moment as we squirmed and hoped
the meeting would end before he chose to expand his aperture.
When Real Learning Occurs
We quickly understood that Jackson was serious about everyone
looking for ways to improve and jotting down notes about
those ideas. As Jackson might say, “A dull pencil is better than a
sharp memory.” At the end of a project, we would have a formal
after-action review and discuss each lesson. One leader suggested
that the “real learning occurs in the after-action review.”
For tactical operations, Jackson’s determination to identify
lessons and improve battalion operations was even more accentuated.
After an extended field exercise in South Korea, he
assembled the key personnel in a large classroom. Displayed
on a roll of contractor paper was a timeline prepared by the
operations shop that captured the activities of the past 14 days.
A map was posted indicating the locations of the company assembly
areas before the exercise began; the missions and
routes from assembly areas and defensive positions; where
June 2016 ■ ARMY 47

In Thailand, troops of
the 2nd Stryker
Brigade Combat
Team, 25th Infantry
Division discuss their
training.
U.S. Army/Sgt. Daniel K. Johnson
rivers were crossed, hilltop objectives taken, patrols dispatched
and units engaged; retrogrades; and final defense.
After Jackson provided his vision and intent for the afteraction
review, the S3 (operations and training officer) set the
stage and returned us to that first night when we occupied our
assembly areas. We discussed the orders and their clarity and
timeliness; our movement into the assembly areas; defensive
positions and attack formations; and the all-important river
crossing. As we wrung every lesson we could from each day,
we progressed to the next, and on through each day of the exercise.
We discussed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)
as well as maintenance and administrative matters.
Thick Skins
Every leader was expected to illuminate shortcomings and
offer recommendations for improvement. Jackson and his executive
officer showed remarkable openness and thick skins
when the shortcomings included battalion staff work. Company
commanders and specialty platoon leaders were expected
to be equally hard on their own individual performance. As we
discussed each operation, Jackson teased out the lesson that we
had, or should have, observed.
For example, during one shallow river crossing, the battalion
was surprised by 2nd Infantry Division tanks using the
river as an avenue of approach into our flanks. This tactic
was highlighted during the review; a recommended counterresponse
was discussed and action agreed upon.
Of course, a discussion of the past 14 days could have signaled
the end of the after-action review process, but that
wasn’t Jackson’s objective. He directed the S3 to publish the
after-action report within 30 days.
In addition, the battalion tactical procedures would be updated
with the new TTP and republished within 30 days.
(“Put the fix in place before it is forgotten.”) As a result of the
after-action review, whenever the 19th Infantry conducted
shallow river crossings, anti-tank weapons would be dispatched
to bolster the security teams on both the left and right
flanks. During the next rotation into South Korea, this tactic
had become part of how our battalion operated. It was one of
several changes in our TTP.
As the late researcher and lecturer W. Edwards Deming once
said, “If you can’t describe what you are doing as a process, you
don’t know what you’re doing.” The Jackson method for developing
and implementing lessons learned is as follows:
■ At the beginning of every project or exercise, set an expectation
for identifying lessons.
■ Include intermediate collections of lessons.
■ Prepare for the formal after-action report by creating a
timeline and map, and conducting research.
■ Assemble the key personnel.
■ Review each day and each operation—first by the S3,
then by each subordinate leader—identifying friction points,
poor performance or good ideas, and identifying the lessons or
observations.
■ Review each lesson and determine how it will change the
way the battalion organizes, trains or equips. In evaluating an
observation and the recommended fix, include all those who
would be affected by the change to ensure it makes sense at
the ground level.
■ Establish deadlines for publishing the after-action report
as well as the updated policies, processes and procedures.
■ Create similar situations in upcoming exercises to ensure
the learning has taken place.
Whenever I reflect on after-action reviews and lessons
learned, I hold up the techniques of Jackson and Alderman as
the gold standard.
✭
Maj. Wayne Heard, USA Ret., spent 20 years in the Army with
assignments in airborne, light infantry and special forces. After
retiring in 1992, he co-authored the Army’s field manual on personnel
recovery and has served with personnel recovery staffs at
Army headquarters, U.S. Central Command and the Drug Enforcement
Administration. The opinions in this article are strictly
the author’s own.
48 ARMY ■ June 2016

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ROTC Turns 100
Future Leaders Trained; the Nation Benefits
By Brig. Gen. Sean A. Gainey
One hundred years ago, President Woodrow Wilson
signed the National Defense Act of 1916 establishing
the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. Throughout
the following century, the U.S. and its Army
faced numerous challenges both at home and abroad. Wars
against despotic foreign governments were fought and won;
economic depressions endured; medical, scientific and technological
advances were made; and U.S.-led peacekeeping operations
contributed to greater global stability.
At U.S. Army Cadet Command, we take great pride in the
role our ROTC graduates played in virtually every aspect of
life during this critical time period.
Since ROTC came into existence on June 3, 1916, over
600,000 men and women have earned a commission through the
program. Among them are two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, seven Army chiefs of staff, two Cabinet secretaries and a
sitting Supreme Court associate justice. Few other military commissioning
sources can claim such significant lineage.
We are commemorating the 100th anniversary of ROTC in
special ceremonies at the Pentagon and Fort Knox, Ky., as
well as on our university campuses. Yet while 1916 is the official
birthday of the program, its origins can be traced back at
least a century earlier.
History Starts in 1819
The ROTC story really begins in 1819 with Capt. Alden
Partridge, a former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy
at West Point, N.Y. Capitalizing on his experience, Partridge
established the American Literary, Scientific and Military
Academy in Norwich, Vt. It was there that Partridge’s
method of producing “citizen-soldiers” first took root. The institution,
now known as Norwich University, continues operating
to this day.
Partridge advocated a process through which able-bodied
men would receive military training while attending civilian
institutions of higher learning. The benefits to the nation
would be multifold. A cohort of trained military leaders would
be available on short notice whenever the need arose. But
when circumstances did not require their service in uniform,
they would be free to pursue civilian occupations. The merits
of Partridge’s approach soon became evident, and a number of
other American academic institutions began to operate along
the lines he advocated.
Between 1819 and 1861, several other schools focusing on
military instruction were established. These included Lafayette
College, Pa.; Oak Ridge Military Academy, N.C.; Kemper
Military School and College, Mo.; and Marion Military Institute,
Ala. By 1840, Indiana University and the University of
Norwich University
Library of Congress/National Photo Co.
50 ARMY ■ June 2016

Library of Congress/Bain News Service Library of Congress/W.E. James
Tennessee had added compulsory military training as well.
The state-supported Virginia Military Institute and The
Citadel, S.C., also commenced operations during this period.
The Land Grant Act of 1862, championed by Vermont legislator
Justin Morrill, represented the next milestone in
ROTC’s history. Under its terms, each state received 30,000
acres of public land to establish institutions of scientific learning.
In return, these land grant colleges were to offer military
tactics courses. Graduates of these institutions, along with
those trained on other campuses, would ultimately fight in
both the Union and Confederate armies.
The Confederacy’s surrender in 1865 did not mark the end
of efforts to incorporate military instruction on college campuses
across the growing nation. A total of 105 colleges and
universities across the country were offering military training
by the early 1900s.
Plattsburg Movement
The next key development in ROTC’s history became
known as the Plattsburg Movement, named for the camp in
upstate New York that was established to train civilian volunteers
on military preparedness. As fierce fighting raged between
the Central Powers and the Allies, a group of prominent
Americans formed this preparedness program. These pro-Allied
community leaders believed our Army was too small to be
effective if America was drawn into World War I. In the summers
of 1915 and 1916, they facilitated the establishment of
additional camps to train potential Army officers. By the end of
1917, more than 17,000 men had trained at these camps.
Subsequently, the National Defense Act of 1916 yielded
Army ROTC units closely resembling the college-based
Cadet Command formations of today. Many premier academic
institutions such as Harvard, Yale and Princeton
universities and Dartmouth College petitioned for military
commissioning units. World events outpaced America’s ability
to commission large numbers of officers through on-campus
training for World War I service, however. By 1920, Army
ROTC production totaled only 133 officers.
Lean Years
Isolationism and the resulting smaller standing Army did
not produce a favorable environment for ROTC in the wake
of World War I. During these lean years, Army ROTC efforts
focused on producing officers for the Army Reserve.
When war came in 1941, these ROTC graduates made an immediate
positive impact. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C.
Marshall Jr., himself a Virginia Military Institute graduate,
wrote, “Just what we would have done in the first phases of
our mobilization without [ROTC graduates] I do not know.
... The cessation of hostilities on the European front would
have been delayed accordingly.”
Clockwise from opposite, top: Capt. Alden Partridge established military
training at what is now Norwich University, Vt., in 1819; The Citadel was
founded in 1842 as the Military College of South Carolina; a volunteer
regiment-in-training at Plattsburg, N.Y.; President Herbert Hoover reviews
ROTC cadets at the White House in 1929.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 51

By 1947, America had rapidly demobilized with the surrender
of Nazi Germany and the Imperial Japanese government. But
Soviet aggression and an armed conflict in Korea quickly spurred
renewed interest in ROTC. The ROTC Vitalization Act of
1964 solidified ROTC’s role as the primary source of active-duty
Army officers, and the program of instruction for Army ROTC
became more closely aligned with a college education than ever
before. Scholarships were made available to qualified cadets, and
monthly stipends were offered. All of these factors were expected
to broaden the popularity of the program on campus.
Uncertain Future
Challenges to the requirement that all male students at land
grant institutions enroll in ROTC surfaced at virtually the same
time. The national debate on U.S. involvement in Vietnam also
contributed to an uncertain future for ROTC. Young men had
faced compulsive military service throughout the Cold War
years. Deferments granted to students enrolled in college-level
ROTC increased the attraction of the program. That situation
was altered when Congress initiated a draft lottery system that
did not feature draft deferments to ROTC cadets.
The draft ended in 1973 and as might be expected, total
ROTC enrollment declined significantly. But under a pilot
program, women became eligible to enroll
in Army ROTC in the 1972–73
school year. The pilot program proved
successful and in short order, the program
was commissioning female lieutenants.
Cadet Command’s establishment in
1986 at Fort Monroe, Va., was a true
milestone in ROTC’s long history. Under
Maj. Gen. Robert E. Wagner, the
new command assumed responsibility
for over 300 college-level Army ROTC
units, four regional headquarters, and
Junior ROTC programs at over 800
high schools. Under Wagner’s leadership,
Army ROTC was totally transformed
into a centralized command producing
top-quality lieutenants.
Each subsequent commander has built
on Wagner’s success. Since the onset of
the global war on terrorism, the quality of
ROTC-trained officers has won high
praise. In a 2002 speech at Virginia Military
Institute, President George W. Bush
said ROTC cadets “represent the best of
our country, and the best future for the
United States Army.”
He added, “For nearly 90 years, this
great program has developed leaders and shaped character.
Those looking for idealism on the college campuses of America
will find it in the men and women of ROTC. ROTC’s traditions
and values are a contribution and a credit to every college
and every university where they’re found.”
In those same remarks, Bush highlighted retired Gen.
Colin L. Powell, a graduate of the City College of New York
Army ROTC program, who was then serving as U.S. secretary
of state. Bush shared with the audience Powell’s personal
reflection on his time in ROTC. Those thoughts speak volumes
about the lasting benefits of ROTC.
Powell’s Affinity for ROTC
Powell said, “The order, the self-discipline, the pride that
had been instilled in me by ROTC prepared me well for my
Army career or, for that matter, any career I might have chosen.”
Powell’s affinity for ROTC also extended to the high
school Junior ROTC program. He was the driving force behind
its major expansion during his tenure as chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Cadet Command has continued refining its training
methodologies and the leader development process in recent
years. In 2014, all collective ROTC summer training was con-
Maj. Gen. Robert E. Wagner, left, accepts the
U.S. Army Cadet Command colors from Sgt.
Maj. Calvin Foster during the ceremony marking
the command’s formal activation in 1986
at Fort Monroe, Va.
U.S. Army/Charles Alston
52 ARMY ■ June 2016

