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Autumn 2016<br />
A Publication based at St Antony’s College<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong><br />
in the 21 st Century Gulf<br />
Featuring<br />
H.E. Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali<br />
Minister of <strong>Culture</strong> and Sports<br />
State of Qatar<br />
H.E. Shaikha Mai Al-Khalifa<br />
President<br />
Bahrain Authority for <strong>Culture</strong> & Antiquities<br />
Ali Al-Youha<br />
Secretary General<br />
Kuwait National Council for <strong>Culture</strong>,<br />
Arts and Letters<br />
Nada Al Hassan<br />
Chief of Arab States Unit<br />
UNESCO<br />
Foreword by<br />
Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain
OxGAPS | Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum<br />
OxGAPS is a University of Oxford platform based at St Antony’s College promoting<br />
interdisciplinary research and dialogue on the pressing issues facing the region.<br />
Senior Member: Dr. Eugene Rogan<br />
Committee:<br />
Chairman & Managing Editor: Suliman Al-Atiqi<br />
Vice Chairman & Partnerships: Adel Hamaizia<br />
Editor: Jamie Etheridge<br />
Chief Copy Editor: Jack Hoover<br />
Arabic Content Lead: Lolwah Al-Khater<br />
Head of Outreach: Mohammed Al-Dubayan<br />
Communications Manager: Aisha Fakhroo<br />
Broadcasting & Archiving Officer: Oliver Ramsay Gray<br />
Research Assistant: Matthew Greene<br />
Copyright © 2016 OxGAPS Forum<br />
All rights reserved<br />
Autumn 2016<br />
Gulf Affairs is an independent, non-partisan journal organized by OxGAPS, with<br />
the aim of bridging the voices of scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers to further<br />
knowledge and dialogue on pressing issues, challenges and opportunities facing the six<br />
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.<br />
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily<br />
represent those of OxGAPS, St Antony’s College, or the University of Oxford.<br />
Contact Details:<br />
OxGAPS Forum<br />
62 Woodstock Road<br />
Oxford, OX2 6JF, UK<br />
Fax: +44 (0)1865 595770<br />
Email: info@oxgaps.org<br />
Web: www.oxgaps.org<br />
Design and Layout by B’s Graphic Communication.<br />
Email: abarboza@bsgraphic.com<br />
Cover: A visitor looks at photographs from Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid<br />
Al Maktoum’s, the Crown Prince of Dubai, personal collection at the Dubai Photo Exhibition<br />
on 19 March 2016.<br />
Photo Credits: Cover - Karim Sahib/AFP/Getty Images; 2 - Pool/Bandar Algaloud/<br />
Anadolu Agency/Getty Images; 6 - Xinhua/Alamy Stock Photo; 10 - Rabih Moghrabi/<br />
AFP/Getty Images; 13 - Nelson Garrido; 17 - Yasser Al-Zayyat/AFP/Getty Images; 22 -<br />
Marwan Naamani/AFP/Getty Images; 38 - REUTERS/Alamy Stock Photo; 42 - BACA;<br />
45 - NCCAL; 49 - UNESCO.
The Issue ‘<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the<br />
21 st Century Gulf’ was supported by:
Table of Contents<br />
Foreword<br />
Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain<br />
iv<br />
iv<br />
I. Overview<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> and <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21 st Century Gulf<br />
Magdalena Karolak, Theme Editor<br />
vi<br />
vi<br />
II. Analysis<br />
Khaleeji <strong>Identity</strong> in Contemporary Gulf Politics<br />
by Gaith Abdulla<br />
“Emiratization of <strong>Identity</strong>”: Conscription as a Cultural Tool of Nation-building<br />
by Eleonora Ardemagni<br />
Saruq Al-Hadid to Jebel Ali: Dubai’s Evolving Trading <strong>Culture</strong><br />
by Robert Mogielnicki<br />
IconiCity: Seeking <strong>Identity</strong> by Building Iconic Architectures in Kuwait<br />
by Roberto Fabbri<br />
The Banality of Protest? Twitter Campaigns in Qatar<br />
by Andrew Leber and Charlotte Lysa<br />
Monolithic Representations and Orientalist Credence in the UAE<br />
by Rana AlMutawa<br />
1<br />
2<br />
6<br />
10<br />
13<br />
17<br />
22<br />
III. Commentary<br />
27<br />
Challenges of Cultural <strong>Identity</strong> in the GCC<br />
by Ahmad Al-Dubayan<br />
The Gulf States’ National Museums<br />
by Sultan Al Qassemi<br />
The Local Evolution of Saudi Arabia’s Contemporary Art Scene<br />
by Alia Al-Senussi<br />
Understanding the Evolution of the Khaleeji <strong>Identity</strong><br />
by Lulwa Abdulla Al-Misned<br />
28<br />
30<br />
32<br />
34<br />
ii Gulf Affairs
Table of Contents<br />
IV. Interviews<br />
H.E. Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali<br />
Minister of <strong>Culture</strong> and Sports<br />
State of Qatar<br />
H.E. Shaikha Mai bint Mohammed Al-Khalifa<br />
President, Bahrain Authority for <strong>Culture</strong> & Antiquities<br />
Kingdom of Bahrain<br />
Ali Al-Youha<br />
Secretary General<br />
Kuwait National Council for <strong>Culture</strong>, Arts and Letters<br />
Nada Al Hassan<br />
Chief of Arab States Unit<br />
UNESCO<br />
37<br />
38<br />
42<br />
45<br />
49<br />
V. Featured Photo Essay and Timeline<br />
54<br />
Featured Photo Essay: Walls of the GCC<br />
by Rana Jarbou<br />
Timeline<br />
54<br />
56<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016<br />
iii
Foreword<br />
Foreword<br />
by Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain<br />
In the 1960s, the Gulf states experienced a cultural renaissance<br />
and the start of intellectual modernization. Khaleeji society<br />
has evolved over the ensuing 50 years due to four key<br />
reasons. First is the progressive vision of civil society. This includes<br />
cultural foundations, institutions, clubs, and non-profit<br />
organizations as well as poets, sheikhs, thinkers, artists, and<br />
writers from the region. They all believe in culture and its value<br />
in evolving society’s virtues, principles, and wisdom. The<br />
second is communication. Across the region, daily editorials,<br />
columns, analyses, interviews, TV programs, radio programs<br />
and more recently, social media have all focused on cultural<br />
activities, and the cultural dimension of these societies has become<br />
a facet of daily life. It orients common opinion and adds<br />
understanding and value to our view of life.<br />
A third factor that has promoted cultural production and exchange<br />
across the GCC region is the development of printing<br />
and translation and the explosion of information available to a<br />
large segment of the population. Finally, governments of the Gulf states all play an important, central role<br />
in promoting local cultural production. Through the allocation of funds and encouragement of local societies,<br />
competitions, awards, and other efforts, public institutions have supported a well-entrenched tradition<br />
of indigenously-produced arts and culture. Today, the Arabic culture is much more universal than before<br />
because it has been disseminated internationally through cultural and civilizational centers for dialogue<br />
established in the big historical cities.<br />
My own efforts should be understood within the framework of civil society and corporate social responsibility.<br />
In 1989, I established the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain Foundation, which now functions through<br />
six bodies: the Prize of Poetic Creativity, the Centre of Intercultural Dialogue, the Institute of Peace, the<br />
Centre of Communication, the Centre of Social Development, and the Directorate of Libraries.<br />
We organize and co-organize a number of cultural events with international institutions and finance others,<br />
forming a bridge between the Arab world and countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Recently, we were<br />
honored by re-endowing the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain Laudian Chair in Arabic at the University of Oxford,<br />
which is one of seven other chairs ensuring the same mission in different universities in Chad, China,<br />
Comoros Islands, France, Italy, Spain, and Togo.<br />
After 25 years, the foundation is known all over the world, and we have organized 15 conferences and sessions<br />
in Arabic poetry and intercultural dialogue. We work closely with governmental institutions, international<br />
bodies, and NGOs, as the goals of the foundation resonate deeply with their missions. For example,<br />
in 2006, during the Foundation’s 10 th session held in Paris, France, under the auspices of His Excellency<br />
iv Gulf Affairs
Foreword<br />
the former French President Jacques Chirac and in coordination with UNESCO, we organized a seminar<br />
which was described by the former Director-General of UNESCO Koichiro Matsuura as an “excellent opportunity<br />
to reflect on the notion of intercultural dialogue, as well as on the role of the poet in encouraging<br />
mutual understanding and respect among cultures.” We are, Matsuura added, “encouraging creativity,<br />
and enabling it to flourish in a spirit of diversity and freedom. This is one of the best ways of promoting<br />
cultural vitality and sustaining human development.”<br />
Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain is a prominent Kuwaiti businessman and founder of the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain<br />
Foundation. He is also a renowned poet and his first book Bauh Al-Bawadi (Intimations of the Desert) was published<br />
in 1995. Al-Babtain holds 14 honorary doctorates, has received numerous awards, honors, and medals<br />
including the Kuwait Order of the Sash from the Amir of Kuwait, Order of Civil Merit from the King of Spain<br />
and National Order of the Cedar from the President of Lebanon.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016<br />
v
I. Overview<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> and <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21 st Century Gulf<br />
Overview<br />
by Magdalena Karolak, Theme Editor<br />
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries entered the 21 st century with greater maturity. Across the<br />
region, these states consolidated the many political, economic, and social projects that had been in progress<br />
since independence and state formation in the 20 th century.<br />
New challenges abound, however, as Gulf millennials enter a rapidly changing world facing regional conflicts<br />
