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Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

1 Great Britain Table 15

1 Great Britain Table 15 Brexit model with attitudes to globalisation (own life) leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval) age3 25–34 2.128536 0.5767968 3.69 0 0.9980351 3.259037 35–44 2.018186 0.5883192 3.43 0.001 0.8651012 3.17127 45–54 2.345339 0.5868823 4 0 1.195071 3.495607 55–64 2.311586 0.5555125 4.16 0 1.222801 3.40037 65+ 2.301402 0.5702286 4.04 0 1.183774 3.419029 education1 -0.5632384 0.0889705 -6.33 0 -0.7376174 -0.3888593 1.white 1.201348 0.7137202 1.68 0.092 -0.1975184 2.600213 religion1 Christian 0.6711543 0.2678068 2.51 0.012 0.1462627 1.196046 other religion 0.2015327 0.5221228 0.39 0.7 -0.8218092 1.224875 1.ruralla 0.6589097 0.2406382 2.74 0.006 0.1872674 1.130552 incomenom1 under £1,520pm -0.652963 0.4112525 -1.59 0.112 -1.459003 0.1530771 over £3,160 -2.494873 0.6863733 -3.63 0 -3.84014 -1.149607 male male -0.5610426 0.319424 -1.76 0.079 -1.187102 0.065017 socdifcountry yes -0.8858376 0.3168724 -2.8 0.005 -1.506896 -0.2647791 incomenom1#socdifcountry under £1,520pm#yes -0.0532684 0.4874833 -0.11 0.913 -1.008718 0.9021812 over £3,160#yes 1.590677 0.7126725 2.23 0.026 0.1938646 2.987489 incomenom1#male under £1,520pm#male 0.7529648 0.4801523 1.57 0.117 -0.1881164 1.694046 over £3,160#male 1.575893 0.6796225 2.32 0.02 0.2438573 2.907929 glob4b negative 1.55371 0.2882326 5.39 0 0.9887845 2.118636 _cons -1.742764 0.904825 -1.93 0.054 -3.516189 0.0306601 Logistic Regression Number of obs = 594 Wald chi2(20) = 163.96 Prob > chi2 = 0 Log pseudolikelihood = -272.7166 Pseudo R2 = 0.2853

105 Table 16 Brexit model with preferred political leadership style (consensual vs strong or neither) leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval) age3 25–34 1.440666 0.5378152 2.68 0.007 0.3865673 2.494764 35–44 1.744874 0.5352011 3.26 0.001 0.6958987 2.793849 45–54 1.927284 0.5422538 3.55 0 0.864486 2.990082 55–64 2.06618 0.5070442 4.07 0 1.072392 3.059968 65+ 1.966977 0.5108311 3.85 0 0.9657667 2.968188 education1 -0.5996438 0.0802994 -7.47 0 -0.7570277 -0.4422599 1.white 1.534104 0.6434662 2.38 0.017 0.2729333 2.795274 religion1 Christian 0.5349257 0.217184 2.46 0.014 0.1092528 0.9605986 other religion 0.6504472 0.5235499 1.24 0.214 -0.3756918 1.676586 1.ruralla 0.5542725 0.213787 2.59 0.01 0.1352577 0.9732874 incomenom1 under £1,520pm -0.9247793 0.3820564 -2.42 0.015 -1.673596 -0.1759626 over £3,160 -2.648528 0.5882963 -4.5 0 -3.801568 -1.495488 male male -0.8261431 0.3028058 -2.73 0.006 -1.419631 -0.2326547 socdifcountry yes -1.181874 0.3008092 -3.93 0 -1.771449 -0.5922985 incomenom1#socdifcountry under £1,520pm#yes 0.1423095 0.4357065 0.33 0.744 -0.7116595 0.9962786 over £3,160#yes 1.692764 0.6051272 2.8 0.005 0.5067365 2.878791 incomenom1#male under £1,520pm#male 0.8872693 0.4263684 2.08 0.037 0.0516026 1.722936 over £3,160#male 1.698101 0.6106393 2.78 0.005 0.5012698 2.894932 consensual consensual -0.5822296 0.2258108 -2.58 0.01 -1.024811 -0.1396486 _cons -0.4070814 0.8406769 -0.48 0.628 -2.054778 1.240615 Logistic Regression Number of obs = 668 Wald chi2(20) = 168.33 Prob > chi2 = 0 Log pseudolikelihood = -323.04264 Pseudo R2 = 0.2427

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    “ Mapping and responding to the r

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    First published in 2017 © Demos. S

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    Open access. Some rights reserved.

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    11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea

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    13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o

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    15 rising tide that cuts across tra

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    17 diversity), and political leader

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    19 trends in Austria, where the Fre

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    21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k

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    23 themselves embodying the fear of

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    25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and

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    27 While the Central European case

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    29 Europe, but the politics of fear

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    31 of European identity - attachmen

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    33 Euroscepticism In every country,

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    35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in

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    37 Political trust We also asked ou

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    39 significantly less support in th

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    41 - internationally and intranatio

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    43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit

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    45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur

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    47 References ‘Denmark suspends q

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    49 European Commission, Standard Eu

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    1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you

