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Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself

4 Spain

4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (%) Partido Socialista Obrero Español (%) Unidos Podemos (%) Ciudadanos- Partido de la Ciudadanía (%) The Spanish Parliament 0 – No trust at all 29 6 31 48 28 1 6 4 8 8 4 2 8 6 9 8 8 3 8 6 10 9 12 4 9 6 11 6 15 5 12 20 17 4 11 6 8 17 3 7 8 7 7 16 2 3 9 8 4 6 3 2 5 9 1 4 2 0 0 10 – Completely trust 3 7 1 1 1 Don’t know 5 3 4 1 0

285 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) Partido Socialista Obrero Español (%) Unidos Podemos (%) Ciudadanos- Partido de la Ciudadanía (%) The European Parliament 0 – No trust at all 18 4 21 36 14 1 6 2 8 11 11 2 8 1 12 9 8 3 7 5 7 8 9 4 9 9 10 10 10 5 17 22 20 14 15 6 8 16 4 4 11 7 8 14 5 3 8 8 6 11 5 2 10 9 2 4 0 2 1 10 – Completely trust 3 7 2 1 1 Don’t know 6 3 6 2 1

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    “ Mapping and responding to the r

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    First published in 2017 © Demos. S

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    Open access. Some rights reserved.

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    11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea

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    13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o

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    15 rising tide that cuts across tra

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    17 diversity), and political leader

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    19 trends in Austria, where the Fre

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    21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k

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    23 themselves embodying the fear of

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    25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and

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    27 While the Central European case

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    29 Europe, but the politics of fear

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    31 of European identity - attachmen

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    33 Euroscepticism In every country,

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    35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in

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    37 Political trust We also asked ou

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    39 significantly less support in th

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    41 - internationally and intranatio

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    43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit

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    45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur

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    47 References ‘Denmark suspends q

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    49 European Commission, Standard Eu

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    1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you

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    53 1 What we already know about Bre

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    55 compared with 59 per cent of tho

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    57 This leads the authors to conclu

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    59 think it is vital to let Europea

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    61 between areas hit hardest by aus

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    63 wealthy towns in the south of En

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    65 Similarly strong predictive powe

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    67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi

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    69 External and campaign factors Th

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    71 One caveat of this research is t

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    73 vote (and indeed on populism in

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    75 As part of this project, we comm

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    77 Table 1 Predicted probability of

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    79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat

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    81 Social networks Most important f

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    83 Table 3 Predicted probability of

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    85 Over recent decades the world ha

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    87 significance of demographic vari

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    89 ·· relative employment depriva

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    91 Variable Scale Explanatory or re

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    93 regardless of the possible impor

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    95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif

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    97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu

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    99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit

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    101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti

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    103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti

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    105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref

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    107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo

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    109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-

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    111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org

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    113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff

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    115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United

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    117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit

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    119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi

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    121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes

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    123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling

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    125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey

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    Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea

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    Introduction 2 France Fear exists i

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    2 France of reasons. It affects how

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    2 France impetus that originates in

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    2 France Another illustration of Fr

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    2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv

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    2 France Slightly more French peopl

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    2 France The situation in Poland, f

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    2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv

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    2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv

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    2 France 2 Elections at a time of p

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    2 France These results are particul

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    2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur

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    2 France One of the parties that is

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    2 France the idea of ‘plain speak

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    2 France The fact that these two is

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    2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur

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    2 France As in the YouGov survey, D

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    2 France Conclusion: the need to pu

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    2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p

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    2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon

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    2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be

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    2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus

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    Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég

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    Contents Summary Introduction Metho

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    3 Germany politicians have difficul

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    3 Germany among the German public s

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    Methodology 3 Germany To further th

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    3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente

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    3 Germany Taking a closer look at t

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    3 Germany When looking at all the c

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    3 Germany with different demographi

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    3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond

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    3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont

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    3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about

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    3 Germany of the politicians interv

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    3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone

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    3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany issues that are the EU’

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    3 Germany are able to draw on compa

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    Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat

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    3 Germany concerns and alleviating

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    3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl

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    3 Germany public-elite comparisons

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    3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··

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    3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol

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    3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger

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    3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp

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    3 Germany European Parliament, Stan

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    Contents Introduction 1 Migration,

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    4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi

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    4 Spain During the rapid economic e

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  • Page 264 and 265: 4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit
  • Page 266 and 267: 4 Spain The extreme right was disco
  • Page 268 and 269: 4 Spain towns, although none of the
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  • Page 290 and 291: 4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne
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  • Page 304 and 305: Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc
  • Page 306 and 307: 5 Poland Introduction - what happen
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    5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co

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    5 Poland Post-election developments

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    5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and

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    5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB

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    5 Poland women’s access to legal

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    5 Poland commentators did not expec

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    5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a

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    5 Poland The rise of authoritarian

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    5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad

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    5 Poland Since then, the near absen

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    5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind

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    5 Poland European Union’, Standar

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    5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac

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    5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup

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    5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,

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    5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje

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    5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a

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    5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek

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    5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2

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    6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration

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    375 Introduction In Swedish migrati

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    377 migrants came mainly as family

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    379 Citizens from outside the EU ar

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    381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo

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    383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed

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    385 science: national identity is t

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    387 During the refugee crisis of 20

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    389 and immigrants even when suppos

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    391 2 Analysis and results The main

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    393 she suggested that the ‘migra

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    395 emphasised, this crisis came ac

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    397 directed towards Swedishness in

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    399 which leads voters to connect S

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    401 exclusively of people with a ci

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    403 Table 3 confirms the findings i

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    405 Summary and discussion During 2

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    407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ

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    409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök

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    411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström

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    413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,

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    415 References ‘Historiskt högt

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    417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon

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    419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    423 Introduction This project has i

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    425 In responding to the current fe

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    427 in facilitated discussion to es

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    429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites

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    431 background is also central to r

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    433 Boost the accountability of EU

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    435 3 Make the case for openness an

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    437 communities and country’s pla

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    439 1.8 million signatures, predomi

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    441 4 Counter post-truth narratives

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    443 organisation’ 30 - including

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    445 - whether through public policy

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    447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob

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    449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl

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    451 References Arthur J and Kristj

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    453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma

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    Demos - License to Publish The work

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    This project is supported by The ca

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