and socioeconomic pressures. One of the core questions likely to shape the coming decades in the Gulf<br />
is the issue of identity. States must continue to forge strong national identities, while the creation of the<br />
GCC has paved the way for the growth of a pan-khaleeji identity. Formation of national identities in the<br />
Gulf has not been an easy project, as exemplified elsewhere in the Middle East. Religious, ethnic, tribal,<br />
and settlement cleavages that cut through the population are factors that make identification and loyalty<br />
with non-state structures more salient. The structures of power often determine these specific patterns of<br />
identification. Yet, it is also clear that identities, once crystallized, in turn impact the social structure.<br />
The creation of strong national identities requires anchoring the nation’s history in founding myths shared<br />
by all citizens. Indeed, a community exists thanks to a shared perception of the past, present, and future<br />
events that transcends individuals, linking their lives to those of their predecessors and their successors in<br />
a meaningful way. Attempts to revive and, most importantly, reconstruct history based on present needs,<br />
are widely observed in the Gulf. New museums, monuments, archaeological sites, and the revival of tradition<br />
all testify to this need. In the process, new meanings and national narratives are formed.<br />
However, in search of uniformity and consolidation, what is inscribed in the collective memory often omits<br />
minority identities that do not easily fit the mainstream. Such strong national identities have been actively<br />
sought as the GCC attempts to move away from the rentier model and new generations of citizens are<br />
asked to contribute to their countries in various ways. Gulf newspapers often celebrate the talents and<br />
achievements of young citizens in various disciplines, while Saudi Arabia recently called on its citizens to<br />
sacrifice for their country with salary cuts in public jobs. Other types of sacrifice may be even more palpable<br />
as GCC countries intervene militarily in conflicts at home and abroad. Sacrifice for the country is, in turn,<br />
cherished through public celebrations of citizens’ commitments and achievements, further strengthening<br />
national narratives.<br />
The needs of the present also dictate another trend that shapes the Gulf, that of construction. Lacking<br />
monuments that could rival others in the Middle East, the GCC countries have embarked on extravagant<br />
building programs that put Gulf cities on the map among the most impressive architectural undertakings.<br />
With the tallest building in the world in Dubai (soon to be overshadowed by Jeddah Tower), and many other<br />
daring constructions and developments on the way, the Gulf cities have been transformed from somewhat<br />
sleepy trading towns to world centers, places to see and to be seen. The glamour that is a by-product<br />
of modernity does not undermine the fact that the Gulf strives to continue the legacy of Middle Eastern<br />
achievements. Many iconic buildings in the GCC stand out juxtaposed with the Egyptian pyramids in the<br />
Priceless Arabia MasterCard advertisement for the MENA region, for example. So far, facilitated by oil re-<br />
vi Gulf Affairs
I. Overview<br />
sources, the Gulf further sets itself as a center of world banking, tourism, trade, shopping, and innovation,<br />
projecting its identity toward the future with a sense of pride.<br />
Indeed, in a Middle East torn by conflicts and upheavals, the Gulf seems to hold a special place characterized<br />
by stability and progress. This search for stability was the reason for the creation of the GCC in the<br />
first place and makes “othering” from neighboring states easier. Yet, the khaleeji identity tied to the GCC<br />
project is characterized by fluidity, with cooperation at times closer or further away. However, the need<br />
for security and preservation of the Gulf’s political systems may dictate closer ties in the future. It is not a<br />
coincidence that the proposal of a Gulf union followed the GCC intervention in Bahrain. With the rising<br />
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over dominance in the Middle East, the GCC project, and hence<br />
khaleeji identity building, remains as valid as ever.<br />
Lastly, it is clear that individuals need to self-identify with specific communities, practices, and institutions<br />
with which they form attachments. The study “Psychological Effects of Globalisation on Young Women<br />
and Men” conducted by the Dubai School of Government concluded that bilingual students in the UAE<br />
and Saudi Arabia are bicultural, as they identify with both local and global cultures. The GCC has some<br />
of the highest per-capita rates of internet use in the world and offers a particularly interesting case study.<br />
While at this point the internet has not eradicated local cultures, appropriation of cultural elements from<br />