  • Page 53 and 54: 53 1 What we already know about Bre
  • Page 55 and 56: 55 compared with 59 per cent of tho
  • Page 57 and 58: 57 This leads the authors to conclu
  • Page 59 and 60: 59 think it is vital to let Europea
  • Page 61 and 62: 61 between areas hit hardest by aus
  • Page 63 and 64: 63 wealthy towns in the south of En
  • Page 65 and 66: 65 Similarly strong predictive powe
  • Page 67 and 68: 67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi
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  • Page 71 and 72: 71 One caveat of this research is t
  • Page 73 and 74: 73 vote (and indeed on populism in
  • Page 75 and 76: 75 As part of this project, we comm
  • Page 77 and 78: 77 Table 1 Predicted probability of
  • Page 79 and 80: 79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat
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  • Page 83 and 84: 83 Table 3 Predicted probability of
  • Page 85 and 86: 85 Over recent decades the world ha
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  • Page 93 and 94: 93 regardless of the possible impor
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  • Page 97 and 98: 97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu
  • Page 99 and 100: 99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit
  • Page 101 and 102: 101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti
  • Page 103: 103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti
  • Page 107 and 108: 107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo
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  • Page 111 and 112: 111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org
  • Page 113 and 114: 113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff
  • Page 115 and 116: 115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United
  • Page 117 and 118: 117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit
  • Page 119 and 120: 119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
  • Page 121 and 122: 121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
  • Page 123 and 124: 123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
  • Page 125: 125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
  • Page 128 and 129: Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
  • Page 130 and 131: Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
  • Page 132 and 133: 2 France of reasons. It affects how
  • Page 134 and 135: 2 France impetus that originates in
  • Page 136 and 137: 2 France Another illustration of Fr
  • Page 138 and 139: 2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
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  • Page 142 and 143: 2 France The situation in Poland, f
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  • Page 146 and 147: 2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv
  • Page 148 and 149: 2 France 2 Elections at a time of p
  • Page 150 and 151: 2 France These results are particul
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    2 France One of the parties that is

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    2 France the idea of ‘plain speak

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    2 France The fact that these two is

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    2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur

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    2 France As in the YouGov survey, D

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    2 France Conclusion: the need to pu

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    2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p

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    2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon

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    2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be

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    2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus

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    Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég

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    Contents Summary Introduction Metho

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    3 Germany politicians have difficul

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    3 Germany among the German public s

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    Methodology 3 Germany To further th

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    3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente

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    3 Germany Taking a closer look at t

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    3 Germany When looking at all the c

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    3 Germany with different demographi

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    3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond

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    3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont

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    3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about

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    3 Germany of the politicians interv

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    3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone

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    3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany issues that are the EU’

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    3 Germany are able to draw on compa

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    Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat

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    3 Germany concerns and alleviating

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    3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl

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    3 Germany public-elite comparisons

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    3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··

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    3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol

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    3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger

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    3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp

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    3 Germany European Parliament, Stan

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    Contents Introduction 1 Migration,

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    4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi

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    4 Spain During the rapid economic e

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    4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for

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    4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit

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    4 Spain In short, high levels of mi

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    4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer

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    4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of

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    4 Spain This Europeanism presents i

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    4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon

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    4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa

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    4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp

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    4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif

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    4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r

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    4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde

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    4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which

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    4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie

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    4 Spain are most inclined to vote f

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    4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit

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    4 Spain The extreme right was disco

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    4 Spain towns, although none of the

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    4 Spain emphasising unity and the l

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    4 Spain cradles of successful natio

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    4 Spain of the population supportin

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    4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne

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    4 Spain Material deprivation covers

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    4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta

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    4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion

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    4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub

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    4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal

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    4 Spain paper presented at the 12th

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    Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc

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    5 Poland Introduction - what happen

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    5 Poland the Hungarian political sc

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    5 Poland the Law and Justice party,

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    5 Poland giving the winner an absol

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    5 Poland and to tire out the domest

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    5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ

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    5 Poland and an inflow of European

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    5 Poland The second factor is the p

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    5 Poland seems economic indicators

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    5 Poland occupational qualification

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    5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans

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    5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie

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    5 Poland Despite the generally posi

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    5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa

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    5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co

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    5 Poland Post-election developments

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    5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and

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    5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB

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    5 Poland women’s access to legal

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    5 Poland commentators did not expec

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    5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a

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    5 Poland The rise of authoritarian

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    5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad

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    5 Poland Since then, the near absen

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    5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind

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    5 Poland European Union’, Standar

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    5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac

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    5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup

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    5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,

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    5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje

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    5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a

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    5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek

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    5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2

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    6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration

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    375 Introduction In Swedish migrati

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    377 migrants came mainly as family

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    379 Citizens from outside the EU ar

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    381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo

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    383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed

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    385 science: national identity is t

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    387 During the refugee crisis of 20

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    389 and immigrants even when suppos

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    391 2 Analysis and results The main

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    393 she suggested that the ‘migra

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    395 emphasised, this crisis came ac

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    397 directed towards Swedishness in

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    399 which leads voters to connect S

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    401 exclusively of people with a ci

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    403 Table 3 confirms the findings i

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    405 Summary and discussion During 2

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    407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ

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    409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök

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    411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström

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    413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,

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    415 References ‘Historiskt högt

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    417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon

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    419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    423 Introduction This project has i

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    425 In responding to the current fe

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    427 in facilitated discussion to es

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    429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites

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    431 background is also central to r

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    433 Boost the accountability of EU

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    435 3 Make the case for openness an

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    437 communities and country’s pla

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    439 1.8 million signatures, predomi

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    441 4 Counter post-truth narratives

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    443 organisation’ 30 - including

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    445 - whether through public policy

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    447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob

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    449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl

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    451 References Arthur J and Kristj

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    453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma

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    Demos - License to Publish The work

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    This project is supported by The ca

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