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Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

2 France

2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus-contre-des-refugies_4917914_3224. html#2bKdGgTbwgXWFI1D.99 (accessed 19 Jan 2017). Debomy D, L’UE malgré tout? Les opinions publiques européennes face aux crises (2005–2015) [The EU in spite of everything? European public opinion in times of crises (2005–2015)], Études et Rapports 111, Institut Jacques Delors, Jun 2016. Duhamel A, Les peurs françaises [French fears], Gallimard, 1993. Duhamel A, Pathologies Françaises [French pathologies], Plon, 2016. European Commission, ‘Public opinion in the European Union: first results’, wave EB85.2, Standard Eurobarometer 85, spring 2016, ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/ index.cfm/…/75902 (accessed 20 Jan 2017). European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, European Union Open Data Portal, Jul 2016, https://data.europa.eu/ euodp/en/data/dataset/S2130_85_2_STD85_ENG (accessed 20 Jan 2017). Finchelstein G et al, ‘L’observatoire de la démocratie’, Fondation Jean Jaurès, 29 Sep 2016, https://jean-jaures.org/ nos-productions/l-observatoire-de-la-democratie (accessed 20 Jan 2017). Fractures Françaises 2016: Vague 4, Ipsos and Sopra Steria pour Le Monde, La Fondation Jean Jaurès et Sciences Po, May 2016, www.ipsos.fr/sites/default/files/doc_associe/fractures_ francaises_2016.pdf (accessed 19 Jan 2017). Furedi F, ‘The politics of fear’ in Politics of Fear, London, Continuum, 2005.

173 Hobeika A and Villeneuve G, Les thèmes du Front National et l’agenda de la presse française (2006–2013), [The themes of the National Front and the agenda of the French press (2006– 2013)], Counterpoint, supported by Stichting Democratie in Media, 2014. Husymans J, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, London, Routledge, 2006. Ifop pour Atlantico, ‘Les enjeux déterminants du vote à l’élection pridentielle de 2017’, Jul 2016, www.ifop.com/media/ poll/3450-1-study_file.pdf (accessed 19 Jan 2017). INSEE, ‘Unemployment according to the ILO standard (annual average) – by gender and age – Metropolitan France’, L’Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, 2017, www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixCriteres?codeGroupe=1471 (accessed 20 Jan 2017). Maurin E, La peur du déclassement, une sociologie des recessions [The fear of declining social status, a sociology of recessions], La République des Idées, 2009. Moffitt B and Tormey S, ‘Rethinking populism: politics, mediatisation and political style’, Political Studies 62, no 2, 2014, pp 381–97. OCDE, ‘Taux de chômage des jeunes’, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015, https://data. oecd.org/fr/unemp/taux-de-chomage-des-jeunes.htm (accessed 20 Jan 2017). Riviere E et al, ‘Baromètre 2016 d’image du Front National’, Kantar TNS, Feb 2016, www.tns-sofres.com/publications/ barometre-2016-dimage-du-front-national (accessed 20 Jan 2017).

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    “ Mapping and responding to the r

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    First published in 2017 © Demos. S

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    Open access. Some rights reserved.

  • Page 11 and 12:

    11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea

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    13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o

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    15 rising tide that cuts across tra

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    17 diversity), and political leader

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    19 trends in Austria, where the Fre

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    21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k

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    23 themselves embodying the fear of

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    25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and

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    27 While the Central European case

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    29 Europe, but the politics of fear

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    31 of European identity - attachmen

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    33 Euroscepticism In every country,

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    35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in

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    37 Political trust We also asked ou

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    39 significantly less support in th

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    41 - internationally and intranatio

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    43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit

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    45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur

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    47 References ‘Denmark suspends q

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    49 European Commission, Standard Eu

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    1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you

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    53 1 What we already know about Bre

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    55 compared with 59 per cent of tho

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    57 This leads the authors to conclu

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    59 think it is vital to let Europea

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    61 between areas hit hardest by aus

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    63 wealthy towns in the south of En

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    65 Similarly strong predictive powe

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    67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi

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    69 External and campaign factors Th

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    71 One caveat of this research is t

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    73 vote (and indeed on populism in

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    75 As part of this project, we comm

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    77 Table 1 Predicted probability of

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    79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat

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    81 Social networks Most important f

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    83 Table 3 Predicted probability of

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    85 Over recent decades the world ha

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    87 significance of demographic vari

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    89 ·· relative employment depriva

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    91 Variable Scale Explanatory or re

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    93 regardless of the possible impor

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    95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif

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    97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu

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    99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit

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    101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti

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    103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti

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    105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref

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    107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo

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    109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-

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    111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org

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    113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff

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    115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United

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    117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit

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    119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi

  • Page 121 and 122: 121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
  • Page 123 and 124: 123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
  • Page 125: 125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
  • Page 128 and 129: Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
  • Page 130 and 131: Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
  • Page 132 and 133: 2 France of reasons. It affects how
  • Page 134 and 135: 2 France impetus that originates in
  • Page 136 and 137: 2 France Another illustration of Fr
  • Page 138 and 139: 2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
  • Page 140 and 141: 2 France Slightly more French peopl
  • Page 142 and 143: 2 France The situation in Poland, f
  • Page 144 and 145: 2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv
  • Page 146 and 147: 2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv
  • Page 148 and 149: 2 France 2 Elections at a time of p
  • Page 150 and 151: 2 France These results are particul
  • Page 152 and 153: 2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur
  • Page 154 and 155: 2 France One of the parties that is
  • Page 156 and 157: 2 France the idea of ‘plain speak
  • Page 158 and 159: 2 France The fact that these two is
  • Page 160 and 161: 2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur
  • Page 162 and 163: 2 France As in the YouGov survey, D
  • Page 164 and 165: 2 France Conclusion: the need to pu
  • Page 166 and 167: 2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p
  • Page 168 and 169: 2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon
  • Page 170 and 171: 2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be
  • Page 174 and 175: Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég
  • Page 176 and 177: Contents Summary Introduction Metho
  • Page 178 and 179: 3 Germany politicians have difficul
  • Page 180 and 181: 3 Germany among the German public s
  • Page 182 and 183: Methodology 3 Germany To further th
  • Page 184 and 185: 3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente
  • Page 186 and 187: 3 Germany Taking a closer look at t
  • Page 188 and 189: 3 Germany When looking at all the c
  • Page 190 and 191: 3 Germany with different demographi
  • Page 192 and 193: 3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond
  • Page 194 and 195: 3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont
  • Page 196 and 197: 3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about
  • Page 198 and 199: 3 Germany of the politicians interv
  • Page 200 and 201: 3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon
  • Page 202 and 203: 3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone
  • Page 204 and 205: 3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon
  • Page 206 and 207: 3 Germany issues that are the EU’
  • Page 208 and 209: 3 Germany are able to draw on compa
  • Page 210 and 211: Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat
  • Page 212 and 213: 3 Germany concerns and alleviating
  • Page 214 and 215: 3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl
  • Page 216 and 217: 3 Germany public-elite comparisons
  • Page 218 and 219: 3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
  • Page 220 and 221: 3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol
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    3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger

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    3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp

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    3 Germany European Parliament, Stan

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    Contents Introduction 1 Migration,

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    4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi

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    4 Spain During the rapid economic e

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    4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for

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    4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit

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    4 Spain In short, high levels of mi

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    4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer

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    4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of

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    4 Spain This Europeanism presents i

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    4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon

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    4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa

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    4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp

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    4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif

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    4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r

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    4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde

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    4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which

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    4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie

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    4 Spain are most inclined to vote f

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    4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit

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    4 Spain The extreme right was disco

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    4 Spain towns, although none of the

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    4 Spain emphasising unity and the l

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    4 Spain cradles of successful natio

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    4 Spain of the population supportin

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    4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne

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    4 Spain Material deprivation covers

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    4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta

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    4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion

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    4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub

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    4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal

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    4 Spain paper presented at the 12th

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    Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc

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    5 Poland Introduction - what happen

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    5 Poland the Hungarian political sc

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    5 Poland the Law and Justice party,

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    5 Poland giving the winner an absol

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    5 Poland and to tire out the domest

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    5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ

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    5 Poland and an inflow of European

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    5 Poland The second factor is the p

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    5 Poland seems economic indicators

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    5 Poland occupational qualification

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    5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans

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    5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie

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    5 Poland Despite the generally posi

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    5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa

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    5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co

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    5 Poland Post-election developments

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    5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and

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    5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB

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    5 Poland women’s access to legal

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    5 Poland commentators did not expec

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    5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a

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    5 Poland The rise of authoritarian

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    5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad

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    5 Poland Since then, the near absen

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    5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind

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    5 Poland European Union’, Standar

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    5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac

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    5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup

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    5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,

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    5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje

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    5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a

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    5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek

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    5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2

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    6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration

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    375 Introduction In Swedish migrati

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    377 migrants came mainly as family

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    379 Citizens from outside the EU ar

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    381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo

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    383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed

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    385 science: national identity is t

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    387 During the refugee crisis of 20

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    389 and immigrants even when suppos

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    391 2 Analysis and results The main

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    393 she suggested that the ‘migra

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    395 emphasised, this crisis came ac

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    397 directed towards Swedishness in

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    399 which leads voters to connect S

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    401 exclusively of people with a ci

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    403 Table 3 confirms the findings i

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    405 Summary and discussion During 2

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    407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ

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    409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök

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    411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström

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    413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,

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    415 References ‘Historiskt högt

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    417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon

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    419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    423 Introduction This project has i

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    425 In responding to the current fe

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    427 in facilitated discussion to es

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    429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites

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    431 background is also central to r

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    433 Boost the accountability of EU

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    435 3 Make the case for openness an

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    437 communities and country’s pla

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    439 1.8 million signatures, predomi

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    441 4 Counter post-truth narratives

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    443 organisation’ 30 - including

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    445 - whether through public policy

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    447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob

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    449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl

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    451 References Arthur J and Kristj

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    453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma

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    Demos - License to Publish The work

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    This project is supported by The ca

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