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Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

1 Great Britain Table 11

1 Great Britain Table 11 Brexit model with levels of social trust leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval) age3 25–34 1.793987 0.6310889 2.84 0.004 0.5570757 3.030899 35–44 2.026917 0.6391752 3.17 0.002 0.7741571 3.279678 45–54 2.178513 0.6320035 3.45 0.001 0.9398089 3.417217 55–64 2.299213 0.6071426 3.79 0 1.109236 3.489191 65+ 2.265572 0.6064029 3.74 0 1.077044 3.4541 education1 -0.5582819 0.0784971 -7.11 0 -0.7121334 -0.4044304 1.white 1.275547 0.6544262 1.95 0.051 -0.0071048 2.558199 religion1 Christian 0.4488639 0.2127661 2.11 0.035 0.03185 0.8658779 other religion 0.420326 0.5303171 0.79 0.428 -0.6190765 1.459728 1.ruralla 0.6761046 0.2100748 3.22 0.001 0.2643655 1.087844 incomenom1 under £1,520pm -0.7535278 0.370463 -2.03 0.042 -1.1479622 -0.0274336 over £3,160 -2.317528 0.5806413 -3.99 0 -3.455564 -1.179491 male male -0.8038296 0.2982439 -2.7 0.007 -1.388366 -0.2192822 socdifcountry yes -0.953439 0.2968335 -3.21 0.001 -1.535222 -0.3716559 incomenom1#socdifcountry under £1,520pm#yes 0.1284486 0.4281261 0.3 0.764 -0.7106632 0.9675604 over £3,160#yes 1.509081 0.5913802 2.55 0.011 0.3499967 2.668165 incomenom1#male under £1,520pm#male 0.7859251 0.4263775 1.84 0.065 -0.0497595 1.62161 over £3,160#male 1.55748 0.5885303 2.65 0.008 0.4039815 2.710978 soctrust1 04-Jul -1.289572 0.6063319 -2.13 0.033 -2.477961 -0.1011836 08-Oct -1.611063 0.5970109 -2.7 0.007 -2.781183 -0.4409435 _cons 0.3368493 1.085019 0.31 0.756 -1.789748 2.463447 Logistic Regression Number of obs = 693 Wald chi2(20) = 168.71 Prob > chi2 = 0 Log pseudolikelihood = -341.63936 Pseudo R2 = 0.2335

101 Table 12 Brexit model with attitudes to globalisation (Europe) leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval) age3 25–34 1.27012 0.6090076 2.09 0.037 0.0764869 2.463753 35–44 1.184893 0.5940277 1.99 0.046 0.0206203 2.349166 45–54 1.457002 0.5939093 2.45 0.014 0.2929616 2.621043 55–64 1.381286 0.5693809 2.43 0.015 0.2653201 2.497252 65+ 1.292294 0.5640453 2.29 0.022 0.1867853 2.397802 education1 -0.5045843 0.0849808 -5.94 0 -0.6711436 -0.338025 1.white 1.596494 0.762329 2.09 0.036 0.1023567 3.090632 religion1 Christian 0.7917461 0.2545319 3.11 0.002 0.2928727 1.290619 other religion 0.1689743 0.5386787 0.31 0.754 -0.8868167 1.224765 1.ruralla 0.7952901 0.2353882 3.38 0.001 0.3339377 1.256642 incomenom1 under £1,520pm -1.139291 0.4307787 -2.64 0.008 -1.983602 -0.2949803 over £3,160 -2.92856 0.8113665 -3.61 0 -4.518809 -1.33831 male male -1.016657 0.3335248 -3.05 0.002 -1.670354 -0.3629606 socdifcountry yes -1.049536 0.3265969 -3.21 0.001 -1.689654 -0.4094178 incomenom1#socdifcountry under £1,520pm#yes -0.0456634 0.4848669 -0.09 0.925 -0.995985 0.9046582 over £3,160#yes 1.916262 0.7687773 2.49 0.013 0.4094858 3.423037 incomenom1#male under £1,520pm#male 1.352823 0.4781883 2.83 0.005 0.4155908 2.290054 over £3,160#male 1.581352 0.6805341 2.32 0.02 0.2475294 2.915174 glob1b negative 2.666646 0.3142108 8.49 0 2.050804 3.282488 _cons -1.178349 0.9584769 -1.23 0.219 -3.056929 0.7002316 Logistic Regression Number of obs = 657 Wald chi2(20) = 175.29 Prob > chi2 = 0 Log pseudolikelihood = -277.56236 Pseudo R2 = 0.3436

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    “ Mapping and responding to the r

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    First published in 2017 © Demos. S

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    Open access. Some rights reserved.

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    11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea

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    13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o

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    15 rising tide that cuts across tra

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    17 diversity), and political leader

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    19 trends in Austria, where the Fre

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    21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k

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    23 themselves embodying the fear of

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    25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and

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    27 While the Central European case

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    29 Europe, but the politics of fear

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    31 of European identity - attachmen

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    33 Euroscepticism In every country,

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    35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in

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    37 Political trust We also asked ou

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    39 significantly less support in th

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    41 - internationally and intranatio

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    43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit

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    45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur

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    47 References ‘Denmark suspends q