Training, Education at Heart of Program
By Lt. Col. Greg Lane, U.S. Army Reserve retired
Army ROTC, which is run by the U.S. Army Cadet
Command, is the main source of officers to the U.S.
Army, providing 70 percent of the new lieutenants in each
year’s cohort. These officers come from the 275 colleges and
universities that host Army ROTC programs as well as hundreds
of other schools that “satellite” off the host programs.
ROTC comprises both training and education. On-campus
classes and leadership labs focus on a variety of topics
involved with teaching officership. Off-campus training includes
a mandatory, 29-day training cycle over the summer
at Fort Knox, Ky., called the Cadet Leader Course. A cadet
normally attends this between his or her junior and senior
years. Cadet Initial Entry Training, also conducted each
summer at Fort Knox, provides a 28-day training experience
for cadets and students who missed some or all of the
freshman and sophomore Army ROTC classes.
Final preparation for commissioning involves training in
topics such as officer and NCO efficiency reports, counseling,
military law, supply and property accountability, financial
management, the military decisionmaking process, and
the Army awards system. Cadets also go on at least one
staff ride during their cadet career.
Cadets also have the opportunity to participate in Cadet
Professional Development Training. This can include Airborne
School at Fort Benning, Ga.; Air Assault School at
Fort Campbell, Ky.; Mountain Warfare School in Jericho,
Vt.; or Combat Diver School in Key West, Fla. Some also
complete Cadet Troop Leader Training, in which a cadet
visits an active Army unit anywhere in the world other
than a combat zone and gains three to four weeks of experience
as a “third lieutenant,” filling an officer slot. In addition,
cadets fill internships at various locations including
the National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville,
Va., and at the Pentagon.
A recent addition to training opportunities is the Cultural
Understanding and Language Proficiency Program,
which immerses a cadet in one of more than 40 countries
for a period of one month.
Junior ROTC at the high school level, created at the
same time as ROTC, comprises 277,000 students at 1,645
secondary schools. It also falls under Cadet Command.
The main thrust of JROTC is good citizenship, though
some JROTC cadets go to the service academies and college-level
ROTC programs, and some join the armed
forces as enlisted members.
JROTC is a four-year program that teaches topics including
the three branches of government, first aid, communication
skills, land navigation/orienteering and physical
fitness. Cadets also have the opportunity to compete
against other JROTC units in Raider Challenge competitions.
These involve physical tasks such as an obstacle
Cadets negotiate an obstacle during Army ROTC Advanced Camp.
course, and mental tasks such as a map-reading test or
problem-solving exercises. Some of the most visible parts
of JROTC are the drill teams and color guard, with many
JROTC units presenting the national colors at their
school’s home athletic events.
During their summer break, selected JROTC cadets
participate in Junior Cadet Leadership Challenge camps
run in a variety of locations across the nation. The camps
last a week, with structured adventure and leadership
events to push and develop the cadets.
Army ROTC serves its purpose well in future officer
preparation. All in all, Cadet Command is succeeding in
producing quality officers to make up a majority of the
Army’s officer corps and training high school students to
be better Americans.
Lt. Col. Greg Lane, USAR Ret., is an Army ROTC staff
member at Austin Peay State University (APSU), Tenn. He
commanded twice at the company level and served on battalion-
and brigade-level staffs in the continental U.S. and
overseas. He has a bachelor’s degree from The Citadel and a
master’s from APSU.
U.S. Army Cadet Command
June 2016 ■ ARMY 53

Notable ROTC Grads
For many years, the Army ROTC program has produced the majority
of commissioned officers for America’s Army. Armed with the
skills acquired in the program, many ROTC graduates have risen
to national prominence. Here are some of the men and women who
got their start in Army ROTC, according to the U.S. Army Cadet
Command:
Army Chiefs of Staff
■ Gen. (Ret.) George W. Casey Jr. (Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C.)
■ Gen. George H. Decker* (Lafayette College, Pa.)
■ Gen. George C. Marshall Jr.* (Virginia Military Institute)
■ Gen. Mark A. Milley (Princeton University, N.J.)
■ Gen. (Ret.) Peter J. Schoomaker (University of Wyoming)
■ Gen. (Ret.) Gordon R. Sullivan (Norwich University, Vt.)—
President and CEO, AUSA
■ Gen. Frederick C. Weyand* (University of California, Berkeley)
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
■ Gen. (Ret.) Colin Powell (City College of New York)
■ Gen. (Ret.) Hugh Shelton (North Carolina State University)
Other Prominent Graduates
■ Samuel Alito Jr. (Princeton University)—U.S. Supreme Court justice
■ Ronald Brown* (Middlebury College, Vt.)—Former U.S. secretary
of commerce
■ Gen. (Ret.) Richard E. Cavazos (Texas Technological University)—
Former commander, U.S. Army Forces Command
■ Maj. Gen. Peggy C. Combs (Syracuse University, N.Y.)—
Commanding general, U.S. Army Cadet Command
■ Nancy Currie (Ohio State University)—Astronaut
■ Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Gina S. Farrisee (University of Richmond, Va.)—
Former commanding general, Human Resources Command;
assistant secretary, Office of Human Resources and
Administration, VA
■ Earl G. Graves Sr. (Morgan State University, Md.)—Founder and
publisher, Black Enterprise magazine
■ Gen. (Ret.) Carter F. Ham (John Carroll University, Ohio)—
Former commander, U.S. Africa Command; incoming president and
CEO, AUSA
■ Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (The Citadel, S.C.)—Former U.S. senator;
former governor, South Carolina
■ James Earl Jones (University of Michigan)—Actor
■ Kris Kristofferson (Pomona College, Calif.)—Actor; songwriter
■ Leon Panetta (Santa Clara University, Calif.)—Former secretary of
defense; former director, CIA
■ Dean Rusk* (Davidson College, N.C.)—Former secretary of state
■ Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez (Texas A&M)—Former
commander, coalition ground forces, Iraq
■ Sam Walton* (University of Missouri)—Founder, Wal-Mart
Stores Inc.
*Deceased
Then an ROTC cadet, Gen. Colin Powell, USA Ret., was
commander of the guard during training at Fort Bragg,
N.C., in July 1957.
solidated at Fort Knox. In a departure from the
past, new hands-on training opportunities are
now available to all cadets. Graduates must be
prepared to operate in every corner of the globe,
so cultural awareness training became a priority.
Overseas immersions help prepare ROTC
graduates in ways the classroom cannot.
These opportunities expose cadets to everyday
life in different cultures and also intensify
language study. Armed with these experiences,
today’s ROTC cadets are well-prepared to assume
the reins of small-unit leadership from
the onset of their service to the nation.
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley
earned his commission through the Army
ROTC program at Princeton University in
1980. In recent remarks at his alma mater, he
noted America’s Army is powerful because it
protects the most powerful idea that ever existed
in world history.
As we mark the centennial of our program,
the Army ROTC community renews its pledge
to remain at the vanguard of that effort. ✭
Brig. Gen. Sean A. Gainey is the deputy commanding
general of the U.S. Army Cadet Command.
He has led at the platoon, company, battalion
and brigade levels, and deployed in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom. He holds a bachelor’s
degree from Georgia Southern University, and
master’s degrees from Central Michigan University
and the National Defense University’s
Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security,
Washington, D.C.
ARMY magazine archives
54 ARMY ■ June 2016

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Spouses Balance Work,
In today’s Army, more and more spouses are focusing on
their own careers and letting their soldiers focus on
theirs. Somehow, they’ve found ways to balance their
own demanding careers while supporting their soldiers
and families.
Jamie Libby Boyle, the spouse of an enlisted soldier in the
Hampton Roads, Va., area, started her career as a public
school teacher. Later she attended graduate school and completed
a Ph.D. in English. She has reinvented herself a few
times, to include jobs as a technical writer. She now works as
an adjunct professor at a local college and an online university.
Jennifer Babich, wife of Lt. Col. Bryan Babich with the
82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., has been married
for 16 years and works as a television news broadcaster. “I
have been able to maintain my broadcasting career, which I
started before becoming an Army spouse, although my career
has certainly had to evolve with our military lifestyle,” Babich
said. Her employers allow her to work part time, when necessary,
and have even helped find her jobs within the company
after two moves.
Staci-Jill Burnley, a Department of the Army civilian, met
her husband in 2006 while she was working as a contractor in
the military public affairs and communications field. They
married in 2008 shortly before moving to Fort Bragg. “When
we moved back to D.C. is when I was able to maneuver over to
a government position using Military Executive Order 13473,
a noncompetitive appointment for military spouses,” she explained.
She left the contracting world in 2012. Her husband,
Lt. Col. Todd Burnley, is currently attending the Dwight D.
Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy
at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.
Volunteer Work
Military spouses, particularly those whose partners are in
leadership positions, have additional pressure to volunteer and
do other activities in line with traditional Army spouse roles.
“I find it is always a balancing act trying to keep all these
balls in the air at the same time,” Babich said. “Sometimes
something drops, but I try to focus on the things which I can
control. I’m a big believer in maintaining calendars and to-do
lists to help keep myself organized, but do find I often have to
schedule in times to have fun.” She spent the past two years as
her husband’s family readiness group adviser while he was in
battalion command and deployed.
Boyle, while working as an assistant editor for the journal of
the Military Spouse Corporate Career Network (MSCCN)
and teaching as an adjunct professor, also balances being a
mother to a 5-year-old and newborn with volunteer work and
activities with her husband’s family readiness group.
Likewise, Burnley is a member of several volunteer organizations
and is vice president of the Eisenhower School Class of
2016 Spouses’ Organization. This year she juggled pregnancy,
a deployment and an ailing pet, all while working full time.
Courtesy Jennifer Babich
Jennifer Babich
Balancing Career and Children
Military spouses have many things to consider when deciding
to work outside the home. Because service members rarely
work a traditional 8 a.m.–5 p.m. Monday through Friday job,
reliable and affordable child care is a top priority for those pursuing
a family and a career.
Several options exist for child care through the military, including
installation Child Development Centers. However,
the centers’ hours of operation are not flexible. Boyle said
spouses should be vocal about child care needs. If these programs
“don’t work, speak up and advocate for what you and
your family need,” Boyle said.
Burnley admitted to having some sleepless nights when it
came to deciding on child care. “The D.C. area is incredibly
complex when it comes to child care with … yearlong-plus
wait lists. You basically have to be on a wait list before you get
pregnant to have child care waiting when you need it,” she said.
Burnley and her husband, who have a 1-year-old daughter,
are fans of the military child care subsidy organized through the
National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral
Agencies, which helps families who cannot use the child care
facility on an installation.
“We found a participating day care on the economy and pay
56 ARMY ■ June 2016

