Army - Photo Contest Winner

Preparing for the 21st Century’s Multi-Domain Battles Page 18
The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army
ARMY
December 2016 www.ausa.org $3.00
Photo
Contest
Winners
7th Infantry Division
Capt. Gets Top Prize
Enthusiastic Greeting for
‘Train, Advise and Assist’
Page 24

ARMY
The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army
December 2016 www.ausa.org Vol. 66, No. 12
DEPARTMENTS
LETTERS....................................................4
FRONT & CENTER
An Army: Strong, Versatile and
Durable
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.
Page 7
Staff Colonels Are Army’s
Innovation Engines
By Col. Eric E. Aslakson and Lt. Col. Richard
T. Brown, USA Ret.
Page 8
Good Leaders Know Value of
Recognizing the Deserving
By Col. Richard D. Hooker Jr., USA Ret.
Page 10
Proposals to Select and Train
Junior Officers
By Maj. Stephen W. Richey, USA Ret.
Page 12
Eradicate ISIS by Tackling
Its Motivation
By Lt. Col. Thomas M. Magee, USAR Ret.
Page 14
‘War to End All Wars’ Continues
In Mideast
By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret.
Page 16
HE’S THE ARMY......................................17
NEWS CALL ............................................55
THE OUTPOST........................................59
SEVEN QUESTIONS ...............................62
REVIEWS.................................................63
SUSTAINING MEMBER PROFILE ...........66
SOLDIER ARMED....................................67
HISTORICALLY SPEAKING.....................69
FINAL SHOT ...........................................72
FEATURES
ON THE COVER
2016 Photo Contest Winners
ARMY magazine received more than 70
entries in our 2016 SFC Dennis Steele
Photo Contest. Images depicted
everything from soldiers and families
to training and ceremonies. Page 36
Cover Photo: A crew member with the
16th Combat Aviation Brigade at Joint
Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., is silhouetted
as the sun sets over Puget Sound.
Capt. Brian Harris
Multi-Domain Battle: Joint Combined Arms Concept for the 21st Century
By Gen. David G. Perkins
18
‘Train, Advise, Assist’
Brigades: Milley’s
New Vision for
Ongoing Mission
By Chuck Vinch
Three longtime military
analysts may disagree on
some of the details of the
plan championed by Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A.
Milley. But they agree it’s
the right move, and it’s
long overdue. Page 24
Contemporary and
emerging threats
seek to gain control
over a variety of
contested spaces.
To address these
challenges, the Army
and Marine Corps, in
concert with the joint
force, are developing
the Multi-Domain
Battle concept.
Page 18
24
December 2016 ■ ARMY 1

Eye on Earth: Geospatial
Intelligence Vital to
Commanders
By Air Force Maj. Nicholas Coleman
In today’s culture, it’s not good
enough to describe a situation;
most people want a photo or video
to support the description. Military
leaders are no different, and
geospatial intelligence is vital when
developing the operational picture.
Page 28
The Value of Broadening
Assignments
By Capt. Zach N. Watson, Maj. Brian
C. Babcock-Lumish and
Lt. Col. Heidi A. Urben
Broadening experiences outside of
the Army can be ideal preparation
for key developmental assignments
at both the company and field
grade levels. Broadening is also
about building better military
leaders. Page 32
Next Network Needs:
Commanders Deserve
More Input
By Gen. William “Scott” Wallace,
USA Ret.
In an age of digital devices and
ubiquitous commercial networks,
it’s easy to assume there is a need
for soldiers and leaders to have
unlimited access to a network for
operational purposes. But making
this assumption a reality has proven
to be elusive. Page 43
43
28
32
War College Fills Gaps in
Leader Preparation
By Col. Bryan D. DeCoster, USA Ret.,
Col. Charles D. Allen, USA Ret., and
Col. Douglas Orsi
With ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq revealing shortcomings in the
preparation of officers for higher levels of
command, the U.S. Army War College has
boosted its curriculum. In addition to
developing strategic thinking skills, leaders
become enlightened on strategic-level
issues related to command. Page 47
47
San Antonio Partnership Targets Sexual Assault
By Monica Yoas and Sgt. 1st Class Fernando J. Torres
What happens when the military teams with college
campuses to combat sexual harassment and assault? The
San Antonio Against Sexual Assault Coalition, the first of
its kind in Texas, addresses the issues faced by soldiers
and students alike. Page 50
50
52
Engulfed by Illness:
VA Takes Practical
Approach to
Multisymptom
Condition
By Mitch Mirkin
With about 300,000 U.S.
veterans believed to be
suffering from Gulf War
illness, VA researchers
are conducting a range
of studies to better
understand the condition
and identify effective
therapies. Page 52
2 ARMY ■ December 2016

Letters
Character Development
Shouldn’t Be Army Role
■ I spent quite a bit of time reading
“Character Development: Initiative Focuses
on What It Takes to Be a Trusted
Professional in Today’s Army,” by Col.
John A. Vermeesch and retired Lt. Col.
Francis C. Licameli (September).
Please do not confuse character with
leadership. Leadership is something you
learn and earn. The Army does not teach
character. Character is taught from birth.
Children are taught by their parents to
recognize good from bad, and right from
wrong. A tremendous amount of character
is based on being true to oneself.
I am 82, served in the Army from
1954 to 1956, and received an honorable
discharge. Here is some advice I
used in bringing up my own children
and grandchildren. Ask them the following:
“Would your parents and your
grandparents be proud of you if they
knew what you were doing, or going
to do?”
Then, tell them to stand in front of a
mirror. Look themselves straight in the
eye, and ask the same question. If the
answer is “yes,” then there is no problem.
If the answer is “no” or “maybe,”
then there is a problem.
This is also known as a guilt trip.
Jerome E. Firsty
San Juan, Puerto Rico
Civil Affairs Branch
Needs More Attention
■ In the August Front & Center article
“Civil Affairs in an Era of Engagement,”
retired Col. Christopher Holshek
points out the major impediments to the
Army’s effective use of civil affairs: The
Army doesn’t understand civil affairs,
and civil affairs doesn’t understand the
Army. But Holshek’s solutions merely
nibble around the edges of the problem.
Holshek proposes that civil affairs
soldiers “become more conversant with
the concepts and planning and operations
frameworks” of the Army through
“steady state engagement with” their
supported commands. Army Reserve
civil affairs soldiers—almost all of the
conventional civil affairs force—do not
integrate seamlessly into conventional
units at the tactical, operational and
strategic levels because they are trained
by their proponent, the U.S. Army John
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School, to support special operations
forces. That is the core competency of
the Special Warfare Center, which belongs
to the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command.
Similarly, civil affairs is “among the
least understood military capabilities”
because the civil affairs proponent is not
a true part of the institutional Army. As
a result, the officers who employ civil affairs
assets—conventional commanders
at the battalion level and above—are not
trained how to do so.
As Holshek implies, the solutions to
these problems lie in changes in doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel and facilities.
But these changes do not happen
through more “engagement” within the
operational force. They occur in the institutional
Army in the Army’s centers of
excellence, where doctrine is written, organizations
are developed, and soldiers
are trained.
The civil affairs community needs to
wake up and smell the coffee. The solution
to this problem is not more Civil
Affairs Association symposia where civil
affairs majors and lieutenant colonels
present more issue papers to themselves,
no matter how cogent the ideas or how
important the guest speakers. As I
posited in my Front & Center article in
the April issue, “Integrate Civil Affairs
Into Institutional Army,” if the Army
wants to admit it has a problem with its
civil affairs force, and if it is serious about
solving that problem, then it will move
civil affairs proponency from its Special
Operations Command to the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command.
The Special Warfare Center’s focus
is not on the conventional Army. On
the other hand, that is Training and
Doctrine Command’s sole focus. If the
Army cannot find the resources to recognize
this fact institutionally, it needs
to accept that it gets the civil affairs
force it pays for.
This is not to say that there are not
problems with civil affairs in the operational
Army; there are. Inactivating
almost all of the active component
conventional civil affairs force is shortsighted.
And with the 85th Civil Affairs
Brigade gone, the Army will have to
figure out how to make its conventional
civil affairs force in the Army Reserve
more ready, more accessible, and more
quickly deployable. But the Army has
been through all that before.
Without recognizing and addressing
the civil affairs issues in the institutional
Army, that course of action alone would
be but a manifestation of the colloquial
definition of insanity: doing something
repeatedly and expecting different results.
Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. Jacobs, USA Ret.
Columbia, S.C.
Is AMP Round Necessary?
■ Having spent a good part of my armor
service on the research and development
side dealing with M1 Abrams tank
armament, I found Scott R. Gourley’s
September “Soldier Armed” article on
the XM1147 Advanced Multi-Purpose
(AMP) cartridge, currently in development,
interesting but also somewhat
worrying.
Currently, the M1 tank has the option
of carrying a mix of four different
cartridges depending on the threat: armor-piercing
(sabot), high explosive
anti-tank, multipurpose and anti-personnel
rounds.
The XM1147 AMP is being billed by
the project manager as combining “the
capabilities of four different rounds into
one.” In short, while this round may
have some utility in filling the role of
each of the four current rounds, it certainly
won’t be optimum for many missions.
This should be of concern.
I am well aware of the decades of engineering
that have gone into optimizing
the family of Armor-Piercing, Fin-
4 ARMY ■ December 2016

Gen. Carter F. Ham, USA Ret.
President and CEO, AUSA
Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, USA Ret.
Vice President, Education, AUSA
Rick Maze
Editor-in-Chief
Liz Rathbun Managing Editor
Joseph L. Broderick Art Director
Chuck Vinch Senior Staff Writer
Christopher Wright Production Artist
Laura Stassi Assistant Managing Editor
Thomas B. Spincic Assistant Editor
Contributing Editors
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.;
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.; Lt.
Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret.; and
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret.
Contributing Writers
Scott R. Gourley and Rebecca Alwine
Lt. Gen. Jerry L. Sinn, USA Ret.
Vice President, Finance and
Administration, AUSA
Desiree Hurlocker
Advertising Production and
Fulfillment Manager
ARMY is a professional journal devoted to the advancement
of the military arts and sciences and representing the in terests
of the U.S. Army. Copyright©2016, by the Association of
the United States Army. ■ ARTICLES appearing in
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Articles are expressions of personal opin ion and should not
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ARMY (ISSN 0004-2455), published monthly. Vol. 66, No. 12.
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2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201-3326, 703-841-
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Stabilized Discarding Sabot rounds, our
primary tank-killing round. Clearly, any
AMP round will compromise that optimum
anti-tank design.
The assumption that likely drives the
multipurpose “requirement” is the target
uncertainty the crew faces on today’s
battlefield. As an M1 battalion commander,
my crew’s battle-carry round
(already loaded in the cannon) was always
based on the most dangerous
threat we were likely to face. Back in the
Fulda Gap days, this was certainly sabot.
Today, however, crews in the Middle
East might carry a high-explosive antitank
round that also has lethal blast
characteristics.
The question: Given the number of
urgent modernization needs facing the
Army, is the AMP round really required?
Did the user initiate this requirement,
or did the materiel development
community sell this concept to the
user?
Col. Colin McArthur, USA Ret.
Franklin, Tenn.
First, ‘We’ Must Believe
■ Retired Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen
neatly laid out and explained things in
his September Front & Center article,
“Post-Vietnam Lesson Learned, Now a
Memory.” He concisely points out the
successes of the post-Vietnam Army up
to and including the Kuwait campaign.
He then takes us through the reductions
in the force by successive administrations,
and the contracting out of much
of the needed boots on the ground as
well as the multiple deployments of active
Army, Army Reserve and Army
National Guard units today. He suggests,
and rightfully so, a return to the
“Abrams kind of Army,” stating such a
system would be better able to cope with
today’s demands.
Kroesen obviously understands what is
required by the military. His last sentence,
however, goes to the political:
“Perhaps the next president will understand
the need.” Not that this is a wrong
statement on its surface, but what is
missing is that only the Army and its
leadership can make the case for getting
this done. “We” have to believe in it before
any president will even consider any
such change.
Our present system didn’t happen
ARMY magazine welcomes letters to
the editor. Short letters are more
likely to be published, and all letters
may be edited for reasons of style,
accuracy or space limitations. Letters
should be exclusive to ARMY magazine.
All letters must include the
writer’s full name, address and daytime
telephone num ber. The volume
of letters we receive makes individual
acknowledgment impossible. Please
send letters to Editor-in-Chief, ARMY
magazine, AUSA, 2425 Wilson Blvd.,
Arlington, VA 22201. Letters may also
be faxed to 703-841-3505 or sent via
email to armymag@ausa.org.
overnight. Army leadership was involved
in every aspect of what currently exists as
our policies and structure. Congress and
the executive are all politicians. Generals
should remain soldiers who give honest
assessments, as now-retired Gen. Eric K.
Shinseki did when he was asked what
was needed. The evolution of today’s situation
was not just the fault of our politicians.
Army leadership continually offered
little or no resistance other than
tactical advice to congressional committees
while ignoring the strategic impact
of short-range solutions that impact how
we fight today.
Lt. Col. William D. Houck,
USA Ret.
Lake Ridge, Va.
Remember This World War I Poet
■ Retired Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger’s
well-researched and well-written July
article, “American Poet Among Lions
Led by Donkeys,” mentioned several
poets who were in World War I. Only
one American poet fought and died in
the Battle of the Somme. He was with
the French.
It must be remembered that Sgt.
Alfred Joyce Kilmer was killed during
the Second Battle of the Marne. He was
a writer for The New York Times and published
Trees and Other Poems in 1914.
He also wrote poems of World War I.
One outstanding work was “Prayer of a
Soldier in France.” It depicts a company
on the march.
Kilmer should not be forgotten. More
attention should be paid to his life—
Army life.
Staff Sgt. R.J. Latsch, USA Ret.
Belford, N.J.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 5

2017 ARMY Magazine
SFC Dennis Steele Photo Contest
Sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army
The Association of the U.S.
Army is pleased to announce
our annual photo contest.
Amateur and professional
photographers are invited
to enter.
The winning photographs
will be published in ARMY
magazine, and the
photographers will be
awarded cash prizes. First
prize is $500; second prize
is $300; third prize is $200.
Those who are awarded an
honorable mention will
each receive $100.
“Jacob Deployed to Afghanistan” by
Sgt. Maj. Victor J.A. LaBier, USA Ret.,
was the 2015 SFC Dennis Steele Photo
Contest third-place winner.
Entry Rules:
1. Each photograph must have a U.S. Army-related
subject and must have been taken on or after July
1, 2016.
2. Entries must not have been published elsewhere.
3. Each contestant is limited to three entries.
4. Entries may be 300-dpi digital photos, black-andwhite
prints or color prints. Photographs must
not be tinted or altered or have watermarks.
5. The minimum size for prints is 5 x 7 inches; the
maximum is 8 x 10 inches (no mats or frames).
6. The following information must be provided with
each photograph: the photographer’s name,
address and telephone number, and a brief
description of the photograph.
7. Entries may be mailed to: Editor-in-Chief, ARMY
magazine, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201,
ATTN: Photo Contest. Send digital photos to
armymag@ausa.org.
8. Entries must be postmarked by Sept. 15, 2017.
Winners will be notified by mail in October.
9. Entries will not be returned.
10. Employees of AUSA and their family members
are not eligible to participate.
11. Prize-winning photographs may be published in
ARMY magazine and other AUSA publications up
to three times.
12. Photographic quality and subject matter will be
the primary considerations in judging.
For more information, contact armymag@ausa.org • ARMY magazine, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201

Front & Center
Commentaries From Around the Army
An Army: Strong, Versatile and Durable
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired
The U.S. Army has varied in size and
capability throughout its various
stages of existence. From the 10 infantry
companies and 1,000 men organized in
1775 to the Army of more than 7 million
soldiers in 1945, size variation has always
been in response to mission requirements.
In 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor occurred when the Regular
Army was manned at approximately
140,000, woefully unready to cope with
the declaration by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill that “unconditional
surrender” was our objective. That established
a mission requiring the defeat of
the German, Italian and Japanese armies
that were then ravaging large areas of
the world.
The president turned to Gen. George
C. Marshall Jr. and Adm. Ernest J. King
to build the Army and Navy forces
needed for the task. It took almost three
years to build the Army for the D-Day
invasion of Europe, meanwhile employing
the forces available to “keep from
losing.” It was overcoming a costly unreadiness
that resulted in the Pearl Harbor
debacle, the loss of the Philippines
and Wake Island, the Bataan Death
March, and other actions occurring before
the tide began to turn in 1943. That
Army concluded the victory over the
Axis powers and also furnished the military
government with forces that shepherded
the development of the friendly
governments that are allies still today.
In 1950, a decision by President
Harry Truman committed an again-unready
Army to combat the North Korean
attack into South Korea. Fortunately,
the Army could be rebuilt rapidly
to a strength of 1.5 million by mobilizing
some of the reconstituted National
Guard and recalling a large contingent of
World War II veterans. Again, early disasters
occurred: Task Force Smith and
the costly retreat from the Yalu River
when the Chinese army entered the war.
The cease-fire that brought about a military
stalemate reflected a modifying of
the mission of the force to one satisfied
with guaranteeing the border and the
freedom of the South Korean people.
The ultimate cost of that war remains an
open account as we continue to pay for
troop units enforcing the settlement.
After 1953, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, relying on “massive retaliation”
as the principal defense requirement,
reduced the Army to less than a
million, perpetrating a conversion to the
“Pentomic Army” designed to dominate
an atomic battlefield. President John F.
Kennedy presided over a return to more
conventional Army organization but
with added emphasis on Special Forces
and their operations. President Lyndon
B. Johnson inherited a 960,000-strong,
reasonably prepared force that he committed
into Vietnam in 1965. However,
he disallowed any mobilization of the reserve
forces, ordering instead an increase
of 133,000 to the end strength to provide
the service and support units that would
have come from the reserve troop list.
A major reorganization of the Army
U.S. Army
was required before American and allied
forces numbered about 500,000 in Vietnam
in 1968, when the maximum
strength was achieved. The active Army
again grew to more than 1.5 million, but
the mission of the total force remained
nebulous throughout. The Army was directed,
much as in World War II, to destroy
the enemy ground forces employed
in South Vietnam, but it was restricted
from any action outside that nation’s
borders. Combat action was directed and
controlled by DoD and White House
experts whose efforts were directed to
cause the enemy to abandon its purpose.
Once again, we settled for less than our
original intent, absorbing disasters up to
and including the abandonment of our
embassy in Saigon and of our ally, the
South Vietnamese people.
I discussed in some detail in the
September issue of ARMY the lessons
learned from Vietnam; the creation and
service of the Abrams Army through the
Cold War; and the successful campaigns
of the 1980s and 1990s before the “peace
dividend” led to the major 1992 reduction
of the force to 480,000, which is
now moving to 450,000. These are major
contributions to the conclusions of
this article, which is primarily concerned
with lessons learned in the past century
that should guide decisions regarding the
following issues concerning force development
for the future:
■ The Army is a versatile organization
that can design and employ the
forces necessary to fulfill the intentions
of our commander in chief and the aims
of our National Military Strategy. World
War II is the prime example of this capability
but Operations Urgent Fury, in
Grenada; Just Cause, in Panama; and
Desert Storm, the First Gulf War add
evidence supporting the conclusion.
■ Winning wars requires the control
of geographical areas and dominance of
the population, a mission that requires
December 2016 ■ ARMY 7

the commitment of an Army. Punishment
inflicted by airstrikes, missiles and
long-range fires are necessary as support
for land-power operations, but are not
decisive.
■ Governmental controls that limit
needed expansion and establish “whizkid”
and “armchair” analysts for directing
structure development and operational
activities are not successful means of
achieving desired results. Supporting this
conclusion are Vietnam, the current wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and actions
against the Islamic State group.
■ Creation of an Abrams-type stable
Army designed to guarantee immediate
response to a crisis and an ability to accomplish
a mission or be developed into
the force necessary for that conclusion is
the most effective and, in the long run,
the most efficient system. A re-look at
the 650,000 Army recommended by the
Army leadership following the end of
the Cold War deserves consideration. ■
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., formerly
served as vice chief of staff of the
U.S. Army and commander in chief of
U.S. Army Europe. He is a senior fellow
of AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare.
Staff Colonels Are Army’s Innovation Engines
By Col. Eric E. Aslakson and Lt. Col. Richard T. Brown, U.S. Army retired
The Army is at an inflection point, vantage for our joint force. In short, staff
where the rate of technological and colonels are key to Army innovation.
geopolitical change is outstripping our Innovation is not synonymous with invention.
Instead, innovation is a process
capacity to anticipate, adapt and then
implement transformative institutional or chain of activities that starts with an
processes to gain and maintain competitive
advantage. We are combating in-
precisely, innovation is the process of
idea and ends with an advantage. More
formation and knowledge-age challenges creating decisive value from change to
with industrial-age solutions. Few would gain competitive advantage.
call our acquisition and personnel management
processes nimble and respon-
forms of change such as improvisation
Innovation is differentiated from other
sive enough to address the complex and adaptation by the scale, scope and
challenges of the contemporary operating
environment.
is not about a new widget or process, but
impact of that value creation. Innovation
After more than 25 years of unprecedented
conventional combat power overpetitive
advantage gained when that new
the decisive value created and the commatch
with long and troubled flirtations widget or process is applied throughout
with peacekeeping, nation-building and the Army or joint force.
counterinsurgency operations, we have Consider how armed drones and riflemounted
aiming lights both formed the
awakened to near-peer adversaries with
sophisticated anti-submarine, cyberwarfare,
electronic warfare, and other anti-
that culminated in competitive advan-
basis of a chain of progressive activities
access/area denial capabilities. We have tage. In each case, existing technologies
access to ideas and inventions that can be were cleverly integrated, refined through
leveraged to gain competitive advantage experimentation, fielded in sufficient
in these areas if we have the will to develop,
select and empower staff colonels, training to decisive effect.
mass, and employed with new tactics and
the innovation engines of our Army. With armed drones, the missile was
If the Army wants to foster a culture of not the innovation. Neither was the
innovation as senior leaders profess and drone, the trained operator, the communications
and targeting systems, or even
doctrine proclaims, then we must innovate
to create that culture. We must break the capability development and budgetary
and logistics processes that even-
from our current command-centric leader
development model to build the military’s tually brought that complete weapon
finest senior staff officers, making strategic-level
staff positions sought after and Instead, the real innovation was the
system to the field.
progressive assignments for the best and entire cumulative process through which
brightest officers. Staff colonels and the decisive value—unmanned long-loiter
talented teams that support them are the intelligence and precision strike—was
engines of the institutional Army and essential
components of an innovation isting capabilities—to gain competitive
created from change—integration of ex-
chain converting ideas to competitive ad-
advantage—destruction of adversary
leadership. Similarly, in the 1990s when
small, advanced, rifle-mounted infrared
aiming lights were paired with night vision
goggles and employed by trained
soldiers—integration of capabilities—the
effect was precision nighttime small arms
engagement, or decisive value, resulting
in both greater lethality and force protection
with smaller force structure and
lighter soldier loads—in other words,
competitive advantage.
Every day throughout the Army in
personnel offices, motor pool bays, communications
facilities, and turrets of combat
vehicles, soldiers and Army civilians
are developing and refining standardized
operating procedures to improve mission
effectiveness. Similarly, new technology
is being developed in university-affiliated
research centers, private industry and
academia, enabling the Army to better
defend its networks, navigate and communicate
in satellite denied or degraded
environments, maintain persistent situational
awareness in urban terrain, or
tackle any number of other critical challenges
in the future security environment.
However, none of these inventions or
activities can rise to the level of innovation
unless there are skilled professionals
within the Army who can convert
these ideas into competitive advantage
across the enterprise. That is the role of
a colonel serving in a major command
staff leadership assignment.
Staff colonels are the Army’s innovation
center of gravity. Whether these
leaders are serving as division chiefs or
equivalents on the joint or Army headquarters
staff, the Army Secretariat, the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
the U.S. Army Forces Command,
8 ARMY ■ December 2016

or other major commands and activities,
they drive the process of institutionalizing
the change at both scale and scope to
create the value that commanders can
implement for decisive effect.
These leaders do not typically create
the change. But they have the necessary
institutional and operational expertise
and experience, contacts, resources and
risk tolerance to manage processes across
the entire framework of doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel and facilities, converting
invention into competitive advantage.
These processes, including documenting
requirements and managing
capabilities, experimentation, doctrine
development, budget processes, force
structure design and strategic planning,
span the entire spectrum of institutional
activities that run the U.S. Army.
If staff colonels are the innovation
center of gravity, how is the Army as an
institution focused on developing and
growing our best staff colonels? The
Army should remain an organization
where due regard and authority are
given to those officers with the command
responsibility of preparing and
leading soldiers to “deploy, engage, and
destroy the enemies of the United States
of America in close combat,” as stated in
the Soldier’s Creed. That is the fundamental
mission of the Army.
However, as noted earlier, commanders
are neither the engines of the institutional
Army nor the engines of innovation.
The Army need not diminish the
position of senior command, but it must
elevate the position of senior staff in
both policy and practice if we wish to
create a real culture of innovation and institutional
effectiveness.
Changes to policy and practice should
include more deliberative and predictive
talent management processes,
progressive broadening experiences, advanced
education with focused utilization
assignments, and developmental
models that recognize the importance
of assignment stability, institutional expertise
and strategic competencies. As
Michael Colarusso and David Lyle wrote
in their Strategic Studies Institute report,
“Senior Officer Talent Management:
Fostering Institutional Adaptability,”
the Army’s officer management
approach “may have been sufficient during
the relative equilibrium of the Cold
War era, with its industrial economies,
planned mobilization of conscript armies,
clear adversaries, and manageable pace
of change, but it is unequal to the needs
of a volunteer force facing the challenges
of a competitive labor market, a
relative decline in American economic
power, and a complex global threat and
operating environment that changes at
breakneck pace.” This industrial-age
approach to officer management is the
single greatest impediment to fostering
innovation in the Army.
The Army must change leader development
models and promotion and selection
board instructions to recognize
the criticality of senior staff assignments,
selecting and incentivizing the
right officers for those positions. As expressed
by Colarusso and Lyle, a “rigid,
time-based, up-or-out system, while
fairly simple from a management perspective,
engenders talent flight and is
devoid of the dynamic talent management
which must be implemented
across the entire officer corps to ensure
senior officers are equal to future national
security demands.”
Regrettably, the Army is failing in
this endeavor. For example, consider
how the Army treats officers centrally
selected for command-equivalent positions
on a corps or joint task force staff,
such as corps intelligence or signal officers.
Despite promises to the contrary,
the Army disenfranchises colonels selected
for command-equivalent staff assignments
with dismal promotion selection
rates to brigadier general.
In a review of two officer basic
branches with these type of commandequivalent
staff assignments, not a single
general officer of the 31 presently on active
duty exclusively held a commandequivalent
staff assignment as a colonel.
Each had a brigade-equivalent command
even though in doctrine, the Army considers
both central select list staff and
command positions to be equivalent key
developmental assignments. Unfortunately,
these practices are reinforced
through mirror-imaging by these very
general officers and their peers who sit
on Army senior promotion boards.
A further challenge of current policy is
that many primary senior staff positions
are coded as follow-on assignments for
those who have successfully completed
command. Are those officers—rigorously
screened and competitively selected
for command based on their demonstrated
leadership attributes and competencies—best
suited for our most important
staff positions in the Army? In
effect, these senior staff assignments
have become byproducts of successful
command, not deemed worthy of specialized
development, screening and selection
processes independent of command
boards and assignments. As a
result, these staff assignments are considered
a necessary evil en route to senior
command instead of admirable destinations
themselves for our best and brightest
thinkers.
Considering the developmental requirements
for these critical strategic
staff officers, there are compelling arguments
that it is more difficult to develop
a successful division chief on the joint or
U.S. Army
December 2016 ■ ARMY 9

headquarters staff than it is to develop a
typical brigade commander. It is essential
that our senior staff officers are able to
successfully maneuver in this environment
and drive staff processes instead of
becoming victim to them.
For example, just as brigade command
requires a progression of successful command
assignments at the company and
battalion level, an equivalent process
should hold true for division chief or
equivalent staff assignments. A division
chief assigned to Army headquarters
staff should have held two operational or
strategic-level field grade staff assignments,
preferably with one in the Pentagon.
Simply stated, a colonel newly assigned
to the Pentagon should never
have to ask directions to his or her office.
Some would argue that while obviously
important, staff colonels are not
the innovation engines of the Army and
consequently, the Army should maintain
its command-centric leader development
models for basic branch officers
to ensure we focus efforts on basic combat
readiness. Some also might argue
that we have undervalued the contribution
played by junior soldiers and
NCOs, who routinely generate creative
solutions to difficult problems, throughout
the tactical Army.
While we believe innovation is often a
bottom-up process driven by great ideas
from the force, we also believe these
great ideas languish in unit motor pools
and research laboratories unless the right
people—staff colonels—can harness and
convert these ideas into competitive advantage
for the Army.
Many of our most senior military
leaders have approached this challenge
by focusing their energies on creating
new organizational structure and
special staff positions to foster innovation.
However, creating innovation outposts,
developing strategic initiative
groups, designating chief innovation officers
and even conducting special innovation
conferences can become innovation
theater unless the underlying
processes of the military enterprise are
adapted and harnessed, enabling real
innovation throughout the force. How
often are complex problems solved by
simply creating new organizational
structure?
As iron (staff) majors run battalions
and brigades, iron (staff) colonels run
the Army. Yet there is insufficient senior
leader emphasis on developing, selecting
and incentivizing talent to serve
in critical strategic-level staff assignments.
In practice, current commandcentric
leader development models treat
staff assignments as second-class rest
stops on the road to potential senior
command. ■
Col. Eric E. Aslakson serves as the assistant
commandant of the U.S. Army Cyber
School. Before that, he served with the
U.S. Cyber Command as the operational
adviser to the Department of Homeland
Security. He holds a bachelor’s degree
from St. Cloud State University, Minn.,
and a master’s degree from the U.S.
Naval War College. Lt. Col. Richard T.
Brown, USA Ret., is a senior visualization
engineer working for an innovative
firm headquartered in Ashburn, Va. Before
retiring from the Army after 21
years of service, he served as chief technology
officer for a large acquisition program
supporting the U.S. Army Cyber
Command and the U.S. Army Network
Enterprise Technology Command. He
holds two bachelor’s degrees from Indiana
University and master’s degrees from the
Georgia Institute of Technology and
George Mason University, Va.
Good Leaders Know Value of
Recognizing the Deserving
By Col. Richard D. Hooker Jr., U.S. Army retired
Iknew from the crestfallen look on He came right to the point. “I don’t
the major’s face that he had bad believe in giving out medals to soldiers
news. I was a first-year battalion commander
recently returned from a chal-
I remonstrated. “Sir, I’m sure you
doing their job,” he said sternly.
lenging deployment and had carefully noticed that we were pretty conservative
with our awards, unlike some units
prepared award recommendations for
deserving soldiers who had excelled in the division. I can assure you, every
during an arduous and hazardous campaign.
won’t understand why they are being
one of them is well-deserved. The men
I confidently looked forward to support
from my higher headquarters. By “Well, colonel,” he said gruffly, “it’s
held to a different standard.”
all accounts, the battalion’s performance your job to explain it to them. We’re
had been outstanding. We had been done here.”
neither chary nor profuse with our submissions,
striking an appropriate bal-
gloomily. I could not easily pass this or-
As I retraced my steps, I pondered
ance between too many, which would der down as my own because my troops
cheapen the awards, and too few, which knew I had endorsed their awards. And
would unjustly overlook the contributions
of the deserving.
there wasn’t even the consolation of
because most had been disapproved,
Now, my executive officer dropped handing out lesser awards.
the bomb.
I called the men together. “Gentlemen,
the commander has made his deci-
“Sir,” he said sadly, “higher headquarters
has disapproved most of our awards.” sion,” I told them. “I can’t pretend I
I was incredulous. “You mean downgraded,
right?”
But you need to know that your country
agree with it because you know better.
“No sir, disapproved. I don’t think is proud of you, the division is proud of
even 10 percent went through.” you, and I’m proud of you. I hope we
I grabbed my headgear and headed can put this behind us and move forward.
As a great man once said, ‘It is the
for brigade. This couldn’t be right. Perhaps
some overzealous staff officer had deed that matters, not the glory that
exceeded his authority? A few minutes comes after.’”
later, I found myself at attention in front My troops did go forward and continued
to excel, but they held a of the brigade commander.
grudge
10 ARMY ■ December 2016

senior NCO to involve the soldier’s
family in the recognition process. I often
sent a copy of the award certificate, a
picture of the ceremony, and a short
note to parents or a spouse. In many
cases, I’d receive moving replies.
“Thank you for your letter,” said one.
“We are so proud of our son. We weren’t
sure that the Army was a good thing for
him. But now we know that he is surrounded
by friends who care about him.
His picture and award are in our living
room above the fireplace. Thanks for
taking care of him.”
It doesn’t get much better than that.
Like many deployed commanders, I
was often dismayed by an observable
trend. The farther away one got from
the battlefield, the less valorous or meritorious
an action seemed to be. At
higher levels, the views and perspectives
of company, battalion and brigade commanders
were too often disregarded.
This is a corrosive and harmful thing
that should be stamped out whenever
and wherever encountered. We trust
commanders to lead soldiers in combat.
We can trust them to sort out the deserving
from the undeserving.
A particularly egregious case is that
of the soldiers who served in the earliest
days of the Kosovo conflict. Later,
the operation evolved into a fairly routine
peace-enforcement mission. But in
the early weeks, it was vicious and dangerous,
with dozens of firefights and
mortar attacks. Field commanders took
careful notes and, back at home station,
submitted soldiers for the combat
awards they clearly deserved. Endorsed
by layers of general officers, they found
their way to Washington, D.C., for final
approval.
There they stayed for 15 years. Administrative
officers applied one delaying
tactic after another, first citing the
need to “staff” the awards, then returning
them for “incorrect format” or citing
the need to draft “implementing instructions”
and, when all else failed,
submitting the actions for “legal review.”
In all that time, no one asked the
only question that really mattered: Did
the soldiers actually deserve awards?
Ultimately, senior Army leaders intervened
and the awards were finally approved.
By then, most of the soldiers involved
had long since departed the
service.
In an Army committed to taking care
of soldiers, we have a sacred obligation
to recognize and reward good performance.
Sometimes, it’s a handshake in a
tower in the middle of the night somewhere
on the other side of the world.
Sometimes, it’s pinning on a new set of
stripes or a well-deserved award in front
of a formation. However it’s done, it
continues a tradition rooted in the distant
past, but as relevant today as ever,
“reflecting great credit” upon the soldier,
the unit and the U.S. Army. ■
Col. Richard D. Hooker Jr., USA Ret., is the
director for research and strategic support
and director of the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, Washington, D.C. His Army
career spanned 30 years as a parachute infantry
officer in the U.S. and Europe, including
tours in the offices of the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, the secretary of the Army
and the chief of staff of the Army. He participated
in combat operations in Grenada,
Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. A
graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he
has a master’s degree from the National
War College, and a master’s degree and
Ph.D. from the University of Virginia.
Proposals to Select and Train Junior Officers
By Maj. Stephen W. Richey, U.S. Army retired
Arecurring cliché of Hollywood war people ask us to fight. We need to make
movies is the newbie lieutenant who sure new lieutenants are more reliably
falls to pieces in his first battle and has shock-of-battleproof than new lieutenants
have all too frequently been in
to be rescued by his crusty old platoon
sergeant. It is a trope of which I am the past.
heartily tired. And yet, I am compelled I believe we should adopt, with appropriate
changes, a few specific aspects
to admit that in the U.S. Army, it has a
basis in reality. We, as an Army, have a of how the old German army selected
moral obligation to do everything we and trained its junior officers. Certain
can to ensure that our newest officers are traditional German practices can be
capable of meeting and mastering the modified to make a good fit on American
Army culture.
first shock of combat they encounter as
small-unit leaders. We have this moral First, however, I must make the necessary
caveats about the dangers of emu-
obligation, not to prevent Hollywood
from making more clichéd war movies lating German military practices. We do
but to save the lives of as many of our not want to catch the German disease of
magnificent enlisted soldiers as we possibly
can. We have this moral obligation It is the consensus of most military
winning battles but losing wars.
to bring into our Army the strongest historians that Germany lost both world
junior officers we can because having wars because at the strategic level of war,
such officers improves the odds of winning
the battles and wars the American and World War II, it was the victim
it was bankrupt. In both World War I
of
its own arrogant folly in taking on coalitions
of enemies whose combined resources
of men and materiel were multiple
times those of Germany’s. But those
same military historians mostly agree that
at the tactical level of war, the German
army, when at the top of its form, was a
showpiece of excellence. Granted, by the
late summer of 1944, the American
Army had overtaken and surpassed the
Germans in quality at the tactical as well
as the strategic levels of war, but that was
only because of the catastrophic attrition
of their best people the Germans had
suffered in Russia and Normandy.
Many military historians agree that
the German army as it existed in the
spring of 1918 and in the spring of 1941
was, at the tactical level of war, one of
the most superb armies the world has
seen. Both world wars lasted as long as
they did, both world wars were as
12 ARMY ■ December 2016

painful as they were for the victorious
Allies, because German tactical excellence
went a long way toward compensating
for German strategic folly. The
point is that the tactical level of war is
the province of junior officers leading
small units—and selecting and training
junior officers to lead small units in
battle is my theme. How did the old
German army acquire and develop new
lieutenants who were so consistently
excellent?
The old German army was recruited
and organized on a regional basis. Every
town of any size in Germany had its
own army regiment that was raised from
the young men of that town and the surrounding
countryside. Young men aspiring
to become army officers first applied
to the commanding officer of their local
regiment. Those who received passing
marks in a rigorous initial winnowing
process of exams and interviews became
officer candidates.
The next step for the officer candidate
was not going directly to a school for officers.
Instead, the next step was going
to basic training for enlisted soldiers and
then spending one year as an enlisted
soldier. He was given no special favors
or treatment that distinguished him
from the mass of enlisted trainees in
which he was placed. Thus, the officer
candidate experienced basic training in
the company of, and served alongside of,
the same enlisted soldiers he aspired to
someday lead.
Only upon successful completion of
one year of enlisted service did the officer
candidate first set foot in an officer
cadet school. There, the officer candidate
received an education in all the academic
aspects of how to lead soldiers
that was analogous to what our West
Point and ROTC cadets learn in the
classroom today.
Upon successful completion of his
academic military instruction, the German
officer candidate returned to his
home regiment. But he still wasn’t fully
an officer. Rather, he served as a junior
officer in a trial status under the close
scrutiny of his regiment’s officer cadre.
This experience was analogous to Cadet
Troop Leader Training (CTLT) as experienced
by West Point and ROTC
cadets today. During times of war, German
officer candidates performed their
equivalent of CTLT in real combat. If
they displayed any weakness or deficiency,
they were likely to be dropped
from the officer training program.
Only after demonstrating the required
levels of proficiency as trial status lieutenants
were officer candidates finally
accepted into their regiments as fully
fledged new lieutenants. The admirable
result of this traditional German
methodology was that in the old German
army, there was no such thing as a
“newbie” lieutenant who was wearing
the insignia of his rank but was still a
walking question mark with regard to
his ability to lead soldiers in battle.
Contrast the situation just described
for the old German army with the situation
in our Army today. New lieutenants
who have just graduated from West
Point or ROTC and their branch basic
courses report to their first units as unknown
quantities. The soldiers they will
lead and the higher officers whom they
will obey are strangers to them. And
they are strangers to both the soldiers
they are presuming to lead and to the
higher-ranking officers who are depending
on them to perform. The conditions
have been set for another clichéd Hollywood
war movie about a newbie lieutenant
having his previously undetected
shortcomings ruthlessly revealed in
combat—and getting a bunch of his soldiers
needlessly killed in the process.
Pieces of the traditional German
method of selecting and training officer
candidates can be modified and grafted
onto our American Army of today. It
will require a difficult and painful transition
period. It will require more fortitude,
adaptability and creativity from the
U.S. Army/Tommy Gilligan
Army’s bureaucracy than that bureaucracy
will probably want to display. But
if the process provides the Army with
new lieutenants who are better proven in
their competence to lead soldiers into
battle before they actually do lead them
into battle, it will be worth it.
Building Army units so that each unit
is raised from the population of a
specific geographic locality—like the
Germans as well as the British did—
would be too unwieldy to implement in
our American context. But we can do
the following if we summon the will to
follow through: Young people continue
to apply to West Point and ROTC just
as they do now. The big change will be
what happens after they are accepted.
Before they set foot on either West
Point or the ROTC-hosting college
campus of their choice, they must complete
enlisted soldier basic training and
advanced individual training to be
awarded an enlisted soldier’s MOS.
They must then serve for one year as an
enlisted soldier in a line unit. Only upon
successful completion of this period of
enlisted service will they proceed to
West Point or the ROTC-hosting college
of their choice.
What this methodology would mean
for West Point is that during the first
plebe summer of the cadet experience, it
will not be necessary to give a mass of
pathetically clueless recent high school
graduates their first military haircut and
their first clumsily learned introduction
to how to stand at attention, how to
salute, how to march, how to say “yes,
sir” and “no, ma’am,” and how to qualify
with their individual weapon. The
plebes will already be masters of these
fundamental skills. Plebe summer could
start off immediately at a higher level of
training for people who have already
proven themselves to be trainable. Similar
benefits would be seen at ROTC
programs nationwide.
Eventually, under the proposed system,
West Point and ROTC cadets will
be ready to leave their schools and return
to the U.S. Army for their troopleading
experience. To the maximum
extent possible, the units in which cadets
perform CTLT should be the same
units in which they performed their year
of enlisted service.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 13

A point to stress here is that the CTLT
experience must be a much harsher
winnowing exercise than is presently
the case. A demonstrated lack of competence
or character at CTLT would be
grounds for dismissal.
Having mastered the challenges of a
severe CTLT period, cadets would
return to West Point or their various
ROTC programs to complete their
schooling. And, on fine days in May,
they would walk across the stage, receive
their diplomas and commissions, throw
their hats into the air, and present a silver
dollar to the first enlisted soldier to
salute them. Then they would, as usual,
proceed to their officer basic courses for
their respective branches and to their
first units of assignment. To the maximum
extent possible, the branch assignments
and the first unit assignments of
these new lieutenants should be the
same as the branches and units in which
they served as enlisted soldiers and the
same as the branches and units in which
they completed CTLT.
The system I propose would likely
save the lives of many of our enlisted
soldiers and improve our odds of winning
future battles and wars. There
would be a cost-effectiveness benefit derived
from this proposed system as well.
The cost to the taxpayer to turn out each
West Point graduate is enormous. Ditto
for ROTC cadets on scholarships.
Given the expense of creating these officers,
the percentage of them who typically
decide to leave the Army after serving
their minimum obligatory term of
service is too high. Taxpayers have the
right to expect that the officers they pay
so much to produce stick around for the
longest careers possible. That is simply
smart investment strategy.
The system proposed here, with its
requirement for a year of enlisted service,
would serve to scare off those
young people who are not serious about
committing themselves to the Army for
life. It is true that the young people who
are willing to meet the preliminary requirement
for a year of enlisted service
may have SAT scores that are a few
points lower than the SAT scores of
typical cadets under the current system.
But I would rather have new officers
who might have slightly lower SAT
scores as long as they display the guts to
commit themselves totally to a life in the
U.S. Army.
The purpose of West Point and
ROTC graduates is to lead our soldiers
into combat, to win our battles, to win
our wars, and to bring back as many of
our soldiers alive as possible. It is a
moral imperative that the way we select
and train West Point and ROTC
cadets fulfills that purpose as completely
as can be.
■
Maj. Stephen W. Richey, USA Ret.,
served as an enlisted armor crewman
from 1977 to 1979 and graduated from
West Point as an armor officer in 1984.
He served in various assignments in
Germany, Ethiopia, Iraq and the continental
U.S. He holds a master’s degree in
history from Central Washington University
and is the author of Joan of Arc:
The Warrior Saint.
Eradicate ISIS by Tackling Its Motivation
By Lt. Col. Thomas M. Magee, U.S. Army Reserve retired
An often forgotten 1978 movie, The power that provides moral or physical
Boys in Company C, followed five strength, freedom of action, or will to
Marine Corps inductees from boot camp act. It is what military strategist Carl von
to the battlefields of Vietnam in 1968. Clausewitz called “the hub of all power
Their commander, a Capt. Collins, at and movement, on which everything depends
… the point at which all our ener-
times would offer his own theory of
counterinsurgency. He would say the gies should be directed.”
enemy, Charlie, plays soccer while the ISIS is more than a run-of-the-mill
U.S. plays baseball. To win, the U.S. terrorist group. It is a mix of terrorism
must play soccer. The captain would go and standard army. As such, it has two
literal with that thought, periodically attempting
to teach his troops how to play ISIS generates nearly $1 billion annu-
centers of gravity. The first is economic.
soccer.
ally from extortion and taxation in
To paraphrase the captain, when it newly conquered lands. ISIS also controls
energy resources in its territory
comes to our battle against the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS is playing and has made more than $500 million
soccer while the U.S. is playing football. from annual oil sales. The West is wellequipped
in attacking such centers of
Further, we and ISIS are playing past
each other, like two boxers fighting in the gravity; this is something that has been
dark. In other words, the U.S. is missing refined for years.
what motivates the terrorist group. However, the U.S. is less equipped to
To defeat ISIS, we must define and deal with the group’s second center of
understand its center of gravity. Joint gravity: its interpretation of the Islam
Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning
defines this term as a source of people to ISIS from all over the
faith. That interpretation is what drives
world.
It is what drives people here in the U.S.
to do horrible things in places like Orlando,
Fla.
We know now that ISIS was built
upon the old Iraqi Sunni resistance
with new religious wrappings. It took
advantage of the chaos in Syria and acquired
around two dozen cities in both
Syria and Iraq. It set up a capital in
Raqqa, Syria, and now controls approximately
20,000 square miles including
Mosul, Iraq, a city with a civilian population
of more than 500,000. Large
groups of ISIS followers have arisen in
places including Afghanistan and Libya,
while lone wolves have spread terror on
their own across the world, including in
the U.S.
ISIS is making a new state into a clone
of one from the seventh century. ISIS
has instituted Sharia law all across its
new nation; its constitution is the Quran.
ISIS government policy is to bring about
the Islamic version of the apocalypse.
This living history state has touches of
14 ARMY ■ December 2016

the modern world. It has a cash economy,
and uses sophisticated social media
to motivate followers near and far.
The countries of the world—Western
and others, like Iran—have rallied to try
to stop the group. In spite of aroundthe-clock
bombing and other pressures,
ISIS has somehow survived, building its
force seemingly overnight. According to
a July report from the House Committee
on Homeland Security, more than
40,000 people have traveled to fight for
ISIS since 2011. That figure includes
6,900 people from Western countries,
including 250 U.S. citizens who have
traveled to Syria for ISIS.
Inspired ISIS fighters have expanded
the cause in their own neighborhoods,
in the past year launching attacks in Istanbul,
Turkey; Saudi Arabia; Iraq;
Paris; San Bernardino, Calif.; and Orlando.
The FBI director estimates his
agency has more than 1,000 active investigations
open across the U.S.
ISIS followers see themselves as God’s
vehicle to bring about the end of the
world. ISIS believes its mission is to bait
Western armies to Northern Syria
around the town of Aleppo. A massive
battle with Western forces would bring
in the Islamic version of the apocalypse.
An anti-Messiah will lead the Western
armies, according to ISIS propaganda.
He will kill a vast number of the
caliphate’s fighters until only 5,000 remain.
The remainder will be cornered in
Jerusalem. Just as the Islamic fighters are
almost all killed, the second-mostrevered
prophet in Islam, Jesus, will return
to lead the Muslims to victory and
heaven on Earth.
To most Western minds, this sounds
like lunacy. How can governments address
that? To better understand how to
deal with this center of gravity, one has
to understand how people can get
snared up into such beliefs. Several studies
have examined the lives of Western
ISIS recruits. They found many had
criminal records before being arrested
for terrorism.
Also, many of the foreign recruits are
new converts to the faith. A study by
Fordham University School of Law,
N.Y., of 100 U.S. residents accused of
trying to help ISIS found that many of
the subjects expressed some form of social
alienation, loneliness or identity issues,
The New York Times reported in
July. “These individuals seemed to be
looking to attach to something that can
help define them as well as give them a
cause worth fighting for,” said Karen J.
Greenberg, director of Fordham Law’s
Center on National Security.
At least a quarter of them expressed a
desire for martyrdom, Greenberg said.
Some were seeking religious attachment
and converted to Islam. Almost all were
attracted to the idea of serving the “larger
purpose of the caliphate.” Many of these
recruits are young and still live at home
with their parents.
The idea of worship being all-important
may be difficult for many Americans
to understand. A recent Pew Research
Center study on religion in America
found the percentages of those who believe
in God, pray daily, and regularly go
to church or other religious services have
declined in recent years. Additionally,
atheists comprise 23 percent of the adult
population, up from 16 percent in 2007.
This declining personal connection to
any religion means Western armies will
have problems even understanding religion
or those who are motivated by it,
much less doing something about it.
Countering religious or ideological
motivation of our enemies isn’t new.
The U.S. Army in the fight against the
American Indians had to deal with religion.
So did the U.S. Army against the
Moro warriors in the Philippines.
The U.S. can counter the story in
three steps. The first is to expose the
truth to the world about life in ISIScontrolled
lands. They are not heaven on
Earth, as ISIS claims through social media.
Conflict and bombings have eroded
daily life for members of ISIS-held communities.
The second piece is denial of social
media, a tool ISIS uses to gain support.
The platforms ISIS uses are common
applications such as Facebook or Twitter.
All of these platforms are designed
and run by Americans. The Army has to
figure out a way to block the enemy’s use
of them.
The third piece of the puzzle is an alternate
message. The ISIS version of Islam
from the seventh century is not what
most people in the faith follow. In fact,
terrorists are a small minority. The mainstream
view of Islam from nations such
as Jordan and Turkey needs to be promoted
by all means possible. The U.S.
government has to utilize their expertise.
To defeat ISIS, we need to attack its
second center of gravity: faith. That is
where ISIS draws its strength. It combines
terror, old-fashioned kinetic unit
action, and a very strong information operations
campaign. To eradicate ISIS, we
need to do the same. As Collins said, we
need to start playing soccer. ■
Lt. Col. Thomas M. Magee, USAR Ret.,
is an emergency planner for the federal
civil service and served over 28 years in
the Army Reserve. He is a veteran of
Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi
Freedom and served on a military transition
team in Iraq. His last posting
was as an Army School System battalion
instructor for intermediate-level education.
He has a bachelor’s degree from
the University of Kansas and a master’s
degree from the University of Missouri-
Kansas City.
U.S. Army
December 2016 ■ ARMY 15

‘War to End All Wars’ Continues in Mideast
By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, U.S. Army retired
It has been said that military tactics
without a viable strategy are just noise
before defeat. Certainly, the U.S. involvement
in the first two years of World
War II proved that point. That period of
the war was filled with counterproductive
and competing tactics such as who
we should fight first, the Japanese or the
Germans, and how and where to do it. It
took the Casablanca Conference in January
1943 between President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill to settle on a war
strategy, which was unconditional surrender
of the Axis powers. Once that
was done, the U.S. got on with the war
and won it.
That simple, unifying statement of
strategy did not hold for long, however.
It was not used for the Korean War,
which President Harry Truman called a
“police action” that resulted in an unsatisfactorily
divided Korea that still causes
great problems. The Vietnam War did
not turn out well, either; the U.S. really
did not win anything and lost a lot of
world prestige.
Subsequent conflicts in the Middle
East have suffered from mediocre strategy
even though the First Gulf War
ended with Saddam Hussein’s forces
surrendering at Safwan in the desert.
The continuing, expensive, low-level
conflict lasted between the U.S. and Iraq
until Baghdad was taken in 2003. Since
then, an irregular civil war with conflicting
tactics has consumed the Arabian
Peninsula, costing trillions of U.S. dollars
to try to get an elusive, final solution.
Those efforts have become generally unsuccessful
and the war against Islamic
fundamentalists has slopped over into
Afghanistan, where we find ourselves involved
in counterinsurgencies and civil
wars once again.
Part of the problem since World War
II is that there has been no unifying
strategic aim of a conflict that has cost so
much and has ended up supporting corrupt
and inefficient local governments.
The lofty aims of fighting until we have
achieved the goals of unconditional surrender
of our enemies have not been
achieved primarily because we entered
these post-World War II conflicts without
an end-game plan. We have followed
few consistent rules, and our efforts
have degenerated into a long war
against the Islamic State group and its
derivatives that has proved very expensive
in human lives and capital wealth.
The Irish-bred Duke of Wellington is
reported to have coined the term “in for
a penny, in for a pound,” taken after the
well-known Irish fondness for betting
on horse races. It has certainly cost us
more than a few pennies to keep the
U.S. Army/Pvt. Austin Anyzeski
Middle East wars going. One of the
keys to any success we hope to achieve is
going to have to be how to pursue a long
campaign effectively without breaking
the bank financially. We need to do it
smarter than by buying nearly $50 billion
dollars’ worth of MRAPs that are now
practically worthless when a few disposable
drones may have done the job.
We are in the centennial years of
World War I, “the war to end all wars,”
and it was a war so destructive to Great
Britain, France, Germany and Russia
as to make it, in the words of military
historian and retired Army Brig. Gen.
Robert Doughty, a “Pyrrhic victory.” We
are also at a turning point in our Middle
East conflicts because we were lied into
the Iraq War by neoconservatives who
had no exit strategy for that never-ending
war. What is now needed is a strategy
as good as “unconditional surrender”
was for World War II.
The first phase of those Middle East
wars has ended, and now we find ourselves
at a point where we either go back
into full-fledged combat or back off and
let our erstwhile allies (and even the Russians)
continue the fight against Islamic
terrorism.
Like the popular Vietnam-era Peter,
Paul and Mary song, we are wondering
“where have all the soldiers gone” as we
commemorate the killed and wounded,
and spend tremendous amounts of
money on them, much of it through the
VA. Still, we do not have a unifying
strategy for the current wars, nor many
rules that authorize our military activities,
in the Islamic parts of the world.
Unconditional surrender implies that we
would do anything to win, and we did in
World War II when we firebombed
German cities and destroyed two of
Japan’s largest cities with atomic bombs.
That World War II strategy may not
be appropriate for the 21st century, but
something has to be better than just going
along and letting politicians and their
political parties decide what to do. The
chaos in Baghdad, the flawed cease-fire
in Syria, and now political turmoil in
Turkey and Afghanistan are some of the
results of a flawed national strategy. We
have confused nation-building and counterinsurgency
tactics with a real strategy.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower
shaped the National Security Council to
help him make viable national strategy.
It was not followed by President John F.
Kennedy or any of the other presidents
as Eisenhower envisioned it, and we
have had bad results from our national
policies ever since Vietnam.
The “war to end all wars” continues in
the Middle East, and this country is still
looking for a viable military strategy to
buck up our morale.
■
Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret.,
is a West Point graduate who served in
field artillery, Special Forces, civil affairs,
community/public affairs and force
development. He also worked as a civilian
contractor for the Battle Command
Training Program until retiring in
2002. He is the recording secretary/photographer
of the Society for Military
History.
16 ARMY ■ December 2016

He’s the Army
Vet Finds Solace in Roaming National Parks
The beauty of nature has long stoked the creative fires of
countless poets, authors, musicians, photographers, filmmakers
and other artists.
Count Army veteran Juan “JT” Ibanez among them.
Ibanez hiked a dozen of America’s national parks with a
video camera over 7,200 miles and several weeks in the spring,
producing a short documentary film that he submitted to a
National Park Service initiative called Find Your Park, designed
to celebrate the service’s centennial in August.
Along the way, Ibanez said, the sojourn gave him another,
more valuable benefit: relief from the post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) he said he developed serving in combat with
the initial wave of U.S. troops who invaded Iraq in early 2003.
Ibanez, the son of an Air Force veteran and grandson of an
Army veteran, enlisted in the Army in 2000 at the age of 20.
In early 2003, then-Spc. Ibanez deployed to Iraq with the 2nd
Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division.
“We were among the first to deploy and cross the border,”
he said, adding that the ensuing deployment of nearly one year
was a churn of multiple missions on a near-daily basis, with
“very little rest in between.”
Some of those missions sparked considerable combat trauma,
he said. One of the most vivid episodes came when Ibanez was
driving a truck filled with soldiers on a small side street in
Baghdad and ran over a roadside bomb.
“A number of people were wounded or maimed severely, including
the person sitting up front in the passenger seat,” he
recalled. “I can still picture the blood-smeared truck in the aftermath
of that chaos.”
Ibanez briefly blacked out and suffered temporary hearing loss
for a day or two, but otherwise came away physically unscathed.
But after returning to the U.S. in 2004 and leaving the
Army, he struggled over the ensuing years with the psychic
wounds of his wartime experience.
“I went through 34-plus different jobs in multiple states,”
he said. “I also had a few years where I didn’t have a place to
call home, so I would stay with family or wherever I could find
a place to crash temporarily. At one point, I even found myself
living out of my car in a parking lot for almost six months.”
He began to research how other PTSD sufferers dealt with
their demons, and found that quite a few said connecting with
nature helped considerably. That gave Ibanez the idea to embark
on a personal tour of some of America’s most famous parks.
“I didn’t know for sure where or how far I would go. I just
knew I needed to get out. The thought of camping and hiking
sounded very appealing, especially after reading up and watching
videos of other veterans finding healing within nature.”
Accompanied by a friend, he picked parks that were near,
or on the way to, friends and family he could visit. But he did
more than just revel in the majestic beauty of national parks.
He also began filming that beauty with his video camera.
His first stop was Shenandoah National Park, Va., after
which he intended to work his way westward. The parks list
included Manassas National Battlefield Park, Va.; Big Bend
National Park, Texas; Yellowstone National Park, Wyo.;
Olympic National Park, Wash.; and several others before
wrapping up at Redwood National Park, Calif.
In the early stages of his trip, Ibanez found himself “apprehensive
and anxiety-ridden.” But as his travels rolled on, “it
became easier and easier to enjoy my surroundings,” he said.
“By the time I got to Yellowstone, I could really find those
moments to reflect without hesitation.”
Juan ‘JT’ Ibanez
All along the way, Ibanez had his video camera rolling. After
his sojourn came to an end, he turned his footage into a
short documentary with help from HitRECord.org, an online
collaborative production company that he calls his “creative
therapy for the past few years.”
HitRECord.org, founded and owned by actor and director
Joseph Gordon-Levitt, uses a variety of media to produce
short films, books, DVDs and other projects. Ibanez’s film, “A
Veteran and His Camera,” is online at www.youtube.com/
watch?v=5PgqEoOaiMk.
“Anything that involves the outdoors and creativity—painting,
drawing, photography, filming, writing—can help with
the symptoms of PTSD,” Ibanez said. “Everything I just mentioned
and more can be found within HitRECord.org. The
community there has been overwhelmingly supportive.
“I don’t think there is a permanent fix for PTSD, but I do
believe there are ways to cope with the effects. For me, the
best therapy for PTSD is found within the beauty of nature
and creativity.”
—Staff Report
December 2016 ■ ARMY 17

Multi-Domain Battle
Joint Combined Arms Concept for the 21st Century
By Gen. David G. Perkins
A concept is an idea, a thought, a general
notion. In its broadest sense a concept
describes what is to be done.
—Gen. Donn Starry, Commander, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, 1977–1981
Smoking American and Soviet-made tanks and planes
littering the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights in 1973
shocked the world. In only two short weeks, the violence,
precision and lethality of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War exposed glaring weaknesses in NATO’s concept to defend
Western Europe. Energized by the magnitude of the problem
to take on extensive reform, American military leaders embarked
on the development of a new concept of how the Army
and Air Force could effectively deter, fight and win against a
modernized foe in the changed operational environment.
In the following years, the U.S. military developed, tested
and formalized a coherent, joint solution known as AirLand
Battle to counter the Soviet conventional threat in Western
Europe. For decades, AirLand Battle and its successors met
operational demands and attempts by adversaries to counter its
strengths. But today and into the future, ground combat forces
confront threats that adapted and modernized their militaries
specifically to defeat how the joint force currently fights.
Our current and potential adversaries saw the success of
AirLand Battle during Operation Desert Storm and have
been going to school on us ever since. Their focus is to fracture
the paradigms established with AirLand Battle and take
away our advantages. With the adoption of AirLand Battle,
the joint force depended on overall superiority in domains
such as air, maritime, space and cyber as well as qualitative
superiority in the land domain to offset vulnerabilities in
ground capabilities based on numbers and position.
During most of our recent history, the only domain that
has been truly contested has been the land domain. The joint
force has enjoyed an unprecedented level of freedom of action
in the air, space, maritime and cyber domains. This will not
be the case in the future. Contemporary and emerging threats
seek to gain control of contested spaces not only in the air
and on land but at sea, in space and cyberspace as well as the
electromagnetic spectrum and the cognitive dimension of human
perception. Thus, the increasing number of adversaries
who learned to attack the air, maritime, space and cyberspace
domain superiority premises of current Army and joint doctrine
challenge the U.S. military’s ability to achieve military
and political objectives.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Christopher McCullough
Gen. David G. Perkins, commanding general of the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, speaks at the 2016 LANPAC
Symposium and Exposition, hosted by the Association of the
U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare.
18 ARMY ■ December 2016

To address these challenges, the Army and Marine Corps,
in concert with the joint force, are developing the Multi-
Domain Battle concept. Multi-Domain Battle is an effort to
maintain American military dominance by reimagining joint
operations for the 21st century. This concept advances the
proven idea of combined arms into the 21st-century operational
environment by describing how future ground combat
forces working as part of joint, interorganizational and multinational
teams will provide commanders the multiple options
across all domains that are required to deter and defeat highly
capable peer enemies.
At its core, Multi-Domain Battle requires flexible and resilient
ground formations that project combat power from
land into other domains to enable joint force freedom of action,
as well as seize positions of relative advantage and control
key terrain to consolidate gains.
Why Multi-Domain Battle Is Needed
Currently revisionist states seek to alter the post-Cold War
security order by coercing neutrals, partners and allies through
economic pressure, disinformation, subversion, and the threat
of military force. These actions succeed by creating a fait accompli
before the joint force can react or by operating under
the threshold that triggers a decisive U.S. counteraction. Potential
enemies use deception, surprise, and speed of action to
achieve their objectives while integrating a combination of
economic, political, technological, informational and military
means to exploit seams within established U.S. operating
methods. Moreover, these adversaries may use, or threaten use
of, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass disruption or
destruction to manipulate the risks of escalation.
Doctrine is how we run the Army today;
concepts are how we change the Army for
tomorrow.
—Gen. David G. Perkins, Commander,
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Adversary operational methods take advantage of modernized
integrated air defenses and long-range precision strike
capabilities to secure a series of limited objectives prior to an
effective joint force response. They continue to improve and
export integrated air defense systems that provide protection
under which ground forces can operate more freely from the
persistent effects of joint force standoff targeting and strike
capabilities. These integrated air defense networks complicate
joint operations because hidden, lethal and dispersed air defenses
can allow the enemy to establish superiority in one domain
(the air) from a different domain (the ground).
Advanced integrated air defenses also protect enemy surfaceto-surface
missile capabilities, which enable enemy deep strikes
without reliance on aircraft. To conduct campaigns, ground
forces designed under the assumption of friendly air and maritime
supremacy currently require large-signature sustainment
facilities and command nodes vulnerable to such missile systems.
By extension, adversary missile capabilities also threaten
maritime maneuver by placing valuable naval assets at risk. They
also can engage large and fixed air bases at increasing ranges,
further limiting the ability to project power in the air domain.
Operationally and tactically, adversaries limit joint force battlespace
awareness by winning the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance
fight. Their all-domain reconnaissance and
counter-reconnaissance capabilities challenge U.S. forces’ abil-
December 2016 ■ ARMY 19

U.S. Air Force/Alejandro Pena
25th Infantry Division paratroopers prepare for a night jump from an Air Force C-17 at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.
ity to shield friendly dispositions and prevent gaining an accurate
understanding of the enemy’s dispositions. By coupling
developments in reconnaissance such as inexpensive unmanned
aerial vehicles (air and cyber domain) with indirect fires assets
(land domain), which are now increasingly free from joint force
airstrikes and counterfire, enemies can inflict significant damage
to friendly forces even when out of direct contact.
The individual quality of soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen,
combined with training of joint teams and leaders, remains
the decisive advantage over modernized threats. To
leverage this advantage, Army operations and organizations
require a new concept and corresponding capabilities to fully
exploit this advantage in the 21st century. Multi-Domain
Battle is, therefore, the Army’s concept for applying our advantage
in quality of personnel and training through proven
combined arms principles adapted to modern technological,
military and strategic conditions.
Joint Combined Arms
Implementing Multi-Domain Battle entails creating and exploiting
temporary windows of advantage and restoring capability
balance to build flexible, resilient formations in the joint
force. AirLand Battle started developing the concept of “extended
battlefield.” This concept noted that different commanders
had different views of the battlefield in geographical terms.
Multi-Domain Battle continues the concept of extended battlefield
but now with a focus on the extension across domains and
time. The current phasing construct, which is somewhat linear
The purpose of military operations cannot
be simply to avert defeat—but rather it
must be to win.
—TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, March 1981
and consecutive, is becoming less and less useful to visualize
how conflict is spread across domains and time. There is no
longer a singular main battle area but rather, windows of opportunities
and vulnerabilities that open and close in each domain.
Multi-Domain Battle endeavors to integrate capabilities in
such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become
more vulnerable to another. Creating and exploiting temporary
windows of advantage require ready ground combat
forces capable of projecting power from land into other domains
as well as integrating joint and partner capabilities at
the lowest level to extend the principle of combined arms maneuver
across all domains.
However, just as the evolution of AirLand Battle led to the
creation of battlefield coordination detachments and air and
missile defense commands to coordinate operations in the air
and land domains, synchronizing domain windows across five
domains in degraded conditions as envisioned in Multi-Domain
Battle will require a new generation of innovative Mission
Command solutions in doctrine, organization and training
across the joint force.
20 ARMY ■ December 2016

A California Army National Guard Chinook
supports Marines during high-elevation
training in the Sierra Mountains.
For example, future multifunctional Army fires units will
provide the joint task force with a single unit combining surface-to-surface
(land and maritime), surface-to-air, electromagnetic,
and cyberspace cross-domain fires. These fires formations
integrate with emerging Navy, Air Force, Marine
and special operations forces capabilities to provide the commander
multiple resilient options for striking the enemy and
covering joint force maneuver.
California National Guard/Master Sgt. Paul Wade
To win in a complex world, Army forces
must provide the Joint Force with
multiple options, integrate the efforts of
multiple partners, operate across multiple
domains, and present our enemies and
adversaries with multiple dilemmas.
—The U.S. Army Operating Concept:
Win in a Complex World, 2014
At the same time, ground forces with improved maneuver
and close combat capabilities allow the joint force to overwhelm
or infiltrate dispersed enemy formations concealed from joint
targeting and fires. A joint force containing effective ground
forces requires the enemy to expose their dispersed forces to defeat
in ground combat, face destruction from joint fires if they
U.S. Army/Sgt. Christopher Prows
Army aviators and Navy crew members train at Moses Lake, Wash.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 21

Chief Warrant Officer
2 Michael Lyons, a
Joint Tactical Communications
Office
communications
operator, participates
in air-space-cyber
training at Nellis Air
Force Base, Nev.
U.S. Air Force/Senior Airman Brett Clashman
If we get this right, the Army will kill the
archer instead of dealing with one of the
arrows.
—Adm. Harry Harris, Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command
concentrate, or the loss of key terrain if they displace.
Future Army and Marine tactical ground maneuver units
will combine sufficient cross-domain fires capability to enable
decentralized ground maneuver and the creation of durable
domain windows for the joint force with the mobility, lethality
and protection to close with and destroy enemy ground
forces in close combat. With combined arms pushed to the
lowest practical level, these units will be flexible and resilient
with the ability to operate in degraded conditions and with
sufficient endurance to sustain losses and continue operations
for extended periods and across wide areas.
Forward-positioned forces capable of executing Multi-
Domain Battle can deter enemy actions. They provide commanders
with the capability to build partner capacity and are
in a position of relative advantage to challenge adversary subversion
and fait accompli territory grabs.
The battlefields of Crimea, Ukraine and Syria as well as the
increasingly contested spaces in Southeast Asia, Northeast
Asia and near the Indian Ocean have revealed revisionist
states exercising new capabilities that challenge existing joint
force strengths. Drawing on time-tested principles of combined
arms and the conceptual foundation of AirLand Battle,
Multi-Domain Battle is not unprecedented; rather, it proposes
to combine capabilities in more innovative ways to
overcome the challenges posed by adversaries.
Multi-Domain Battle allows U.S. forces to take advantage
of existing personnel quality and training strengths to outmaneuver
adversaries physically and cognitively, applying combined
arms in and across all domains. It provides a flexible
means to present multiple dilemmas to an enemy and create
temporary windows of localized control to seize, retain and
exploit the initiative.
Employing Multi-Domain Battle, joint forces with integrated
cross-domain capabilities provide a credible capability
to deter adversary aggression, deny the enemy freedom of action,
ensure joint force access, secure terrain, and consolidate
gains for sustainable outcomes. In other words, employing
Multi-Domain Battle enables us to win.
✭
Gen. David G. Perkins assumed duties as the commander of the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command in March 2014. Previously,
he served as commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms
Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He also served as the commanding
general of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and
brigade commander of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division
(Mechanized), during the invasion of Iraq; deputy chief of staff
for strategic effects for Multi-National Forces-Iraq; deputy chief
of staff for operations for U.S. Army Europe; and special assistant
to the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. A 1980 graduate
of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds master’s degrees from
the U.S. Naval War College and the University of Michigan.
22 ARMY ■ December 2016

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‘Train, Advise,
Assist’ Brigades
Milley’s New Vision for Ongoing Mission
A U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit member helps an Afghan National
Army soldier adjust his M16 rifle during training in Afghanistan.
24 ARMY ■ December 2016

By Chuck Vinch, Senior Staff Writer
DoD/U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Joseph Swafford
They differ slightly on some of the nuances, but three longtime
military analysts who weighed in on the Army’s plan to
begin creating new “train, advise and assist” brigades in the
next few years expressed solid consensus on two basic points:
It’s the right move. And it’s long overdue.
As described by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, the
concept sounds straightforward: These formalized, standing entities
would take the lead in training and advising the underdeveloped
military forces of Iraq, Afghanistan and other allies in the professionalized
American way of ground war.
Milley wants to stand up five of these units and assign one to each
geographic combatant command. The fundamental goal would be to
eliminate the problematic strategy to date of essentially carving up
standing Army combat units to train foreign military troops for extended
lengths of time, crimping U.S. combat readiness in the bargain.
The train, advise and assist (TAA) concept is on the chief’s short
list. He has talked it up more than once this year, to include laying out
his premise in some detail in an extensive discussion at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies think tank in early summer.
And he’s garnering enthusiastic fans for the premise. One is retired
Army Lt. Col. John Nagl. He is a member of the board of advisers,
and former president, of the Center for a New American Security
and is also on the board of advisers of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute.
“This is a win,” Nagl said. “You can bang your head against the
wall that it took so long for us to get here but in the Army’s defense,
I’d say this is the first time the demand for combat troops in Iraq
and Afghanistan has finally started to ease and the Army has been
able to catch its breath. The kindest explanation, that the Army
sought to maintain combat power as the force has diminished, is not
completely untrue.”
Retired Marine Corps Col. Mark Cancian, senior adviser in the
International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, also praised the concept. The Army’s efforts to
train Iraqi forces early in the Iraq War, he said, showed fairly clearly
that “if you just have a pickup team, they often don’t do terribly well.
“I think as the war went on, we got better at it but still, it was very
much a pickup effort,” Cancian said. “It makes a lot of sense to have
units that are really trained for it.”
Cancian said this idea “is clearly needed” because the U.S. will “be
doing more of this kind of mission. So it’s worth having a group of
people who are really focused on it.”
Tom Donnelly, co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security
Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, agreed. “It’s a good
idea,” he said. “And it’s somewhat overdue after 15 years of either
breaking down regular combat units or putting together kind of a
pastiche of cats and dogs for these missions.”
Added Nagl: “At a time when the Army is getting smaller but we
have this extraordinary resource of midgrade officers and NCOs who
don’t want to leave the military and want to continue to serve; who
have irreplaceable, invaluable combat experience … why would you
not try to preserve and use that experience?”
‘Head and Shoulders’
The TAA concept does not call for full-sized brigade combat
teams. Rather, Milley likens the basic structure to the “head and
shoulders” of a brigade combat team—a few hundred senior staff officers
and NCOs without the lower-ranking combat muscle.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 25

