Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself
5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed adults (aged 18+) in six countries online between 23 August and 7 September 2016. The sample sizes were as follows: France – 1,001; Germany – 2,125; Poland – 1,011; Spain – 1,000; Sweden – 1,007; UK – 1,661 (only adults from Great Britain were surveyed in UK polling). The figures have been weighted and are representative of adults aged 18+ on age, gender and region. Four YouGov panels (GB, France, Germany and Sweden) also took account of other factors such as last political vote, education and political affiliation. Two non-YouGov panels (Poland and Spain) were sampled by age, gender and region and weighted by these variables in addition to last political vote and education post-fieldwork. All respondents were asked a set of common questions. YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council. 2 B Roguska, ‘Charakterystyka poglądów potencjalnych elektoratów partyjnych’, Komunikat z badań 85, Centre for Public Opinion Research, 2015. 3 TVN24, ‘Przyjdzie dzień, że w Warszawie będzie Budapeszt’, 9 Oct 2011, www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosciz-kraju,3/przyjdzie-dzien-ze-w-warszawie-bedziebudapeszt,186922.html (accessed 20 Jan 2017). 4 Results of difference corruption indexes available at ‘Rankingi korupcji’, antykorupcja.gov.pl, 2016, www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/analizy-i-raporty/rankingikorupcji (accessed 20 Jan 2017). 5 B Roguska, ‘Polska w Unii Europejskiej’, Komunikat z badań 31, Centre for Public Opinion Research, 2016,
351 www.Cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_031_16.PDF (accessed 20 Jan 2017). 6 J Fomina and J Kucharczyk, ‘The specter haunting Europe: populism and protest in Poland’, Journal of Democracy 27, no 4, Oct 2016. 7 A number of articles appeared in the media in 2014 and 2015 promulgating this claim, eg Ł Piechowiak, ‘Zarobki w Unii coraz wyższe – w Polsce stoją w miejscu’, 1 Apr 2014, www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Zarobki-w-Uniicoraz-wyzsze-w-Polsce-stoja-w-miejscu-3093386.html (accessed 20 Jan 2017). 8 Ł Woźnicki, ‘Dlaczego geje głosowali na Dudę? Związków partnerskich i tak nie będzie, a każdy oczekuje zmiany’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 May 2015, http://wyborcza. pl/1,76842,17907415,Dlaczego_geje_glosowali_na_ Dude___Zwiazkow_partnerskich.html#ixzz4UQKb9itA (accessed 20 Jan 2017). 9 J Fomina, ‘The unlikely Eurosceptics: the role of the domestic context in shaping anti-European attitudes among the young Poles’, Polish Sociological Review, (forthcoming) 2017. 10 W Kazanecki, ‘Zainteresowanie Polityką i Poglądy Polityczne w Latach 1989–2015: Deklaracje ludzi młodych na tle ogółu badanych’, Komunikat z badań 135, Centre for Public Opinion Research, 2015, www.Cbos. pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_135_15.PDF (accessed 20 Jan 2017). 11 See the Law and Justice party’s official webpage, http://wybierzpis.org.pl/materialy-programowe (accessed 20 Jan 2017). 12 The decline of the Polish political left started in 2003, with the so-called ‘Rywin Affair’, a major corruption scandal.
“ Mapping and responding to the r
First published in 2017 © Demos. S
Open access. Some rights reserved.
11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea
13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o
15 rising tide that cuts across tra
17 diversity), and political leader
19 trends in Austria, where the Fre
21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k
23 themselves embodying the fear of
25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and
27 While the Central European case
29 Europe, but the politics of fear
31 of European identity - attachmen
33 Euroscepticism In every country,
35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in
37 Political trust We also asked ou
39 significantly less support in th
41 - internationally and intranatio
43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit
45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur
47 References ‘Denmark suspends q
49 European Commission, Standard Eu
1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you
53 1 What we already know about Bre
55 compared with 59 per cent of tho
57 This leads the authors to conclu
59 think it is vital to let Europea
61 between areas hit hardest by aus
63 wealthy towns in the south of En
65 Similarly strong predictive powe
67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi
69 External and campaign factors Th
71 One caveat of this research is t
73 vote (and indeed on populism in
75 As part of this project, we comm
77 Table 1 Predicted probability of
79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat
81 Social networks Most important f
83 Table 3 Predicted probability of
85 Over recent decades the world ha
87 significance of demographic vari
89 ·· relative employment depriva
91 Variable Scale Explanatory or re
93 regardless of the possible impor
95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif
97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu
99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit
101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti
103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti
105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref
107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo
109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-
111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org
113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff
115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United
117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit
119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
2 France of reasons. It affects how
2 France impetus that originates in
2 France Another illustration of Fr
2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
2 France Slightly more French peopl
2 France The situation in Poland, f
2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv
2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv
2 France 2 Elections at a time of p
2 France These results are particul
2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur
2 France One of the parties that is
2 France the idea of ‘plain speak
2 France The fact that these two is
2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur
2 France As in the YouGov survey, D
2 France Conclusion: the need to pu
2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p
2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon
2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be
2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus
Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég
Contents Summary Introduction Metho
3 Germany politicians have difficul
3 Germany among the German public s
Methodology 3 Germany To further th
3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente
3 Germany Taking a closer look at t
3 Germany When looking at all the c
3 Germany with different demographi
3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond
3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont
3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about
3 Germany of the politicians interv
3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon
3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone
3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon
3 Germany issues that are the EU’
3 Germany are able to draw on compa
Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat
3 Germany concerns and alleviating
3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl
3 Germany public-elite comparisons
3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol
3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger
3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp
3 Germany European Parliament, Stan
Contents Introduction 1 Migration,
4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi
4 Spain During the rapid economic e
4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for
4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit
4 Spain In short, high levels of mi
4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer
4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of
4 Spain This Europeanism presents i
4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon
4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa
4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp
4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif
4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r
4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde
4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which
4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie
4 Spain are most inclined to vote f
4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit
4 Spain The extreme right was disco
4 Spain towns, although none of the
4 Spain emphasising unity and the l
4 Spain cradles of successful natio
4 Spain of the population supportin
4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne
4 Spain Material deprivation covers
4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta
4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion
4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub
401 exclusively of people with a ci
403 Table 3 confirms the findings i
405 Summary and discussion During 2
407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ
409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök
411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström
413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,
415 References ‘Historiskt högt
417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon
419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe
7 Responding to the politics of fea
423 Introduction This project has i
425 In responding to the current fe
427 in facilitated discussion to es
429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites
431 background is also central to r
433 Boost the accountability of EU
435 3 Make the case for openness an
437 communities and country’s pla
439 1.8 million signatures, predomi
441 4 Counter post-truth narratives
443 organisation’ 30 - including
445 - whether through public policy
447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob
449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl
451 References Arthur J and Kristj
453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma
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