elsewhere will have important effects in the future. This may raise interest in institutionalizing the protection<br />
of local cultures, taking into account the large presence of expatriates. In addition, networking<br />
opportunities offered by the internet have already proved important in the creation of collective identities<br />
on national and regional levels. The shift towards responsible and active citizenship will no doubt create<br />
more grassroots activism facilitated by the use of internet. Collective activism may ultimately be based on<br />
identities of groups that feel left out of the mainstream, bringing us back to the question of strong national<br />
identities.<br />
This volume is a fine selection of analyses highlighting the many debates and multi-dimensional developments<br />
that are taking place. These extremely interesting intersections invite us to closely follow the subject<br />
of Gulf identities, no doubt leaving us with more questions than answers, which makes the reading even<br />
more rewarding.<br />
Dr. Magdalena Karolak is Assistant Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at Zayed University, UAE. She<br />
has published more than 30 journal articles and book chapters on various aspects of social, political and<br />
economic transformations in the GCC.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016<br />
vii
II. Analysis
II. Analysis<br />
Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman chairs the meeting of defense ministers of the GCC<br />
states in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 15 November 2016.<br />
Khaleeji <strong>Identity</strong> in Contemporary<br />
Gulf Politics<br />
by Gaith Abdulla<br />
haleeji identity has great potential to explain the contemporary politics and international relations of<br />
the Gulf. However, it is by no means a widely recognized concept; you’d be hard pressed to find even<br />
passing reference to the term in the literature on Gulf politics. 1 Khaleeji (meaning ‘of the Gulf’ in Arabic)<br />
denotes a socio-political regional identity that is shared by citizens of the six Gulf Cooperation Council<br />
(GCC) states. Khaleeji identity is the next step in the evolution of political identity in the Gulf, which began<br />
with tribal identities and developed to include national identities with the advent of nation-states in the<br />
region in the mid-20 th Century.<br />
Khaleeji identity builds on strong cultural homogeneity within the Gulf states, the result of a long history<br />
of sustained social engagement and intermarriage. It also features prominently in popular culture, music,<br />
television, sports, civil society, and reaches all the way to the top decision-making levels of government.<br />
In the regional milieu, khaleeji identity has had a defining role in the creation and durability of the GCC,<br />
what is today the most stable and highly functional regional institution in the Middle East. 2 Although fear<br />
of an expansionist post-revolution Iran was one of the primary motivations behind the establishment of<br />
this regional architecture, 3 the underlying khaleeji identity common to the Gulf states was the social glue<br />
that allowed such regionalization to take place. What’s interesting about the GCC is that since its creation<br />
2<br />
Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
in 1981 it has become a key driver of khaleeji identity. The GCC is the most tangible manifestation of the<br />
regional identity and this international institution has “contributed decisively to the creation of a khaleeji<br />
persona in international relations.” 4<br />
Khaleeji – in theory<br />
Despite its significance and potential, khaleeji identity has remained an under-theorized term. This is primarily<br />
the result of the overriding influence of oil on the conceptualization of the politics of the Gulf. Many<br />
of the existing theories of the socio-political structures of the Gulf have developed with oil as a central unit<br />
of analysis. As these conceptions reflect the strategic, political, and economic security concerns of great<br />
powers (namely the US) in the region, it is only natural that oil has had such a defining role in shaping the<br />
theories and perceptions of Gulf politics. 5<br />
Because elite and ruling social classes in the Gulf are the most relevant to oil production and policy, they<br />
are the most notable classes to account for in the oil-centric theories. And these theories, which are mostly<br />
concerned with security and oil output from a great power perspective, content themselves by discussing<br />
the internal dynamics of Gulf states as a relationship of the elite/ruling classes with the rest of ‘society’<br />
measured in terms of material resources. 6 The inflated influence of oil, great power strategic interests, and<br />
the elite/ruling classes on existing theories points to the importance of developing concepts such as khaleeji<br />
identity that open avenues to constructivist approaches to the politics of the Gulf as opposed to the hawkeyed<br />
realist conceptualizations.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> and the interests of the state<br />