Family, Army By
Rebecca Alwine, Contributing Writer
what we would pay” at the Child Development
Center. “So for us, that’s a savings
of $1,089 a month,” Burnley said.
“And we know that the participating
school had to pass a rigorous screening
process to be a partnering facility.”
Another child care option gaining
popularity among military families is
hiring an au pair. Over the past five
years, Babich, who has two daughters,
ages 7 and 12, has hosted six au pairs.
Four worked out well, and two did not.
“While it’s not perfect, it has been a
great choice for us,” Babich said. “It allows
for the kind of flexibility we require
to keep our family on track, and
our girls have benefited from having
such wonderful young ladies who live
with us and become like big sisters to
them. I highly recommend the au pair
program to military families who have
the resources to make it work.”
Support Groups/Forums
Many organizations and groups support
military spouses in their career goals.
The most popular organizations seem to Staci-Jill Burnley and family
be In Gear Career, Hiring Our Heroes,
Rosie’s Jobs, and Spouse Education and Career Opportunities.
Blue Star Families, the National Military Family Association
and Military OneSource also feature programs that help military
spouses secure employment and further their careers.
MSCCN is a nonprofit organization that focuses on employment
readiness training programs, job placement solutions,
and no-cost services to all military-affiliated spouses, retired
military spouses, and caregivers to war-wounded heroes.
All staff members at MSCCN have a military affiliation.
In addition, military spouses have launched a specialized
group, the Military Spouse Resume Writers’ Coalition. This
coalition boasts a group of professional resume writers with a
common goal: “to increase the awareness of military spouse
and veteran employment issues, engage with organizations to
improve access to military spouse and veteran employment,
connect employers with military spouses and veterans, and
provide access to much-needed resources, including the latest
resume industry trends,” according to its mission statement.
License Barriers Removed
Oregon is the most recent state to enact rules about professional
licenses. These rules can help people in a variety of
fields including law, education, health care, child care, food
services, fitness and even cosmetology. For example, the Oregon
law states that a military spouse attorney licensed in another
state, in good standing in each place they are licensed,
and living in Oregon due to military orders can be licensed on
a temporary basis while in the jurisdiction. Attorneys temporarily
licensed under this rule of admission must complete
15 hours of continuing education specific to Oregon’s procedures,
practice and ethics up to six months before moving or
immediately after filing for admission.
“Changes like the new licensing accommodation for military
spouse attorneys in Oregon demonstrate meaningful support
for career-minded spouses. While a ‘thank you for your
service’ goes a long way, removing barriers to licensing and
employment makes a significant and lasting impact in the lives
of military families by allowing the spouse to maintain a career
and contribute financially to the household, despite the difficulties
caused by frequent relocations,” said attorney Elizabeth
Jamison, a Navy spouse and communications director of the
Military Spouse J.D. Network.
“There are opportunities for success as a career military
spouse, even though it may not always be ideal. In the long
run, I believe that persistence pays off … even if sacrifices have
to be made along the way,” according to Babich.
“We are all individuals who find our rewards through a variety
of life choices. As long as you are happy and have the support
of your family, you can achieve great things and have success
in whatever venue you seek,” Burnley said. ✭
June 2016 ■ ARMY 57
Courtesy Staci-Jill Burnley

Cross-Culture Chemistry
Joint Service Environment Brings Out Best
By Col. Richard D. Hooker Jr., U.S. Army retired
With the orders, “You’re in
charge. Move out and
draw fire!” I put then-Lt.
Col. Steve Manber, U.S.
Marine Corps Reserve, in charge of
Combined Joint Task Force 82’s information
operations in Afghanistan. Although
he had attended a short course
before deploying, Manber was no more
of an information operations professional
than I was.
An infantry officer with combat experience
in Iraq, he had volunteered for a
year on active duty and been assigned to
Regional Command-East. As his boss, I
headed the largely Army Communications
Action Group, an innovative organization
created by our commander,
then-Army Maj. Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti,
to coordinate all information
operations, psychological operations and
public affairs messaging efforts in our
area of operations.
When soldiers deploy today, they will
often do so in joint environments with
active and reserve sailors, airmen and
Marines, not to mention our many allies
and partners. The joint environment
takes place not only in large, senior
staffs but throughout the joint
force. We’ve come a long way in the
joint arena, and combat operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us to
work closer and better with our sister
services. All that would now be put to
the test. How would our soldiers react
to Manber? How would he fit in with our Army culture?
Manber was all Marine in his short speech to his team. “I’m
your new boss. We’re going to make a difference here. If you
don’t perform, I’m here to make you. Let’s go to work.”
In less time than it takes to tell, things began to happen.
Manber’s first step was to assess his organization, which consisted
of 10 officers and NCOs, mostly Army Reserve, from a
variety of civilian backgrounds. He had a budget of about $10
million, a chain of 52 high-powered radio stations, a psychological
operations company staffed at 60 percent strength,
and his own energy and drive. With them, he would work
miracles.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Adora Medina
After a few days, the new information operations chief came
to see me with a plan. “Sir, we have a lot of pieces in place, but
we aren’t using them together in support of the campaign
plan. I propose that we buy and distribute hand-cranked radios
and cellphones—hundreds of thousands of them. Our
units will hand them out as they move through the battlespace.
Our radio stations will encourage the local population
to call in if they spot an improvised explosive device or a highvalue
target in their area.”
“The radios will enable them to hear the radio messages,”
Manber said. “The cellphones will give them an ability to call in
with actionable tips. Our tactical PSYOPS teams will help us
58 ARMY ■ June 2016

assess and monitor how we’re doing. And we can even hand out
cash rewards under the U.S. Central Command’s rewards program,
which has a $25 million fund. If we do this right, we can
make a huge difference.”
How this driven Marine and his small band of information
operations warriors managed to transform this simple concept
into reality could fill a book. Obstacles and land mines were
everywhere. Contracting officers were too busy to fill our equipment
orders. Resource managers stalled actions in their inboxes.
of thousands. Our Afghan DJs bombarded the airwaves. In
key leader engagements, company, battalion and brigade commanders
pushed the tip lines. Foot patrols visited towns and
villages with Afghan currency to reward verified tip-line calls.
Lieutenants and sergeants passed out cellphones and handcranked
radios in huge numbers.
Eventually, more than 500,000 radios and more than
50,000 cellphones were distributed among a population of 10
million. Then the calls began flooding in. Within six months,
actionable tip-line calls exploded by a factor of
10. Our casualties and Afghan casualties
dropped. It was an epic achievement.
Manber, by no means a bully, was nonetheless
an aggressive and committed leader, persuading,
cajoling, pushing and on occasion
even intimidating the faint-hearted. His troops
took heart, quickly becoming true believers.
Often the entire information operations section
would be working at 0100, unloading shipments
of new equipment because there was no
one else to do it.
Higher headquarters insisted on “staffing” every suggestion. Rival
staff sections critiqued the plan. Subordinate units balked at
new requirements. Even the information operations schoolhouses
in the rear weighed in with academic arguments.
There was inertia everywhere. Manber defeated them all,
with a determination and persistence I’d never seen equaled.
He had a big idea: It was the Afghans who knew Afghanistan,
far better than we ever could. If we could give them a
way to talk to us, they would help. That would save lives—
lots of them.
Within a few weeks, the plan began to take form. Billboards
popped up in countless villages. Leaflets went out by the tens
The long days with no breaks didn’t
seem to discourage Manber’s team;
on the contrary, they knew they were
making a difference, believed in the
mission, and felt like winners. Not for the first
time, I pondered a timeless truth: Leadership
is more than just important. Leadership is
everything.
Long before, when I was a new lieutenant
reporting to my first battalion, I’d been
handed a copy of Elbert Hubbard’s “A Message
to Garcia” by my new commander. First
published in 1899, the essay is about a young
officer, Rowan, who is given an almost impossible
task by President William McKinley at
the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.
Without comment or question, Rowan salutes
and carries out the mission. As I watched
Manber, a superb leader in action, I recalled
the stirring words I’d first read so long ago:
“By the Eternal! There is a man whose form
should be cast in deathless bronze and the
statue placed in every college of the land. It is
not book-learning young men need, nor instruction
about this or that, but a stiffening of the vertebrae
which will cause them to be loyal to a trust, to act promptly,
concentrate their energies: do the thing—‘Carry a message to
Garcia.’”
Manber had been my Rowan. Countless soldiers and
Afghans are alive today because of his service. He would later
command a battalion of infantry and today, he’s a full-bird
colonel. No officer ever deserved promotion and command
more.
Manber was proud to be a Marine. But he was just as proud
to be leading soldiers. Though his work may not have seemed
glamorous, he knew its worth and gave it his all. ✭
A 1st Infantry Division
soldier hands a radio
to a villager in
Afghanistan’s
Nuristan Province.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 59

Russia’s New-Generation
By Phillip Karber and
Lt. Col. Joshua Thibeault
The military conflict between Russia and Ukraine is now in its 25th month.
What began as a relatively bloodless superpower intervention in Crimea
and morphed into a proxy “separatist” insurrection in the Donbass region
has turned into a two-year-long, real war. Despite repeated attempts to negotiate
an effective cease-fire, the struggle in Ukraine has involved the largest-scale
battles in Europe since the end of World War II.
Like the Yom Kippur War 40 years earlier, the Russo-Ukraine War is a natural
“test bed” and insightful glimpse of what is to come on future battlefields. What follows
are 10 of the most critical lessons the U.S. Army must learn from this conflict
as it emerges from 15 years of counterinsurgency operations and turns its attention
once again to a near-peer threats.
New-Generation Warfare
In this complex and uncertain world, Russia represents a real threat, to real allies,
on real terrain. Though Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions might be un-
60 ARMY ■ June 2016

Warfare
The BM-30 Smerch, a Russian heavy multiple rocket launcher
Shutterstock/ID1974
knowable, we do know what his game plan is. It’s called “newgeneration
warfare,” and it targets Western weaknesses, not
strengths. New-generation warfare differs from Western views
of hybrid conflict in that it combines both low-end, hidden
state involvement with high-end, direct, even braggadocio superpower
involvement.
Aspects of this strategy were evident earlier in Chechnya
and Georgia but in Ukraine, Russia is both testing and perfecting
it. As practiced in Ukraine, Russian new-generation
warfare is manifested in five component elements:
■ Political subversion: Insertion of agents; classic “agitprop,”
or political propaganda, information operations employing
modern mass media to exploit ethnic-linguistic-class differences;
corruption, compromise of local officials.
■ Proxy sanctuary: Seizing local governmental centers, police
stations, airports and military depots; arming and training
insurgents; creating checkpoints and destroying ingress transportation
infrastructure; cyberattacks compromising victim
communications; phony referendum with single-party representation
and establishment of a “People’s Republic” under
Russian tutelage.
■ Intervention: Deployment of Russian forces to the border
with sudden large-scale exercises involving ground, naval, air
and airborne troops; surreptitious introduction of heavy
weapons to insurgents; creation of training and logistics camps
adjacent to the border; commitment of so-called volunteer
combined-arms battalion tactical groups; integration of proxy
troops into higher-level formations that are equipped, supported
and led by Russians.
■ Coercive deterrence: Secret strategic force alerts and
“snap checks”; forward deployment of tactical nuclear delivery
systems; theater and intercontinental maneuvers; aggressive air
patrolling of neighboring areas to inhibit their involvement.
■ Negotiated manipulation: Using and abusing Westernnegotiated
cease-fires to rearm their proxies; using violations
to bleed the opponent’s army white while inhibiting other
states from helping under the fear of escalation; dividing the
Western alliance by playing economic incentives; selective
and repetitive phone negotiations infatuating a favorite security
partner.
Contrary to Western politicians, the Russian leadership understands
these military options and plays them like a Stradivarius.
Electronic Warfare
Russian electronic warfare coupled with U.S. dependence
on technology and digital systems create a huge vulnerability
for U.S. forces on the modern battlefield. Russia uses electronic
warfare for four primary roles:
■ Denying communications: There are regions in Donbass
where no electromagnetic communications—including radio,
cellphone and television—work.
■ Defeating unmanned aerial systems: Electronic warfare is
the single largest killer of Ukrainian systems by jamming either
the controller or GPS signals.
■ Defeating artillery and mortars: Russian electronic warfare
predetonates or duds incoming artillery and mortar
rounds that have electronic fusing.
■ Targeting command and control nodes: Russian electronic
warfare can detect all electromagnetic emissions, including
those from radios, Blue Force Tracker, Wi-Fi and
cellphones, which can then be pinpointed with unmanned aerial
systems and targeted with massed artillery.
To compete in an electronic warfare environment, the Army
must become proficient on analog systems again, remove all unnecessary
electromagnetic emitters such as personal cellphones;
route antennas as far from operations centers as possible; conduct
June 2016 ■ ARMY 61