Cancian sees the more formalized structure as a big step forward
in the evolution of how the Army can best help develop
the military prowess of allies. “How well did we really train the
Iraqi army initially, considering how they fell apart against
ISIS?” he said, referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
“A lot of people are sort of trying to figure out what we need to
do just in general to build partner military capabilities.”
In building these units, Milley has said he would seek to
form them from the existing force without altering the downward
end-strength trend line that has the Army shrinking to
450,000 active-duty soldiers by autumn 2018.
That would require careful consideration and calibration,
Nagl said. “Taking these personnel ‘out of hide’ is no joke.
Budget caps have done real damage to the readiness and size
of the Army. But if you make it 500 personnel for each of the
five TAA brigades, you should be able to find 2,500 people.”
Keep Units Compact
Donnelly agreed on the need to keep these outfits compact.
“Let’s not pretend this is a secret way to get more brigade-level
headquarters into the structure and end up with more structure
than the end strength can sustain, with no associated
training base or schoolhouse slice to support it,” he said.
On the far side of the concept, Milley cites an additional potential
benefit: If broad, conventional war were to break out,
these standing command structures could be filled out relatively
quickly with junior enlisted draftees, giving the Army five more
brigade combat teams to send into the fight.
His thinking on that begins with the basic fact that current
plans have the Total Army—active, National Guard and Reserve—on
a course to drop to 980,000 soldiers.
“History tells us that depending on the situation, you have
to have more than that,” he said. “If we have to have more,
what is our ability to regenerate? It takes a long time to train a
platoon sergeant, to train a battalion commander, to build a
unit. This isn’t your instant pancake thing where you just add
water, mix, throw it on the griddle, and you’ve got a pancake.
It doesn’t work like that.”
Under the TAA brigade concept, if a national emergency
erupted, Milley said new soldiers could be put through boot
camp and Advanced Individual Training and then be joined
with those existing chains of command, considerably shortening
the time it would take to create combat units.
“I look at it as a twofer,” he said. “You get the day-to-day
engagement that combatant commanders want to train, advise
and assist. And then in times of national emergency, you have
at least four or five brigades’ worth of standing chains of command
that can marry up with soldiers, and you will have units
pretty quickly.”
That aspect of the plan sparks doubts among some defense
analysts. Cancian thinks the vision of filling out these units for
conventional combat quickly enough for them to have an immediate,
near-term impact on the fluid, fast-moving modern
battlefield is “extremely unlikely.”
“The Army has done that before, in Vietnam,” he said.
“You formed an experienced cadre, fed them draftees—and it
still took a year or two.”
Donnelly thinks it might work in the event of a “true World
A Czech soldier and
U.S. soldier discuss
map coordinates at
Hohenfels Training
Area, Germany.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Andrew Guffey
26 ARMY ■ December 2016

In Iraq, a 1st Cavalry
Division soldier trains
Iraqi troops in urban
operations.
DoD/U.S. Army National Guard Sgt. Shawn Miller
War II- or Korea-style emergency,” but he also believes it
would be a challenge, given the significant differences between
the TAA mission and full-scale combat.
“You’d have to integrate a lot of different equipment and capabilities,
and a much different mindset, too,” he said. “Leading
a battalion in combat in the field requires different skills.”
Fielding in Two Years
Milley said the TAA concept will begin to coalesce in the
near-term Army Program Objective Memorandum, a recommendation
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on how the
service plans to allocate resources to meet Army and defense
planning guidance.
“We’ll probably look at the first one being real about—my
guess, two years from now,” Milley said. “We’ll use it with a
combatant commander, then tweak it for the next version. At
the end of the day, what I want to do is try to create probably
five of these, one for each of the geographic combatant commanders.”
Under his vision, the TAA cadres would stay intact for
about three years, in theory boosting proficiency and readiness
by suppressing the steady turbulence that comes with rotating
new personnel in and out of units on individual reassignments.
And he does not expect costs to be prohibitive. “The numbers
of people are not large,” he said. “These are the chains of
command of brigades. We’re not looking to … go back to the
Department of Defense for more people.”
At this early stage, Milley said he’d like to craft one TAA
brigade as a pilot and then tweak it to “make sure we get the
design right; take it slow at first, and not rush to failure.”
Donnelly sees that as a sound strategy. “I would support this
on the condition that it is not done half-assed—to use an Army
technical term that everybody understands,” he said. “Don’t do
something in a way that is a recipe for failure and misery if you
cannot establish a plan to sustain it over the long haul.”
Indeed, five such TAA brigades may not even be necessary,
Cancian said. “There are clearly some theaters where you’re going
to have high demand for these teams: Europe, the Middle
East, the Pacific,” he said. But for South America and Africa,
he said, what U.S. Special Operations Command “is already
doing with low-level, small training teams is adequate.”
An alternative might be to place TAA units in the Middle
East and Europe, and have a third serve as a global entity to
go where it is needed, when it is needed, Cancian said.
However many teams are formed, Donnelly said, “if the
Army is serious about institutionalizing this, they need to institutionalize
it in every way—training base, doctrine, courses of
instruction. Either do it right or don’t do it. If you just create a
unit and don’t have an institutional slice to support it, I’d be
skeptical that the initiative would survive Gen. Milley’s tenure.”
“It’s an idea worth pursuing,” Cancian concurred. “A mechanism
like this would provide real combat power and assistance
to an ally without putting a lot of U.S. boots on the
ground. So I think it fits where a lot of the political strategic
thinking has been moving.”
Nagel said the concept has “lots and lots of pluses, and next
to no minuses. Iraq and Afghanistan are not over; they’re not
going to be over anytime soon. These are the kinds of wars
we’re actually fighting, so let’s build what the nation needs” to
fight them.
“My unbelievably sincere, bottom-of-my-heart hope is that
having spent so much money and so many lives getting to this
point, we’re finally recognizing that ‘train, advise and assist’ is
an enduring mission, a war-shortening mission, even a warwinning
mission,” Nagl said, calling it a capability “no future
chief will be allowed to give up.”
✭
December 2016 ■ ARMY 27

Eye on Earth
Geospatial Intelligence Vital to Commanders
By Air Force Maj. Nicholas Coleman
Try to imagine a world without
access to imagery or video. In
today’s culture, it is not good
enough to describe a situation;
most people prefer a photo or video to
support the description. Military leadership
expects a similar picture of the situation
or operational environment.
Geospatial intelligence is defined as
the exploitation and analysis of imagery,
imagery intelligence and geospatial information
to describe, assess and visually
depict physical features and geographically
referenced activities on Earth.
Awareness of geospatial intelligence,
known as GEOINT, is vital to military
leaders when developing the operational
picture. It is especially important in the
context of the six joint warfighting functions:
command and control, intelligence,
fires, movement and maneuver,
protection, and sustainment.
Command and Control
One way GEOINT supports command
and control is in determining
where to establish headquarters. This
type of analysis provides commanders
with information on factors such as
roads, communication infrastructure, geographic
advantages and limitations of
terrain, and demographics of population.
Each of these elements helps to determine
the most effective and efficient location
for commanding an operation.
GEOINT also aids the commander
in developing situational understanding,
which is the product of applying analysis
and judgment to relevant information to
determine the relationships among the
operational and mission variables to facilitate
decisionmaking. Decisionmaking
is the essence of command, and
GEOINT is a vital element for commanders
to turn situational understanding
into the commander’s visualization.
A commander’s visualization is defined
in Army Doctrine Reference Publication
5-0: The Operations Process as the mental
process of developing situational understanding,
determining a desired end
state, and envisioning an operational approach
to achieve that end state. A commander’s
visualization shapes the issuing
of plans and orders, another key component
of command and control. Subordinate
units also expect a clear understanding
of their respective areas of operations
and areas of responsibility, often depicted
in images.
GEOINT provides a depiction of
these areas so subordinate units know
who is responsible for each area, and
with whom they need to coordinate if
operations occur at or near these interfaces.
These control measures include
geographic data on land, sea and air including
brigade boundaries, areas of operations,
coordinating altitudes, and area
air defense regions.
The final command and control element
is the development of the common
operating picture. Depicting significant
events and other relevant information to
all warfighters who are involved aids in
developing shared understanding. The
common means for this depiction is a
map software with events overlaid where
and when they happened or plan to occur.
Looking back at the GEOINT definition,
this is the imagery and geospatial
information that comprises GEOINT.
Intelligence
Intelligence is all about understanding
the operational environment. The operational
environment is the composite of
conditions, circumstances and influences
that affect employment of capabilities
and bear on the decisions of the commander.
Intelligence functions use joint
intelligence preparation of the operational
environment, a process that seeks
to understand not only the physical terrain
but also circumstances and influences
that might prove relevant to operations.
iStock images
Understanding requires collection, processing
and exploitation to ensure appropriate
data availability to support a
leader’s needs. Therefore, leaders need to
know how to convey requirements to a
collection manager.
Helping to frame collection and exploitation
are models such as political,
military, economic, social, information
and infrastructure; area, structure, capabilities,
organizations, people and events;
and obstacles, avenues of approach, key
terrain, observation/fields of fire and
cover/concealment. Other elements include
friendly and enemy center of gravity
analysis, and probable enemy courses
of action.
28 ARMY ■ December 2016

Each contributes to building a picture
of the operational environment. Although
much of this data comes from
other intelligence sources, its referenced
location on the Earth is geospatial information.
GEOINT provides a common
thread among all the intelligence
sources and thus is vital to developing
the intelligence picture of the battlespace.
Dissemination of the intelligence
supports the development of the common
operating picture, situational
awareness and shared understanding.
Fires
Fires require GEOINT to employ capabilities
whether lethal or nonlethal.
Geospatial information aids in establishing
fire support coordination measures
such as coordinated fire lines and coordinating
altitudes. GEOINT is also key
to establishing engagement areas with
sectors of fire, trigger lines and target
reference points. Such coordination
measures are critical to movement and
maneuver, controlling territory and airspace,
and preventing fratricide of U.S.
or coalition forces during operations.
Nonlethal fires require geographical
data acquired in joint intelligence preparation
of the operational environment
to target information operations at the
desired social/political demographics.
Lethal fires depend on GEOINT for
targeting, and targeting professionals
rely heavily on GEOINT to build target
information. GEOINT provides information
such as materials and facility
construction to aid in weapon selection
capable of achieving desired effects. Coordinate
mensuration, a GEOINT process
of geometric computation, removes
errors in locations to provide the weapon
system with required fidelity to strike
precise locations and reduce collateral
damage. This is important to achieve
desired effects from fires while minimizing
unintended consequences. GEOINT
makes precision targeting possible to the
fires warfighting function, and aids movement
and maneuver.
Movement and Maneuver
Movement of forces seeks to gain positional
advantage over an adversary.
Disposition of friendly and enemy forces
as well as terrain details help determine
avenues and axis of approach. GEOINT
provides these details, which are critical
to aiding friendly freedom of movement
by avoiding obstacles and helping to determine
where to emplace countermobility
obstacles in conjunction with terrain
to impede enemy freedom of
movement or channelize movement in a
desired direction.
Maneuver is defined as the employment
of forces in the operational area
through movement in combination with
fires to achieve a position of advantage in
respect to the enemy. Based on this definition
and the importance of GEOINT
to both fires and movement, GEOINT
is critical to maneuver.
Protection
Protection focuses on preserving the
joint force’s fighting potential, and
GEOINT aids protection in several
ways. The intelligence function identifies
threats and enemy locations, enabling
protection to establish active defensive
measures such as air and missile
defense. GEOINT provides details on
areas to maximize coverage with consideration
of terrain limitations.
Air and missile defenses are high-demand/low-density
assets, so maximizing
effectiveness is critical. GEOINT is
also key in determining locations for
passive defensive measures such as establishing
combat support hospitals and
December 2016 ■ ARMY 29

U.S. Army/Capt. Benjamin Gruver
Colorado National Guard soldiers use mapping software during a multistate exercise in Salina, Kan.
sustainment capabilities outside enemy weapon ranges while
making them easy for friendly forces access. This, in turn,
makes emergency management and response easier.
Another function of protection is combat identification.
GEOINT is a common provider for determining the characterization
of personnel and facilities as friendly, enemy or neutral.
Characterization of an environment and tracking changes
to it is another way GEOINT helps combat threats such as
IEDs. These factors make GEOINT an important element in
protecting the joint force and ensuring sustainment.
Sustainment
Sustainment has two primary elements: logistics and personnel
services. Protection of sustainment highlighted earlier
discussed access and enemy threats, but GEOINT also helps
locate key infrastructure such as railroads, roads, airports and
seaports; and key attributes such as natural protection and access
to water. GEOINT also helps logisticians determine appropriate
space allocation for operations and locations/need
for field logistic elements based on distance between operations
and logistical support areas.
Determining these items is critical to prevent culmination
of operations before mission accomplishment as well as critical
care for injured personnel. Environmental considerations are
another responsibility of the sustainment function. GEOINT
can aid in baselining the environment and assessing any impacts
to the environment as units redeploy. GEOINT supports
personnel services by helping determine best locations to
ensure access and communication with chaplains, finance and
legal services, just as it aids in access to critical care.
GEOINT is all about the depiction of imagery and geospatial
data to build a picture of the operational environment. GEOINT
plays a vital role in each of the six joint warfighting functions,
whether it is finding the optimum location to establish command
and control headquarters, developing understanding of the enemy’s
likely courses of action through joint intelligence preparation
of the operational environment, building precise targeting
information for fires, understanding terrain limitations to movement
and maneuver, optimizing active defensive measures to
protect the force, or locating the most effective and efficient location
for logistical support areas to sustain the force.
Military leaders are required to make decisions on a regular
basis within these warfighting functions or over all of them
collectively, depending on the level of the decisionmaker.
Thus, it is vital that military leaders gain awareness of
GEOINT and understand how it supports their functions. ✭
Air Force Maj. Nicholas Coleman is a program element monitor for
the Secretary of the Air Force, Global Power Directorate. Notable
previous assignments include thermal analyst and officer in charge
of a geospatial intelligence operations support cell. He holds a
bachelor’s degree from the University of Toledo, Ohio, and a master’s
degree from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He recently
attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
30 ARMY ■ December 2016

The Value of
Broadening
Assignments
By
Capt. Zach N. Watson,
Maj. Brian C. Babcock-Lumish
and Lt. Col. Heidi A. Urben
While there is a burgeoning body of literature examining the skills necessary
for officer success in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and
multinational environments, less has been written about the value of
broadening experiences for performing in subsequent operational assignments
within the Army at all echelons.
In our careers, broadening experiences outside the Army were ideal preparation
for key developmental assignments at both company and field grade levels. Broadening
is also about building better leaders within the Army, not solely about preparing
officers to excel when dealing with those outside the Army, whether they be uniformed
members of other services, civil servants, or representatives of other countries’
militaries and governments.
With the return of officer separation boards and lower promotion rates, many
junior officers may view broadening opportunities as too risky to their careers, opting
to pursue traditional developmental jobs in their basic branches within the Army.
We argue that such views are shortsighted. Some of the best preparation for tough
key developmental jobs in the Army can come from exposure to communities outside
the service.
We offer the following 10 ways we were better prepared for key developmental
jobs because of broadening experiences:
1. Asking good questions. Often the most important skill a leader can contribute
to guiding subordinates is asking the right questions to generate the
understanding of a problem or task before solving or accomplishing it. Broadening
experiences, more than prior operational assignments, expose Army leaders to
communities, such as civilian academia, that spend as much time formulating
questions as answering them.
2. Being comfortable not knowing everything. While the commander of a
theater military intelligence company may not perfectly understand the nuances of
all 12 intelligence MOSs within the company, even the purest rifle company contains
more than 10 individual MOSs and relies on the support of countless others.
Furthermore, the past several years of war have demonstrated that during overseas
deployments, few units operate without “enablers” from joint, interagency, intergovernmental
and multinational entities.
The gap in training and expertise among leaders, their subordinates and their
partners will only grow wider as the world grows increasingly complex. Proper
broadening offers experiences wherein leaders learn to work without much training
or knowledge of their environment—whether in a foreign country or a commercial
company—gaining a level of comfort with “not knowing” that can serve them well
when charged with leading diverse formations.
3. Emphasizing empirical evidence over anecdotes. Leaders must always
guard against well-intentioned teammates and subordinates who offer compelling,
often passionate anecdotes as evidence to support the adoption of a particular
course of action. Leaders are especially vulnerable during transitions, when subordinates
may be tempted to seek a quick decision from the new person at the helm.
DoD
32 ARMY ■ December 2016

At the same time, even cohesive and established teams must
be wary of pitfalls.
Implicit trust in our teammates that has been forged over
time should not preclude establishing a culture that values the
gathering of empirical observations to support decisionmaking.
Our graduate education in the social sciences not only reinforced
the general value of skepticism, but also instilled in us
a persistent need to back up assertions with empirical data—
and to expect the same from those with whom we serve.
4. Receiving candid feedback. While the Army has taken
steps to incorporate 360-degree assessments into leader-development
efforts, it has long faced criticism for an inflated evaluation
system. We contend that the most candid, critical, substantive
feedback the three of us have received was in graduate
school, not the Army. In fact, during one of the authors’ graduate
studies, a professor admitted he had to abandon peer assessments
for group projects in classes that had concentrations
of Army officers, because the Army officers rated their peers—
often, other Army officers—as excellent, with little to no room
for improvement. Broadening experiences that truly assess
performance and then help guide individuals forward are
evocative of learning organizations that place a high premium
on continuous assessment.
5. Seeking a diversity of viewpoints. While the need for
good order and discipline necessitates a healthy degree of deference
to those in positions of authority, there is a danger of
such top-down thinking resulting in groupthink and confirmation
bias. The Army ethos does not instill the impulse to
seek input from subordinates in as holistic a way as do the less
hierarchical contexts of certain broadening assignments, such
as those in civilian academia or joint, interagency, intergovernmental
and multinational positions.
6. Valuing consensus building. While leaders in Army
units have authority by virtue of their rank and position, the
truth is that it is easier to lead soldiers who understand and
believe in their assigned mission. And soldiers are more likely
to buy in to an organizational vision if they feel their voices are
heard. Even within purely Army contexts, mission success often
depends on coordination with organizations outside a
given unit and well-defined lines of authority. Broadening assignments
outside the military may offer valuable perspective
on how consensus building can lead to effective action outside
defined chains of authority.
7. Expanding sources of authority. By virtue of our positions,
each of us exercised considerable authority over hundreds
of soldiers. Yet we also recognized that having to invoke
positional authority to compel others to do something was
probably a last resort. Deference to authority and respect for
the chain of command are absolute necessities in the Army,
but our most significant accomplishments were often realized
through creative, collaborative endeavors. Broadening experiences
that offer immersion in the corporate world or graduate
degrees in business offer Army leaders unique insights into
leading organizational change.
8. Appreciating process as much as outcome. The
Army uses the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) as
its primary decisionmaking framework. MDMP is a useful,
time-tested and effective tool for leading units at various echelons,
but it is not alone in the world as a decisionmaking
framework. When Army officers serve outside of the Army,
whether as students in civilian graduate schools or “embeds”
in other departments of government, they are exposed to alternate
decisionmaking and management processes. That
contrast itself is an education to Army leaders. It makes more
apparent MDMP’s strengths and weaknesses, and equips
leaders to account for those characteristics in leading their
own units through MDMP.
9. Strengthening ties beyond the Army. Whether in
garrison or deployed, tactical and operational Army units are
more successful when they leverage the capabilities of organizations
beyond the Army. Particularly in an era of declining
budgets, leaders with contacts beyond the Army can create
December 2016 ■ ARMY 33

What Is Broadening?
Currently, there is not a uniformly held doctrinal definition
of broadening. The closest is the recent revision
to Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, but the difficulty
with this definition is that little is not broadening.
The implication is that anything that is not “key developmental”
is broadening.
In the past, the distinction within a branch was between
developmental assignments and key developmental assignments
such as company command, battalion operations
officer or battalion executive officer. In the current version
of Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, some
branches make a distinction between developmental and
broadening assignments—for example, aviation—while
others imply that broadening and developmental are synonymous
in both not being key developmental, such as
military intelligence.
The 2012 version, the most recent, of Army Doctrine
Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22: Army Leadership is
closer to the spirit of a narrower definition of broadening,
defining it as an opportunity that provides “exposure outside
the leader’s branch or functional area competencies”
and “allows development of a wider range of knowledge
and skills” or “increases cross-cultural exposure and expands
awareness of other governmental agencies, organizations
or environments.”
In line with ADRP 6-22, we argue for a narrower definition
of broadening and that assignments should meet at
least two important criteria to truly be considered broadening.
First, such an assignment should foster an environment
that puts officers outside their comfort zone, where
they cannot solely leverage their own past experiences in
the Army in order to excel and where they are exposed to
different organizational cultures and dynamics.
This is best, and perhaps only, achieved when the officer
becomes a minority in an organization. Serving as an exchange
officer in the British Army or as an interagency fellow
at the U.S. Agency for International Development are
great examples. This caveat naturally rules out most Army
assignments. Army assignments in the functional and institutional
realms currently labeled as broadening should
probably instead be designated as developmental in nature.
Second, the assignment should help cultivate an officer’s
critical thinking skills. Broadening opportunities should
challenge officers to examine their previously held assumptions
and instill in them the value of self-reflection.
Attending graduate school full time, preferably not in
classrooms entirely full of other military officers, is one
obvious example but not the only one. Fellowships and
serving as speechwriters, faculty members or on a Commander’s
Initiatives Group at the Joint Staff or at a combatant
command also stand out as superb broadening opportunities
that nourish critical and creative thinking.
—Capt. Zach N. Watson, Maj. Brian C. Babcock-Lumish
and Lt. Col. Heidi A. Urben
garrison developmental opportunities for soldiers within their
formations, including cultural awareness training with subject-matter
experts or sharing broadening experiences in
leader professional development contexts. Likewise, while deployed,
having an understanding of the organizational culture
of other government agencies or nongovernmental organizations
can go a long way in minimizing miscommunication.
10. Communicating more broadly. In facing modern security
challenges, the U.S. Army rarely deploys alone. Almost
always deployed with joint forces, the Army often deploys
with partner-nation militaries, the support of other U.S. and
partner-nation government agencies, or partners with international
and nongovernmental organizations as a key component
of accomplishing the mission. Additionally, when facing
hybrid or insurgent threats, military leaders often must be
able to communicate with local populations and their leaders.
The ability to communicate effectively with this broad array
of audiences is often vital to mission accomplishment. This
ability can be taught to a degree, but it is often learned best
through experience and practice. Broadening experiences out
of uniform, embedded in foreign countries or with other government
agencies offer a directly applicable opportunity for
leaders to develop such skills.
The general direction of the Army regarding the importance
of broadening is one we fully support. We must not, however,
allow bureaucratic incentives to label every non-key developmental
billet as broadening to dilute the intent of the Army’s
initiative into something so broad as to be devoid of meaning.
All experiences are valuable, but not all experiences outside
of our core competencies are equally broadening. If we are going
to institutionalize and incentivize broadening across all
ranks, leaders at all levels must encourage subordinates to seek
out both the most challenging key developmental jobs and
most challenging broadening assignments. ✭
Capt. Zach N. Watson is assigned to the chief of staff of the
Army’s Strategic Studies Group. He most recently commanded
Company A, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion at Fort
Shafter, Hawaii. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S.
Military Academy and a master’s degree from the University
of Cambridge, England. Maj. Brian C. Babcock-Lumish is the
executive officer for the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion.
He holds a bachelor’s degree from West Point; a master’s degree
from the University of Oxford, England; and a Ph.D. from
King’s College London. Lt. Col. Heidi A. Urben is assigned to
the Joint Staff and formerly commanded the 205th Military
Intelligence Battalion. She holds a bachelor’s degree from the
University of Notre Dame, Ind., and master’s degrees from
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and the National
War College.
34 ARMY ■ December 2016

2016 Photo Contest
First Prize
Capt. Brian Harris, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash.
36 ARMY ■ December 2016

Winners
“Sunset Over Puget Sound”
The competition was intense in ARMY magazine’s
2016 SFC Dennis Steele Photo Contest.
We received more than 70 entries that captured
everything from soldiers and families to
training and ceremonies. Army photographers took
the top two spots, while an Army spouse placed third.
The first-place winner, Capt. Brian Harris, a public affairs
officer with the 7th Infantry Division at Joint Base
Lewis-McChord, Wash., wanted “to tell the Army
story,” so he entered the contest after finding out
about it through the I Corps public affairs team. He
jumped at the chance because “finding new places to
share the amazing work of our 16th Combat Aviation
Brigade soldiers” is always on his mind.
His photo, “Sunset Over Puget Sound,” was “one of
those ones that happens out of the blue,” he said. He
and his team were flying to meet an infantry unit for
air assault training when he realized the perfect scene
was unfolding before his eyes.
As the aircraft approached Joint Base Lewis-McChord
at 8:30 p.m. on June 26, Harris snapped a few photos of
the crew chief in silhouette. He used a Canon EOS 7D
to take the photo with a Sigma 18–35mm f/1.8 lens.
The photo “is significant to me because it really feels
like it brings emotion out of people. The combination
of the beautiful scenery and the rugged military gear
is a really great pairing,” Harris said.
Emotional response is the reason why he decided to
submit the photo in the first place. “Sunsets are one of
those things that almost everyone gravitates toward,
and it’s paired with an amazing U.S. Army soldier
training hard in one of our great aircraft,” he said.
Army leaders have stressed that the total force cannot
be truly strong without tough training. Michael
Curtis of Waynesville, Mo., an Army photographer, set
out to capture strength and resilience in his secondplace
photo, “Hold On!”
Each year, he has the opportunity to photograph the
Best Sapper Competition at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.
The grueling three-day competition for combat engineers
is designed to measure technical proficiency,
stamina and performance under stressful conditions.
Curtis was positioned at the finish line when he saw
the perfect moment to snap the shutter as two soldiers
consoled each other.
“It is a hard competition, and I believe this image
shows just how hard it can be. I just turned around
and there it was; right place at the right time, with the
right lens and settings,” he said. He used a Nikon D4s
with 24–70mm f/6.7 lens.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 37

Second Prize
Michael Curtis, Waynesville, Mo.
“Hold On!”
Curtis hopes this photo resonates with readers and
shows how rigorously the Army trains its soldiers.
“I’ve entered the contest the last few years,” he
said, to see “where my images stack up against my
peers’. Each year, the images just seem to get better
and better.”
Deborah Spratt didn’t have much of a plan in mind
when she snapped her third-place photo, “Growing
Up.” She just knew she wanted to catch her husband,
Staff Sgt. Terry Spratt, kissing their daughter Glory
goodbye shortly before seeing her off for her first day
of first grade. The photo was taken at Pierce Terrace
Elementary School in Columbia, S.C.
“As an amateur photographer, when I capture [images],
I never realize what the end result will be, or
even if they will turn out,” she said.
“My daughter required a kiss in private and made it
clear no classmates could see her be kissed,” Spratt
said. Her two younger sisters round out the picture.
“This wasn’t just a photo of a loving father, but a
photo of a drill sergeant doing everything opposite of
how they are portrayed,” she said. Spratt took her
photo with an iPhone 6s and later found out about
the contest through a Google search.
Spratt said it seemed natural to take a photo at such
an important moment in her daughter’s life, but she
also realized something else unique about the photo:
her husband.
He was “a drill sergeant frozen in time, not as a scary
person as many perceive but instead as a loving, tender
person,” she said.
Photo contest entries were judged primarily on subject
matter and photographic quality.
—Thomas B. Spincic
38 ARMY ■ December 2016

Third Prize
Deborah Spratt, Columbia, S.C.
“Growing Up”
December 2016 ■ ARMY 39

Honorable Mentions
Below:
Crystal Stupar, Cameron, N.C.
“Prayer Before Mission”
Facing page, top:
Melanie O’Brien, Abington, Mass.
“A True Friend”
Facing page, bottom:
Caitlyn Riley, Asheville, N.C.
“Gone But Not Forgotten”
40 ARMY ■ December 2016

December 2016 ■ ARMY 41

Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare
LANPAC
SYMPOSIUM & EXPOSITION
A Professional Development Forum
23-25 May 2017
Sheraton Waikiki | Honolulu, HI
A world-class international event highlighting the role
of land power in the Indo-Asia Pacific region.
Be part of the discussion as Joint, Interagency and Multinational key leaders
along with academia, industry and non-governmental organizations examine:
• Info assurance and cyber activities in operations
• Leveraging science and technology in maintaining readiness
• Contingency preparedness before and during crisis
• Communications interoperability in joint and
combined operations
ausameetings.org/lanpac2017
For more information on exhibiting, contact Laura Miller
lmiller@ausa.org | 703-907-2921

Next Network Needs
Commanders Deserve More Input
Satellite-based network communications equipment
at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. John Briggs
By Gen. William “Scott” Wallace ,
U.S. Army retired
In April 1994, a group of distinguished Army leaders watched as the first “digitized”
battalion to fight the National Training Center’s opposing force tried to
assault the opposing force’s defensive positions. It was not a pretty picture. In
spite of the intervehicle information system available to task force leaders, the
opposing force had their way—not an unusual outcome at the Army’s combat training
centers then or now.
In spite of the inability to defeat the opposing force, there were lessons learned
from the experience. Who needs “the network,” along with why and how to make it
routinely available, are questions that have perplexed commanders, leaders and soldiers
for over two decades.
Why a Network?
In an age of digital devices and ubiquitous commercial networks, it is easy to assume
there is a need for soldiers and leaders to have unlimited access to a network
for operational purposes. Making this assumption a reality has proven to be elusive.
Even if one is convinced a network is needed, debate continues over what kind of
network, for what purpose, and to what echelon. This debate is not exclusively an
argument of operational need. When the discussion centers on affordability, accountants
rather than soldiers take center stage and suboptimization is the result.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 43

So it has been with the Army’s relationship with its network.
Why a network? In the early days of U.S. Army digitization,
the thesis was simple. It went something like this: “If I know
where I am, where my buddies are, and where the enemy is,
then I will enjoy increases in lethality and tempo leading to decisive
battlefield outcomes.” The Army conducted experiments
to determine the validity of this thesis. After much experimentation
and analysis, not only was the thesis proven to be valid,
but unlike the tactical benefit of weapon systems and platforms,
the network was seen by Army leaders for its strategic potential.
Thus began the Army’s quest for a network that, with
properly trained soldiers and if appropriately resourced, would
afford soldiers information superiority, leading to decision superiority,
leading to unparalleled battlefield success.
Army leaders have long acknowledged the advantages of network
connectivity and the capability it brings. Among the many
arguments for a robust Army network, perhaps two stand out as
most compelling. First, networks imply connectivity. Connectivity
is the essence of joint and combined arms warfare.
Any talk of cross-domain fires, intelligence, protection or
logistics must begin with a discussion of how to meaningfully
connect service capabilities. Connection allows collaboration.
The network not only allows but promotes real-time collaboration,
creating unity of purpose, direction and action. From
infantry squad to joint task force, collaboration via a robust
operational network is profoundly powerful.
Second, it seems likely that the U.S. Army is destined to be
smaller. While size alone does not imply loss of capability, there
is ample evidence to suggest that despite our best efforts, a
smaller Army will be one with less capability and less capacity.
A smaller Army needs the connectivity
of the network to punch above its
weight class and, via planning, collaboration
and action, to use other service,
coalition and agency capabilities as if
they were its own—hence mitigating, to
an extent, the effects of the Army’s reduction
in manpower.
after, Fort Benning, Ga., launched an effort with the theme
“Squad: Foundation of the Decisive Force.” (The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency’s current Squad X effort is on
the same azimuth.) These initiatives, although short-lived in
some cases, acknowledged that in spite of our operational and
technological superiority, enemies have found and exploited
the near-parity they find at squad level.
Although some suggest we ought not bother trigger-pullers
with the burden of the network, logic dictates the infantry
squad could benefit from network attention, perhaps for intersquad
communication or position/location awareness; the receipt
of tailored intelligence information and situational
awareness; or for both active and passive control of a suite of
robotic capabilities whose addition seems inevitable.
Network needs reside at each echelon and are equally as
compelling as those of the squad for similar reasons. The
larger the headquarters, the more data it collects. Increasingly,
headquarters are looking for nonresident assistance in the
analysis of their resident data. This leads to a need for networked
communications to support analytic efforts.
Additionally, the complex problems faced by each echelon
are best addressed when they are looked at by many minds
with many different competencies and from many different
directions. Information sharing, collaboration and consensus
building are all greatly enhanced by networked communications
that not only reduce the need for face-to-face sessions,
but also allow for a much wider collaborative net to be cast.
None of this is meant to suggest there is no need for voice
communications or face-to-face meetings. There is, and always
will be, a sense of purpose and determination when orders are
Who Needs a Network?
It is entirely too simplistic to answer
the question of need with a resounding
“Everybody!” Or is it?
Starting at the squad, the basic building
block of our formations, it is easy to
see a need. During his time as commander
of the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, now-retired Gen.
Martin Dempsey began efforts to increase
the capabilities of the squad. Soon
Spc. Darnell Brown, a South Carolina National
Guard soldier with the 228th Signal Brigade,
provides communications and network support
during a training exercise in Germany.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Brian M. Cline
44 ARMY ■ December 2016

A soldier uses a Pocket-sized
Forward Entry Device during
fire-support operations.
U.S. Army/Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod
passed verbally. Thoughtful commanders and staff principals
understand the power of the network. They also understand
the requirement for personal presence and personal leadership.
What We Have Learned
With each field exercise and during each operational deployment,
the Army has learned more about the network. We
have learned that our soldiers and leaders have an insatiable
appetite for information and that they are comfortable—some
suggest they thrive—in an information-rich environment. We
have learned that well-trained soldiers and leaders are innovative
and use the network to their advantage, sometimes well
beyond its original design. We have learned that given a reliable
network, our formations will excel and win.
Some of what we have learned about the network is not flattering;
in fact, it is downright disturbing. We have learned
that many of our current efforts as well as the demands of the
operational environment have led to large, stationary Mission
Command centers supported by network apparatus and platforms
that do not promote the mobility essential for combined
arms operations. Mission Command On the Move, essential
to both combined arms maneuver and wide-area security missions,
is simply not supported by much of our current network
and command post infrastructure.
We have learned that our networks are not simple to understand,
set up, maintain or operate. We make the mistake of assuming
military networks can be turned on as easily as the commercial
networks with which we are familiar, forgetting the
huge investment by modern telecommunications companies to
make ease of use an imperative. Further, for the first time in our
history, we have placed much of the Army’s network responsibility
in the hands of non-signal soldiers, without devoting the
requisite time and energy to the training they now require.
We have learned our network
is less agile than the soldiers who
depend on it. We cannot taskorganize
the network as easily as
we can our formations. We have
great difficulty maneuvering bandwidth
as easily as we maneuver
units. While each echelon has
demand for network capability,
we frequently shortchange lower
echelons while supporting higher,
and frequently immobile, headquarters.
While our formations
operate at increasingly greater
distances from each other, our
networks remain disturbingly dependent
on line-of-sight communications.
We have learned that while we have been busy and at war,
potential adversaries have been watching. They have found vulnerabilities
to be exploited. Many of our vulnerabilities center
on our dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum. Our ability
to operate, regardless of mission, depends on our ability to
engineer cyber protection into our operational networks, and in
a willingness to routinely train under conditions where our networks
are challenged.
Trends in Technology
The network the Army wants and needs is an evolution of
thought and capability. There are network-related technology
trends that are shaping the commercial sector and will inevitably
shape the way the Army thinks about its network.
The analytics of big data are a persistent concern for any
contemporary business or organization. For some, data analysis
is an integral piece of their business model. Others depend
on data analytics to gain a competitive advantage. The Army
must keep abreast of trends in the analysis of big data and the
benefits it promises.
From tablets to cellular phones, the emphasis on mobility is
huge and unmistakable. The Army’s ability to conduct decisive
combined arms maneuver and wide-area security missions
largely depends on its ability to purposely move around the
battlefield to positions of advantage. Mobility, and the means
to achieve it on a 21st-century battlefield, is an attribute that
must be regained.
The increased demand for mobility has increased demand
for cloud computing and cloud services that not only enhance
mobility but also reduce dependence on hands-on maintenance
and upkeep to keep security and application software
current and relevant. The Army must be alert to cloud-based
advances born of large investments by private industry, and the
December 2016 ■ ARMY 45

The Army has evaluated
enhanced and
simplified network
capabilities to help
soldiers dominate on
the battlefield.
U.S. Army
likelihood that those advances will come from somewhere
other that the traditional defense contractor base.
While perhaps not a technology trend, the explosion of social
media and its various uses is a byproduct of the technology
around us. Social media is rich with information, some of
which can be valuable to commanders and staffs during planning,
preparation and execution. Of course, some of the gibberish
found on social media is just that. Regardless, commercial
firms look to mine social media to use in planning,
marketing, advertising and trend analysis. It behooves the
Army to pay close attention to this phenomenon and gain
leverage from what it might provide.
The vulnerability of networks to cyber threat has given rise
to new and innovative pursuits in network protection. Once
the exclusive terrain of the National Security Agency, cyber
protection has become a matter of survival for network-dependent
industries. To suggest we are all in this together is a gross
understatement. The Army has no choice but to collaborate
and partner with private industry across the width and depth
of the cyber domain. We both have a vested interest. The ability
to operate effectively depends on our freedom to maneuver
within the cyber domain.
Moving Forward
A set of technology attributes and trends might inform the
Army’s network journey, including the following:
■ Attributes: mobility, simplicity, agility, protection.
■ Trends: big data collection and analysis, mobility, cloudbasing,
social media, cyber protection.
I also offer two ideas for consideration. First, assuming
there is value in network access at squad level, why not build
one? It could be a network built from the ground up rather
than the top down; one that is not externally connected and is
optimized to enable the squad.
Give a few talented small-unit leaders a network with which
to operate. Listen to their ideas, add to it what they want, and
eliminate what they find of no use. Allow no external network
interference into or out of. Once they are satisfied and where
there is value, experiment with how to link the squad network
with other networks while being highly protective of the
squad’s ability to operate freely and unencumbered.
Second, perhaps it is time to pull a page from the old
Force XXI playbook and give an operational commander the
responsibility for advanced experimentation. (Yes, I know we
have the Brigade Modernization Command. In my opinion,
it’s a good idea gone astray.) Give that commander the following
guidance: “Two years from today, you are to attack
from X to Y to defeat the combat training center’s opposing
force using network-enabled Mission Command techniques.
The Army will provide you capabilities appropriate to the
mission and the training resources with which to prepare.”
We have a long history of gaining huge benefit by giving
mission and intent to our hypertalented commanders. Why
not give them an opportunity to speak for the network on
which they depend?
There is a network in the Army’s future. This network deserves
to be as innovative as the soldiers and leaders who depend
on it.
✭
Gen. William “Scott” Wallace, USA Ret., retired in 2009 after
more than 39 years of service, commanding at every level from
platoon to corps. In 1972, he served as a military adviser in Vietnam.
In 2003 as V Corps commander, he led the Army’s attack to
Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom. His final assignment was
commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
He holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy, and
master’s degrees from Salve Regina University, R.I.; the Naval
Postgraduate School; and the Naval War College.
46 ARMY ■ December 2016

War College Fills Gaps
In Leader Preparation
By Col. Bryan D. DeCoster , U.S. Army retired, Col. Charles D. Allen, U.S. Army retired, and Col. Douglas Orsi
With the following words, then-U.S. Ambassador
to Britain John Hay summarized the 1898 Spanish-American
War: “It has been a splendid
little war, begun with the highest of motives,
carried on with the highest of motivations, carried on with
magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored by that fortune
which loves the brave.”
While the war resulted in victory and strategic gains for
the U.S., it revealed several flaws in the planning and execution
of military operations. Foremost among then-Secretary
of War Elihu Root’s reforms to address institutional failures
was the establishment in 1901 of the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC). Here, military officers would “study and confer
upon the great problems of national defense, of military science,
and of responsible command.”
Arguably, the U.S. viewed the quick regime changes in
Afghanistan and Iraq as its two “splendid wars” of the new
21st century. But as the conflicts persisted, shortcomings in
the preparation of officers for higher levels of command were
revealed. Notably, the greater capability and responsibility of
units exceeded the experience and expertise of officers selected
to lead them, affirming that professional military education remains
a necessary element of development for command.
While the War College has consistently focused its curriculum
on the first two great problems, responsible command has
generally been an afterthought.
In any given year, 40 to 60 USAWC students will assume
brigade-level command after graduating, many within 30 to
60 days of graduation. Some of these command selectees will
be among the few who advance to general officer ranks and
serve as strategic leaders. In addition to developing strategic
thinking skills, it is important for these leaders to understand
strategic-level issues related to command.
As stewards of the military profession, these leaders will
be charged with demonstrating the character, competence
and commitment to lead future organizational change. For
these reasons, the War College has developed two courses
Both photos from Library of Congress
Above: Secretary of War
Elihu Root; left: Before
opening at Carlisle
Barracks, Pa., in 1951,
the U.S. Army War
College was located at
what’s now known as
Fort Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, D.C.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 47

to help fill gaps in preparation for command and senior
leader assignments.
Responsible Command
Since 2010, the USAWC has taught the 30-hour elective
course “Responsible Command” specifically to address perceived
gaps in command preparation. In the 2015–16 academic
year, 28 students took the course; 15 assumed command immediately
following graduation. Since its inception, over 100
students have completed the course.
As with other senior-level college selectees, USAWC students
have been highly successful in their careers and previous commands;
however, an important part of command preparation is to
understand the nuances of advancing to brigade- and higher-level
commands. During the elective course, students reflect on upcoming
challenges through dialogues with experienced faculty,
former brigade commanders and, most importantly, their peers.
Commanders at the brigade and higher level will lead a more
diverse workforce than in their prior assignments. This is often
the first time commanders will have a significant number of
civilian, contractor and potentially foreign-national employees,
as well as a mix of organizations that perform unique missions
from geographically dispersed locations. Just consider the differences
in diversity and span of control between an infantry battalion
and a Stryker brigade combat team, or a garrison with more
than 40 installations spread across multiple German states.
Additionally, brigade-level commanders have access to and
control of greater resources in terms of time, personnel,
money, equipment and facilities. In this more diverse and
complex environment, brigade-level commanders need to understand
and competently apply indirect and transformational
leadership skills more so than the direct and transactional
leadership that made them successful in the past.
The course also focuses on organizational-level issues related
to command for the Army and other services, and for the International
Fellows program. Discussions on topics of self-awareness,
ethics, Mission Command, culture, command climate, organizational
change, innovation, toxic
leadership and stewardship naturally link
to the strategic leadership environment.
As students engage in seminar dialogue
and record reflections through
journaling, they begin to develop personal
concepts of how these strategiclevel
issues will relate to their future positions
of command and leadership. For
example, how will they accomplish
mandatory training with limited time?
How will they communicate to their
higher command about when they will
accept risk? How will they communicate
to subordinate commanders what is
acceptable within the philosophy of Mission Command?
The Responsible Command elective is not intended to be a
substitute for Army pre-command courses. Instead, it is complementary
and provides students the opportunity to truly reflect,
synthesize, share and weigh ideas in a small, peer-group setting.
Appropriately, the pre-command course at Fort Leavenworth,
Kan., provides students with a great deal of critical information
and introduces them to the concept of journaling to develop introspection
and focus efforts for their transition to command. At
the War College, Responsible Command provides a venue for
in-depth discussions of command and leadership topics. Reflection
is reinforced as a key component, and students are encouraged
to share their reflections through journaling.
The command and leadership concepts discussed in Responsible
Command serve these future leaders well in brigade command
but, more importantly, prepare them to be good stewards of the
military profession as they advance to become the strategic-level
commanders of the future. In the words of one former student:
The Responsible Command course was very helpful and provided
practical information as I prepared to take command. The invaluable
dialogue among the students and faculty allowed me to gain
new insights that directly aided my preparation. It also provided
me with an opportunity to reflect on the leadership lessons learned
throughout the year and organize my thoughts headed into command
of a [brigade combat team] within two weeks of graduation.
Garrison Command
War College faculty also offer a directed-study elective
course for students preparing to take garrison command to
help fill a gap in their professional military education. Army
centrally selected garrison command began in the mid-1990s.
At present, there are more than 70 garrisons under the U.S.
Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM). For
most brigade-level garrison commanders, this will be their first
experience with installation management beyond being customers
as on-post residents, members of a tenant unit, and re-
U.S. Army War College classes were taught at
Upton Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., until 1967.
U.S. Army/Scott Finger
48 ARMY ■ December 2016

U.S. Army/Scott Finger
Collins Hall at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., home of the Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership
cipients of base services. Accordingly, the Army provides specific
orientation and training for these leaders.
However, incoming garrison commanders typically attend
the IMCOM Garrison Leader’s Course 60 to 90 days after taking
command. The War College thus recognized the need for
another learning opportunity. While the small number of garrison-command
selectees—about five students—in each class
does not warrant a traditional elective, students have sought
other approaches to prepare for their unique commands.
Through a voluntary directed study, students tailor their research
to address specific aspects of command. One year they
focused on the topic of leader development for garrison commanders
and developed a proposal for a USAWC elective.
They presented a 10-lesson syllabus complete with course objectives
and suggested reading material.
Another group of students explored joint basing as a recent
initiative that is still under scrutiny, facing issues associated
with service cultures and expectations. For each year, students
assessed the alignment of the IMCOM strategy with the
higher Army strategic direction and considered the impact on
their future commands. Consequently, a recent student cohort
used operational design to analyze the IMCOM campaign
plan. Their goals were to understand the environment, identify
service and organizational-level issues related to managing
installations, and develop an operational approach to address
these issues in command.
Students visually mapped out the IMCOM campaign plan
lines of effort. In the process, they identified lines of connectivity
between related goals and objectives. This helped them
identify issues for further analysis. Research included visits with
key agencies and officials in installation management. Through
independent study, networking with subject-matter experts,
and dialogue within the group, they further synthesized possible
approaches to the garrison support issues.
Finally, they visited a group of former garrison commanders
who are now serving on the assistant chief of staff for installation
management staff. They discussed policy implications for
these issues and weighed their ideas with those who have wrestled
with them before.
Through dialogue and reflection, these future commanders
are now better prepared going into command to take on the
complex issues faced on military installations. Most important,
each student developed a 90-day transition plan for his or her
specific command.
Good Stewards
Since its creation to address shortcomings identified during the
Spanish-American War, the USAWC has prepared leaders for
service at the strategic level. Integral to this is developing responsible
commanders aligned with the Army Ethic. Formal precommand
courses are the primary venue for command preparation,
while War College electives provide complementary
opportunities for leaders to reflect, grow professionally, and apply
Mission Command in their decisions and actions. Developing
the competencies and attributes for responsible command will
pay dividends as these leaders become stewards of the Army Profession
in their future strategic roles.
✭
Col. Bryan D. DeCoster, USA Ret., is the chief of training and
education at the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. He
has commanded at company through brigade levels and taught at
the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC). He holds a bachelor’s degree from West Point, and
master’s degrees from the National Intelligence University and
the USAWC. Col. Charles D. Allen, USA Ret., is professor of
leadership and cultural studies in the Department of Command,
Leadership and Management at the War College. His
active-duty assignments included teaching at West Point and
the USAWC. He holds a bachelor’s degree from West Point, and
master’s degrees from Georgia Tech, the School of Advanced
Military Studies and the USAWC. Col. Douglas Orsi is a
faculty instructor and director of military requirements and
capabilities in the Department of Command, Leadership, and
Management at the War College. Previously, he commanded
the Joint Interoperability Test Command at Fort Huachuca,
Ariz. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Clarion University, Pa.;
and master’s degrees from Old Dominion University, Va., the
Command and General Staff College and the USAWC.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 49

San Antonio Partnership
By Monica Yoas and Sgt. 1st Class Fernando J. Torres
The San Antonio skyline
The all-volunteer military has long been considered a microcosm
and reflection of American society. Incidents
of sexual violence in recent years reflect what is occurring
in both the civilian and the military populations.
Along with the other armed forces branches, the Army was
tasked by DoD to create an appropriate culture to prevent sexual
assault and require a personal commitment from all soldiers
at every level. Similarly, universities are considered a representation
of society and in recent years have faced similar
challenges in how they have handled sexual assault cases on
campuses nationwide. In January 2014, the White House established
a task force to “strengthen and address compliance
issues and provide institutions with additional tools to respond
to and address rape and sexual assault.”
What happens when the military joins with college campuses
to combat sexual harassment and assault? A thriving
partnership in San Antonio addresses the issues that soldiers
and students alike face. The San Antonio Against Sexual Assault
Coalition is the first of its kind in the state, according to
a representative of the Texas Association Against Sexual Assault.
The coalition’s membership includes representatives
from local colleges and universities, the San Antonio Rape
Crisis Center, the Texas Association Against Sexual Assault,
the South Texas Veterans Health Care System and the 470th
Military Intelligence Brigade Sexual Harassment/Assault Response
& Prevention (SHARP) Office.
The Army developed the SHARP program in December
2011, adding a sexual assault response coordinator and victim
advocate to every formation at the battalion level and higher.
Meanwhile, universities across the U.S. were developing similar
programs, placing Title IX coordinators and counselors on
campuses. The Title IX office was tasked with preparing and
disseminating educational materials to inform students of their
rights and grievance procedures and to process complaints.
In October 2015, Col. James C. Royse, commander of the
470th Military Intelligence Brigade at Joint Base San Antonio-
Fort Sam Houston, Texas, asked the brigade’s SHARP team
to initiate a dialogue with local colleges and universities about
sexual harassment and assault at their institutions.
‘A Society Issue’
“This is not a military issue or a university issue. It is a society
issue,” Royse said about the growing need to come together
as a community to combat sexual assault.
San Antonio is home to over 16 colleges and universities.
The brigade sexual assault response coordinator, Addison Elliott,
and the brigade SHARP victim advocate, Sgt. 1st Class
Fernando Torres, began to collaborate with Title IX officers
from several local universities and colleges to address issues of
common concern and create an information-sharing forum.
The group quickly grew in membership and started meeting
months in advance to prepare for the launch of the coalition to
the community in the spring.
April is recognized by both civilian and military communities
as sexual assault awareness and prevention month. The
theme of the 2016 DoD campaign is “Eliminate Sexual As-
50 ARMY ■ December 2016