Realism plays a big role in the behavior of khaleeji states given the region’s strategic significance. But<br />
among other nebulous state-society relationships, institutional policy production is often mired in self-interests.<br />
Hence taking a step back and re-theorizing could possibly yield a better understanding of policy<br />
production and state behavior in the Gulf. On the other hand, with a sight set beyond material interests<br />
and security concerns, constructivism recognizes that states are social actors, seeing identity and other<br />
“ideational forces” as important motivators “on political interests and thus on national security policies.” 7<br />
From a constructivist perspective, khaleeji identity forms a vital component of Gulf politics and would<br />
be a cornerstone in any project of regional integration in the Gulf. Constructivism defines regionalism<br />
as a product of “regional awareness, a shared sense of belonging to a particular regional community. . .<br />
Therefore, sub-regional integration is dependent on the compatibility of major values relevant to political<br />
decision-making.” 8<br />
The potential of a shared regional identity, like khaleeji identity, for policy production and grass-roots regionalization<br />
is evident. However, bygone failed integration projects based on the perception of a shared<br />
identity (e.g. Arabism) call for caution. The issues that plague Arabism are for the most part the same problems<br />
faced in the Gulf, that the project of integration exists at the level of states, is informed by the ruling/<br />
elite classes, and lacks functioning democratic avenues. These factors hinder the effective representation<br />
of the social dimension. 9<br />
However, the homogeneity of the socio-political climate in the Gulf states is something that did not feature<br />
in the Arab integration project. This is where khaleeji identity comes to play: it represents not only<br />
common popular culture, history, traditions and heritage, but also complements the existent prevailing<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016<br />
3
II. Analysis<br />
Khaleeji identity forms a vital component of Gulf politics<br />
and would be a cornerstone in any project of regional<br />
integration in the Gulf.<br />
elite classes.<br />
socio-political identities, namely Arab, Islamic,<br />
tribal and national identities. This<br />
regional identity represents a shared political<br />
culture amongst citizens and not<br />
only common ideals limited to the ruling/<br />
The Middle East today is probably in the worst shape in its modern history. Amidst this, the Gulf states<br />
contrast starkly with their surroundings. Although by no means unscathed by the turmoil, the six members<br />
of the GCC find themselves as the most stable and coherently functional states in the region. As the<br />
rest of the Arab world has ground to a halt, Gulf cities are argued to be the new centers of the region. They<br />
are now the “nerve center of the contemporary Arab world’s culture, commerce, design, architecture, art<br />
and academia.” 10 The Gulf states need to reflect on their particularities, strengths, and weaknesses as they<br />
find themselves occupying positions of power and influence in the Middle East that they are unaccustomed<br />
to. Khaleeji identity is an invaluable particularity to the Gulf states, both shaping and being shaped by actions<br />
and policies. It acts as a dynamic force strengthening intra-GCC relations at the elite and grass roots<br />
levels and informs more coherent and consistent regional interaction.<br />
The relationship between identity, the state, and society has become more complex and pronounced than<br />
ever in the history of the Gulf. The roles, actions, and attitudes of the Gulf states are changing, and with<br />
that the role of identity becomes ever more salient. It is necessary to appreciate the role that khaleeji identity<br />
plays in the social milieu as a fundamental driver of domestic attitudes and regional and international<br />
policy positions, as doing so will create more strategic, sustainable, and perhaps democratic policies. Indeed,<br />
khaleeji identity will remain highly dynamic as it defines the societies and states of the Arab Gulf in<br />
the 21 st Century.<br />
Gaith Abdulla is a doctoral candidate at Durham University focusing on khaleeji identity, youth and regionalisation<br />
in the Gulf.<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
A notable exception is Adam Hanieh’s conceptualization of khaleeji capital in his book Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States<br />
(Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2011). In defining khaleeji capital he explains “The Arabic word khaleej is literally translated as “Gulf” but<br />
goes beyond a geographic meaning to convey a common pan-Gulf Arab identity that sets the people of the region apart from the rest of the<br />
Middle East.” (p.2).<br />
Abdullah Al Shayji, “Salman doctrine is the best option,” Gulf News, April 3, 2016.<br />