“a day without radios or computers” during training missions;
and quickly field its own organic electronic warfare systems.
Unmanned Aerial Systems
Ukraine is the first conflict in which unmanned aerial vehicles
have been present on both sides in significant numbers. Russia
employs UAVs for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;
target acquisition and real-time engagement for massed artillery
fires; and, most recently, as minibombers carrying incendiary
explosives targeting ammunition and fuel storage areas.
Ukrainian units have observed up to eight Russian UAV
overflights per day, and the constant awareness of being observed
and targeted is often a traumatic experience that instills
fear and inhibits movement, particularly in daylight. The
combination of small-size, limited radar cross-section or infrared
signature, and lack of acquisition until they are over or
past the target, makes engagement with surface-to-air missiles
a low-probability and high-cost proposition.
The Army must relearn the importance of camouflage, concealment
and deception; and must train with opposing forces
utilizing drone technology and assuming they are under constant,
real-time aerial surveillance. Likewise, anti-UAV targeting
and defeat systems for low-level quadcopter and fixedwing
unmanned aircraft are needed at the company level.
Massed Fires
The increased availability of overhead surveillance combined
with massed area fires of artillery and the Multiple
Launch Rocket System have produced a new level of intensity
in modern conventional combat. Data from the Ukraine conflict
show that artillery is producing approximately 80 percent
of all casualties. Four trends have emerged that are important
for U.S. ground forces:
■ Russia employs a combination of dual-purpose improved
conventional munitions, scatterable mines, top-attack munitions
and thermobaric warheads that have catastrophic consequences
when used in preplanned, massed fire strikes. The
U.S. has removed all of these warheads from its inventory.
■ Ukraine and Russia are using direct fire artillery at a
range of 1 to 6 km as overwatch systems, to suppress anti-tank
defenses, and as anti-tank weapons.
■ The pursuit of increased artillery range is a trend necessitated
by greater dispersion on the battlefield and made possible
by a combination of unmanned aerial vehicles on the battlefield
and the increased capability of counter-battery radar.
■ Increased emphasis on counter-battery radar and fires
disrupts opposing fire missions by forcing the enemy to move.
Russian artillery maintains an approximate 3:1 size advantage
over the Army’s artillery, and they have a capability advantage
as well with their use of dual-purpose improved conventional
munitions and submunitions. For the Army to be
competitive, the DoD must repeal then-Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates’ 2008 directive to comply with the provisions of
the Ottawa Treaty, which resulted in the removal of all submunitions
from the Army’s inventory.
Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicles
Main battle tanks remain decisive in modern combat if
equipped to defeat anti-tank guided missiles and infantry
handheld anti-tank rockets. Modern Russian T-72B3s have
T-90 tanks on display in Zhukovsky, Russia
Shutterstock/Andrey Degtyaryov
62 ARMY ■ June 2016

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Adriana M. Diaz-Brown
Ukrainian army soldiers mount an infantry fighting vehicle during training.
upgraded armor protection and explosive reactive armor, a
new version of the 125 mm gun and, most significantly, a
vastly improved computerized fire-control system with advanced
optics and modern night/all-weather vision. The T-90
main battle tank enjoys these same upgrades, but its most
noteworthy attribute is an integrated active-armor defense system.
Using radar to detect an incoming missile, the active-armor
system fires a shotgun-like spray of pellets that disables
the guidance in the head of an anti-tank guided missile as it
approaches the tank.
Russia has also developed modular active-armor systems
compatible with all T-80s, T-72s and T-64s. The U.S. must
test its Javelin anti-tank guided missiles against these activearmor
systems to ensure they provide dismounted infantry the
expected lethality.
Light Vehicles Vulnerable
Light infantry fighting vehicles, which prioritize mobility and
firepower over survivability, are vulnerable to anti-tank weapons,
medium-caliber (30 mm) automatic cannons mounted on other
light armored vehicles, artillery submunitions and thermobaric
warheads. When hit, infantry fighting vehicles tend to suffer
catastrophic damage, killing or severely burning everyone on
board. Since troop losses are so high, soldiers prefer riding on
top of the vehicles, and assaults are conducted with dismounted
rather than mounted infantry. As a result, tank attacks
are less effective because they no longer have accompanying
mechanized infantry with equal mobility to protect
them from other infantry.
The survivability of U.S. infantry on the modern battlefield
poses serious challenges against Russian mechanized forces with
supporting artillery and Multiple Launch Rocket System firepower.
At a minimum, the Bradley and Stryker infantry fighting
vehicles should be fitted with reactive armor and other advanced
protection systems.
Dispersion and Maneuver
A low force-to-space ratio on the Donbass battlefield and
the increased lethality of modern weapon systems mandate
wider dispersion for survivability. The wide dispersion creates
opportunities for maneuver, especially armored raiding behind
enemy lines and along lines of communication.
In August 2014, a Ukrainian air assault brigade conducted
the largest and longest armored raid behind enemy lines in
recorded military history to relieve isolated Ukrainian garrisons,
disrupt advancing Russian columns, and capture Russian
armor and heavy artillery.
Since maneuver battalions are operating on traditional
brigade-sized frontages up to 40 km wide, Russia employs
battalion tactical groups composed of one armor company,
three mechanized infantry companies, one anti-tank company,
two to three companies of self-propelled artillery and Multiple
Launch Rocket Systems, and two air defense companies.
These organic assets provide the battalion tactical group commander
the lethality, maneuverability and protection to operate
in the dispersed and decentralized environment. Similarly,
the Army should consider returning the armored cavalry regiment,
with its full complement of maneuver, maneuver support,
fires and aviation assets, to its current force structure.
Air Superiority, Supremacy
Russia operates the world’s largest and densest mobile air
defense network in the Donbass region. The combination of
integrated and networked self-propelled air defense systems
June 2016 ■ ARMY 63

The U.S. delivered
two AN/TPQ-36 radar
systems to Ukraine
in November to help
with defense and
internal security
operations.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Adriana Diaz-Brown
and manportable air defense systems virtually shot the Ukrainian
air force out of its own sky.
Ukrainian helicopters were reduced to flying 3 to 5 meters
above ground or treetop level to avoid the larger surface-to-air
missiles from the self-propelled systems, but ambush teams of
two to five manportable air defense systems, cued by the integrated
air defense network, shot them down. Without adequate
suppression of enemy air defense assets or hardened
bases and defenses, Ukraine was powerless to stop this.
Aviation Relevant, Vulnerable
Fortunately, the wide dispersion on the battlefield creates opportunities
for aviation. As armor and mechanized infantry maneuver
farther from their battalion tactical group headquarters
and escape the protection of their air defense assets, they become
vulnerable to attack aviation. Similarly, lines of communication
can be overextended and become equally vulnerable.
For U.S. air power to be effective against Russian air defense
networks elsewhere in the world, its base infrastructure needs to
be survivable through a combination of dispersion, hardening
and defenses. It also needs an integrated air defense system that
combines long-range surveillance with effective surface-to-air
missile defenses. Achieving significant results against ground targets
requires large-scale reinforcement with strike aircraft supported
by escorting fighters and electronic countermeasure aircraft,
and a close integration with long-range, ground-based
artillery capable of suppressing enemy air defenses with area fires.
High Casualties
The low-intensity counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have not prepared U.S. forces for the high-intensity,
peer-on-peer battlefield. In July 2014, Russia launched
fire strikes with long-range artillery and multiple rocket
launchers employing top-attack munitions and thermobaric
warheads against two Ukrainian mechanized battalions in the
open. This intensely concentrated fire strike lasted only a few
minutes yet inflicted high casualties and destroyed most armored
vehicles, rendering both battalions combat-ineffective.
In combat situations like this, when up to 30 percent of a unit
is killed or incapacitated, command and control breaks down
and the unit is unable to treat its own wounded, much less reconstitute
itself and continue its mission. The Army needs to
develop reconstitution teams at the brigade level that will re-establish
command and control, provide triage and other medical
support, and quickly coordinate reconstitution. Likewise, units
at all levels must frequently train in mass-casualty scenarios.
For nearly 100 years, American forces have had a major responsibility
defending democracy and helping secure peace on
the European continent. A million U.S. service members were
killed or wounded winning the two world wars, and over 21
million man-years of troop deployment in that theater helped
win the Cold War and produce a Europe “whole and free.”
Yet as Russia threatens the stability of the region with its newgeneration
warfare concepts and the American military struggles
under budgetary pressures, the question becomes whether
the U.S. Army can learn from these lessons and make itself
relevant and viable for the future.
✭
Phillip Karber is president of the Potomac Foundation and an adjunct
assistant professor at Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C. A former Marine, he worked with Gen. Donn Starry and
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on Lessons
Learned from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and served as strategy
adviser to former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Lt.
Col. Joshua Thibeault is an operations research systems analyst
assigned to the Army Capabilities Integration Center and a
member of Training and Doctrine Command’s Russian New
Generation Warfare Study Team. He holds a bachelor’s degree
from the U.S. Military Academy and master’s degrees from Virginia
Tech and Missouri University of Science and Technology.
64 ARMY ■ June 2016

Miracle Man
26 Years After Near-Death, Former
Soldier Meets Doctor Who Saved Him
Courtesy Nationwide Children’s Hospital
Dr. Richard Brilli, left, saved Tim Duer’s life in 1989, but they didn’t meet formally until last year.
By Chuck Vinch, Senior Staff Writer
Former Army Spc. Tim Duer had been working in computer information
systems at Nationwide Children’s Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, for just a
couple of weeks last October when an email made the rounds noting that
the facility planned to mark the upcoming Veterans Day with a gathering
and ceremony.
Duer, 46, had never worked for a private-sector company that did such a thing, so
he wanted to check it out.
The program included remarks by the hospital’s chief medical officer, Navy veteran
Dr. Richard Brilli, who told a story about one of the most memorable trauma
cases from his time in uniform. It was more than a quarter-century ago when a 20-
year-old private was rushed into his intensive care unit at what’s now known as
Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, Va., suffering massive, multiple organ failure
from a high-speed infection raging through his body.
As Duer listened to Brilli talk about how his team went into overdrive, refusing
to give up the fight to save the young man’s life, an eerie feeling washed over him.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 65