  • Page 49 and 50: 49 European Commission, Standard Eu
  • Page 51 and 52: 1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you
  • Page 53 and 54: 53 1 What we already know about Bre
  • Page 55 and 56: 55 compared with 59 per cent of tho
  • Page 57 and 58: 57 This leads the authors to conclu
  • Page 59 and 60: 59 think it is vital to let Europea
  • Page 61 and 62: 61 between areas hit hardest by aus
  • Page 63 and 64: 63 wealthy towns in the south of En
  • Page 65 and 66: 65 Similarly strong predictive powe
  • Page 67 and 68: 67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi
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  • Page 71 and 72: 71 One caveat of this research is t
  • Page 73 and 74: 73 vote (and indeed on populism in
  • Page 75 and 76: 75 As part of this project, we comm
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  • Page 83 and 84: 83 Table 3 Predicted probability of
  • Page 85 and 86: 85 Over recent decades the world ha
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  • Page 89 and 90: 89 ·· relative employment depriva
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  • Page 93 and 94: 93 regardless of the possible impor
  • Page 95 and 96: 95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif
  • Page 97 and 98: 97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu
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  • Page 103 and 104: 103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti
  • Page 105 and 106: 105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref
  • Page 107 and 108: 107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo
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  • Page 111 and 112: 111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org
  • Page 113 and 114: 113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff
  • Page 115 and 116: 115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United
  • Page 117 and 118: 117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit
  • Page 119 and 120: 119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
  • Page 121 and 122: 121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
  • Page 123 and 124: 123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
  • Page 125: 125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
  • Page 128 and 129: Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
  • Page 130 and 131: Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
  • Page 132 and 133: 2 France of reasons. It affects how
  • Page 134 and 135: 2 France impetus that originates in
  • Page 136 and 137: 2 France Another illustration of Fr
  • Page 138 and 139: 2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
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  • Page 142 and 143: 2 France The situation in Poland, f
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  • Page 148 and 149: 2 France 2 Elections at a time of p
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    2 France These results are particul

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    2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur

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    2 France One of the parties that is

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    2 France the idea of ‘plain speak

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    2 France The fact that these two is

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    2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur

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    2 France As in the YouGov survey, D

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    2 France Conclusion: the need to pu

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    2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p

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    2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon

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    2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be

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    2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus

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    Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég

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    Contents Summary Introduction Metho

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    3 Germany politicians have difficul

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    3 Germany among the German public s

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    Methodology 3 Germany To further th

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    3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente

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    3 Germany Taking a closer look at t

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    3 Germany When looking at all the c

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    3 Germany with different demographi

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    3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond

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    3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont

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    3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about

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    3 Germany of the politicians interv

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    3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone

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    3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany issues that are the EU’

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    3 Germany are able to draw on compa

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    Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat

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    3 Germany concerns and alleviating

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    3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl

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    3 Germany public-elite comparisons

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    3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··

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    3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol

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    3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger

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    3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp

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    3 Germany European Parliament, Stan

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    Contents Introduction 1 Migration,

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    4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi

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    4 Spain During the rapid economic e

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    4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for

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    4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit

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    4 Spain In short, high levels of mi

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    4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer

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    4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of

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    4 Spain This Europeanism presents i

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    4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon

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    4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa

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    4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp

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    4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif

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    4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r

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    4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde

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    4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which

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    4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie

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    4 Spain are most inclined to vote f

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    4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit

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    4 Spain The extreme right was disco

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    4 Spain towns, although none of the

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    4 Spain emphasising unity and the l

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    4 Spain cradles of successful natio

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    4 Spain of the population supportin

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    4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne

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    4 Spain Material deprivation covers

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    4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta

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    4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion

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    4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub

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    4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal

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    4 Spain paper presented at the 12th

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    Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc

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    5 Poland Introduction - what happen

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    5 Poland the Hungarian political sc

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    5 Poland the Law and Justice party,

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    5 Poland giving the winner an absol

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    5 Poland and to tire out the domest

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    5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ

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    5 Poland and an inflow of European

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    5 Poland The second factor is the p

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    5 Poland seems economic indicators

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    5 Poland occupational qualification

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    5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans

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    5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie

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    5 Poland Despite the generally posi

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    5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa

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    5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co

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    5 Poland Post-election developments

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    5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and

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    5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB

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    5 Poland women’s access to legal

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    5 Poland commentators did not expec

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    5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a

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    5 Poland The rise of authoritarian

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    5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad

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    5 Poland Since then, the near absen

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    5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind

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    5 Poland European Union’, Standar

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    5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac

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    5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup

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    5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,

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    5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje

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    5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a

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    5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek

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    5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2

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    6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration

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    375 Introduction In Swedish migrati

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    377 migrants came mainly as family

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    379 Citizens from outside the EU ar

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    381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo

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    383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed

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    385 science: national identity is t

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    387 During the refugee crisis of 20

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    389 and immigrants even when suppos

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    391 2 Analysis and results The main

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    393 she suggested that the ‘migra

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    395 emphasised, this crisis came ac

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    397 directed towards Swedishness in

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    399 which leads voters to connect S

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    401 exclusively of people with a ci

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    403 Table 3 confirms the findings i

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    405 Summary and discussion During 2

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    407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ

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    409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök

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    411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström

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    413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,

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    415 References ‘Historiskt högt

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    417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon

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    419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    423 Introduction This project has i

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    425 In responding to the current fe

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    427 in facilitated discussion to es

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    429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites

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    431 background is also central to r

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    433 Boost the accountability of EU

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    435 3 Make the case for openness an

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    437 communities and country’s pla

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    439 1.8 million signatures, predomi

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    441 4 Counter post-truth narratives

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    443 organisation’ 30 - including

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    445 - whether through public policy

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    447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob

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    449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl

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    451 References Arthur J and Kristj

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    453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma

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    Demos - License to Publish The work

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    This project is supported by The ca

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