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DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1

DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1

2 France – Living

2 France – Living together in the face of fear: the French political dilemma Jacques Delors Institute Yves Bertoncini Dídac Gutiérrez-Peris Translated by Zosia Krasodomska-Jones

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    “ Mapping and responding to the r

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    First published in 2017 © Demos. S

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    Open access. Some rights reserved.

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    11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea

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    13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o

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    15 rising tide that cuts across tra

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    17 diversity), and political leader

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    19 trends in Austria, where the Fre

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    21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k

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    23 themselves embodying the fear of

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    25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and

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    27 While the Central European case

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    29 Europe, but the politics of fear

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    31 of European identity - attachmen

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    33 Euroscepticism In every country,

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    35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in

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    37 Political trust We also asked ou

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    39 significantly less support in th

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    41 - internationally and intranatio

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    43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit

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    45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur

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    47 References ‘Denmark suspends q

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    49 European Commission, Standard Eu

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    1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you

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    53 1 What we already know about Bre

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    55 compared with 59 per cent of tho

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    57 This leads the authors to conclu

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    59 think it is vital to let Europea

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    61 between areas hit hardest by aus

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    63 wealthy towns in the south of En

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    65 Similarly strong predictive powe

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    67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi

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    69 External and campaign factors Th

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    71 One caveat of this research is t

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    73 vote (and indeed on populism in

  • Page 75 and 76: 75 As part of this project, we comm
  • Page 77 and 78: 77 Table 1 Predicted probability of
  • Page 79 and 80: 79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat
  • Page 81 and 82: 81 Social networks Most important f
  • Page 83 and 84: 83 Table 3 Predicted probability of
  • Page 85 and 86: 85 Over recent decades the world ha
  • Page 87 and 88: 87 significance of demographic vari
  • Page 89 and 90: 89 ·· relative employment depriva
  • Page 91 and 92: 91 Variable Scale Explanatory or re
  • Page 93 and 94: 93 regardless of the possible impor
  • Page 95 and 96: 95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif
  • Page 97 and 98: 97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu
  • Page 99 and 100: 99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit
  • Page 101 and 102: 101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti
  • Page 103 and 104: 103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti
  • Page 105 and 106: 105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref
  • Page 107 and 108: 107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo
  • Page 109 and 110: 109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-
  • Page 111 and 112: 111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org
  • Page 113 and 114: 113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff
  • Page 115 and 116: 115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United
  • Page 117 and 118: 117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit
  • Page 119 and 120: 119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
  • Page 121 and 122: 121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
  • Page 123 and 124: 123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
  • Page 125: 125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
  • Page 129 and 130: 129 Summary How do we live with fea
  • Page 131 and 132: 131 French déclinisme Anyone who h
  • Page 133 and 134: 133 outside the political world (fo
  • Page 135 and 136: 135 Figure 1 Responses by survey re
  • Page 137 and 138: 137 1 Fear, a structuring element o
  • Page 139 and 140: 139 A more structural issue: French
  • Page 141 and 142: 141 Figure 4 Responses by survey re
  • Page 143 and 144: 143 than 1 in 2 (53 per cent) Frenc
  • Page 145 and 146: 145 Figure 7 Responses by survey re
  • Page 147 and 148: 147 paradoxically this is the age g
  • Page 149 and 150: 149 Commission. Similarly, nearly 1
  • Page 151 and 152: 151 ‘racist’ (figure 15). With
  • Page 153 and 154: 153 Figure 12 Responses by survey r
  • Page 155 and 156: 155 Figure 14 Responses by survey r
  • Page 157 and 158: 157 Figure 16 Responses by survey r
  • Page 159 and 160: 159 3 French citizens are increasin
  • Page 161 and 162: 161 In today’s European political
  • Page 163 and 164: 163 in question. Thus, when asked a
  • Page 165 and 166: 165 It would probably be possible t
  • Page 167 and 168: 167 9 Ibid, p 392. 10 YouGov survey
  • Page 169 and 170: 169 21 E Maurin, La peur du déclas
  • Page 171 and 172: 171 References Bertoncini Y, ‘Eur
  • Page 173 and 174: 173 Hobeika A and Villeneuve G, Les
  • Page 175 and 176: 3 Germany - Mind the gap: understan
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    177 Summary Germany has long been v

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    179 Introduction Germany has long b

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    181 German political elites. We com

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    183 Elite interviews with political

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    185 Results Sizeable numbers of Ger

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    187 I have honestly never heard of

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    189 In other words, when we compare

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    191 Figure 5 Fears of respondents b

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    193 Figure 8 Fears of respondents b

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    195 a loss in social security, for

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    197 Figure 10 Fears of respondents

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    199 What we have seen are repeated

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    201 This difference is also apparen

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    203 Those politicians who perceive

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    205 one’s individual preferences.