Former Spc. Tim Duer in the early 1980s; the hospital formerly known as Naval
Hospital Portsmouth, Va., where his life was saved.
Courtesy Tim Duer
Library of Congress
“I got chills all over my body,” he said. “I was sitting in a
chair, but I felt like I was falling.”
The reason: The service member in that story sounded very
much like … him.
Elephant on His Chest
Flash back to June 1989, when Duer was in Advanced Individual
Training at Fort Eustis, Va., to become a helicopter mechanic.
“After going out to eat dinner with my family, I woke
up in the middle of the night unable to breathe, like an elephant
was sitting on my chest,” he said.
He was rushed to the Fort Eustis hospital, where staffers
quickly realized that he needed much more extensive treatment
than they could give him. So he was transported by ambulance
to the larger Naval Medical Center Portsmouth and sent directly
into the emergency room.
“That was the last thing I remember until I woke up 3½
weeks later,” he said. “I found out they had to induce a coma
and keep me in it. I had 21 blood transfusions, catheters—
everything. I had double pneumonia; both of my lungs collapsed;
I had a fever, at times, of over 105; kidney failure; heart
failure. They had to revive me several times.”
“His probability of survival was extremely low,” recalled
Brilli, who left the Navy in 1990 after 11 years and continued
in medicine as a civilian, eventually going to Nationwide Children’s
Hospital in 2008. “Ultimately, Tim had at least four organs
fail. When that happens, mortality risk is almost 100 percent.
It was a grave situation.”
Will to Live
Yet thanks in no small measure to Brilli and his team, Duer
did pull through. He went on to serve seven years in the
Army, separating in 1995. “He was a young man with a strong
body and a will to live,” Brilli said, adding, “I think maybe
there was some intervention from above as well.”
Amid his considerable trauma and subsequent lengthy coma,
Duer was never sufficiently conscious to meet, let alone thank,
the surgeon who had led the team that saved him. And although
Brilli has been telling Duer’s story for years, it was
without using Duer’s name because over time, it had slipped
his mind.
“I didn’t remember his name,” Brilli said, but “whenever I
talked to medical groups about miracles, about somebody who
survived when all the science said they weren’t supposed to, I
used this story to inspire trainees and younger doctors to never
give up.”
And it felt like the right story to tell at the Nationwide
Children’s Hospital Veterans Day event.
Afterward, a shaken Duer introduced himself to Brilli and
said, “‘Sir, you know that story you told? I think you were talking
about me.’ I could see in his eyes that he didn’t know
whether to believe me or not.”
That night, Duer dug out his old Army medical records.
The next day, he and Brilli looked them over together. Doctor
and patient finally made the definitive connection.
“I was flabbergasted, to say the least,” Brilli said. “It’s beyond
belief that we could come full circle like this.”
“I have a daughter who was just a month old at the time.
She’ll be 27 soon,” Duer said. “I have a son who is 23. I have
two grandkids who would not be here if Dr. Brilli had not
saved my life. It’s just crazy, 26 years later, to run into the person
who saved your life, and find out he’s working at the same
place you are. Serendipity is the word.”
“I’d go with miraculous,” Brilli said.
✭
66 ARMY ■ June 2016

The Outpost
The Three-Year Manhunt for Zarqawi
By Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army retired
Fans of the British comedy group Monty Python and their
TV show Monty Python’s Flying Circus may recall a delightfully
bizarre skit called “How Not to Be Seen.” The segment
purported to be an official government film. People hid while
pompous narrator John Cleese commented on each case, and
then individuals popped out of concealment. Gunshots, explosions
and even nuclear mushroom clouds followed. It was
zany. It was random. It made no sense. Then again, it was
Monty Python. It wasn’t supposed to make sense.
Sometimes it seems like America’s most notorious enemies
have watched that old clip about a million times, treating it as
a training film. In real life, the joke was on us. Only our foes
were laughing.
It surely was amazing, given that the people we sought were
anything but anonymous. Top enemy leaders like Moammar
Gadhafi of Libya, Manuel Noriega of Panama, Mohamed
Farrah Aidid of Somalia, Ratko Mladic of the former Yugoslavia,
Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Mullah Omar of Afghanistan
and Osama bin Laden of al-Qaida were ubiquitous as
long as the U.S. was not interested in them. They were seen on
TV and heard on radio, their photos were published in newspapers
and eventually, their catchy clips were plastered all over
the internet. They could have taught Madison Avenue a thing
or two about viral branding.
Yet each of these infamous characters went from media superstar
to ghost almost as soon as the U.S. really started looking
for them. It was how not to be seen, all right. The biggest
bad guys went underground, way below the radar, hiding in
the ground clutter of ongoing wars. They stayed there, and we
couldn’t find them. Oh sure, we cranked off a lot of explosives,
sort of like Cleese and the guys in the Monty Python skit. But
mostly, we came up empty.
If you know American military history, you realize this isn’t
new. Armed forces are built for mass destruction, not manhunting.
It took years of difficult, dusty treks through the Arizona
badlands to track down the wily Apache leader Geronimo,
finally nabbed in 1886. Catching Emilio Aguinaldo in
the Philippines in 1901 required many dangerous, draining
jungle patrols and finally came because of outright trickery,
with the assault team posing as captives to get near the guerrilla
commander. We never did get Pancho Villa in north
Mexico in 1916–17. Using the military for manhunting resembles
chasing flies with a sledgehammer. You might get a
few, but the furniture is definitely going to suffer.
After the al-Qaida terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, we
brought out the sledgehammers in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Sure, we knocked out two odious regimes: the Taliban in
Kabul, and Saddam’s Baathists. We struggled to build two
pro-American states in the teeth of virulent insurgencies. But
amid all that smoke and fire, we didn’t catch many top enemy
leaders. Indeed, in 2001, we barely knew how to do so. Over
the next few tough years, we received quite an education.
The long, long pursuit for bin Laden was depicted in books,
documentaries and even a major motion picture, Zero Dark
Thirty. Yet the greatest manhunt of the war happened in Iraq,
the other major theater. It focused on a burly, brash terrorist
chief who not only eluded American forces for three years, but
successfully commanded his terror network while on the run.
The notorious bin Laden hid in Pakistan and sent out a few
cryptic notes. But Abu Musab al-Zarqawi fought back,
demonstrating for years how not to be seen while again and
again hitting the American “occupiers” and their local allies.
Then 9/11 happened. Caught up in the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan that followed, Zarqawi was wounded and escaped
through Iran, ending up as one of Saddam’s many terrorist
“guests” in northern Iraq. We knew about him. Indeed,
when then-U.S. Secretary of State and retired Gen. Colin
Powell explained the reasons for war to the United Nations
on Feb. 5, 2003, Zarqawi was one of the al-Qaida affiliates
described at length. When the Americans plunged into Iraq
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on video
American Forces Network Iraq
June 2016 ■ ARMY 67

U.S. Army/Sgt. Zach Mott
U.S. and Iraqi soldiers inspect the site of an airstrike that killed Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2006.
in March 2003, Zarqawi was one of the targets we hoped to
catch. We didn’t get him.
While American special operations forces (SOF) chased
Saddam and his sons Uday and Qusay as well as the other
Baathist bigwigs on the infamous deck of playing cards widely
distributed to soldiers in the late spring of 2003, Zarqawi activated
his Iraqi network. He called it al-Qaida in the Land of
the Two Rivers, shortened by U.S. commanders to al-Qaida
in Iraq, or AQI. The group had one goal: Evict the hated
American infidels and their local proxies.
To do that, Zarqawi intended to tear open the festering
Shiite-Sunni split, going hard after Shiites in the hopes there
would be a bloody backlash. Iraq had long been the fault line
between these two major strains of Islam, with strife tracing all
the way back to the Battle of Karbala in 680 A.D. It was a
simmering kettle and now and then, it erupted.
Zarqawi decided to make sure it did. Before 2003, the
Sunni minority (about 17 percent of the populace) dominated
Iraq under Saddam. Now the Shiite majority (about 60 percent),
backed by the U.S. and the coalition, ran the show. Zarqawi
knew that rankled the displaced Sunnis. Saddam and the
deck of cards crew were off the grid, running for their lives.
But Zarqawi was in his element, and he went into action.
Zarqawi’s AQI didn’t think small. It planned and pulled off
spectacular attacks, often relying on powerful vehicle
bombs. On Aug. 19, 2003, AQI hit the U.N. facility in Baghdad,
killing 22 people, including the senior envoy. Ten days
later, AQI blew up a mosque in the Shiite holy city of Najaf,
leaving 86 dead and more than 500 wounded. Every month or
so, a similar set of strikes would follow, hitting coalition sites
and Shiite gatherings.
AQI also kidnapped and beheaded foreign civilians, including
Americans Nick Berg, Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley;
Kenneth Bigley, of Great Britain; Kim Sun-il, of South
Korea; and Shosei Koda, of Japan. Each execution was filmed,
the gory videos making Zarqawi a folk hero among the Sunni
Arab villagers of rural Iraq. He was sticking it to the infidel
foreigners and apostate Shiites.
AQI was seen as the driver of the insurgency, the No. 1
threat to the shaky Baghdad government and hence, to the
U.S. war effort. So stopping Zarqawi became job one. The
major Fallujah operation in November 2004 erased a key Zarqawi
safe haven. That was the sledgehammer again. Could we
do better than that? Could we find Zarqawi?
We could, but it took time to learn how. The intelligence
people called it establishing a pattern of life. It took weeks of
watching. That was not easy in Iraq, a culture alien to Americans.
You had to figure out who mattered and who didn’t.
Raid after raid by U.S. and British special operators took
AQI figures off the battlefield. Smart ones surrendered, then
gave up information that identified more targets. By some estimates,
by early 2006 AQI consisted of the elusive Zarqawi
and a bunch of rookies. The key subordinates were dead or in
captivity.
Zarqawi kept moving and fighting back. Aiming at the
broader coalition, AQI operatives detonated bombs in three hotels
in Amman, Jordan, on Nov. 9, 2005, with 60 killed and 115
wounded. Then, in Zarqawi’s greatest attack, on Feb. 22, 2006,
AQI bombers brought down the golden dome of the massive
Shiite mosque in Samarra. That one finally ignited the vicious
Shiite militias. For the next two years, outright Sunni and Shiite
civil war added to the miseries of Iraq’s ongoing insurgency.
But Zarqawi wasn’t around long enough to enjoy it. The relentless
SOF, having learned by doing, became terrific manhunters.
Drawn by the unblinking eye of 24/7 technical intelligence,
raiding target after target and using conventional forces
as back-ups and “beaters” to stir the insurgents, the SOF closed
in. They finally got Zarqawi at a house north of Baqubah on
June 7, 2006. Fittingly, U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter jets did the
deed with two guided 500-pound bombs. Sort of like the old
Monty Python skit, the manhunt ended in huge explosions.
For all the deaths he caused, the U.S. military owes Zarqawi
some grudging thanks. He taught both SOF and conventional
forces how to track and catch hostile leaders. In the odd corners
of our unhappy world where terrorists work hard on how
not to be seen, we’ve learned how to find them. Ten years after
Zarqawi, the manhunts go on.
✭
Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret., was the commander of
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Previously, he served as
the deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, and as the commanding general,
1st Cavalry Division/commanding general, Multinational
Division-Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a doctorate
in Russian history from the University of Chicago and has
published a number of books on military subjects. He is a senior
fellow of the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare.
68 ARMY ■ June 2016

