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120 competition policy

120 competition policy towards abuse of dominance cases has to be reassessed and potentially improved to face the challenges of digital markets. The different positions show that the digital economy has given rise to new challenges, which need to be faced by the Commission in order to ensure competition on the merits on digital markets. This article weighs the claims made on which role competition policy should play in the digital economy and examines in which way the current policy on abuse of dominance might be improved to face the novelties of digital markets. It takes the view that the positions either to abstain from enforcement of competition law in the digital economy or to introduce an ex-ante regulatory framework are excessive and not necessary, and that the evolvement of the competition policy of the Commission towards Article 102 TFEU is not only completely adequate but rather best suited to face abusive conduct on digital markets. The main aim of this article is to examine whether and how competition policy should evolve with the traditional tools at hand in the fast-moving and highly innovative digitalised industry without producing unacceptable false positive or negative outcomes for those markets. The position taken by the Commission on market definition and dominance was highly criticised in previous abuse of dominance proceedings in digital markets, such as Microsoft or Google Search. Therefore, the article focuses on market definition and dominance as the most crucial points in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU in digital markets. In order to discuss the primary question at issue, the article in section 2 first defines digital markets and outlines their main characteristics distinguishing digital markets from the analogue world. After having reflected on the current state of discussion and the proposed approaches how to handle the challenges given rise by the digital economy in abuse of dominance cases in Section 3, Section 4 outlines the current legal framework and policy considerations under Article 102 TFEU and concentrates on the improvement of the Commission's competition policy towards abuse of dominance cases in digital markets and discusses whether the policy as it stands is appropriate in dealing with the abuse of dominance in the web based economy and where adjustments are needed. Section 5 concludes.

121 II. Characteristics of Digital Markets 1. Introduction This chapter provides an overview of industries coming under the definition of digital markets and the economic characteristics generally presented by them. Given that digitalisation profoundly changed the commercial behaviour in most markets, and nowadays practically every business is to a larger or smaller extent carried out in a digitalised manner, a uniform definition of digital markets is difficult to provide. For the purpose of this article, digital markets are understood as industries which are characterised by the supply of digital goods or services. According to this definition, digital markets comprise operating systems for PCs or laptops (eg Windows), search engines (eg Google), apps for smart mobile devices (eg Whatsapp), websites or software for the distribution of digital content (eg YouTube or Spotify), or social networks (eg Facebook). 1 Furthermore, also industries where physical goods are distributed through a digital platform come under this definition, provided that the core business in question concerns the development and management of the platform (eg Amazon). Despite the fact that a wide range of industries are covered under the umbrella of digital markets, most of these markets share common characteristics. These characteristics significantly influence both business decisions taken by the individual undertakings as well as competition on the market leading to business models quite different from those in conventional sectors. 2 In this context, it is particularly vital for competition policy to take into account the characteristics of two- or multi-sided platforms, since most features of onesided businesses do not apply to those business models. 3 1 See Massimiliano Kadar, 'European Union competition law in the digital era' (2015) 4 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht 342, 345. 2 David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, 'The antitrust analysis of multi-sided platform businesses' in Roger D Blair and D Daniel Sokol (eds), Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics (OUP 2013) 404. 3 This was also emphasised in OECD, 'Roundtable on Two-Sided Markets' (DAF/COMP(2009)20) 11 et seq accessed 28 July 2016.

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