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DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1

DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1

Conclusions 3 Germany

Conclusions 3 Germany Using the latest assessments of public opinion in Germany, in particular the contradiction between positive pragmatic evaluations of Germany’s membership in the EU and the drastic decline in the image of EU as an institution, we can speculate on what might happen to German public opinion in the coming months. Among a range of possibilities, two alternative scenarios stand out: ·· Scenario 1: The EU’s image will bounce back to match the previous, rather low levels of Euroscepticism. This would suggest that the recent drastic decline in the perception of the EU among the German public was merely a temporary dip that could have been caused by citizens’ projections of generalised fear and insecurity onto the EU, which were particularly pronounced at the time of our research (summer 2016). ·· Scenario 2: The German public will become more Eurosceptic, also in their pragmatic evaluations of the country’s structural position within the EU, or make more vehement demands for German politicians to drive EU reform. The former would involve some citizens changing their views on Germany’s long-term strategy in the EU (advocating for Germany to leave the EU or to work towards reducing the EU’s power). The latter would put significant pressure on German politicians to put forth concrete ideas for EU reform. Our analysis indicates that there are concrete and distinct reasons why citizens in Germany hold a negative image of the EU: we find no evidence of them having a generalised, abstract feeling of fear. Overall, the majority of citizens hold distinguishable concerns, suggesting that we cannot speak about EU fears in the aggregate. What is more: we find that citizens’ apprehensions are directly related to their perception

211 of Germany’s future strategy in the EU. This is reason to believe that the German public do not simply project a generalised feeling of insecurity onto the EU as an institutional scapegoat. Instead, they hold genuine concerns, which – if they remain unaddressed by politicians – may induce German people to become more Eurosceptic or to demand concrete measures of EU reform. However, political elites perceive fears in Germany to be largely generalised, abstract or unrelated to evaluations of the EU, which is not borne out by our analysis. While we find citizens’ concerns to depend on both pragmatic economic considerations and emotive (latent) variables such as the degree of national and European identification, politicians focus on pragmatic economic aspects. They underestimate the impact of identity for the German public. Given this gap in understanding of fears between the public and political elites in Germany, it is not surprising that politicians have difficulty in addressing citizens’ concerns over the EU. Although all politicians recognise their particular responsibility to address citizens’ concerns, the measures they suggest to alleviate those that are EU-related are largely one-dimensional. Politicians realise that representation is crucial for the EU’s legitimacy and acknowledge that many citizens believe the EU currently lacks input as well as output legitimacy. However, they struggle to think of measures that specifically address output legitimacy and use various different ways to improve the EU’s problem-solving capacity (through reform of the EU or through national political institutions). Concrete suggestions increase input legitimacy directly at the EU level: they typically revolve around explaining the EU’s procedures and encouraging identification with the EU. Suggestions for EU reform are rarely mentioned. Should the German public indeed become more Eurosceptic overall and should German politicians come under pressure to offer concrete measures for EU reform over the next months, their difficulty with exactly this task poses a major problem for German political institutions as well as the EU as a whole. The EU’s capacity to offer solutions to current crises and future challenges is key to addressing citizens’

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    “ Mapping and responding to the r

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    First published in 2017 © Demos. S

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    Open access. Some rights reserved.

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    11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea

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    13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o

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    15 rising tide that cuts across tra

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    17 diversity), and political leader

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    19 trends in Austria, where the Fre

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    21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k

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    23 themselves embodying the fear of

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    25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and

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    27 While the Central European case

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    29 Europe, but the politics of fear

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    31 of European identity - attachmen

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    33 Euroscepticism In every country,

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    35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in

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    37 Political trust We also asked ou

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    39 significantly less support in th

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    41 - internationally and intranatio

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    43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit

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    45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur

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    47 References ‘Denmark suspends q

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    49 European Commission, Standard Eu

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    1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you

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    53 1 What we already know about Bre

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    55 compared with 59 per cent of tho

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    57 This leads the authors to conclu

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    59 think it is vital to let Europea

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    61 between areas hit hardest by aus

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    63 wealthy towns in the south of En

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    65 Similarly strong predictive powe

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    67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi

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    69 External and campaign factors Th

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    71 One caveat of this research is t

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    73 vote (and indeed on populism in

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    75 As part of this project, we comm

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    77 Table 1 Predicted probability of

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    79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat

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    81 Social networks Most important f

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    83 Table 3 Predicted probability of

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    85 Over recent decades the world ha

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    87 significance of demographic vari

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    89 ·· relative employment depriva

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    91 Variable Scale Explanatory or re

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    93 regardless of the possible impor

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    95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif

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    97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu

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    99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit

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    101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti

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    103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti

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    105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref

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    107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo

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    109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-

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    111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org

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    113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff

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    115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United

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    117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit

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    119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi

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    121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes

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    123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling

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    125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey

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    Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea

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    Introduction 2 France Fear exists i

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    2 France of reasons. It affects how

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    2 France impetus that originates in

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    2 France Another illustration of Fr

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    2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv

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    2 France Slightly more French peopl

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    2 France The situation in Poland, f

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    2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv

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    2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv

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    2 France 2 Elections at a time of p

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    2 France These results are particul

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    2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur

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    2 France One of the parties that is

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    2 France the idea of ‘plain speak

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    2 France The fact that these two is

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  • Page 218 and 219: 3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
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    4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie

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    4 Spain are most inclined to vote f

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    4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit

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    4 Spain The extreme right was disco

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    4 Spain towns, although none of the

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    4 Spain emphasising unity and the l

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    4 Spain cradles of successful natio

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    4 Spain of the population supportin

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    4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne

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    4 Spain Material deprivation covers

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    4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta

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    4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion

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    4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub

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    4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal

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    4 Spain paper presented at the 12th

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    Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc

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    5 Poland Introduction - what happen

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    5 Poland the Hungarian political sc

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    5 Poland the Law and Justice party,

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    5 Poland giving the winner an absol

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    5 Poland and to tire out the domest

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    5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ

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    5 Poland and an inflow of European

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    5 Poland The second factor is the p

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    5 Poland seems economic indicators

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    5 Poland occupational qualification

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    5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans

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    5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie

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    5 Poland Despite the generally posi

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    5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa

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    5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co

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    5 Poland Post-election developments

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    5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and

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    5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB

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    5 Poland women’s access to legal

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    5 Poland commentators did not expec

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    5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a

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    5 Poland The rise of authoritarian

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    5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad

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    5 Poland Since then, the near absen

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    5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind

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    5 Poland European Union’, Standar

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    5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac

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    5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup

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    5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,

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    5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje

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    5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a

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    5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek

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    5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2

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    6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration

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    375 Introduction In Swedish migrati

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    377 migrants came mainly as family

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    379 Citizens from outside the EU ar

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    381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo

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    383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed

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    385 science: national identity is t

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    387 During the refugee crisis of 20

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    389 and immigrants even when suppos

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    391 2 Analysis and results The main

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    393 she suggested that the ‘migra

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    395 emphasised, this crisis came ac

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    397 directed towards Swedishness in

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    399 which leads voters to connect S

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    401 exclusively of people with a ci

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    403 Table 3 confirms the findings i

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    405 Summary and discussion During 2

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    407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ

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    409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök

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    411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström

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    413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,

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    415 References ‘Historiskt högt

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    417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon

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    419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    423 Introduction This project has i

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    425 In responding to the current fe

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    427 in facilitated discussion to es

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    429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites

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    431 background is also central to r

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    433 Boost the accountability of EU

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    435 3 Make the case for openness an

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    437 communities and country’s pla

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    439 1.8 million signatures, predomi

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    441 4 Counter post-truth narratives

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    443 organisation’ 30 - including

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    445 - whether through public policy

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    447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob

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    449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl

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    451 References Arthur J and Kristj

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    453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma

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    Demos - License to Publish The work

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    This project is supported by The ca

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