Soldier Armed
GATR Inflatable Ground Satellite System
By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer
Many people aren’t sure what they’re looking at when they
first see the large, inflatable fabric balls measuring 1.2 and
2.4 meters in diameter. While some might assume the balls are
some sort of aerial flotation device, in reality the Ground Antenna
Transmit and Receive system, known as GATR, represents
a revolutionary enhancement in U.S. Army communications
capabilities.
The balls, designed by GATR Technologies, actually are
antenna systems that carry a flexible parabolic dish on the inside,
and a hanging antenna on the outside. With the air removed,
a ball and dish can be rolled up to fit into a relatively
small backpack. The bigger system—including electronics—
can be packaged into two portable cases.
Offering weight and volume savings of 50 to 80 percent
compared to portable rigid antenna systems, the unique inflatable
ball design enables the establishment of ground communications
in 20 to 30 minutes. When inflated on site,
warfighters can reach into the Army’s Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical “backbone” to operate Mission Command
applications and transmit large amounts of data around the
battlespace without the presence of additional communications
vehicles or trailers.
Evolved From Space Efforts
The system design initially evolved from research and development
efforts focused on getting lightweight, deployable
communications systems into space, said Roy Priest, vice president
of sales and customer support for GATR Technologies.
It was clear there was probably an application for that type of
technology on the ground, he said.
“It’s taking advantage of the large aperture that we want and
high bandwidth, and getting it into a very small box for transportability,”
he added.
Supported by the Small Business Innovative Research
process, the satellite antenna designs first began to enter specialized
Army inventories about five years later.
“We first started providing these to the military—to U.S.
Special Operations Command—in the 2009 time frame,”
Priest said. “The Air Force Special Operations Command and
112th Special Operations Signal Battalion (Airborne)—those
sorts of very light expeditionary elements started acquiring it.”
The GATR designs proceeded into broader Army application
with the XVIII Airborne Corps, said retired Army Col.
Jack Arnold, a program manager at GATR Technologies.
The 82nd Airborne Division “saw this as a means to get
large bandwidth communications in earlier in the fight,”
Arnold said. “They can actually push it out in a door bundle,
or something like that, instead of waiting for the landing of a
C-17 or a C-130.”
“They previously had” a Satellite Transportable Terminal
trailer, Priest said. “And they would take GATR out as an early
entry package alternative to that.” Priest said the 82nd and
Soldiers at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., work
with a variety of technologies to communicate,
including the inflatable Ground Antenna Transmit
and Receive system behind them.
U.S. Army
June 2016 ■ ARMY 69

The Ground Antenna
Transmit and Receive
system works in many
settings.
U.S. Army
101st Airborne Divisions and the 25th Infantry Division “are
all using it in that form.”
All Services Have Purchased
All four services eventually purchased GATR, with current
total inventories of approximately 200 2.4-meter terminals
and 100 1.2-meter terminals. In addition to U.S. military and
other U.S. government applications, including homeland security,
the company also has international sales to Australia,
Canada, Italy and the U.K., Priest said.
While early U.S. Army acquisitions were made through the
Small Business Innovative Research Phase III program, the
Army, through its Program Executive Office for Command,
Control, Communications-Tactical, was also developing a
standardized, small-aperture, affordable satellite antenna program
called Transportable Tactical Command Communications.
The program office utilized the Phase III effort to select
GATR as the solution for the new antenna program. In December,
the company received the contract to provide both V1
light (1.2-meter) and V2 heavy (2.4-meter) variants for broad
Army application.
Army representatives emphasized that the program is now
standardizing lightweight satellite communications, eliminating
the problem of multiple small satellite terminals presenting
training and logistics challenges.
Weight: 25 Pounds
Highlighting the 2.4-meter antenna design on display at
the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Global Force Symposium
and Exposition, Priest said, “Most traditional 2.4s weigh
in the neighborhood of 800 to 1,000 pounds. By comparison,
this weighs 25 pounds for the ball and the dish. It also has
some additional electronics, so we normally package it in as
few as two cases that weigh about 100 pounds each.”
“That’s the reason for this technology to exist,” he said.
“That’s the value of it.”
There are additional benefits in terms of electronics repackaging.
The Army Transportable Tactical Command Communications
effort had “originally anticipated smaller antennas
for both the V1 and V2,” he said. “But we were able to give
them a 1.2 for the V1, and a 2.4 for the V2—both much bigger
dishes than they had counted on. By having a bigger dish,
they were able to use smaller, lower-power amplifiers, so they
were able to shrink the electronics down.”
Following receipt of the Transportable Tactical Command
Communications award in December, the company produced
10 GATRs that recently entered production verification testing.
Parallel to that testing, Priest said, the company is also
making preparations for low-rate initial production. Subsequent
milestones will include operational test and evaluation
followed by full-rate production.
“We hope to get to full-rate production in 2017 and get
these out in the field,” he said.
Army representatives noted the current program is targeting
the acquisition of approximately 600 systems.
Priest emphasized a few more system features during the
Global Force event, in an effort to clarify what he acknowledged
to be “common misconceptions about the program.”
More Stable in Wind
“The first thing is the wind stability,” he said. It’s more stable
in the wind than a rigid structure because the round shape
is aerodynamic. Also, “the way that we tie it down and cable it
to the ground [means] that this can stand up to 60 mph
winds, where a rigid parabolic dish normally has to come
down at 35 to 40 mph.”
“Second, it’s also a very robust system,” he said. “One of the
questions that comes up is what happens if it’s shot. You can
actually hear the [battery powered] inflation system speed up
when I start to open the zipper. It compensates for the lost
air. It recognizes that there is a deficiency in the air pressure,
so it’s speeding up to make up for the deficiency. And it can
keep up with about the equivalent of 12 holes from a .40 caliber
weapon.”
“Finally, we want to make sure people understand that this
is a ground-based antenna,” he said. “Despite the inflatable
nature, it doesn’t go up in the air.”
✭
70 ARMY ■ June 2016

AUSA Sustaining Member Profile
Fincantieri Marine Group
Corporate Structure—President and CEO: Francesco Valente.
Headquarters: 55 M Street SE, Suite 910, Washington, DC
20003. Telephone: 202-488-4799. Website: www.fincantierimarinegroup.com.
Fincantieri Marine Group is the U.S. division of Fincantieri,
one of the world’s largest shipbuilding groups and No. 1 by diversification
and innovation, employing almost 21,000 shipbuilding
professionals in 21 shipyards located in 13 countries on
four continents.
Fincantieri has a distinguished, 230-year history of building
more than 7,000 ships for government and commercial customers.
It is a world leader in building cruise ships and offshore
vessels, including those with polar class ratings. Fincantieri is
also a reference player of complex warships and vessels to
navies around the world, including the U.S. Navy.
Fincantieri is a recognized innovator in marine design and
employs more than 1,000 engineers around the globe. The
company recently completed an innovative, liquefied natural
gas-powered ferry for North America and has under design or
construction worldwide five different classes of warships and
three different large commercial ships.
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., Fincantieri Marine
Group (FMG) is comprised of three Great Lakes shipyards, which
are uniquely positioned to provide cost-effective solutions to
new construction, repair and conversion challenges. Substantial
capital investments by parent Fincantieri in new facilities,
streamlined processes and computer-aided ship manufacturing
technology have transformed the FMG yards into shipbuilding
powerhouses—purpose-designed for serial production of government
and commercial ships.
A highly trained and motivated workforce, including a
team of more than 100 naval architects and marine engineers,
has established FMG as a world leader in ship manufacturing
innovation. This has resulted in the delivery of
some of the most sophisticated ships sailing the oceans of
the globe. FMG built the Freedom-Class Littoral Combat Ship
and has a longstanding record of building a wide variety of
ships for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, including the Coast
Guard Response Boat Medium, a program that built 174
boats currently in service.
FMG’s record in commercial vessel construction and repair
is expansive. Expert in the building of articulated tug-barge
units and vessels compliant with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
FMG also delivered the first two platform support vessels built
in the U.S. to meet American Bureau of Shipping Polar Class-7
standards.
As the largest commercial shipyard on the Great Lakes, FMG
is the unquestioned leader in year-round repairs, peaking in the
winter season. This expertise spans all types of vessels including
the Great Lakes Bulk Carrier Fleet.
FMG also specializes in converting older power, electrical
propulsion systems and in meeting Environmental Protection
Agency mandates, such as increasingly stringent emission requirements
and ballast water treatment systems. These engineering,
manpower, financial and shipyard resources translate
into FMG’s ability to completely satisfy customer requirements
and provide total marine solutions with relevant after-sale service
and logistics support.
FMG recently announced that it will lead a world-class industry
team in pursuit of the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Vessel
(Light) program. The MSV(L) is a replacement for the Landing
Craft Mechanized (LCM-8), which has been in service since 1959.
This is the first of three major watercraft fleet recapitalization
programs over the next 15 to 20 years. A total of 28–36 MSV(L)
watercraft are expected to be funded through 2027.
Key members of the FMG-led industry team include French
company Constructions industrielles de la Mediterranee (CNIM),
Oshkosh Defense LLC and Watercraft Logistics Services. CNIM is
the designer and builder of seven operational catamaran landing
craft vessels, four of which have been in operation with allied
military forces for the past four years. Oshkosh Defense is a
world leader in designing, manufacturing and sustaining tactical
wheeled vehicles for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Watercraft
Logistics Services is a service-disabled, veteran-owned
small business specializing in logistics and training.
In making the announcement, Francesco Valente, president
and CEO of FMG, described the team as “the most experienced
team suited for delivering specialized watercrafts to the U.S.
Army,” pointing to the expertise of FMG’s shipyards, which built
LCM-6, LCM-8 and Landing Craft Utility landing craft in
Marinette, Wis., and delivered 562 landing crafts for the Army
and Navy over a period of 23 years.
“We believe that our world-class team and proven design
represent the lowest risk and lowest total life cycle cost to the
U.S. Army,” Valente said. “Our solution brings significant
warfighting capabilities in increased speed, maneuverability, access
to austere shallow water beachheads as well as survivability
and endurance to the battlefield.”
“The MSV(L) proven design provides high reliability and flexibility
to support brigade combat teams and their operational
and tactical maneuver requirements, now and in the future,” Valente
said.
This innovative thinking and enterprising spirit as well as
readily available engineering and design support, manufacturing
know-how, and strength and stability of parent Fincantieri
represent the foundation and future of Fincantieri Marine Group.
June 2016 ■ ARMY 71

