Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself
1 Great Britain Table 17 Brexit model with attitudes to international cooperation (cooperate vs put Britain first or neither) leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval) age3 25–34 1.379287 0.6733361 2.05 0.041 0.0595726 2.699001 35–44 1.992022 0.6748388 2.95 0.003 0.6693624 3.314682 45–54 1.74318 0.6168398 2.83 0.005 0.5341962 2.952164 55–64 2.073719 0.6218387 3.33 0.001 0.8549376 3.292501 65+ 1.956028 0.6169567 3.17 0.002 0.7468149 3.165241 education1 -0.4762585 0.0957761 -4.97 0 -0.6639762 -0.2885408 1.white 1.333426 0.9042877 1.47 0.14 -0.4389456 3.105797 religion1 Christian 0.4710541 0.2645078 1.78 0.075 -0.0473717 0.9894799 other religion 0.4631358 0.561161 0.83 0.409 -0.6367195 1.562991 1.ruralla 0.529269 0.2837055 1.87 0.062 -0.0267835 1.085322 incomenom1 under £1,520pm -0.5186517 0.4428839 -1.17 0.242 -1.386688 0.3493847 over £3,160 -2.22161 0.7465685 -2.98 0.003 -3.684857 -0.7583628 male male -0.3040613 0.3611871 -0.84 0.4 -1.011975 0.4038524 socdifcountry yes -1.012278 0.3602688 -2.81 0.005 -1.718392 -0.3061645 incomenom1#socdifcountry under £1,520pm#yes -0.4153401 0.5363815 -0.77 0.439 -1.466629 0.6359484 over £3,160#yes 2.057513 0.77995 2.64 0.008 0.5288393 3.586187 incomenom1#male under £1,520pm#male 0.7906286 0.5381362 1.47 0.142 -0.264099 1.845356 over £3,160#male 1.188076 0.7048558 1.69 0.092 -0.193416 2.569568 intcoop cooperate -3.048002 0.2589008 -11.77 0 -3.555439 -2.540566 _cons 0.2723731 1.082688 0.25 0.801 -1.849656 2.394402 Logistic Regression Number of obs = 669 Wald chi2(20) = 215.41 Prob > chi2 = 0 Log pseudolikelihood = -237.71372 Pseudo R2 = 0.4467
107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win for “proper people”?: Brexit as a rejection of the networked world?’, Juncture. 23, no 1, 2016, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2050- 5876.2016.00886.x/epdf (accessed 16 Jan 2017). 2 D Rodrik, ‘The inescapable trilemma of the world economy’, Dani Rodrik’s weblog, 27 Jun 2007, http:// rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/06/theinescapable.html (accessed 16 Jan 2017). 3 MJ Goodwin and O Heath, ‘The 2016 referendum, Brexit and the left behind: an aggregate-level analysis of the result’, Political Quarterly 87, no 3, Jul–Sep 2016, pp 323–32, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12285/ abstract (accessed 16 Jan 2017). 4 Ibid. 5 www.matthewjgoodwin.org/uploads/6/4/0/2/64026337/ political_quarterly_version_1_9.pdf. 6 E Fieldhouse et al, ‘British Election Study Combined Wave 1–9 Internet Panel’, British Election Study, [2016]. 7 M Goodwin and O Heath, ‘Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016, www.jrf.org.uk/report/brexit-voteexplained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-opportunities (accessed 16 Jan 2017). 8 T Helm, ‘EU referendum: youth turnout almost twice as high as first thought’, Guardian, 10 Jul 2016, www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/09/
“ Mapping and responding to the r
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11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea
13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o
15 rising tide that cuts across tra
17 diversity), and political leader
19 trends in Austria, where the Fre
21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k
23 themselves embodying the fear of
25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and
27 While the Central European case
29 Europe, but the politics of fear
31 of European identity - attachmen
33 Euroscepticism In every country,
35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in
37 Political trust We also asked ou
39 significantly less support in th
41 - internationally and intranatio
43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit
45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur
47 References ‘Denmark suspends q
49 European Commission, Standard Eu
1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you
53 1 What we already know about Bre
2 France the idea of ‘plain speak
2 France The fact that these two is
2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur
2 France As in the YouGov survey, D
2 France Conclusion: the need to pu
2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p
2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon
2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be
2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus
Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég
Contents Summary Introduction Metho
3 Germany politicians have difficul
3 Germany among the German public s
Methodology 3 Germany To further th
3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente
3 Germany Taking a closer look at t
3 Germany When looking at all the c
3 Germany with different demographi
3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond
3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont
3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about
3 Germany of the politicians interv
3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon
3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone
3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon
3 Germany issues that are the EU’
3 Germany are able to draw on compa
Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat
3 Germany concerns and alleviating
3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl
3 Germany public-elite comparisons
3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol
3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger
3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp
3 Germany European Parliament, Stan
Contents Introduction 1 Migration,
4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi
4 Spain During the rapid economic e
4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for
4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit
4 Spain In short, high levels of mi
4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer
4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of
4 Spain This Europeanism presents i
4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon
4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa
4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp
4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif
4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r
4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde
4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which
4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie
4 Spain are most inclined to vote f
4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit
4 Spain The extreme right was disco
4 Spain towns, although none of the
4 Spain emphasising unity and the l
4 Spain cradles of successful natio
4 Spain of the population supportin
4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne
4 Spain Material deprivation covers
4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta
4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion
4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub
4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal
4 Spain paper presented at the 12th
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc
5 Poland Introduction - what happen
5 Poland the Hungarian political sc
5 Poland the Law and Justice party,
5 Poland giving the winner an absol
5 Poland and to tire out the domest
5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ
5 Poland and an inflow of European
5 Poland The second factor is the p
5 Poland seems economic indicators
5 Poland occupational qualification
5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans
5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie
5 Poland Despite the generally posi
5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa
5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co
5 Poland Post-election developments
5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and
5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB
5 Poland women’s access to legal
5 Poland commentators did not expec
5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a
5 Poland The rise of authoritarian
5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad
5 Poland Since then, the near absen
5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind
5 Poland European Union’, Standar
5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac
5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup
5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,
5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje
5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a
5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek
5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2
6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration
375 Introduction In Swedish migrati
377 migrants came mainly as family
379 Citizens from outside the EU ar
381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo
383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed
385 science: national identity is t
387 During the refugee crisis of 20
389 and immigrants even when suppos
391 2 Analysis and results The main
393 she suggested that the ‘migra
395 emphasised, this crisis came ac
397 directed towards Swedishness in
399 which leads voters to connect S
401 exclusively of people with a ci
403 Table 3 confirms the findings i
405 Summary and discussion During 2
407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ
409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök
411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström
413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,
415 References ‘Historiskt högt
417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon
419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe
7 Responding to the politics of fea
423 Introduction This project has i
425 In responding to the current fe
427 in facilitated discussion to es
429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites
431 background is also central to r
433 Boost the accountability of EU
435 3 Make the case for openness an
437 communities and country’s pla
439 1.8 million signatures, predomi
441 4 Counter post-truth narratives
443 organisation’ 30 - including
445 - whether through public policy
447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob
449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl
451 References Arthur J and Kristj
453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma
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