Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself
1 Great Britain Polonski V, ‘Impact of social media on the outcome of the EU referendum’, EU Referendum Analysis 2016, nd, www. referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-7- social-media/impact-of-social-media-on-the-outcome-of-the-eureferendum/ (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Prosser C, Mellon J and Green J, ‘What mattered most to you when deciding how to vote in the EU referendum?’, British Election Study, 11 Jul 2016, www.britishelectionstudy.com/ bes-findings/what-mattered-most-to-you-when-deciding-howto-vote-in-the-eu-referendum/#.WH3E2_mLSM9 (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Reuters Institute, ‘Study shows that majority of press coverage in EU referendum campaign was heavily skewed in favour of Brexit in first months of campaign’, press release, 20 May 2016, http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/studyshows-majority-press-coverage-eu-referendum-campaign-washeavily-skewed-favour-brexit (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Rodrik D, ‘The inescapable trilemma of the world economy’, Dani Rodrik’s weblog, 27 Jun 2007, http://rodrik.typepad. com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/06/the-inescapable.html (accessed 16 Jan 2017). Runciman D, ‘A win for “proper people”?: Brexit as a rejection of the networked world?’, Juncture. 23, no 1, 2016, http:// onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2050-5876.2016.00886.x/ epdf (accessed 16 Jan 2017). Runciman D, ‘How the education gap is tearing politics apart’, Guardian, 5 Oct 2016, www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/ oct/05/trump-brexit-education-gap-tearing-politics-apart (accessed 16 Jan 2017). Sloam J, ‘The generation gap: how young voters view the UK’s referendum’, blog, EUROPP, 7 Apr 2016, http://blogs. lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/04/07/the-generation-gap-howyoung-voters-view-the-uks-referendum/ (accessed 16 Jan 2017).
125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism beyond Brexit: significant opposition in key European countries to an ever closer EU’, Pew Research Center, 7 Jun 2016, www.pewglobal. org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/ (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Stubager R, ‘Education effects on authoritarian-libertarian values: a question of socialization’, British Journal of Sociology 59, no 2, 2008, pp 327–50, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pubmed/18498598 (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Toynbee P, ‘Brexit supporters have unleashed furies even they can’t control’, Guardian, 13 Jun 2016, www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2016/jun/13/brexit-supporters-leave-vote-right (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Williams R, ‘Using the margins command to estimate and interpret adjusted predictions and marginal effects’, Stata Journal 12, no 2, 2012, pp 308–31, www.econ.uzh.ch/dam/ jcr:00000000-5766-84b0-ffff-ffffa80635e1/sj12-2.pdf#page=148 (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Wright D and Case R, ‘Leave voters felt ignored and left behind as post-Brexit poll reveals extent of economic division across UK’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 15 Jul 2016, www.jrf. org.uk/press/leave-voters-felt-ignored-and-left-behind-brexitpoll (accessed 17 Jan 2017). YouGov, ‘Today Programme survey results’, 13–14 Jun 2016, http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/ document/x4iynd1mn7/TodayResults_160614_ EUReferendum_W.pdf (accessed 17 Jan 2017).
“ Mapping and responding to the r
First published in 2017 © Demos. S
Open access. Some rights reserved.
11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea
13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o
15 rising tide that cuts across tra
17 diversity), and political leader
19 trends in Austria, where the Fre
21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k
23 themselves embodying the fear of
25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and
27 While the Central European case
29 Europe, but the politics of fear
31 of European identity - attachmen
33 Euroscepticism In every country,
35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in
37 Political trust We also asked ou
39 significantly less support in th
41 - internationally and intranatio
43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit
45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur
47 References ‘Denmark suspends q
49 European Commission, Standard Eu
1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you
53 1 What we already know about Bre
55 compared with 59 per cent of tho
57 This leads the authors to conclu
59 think it is vital to let Europea
61 between areas hit hardest by aus
63 wealthy towns in the south of En
65 Similarly strong predictive powe
67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi
69 External and campaign factors Th
71 One caveat of this research is t
Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég
Contents Summary Introduction Metho
3 Germany politicians have difficul
3 Germany among the German public s
Methodology 3 Germany To further th
3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente
3 Germany Taking a closer look at t
3 Germany When looking at all the c
3 Germany with different demographi
3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond
3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont
3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about
3 Germany of the politicians interv
3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon
3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone
3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon
3 Germany issues that are the EU’
3 Germany are able to draw on compa
Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat
3 Germany concerns and alleviating
3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl
3 Germany public-elite comparisons
3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol
3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger
3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp
3 Germany European Parliament, Stan
Contents Introduction 1 Migration,
4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi
4 Spain During the rapid economic e
4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for
4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit
4 Spain In short, high levels of mi
4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer
4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of
4 Spain This Europeanism presents i
4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon
4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa
4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp
4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif
4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r
4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde
4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which
4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie
4 Spain are most inclined to vote f
4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit
4 Spain The extreme right was disco
4 Spain towns, although none of the
4 Spain emphasising unity and the l
4 Spain cradles of successful natio
4 Spain of the population supportin
4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne
4 Spain Material deprivation covers
4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta
4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion
4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub
4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal
4 Spain paper presented at the 12th
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc
5 Poland Introduction - what happen
5 Poland the Hungarian political sc
5 Poland the Law and Justice party,
5 Poland giving the winner an absol
5 Poland and to tire out the domest
5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ
5 Poland and an inflow of European
5 Poland The second factor is the p
5 Poland seems economic indicators
5 Poland occupational qualification
5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans
5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie
5 Poland Despite the generally posi
5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa
5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co
5 Poland Post-election developments
5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and
5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB
5 Poland women’s access to legal
5 Poland commentators did not expec
5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a
5 Poland The rise of authoritarian
5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad
5 Poland Since then, the near absen
5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind
5 Poland European Union’, Standar
5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac
5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup
5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,
5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje
5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a
5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek
5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2
6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration
375 Introduction In Swedish migrati
377 migrants came mainly as family
379 Citizens from outside the EU ar
381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo
383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed
385 science: national identity is t
387 During the refugee crisis of 20
389 and immigrants even when suppos
391 2 Analysis and results The main
393 she suggested that the ‘migra
395 emphasised, this crisis came ac
397 directed towards Swedishness in
399 which leads voters to connect S
401 exclusively of people with a ci
403 Table 3 confirms the findings i
405 Summary and discussion During 2
407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ
409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök
411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström
413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,
415 References ‘Historiskt högt
417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon
419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe
7 Responding to the politics of fea
423 Introduction This project has i
425 In responding to the current fe
427 in facilitated discussion to es
429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites
431 background is also central to r
433 Boost the accountability of EU
435 3 Make the case for openness an
437 communities and country’s pla
439 1.8 million signatures, predomi
441 4 Counter post-truth narratives
443 organisation’ 30 - including
445 - whether through public policy
447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob
449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl
451 References Arthur J and Kristj
453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma
Demos - License to Publish The work
This project is supported by The ca