Historically Speaking
McNamara Legacy: Brilliance Is Not Enough
By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired
June 9 marks the 100th anniversary of Robert S. McNamara’s
birth. He remains the longest-serving secretary of
defense and is certainly among the most consequential. His
ardent advocacy of systems analysis as an instrument of decisionmaking
profoundly altered defense culture and the way
the Pentagon does business. This and other organizational
changes made during his tenure remain with us still.
McNamara is better remembered, however, for his role in the
Vietnam War—and not to his advantage. The lessons, both
good and bad, to be learned from this extraordinarily important
figure may make pausing to reflect upon them worthwhile.
McNamara was born in San Francisco on June 9, 1916, to
Robert and Clara Nell McNamara. He graduated from the
University of California, Berkeley, in 1937 with a bachelor’s
degree in economics and philosophy, and from Harvard University
two years later with an MBA. He returned to Harvard
as an assistant professor in 1940, and became involved in
teaching analysis courses to Army Air Forces officers as the
U.S. entered World War II. He entered the Army Air Forces
himself as a captain in 1943, and worked with its Office of
Statistical Control. Serving in both Europe and the Pacific, he
made notable contributions assessing the efficiency and effectiveness
of bombers, and authoring other studies that made
thoughtful use of statistics and analysis.
McNamara was a lieutenant colonel when he left active
duty in 1946. Together with 10 of his colleagues from the Office
of Statistical Control, he was hired by Henry Ford II to
assist in reforming and modernizing Ford Motor Co. These
so-called “whiz kids” demonstrably improved the company’s
administration, planning, efficiency and market analysis. Mc-
Namara himself advanced from division assistant general
manager to division general manager and then vice president.
When he was named president in November 1960, he was the
company’s first leader from outside the Ford family.
Only a few weeks later, in January 1961, newly elected President
John F. Kennedy asked McNamara to be his secretary of
defense. DoD faced huge organizational hurdles as Kennedy
shifted the nation’s grand strategy from massive retaliation to
flexible response. Severely atrophied conventional forces had
to be resurrected, and a capacity for counterinsurgency conjured
up, if the U.S. was to have the full spectrum of military
capabilities Kennedy envisioned.
McNamara took on the task with gusto. He harnessed systems
analysis to allocate resources all along the combat spectrum,
reduced redundancy and waste, made hard choices with
respect to diminishing or discontinuing programs, and generally
hammered away at inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.
A major aspect of McNamara’s approach was consolidation,
goring service fiefdoms as he did so. He gathered intelligence
assets into the Defense Intelligence Agency; communications
assets into what was then called the Defense Communications
Agency, now the Defense Information Systems Agency; and
procurement, distribution and inventory management into the
Defense Supply Agency, now the Defense Logistics Agency.
Then-Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara, second
from left, departs
Vietnam in 1966; Gen.
William Westmoreland is
second from right.
U.S. Army
72 ARMY ■ June 2016

In each case, the new agencies reported through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the secretary of defense, cutting out the services
as middlemen. Even more important, McNamara consolidated
a fistful of inchoate budgetary processes into a singular
and systematic Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) closely akin to that still used today. An annually refurbished
five-year defense plan projected manpower and costs for
five years, and overall forces for eight. Analysis progressed in
terms of mission areas rather than service interests.
McNamara’s innovations were not universally applauded at
first. Service chiefs felt cut off, at least in part, from Congress
and the White House. Since only a few brainy civilians—
McNamara’s imported version of the whiz kids—actually understood
systems analysis, uniformed staffs considered their
influence diminished. The data consumed by the PPBS was
theoretically available to all but in practice, it was so massive
and difficult to process that only the few equipped with adequate
information technology could make sense of it. Similarly,
the data demands of defense contracting favored a trend
toward the larger and, at times, more noncompetitive defense
contractors.
Over time, complaints about McNamara’s innovations
proved to be growing pains. Service chiefs found ways to
regain their voices, albeit often through the prism of the Joint
Staff. The services eventually raised and groomed their own
uniformed systems analysts. Heavily supplemented by longterm
civil servants with special skills, they eventually took
charge within their purview. Information technologies progressed
to the point of empowering multiple echelons at once,
generating a revolution with respect to accessing and processing
data.
This favored intermediate levels of the service staffs as well
as smaller contractors. The net result has been the integration
of McNamara’s paradigm into defense culture to the point
that we can no longer imagine making programmatic decisions
without the benefit of systems analysis.
Had McNamara’s role been confined to defense modernization,
reorganization and reform, he might now be remembered
as a minor deity. Unfortunately, the outside world, too
often resistant to the powers of logic, intervened. Given the
length of McNamara’s tenure, crises were inevitable. He handled
the Cuban missile crisis well, successfully lobbying for the
naval blockade that worked in the face of more dangerous and
drastic options advocated by others. His subsequent role in
arms control negotiations, to include tempering the ardor of
anti-ballistic missile enthusiasts, was sober and well-considered.
His grip on the Cold War overall, and on other defense
issues, was steady and firm.
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history
at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December
1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion,
66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned
to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry
Division, in 1995. Author of Kevlar Legions: The
Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005, he has a doctorate
in history from Indiana University.
Then there was Vietnam. For reasons that remain unclear,
McNamara saw more than was there in the August 1964 Gulf
of Tonkin incidents, and readily abetted the military escalation
that followed. Statistical methods that had served well in
other venues served poorly amid guerrilla insurgency, battles
for hearts and minds, and political dysfunction. McNamara
pumped in forces, 485,000 by late 1967; this was sufficient to
win every battle, but not appropriate to win the war. Metrics,
in particular the infamous “body counts,” proved to be more
curse than blessing.
Volumes have been written about what went wrong and
what might have been. The broth that bubbled over in Vietnam
had many cooks, and McNamara was perhaps the most
consequential among them. The nature of the challenge did
not match the nature of his genius.
Resigning as secretary of defense in February 1968, McNamara
went on to serve for 13 years at the helm of the World
Bank. Here, he performed ably. In addition to providing
sound management, he shepherded commendable efforts to
expand international funding for poverty reduction, health,
education and food supply. After retiring from the World
Bank in June 1981, he remained engaged in intellectual and
policy-related pursuits.
Of his many books, perhaps the most notable and controversial
was his In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.
McNamara asserted with considerable justification
that the Vietnam War could be understood and appreciated
only in the broader context of the Cold War—which ended
in success.
McNamara died in his sleep at the age of 93, in July 2009.
He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. He had made
invaluable contributions to Ford, DoD, the World Bank, the
U.S., and the world at large. No single person is the best fit for
every role. McNamara reformed the military as an institution
into an entirely new paradigm that has required relatively
modest alterations since. He did less well leading that institution
through a distant and perplexing war.
The Army has long been satisfied with its capability to generate
effective tactical and operational leadership. We are
rightly less sanguine about generating or advising strategic
leadership. Brilliance alone is not enough. An important aspect
of strategic leadership is matching skill sets, whether individual
or collective, with the challenges at hand. ✭
Additional Reading
McMaster, H.R., Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson,
Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies
That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial,
1998)
McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark, In
Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New
York: Times Books, 1995)
Shapley, Deborah, Promise and Power: The Life and
Times of Robert McNamara (New York: Little, Brown &
Co., 1993)
June 2016 ■ ARMY 73

Reviews
U.S. Troops in French Battle Get Respect
Rock of the Marne: The American Soldiers
Who Turned the Tide Against
the Kaiser in World War I. Stephen L.
Harris. Berkley Caliber. 368 pages. $27.95
By Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy
U.S. Army retired
Stephen L. Harris, author of three
nonfiction books about New York’s
National Guard regiments in World
War I, has produced a well-written, diligently
researched and insightful book on
an important chapter of the American
Expeditionary Forces’ history in World
War I.
The Second Battle of the Marne in
July 1918 was a French battle, commanded
by French generals, with American
divisions interspersed among French
units and taking their direction from
French commanders. The 3rd U.S. Infantry
Division occupied a critical sector
on the Marne River between Chateau-
Thierry and Dormans. This book tells
the division’s story through the detailed
account of the battle as it was fought by
the 30th and 38th Infantry Regiments of
the 3rd Division’s Sixth Brigade, which
held decisive terrain in the 38th French
Army Corps’ sector.
The greatest strength of this book is
its focus on individual soldiers and leaders
and how their actions made the critical
difference between victory and defeat.
Harris’s narrative transports the reader to
the banks of the Marne in July 1918,
with the thunder of artillery; the crack of
snipers’ bullets; the chatter of machine
guns; the screaming of wounded and
frightened horses; the smell of explosives
mixed with that of gas, blood, vomit, and
the excrement and urine of dying men
and animals; the whispered prayers and
wild screams of men in the maelstrom of
combat; the disorientation caused by
hours of artillery, darkness, and the inability
to see while wearing protective
masks; and the loss of all communications
when commanders had no idea
what was happening in their units.
These are all brought to life in this gripping,
vivid and fast-paced narrative and
increase our respect for the men who endured
this.
Harris provides a detailed account of
the division’s 7th Machine Gun Battalion’s
fight in Chateau-Thierry at the end
of May in support of French forces. He
also discusses the 7th Infantry Regiment’s
action in Belleau Wood while it
was attached to the U.S. Army’s 2nd Division.
He places each action in context
and gives recognition to these units for
actions incorrectly attributed to, or solely
credited to, the U.S. Marine brigade
serving with the 2nd Division.
Harris covers the French concept of
elastic defense—the result of lessons
learned in earlier fighting when the 6th
French Army was routed on the Chemin
des Dames in May 1918 because it had
not conducted its defense in depth. Students
of command will be mystified as
they read how these two adjacent U.S.
infantry regiments could have such varied
plans for the conduct of the defense
in this critical sector. What were the
brigade and division commanders doing
if not ensuring such plans were properly
coordinated and following the commander’s
intent?
Harris writes in detail of Col. Edmund
L. Butts of the 30th Infantry and Col.
Ulysses Grant McAlexander of the 38th
Infantry, and explains how their different
experiences and personalities impacted
the conduct of the battle. Both commanders
recognized the decisive terrain in
their sectors—the 30th, the Bois d’Aigremont;
the 38th, the Surmelin River valley.
McAlexander believed the best place
to stop the attack was on the river itself;
Butts believed it could be defeated by
massed machine gun, artillery and smallarms
fires on the friendly side of the river,
in accordance with the elastic defense of
the French Corps commander.
I have walked the terrain in both sectors
and viewed it from the German positions.
Harris’s narrative takes me back
to that terrain, which the reader must
understand to appreciate the challenges
presented to both regiments and why the
commanders chose to defend as they did.
Harris writes of the battalion and company
commanders and the challenges they
faced in this confusing battle. In both
regiments’ sectors, subordinate commanders
followed their regimental commanders’
intents and achieved victory despite
little to no contact with their higher
headquarters for most of the battle.
Harris provides important insights on
the German army, its plans for the battle,
the backgrounds of its commanders,
and its conduct of the fight. I was struck
by the rigid timetable developed by
German planners for the actual attack
on July 15, and how it took absolutely
no account of the enemy’s actions and
resistance. They fully expected a total
collapse of the defense within the first
hours of the attack.
It is heartbreaking to learn that Maj.
Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, the 3rd Divi-
June 2016 ■ ARMY 75

