DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1
6 Sweden among immigrants, constructs an essentialised and, to a large extent, deterministic understanding of culture. Since our moral values and behaviour become intrinsically linked with our cultural background, the only way for immigrants not to constitute a threat is to surrender their cultural identity and become part of the cultural Swedish national identity. The leaders of the Moderate party and Christian Democrats did not express the link between culture and values in such explicitly exclusive terms. Perhaps predictably, their speeches were much subtler in this regard. Nonetheless, the narrative of national identity and immigration that their speeches constructed made this link in an exclusive way, primarily by emphasising certain values as national values and, in the case of the Christian Democrats, making an explicit link between such values and Swedish culture, suggesting that immigrants do not share these values. For example, when discussing the value of gender equality, the leader of the Moderates said: To marry off your own daughter against her will is sometimes defended through freedom of religion. However, this is a misuse of the word freedom. To take the future away from your daughter – that is not freedom. The word honour is also misused at times. Subjugation of the youth is sometimes justified with claims that they belong to an honour culture. But it has nothing to do with honour to restrict the members of your own family and take away their rights to their life and their own life choices. On the contrary, it is dishonest and it goes against Swedish values. The final remark, that the subordination is not just morally wrong but un-Swedish, serves to emphasise that the problem with certain immigrant groups is not just their values, but their lack of Swedishness. Because a national or cultural identity is often perceived as ‘stickier’ than moral values, when someone’s failure to adhere to certain moral values also becomes their failure to embrace the national culture they may be perceived as not susceptible to change. A similar link was made by the leader of the Christian Democrats when
393 she suggested that the ‘migration crisis’ was not over yet, because Sweden faces ‘a gigantic challenge of integration’. To overcome this crisis, immigrants need to learn about Swedish culture, which she linked to values: Integration – it is about jobs of course, but also about language, culture and values. All parts are necessary. If one part is missing, exclusion will grow and we risk increasing the fragmentation of society. Learning the language and civic orientation should be mandatory for the newly arrived from the beginning. SFI [Swedish For Immigrants] should start straight away. Civic orientation should provide information on what rights, duties and responsibilities you have as a newcomer in our country. But also on our traditions, values and customs. The leaders of the Moderate party and Christian Democrats make a far subtler link between values and culture, and the suggestion that immigrants are causing a demise of Swedish values, than does the Sweden Democrats leader. The Christian Democrats leader coupled the nationalisation of values with expressions of universalism. Yet the suggestion that the way to remedy a lack of certain values is to strengthen Swedish culture contributes to an essentialist understanding of cultural difference that portrays immigrants as difficult to integrate because of their cultural heritage. This nationalisation of values, making values part of a Swedish culture and national identity in relation to perceived problems brought about by immigration, constructs an increasingly exclusive narrative of national identity. In the speeches this was often coupled with the suggestion that the nation is threatened to some extent by immigration. This was expressed most explicitly by the Sweden Democrats leader. In fact, the threat of immigration to Sweden was the main theme of his speech. He said that immigration, in particular asylum immigration, has affected the country negatively and listed several issues and problems that he claimed are caused by immigration. At the end of the speech, he spoke directly about the damage immigration has caused the nation and referred
“ Mapping and responding to the r
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11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea
13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o
15 rising tide that cuts across tra
17 diversity), and political leader
19 trends in Austria, where the Fre
21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k
23 themselves embodying the fear of
25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and
27 While the Central European case
29 Europe, but the politics of fear
31 of European identity - attachmen
33 Euroscepticism In every country,
35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in
37 Political trust We also asked ou
39 significantly less support in th
41 - internationally and intranatio
43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit
45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur
47 References ‘Denmark suspends q
49 European Commission, Standard Eu
1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you
53 1 What we already know about Bre
55 compared with 59 per cent of tho
57 This leads the authors to conclu
59 think it is vital to let Europea
61 between areas hit hardest by aus
63 wealthy towns in the south of En
65 Similarly strong predictive powe
67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi
69 External and campaign factors Th
71 One caveat of this research is t
73 vote (and indeed on populism in
75 As part of this project, we comm
77 Table 1 Predicted probability of
79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat
81 Social networks Most important f
83 Table 3 Predicted probability of
85 Over recent decades the world ha
87 significance of demographic vari
89 ·· relative employment depriva
91 Variable Scale Explanatory or re
93 regardless of the possible impor
95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdif
97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu
99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit
101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti
103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti
105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref
107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo
109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-
111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org
113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff
115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United
117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit
119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
2 France of reasons. It affects how
2 France impetus that originates in
2 France Another illustration of Fr
2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
2 France Slightly more French peopl
2 France The situation in Poland, f
2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv
2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv
2 France 2 Elections at a time of p
2 France These results are particul
2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur
2 France One of the parties that is
2 France the idea of ‘plain speak
2 France The fact that these two is
2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur
2 France As in the YouGov survey, D
2 France Conclusion: the need to pu
2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p
2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon
2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be
2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus
Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég
Contents Summary Introduction Metho
3 Germany politicians have difficul
3 Germany among the German public s
Methodology 3 Germany To further th
3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente
3 Germany Taking a closer look at t
3 Germany When looking at all the c
3 Germany with different demographi
3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond
3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont
3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about
3 Germany of the politicians interv
3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon
3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone
3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon
3 Germany issues that are the EU’
3 Germany are able to draw on compa
Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat
3 Germany concerns and alleviating
3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl
3 Germany public-elite comparisons
3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··
3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol
3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger
3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp
3 Germany European Parliament, Stan
Contents Introduction 1 Migration,
4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi
4 Spain During the rapid economic e
4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for
4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit
4 Spain In short, high levels of mi
4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer
4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of
4 Spain This Europeanism presents i
4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon
4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa
4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp
4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif
4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r
4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde
4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which
4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie
4 Spain are most inclined to vote f
4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit
4 Spain The extreme right was disco
4 Spain towns, although none of the
4 Spain emphasising unity and the l
4 Spain cradles of successful natio
4 Spain of the population supportin
4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (
4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne
4 Spain Material deprivation covers
4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta
4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion
4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub
4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal
4 Spain paper presented at the 12th
Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc
5 Poland Introduction - what happen
5 Poland the Hungarian political sc
5 Poland the Law and Justice party,
5 Poland giving the winner an absol
5 Poland and to tire out the domest
5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ
5 Poland and an inflow of European
5 Poland The second factor is the p
5 Poland seems economic indicators
5 Poland occupational qualification
5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans
5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie
5 Poland Despite the generally posi
5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa
5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co
5 Poland Post-election developments
5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and
5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB
443 organisation’ 30 - including
445 - whether through public policy
447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob
449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl
451 References Arthur J and Kristj
453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma
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