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    207 Politicians focus on measures t

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    209 It doesn’t happen often that

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    211 of Germany’s future strategy

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    213 Recommendations In order to clo

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    215 to understand and address citiz

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    217 Appendix 1: Survey questions -

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    219 Comparative questions across co

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    221 Germany-specific questions ··

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    223 Notes 1 Demos, ‘The Age of Fe

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    225 References ‘The sick man of t

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    4 Spain - The Spanish exception: un

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    229 Introduction Very few European

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    231 Figure 1 Average net migration

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    233 The crisis has provoked a very

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    235 Figure 6 Percentage of populati

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    237 embezzled by politicians. This

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    239 2 Public opinion: a weak nation

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    241 the left, the definition of Spa

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    243 The European identity of Spanis

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    245 Our own polling also shows ther

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    247 Table 4 The proportion of Spani

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    249 Figure 11 The views of responde

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    251 Table 6 Respondents’ answers

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    253 reappraising their nationhood,

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    255 Table 8 The proportion of respo

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    257 Figure 17 The extent to which r

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    259 potential negative consequences

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    261 Table 11 Spanish respondents’

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    263 Figure 18 Respondents’ views

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    265 centre-right reformist group, w

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    267 compassion are central in its i

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    269 recentralise the semi-federal S

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    271 Conclusions Looking at the seve

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    273 obtain some success in Spain. T

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    275 Appendix 1: Attendants at the m

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    277 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) P

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    279 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) P

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    281 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) P

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    283 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) P

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    285 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) P

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    287 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) P

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    289 Total (%) Partido Popular (%) P

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    291 manuscript_the_populist_radical

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    293 wps/portal/rielcano_es/observat

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    295 32 European Commission, L’opi

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    297 References and bibliography Alo

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    299 González-Enríquez C, ‘El de

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    301 Meseguer XC, Ultrapatriotas, Ex

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    5 Poland - When fear wins: causes a

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    305 Summary Poland has often been p

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    307 recognition of his (and Poland

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    309 things. 6 Statistics showed tha

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    311 but gained a new, elegant and e

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    313 elected five judges to be sworn

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    315 party government and former com

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    317 transformation, however, was an

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    319 Taking into account the whole p

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    321 of Poles have assessed the poli

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    323 From 2013 onwards the ruling co

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    325 approximately 16 billion PLN (r

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    327 2 Globalisation and European in

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    329 These general pro-European atti

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    331 victory in the 2015 elections w

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    333 Table 5 Respondents’ answers

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    335 According to the Demos survey,

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    337 Our polling demonstrates that t

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    339 majority of Poles (70 per cent)

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    341 In order to understand the proc

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    343 to almost half a million. 69 Th

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    345 supported the protest against a

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    347 grounds for the rise of authori

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    349 has generated an unprecedented

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    351 www.Cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_

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    353 18 A Smale and J Berendt, ‘Po

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    355 32 C Mudde, ‘The populist rad

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    357 44 D Hall and A Mikulska-Jolles

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    359 60 Fomina and Kucharczyk, ‘Th

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    361 pl/191829,nauczycielki-przedszk

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    363 References ‘Bronisław Komoro

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    365 Davis C, ‘Poland is “on roa

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    367 Hutter S and Kriesi H, ‘Movem

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    369 Piechowiak Ł, ‘Zarobki w Uni

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    371 TVN24, ‘Przyjdzie dzień, że

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    Contents Introduction 1 Identity an

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    6 Sweden Key statistics for Sweden

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    6 Sweden crises also contributed to

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    6 Sweden Third, restrictions on fam

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    6 Sweden the Sweden Democrats, a cr

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    6 Sweden 1 Identity and political n

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    6 Sweden among mainstream politicia

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    6 Sweden What are the consequences

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    6 Sweden attended by the public as

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    6 Sweden among immigrants, construc

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    6 Sweden to the ‘People’s Home

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    6 Sweden Our vision is built on the

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    6 Sweden 3 Public opinion on nation

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    6 Sweden On a scale from 0 to 10, w

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    6 Sweden it is the Sweden Democrats

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    6 Sweden strong negative correlatio

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    6 Sweden Moderate party and the Chr

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    6 Sweden Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad

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    6 Sweden 15 E Lycke, ‘Hård kriti

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    6 Sweden radical right’, Nations

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    6 Sweden 46 R Johnston et al, ‘Na

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    6 Sweden Eger MA and Valdez S, ‘N

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    6 Sweden Migrationsverket, ‘Bevil

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    6 Sweden Statistiska Central Byrån

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    Contents Introduction 1 Promote saf

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    Conclusions 7 Responding to the pol

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    You may not exercise any of the rig

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    There is a spectre haunting Europe:

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