sion commander, was informed by the
French of the exact time the German artillery
bombardment was to commence
hours beforehand but failed to inform
his front-line commanders, resulting in
hundreds of men being caught in the
open by German artillery. This was a
terrible failure of command.
Another command failure at the division
level was a fires plan that envisioned
massive artillery bombardment of the
friendly bank of the Marne River once
front-line units withdrew to their intermediate
positions, as envisioned by an
elastic defense. This resulted in fratricide
as the 38th Infantry Regiment had no
intention of abandoning its positions
along the Marne, and the 30th Infantry
front-line units had no opportunity to
withdraw from the river.
Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-
British Alliance During World War
II. Niall Barr. Pegasus Books. 548 pages.
$35
By Col. Cole C. Kingseed
U.S. Army retired
The Anglo-American military alliance
during World War II proved to be
perhaps the most effective military alliance
in history. Born in tension yet
united in common purpose, the unification
of military effort between Great
Britain and the U.S. resulted in military
cooperation in an unprecedented way.
In Eisenhower’s Armies, British author
Niall Barr explores the nature of the military
alliance and traces the relationship
between the British and American armies
within the European Theater. Barr is a
reader in military history—similar to associate
professor—in the Defence Studies
Department, King’s College London. He
previously taught at the University of St.
Andrews and the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst. He has published numerous
military histories including Yanks and
Limeys: Alliance Warfare in the Second
World War and Pendulum of War: The
Three Battles of El Alamein.
Harris writes movingly of the fate of
four companies of the 28th Division
that were attached to the French 125th
Division on the 3rd Division’s right flank.
These soldiers displayed extreme heroism
as they were left to fight alone on critical
terrain when the 125th Division withdrew
upon the initiation of the attack.
This book is an excellent examination
of a U.S. Army still learning how to conduct
war at the operational and tactical
levels. More importantly, it is a worthy
tribute to the men of the 3rd Division
who earned it the immortal name of
Rock of the Marne on July 15, 1918.
Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy, USA Ret., is the
historian for the 15th Infantry Regiment
Association and the Society of the 3rd Infantry
Division.
Anglo-American Alliance
Proved Eminently Effective
Why another book on the Anglo-
American alliance in World War II?
Barr contends that “the sheer depth,
scale and scope of the alliance between
Britain and the United States during the
Second World War is hard to comprehend
even now.”
Eisenhower’s Armies is not “an exhaustive
history of the alliance or of the campaigns
fought by either army. It is,
rather, about two armies as they fought
in the largest war in history, and an attempt
to explain how they cooperated,
learned from, and also, at times, ignored
one another.”
Barr begins his narrative by reviewing
the “family legacy” between the
British and American soldiers dating to
the French and Indian War. Over the
next 150 years, however, culminating in
World War I and its aftermath, there
was virtually no meaningful contact between
the soldiers of the British and
American armies. One of the consequences
of this estrangement was that
when World War II erupted in 1939,
“the two armies were strangers to one
another just as they had been in 1917,”
when the U.S. entered World War I.
In telling the story of the evolution of
military cooperation between the West’s
two principal allies, Barr relates not so
much an untold story as he does a welltold
story. British Maj. Gen. Hastings
Ismay, then Prime Minister Winston
Churchill’s chief of staff; and Sir John
Dill, Churchill’s and the British Army’s
representative in Washington, D.C.;
played critical roles in fostering Anglo-
American solidarity.
When Dill died, Field Marshal Alan
Brooke, chief of the Imperial General
Staff, said, “His loss is quite irreparable,
and he is irreplaceable in Washington.
Without him, I do not know how we
should have got through the last three
years.” On the American side, Barr introduces
Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee,
who served as the U.S. military attache
in London from 1935 to 1939.
The culmination of British-American
cooperation, of course, was Gen. Dwight
D. Eisenhower’s creation of Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force,
or SHAEF, that managed “the Great
Crusade” of D-Day. Following the
campaign in Sicily in which British
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery
had sought to relegate the U.S. Seventh
Army to a supporting role, Eisenhower
made it evident that the defeat of Nazi
Germany would be the result of an Allied
endeavor, not contingent on either
American or British dominance.
Much of SHAEF’s groundwork had
been laid with the creation of the chief of
staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
in 1943. The position was to establish “a
76 ARMY ■ June 2016

combined American and British staff to
work on the vast amount of detail required
to mount” a cross-English Channel
invasion in 1944.
What made Anglo-American cooperation
a reality was Eisenhower,
who clearly “understood that the role and
effectiveness of a supreme commander
rested almost entirely on trust and personal
relationships.” In his own words,
Eisenhower recognized “that the job of
the supreme commander was to strive for
‘mutual respect and confidence among
the group of seniors making up the allied
command.’” Though Montgomery and
Gen. George S. Patton Jr. were often
contemptuous of Eisenhower’s “chairman
of the board” approach, Eisenhower
effectively directed SHAEF at war.
In the final analysis, Montgomery and
Patton were far better national commanders
than they were Allied commanders.
Barr posits that Montgomery’s Operation
Market Garden in September 1944
“also marked the last chance for a
British-inspired victory that might have
ended the war.” Henceforth, Eisenhower
exerted his command influence over national
commanders and their staffs.
Barr lauds Eisenhower’s management
of Allied forces in the Battle of the
Bulge. He argues that if Eisenhower
“had been the weak-minded and poor
commander of Montgomery’s accusations,
he might well have listened to the
repeated and strongly worded British advice,
and the results could have been catastrophic.”
And by V-E Day, it was the
supreme commander who had done the
“most to ensure that the Anglo-American
armies worked together and finally
achieved their objective.”
How, then, does one account for the
effectiveness of the American-British alliance
during World War II? Eisenhower,
who launched D-Day with his
simple “OK, let’s go” order, explained in
a letter to Ismay how the Americans and
British pulled it off:
“While it is true that during the war
we had the compelling motive of a common
fear to stick together, the fact is that
we had present in early 1942 … all of the
ingredients for a profound pessimism
and for mutual recrimination. In spite of
the black outlook, we buckled down and
did the job. … The historical truth [is]
that the United States and the British
Empire, working together, did a job that
looked almost impossible at the time it
was undertaken.”
Col. Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret., Ph.D., a
former professor of history at the U.S. Military
Academy, is a writer and consultant.
Entertaining Portrait of a Brief Time in Uniform
The General’s Briefer. Bob Woolsey. 278
pages. MindtheMargins LLC. $24.95
By Chuck Vinch
Senior Staff Writer
Even as it touches on a broad variety of
national and world events, former
Capt. Bob Woolsey’s The General’s Briefer
stays within a relatively narrow context:
the author’s two-year career as an Army
officer in the momentous era of the late
1960s.
Now “semi-retired” from a subsequent
38-year career as a trusts and estates attorney
in New York and New Jersey,
Woolsey has written a book recounting
his entry into the U.S. Army Intelligence
Corps in 1968.
The book consists of 61 economical
chapters, with the shortest covering just
two pages and the longest 13, in which
Woolsey describes a military wedding
dripping with Irish nuance and copious
amounts of alcohol, right down to the
band playing When Irish Eyes Are Smiling
as the groom and his mother take to the
dance floor at the reception.
Woolsey’s memoir is a true fish-outof-water
story. He received no less than
five draft deferments while attending law
school, which he admits he hated but
said was better than “slogging through
some Southeast Asian jungle swatting
away mosquitos … so, like any self-respecting
coward of the ’60s, I stayed in
school. … I loved my country. I just
hated the jerks that got us bogged down
over in Southeast Asia.”
But he is eventually inducted, writing,
“The first few weeks of training were
brutal. … All my years of smoking, guzzling
beer, and avoiding physical activity
had turned my 26-year-old body into one
more akin to that of a puffy, out-of-shape,
50-year-old man.”
He survives, then feels as if he won the
lottery when he opens his first assignment
orders and, rather than a ticket to Southeast
Asia, finds himself assigned to the
Army’s Intelligence Support Branch in the
Pentagon, specifically to the team charged
with summarizing field reports from the
war zone and elsewhere around the world
and providing oral briefings early each
morning to top Army intelligence officers.
Woolsey doesn’t actually report to the
Pentagon until Chapter 23, more than
one-third of the way in. But when he does,
he hits his stride with his assumption of
his book’s title role. In breezy, fast-paced
prose spiced with a dash of absurdity that
brings to mind your best buddy waxing
nostalgic over a few beers at the local pub,
he takes readers deep inside the surrealistic
bowels of the five-sided behemoth in an
era when the Cold War in Europe mixed
uneasily with the hot war in Vietnam.
He serves up anecdotes that touch
on a diverse range of subjects both
global and personal: the antics of his
initial immediate supervisor, a hapless
June 2016 ■ ARMY 77

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major who seems to be in way over his
head at the Pentagon; the emergence
of Saddam Hussein to a position of authority
in Iraq; Soviet forces leading a
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia;
and his attendance at one of newly
elected President Richard Nixon’s inaugural
balls, to name but a few.
For good measure, he describes meeting
another Army captain named
Robert J. Woolsey, the only difference
being their middle names—John for the
author, James for his new acquaintance.
That would be the same Robert J.
Woolsey who, a quarter-century later,
would become head of the CIA.
The General’s Briefer never gets too
deep and offers no truly profound insights.
But it does serve up a consistently
entertaining portrait both of the momentous
events in its specific late-1960s
time frame as well as a variety of military
archetypes and scenarios that remain
timeless.
New Look at Shooting Not for Casual Reader
Death on Base: The Fort Hood Massacre.
Anita Belles Porterfield and John
Porterfield. University of North Texas
Press. 384 pages. $29.95
By Col. Kevin C.M. Benson
U.S. Army retired
The dust jacket comments on this
book call it “expertly told” and “a reliable
case study [that] fills a gap in the
research literature on violence, terrorism,
mass murder, military justice, and socalled
workplace violence.” I offer a different
view. I found this book hard to
follow because it appears to me the authors
tried to write a book that is an exposé,
a history and a psychology text.
The book begins with a compelling
description of the attack at the Soldier
Readiness Processing Center at Fort
Hood, Texas, on Nov. 5, 2009. It ends
with a lengthy recount of Maj. Nidal
Malik Hasan’s court-martial, including
the continuing trials and tribulations of
Hasan’s 43 wounded victims and the relatives
of the 12 soldiers and one civilian
he killed. (Hasan was found guilty and
sentenced to death.)
The opening of the book is gripping.
The conclusion is just that: The book
ends, although the details of the military
trial itself are of interest, even more so
for a law school class I offer.
Interspersed with the tale of the radicalization
of Hasan are stories of famous
or infamous mass murderers, because
this book is part of a series about North
Texas crime and criminal justice. I inferred
the authors’ intent was to highlight
the clues of radicalization on the
part of Hasan by comparing his act of
terror to other mass shooting events,
ranging from the University of Texas
clock tower killings to the Virginia Tech
mass murder. The links may be there,
but I did not see them.
Another somewhat compelling but
underdeveloped series of vignettes are
the continuing troubles of the wounded
survivors and families of the victims.
Hasan’s attack was initially classified as
workplace violence as opposed to a terrorist
attack. This cold-blooded decision,
the authors imply, was based solely on
fiscal considerations as the benefits are
greater for victims of terrorism. The authors
build this point by cataloging the
struggles of survivors and their families,
and then in an understated way letting
the reader know Congress passed a law
reconciling this injustice.
This is a minor point but after praising
their editor for correcting spelling and
grammar errors, the text includes reference
to the “calvary” when, of course, it
should be “cavalry.”
This should be a compelling story
but as written, I found it tough to get
through. Perhaps the utility of the book,
as one dust jacket comment cited, is as a
case study for use in the psychology department
of a university.
Col. Kevin C.M. Benson, USA Ret., Ph.D.,
served in armor and cavalry assignments in
Europe and the U.S. He also served as the
C/J-5 for Combined Forces Land Component
Command during the initial invasion
of Iraq and as director, School of Advanced
Military Studies. He has a doctorate in history
from the University of Kansas.
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June 2016 ■ ARMY 79

Final Shot
U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton
Sgt. 1st Class Ethan Feldner of the U.S.
Army Reserve’s 95th Training Division
(Initial Entry Training) enters a culvert
during the 2016 Best Warrior Competition
at Fort Jackson, S.C.
80 ARMY ■ June 2016

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