Targets Sexual Assault
iStock/Sean Pavone
sault: Know Your Part. Do Your Part.” This campaign challenges
every service member to know, understand and adhere
to service values and standards of behavior in order to eliminate
sexual assault and other inappropriate behavior.
To maximize impact and address sexual violence as a societal
issue, members of the coalition conducted numerous sexual
assault awareness and prevention events with open attendance
throughout San Antonio. These allowed soldiers, family
members, students and faculty opportunities to address sexual
violence together, demonstrating that all of San Antonio is
both affected by and can help reduce incidents of sexual harassment
or assault as a societal issue, not solely a military or
university issue. For the first time in the brigade’s history, soldiers
participated in events hosted by other brigade units, local
universities and Joint Base San Antonio partner units.
Toward Justice and Healing
The brigade also pledged to believe those who say they were
victimized, and it participated in the Rape Crisis Center’s
“Start by Believing” campaign, a public awareness endeavor
uniquely focused on response to sexual assault. Because a
friend or family member is typically the first person a victim
confides in after an assault, an individual’s reaction to this
news can be the first step in a long path toward justice and
healing. Knowing how to respond is critical. A negative response
can worsen the trauma and foster an environment
where perpetrators face zero consequences for their crimes.
The coalition continues to grow in membership, with the intent
to improve education, resources and response to sexual harassment
and assault across San Antonio. After reviewing the
results of sexual assault awareness and prevention month submitted
by soldiers and students via anonymous surveys, members
of the coalition will develop concepts for the future of the
coalition. The 470th Military Intelligence Brigade SHARP
team invited command teams and Joint Base San Antonio sexual
assault response coordinators to join the coalition.
This concept was implemented successfully at the local level,
but it can serve as an Army blueprint and be duplicated by military
units across the nation. The impact of taking the Army’s
“not in my squad” intervention mindset to higher learning institutions
in our community cannot yet be measured, but each
of the hundreds of soldiers who participated improved his or
her awareness of Army values and showed community members
that the Army stands with them to prevent and respond
effectively to sexual assault and violence in our society. ✭
Monica Yoas is the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade public affairs
officer. She served in the Air Force for six years in the weather
field. She holds a bachelor’s degree from Louisiana Tech University
and a master’s degree from American Military University. Sgt.
1st Class Fernando J. Torres is a brigade sexual assault response
coordinator at Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
He has been a signals intelligence analyst in the Army for 17 years
and has participated in combat operations in Iraq and provided
direct support to operations in South America. He has a bachelor’s
degree from the University of Maryland University College.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 51

Engulfed by Illness
VA Takes Practical Approach to Multisymptom Condition
Former Army Capt. Mike Tichenor undergoes
cardiopulmonary exercise testing at the VA’s
War Related Illness and Injury Study Center,
East Orange, N.J.
to the region. The estimate is based on
self-reported symptoms in a VA survey
of more than 14,000 veterans. The study
was published in January.
Gulf War illness is distinct from posttraumatic
stress disorder and depression,
though Tichenor has coped with those
issues as well. He also has had insomnia,
headaches and joint pain. “I’ve had five
knee operations,” he said. “I guess it’s severe
arthritis. And I’ve had surgeries on
my elbows. The muscles are torn away.”
And then there’s the mental and physical
fatigue, although Tichenor isn’t sure
how much is due to his Gulf War illness
and how much can be attributed to the
passing of time. “Maybe it’s just that I’m
getting older.”
Story and Photos by Mitch Mirkin
In an old photo Mike Tichenor has from his Gulf War days, he is wearing fatigues
and standing next to a Russian-made T-62 tank left behind by the Iraqis.
In the background, perhaps only a couple of miles away, a ferocious yellow-orange
fireball shoots upward. Billowing black clouds fill the horizon.
That was nearly 26 years ago. The former Army captain now lives in a quiet town
on the New Jersey shore, but his experiences from the Gulf War stay with him.
Tichenor, who served in MP and civil affairs units, is one of about 300,000 U.S. veterans
thought to have Gulf War illness—as many as 4 in 10 of those who deployed
Research Aimed at New Therapies
VA clinical staff in East Orange, N.J.,
do their best to help ease Tichenor’s symptoms.
Meanwhile, researchers there are
conducting a range of studies to better
understand Gulf War illness in the hopes
of identifying more effective therapies.
The research is carried out in the
framework of the VA’s War Related Illness
and Injury Study Center (WRIISC).
The East Orange VA is one of three
WRIISC sites; the others are in Washington,
D.C., and Palo Alto, Calif.
It’s not only Tichenor’s generation of
vets who stand to benefit. A condition
similar to Gulf War illness—termed,
more broadly, chronic multisymptom
illness—has emerged among more recent
veterans.
Lisa McAndrew, a WRIISC psychologist,
led a recent study of more than 300
Army National Guard and Reserve
members, all of whom served in Iraq or
Afghanistan after 2001. A majority re-
52 ARMY ■ December 2016

ported symptoms consistent with chronic multisymptom illness.
Earlier research, part of the DoD-funded Millennium Cohort
Study, had identified the condition in about a third of Iraq and
Afghanistan veterans.
“This condition appears to be similar to that experienced
by many Gulf War veterans, in terms of the symptoms,”
McAndrew said, “but we don’t really know if it’s the same
condition. That still requires study.”
A trial she is now running, in which Tichenor is enrolled,
aims to help Gulf War veterans regain their problem-solving
skills. It involves 12 telephone sessions.
‘Brain Fog’
“One of the predominant symptoms we see with Gulf War
illness is problem-solving impairment,” McAndrew said.
“Problem-solving is the most complex mental function. It
doesn’t mean they’re not intelligent, or that there are any
changes to their intelligence. It’s just that they have this brain
fog, as many veterans call it. They can’t think as clearly as they
used to, so it is difficult to solve many of their everyday problems.
That leads to more disability.”
The underlying issue is a type of executive-function impairment,
McAndrew said. The problem-solving therapy being
tested by her group has been used successfully for people with
traumatic brain injury.
“Even though Gulf War illness is different than TBI, we
think there are some similarities in terms of the cognitive dysfunction.
We believe this treatment has the potential to help,”
she said.
While grounded in neuroscience and psychology, the approach
is practical. “We’re interested in helping veterans solve
the problems they want to work on,” McAndrew said. “We
get a diverse range. Some are concerned about their marriage
or want to participate in activities with their family. Some are
losing their jobs as their Gulf War illness symptoms worsen.”
“Some will have problems that might seem small on the
surface, but they’re having a big impact on their lives,” she
said. “For example, they may have so many health symptoms
that they can’t keep up with the housework. So the dishes are
always piled up in the sink. And that can start to become a big
problem when it’s every day.”
The first component, McAndrew said, is what the researchers
call positive problem orientation. “It’s essentially reminding
veterans to view problems as solvable, and to view
themselves as effective problem-solvers. Veterans who have
had Gulf War illness for decades can feel overwhelmed by
problems because of their brain fog.”
“Viewing problems as solvable is critical for the second part
of problem-solving, which is to break down the problem into a
logical sequence of steps,” she said. “This two-component approach
can help us become more effective in reaching our
goals. Veterans tell us that problem-solving treatment is a good
fit because the military uses a similar goal-focused approach.”
The Fatigue Factor
For another WRIISC study, Tichenor visited a cardiopulmonary
lab where he sat in a glass-paneled booth. A clip
sealed his nostrils, and he breathed into a mouthpiece hooked
up to an array of tubes. A computer generated reports on
Tichenor’s respiration, said Michael Falvo, a research physiologist
at the WRIISC.
Tichenor later moved to another corner of the
lab to pedal a stationary bike. He strapped on a
shiny blue face mask over his nose and mouth
that fed data to a computer. The test meassures
how well the lungs, heart, blood vessels and
muscles work together during exercise. As
Tichenor stopped pedaling and his body went
into the recovery phase, Falvo was also able to
track mitochondrial function.
Mitochondria are structures within cells that act
as power plants. They take in nutrients, break
them down, and create energy at the cellular level.
They have their own DNA, which is especially
sensitive to toxic insults and stress. Falvo’s team
will correlate the cardiopulmonary results with
chemical tests of Tichenor’s mitochondrial DNA,
extracted from a blood sample.
The group has been able to show a link between
mitochondrial mutations and performance
on exercise tests. “To me, that’s the most exciting
part of this study,” Falvo said. “We’re able to
The VA’s Lisa McAndrew recently led a study of about
300 post-9/11 Army National Guard and Reserve veterans,
the majority of whom reported symptoms of chronic multisymptom
illness.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 53

Ph.D. candidate Yang
Chen is working on a
study of mitochondrial
function in Gulf War
veterans at the VA’s
War Related Illness
and Injury Study
Center, East Orange,
N.J.
associate a cellular measure with something we can measure in
a clinical exercise lab.”
The study of mitochondria in Gulf War illness builds on
work by Dr. Beatrice Golomb at the University of California-
San Diego. Golomb was formerly on the VA’s Research Advisory
Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses. With DoD
funding, her team reported in 2014 what they called “the first
direct evidence supporting mitochondrial dysfunction in Gulf
War illness.” Later that year, in a study of 46 veterans, they reported
promising results for the nutritional supplement coenzyme
Q10, which is thought to promote healthy mitochondria,
as a way to address the fatigue.
CoQ10 is one of several supplements believed to target mitochondria.
Falvo is encouraged by Golomb’s results, but he
believes scientists still need to learn more about whether there
are patterns of mitochondrial damage and dysfunction that
are unique to Gulf War illness. That may lead to a diagnostic
biomarker of the illness. It may also point to treatments that
address very specific pathways in the energy-production
process.
His team is collaborating with environmental toxicologist
Joel Meyer at Duke University, N.C., who has developed
sophisticated ways to analyze mitochondrial DNA. The
group will look at 152 veterans: half with Gulf War illness,
and half without. The funding is from the DoD Congressionally
Directed Medical Research Programs.
Brain Scans Add Insight
In yet another study, Tichenor will undergo brain scans at
the nearby Kessler Foundation, where WRIISC investigator
Glenn Wylie has an imaging lab. Wylie, a neuroscientist,
wants to know what is going on in the brain during cognitive
fatigue. Is there an area that is underactive, or working too
hard? Are there “wiring” (white matter) glitches blocking signals
between regions?
Participants in the study first undergo a resting scan. Then,
as they lie on their backs in an MRI machine, they look up at
a screen that presents them with a series of cognitive tasks.
Before and after each set, they answer questions about their
level of cognitive fatigue.
Wylie and his team look at how participants’ self-reported
fatigue rating changes—typically, it shoots up during the more
difficult tasks—and which areas of their brains show the
biggest changes in activation during those tasks.
In research on people with multiple sclerosis or traumatic
brain injury who also experience cognitive fatigue, Wylie
homed in on the caudate, a structure deep in the basal ganglia
in the middle of the brain. “It’s important for motivation and
reward processing,” Wylie said. There were also parts of the
prefrontal cortex that showed changes. His data so far point to
similar patterns in Gulf War illness.
Wylie and Falvo together plan to study whether cognitive
fatigue may be driven by the same mitochondrial damage that
causes physical fatigue. After all, brain cells rely on mitochondria
for energy the same way muscle cells do.
Another question: Is central motor fatigue to blame for
both forms of fatigue?
“This would involve differences in signals from the brain,”
Wylie said. “That kind of top-down physical fatigue from the
brain to the muscles—is that different from the cognitive fatigue
you feel after spending all evening working on your
taxes? It’s unclear at this point.”
Tichenor said he is glad to volunteer for the research. It’s a
chance to contribute, he said, and to help other vets.
“I think [researchers are] still trying to get a handle on what
Gulf War illness entails,” Tichenor said. “I told them if I can
be of some use, I will certainly do that.”
✭
Mitch Mirkin, based in Baltimore, is the senior writer and editor
for the VA’s Office of Research and Development.
54 ARMY ■ December 2016

News Call
This PACMAN Tests Future Robotic Systems
As the Army continues to shrink in
size, unmanned robotic systems continue
to grow in importance to ensure
soldiers retain sufficient capabilities to
prevail on increasingly complex battlefields.
Direct input from the soldiers
who will have hands-on control of those
systems is a critical aspect.
That was the context of a recent exercise
in Hawaii called PACMAN-I. No,
it wasn’t a resurgence of the legendary
video game, but the Pacific Manned
Unmanned-Initiative. Sponsored by the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
the assessment was designed to
evaluate cutting-edge options to rapidly
build, field and project effective land
combat power where and when it’s
needed.
During PACMAN-I, soldiers from
the 25th Infantry Division used various
systems and a complex network to give
higher echelons feedback that will help
to shape the focus and direction of future
unmanned robotic systems.
It was the third Manned-Unmanned
Teaming combined-arms exercise in
which a company-level infantry element
went into force-on-force conditions
to employ some of the innovative
unmanned technologies that may one
day be fielded. This particular exercise
focused on how such systems might perform
in a jungle environment.
Dismounted combat engineers used
unmanned air and ground robotic capabilities
to support route reconnaissance
and clearance; obstacle breaching; and
chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear defense remote standoff detection
operations.
They also experimented with maneuvering
equipment payloads aboard robotic
vehicles within the battle space
using a networked, non-line-of-sight
communications system; and used a
mobile 4G LTE network in support of
intelligence, fires and Mission Command
tasks.
“PACMAN-I provided an important
step toward moving robotics into the
dismounted soldiers’ hands,” Army officials
said in a news release. “As the Army
moves forward with fewer resources and
potential increases in operations tempo
… these unmanned capabilities will enable
decisive action in unified land operations.”
The U.S. Army Tank Automotive
Research, Development and Engineering
Center was a major participant in
PACMAN-I, assessing the enhanced
warfighting potential of unmanned systems
in terms of reconnaissance, surveillance
and target acquisition capabilities.
“Soldier feedback was truly the most
critical aspect of the mission,” said center
director Paul Rogers, who noted
that engineers and roboticists worked
side by side in the field with soldiers,
“digesting each detail of their hands-on
experiences with our systems.
“That immediate feedback is vital,”
Rogers said.
More live-prototype assessments like
PACMAN-I, aimed at looking ahead to
the battlefields of the next decade, are in
the works, officials said.
U.S. Air National Guard/Tech. Sgt. Jorge Intriago
In Matthew’s Wake
South Carolina Army National
Guard soldiers with the 1050th
Transportation Battalion,
228th Theater Tactical Signal
Brigade help with evacuation
efforts in Nichols, S.C., after
Hurricane Matthew caused
heavy rain that led to severe
flooding. More than 9,000
members of the Guard were
called up in South Carolina,
North Carolina, Florida,
Georgia and Virginia in the
aftermath of the October
hurricane, which caused
more than 30 deaths in the
U.S. and millions of dollars
in damages as it tore up the
Southeast coast.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 55

Briefs
Reservist Takes Top NCO Spot
For the second consecutive year, the
Army’s NCO of the Year title has gone
to a member of the Army Reserve. Sgt.
1st Class Joshua Moeller, a senior drill
instructor from Riverside, Calif., was
the 2016 winner of the Best Warrior
competition.
The 36-year-old is assigned to the 2nd
Battalion, 413th Infantry Regiment,
95th Training Division (Individualized
Training), 108th Training Command
(Individual Entry Training), San Diego.
The 2015 NCO of the Year was Army
Reserve Staff Sgt. Andrew Fink, a
health care specialist with the 409th
Area Support Medical Company, 807th
Medical Command (Deployment Support),
Fort Douglas, Utah.
Soldier of the Year honors for the
2016 Best Warrior competition went to
Spc. Robert Miller, a 24-year-old explosive
ordnance disposal specialist assigned
to the 74th Ordnance Company,
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He represented
the U.S. Army Pacific Command.
The Best Warrior competition was
held in September at Fort A.P. Hill,
Va.
Ukraine Commanders
Tour USAREUR Ranges
A delegation of military officials from
Ukraine, including its highest-ranking
officer, Gen. Viktor Muzhenko, toured
the U.S. Army’s training ranges and facilities
in Europe during a recent twoday
visit.
Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, commanding
general of U.S. Army Europe/Seventh
Army, and Brig. Gen. Tony Aguto,
commander of the 7th Army Training
Command, hosted the October visit to
strengthen relations between the Ukrainian
armed forces and USAREUR as they
work together to build and refine the development
of a new combat training
center at the International Peacekeeping
and Security Center in Yavoriv,
Ukraine.
“The visit was specifically so that they
could see how 7th ATC runs the maneuver
force-on-force at Hohenfels, and
the range complexes and live-fire capa-
‘
SoldierSpeak
’
On Teamwork
“It was a win for the Army,” said Sgt. Augustus Maiyo, who led four other
soldiers to capture the top five spots in the 32nd running of the Army
Ten-Miler race in Arlington, Va., and Washington, D.C.
On Representing
“Too few Americans have an understanding of what their Army is doing,”
Secretary of the Army Eric Fanning said. “They don’t understand the full
impact across our country and around the world.” Soldiers “don’t just fight
for our freedoms, they represent us. Our soldiers are the face of America.”
On Saving Lives
“If it was not for the 811th team evacuating civilians, we would have recovered
40 bodies instead of four,” said Rainelle, W.Va., fire chief Shawn
Wolford. Soldiers with the U.S. Army Reserve’s 811th Ordnance Company,
321st Ordnance Battalion, 38th Regional Support Group helped
with disaster recovery efforts after heavy rains caused unprecedented
flooding in the state.
On Balance
“Your priorities are your family, your civilian job and then the United
States Army,” said Maj. Gen. Nickolas Tooliatos upon retiring from the
Army Reserve, most recently serving as commander of the 63rd Regional
Support Command, Mountain View, Calif. “The Army is a jealous mistress.
She will take as much time as you’re willing to give her, and we need you.
But you have to maintain that balance.”
On a Strong Foundation
“NCOs are the standard-bearers of our profession, whether training our
formations, leading in combat, maintaining discipline throughout the
force, or caring for soldiers and their families. They set the very foundation
on which we build our Army,” said Col. Steve Marks, commander
of U.S. Army Garrison Italy.
On Bystander Intervention
“It doesn’t matter rank, gender, or anything of that sort. You’re the one
who noticed it, and you’re the one supposed to fix it. That’s your duty as a
soldier,” said Sgt. 1st Class Helen Osby, sexual assault response coordinator
for the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division,
Fort Stewart, Ga.
On Leadership
“It’s easy to stay motivated when you have great leadership,” said Spc.
Colter Krohn, a combat engineer with the 43rd Combat Engineer
Company “Sapper,” Regimental Engineer Squadron, 3rd Cavalry
Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas.
56 ARMY ■ December 2016

GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES*
Maj. Gen. M.L.
Howard from Dep.
CG (Ops.), 10th
Mountain Div.
(Light), Fort Drum,
N.Y., to Dir., Force
Mgmt., ODCoS,
G-3/5/7, USA,
Washington, D.C.
Maj. Gen. J.M.
Martin from CG,
NTC and Fort Irwin,
Calif.; Dir., JCOE;
and Dep. Dir.-
Training, JIDA,
Fort Irwin, to CG,
1st Infantry Div.
and Fort Riley, Kan.
Brigadier Generals: J.D. Broadwater from
Dir., CJ-35, RSM Jt. Cmd., NATO, OFS, Afghanistan,
to CG, NTC and Fort Irwin; Dir., JCOE; and
Dep. Dir.-Training, JIDA, Fort Irwin; L.J. Gray,
USAR, from CG (TPU), 86th Training Div. (Ops.),
Fort McCoy, Wis., to Dir., AREC (IMA), ARCENT,
Shaw AFB, S.C.; L.F. Thoms, USAR, from Dep.
Cmdr. (TPU), 311th Signal Cmd. (Theater), Fort
Shafter, Hawaii, to Cmdr. (TPU), 311th Signal
Cmd. (Theater), Fort Shafter; D.R. Walrath
from Dep. CG (Maneuver), 1st Armored Div.,
Fort Bliss, Texas, to Dep. Dir., Ops., NJOIC, Ops.
Team Four, J-3, Jt. Staff, Washington, D.C.; J.L.
Walrath, USAR, from CG (TPU), 100th Training
Div. (Ops. Spt.), Fort Knox, Ky., to Dep. CG (Spt.)
(IMA), USAREC, Fort Knox.
■ AFB—Air Force Base; ARCENT—U.S. Army
Central; AREC—Army Reserve Engagement Cell;
IMA—Individual Mobilization Augmentee;
JCOE—Joint Center of Excellence; JIDA—Joint
Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency; NJOIC—National
Joint Operations and Intelligence Center;
NTC—National Training Center; ODCoS—Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff; OFS—Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel; RSM—Resolute Support Mission;
Spt.—Support; TPU—Troop Program Unit;
USA—U.S. Army; USAR—U.S. Army Reserve;
USAREC—U.S. Army Recruiting Cmd.
*Assignments to general officer slots announced
by the General Officer Management
Office, Department of the Army. Some officers
are listed at the grade to which they are nominated,
promotable, or eligible to be frocked.
The reporting dates for some officers may not
yet be determined.
bilities at Grafenwoehr,” both in Germany,
Hodges said. “Other nations want
to come and train here as well. This
gives us the opportunity to work on interoperability,
which is essential to how
we’re going to fight.”
“Most important is that this is not just
… a tourist trip, to see and forget,” said
Lt. Gen. Leonid Holopatiuk, Ukraine’s
chief of the General Directorate of
Military Cooperation and Peacekeeping.
“What we will bring from here, it will be
analyzed about what can be implemented
in Ukraine.”
Discussions focused on how to build
opposing forces and observer coach/
trainer teams through realistic exercises;
and how to develop and employ tools
that strengthen strategic training environments,
such as after-action reviews.
‘Constant Drumbeat’ of Demand
The operations tempo for Army units
today is as high as it was a decade ago
during the height of deployments to
Iraq, the service’s top operations officer
said recently.
Fewer troops are now deployed in
Iraq and Afghanistan but as of late September,
almost 190,000 soldiers were
supporting combatant commands in
more than 140 locations worldwide,
said Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, deputy
chief of staff, G-3/5/7.
By the end of 2016, soldiers will have
participated in about 60 planned exercises
in Europe along with many others
in the Pacific, Africa and elsewhere.
“Stress to the force is just as bad as it
was back in 2005, if not worse,” Anderson
said. “The demand is not going
down. … This is a constant drumbeat.”
Enlisted Cyber MOS Launch Set
The Army plans a February launch
for the first advanced individual training
cyber course for enlisted soldiers as discussions
continue about working with
private-sector companies on long-term
training.
Cyber operations specialists with the
MOS 17C will receive advanced individual
training in two phases. The first is 25
weeks, with 20 additional weeks in a second
phase, according to the Army’s explanation
to potential recruits.
The idea of looking to the private sector
for help is based on the many niches
of required learning and the higher level
of cyber expertise in the private sector,
officials said.
“Our biggest challenge right now is
culture,” Maj. Gen. Stephen Fogarty,
commander of the U.S. Army Cyber
Center of Excellence at Fort Gordon,
Ga., said during a panel discussion at a
Hot Topics forum, “Network Readiness
in a Complex World,” sponsored by the
Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute
of Land Warfare.
“Effective collaboration is the key to
success not only between intel, signal
[and] electronic warfare, but between our
commercial partners, academia and very
importantly, our multinational partners,”
Fogarty said. “If we can get over that cultural
leap with security clearances, ways
of doing business, we can accelerate to
where we want to be much, much faster.”
The Army intends to build an initial
cadre of 700 enlisted soldiers in the new
17C MOS of cyber operations specialist,
along with 355 officers and 205 warrant
officers. Subsequent plans call for incorporating
electronic warfare soldiers in
the 29-series MOS into the cyber branch
as well.
19th-Century KIAs Come Home
The presumed remains of as many as
13 U.S. soldiers who fought and died in
the mid-19th century during the Mexican-American
War were received recently
at Dover Air Force Base, Del.
Human remains from the Battle of
Monterrey, Mexico, were uncovered in
a series of excavations in the area over
the past 20 years through negotiations
that included scientists and historians at
Middle Tennessee State University.
Forensic examinations found that some
are likely American soldiers killed during
the conflict, which was fought between
April 25, 1846, and Feb. 2, 1848.
The remains that were recently returned
to the U.S. are believed to be
those of Tennessee militiamen who volunteered
to serve—part of the reason
Tennessee is known as the “Volunteer
State.”
University researchers, who say it is
unlikely the remains can be identified,
plan on conducting studies to determine
COMMAND
SERGEANTS
MAJOR
and
SERGEANTS
MAJOR
CHANGES*
Command Sgt.
Maj. D.D. Hough
from 62nd Med.
Bde., JBLM, Wash.,
to BAMC, Fort Sam
Houston, Texas.
Sgt. Maj. R.W. Mansker from ODCoS, G-4, Washington,
D.C., to Command Sgt. Maj., AMC, RA, Ala.
■ AMC—U.S. Army Materiel Cmd.; BAMC—
Brooke Army Medical Ctr.; JBLM—Joint Base Lewis-
McChord; ODCoS—Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff; RA—Redstone Arsenal.
*Command sergeants major and sergeants major
positions assigned to general officer commands.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 57

