1 year ago



6 more adequate to deal

6 more adequate to deal with the arising challenges, concluding that the advancement of competition policy towards Art. 102 TFEU is most suited to protect competition while taking into account the characteristics of digital markets. As always, we would like to especially thank Prof. Eyad Maher Dabbah, the director of the ICC, for his guidance and endless support in our efforts. We hope you will enjoy this volume, and we already look forward to receiving excellent contributions from all interested young scholars for the next one. The GAR Editorial Board December 2016

7 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN COMPANIES’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE I-Ju Chen ∗ Since the EU is bound by the EU Charter of fundamental rights due to the amended Treaty of the European Union, the critical points of companies’ fundamental rights in competition proceeding has generated a large number of legal debates. This article evaluates whether changes to the current competition enforcement are necessary as to comply with EU fundamental rights standards. This article discusses the paradox between the EU competition enforcement and companies’ fundamental rights protection. In author’s view, the EU should comply with EU fundamental rights law, particularly due to the Charter’s binding effects on the EU. The case law concerning EU competition law has reflected compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless, the effective competition enforcement is still necessary for an undistorted market and will ultimately maintain a well-functioning market. This brings a result to consumer welfare, which is another kind of protection of fundamental rights. I. Introduction Fundamental rights’ compliance of public enforcement in European Union (EU) competition law is a particularly complicated issue. 1 Competition public enforcement in the EU may considerably affect the protection of suspected companies’ fundamental rights, and reasons underlying include that the European Commission (Commission) holds investigation and first-instance decision-making powers to sanction penalties to companies’ illegal antitrust infringements. Procedural rules dictating the competition enforcement by the ∗ I-Ju Chen obtains LL.B. (Taiwan) and LL.M. (Taiwan and UCL Laws) and is a PhD candidate in law at the University of Birmingham in the UK. She had worked as a paralegal in a multinational company in Taiwan before studying in the UK. 1 Arianna Andreangeli, ‘Competition Law and the Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights: Back to Square One?’ (2015) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice Advance Access 1.

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