Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself
1 Great Britain to vote Leave. 67 In this light, the ‘take back control’ slogan of the Leave campaign takes on a whole new significance. Optimism To the vast polling data to come out of the referendum, we might add one more predictive factor to Inglehart and Norris’s list of value orientations predicting a vote for populist parties in Europe (identifying as right of centre, espousing authoritarian values, having little trust in national and global governance, and being anti-immigration). Ashcroft polling and British Election Study data suggest that in addition to social attitudes being a strong determinant of referendum voter choice, there is some evidence that a voter’s level of optimism and pessimism regarding the past and the future of the UK is strongly correlated with their referendum vote choice. Leave and Remain voters were presented with pairs of opposing statements indicating pessimism or optimism in a variety of circumstances, and asked which statement they most strongly agreed with. Among Leave voters, there was a 22 per cent net agreement that ‘for most children growing up in Britain today, life will be worse than it was for their parents’, while among Remain voters there was a 4 per cent net agreement with the opposing statement, ‘for most children growing up today, life will be better than it was for their parents’. 68 As well as being less optimistic about the future, Leave voters were more positive about the past than Remain voters. In Ashcroft’s polling, 73 per cent of Remain voters felt that ‘overall, life in Britain today is better than it was 30 years ago’; 58 per cent of Leave voters, by contrast, felt that ‘overall, life in Britain today is worse than it was 30 years ago’. Both sides thought that economic and social changes would bring more threats than opportunities, but to differing degrees: 42 per cent of Leave voters but only 20 per cent of Remain voters agreed. 69 The British Election Study asked similar questions, with similar results. They found, for instance, that among those who strongly disagreed with the statement that things used to be better in Britain in the past, only 15 per cent voted Leave. 70
69 External and campaign factors The predictive value of the demographic, geographic and attitudinal variables discussed thus far suggests that some were always more likely to vote Leave, and some always more likely to vote Remain. Still, like all human behaviour, voting behaviour is complex and changeable: our decisions in the voting booth are not predetermined by structural factors, nor do values and attitudes automatically yield a political preference. To fully capture how people voted on 23 June, any analysis must also consider the influences on people in the run-up to the referendum: the media representations, the campaign leaders and the friends and family they spoke to. Media representations It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the media influenced voters in the referendum for the same reason that it is difficult to ascertain how the media affect voters in any election or popular vote; media representations are just one of many factors that contribute to a voter’s eventual choice and many claimed to have always known how they were going to vote. 71 This being said, some studies have provided evidence that media framing of public discourse around specific EU policies can affect the extent to which those policies are seen positively or negatively. 72 Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that among national newspapers in the UK, the Leave campaign enjoyed a number of advantages. A study by Loughborough University’s Centre for Research in Communication and Culture released two weeks before the vote found that, based on analysis of media articles from the ten largest newspapers in the UK, favourability of reporting towards either the Leave or the Remain camps was largely balanced within the sample of 1,127. However, when circulation and thus number of probable article ‘views’ was taken into account, only 18 per cent of the sample were pro-Remain, while 82 per cent were pro-Leave (discounting neutral articles). 73 Similar research undertaken by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, published one month before the referendum vote, which covered two sample days of coverage a week for the first
“ Mapping and responding to the r
First published in 2017 © Demos. S
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11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea
13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o
15 rising tide that cuts across tra
119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
2 France of reasons. It affects how
2 France impetus that originates in
2 France Another illustration of Fr
2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
2 France Slightly more French peopl
2 France The situation in Poland, f
2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv
2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv
2 France 2 Elections at a time of p
2 France These results are particul
2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur
2 France One of the parties that is
2 France the idea of ‘plain speak
2 France The fact that these two is
2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur
2 France As in the YouGov survey, D
2 France Conclusion: the need to pu
2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p
2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon
2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be
2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus
Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég
Contents Summary Introduction Metho
3 Germany politicians have difficul
3 Germany among the German public s
Methodology 3 Germany To further th
3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente
3 Germany Taking a closer look at t
3 Germany When looking at all the c
3 Germany with different demographi
3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond
3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont
3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about
3 Germany of the politicians interv
3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon
3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone
3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon
3 Germany issues that are the EU’
3 Germany are able to draw on compa
Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat
3 Germany concerns and alleviating
3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl
3 Germany public-elite comparisons
3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol
3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger
3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp
3 Germany European Parliament, Stan
Contents Introduction 1 Migration,
4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi
4 Spain During the rapid economic e
4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for
4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit
4 Spain In short, high levels of mi
4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer
4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of
4 Spain This Europeanism presents i
4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon
4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa
4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp
4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif
4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r
4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde
4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which
4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie
4 Spain are most inclined to vote f
4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit
4 Spain The extreme right was disco
4 Spain towns, although none of the
4 Spain emphasising unity and the l
4 Spain cradles of successful natio
4 Spain of the population supportin
4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne
4 Spain Material deprivation covers
4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta
4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion
4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub
4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal
4 Spain paper presented at the 12th
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc
5 Poland Introduction - what happen
5 Poland the Hungarian political sc
5 Poland the Law and Justice party,
5 Poland giving the winner an absol
5 Poland and to tire out the domest
5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ
5 Poland and an inflow of European
5 Poland The second factor is the p
5 Poland seems economic indicators
5 Poland occupational qualification
5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans
5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie
5 Poland Despite the generally posi
5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa
5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co
5 Poland Post-election developments
5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and
5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB
5 Poland women’s access to legal
5 Poland commentators did not expec
5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a
5 Poland The rise of authoritarian
5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad
5 Poland Since then, the near absen
5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind
5 Poland European Union’, Standar
5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac
5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup
5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,
5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje
5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a
5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek
5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2
6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration
375 Introduction In Swedish migrati
377 migrants came mainly as family
379 Citizens from outside the EU ar
381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo
383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed
385 science: national identity is t
387 During the refugee crisis of 20
389 and immigrants even when suppos
391 2 Analysis and results The main
393 she suggested that the ‘migra
395 emphasised, this crisis came ac
397 directed towards Swedishness in
399 which leads voters to connect S
401 exclusively of people with a ci
403 Table 3 confirms the findings i
405 Summary and discussion During 2
407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ
409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök
411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström
413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,
415 References ‘Historiskt högt
417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon
419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe
7 Responding to the politics of fea
423 Introduction This project has i
425 In responding to the current fe
427 in facilitated discussion to es
429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites
431 background is also central to r
433 Boost the accountability of EU
435 3 Make the case for openness an
437 communities and country’s pla
439 1.8 million signatures, predomi
441 4 Counter post-truth narratives
443 organisation’ 30 - including
445 - whether through public policy
447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob
449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl
451 References Arthur J and Kristj
453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma
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