Kristian Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (London: Hurst, 2011).<br />
Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in a Changing<br />
Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p.153. In his book, Legrenzi argues that the GCC has been responsible for a Gulf popular identity<br />
becoming a substantive reality and “working its way into the political and economic landscape of the six Gulf monarchies.” (p.2)<br />
Current Gulf politics are clearly shaped by U.S. policy and oil security. For example, the U.S. ‘pivot to Asia’ is seen as one of the main<br />
driving forces behind Saudi Arabia’s newfound assertiveness and hard power projection in the region, the Saudi-led military campaign in<br />
Yemen being the prime example of this. And the perception is that current record low oil prices have motivated the governments of the<br />
Gulf states to seek to expedite processes of economic diversification and escape the dependency on oil. See Roberts, David, “Shake up for<br />
the sheikhs as the oil slump hits home,” Chatham House, June/July 2016.<br />
4 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
Commonly referred to as the ‘ruling bargain’, in which the elite/ruling classes use their oil money to subsidize their societies in return<br />
for political acquiescence. See Davidson, Christopher, “Diversification in Abu Dhabi and Dubai: The Impact on National <strong>Identity</strong> and<br />
the Ruling Bargain,” in Popular <strong>Culture</strong> and Political <strong>Identity</strong> in the Arab Gulf States, Alsharekh, A.&R (Springborg London: Saqi<br />
Books, 2008), 143-153.<br />
Legrenzi, 46.<br />
Ibid, 46-47.<br />
Although Arabism and Arab integration was a populist ideal and had huge popular support in its heyday, the lack of functioning<br />
democratic apparatus meant this popular dimension was never able to manifest itself in policy production. The contagion effect of the<br />
Arab Spring is a great example of these deeply ingrained shared attitudes amongst Arabs. See Lynch, Marc. “The Big Think Behind<br />
the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy. November 28, 2011.<br />
Sultan Al-Qassemi, “Thriving Gulf Cities Emerge as New Centers of Arab World,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2013.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 5
II. Analysis<br />
A service man talks with a child during a military show to celebrate the 43 rd anniversary of the founding of the UAE in Abu Dhabi on 1<br />
December 2014.<br />
“Emiratization of <strong>Identity</strong>”: Conscription as a<br />
Cultural Tool of Nation-building<br />
by Eleonora Ardemagni<br />
n 2014, the United Arab Emirates introduced compulsory military service for nationals. However,<br />
this new requirement will not change the fundamental factors shaping the UAE’s security reality.<br />
First, Emiratis comprise a tiny percentage of the country’s total population, representing only 20 percent<br />
of the UAE’s total inhabitants. Secondly, persistent coup-proofing strategies remain fundamental to preserving<br />
regime stability. The Emiratis maintain a small army that is directly controlled by Abu Dhabi’s<br />
royal family and contains a mix of ‘asabiyya-based officers and foreign manpower. In addition to a strict<br />
military rationale, the government’s plan for conscription has a deep cultural intent: the “Emiratization<br />
of identity.” Emiratization is “a policy of national unity”, 1 and with the introduction of the military draft,<br />
the government aims to enhance the collective national Emirati identity, which remains fragmented by<br />
different tribal affiliations, emirate-specific identities, social classes, and the overwhelming numbers of<br />
expatriates in the country. In recently-unified states, conscription has often helped central institutions to<br />
build a national political discourse. 2 National identity, as a dynamic set of shared beliefs and historical<br />
legacies, is a theoretical concept, but at the same time it is an incessant social construction. 3 Looking at<br />
post-colonial state-building in Arab republics, compulsory military service was a driver of nationalism and<br />
enhanced regime security. In a time of multidimensional challenges, the UAE’s conscription and military<br />
engagement abroad may be seen as practical devices to forge a recognizable group identity and a modern<br />
6 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
and effective national discourse.<br />
From a federation towards a nation<br />
The UAE federation-building process has succeeded through top-down policies, even if<br />
state-centralization is still ongoing. In the 1970s, the UAE’s state-building process was primarily<br />
rent-driven, but armed forces became late federation-building drivers from the 1990s<br />
onwards. 4 In 1997, Dubai integrated its military system into a federal one. The modern integration<br />
into a single force allowed Abu Dhabi to include members from the northern emirates,<br />
which was important because at least 61 percent of Emirati nationals live in the north. 5 However,<br />