The updated Generation 7 features a
single-routing buckle through which
soldiers feed the tourniquet belt before
tightening it with a textured black rod
called a windlass.
Officials say the old model is still effective,
but the newer version can be applied
a bit easier and faster. “Soldiers
who have an older version should not
feel they have to replace their device by
getting the newer version or fear that the
older version is any less effective,” Harrington
said.
U.S. Army/Sgt. Lauren Harrah
Dropping In on Poland
Paratroopers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, known as Sky Soldiers, move from a drop zone during
Operation Atlantic Resolve in Chechlo, Poland. The exercise is designed to demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the collective security of NATO.
how the soldiers lived and died. The remains
then will be reinterred in the
U.S. with full military honors.
Army Takes the Lead
In Service Stomach Woes
The Army may march on its stomach,
as the saying goes, but it also has a
lot of gastrointestinal issues. A recent
Defense Health Agency Medical Surveillance
Monthly Report says the rate
of functional gastrointestinal disorders
is far higher in the Army than in the
other services.
The report defines functional gastrointestinal
disorders as chronic conditions
of unknown causes that affect the
digestive tract. “There are no cures or
treatments beyond symptom management,”
according to the report.
A 10-year study found 375.7 cases
of gastrointestinal disorder for every
100,000 service members. However,
there were 422.1 cases in the Army per
100,000 soldiers, the highest rate of all of
the services. The Marine Corps had the
lowest rate—263.5 cases per 100,000.
In general, gastrointestinal issues were
almost five times higher in women than
in men, and higher in the enlisted pay
grades of E-1 to E-4 and the officer
grades of O-1 to O-5 than for other service
members, according to the report.
Combat Tourniquet Gets Update
The Army’s combat tourniquet has
been tweaked, and officials want soldiers
to know about it.
“When you need to actually use a
tourniquet is the wrong time to figure
out which version you have and how to
use it,” said Jason Harrington, the Army
Medical Materiel Agency’s nurse consultant
with the Medical Devices Program
Management Office.
“Soldiers need to look at their tourniquets
and become familiar with the version
they have been issued by carefully
reading the printed instructions that
come with each” combat application
tourniquet (CAT), he said.
Exsanguination—bleeding to death—
is the most common cause of potentially
survivable death for wounded warfighters,
officials say. That’s why every soldier
hits the battlefield carrying a CAT.
The older version of the tourniquet,
Generation 6, is a small, lightweight
model designed to completely stop arterial
blood flow from an injured limb.
It has two slots on the buckle and can
be used to either double-route (for
buddy care) or single-route (self-care)
the belt.
New Hand Grenade in Works
About 13 centuries after hand-tossed
incendiary devices were first used against
enemy forces, the U.S. Army is working
on a new version.
The U.S. Army Armament Research,
Development and Engineering Center at
Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., in cooperation
with the Maneuver Center of Excellence
at Fort Benning, Ga., is developing the
Enhanced Tactical Multi-Purpose (ET-
MP) hand grenade. Soldiers will be able
to arm it for either fragmentation or
concussive effects simply by flipping a
switch before tossing.
Currently, the M67 fragmentation
hand grenade is the only such weapon
available to Army combat forces. The
MK3A2 concussion grenade was ushered
out of service in 1975 because of an
asbestos hazard.
The ET-MP also is being designed
for throwing with either the right or left
hand. The M67 requires a different
arming procedure for southpaws.
Fielding is expected by fiscal year
2020 at the earliest.
Army Fatalities in
Afghanistan
The following U.S. Army soldiers
and an Army civilian died supporting
Operation Freedom’s
Sentinel between Oct. 1 and Oct.
25. Their names were released
through DoD; their families have
been notified.
Sgt. Douglas J. Riney, 26
Michael G. Sauro, 40
Staff Sgt. Adam S. Thomas, 31
58 ARMY ■ December 2016

The Outpost
Questions Linger About Fetterman Massacre
By Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army retired
Something had gone wrong, badly wrong. That much was
obvious from the moment the reaction force arrived on the
scene in the Wyoming Territory. Strewn along the rocky
slope, interspersed with smashed weapons and discarded gear,
the stripped, hacked corpses lay rigid in the glare of day. Not a
single enemy body could be seen among them.
Finding the bad guys—wasn’t that always the problem? Patrol
after patrol, day after day, reported plenty of sullen locals
but rarely a glimpse of the hostiles. The opposition wore no
uniforms, stood no ground, and knew no doctrine. Yet clearly
they had created this ambush, and had done so with ruthless
effectiveness.
The American bodies and trampled ground told the story.
It had begun as these skirmishes always did, with a sighting.
Then came a quick, aggressive lunge, chasing after a few enemies
fleeing across the stony ridge. To grab this running foe,
to fix him and hold on, obsessed the American soldiers. It
drew them in like a physical force, the pitiless gravity of battle.
Close combat always went to the U.S. Army. So on they went.
Upon cresting the ridge, the soldiers apparently shook out in a
skirmish line and opened fire. Discarded golden cartridges
glittered in the sun around every dead man. There had been
plenty of shooting, all right.
What happened then? Who could say? But it must have
been horrific. An enemy who never appeared in numbers evidently
did so this time—hundreds for sure, maybe even thousands.
An opponent who typically shot poorly clearly shot well
enough. And trained U.S. Army infantrymen who went into
every firefight expecting to win must have felt gut-wrenching
spasms, if they had time to feel anything at all. They figured
out too late that this time, on this ugly field, no soldier would
get out alive.
So now it came to this. Watchful, wary, the security elements
fanned out to protect the dreadful site. Designated teams began
moving among the dead, beginning the sad efforts of recovery.
At the direction of the commander, a soldier wrote down what
he saw, a litany of woe recorded with dispassionate care by
someone who had seen it all before, and would see it all again:
Library of Congress
An 1867 engraving in Harper’s Weekly depicted the Fetterman Massacre.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 59

Henry B. Carrington
served as a brigadier
general during the
Civil War.
“Eyes torn out and laid on the rocks; noses cut off; ears cut
off; chins hewn off; teeth chopped out; joints of fingers cut off;
brains taken out and placed on rocks with members of the
body; entrails taken out and exposed; hands cut off; feet cut
off; arms taken out from sockets; private parts severed.”
It didn’t happen in the Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam, or along
the Euphrates River in Iraq, or among the foothills of the
Hindu Kush in Afghanistan. No, this tragic defeat, the slaughter
of 79 soldiers and two civilian contractors, happened 150
years ago, right in our own country, on Dec. 21, 1866, outside
Fort Phil Kearny in the Wyoming Territory. Arapaho,
Cheyenne and Sioux, the fearsome Lakota, Miniconjou and
Oglala—more than 1,000 Native American warriors, including
a charismatic leader named Crazy Horse—had sprung the trap.
Their bloody work done in less than a half-hour, the braves
vanished like wind over the prairie. Later counts suggested
anywhere from 13 to 100 Plains Indians were killed. But no
enemy remains were found. So the real number could have
been a lot lower. It could have been zero.
What happened? Then and now, when a horrendous reverse
occurs, the U.S. Army demands answers, even
when nobody remains alive to provide them. So the questions
went to the officer who sent out the 81 now-dead. In this case,
that was the commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment, Col.
Henry B. Carrington. The telegraph lines burned with
pointed questions from Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, a
man not given to calm in the face of disaster. What happened?
Why? And most important, who bore responsibility?
Carrington certainly thought—no, by God, he knew—it
wasn’t him. The fussy, bookish, Yale-educated attorney
served in the Ohio militia before the Civil War. In that great
conflict, Carrington stayed well back. Working from a wellappointed
headquarters, he paid a shadowy network of informers
and snitches to chase rebel bushwhackers in southern
Indiana. Carrington’s efforts held down some key rear areas.
As a reward, he received postwar command of the 18th Infantry
Regiment, with orders to go west to build log forts
near the intersection of the Bozeman Trail and the Powder
River. The Army thought military garrisons would keep
American Indians away from settlers moving along the Bozeman
Trail. Nobody checked with the American Indians.
As the 18th Infantry Regiment took up its new duties near
the Powder River, Carrington’s 700 men included nearly 400
new recruits. But his ranks also boasted tough sergeants and
officers, men who had marched through Georgia with Sherman
two years earlier. The Civil War veterans urged Carrington
to go out, find the Native Americans and smash them.
Get them before they get the soldiers, let alone the hapless
homesteaders. That kind of direct approach made a lot of
sense when pursuing Confederate regiments outside Atlanta.
In the lee of the Bighorn Mountains, with winter approaching,
it would play right into the hands of wily Native American
chiefs, experts at sucking gullible Regulars into deadly
snares. Hard-bitten scout Jim Bridger said it well: “These soldiers
don’t know anything about fighting Indians.”
Despite his lack of combat experience, Carrington knew
enough to realize Bridger was right. The soldiers needed training.
They needed repeating rifles, not their antiquated Civil
War muzzle loaders. They needed reinforcements, too. So
Carrington did not go hunting for Native Americans. Naturally
indecisive and inert, Carrington preferred to stick with the letter
of his orders. Cut wood. Build forts. Let the American Indians
come—or not. When wagon trains and woodcutters reported
hostile gunshots, the colonel rationalized. It wasn’t much.
When the elusive opponents killed some settlers, then some soldiers,
Carrington still did nothing.
His officers and NCOs objected.
Among the loudest complainers was
Capt. (brevet Lt. Col.) William J. Fetterman,
33, twice recognized for gallantry
during extensive service in the Civil War.
With the wartime 18th Infantry Regiment,
he’d followed Sherman’s lead in
1864 and “made Georgia howl” in the infamous
March to the Sea. Now he implored
his colonel to act. If Carrington
wouldn’t do it, Fetterman would. “Give
me 80 men,” said the captain, “and I can
ride through the whole Sioux nation.” He
really believed it, begging the diffident
Carrington for a chance.
The Native Americans hit and ran, as
was their wont. On Nov. 22, 1866, a
single warrior taunted a woodcutting
party. But the steady lieutenant, wise to
Sioux tactics, didn’t take the bait. On
Dec. 6, another encounter between Native
Americans and a timber detail resulted
in a confused series of maneuvers
through broken ground. Following their
Library of Congress
60 ARMY ■ December 2016

University of Wyoming
University of Wyoming
Capt. William J. Fetterman met his fate about 5 miles from Fort Phil Kearny in the Wyoming Territory.
bold captain, Fetterman’s unit took off after a few braves and
became separated. Unsure of what to do, Carrington hesitated.
In the confusion, the Native Americans killed two bluecoated
Regulars and wounded five. Another inconclusive clash
on Dec. 19 only increased the tension.
Fetterman and other officers insisted, and they grew insolent
in their objections. Next time, when these Native Americans
appeared, Carrington must let them finish the fight. Give
these Plains renegades a taste of the lead and fire that finished
off the Confederacy. Hungry for close combat, Fetterman and
the other Civil War veterans had long despaired of locating a
worthwhile number of American Indians, or any at all.
Now, with the bare ground hardened and snow squalls
nightly, the enemy seemed to be all around, begging for action.
It did not occur to any in authority among the 18th Infantry
Regiment that when a guerrilla opponent offers battle,
he does so for a reason. And the Arapaho, Cheyenne and
Sioux chiefs had thought it out only too well.
On the clear, cold morning of Dec. 21, the wood-chopping
detail trundled into the pine stand 5 miles northwest of Fort
Phil Kearny. The soldiers needed fuel for fires and big logs for
construction, the usual requirements. Some 90 laborers set to
work, protected by an equal number of military guards.
Around 10 a.m., messengers reported to the fort. Native
Americans were harassing the timber crews.
Against his better judgment, Carrington unleashed Fetterman.
“Under no circumstances,” said the colonel, was the captain
to “pursue over the ridge.” Fetterman nodded and headed
out. It’s unknown if the younger officer heard the order, or understood
it. In any case, he did not follow it.
From the walls of Fort Phil Kearny, sentries watched Fetterman’s
column maneuver to the north, crossing high ground,
as if to get behind the American Indians plinking away at the
woodcutters. Not long after noon, a roar of gunfire arose from
the far side of the forested ridge. It lasted until nearly 12:45
p.m., then died away.
Carrington led out a relief force, but they arrived far too late
to find anything but the gory aftermath. In the interlude between
the end of the fatal fight and the coming of the U.S.
colonel and his men, the American Indians had stripped and
mutilated every man in Fetterman’s command. It had been a
very hard lesson indeed: Do not chase Indians.
Carrington blamed it all on the impetuous captain, conveniently
dead. Sherman impugned Carrington, and removed
him. In Washington, D.C., Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant agreed,
and even considered charging the colonel for his failings. For
the rest of his days, Carrington told his version of the fight to
all who would listen. Few did.
In the end, though, the colonel’s view won out. Most historians
followed Carrington’s lead and refer to the Fetterman
Massacre. Ten years later, not far away in the Montana Territory,
Lt. Col. (brevet Maj. Gen.) George Armstrong Custer
and much of the 7th Cavalry Regiment met the same grisly
fate at the Little Bighorn. For the soldiers in blue, and the
Plains Indians they fought, there would be other fatal days,
too many others. They all bled into a long, long series of campaigns
that finally crawled to an ignominious end in 1890–91
in the snows, gunfire and heartbreak of Wounded Knee, S.D.
Today, the U.S. Army flag bears 14 campaign streamers from
the Indian Wars. We count them as victories. Not one came
easily.
✭
Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret., Ph.D., was the commander of
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Previously, he served as
the deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, and as the commanding general,
1st Cavalry Division/commanding general, Multinational
Division-Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a doctorate
from the University of Chicago and has published a number
of books on military subjects. He is a senior fellow of the
AUSA Institute of Land Warfare.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 61

Seven Questions
Murphy Proud of ‘America’s Varsity Team’
Patrick J. Murphy was appointed the 32nd undersecretary of the
Army and chief management officer in early January. Three days
later, he assumed duties as acting Army secretary and served in that
role for about four months. The Bristol, Pa., native was the first Iraq
War veteran elected to Congress, representing Pennsylvania’s 8th
Congressional District from 2007 to 2011 and serving on the Armed
Services, Select Intelligence and Appropriations committees. He coauthored
several initiatives including the 21st Century GI Bill, Hire
Our Heroes legislation and the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell.”
Undersecretary of the Army Patrick J. Murphy
1. How did your experience in Congress
prepare you for your role as undersecretary?
I wouldn’t have been a U.S. congressman
at age 33 if it wasn’t for the Army—
or a professor at the U.S. Military Academy,
or now undersecretary. The Army
has made me a leader of character. In
this role, there is no doubt being an appropriator
in Congress helped as I testified
four times this year with Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley on
the Army budget, talking about why it’s
important for lawmakers to fund us.
We’re America’s varsity team.
2. What’s it like being on this side of
the Army after having been in the
trenches yourself as an officer?
It’s awesome and great to be home. I
joined the Army at 19 and left when I
was 31. I loved my time in the military.
It made me who I am today.
I roll into the Pentagon every day by 6
a.m. and do PT with soldiers. My office
looks out at Arlington National Cemetery, and I think about
the 19 men I served with who gave the ultimate sacrifice in
Iraq. These are veterans of my generation. I want to make sure
we are doing everything possible to ensure our soldiers do not
have a fair fight but are technically and tactically over our enemies
in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria—and wherever we may
send them next.
3. You once said you were worried about the Army, particularly
its size. Are you still worried?
I think we are ready to fight tonight. Our soldiers are doing a
phenomenal job taking the fight to al-Qaida in Afghanistan,
and to ISIS in Iraq and Syria. If we have to fight against Russia,
China, North Korea or Iran, it’s going to be a tough fight.
We will win, but there will be soldiers lost.
We’ve become so proficient in counterinsurgence and counterterrorism
operations. We need to refocus on major, highend
ground combat. I think about back-to-basics and multidomain
battles that we’re going to need to fight. That means
electronic warfare, cyber and traditional armor, infantry.
4. What has been your most notable challenge as undersecretary?
We’ve made incredible strides in the Soldier for Life program.
When my service was done in 2004 and I left Fort
Bragg, N.C., there was no program like that to help me navigate
12 months ahead. It’s important for
soldiers and their families to know how
to manage all areas of service life, particularly
transitions. In the last four years,
we have saved $330 million a year by
having an improving economy and public-private
partnerships—including with
Microsoft and General Motors—to
come on posts to provide certification
programs.
5. You have two children. Do you want
them to join the Army?
I would love to see that, but it has to be
up to them. We were at West Point recently,
and one of the professors I worked
with there asked my daughter, who is 9,
if she is preparing to go to the academy.
She politely told him she is studying hard
so she can get into Princeton. That was
OK, because this professor had gone to
Princeton as well. My son is 6, and I
coach his hockey team on the weekends.
He has said he wants to be a soldier—
although he recently told me after a
practice that he wants to be a spy.
6. What’s next for you?
We’ll see. I love being part of the Army leadership team. Returning
to Congress is not in my immediate future.
Now is a good time to look at the Hidden Heroes campaign.
We’re ready to support the caregivers of those who are injured
in service or other family members. There are 5.5 million military
spouses who are taking care of family members. Hidden
Heroes is their connection to the Army on the homefront.
7. What would you like to see continue in the Army under
the new administration?
Strategically, we need to keep an eye on Russia as it tries to
extend its influence. We need to be ready to go toe to toe regardless,
but I believe our involvement around Europe may increase.
We still have national security policy to maintain.
—Evamarie Socha
U.S. Army/Lt. Col. Renee Russo-Johnson
62 ARMY ■ December 2016

Reviews
Tank Destroyers That Crippled the Panzers
American Knights: The Untold Story
of the Men of the Legendary 601st
Tank Destroyer Battalion. Victor
Failmezger. Osprey Press. 352 pages.
$25.95
By 1st Lt. Jonathan D. Bratten
Amilitary unit is the sum of its parts
—its people. It is in the stories of
those people that the unit comes alive
again, even if that unit has been inactive
for 71 years. This is what author Victor
Failmezger does for the 601st Tank Destroyer
Battalion in American Knights.
Created out of thin air in 1941, the
601st was made up of a hodgepodge of
other units to fight the dreaded German
armor. Through the voices of nine
members of the 601st, Failmezger takes
his readers on a whirlwind adventure
from the sands of North Africa in 1942
to Berchtesgaden, Germany, in 1945.
The nine men, all avid letter-writers,
tell the story of their part in World War
II as Failmezger subtly guides the plot
along.
Failmezger, a retired Navy officer, was
inspired to write the book after discovering
wartime letters from his uncle,
Lt. Thomas Peter Welch, who served
in the 601st. Failmezger organized his
work into a chronological record of the
battalion’s campaigns in a book that is
both easy to read and replete with fascinating
historical vignettes. He allows
the members of the battalion to speak
of the events on their own, adding perspective
and additional information
where needed.
Because of his connections with veterans
of the battalion, the author assembled
an excellent collection of photographs
and original maps. Each chapter is replete
with operational maps to track the
movement of the battalion in every
campaign. Failmezger includes six appendices
full of data on the makeup and
organization of the battalion, vehicle
and weapon capabilities, enemy equipment,
and miscellaneous recollections of
veterans.
The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion
was unique in that having a separate
branch to counter enemy armor was a
brand-new concept for the U.S. Army
in 1941, born out of a need to defeat an
anticipated threat. As such, tank destroyer
units evolved throughout the war
until near the end, when they were no
longer needed because tanks themselves
had become powerful enough. This was
still years in the future for the men of
the 1st Provisional Antitank Regiment,
who assembled in 1941. They were
quickly redesignated the 601st Tank
Destroyer Battalion, consisting of a
headquarters company, reconnaissance
company, medical detachment and three
line companies. The men barely had
time to assemble their new equipment
before they were off for North Africa
and their first shots in the war.
Failmezger details the 601st’s entry
into the war and outlines the difficulties
U.S. forces in North Africa faced: poor
equipment, a shortage of trucks, logistics
failures, and a determined enemy. At the
time, the 601st was equipped with M3
half-tracks, which had 75 mm guns
mounted on them—hardly effective
against German armor. The 601st doggedly
fought on, however. Their first
campaign was a learning experience, writes
Failmezger; the tankers would apply these
lessons in Italy, their next campaign.
Equipped now with M10 tank destroyers,
the 601st fought their way
through Sicily in 1943 before taking part
in the Anzio invasion. Failmezger does
an excellent job describing the World
War I-like combat of Anzio, where the
tank destroyers racked up an impressive
number of enemy tank kills, earning the
respect of the 3rd Division, to which
they were attached. In just one day,
Company B of the 601st knocked out 13
German Panzers. Failmezger details the
day-to-day aspects of soldier life, from
farm boys milking cows so their platoons
could have fresh milk, to the anti-Semitic
propaganda leaflets dropped by the
Germans that the GIs mailed home with
comments of amusement that the Germans
would think Americans would “believe
such rot.”
As the Allies broke out of the Anzio
beachhead and moved on Rome, the
601st was in the thick of the fighting.
The horrors of sustained combat are
made vivid in the letters. One NCO in
the 601st wrote of having to turn his platoon’s
guns on some American infantry
who were threatening to kill German
prisoners of war.
Failmezger collected amazing stories
from veterans of the 601st for this work,
one of which bears particular note for its
humor. It concerns an NCO of Company
A of the 601st, who was returning
to his unit after being wounded.
After being told his outfit was somewhere
near Rome, he took a jeep to find
them. He ended up driving through va-
December 2016 ■ ARMY 63

cant streets, arriving outside the Vatican
around dawn on June 5. According
to the soldier, he parked the jeep and
ran inside, fearful he would never get a
chance like this again. The Swiss Guard
found him and, upon hearing he was an
American, escorted him up to meet
Pope Pius XII. After a five-minute audience,
the sergeant returned to his
company with an incredible story to tell.
The battalion enjoyed Rome for a few
weeks before preparing for their next D-
Day landing, in southern France.
Failmezger details the intensive preparations
for the “other D-Day,” as these
landings often were called. The 601st
seemed to always find themselves fighting
in the less famous yet highly important
campaigns of the European Theater.
Because the landings were easy and
resistance light at first, the 3rd Division
and the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion
advanced too quickly, outpacing their
supply lines. Lack of fuel and spare parts
slowed their attack, as German resistance
stiffened closer to the border of France
and Germany.
The 601st ended its war at Hitler’s
mountain home of Berchtesgaden.
The battalion had spent 456 days in
combat, fought in eight campaigns,
made four amphibious landings, and suffered
683 casualties. It became one of the
most decorated units in the U.S. Army
in World War II, with three Presidential
Unit Citations and the French Croix de
Guerre.
Failmezger does not attempt to make
an argument either for or against the
idea of tank destroyers as a separate
branch, instead focusing on the stories of
the soldiers who manned the battalion.
His book is a highly engaging work that
is a valuable addition to World War II
histories.
1st Lt. Jonathan D. Bratten is an engineer
officer and command historian in the
Maine Army National Guard. He holds
a bachelor’s degree from the Franciscan
University of Steubenville, Ohio, and a
master’s degree from the University of
New Hampshire.
The Mechanisms of Doctrinal Change
Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change
in the U.S. Army. Benjamin M.
Jensen. Stanford Security Studies. 216
pages. $24.95
By Col. Richard Hart Sinnreich
U.S. Army retired
In the U.S. Army, doctrine tends to be a
fraught term. Even defining it has
proven to be controversial over the years,
with one distinguished general officer
notoriously describing it as nothing more
than what the majority of the Army’s
leaders believe at any given time about
how to fight.
At the lowest level, of course, doctrine
merely is the military equivalent of
rules of the road, intended to ensure
that friendly forces collide with the enemy,
not each other. At that level—the
level of tactics, techniques and procedures—doctrinal
development tends to
be relatively straightforward and its prescriptions
uncontroversial, the qualifier
reflecting that even at the basic level,
doctrinal conformity often is honored
more in the breach than in the observance.
It’s when doctrine aspires to the status
of operational or even quasi-strategic
theory, however, that both intellectual
and institutional challenges arise.
Benjamin M. Jensen examines these
challenges in Forging the Sword: Doctrinal
Change in the U.S. Army. Jensen
holds a dual appointment as the Donald
L. Bren Chair of Creative Problem Solving
at Marine Corps University and as a
scholar-in-residence at American University’s
School of International Service
in Washington, D.C.
Jensen’s central concern is to refute
what might be called the “Col. Blimp”
description of military reform: the proposition
that doctrinal change in the military
occurs only when external pressures
such as defeat or political demands overcome
internal resistance. In his words,
“This book challenges the prevailing wisdom
of professional soldiers as unimaginative
bureaucrats trapped in an iron
cage.”
Instead, he insists, far from resisting
doctrinal reform, the Army during the
past 50 years has embraced and institutionalized
it, adapting with remarkable
success—and largely independent of external
compulsion—to changing strategic,
technological and sociological imperatives.
Jensen attributes that success to three
crucial mechanisms: the creation of small
doctrinal “incubators” independent of established
force development organizations;
the use of “advocacy networks” to
debate and refine their products and to
secure buy-in by the wider Army community;
and the legitimation of both efforts
and their results by invested senior
leaders who welcome innovation and
protect its authors.
Jensen finds evidence of all three
mechanisms at work in the post-Vietnam
War evolution of Army doctrine.
He describes that evolution through
four distinctly different variants: Active
Defense (1976), AirLand Battle (1982
and 1986), Full-Dimensional (later
Full-Spectrum) Operations (1993, 2001,
2008) and Counterinsurgency (2014).
Each is formally captured in successive
editions of Field Manual 100-5: Operations
(later FM 3.0) and in Field
64 ARMY ■ December 2016

Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency.
Jensen is careful to point out the ways
in which that progression reflected
changing military commitments, budget
pressures, and perceptions of the battlefield
environment. But he is at pains to
demonstrate that those exogenous factors
merely helped condition the emergence
of doctrinal ideas themselves derived
from in-house study, field exercise
and experimentation.
The pattern that emerges from his description
is one of relatively linear and
collegial change. This is perhaps inevitable,
given the scope of history Jensen
attempts to capture in a limited space.
But if the book has a weakness, this is
where it resides. Doctrinal changes in
fact were considerably less straightforward
and controversy-free than portrayed.
The shift from Active Defense
to AirLand Battle, for example, looked
more like a revolution-from-below than
the senior leader-orchestrated evolution
Jensen describes, engaging players ranging
from rebellious Army students at
Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and the Naval
War College and former Wehrmacht
generals to a vocal and highly critical
Senate staffer and NATO’s Supreme
Allied Commander.
Similarly, though attributed in popular
mythology to the influence of retired
Gen. David Petraeus, the counterinsurgency
doctrine formalized in Field Manual
3-24 in fact culminated a debate that
had been raging for many years, involving
participants as disparate as American
academics, foreign counterinsurgency experts,
and—as from 1976 to 1982—
disaffected junior officers.
Overall, far from a leader-directed
and largely cloistered evolution, doctrinal
progression after 1975 more
closely resembled the process of paradigm
change famously described by
scientific historian Thomas Kuhn: a
process marked by occasionally acrimonious
intellectual combat.
That said, Jensen is on firm ground in
urging Army leaders not to take that
process and the resources needed to fuel
it for granted. As he puts it, “Do not cut
off the flow of oxygen to the brain.”
While senior leaders might not invariably
relish, let alone initiate, what Jensen
calls “creative [doctrinal] destruction,”
their willingness nonetheless to resource
and protect those who do is essential. In
suggesting some of the mechanisms deserving
that support, Jensen has done us
a service.
Col. Richard Hart Sinnreich, USA Ret.,
is a former director of the Army’s School of
Advanced Military Studies and co-authored
the 1986 edition of Field Manual
100-5: Operations.
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Recent Publications
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All publications are available at:
www.ausa.org/publications-and-news
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Steven Estes, Joel M. Miller and Marcus D. Majure
(October 2016)
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Evidence of an Aggressive National Security
Policy? by Christopher L. Budihas (October 2016)
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Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim
(June 2016)
• LWP 108 – Are U.S. Army Capabilities for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction at
Risk? by Thomas C. Westen (September 2015)
• LWP 107 – Integrating Landpower in the
Indo–Asia–Pacific Through 2020: Analysis of a
Theater Army Campaign Design by Benjamin A.
Bennett (May 2015)
National Security Watch
• NSW 16-1 – African Horizons: The United States
Army Working Toward a Secure and Stable
Africa by Douglas W. Merritt (February 2016)
• NSW 15-4 – These Are the Drones You Are
Looking For: Manned–Unmanned Teaming and
the U.S. Army by Richard Lim (December 2015)
NCO Update
• Lead Story: NCO Writing Excellence Program
(3rd Quarter 2016)
• Lead Story: Senior NCO Punches PTSD in the
Face (2nd Quarter 2016)
Special Reports
• Profile of the U.S. Army: a reference handbook
(October 2016)
• AUSA + 1st Session, 114th Congress = Some
Good News (December 2015)
• Your Soldier, Your Army: A Parents’ Guide
by Vicki Cody (also available in Spanish)
Torchbearer Issue Papers
• Delivering Materiel Readiness: From “Blunt
Force” Logistics to Enterprise Resource
Planning (June 2016)
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Way of Understanding the Future Operational
Environment (May 2016)
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Readiness Multiplier (April 2016)
Defense Reports
• DR 16-3 – Strategic Readiness: The U.S. Army
as a Global Force (June 2016)
• DR 16-2 – National Commission on the Future
of the Army: An Initial Blueprint for the Total
Army (February 2016)
• DR 16-1 – Until They All Come Home: The
Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action
Accounting Agency (February 2016)
Landpower Essays
• LPE 16-1 – The State of the Cavalry: An Analysis
of the U.S. Army’s Reconnaissance and Security
Capability by Amos C. Fox (June 2016)
December 2016 ■ ARMY 65

AUSA Sustaining Member Profile
IDS International Government Services LLC
Corporate Structure—President and CEO: Nick Dowling.
Headquarters: 2500 Wilson Blvd., Suite 200, Arlington,
VA 22201. Telephone: 703-875-2212. Website: www.
idsinternational.com.
Today’s national security challenges are complex and dynamic,
requiring adaptive, creative and multidisciplinary responses.
For more than a decade, IDS International Government
Services LLC has delivered innovative training, research
and mission support services to help address these 21stcentury
challenges. We are seasoned soldiers, aid workers,
diplomats, logisticians, intelligence professionals, cyber warriors,
technical experts and political advisers with a common
understanding of how to operate in conflict zones and transitional
areas.
IDS provides customized training, education and exercise
support for military and civilian audiences, with a particular
focus on preparing land forces for the complexity of the contemporary
operational environment. From large combat
training center exercises to small classes for special operations
forces, IDS works with customers to develop effective
training and education solutions needed to succeed in today’s
complex environment. IDS is known for its exceptional
team of experienced interagency experts who have in-depth
knowledge of both the operating environment and the training
environment. These subject-matter experts have extensive
experience in a wide range of military and civilian government
agencies, including the military, the intelligence
community, the U.S. Agency for International Development
and the U.S. Department of State.
IDS is the leader in training U.S. military forces at corps
level and below on how social media affects the operating
environment in the 21st century.
■ Replication: IDS has developed a proprietary Social Media
Environment and Internet Replication (SMEIR) program
to help U.S. military forces exercise monitoring, decisionmaking
and engagement of social media. The program is a realistic
replication of web pages, digital media news sites, realtime
videos and blogs to portray the digital human network
and the various factors that affect the training environment.
■ Training: Our social media training helps improve units’
capacities to identify group affiliations, prepare for key leader
engagements, highlight potential power brokers and support
real-time situational awareness. The SMEIR program
provides trainees with a thorough understanding of the tools
and methods needed to consider and engage social media in
its operating environment. IDS works with units and organizations
to determine their unique training requirements and
develop custom training approaches that are tailored to specific
operations. Cyber training offers support to stand up of
military cyber mission forces and cyber classes in offense and
defense for both cyber and noncyber audiences.
■ Analysis: IDS offers both social media analytics technology
and analytics as a service. The IDS approach makes a
range of analytical capabilities, raw data and finished reports
available via a web-based platform. IDS understands the
value of the human in the loop and knows that no algorithm,
no matter how advanced, can detect things like sarcasm, humor
or hyperbole. Only a human with native understanding
of the language can do that. While IDS leverages the power
of big-data platforms to perform analytics, thereby reducing
costs, we know some context can be supplied only by a
skilled and knowledgeable human. IDS delivers what clients
want, in the format they need.
Our research division applies rigorous methodologies, cutting-edge
technologies and business processes, and human
talent to gather and assess data in conflict environments.
■ Human terrain: Our researchers are experts in local human
domain-driven dynamics. We leverage local expertise to
provide clients with actionable “ground truth” that effectively
informs strategic decisions.
■ Monitoring and evaluation: From on-the-ground data
collection in austere environments to comprehensive bigdata
analytics, our monitoring and evaluation specialists provide
U.S. government leaders with comprehensive and credible
assessments of outputs and impact of activities.
■ Quality: Our quality control and quality assurance
measures are robust, standardized and scalable. By implementing
these measures, we deliver high-quality data, minimize
the probability of data collection errors, and ensure
compliance with best practices.
IDS supports U.S. and coalition-partner overseas contingency
operations with innovative solutions in logistics, operations
and capacity-building challenges. In Afghanistan,
IDS provides operations and maintenance base support to
a wide range of Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces installations. IDS operations and maintenance services
include critical systems such as power generation,
water-treatment systems, wastewater-treatment systems,
heating and air-conditioning systems, and plumbing and
electrical systems. In addition, IDS supports growth of local
capacity with innovative approaches to ensure the successful
transition to local authorities following conflict or
natural disaster. IDS offers logistics and capacity-building
capabilities globally with particular focus on the Middle
East, Africa and South Asia.
DoD/Sgt. Shelman Spencer
66 ARMY ■ December 2016

Soldier Armed
Army Receiving Its First AMPV By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer
As of mid-December, the ink should be drying on the paperwork
marking the Army’s receipt of its first Armored
Multi-Purpose Vehicle. The vehicle will be fielded in multiple
variants—medical evacuation, medical treatment, 120 mm
M121 mortar, Mission Command and general purpose—to
replace the obsolescent M113 series armored personnel carrier
family within the Army’s armored brigade combat teams.
BAE Systems is producing the first 29 Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicles (AMPVs) under an engineering and manufacturing
development contract awarded in December 2014. That
contract included an option to begin low-rate initial production.
The mid-December delivery of the first of those 29 vehicles
was one of the many spotlight industry updates during the Association
of the U.S. Army’s 2016 Annual Meeting and Exposition.
The update included a tour of an AMPV medical evacuation
prototype displayed on the show floor.
Retired Army Col. James Miller, business development director
for BAE Systems, said the first of the 29 prototypes is
“close to final assembly. We are aiming to deliver that vehicle
to the Army in December.”
He said production was “going great” and noted that the vehicles
are being built on the actual production line that will be
used for the program.
“That allows us to ‘prototype production,’” he said. “We can
work the flaws out and make sure the production line is ready
to go” for the low-rate initial production contract. “We can
just turn the lights back on and go to work.”
Miller said the current production focus was on getting the
first 29 vehicles delivered to the Army for service testing.
Noting successful completion of the critical design review
and start of hull production 18 months after the contract
award, U.S. Army program manager Col. Mike Milner emphasized
the Army’s focus on program cost and schedule.
“We want to get this capability out to the field as soon as
possible to our soldiers and start divesting ourselves of the
M113s,” he said. “Now, the M113 is a great vehicle. It’s just a
little long in the tooth right now and is not able to complete
all the missions we need it to do” because of its size, weight,
power and carrying capacity.
Milner said the period between preliminary design review
and critical design review allowed identification of some additional
capabilities, including raising the deck in the driver’s
area about 4 inches to give some additional head space, and
adoption of the bulk of Bradley Engineering Change Proposal
1 suspension elements to increase subsystem commonality
across the armored brigade combat team.
Milner described “the derivative approach” behind the
AMPV, which is based on a modified Bradley chassis.
“In doing that, we have created a vehicle which is significantly
better than what we have in the field today,” he said.
“This will be one of the most survivable protected vehicles” in
the armored brigade combat team.
Photos from BAE Systems
Variants of Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles include the 120 mm M121 mortar system and medical
evacuation and medical treatment vehicles.
December 2016 ■ ARMY 67

Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles will replace the obsolescent M113 series armored personnel carrier family in armored brigade combat teams.
“We’ve got significantly more size than we have” in the
M113, Milner added. “We’re able to move soldiers around in
the casualty evac mode. We’re able to do Mission Command
on the Move, with three seats in the back and people able to
operate while they’re moving down the road. They’ll have
computers out of trays. They will have WIN-T [Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical] on them so they can transmit
and receive data.
“So we’re getting everything that the Army is looking for in
a vehicle,” he said. “And, most importantly, we’re getting it on
schedule and really focused on manufacturing cost—keeping
those manufacturing costs down.”
Milner outlined a government developmental test plan running
approximately 19 months and including 21,000
miles of government reliability driving; 7,500 miles of contractor
reliability testing; a “full suite of live-fire evaluations”
against all five variants; and performance testing at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Md., as well as Yuma Proving Ground and
the Electronic Proving Ground in Arizona.
Elaborating on testing at the Electronic Proving Ground,
he said, “As we’ve gotten more and more connected, these
platforms have gotten more and more systems on them that
talk. We have close to 20 antennas on one of our variants
right now.”
Sitting inside the medical evacuation prototype on display at
the AUSA event, the AMPV program director at BAE Systems,
Beach Day, began by highlighting differences with the
current M113-based variants.
“You can have up to six people sitting in seats,” Day said, or
a smaller lift system “could carry two litters on a side. This has
about 78 percent more space” than the M113 variant “to do work,
with different types of medical equipment inside the vehicle.”
Both medical treatment and casualty evacuation variants
will also have air conditioning systems designed to reduce the
interior temperature to 85 degrees in a matter of minutes, “because
we have got to keep the climate controlled for the patients,”
he said.
“For the medical treatment variant, instead of the seats it
actually has a treatment table in it, where the stretcher comes
right onto the top of the table for the medic and an assistant to
perform lifesaving patient stabilization measures,” he said.
“They can even roll that table out into an auxiliary tent that
will be coming off the back.”
Day identified the Mission Command variant as the one
Milner had cited with nearly 20 antennae on the roof, noting
it is “currently configured with the existing WIN-T design”
but that the program “will look at an evolution to the new
WIN-T” for low-rate initial production.
“The real key in all of this is that we have given them more
space and height than what they had, but we have increased
the overall survivability of the whole vehicle,” he said.
Milner said schedules call for a Milestone C low-rate initial
production decision in the second quarter of fiscal year 2019,
with a current “target production number” of 2,897 vehicles.
He also said the Army is conducting a study on what to do
with the M113s at echelons above brigade. “There are about
1,500 M113s up there, predominantly in engineer and fires
units,” he said, adding that the analysis of alternatives is expected
to be done by the end of December. ✭
68 ARMY ■ December 2016

Historically Speaking
Yanbu a Minor Battle with Major Consequences
By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired
Dec. 12 marks the 100th anniversary of the final Ottoman
withdrawal from Yanbu, in present-day Saudi Arabia.
The struggle for this Red Sea port was not much of a battle by
World War I standards, but its consequences were nevertheless
profound—to the Ottomans, to the Arab Revolt, and to a
century of follow-on effects that came in its trail.
T.E. Lawrence, the British military officer who came to be
known as Lawrence of Arabia, said of the climax at Yanbu: “So
they turned back: and that night, I believe, the Turks lost their
war.” Turkish defeat in the war overall led to a scramble for the
carcass of their empire as well as to competing expectations
that haunt us to this day.
The Ottoman Empire entered World War I with an attack
on Russia’s Crimean Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol on Oct.
29, 1914. Strongly encouraged by its German allies, it almost
immediately raised the banner of Islamic holy war—jihad.
The sultan was ostensibly head of the Ottoman state but also
claimed the religious title of caliph, leader of the Muslim
global community. Twenty-nine Islamic legal scholars deliberated
in Istanbul for about a week, and drafted five fatwas (legal
opinions) endorsing holy war against the Allied powers. The
sultan sanctioned these, and had them publicly announced
amid roars of approval on Nov. 14, 1914.
The sultan’s claim to be caliph was widely, although not
universally, opposed in the Muslim world outside the Ottoman
Empire. It did, however, serve as a call to arms for
some, and as an excuse for mischief for many. The Allies were
worried: Of the 240 million Muslims then living in 1914, 100
million lived in British colonies or possessions, 20 million in
French colonies or possessions, and 20 million in territories of
the Russian Empire. Muslim subjects in Egypt and the Russian
Caucasus were in particularly sensitive locations, and
those in India were particularly numerous and consequential.
The Germans began actively recruiting captured French
North African troops and pressing them into the service of the
sultan, further increasing Allied anxieties.
After a flurry of preventive political and military measures,
and amid a substantial jihadi-inspired campaign launched
among the Senussi along the Libyan border, the British surmised
they could keep a lid on jihad within their empire as
long as the Ottomans were not winning on the battlefield.
Ottoman defeats in the Sinai, the Caucasus and Mesopotamia
during 1914 and early 1915 diminished Allied fears
of jihad. Then the Ottomans, heavily assisted by the Germans,
won striking victories over the British at Gallipoli and Kut al-
Amara in late 1915 and early 1916. The British, committed to
a desperate struggle on the Western Front, found themselves
flailing to stabilize their situation in the Middle East.
The emir of Mecca, appointed by the sultan from among
the Arab descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, was second
only to the caliph in his presumed religious authority. The incumbent
in 1914, Sharif Hussein bin Ali, experienced un-
Imperial War Museum, London
Sharif Hussein bin Ali,
left, and British Capt.
T.E. Lawrence
December 2016 ■ ARMY 69

Library of Congress
Turkish troops use a German light field howitzer in Palestine.
happy relationships with the “Young Turk” leadership that
seized effective power in Istanbul shortly before the war. The
Young Turks set about centralizing Ottoman governance,
whereas Hussein preferred the relative autonomy of an earlier
era. Hussein temporized in committing to jihad against the
Allies, hoping to keep the Hejaz out of the war. Then he
learned of a Young Turk plot to assassinate him and replace
him with a more compliant Arab descendant of Muhammad.
Hussein avoided an immediate breach with the Ottomans,
but stepped up clandestine negotiations with the British.
He cobbled out arrangements with Sir Henry McMahon, the
British high commissioner in Egypt, as top cover for a revolt.
An independent Arab Kingdom with Hussein as its leader was
to encompass the Arab lands.
Proposed boundaries were wobbly. Hussein acknowledged
British interests in the Persian Gulf and French interests in
Syria, but anticipated European administration there for “a
short time” and with “compensation to the Arab Kingdom for
the period of occupation.”
The British supplied Hussein with grain, gold and guns.
On June 10, 1916, Hussein himself fired a single rifle round
into the Ottoman barracks in Mecca, launching the Arab Revolt.
Competing jihads now relieved Allied anxieties concerning
unrest among their Muslim peoples.
Hussein and his sons quickly secured most of the Hejaz, including
Mecca, Taif, Jeddah, Rabigh and Yanbu. Their forces
consisted largely of Bedouin irregulars, well adapted to the
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history
at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December
1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion,
66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned
to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry
Division, in 1995. Author of Kevlar Legions: The
Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005, he has a doctorate
in history from Indiana University.
desert but short on firepower and discipline.
These would be no match for
heavily armed Ottoman regulars in
pitched battles. The Ottomans retained
control of the railhead at Medina, and
soon amassed a force exceeding 11,000
there. They also imported Sharif Ali
Haydar, another Arab descendant of the
Prophet Muhammad, as their proposed
replacement for Hussein. The number
of tribesmen available to Hussein fluctuated
but averaged a few thousand.
The Ottomans set out from Medina
to recapture Mecca in August 1916, following
the reasonably watered coastal
route stretching through Yanbu, Rabigh
and Jeddah. At first they pushed all before
them, with the Bedouin melting
away rather than risking lopsided battles.
Arab deserters from the Ottoman
army, some of whom were former prisoners
of war, and a few Egyptian artillerymen provided a
leavening of conventional capability to Hussein’s forces, but
not enough to seriously delay the Ottoman advance. As the
Ottomans advanced and Hussein’s position deteriorated, the
potential for Bedouin desertions to Haydar and the Ottomans
became ever more likely.
In this emergency, British Capt. T.E. Lawrence of the Arab
Bureau captured the ear of British authorities in Cairo. An intelligence
officer widely traveled in the Arab East and familiar
with Hussein’s sons, he counseled against direct intervention.
European and non-Arab Muslim soldiers would be unwelcome
on the holy ground of the Hejaz, provoking resistance
that otherwise might not occur.
If the war in the Hejaz was to be won, Arabs would have to
win it. Guns, ammunition and, in particular, cash would help.
With these, Hussein could keep Bedouin troops in the field for
months on end. As long as they did not desert, the Bedouin
could wear the Ottomans down in the vast expanses of the
desert. British naval power, air support and technical advice
could be helpful, if discreetly used. Lawrence became the main
such adviser, bestowed with Arab dress by Hussein’s son Faysal.
The Ottomans pushed on toward Yanbu, scattering an
Arab contingent blocking their path with a surprise attack in
early December. Faysal rushed in with 5,000 reinforcements,
but the Ottomans turned these out of successive positions before
defeating them altogether at Nakhl Mubarak, an oasis but
a few hours’ ride from Yanbu. Faysal’s men retreated in considerable
disorder into Yanbu, steadily pursued by the Ottomans.
The Arabs dug in across the crowded streets of
Yanbu, throwing up barricades to assist in their defense.
Here, however, they had an advantage. Alerted by Lawrence,
the Royal Navy had assembled five ships off Yanbu. These outranged
and outgunned the artillery the Ottomans had brought
with them, and enjoyed superior fire controls. Searchlights on
the ships spoiled Ottoman options for a night attack. An assault
on Yanbu would have been costly, even if successful.
Over a hundred miles from their railhead at Medina and ex-
70 ARMY ■ December 2016

Prince Faysal, front,
at the Paris Peace
Conference with others
including British Capt.
T.E. Lawrence, third
from right.
National Archives
hausted by weeks of marching and fighting in a hostile environment,
the Ottomans weighed their options. They were
well aware of the British experience at Kut al-Amara, where a
Pyrrhic victory was followed by isolation, siege and surrender.
Bedouin tribesmen threatened their communications, their
own transportation animals were dying off, and reinforcements
in any immediate sense were unlikely.
They decided to withdraw back to Medina. British aircraft
and Bedouin raiders harassed the retreat, but the Ottomans
reached Medina largely intact. Here, they dug in for the duration
of the war.
Characterizing Yanbu as a decisive victory, Hussein gained
momentum. Bypassing Medina, forces of the Arab Revolt
seized Wajh and then Aqaba, and bedeviled the Hejaz Railway.
Eventually the Ottomans committed 25,000 soldiers to
securing that tenuous route, and Hussein’s forces dominated
the rest of the Hejaz.
British gold, weapons and supplies poured in. Severe Ottoman
suppressive measures had stoked resentment among
Arab nationalists in Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. Many
of them rallied to Hussein’s cause. British advances in Palestine
and Arab advances in the Transjordan complemented
each other. Damascus fell on Oct. 1, 1918, with Faysal formally
accepting its surrender. The Armistice of Mudros carried
the Ottomans out of the war on Oct. 31, 1918.
Unfortunately for peace in the Middle East, the British had
made more wartime promises than they could keep. Correspondence
between Hussein and McMahon committed to an
independent Arab Kingdom led by Hussein encompassing the
“Arab lands.” At about the same time, the Sykes-Picot Agreement
endorsed postwar colonial ambitions for France in Syria
and Britain in Mesopotamia.
To court Jewish support for the war effort, the Balfour Declaration
promised Britain’s “best endeavors” to facilitate “a national
home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. The British
had negotiated a fistful of arrangements with Persian Gulf potentates
prior to World War I, and these understandings remained
intact even as Hussein tried to pull together his “Arab
Kingdom.”
Secretiveness and lack of coordination more so than malice
account for the wildly conflicting British commitments, but
the damage was extraordinary nevertheless. Egypt, Syria and
Mesopotamia rose in revolt as British and French colonial intentions
became clear. Fighting broke out between Jews and
Arabs in Palestine.
Ibn Saud, a Persian Gulf British ally, conquered the Hejaz,
displaced Hussein’s son Ali, and established Saudi Arabia.
Colonial borders hardened into not particularly governable
post-colonial states, and ethnic and national rivalries carried
on unabated. Never have the consequences of inadequate
plans to secure peace been more consequential than in the aftermath
of World War I. The ideal of a peaceable and united
Arab Kingdom was gone with the wind.
✭
Additional Reading
Anderson, Scott, Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial
Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East
(London: Atlantic Books, 2014)
Lawrence, T.E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph
(New York: Doubleday, 1936)
Rogan, Eugene, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War
in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2015)
December 2016 ■ ARMY 71

Final Shot
U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton
A soldier demonstrates his hand-grenade skills during the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command’s Drill Sergeant and Advanced Individual Training
Platoon Sergeant of the Year competition at Fort Jackson, S.C.
72 ARMY ■ December 2016

THIS CONNECTED.
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So whether the mission is transport of troops and equipment, special ops, search and rescue, or delivering
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