5 Poland Conclusions – resilience and resistance to populism in power One of the received theories on the rise of authoritarian populism across the Western world is that populism is a response to growing social inequality, a product of a neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ predominant after 1989 and resulting in the financial and economic crisis of 2008. What makes this theory plausible is that populism draws its support from the less affluent and less educated sections of society, especially men, whose economic position has become precarious in the globalised post-industrial economy. However, this theory of the ‘mobilisation of the dispossessed’ has limited explanatory power. As Pippa Norris pointed out: Populist authoritarian leaders have arisen in several affluent post-industrial ‘knowledge’ societies, in cradle-to-grave welfare states with some of the best-educated and most secure populations in the world, like Sweden and Denmark – where you’d expect social tolerance and liberal attitudes instead of xenophobic appeals. 78 As we argue in this case study, the rise of authoritarian populism in Poland can serve as an argument that the ‘inequality’ theory has limited explanatory value. The Law and Justice victory in Poland came about during a period of stable economic development, falling unemployment and a reduction in poverty rates. The level of inequality, as measured by the standard Gini coefficient, puts Poland close to the EU average, worse than the egalitarian Nordic countries but better than the UK and crisis-stricken southern members such as Greece. We can only conclude that inequality and socioeconomic deprivation, while definitely creating fertile
347 grounds for the rise of authoritarian populism, nevertheless fail to explain its political success in particular countries, such as Poland. The rise of authoritarian populism in Poland cannot be explained by reference to the ‘fear of globalisation’. According to the Demos survey, Poles are among the most enthusiastic supporters of globalisation of any group in the sample. Interestingly, in this case both the supporters of the populist Law and Justice party and those of the conservative–liberal Civic Platform tend to see more benefits then threats resulting from globalisation. The same can be said about European integration, where the Polish public has been firmly supporting Polish EU membership since the country joined the EU in May 2004. As we demonstrated, support for the Law and Justice party’s ‘soft Euroscepticism’, largely fuelled by opposition to a refugee quota system, is mainly a post-election phenomenon, driven by the successful exercise of the politics of fear by the government. All in all, the analysis of the Polish case prompts us to agree with Pippa Norris, who argues that ‘authoritarianism can best be explained as a cultural backlash in Western societies against long-term, ongoing social change’. 79 Poland has undergone very intensive social and cultural change since the breakup of the communist regime in 1989 and especially since it joined the EU in 2004. Integration with the Western political and economic structures as well as the opening up of the borders (visas to most West European countries were abolished in 1991/92) has resulted in a quarter of a century of sustained economic development and vast investment in infrastructure (fuelled by EU structural funds) but also diffusion of liberal social norms and modes. After 2007, under the central-right government, many ideas and policies once promoted by relatively marginal groups of feminist and LGBT activists have become mainstreamed even if they have not always managed to influence legislation. Although most Poles formally remained members of the Roman Catholic Church, studies show a growing social and political divide along moral–cultural rather than socioeconomic issues. 80
“ Mapping and responding to the r
First published in 2017 © Demos. S
Open access. Some rights reserved.
11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea
13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o
15 rising tide that cuts across tra
17 diversity), and political leader
19 trends in Austria, where the Fre
21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k
23 themselves embodying the fear of
25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and
27 While the Central European case
29 Europe, but the politics of fear
31 of European identity - attachmen
33 Euroscepticism In every country,
35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in
37 Political trust We also asked ou
39 significantly less support in th
41 - internationally and intranatio
43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit
45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur
47 References ‘Denmark suspends q
49 European Commission, Standard Eu
1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you
53 1 What we already know about Bre
55 compared with 59 per cent of tho
57 This leads the authors to conclu
59 think it is vital to let Europea
61 between areas hit hardest by aus
63 wealthy towns in the south of En
65 Similarly strong predictive powe
67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi
69 External and campaign factors Th
71 One caveat of this research is t
73 vote (and indeed on populism in
75 As part of this project, we comm
77 Table 1 Predicted probability of
79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat
81 Social networks Most important f
83 Table 3 Predicted probability of
85 Over recent decades the world ha
87 significance of demographic vari
89 ·· relative employment depriva
91 Variable Scale Explanatory or re
93 regardless of the possible impor
95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif
97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu
99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit
101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti
103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti
105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref
107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo
109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-
111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org
113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff
115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United
117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit
119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
2 France of reasons. It affects how
2 France impetus that originates in
2 France Another illustration of Fr
2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
2 France Slightly more French peopl
2 France The situation in Poland, f
2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv
2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv
2 France 2 Elections at a time of p
2 France These results are particul
2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur
2 France One of the parties that is
2 France the idea of ‘plain speak
2 France The fact that these two is
2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur
2 France As in the YouGov survey, D
2 France Conclusion: the need to pu
2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p
2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon
2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be
2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus
Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég
Contents Summary Introduction Metho
3 Germany politicians have difficul
3 Germany among the German public s
Methodology 3 Germany To further th
3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente
3 Germany Taking a closer look at t
3 Germany When looking at all the c
3 Germany with different demographi
3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond
3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont
3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about
3 Germany of the politicians interv
3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon
3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone
3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon
3 Germany issues that are the EU’
3 Germany are able to draw on compa
Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat
3 Germany concerns and alleviating
3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl
3 Germany public-elite comparisons
3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol
3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger
3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp
3 Germany European Parliament, Stan
Contents Introduction 1 Migration,
4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi
4 Spain During the rapid economic e
4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for
4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit
4 Spain In short, high levels of mi
4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer
4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of
4 Spain This Europeanism presents i
4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon
4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa
4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp
4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif
4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r
4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde
4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which
4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie
4 Spain are most inclined to vote f
4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit
4 Spain The extreme right was disco
4 Spain towns, although none of the
4 Spain emphasising unity and the l
4 Spain cradles of successful natio
4 Spain of the population supportin
4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne
4 Spain Material deprivation covers
4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta
397 directed towards Swedishness in
399 which leads voters to connect S
401 exclusively of people with a ci
403 Table 3 confirms the findings i
405 Summary and discussion During 2
407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ
409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök
411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström
413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,
415 References ‘Historiskt högt
417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon
419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe
7 Responding to the politics of fea
423 Introduction This project has i
425 In responding to the current fe
427 in facilitated discussion to es
429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites
431 background is also central to r
433 Boost the accountability of EU
435 3 Make the case for openness an
437 communities and country’s pla
439 1.8 million signatures, predomi
441 4 Counter post-truth narratives
443 organisation’ 30 - including
445 - whether through public policy
447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob
449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl
451 References Arthur J and Kristj
453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma
Demos - License to Publish The work
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Magazine: Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself