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DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1

DEMJ5104_nothing_to_fear_report_140217_WEBv1

1 Great Britain Table 5

1 Great Britain Table 5 The main Brexit predictive model leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval) age3 25–34 1.355448 0.5479525 2.47 0.013 0.2814807 2.429415 35–44 1.689128 0.5534602 3.05 0.002 0.604366 2.77389 45–54 1.858809 0.5597221 3.32 0.001 0.7617743 2.955845 55–64 1.971858 0.5339147 3.69 0 0.9254048 3.018312 65+ 1.898366 0.537191 3.53 0 0.8454905 2.951241 education2 GCSEs -1.136426 0.440053 -2.58 0.01 -1.998914 -0.2739378 A-Levels or higher, below degree -1.569419 0.4337769 -3.62 0 -2.419606 -0.7192321 degree -2.439014 0.4197594 -5.81 0 -3.261727 -1.616301 1.white 1.232452 0.5959748 2.07 0.039 0.0643633 2.400541 1.ruralla 0.6894382 0.2101209 3.28 0.001 0.2776088 1.101268 socdifcountry yes -1.059817 0.2872928 -3.69 0 -1.622901 -0.4967339 religion1 Christian 0.4651931 0.2087088 2.23 0.026 0.0561314 0.8472547 other religion 0.4590905 0.5128065 0.9 0.371 -0.5459918 1.464173 male male -0.7481792 0.2929094 -2.55 0.011 -1.322271 -0.1740874 incomenom1 under £1,520pm -0.7418954 0.3609421 -2.06 0.04 -1.449329 -0.0344618 over £3,160 -2.485991 0.5644772 -4.4 0 -3.592346 -1.379636 male#incomenom1 male#under £1,520pm 0.794986 0.4061168 1.96 0.05 -0.0009884 1.59096 male#over £3,160 1.519846 0.5728461 2.65 0.008 0.3970879 2.642603 incomenom1#socdifcountry under £1,520pm#yes 0.0776491 0.4102226 0.19 0.85 -0.7263723 0.8816706 over £3,160#yes 1.56205 0.5760419 2.71 0.007 0.4330285 2.691071 _cons -0.2417419 0.8851385 -0.27 0.785 -1.976581 1.493098 Logistic Regression Number of obs = 715 Wald chi2(20) = 171.54 Prob > chi2 = 0 Log pseudolikelihood = -362.22919 Pseudo R2 = 0.2114

95 Table 6 Brexit model with socdifbrit (social network – different part of Britain) leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval) age3 25–34 1.310609 0.6073538 216 0.031 0.1202175 2.429415 35–44 1.747973 0.6042527 2.89 0.004 0.5636598 2.77389 45–54 1.950882 0.611457 3.19 0.001 0.7524482 2.955845 55–64 2.053577 0.5939692 3.46 0.001 0.8894186 3.018312 65+ 1.943229 0.5899863 3.29 0.001 0.786877 2.951241 education2 GCSEs -1.117543 0.4450537 -2.51 0.012 -1.989832 -0.2452536 A-Levels or higher, below degree -1.495116 0.4389677 -3.41 0.001 -2.355477 -0.6347548 degree -2.423104 0.4243214 -5.71 0 -3.254759 -1.59145 1.white 1.220537 0.602015 2.03 0.043 0.0406097 2.400465 1.ruralla 0.6480308 0.2080497 3.11 0.002 0.2402608 1.055801 socdifcountry yes -0.9483851 0.3416816 -2.78 0.006 -1.618069 -0.2787014 religion1 Christian 0.4625524 0.2019088 2.11 0.035 0.0308183 0.8222864 other religion 0.324939 0.487735 0.67 0.505 -0.6310031 1.280883 male male -0.6896035 0.2929094 -2.36 0.018 -1.263258 -0.1159493 incomenom1 under £1,520pm -0.651011 0.4727202 -1.38 0.168 -1.577526 0.2755036 over £3,160 -3.639948 0.838833 -4.34 0 -5.284031 -1.995866 male#incomenom1 male#under £1,520pm 0.6573993 0.4029989 1.63 0.103 -0.132464 1.447263 male#over £3,160 1.613362 0.5803072 2.78 0.005 0.4759805 2.750743 incomenom1#socdifcountry under £1,520pm#yes 0.0962631 0.480585 0.2 0.841 -0.8456731 1.038199 over £3,160#yes 2.452025 0.79726 3.08 0.002 0.8894237 4.014626 _cons -0.1503411 0.9217084 -0.16 0.87 -1.956856 1.656174 Logistic Regression Number of obs = 721 Wald chi2(20) = 141.44 Prob > chi2 = 0 Log pseudolikelihood = -368.60842 Pseudo R2 = 0.2013

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    “ Mapping and responding to the r

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    First published in 2017 © Demos. S

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    Open access. Some rights reserved.

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    11 Foreword Nothing to Fear but Fea

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    13 FORES in Sweden, the Institute o

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    15 rising tide that cuts across tra

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    17 diversity), and political leader

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    19 trends in Austria, where the Fre

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    21 refugees of ‘bringing in all k

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    23 themselves embodying the fear of

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    25 ‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and

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    27 While the Central European case

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    29 Europe, but the politics of fear

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    31 of European identity - attachmen

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    33 Euroscepticism In every country,

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    35 Figure 2 Views of respondents in

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    37 Political trust We also asked ou

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    39 significantly less support in th

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    41 - internationally and intranatio

  • Page 43 and 44: 43 els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expendit
  • Page 45 and 46: 45 25 R Wodak and S Boukala, ‘Eur
  • Page 47 and 48: 47 References ‘Denmark suspends q
  • Page 49 and 50: 49 European Commission, Standard Eu
  • Page 51 and 52: 1 Great Britain - ‘It’s who you
  • Page 53 and 54: 53 1 What we already know about Bre
  • Page 55 and 56: 55 compared with 59 per cent of tho
  • Page 57 and 58: 57 This leads the authors to conclu
  • Page 59 and 60: 59 think it is vital to let Europea
  • Page 61 and 62: 61 between areas hit hardest by aus
  • Page 63 and 64: 63 wealthy towns in the south of En
  • Page 65 and 66: 65 Similarly strong predictive powe
  • Page 67 and 68: 67 Anti-immigrant sentiment In addi
  • Page 69 and 70: 69 External and campaign factors Th
  • Page 71 and 72: 71 One caveat of this research is t
  • Page 73 and 74: 73 vote (and indeed on populism in
  • Page 75 and 76: 75 As part of this project, we comm
  • Page 77 and 78: 77 Table 1 Predicted probability of
  • Page 79 and 80: 79 neighbourhood levels of deprivat
  • Page 81 and 82: 81 Social networks Most important f
  • Page 83 and 84: 83 Table 3 Predicted probability of
  • Page 85 and 86: 85 Over recent decades the world ha
  • Page 87 and 88: 87 significance of demographic vari
  • Page 89 and 90: 89 ·· relative employment depriva
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  • Page 93: 93 regardless of the possible impor
  • Page 97 and 98: 97 Table 8 Brexit model with attitu
  • Page 99 and 100: 99 Table 10 Brexit model with attit
  • Page 101 and 102: 101 Table 12 Brexit model with atti
  • Page 103 and 104: 103 Table 14 Brexit model with atti
  • Page 105 and 106: 105 Table 16 Brexit model with pref
  • Page 107 and 108: 107 Notes 1 D Runciman, ‘A win fo
  • Page 109 and 110: 109 org/2016/07/brexit-vote-boosts-
  • Page 111 and 112: 111 29 Jun 2016, http://bruegel.org
  • Page 113 and 114: 113 53 R Stubager, ‘Education eff
  • Page 115 and 116: 115 71 Ashcroft, ‘How the United
  • Page 117 and 118: 117 84 Goodwin and Heath, ‘Brexit
  • Page 119 and 120: 119 Bell T, ‘The referendum, livi
  • Page 121 and 122: 121 brexit-and-the-left-behind-thes
  • Page 123 and 124: 123 Katwala S, Rutter J and Balling
  • Page 125: 125 Stokes B, ‘Euroskepticism bey
  • Page 128 and 129: Contents Summary Introduction 1 Fea
  • Page 130 and 131: Introduction 2 France Fear exists i
  • Page 132 and 133: 2 France of reasons. It affects how
  • Page 134 and 135: 2 France impetus that originates in
  • Page 136 and 137: 2 France Another illustration of Fr
  • Page 138 and 139: 2 France Figure 2 Responses by surv
  • Page 140 and 141: 2 France Slightly more French peopl
  • Page 142 and 143: 2 France The situation in Poland, f
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    2 France Figure 6 Responses by surv

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    2 France Figure 8 Responses by surv

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    2 France 2 Elections at a time of p

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    2 France These results are particul

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    2 France Figure 11 Responses by sur

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    2 France One of the parties that is

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    2 France the idea of ‘plain speak

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    2 France The fact that these two is

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    2 France Figure 17 Responses by sur

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    2 France As in the YouGov survey, D

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    2 France Conclusion: the need to pu

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    2 France Notes 1 F Furedi, ‘The p

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    2 France 15 A de Montigny, ‘Selon

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    2 France 31 On this topic, see Y Be

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    2 France urgence-conduit-a-des-abus

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    Vie Publique, ‘Trente ans de lég

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    Contents Summary Introduction Metho

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    3 Germany politicians have difficul

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    3 Germany among the German public s

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    Methodology 3 Germany To further th

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    3 Germany Figure 1 Areas represente

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    3 Germany Taking a closer look at t

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    3 Germany When looking at all the c

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    3 Germany with different demographi

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    3 Germany Figure 7 Fears of respond

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    3 Germany feeling of insecurity ont

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    3 Germany Insight 3: Concerns about

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    3 Germany of the politicians interv

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    3 Germany Figure 11 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany I haven’t heard anyone

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    3 Germany Figure 13 Fears of respon

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    3 Germany issues that are the EU’

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    3 Germany are able to draw on compa

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    Conclusions 3 Germany Using the lat

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    3 Germany concerns and alleviating

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    3 Germany Provide avenues for knowl

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    3 Germany public-elite comparisons

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    3 Germany ·· €1,351-1,660 ··

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    3 Germany ·· Q5. Which of the fol

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    3 Germany a Angela Merkel b The Ger

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    3 Germany 6 T Lochocki, The Unstopp

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    3 Germany European Parliament, Stan

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    Contents Introduction 1 Migration,

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    4 Spain 1 Migration, economic crisi

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    4 Spain During the rapid economic e

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    4 Spain Figure 4 GDP (adjusted for

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    4 Spain Figure 8 Household expendit

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    4 Spain In short, high levels of mi

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    4 Spain of them also illiberal, wer

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    4 Spain Figure 9 The proportion of

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    4 Spain This Europeanism presents i

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    4 Spain Table 3 The views of respon

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    4 Spain The acceptance of globalisa

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    4 Spain Figure 13 The views of resp

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    4 Spain Increased acceptance of dif

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    4 Spain Table 7 The percentage of r

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    4 Spain Figure 15 Views of responde

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    4 Spain Table 9 The extent to which

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    4 Spain Table 10 Respondents’ vie

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    4 Spain are most inclined to vote f

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    4 Spain 3 Electoral and party polit

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    4 Spain The extreme right was disco

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    4 Spain towns, although none of the

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    4 Spain emphasising unity and the l

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    4 Spain cradles of successful natio

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    4 Spain of the population supportin

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    4 Spain Appendix 2: Results of the

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Total (%) Partido Popular (

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    4 Spain Notes 1 Jose Pablo Martíne

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    4 Spain Material deprivation covers

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    4 Spain 23 European Commission, Sta

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    4 Spain See Centro de Investigacion

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    4 Spain European Commission, ‘Pub

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    4 Spain INE, ‘Padrón municipal

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    4 Spain paper presented at the 12th

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    Contents Summary Introduction 1 Soc

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    5 Poland Introduction - what happen

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    5 Poland the Hungarian political sc

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    5 Poland the Law and Justice party,

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    5 Poland giving the winner an absol

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    5 Poland and to tire out the domest

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    5 Poland 1 Social cohesion and econ

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    5 Poland and an inflow of European

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    5 Poland The second factor is the p

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    5 Poland seems economic indicators

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    5 Poland occupational qualification

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    5 Poland Table 2 Respondents’ ans

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    5 Poland Table 3 Respondents’ vie

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    5 Poland Despite the generally posi

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    5 Poland not the Law and Justice pa

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    5 Poland or immigrants from Arab co

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    5 Poland Post-election developments

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    5 Poland 3 Social conservatism and

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    5 Poland women’s empowerment, LGB

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    5 Poland women’s access to legal

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    5 Poland commentators did not expec

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    5 Poland Conclusions - resilience a

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    5 Poland The rise of authoritarian

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    5 Poland Notes 1 YouGov surveyed ad

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    5 Poland Since then, the near absen

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    5 Poland 24 World Bank, ‘GINI ind

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    5 Poland European Union’, Standar

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    5 Poland migrants-asylum-poland-kac

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    5 Poland 67 In 1993 60 per cent sup

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    5 Poland 82 Fomina and Kucharczyk,

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    5 Poland Boguszewski R, ‘Nastroje

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    5 Poland Faiola A, ‘In Poland, a

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    5 Poland Kucharczyk J and Zbieranek

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    5 Poland Public Opinion Research, 2

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    6 Sweden - Sweden: the immigration

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    375 Introduction In Swedish migrati

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    377 migrants came mainly as family

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    379 Citizens from outside the EU ar

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    381 2018 elections. The Sweden Demo

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    383 Figure 3 The proportion of Swed

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    385 science: national identity is t

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    387 During the refugee crisis of 20

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    389 and immigrants even when suppos

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    391 2 Analysis and results The main

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    393 she suggested that the ‘migra

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    395 emphasised, this crisis came ac

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    397 directed towards Swedishness in

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    399 which leads voters to connect S

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    401 exclusively of people with a ci

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    403 Table 3 confirms the findings i

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    405 Summary and discussion During 2

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    407 rhetoric of the Christian Democ

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    409 6 Migrationsverket, ‘Asylsök

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    411 22 H Oscarsson and A Bergström

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    413 37 P Mouritsen and TV Olsen,

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    415 References ‘Historiskt högt

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    417 Jenkins R, Social Identity, Lon

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    419 Regeringskansliet, ‘Regeringe

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    7 Responding to the politics of fea

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    423 Introduction This project has i

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    425 In responding to the current fe

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    427 in facilitated discussion to es

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    429 2 Reconnect ‘political elites

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    431 background is also central to r

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    433 Boost the accountability of EU

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    435 3 Make the case for openness an

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    437 communities and country’s pla

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    439 1.8 million signatures, predomi

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    441 4 Counter post-truth narratives

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    443 organisation’ 30 - including

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    445 - whether through public policy

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    447 8 C Malmström, ‘Shaping glob

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    449 24 J Haidt, ‘The ethics of gl

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    451 References Arthur J and Kristj

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    453 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsma

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    Demos - License to Publish The work

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    This project is supported by The ca

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