this did little to expand national identity, as the step was primarily used to expand Abu<br />
Dhabi’s neo-patrimonial leadership over the whole federation. Today, nation-building is still a<br />
“work in progress.”<br />
This work in progress is geared towards nurturing<br />
a national mythomoteur built on perceived<br />
myths, memories, and symbols. For example, the<br />
Bedouin mythology is a fundamental heritage, although<br />
it is sometimes stereotyped. 6 But it alone<br />
has not been successful in conveying a sense of belonging among contemporary young Emiratis.<br />
The politics of militarization has gradually differentiated the UAE from its neighbors. Emirati<br />
foreign policy is currently driven from a geopolitical and security viewpoint. As a matter of fact,<br />
the security sector has recently become a pillar of the UAE’s institution-building. The UAE’s<br />
military engagement in Yemen represents an unprecedented effort in terms of regional security,<br />
and economic diversification projects target the defense sector more and more, as confirmed<br />
by the development of Abu Dhabi’s military industrial complex.<br />
Conscription and geopolitics<br />
The Emirati government’s decision<br />
to introduce conscription as a tool<br />
of nation-building has to be framed<br />
in a specific geopolitical context.<br />
In the UAE, compulsory military service involves male citizens between the ages of 18 and 30.<br />
The service is optional for women, who can serve for nine months with the consent of their parents.<br />
Federal Law 6/2014 has extended national service from nine to 12 months for high school<br />
graduates, while it remains two years for nationals with lower levels of education. The 2015-<br />
2017 Emirati Strategy for the National Service establishes three batches each year of between<br />
5,000 and 7,000 total recruits. The first phase of national service is about study, exercises, and<br />
lectures on patriotism. 7 Recruits then join the Presidential Guard for practical training.<br />
The Emirati government’s decision to introduce conscription as a tool of nation-building has to<br />
be framed in a specific geopolitical context. Currently, the Middle East is marked by several<br />
intertwined variables of insecurity which have a direct impact on national identity. First of all,<br />
the Arab uprisings have introduced into the Emirati public debate ideas such as active citizen<br />
participation in the decision-making process and government accountability.<br />
Secondly, the phenomenon of jihadi transnational networks, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic<br />
State, challenges Arab states, suggesting the physical presence of the imagined umma.<br />
The objective of these non-state actors is to erode the political legitimacy of traditional states,<br />
labeling them “un-Islamic” and contesting established boundaries. Such challenges press state<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 7
II. Analysis<br />
institutions to implement intricate counter-narratives. In the UAE’s case, military service symbolizes<br />
the rhetoric of a nation that citizens want to proudly defend.<br />
Thirdly, the political rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional hegemony, where<br />
sectarianism is a tool of power politics, exacerbates national spirits, prompting states to choose<br />
alliances and produce counter-alignments. With regard to the Yemeni conflict, the UAE aligned<br />
with Saudi Arabia from the beginning despite considerable economic interests with Iran, the<br />
presence of a remarkable Iranian diaspora within the federation, and Dubai’s traditional commercial<br />
and cultural relations with Tehran. The mission, which serves geopolitics and nation<br />
building, took precedence over other important interests.<br />
The Yemeni laboratory: militaries as identity-mobilizers<br />
The UAE’s military intervention in Yemen has bolstered a sense of national identity among<br />
Emirati citizens. The federation has been operating in Yemen since March 2015, participating<br />
first in airstrikes against Shia militias, then heading de facto ground operations in the southern<br />
regions, with a specific focus on counterterrorism (anti-AQAP operations) within Aden,<br />
Mukalla and the Abyan region. In the summer of 2015, Abu Dhabi’s Presidential Guard and<br />
some drafted soldiers were deployed to Yemen, and more than eighty Emirati soldiers have lost<br />
their lives in Yemen so far. On September 4, 2015, forty-five Emirati soldiers were killed by a<br />
Houthi attack near Mareb, an unprecedented number of single-day military casualties for the<br />
federation.<br />
Since the beginning, UAE official declarations and media coverage framed the unexpected event<br />
through a patriotic lens: the ‘collective mourning’ was immediately juxtaposed with references<br />
to the ‘epic of sacrifice’ and the ‘celebration of the Nation,’ evoking the “soldiers martyred<br />
in Yemen.” 8 To commemorate what happened in Mareb, a day of National Celebration was<br />
established on November 30. The day also emphasizes the novel nature of the UAE’s military<br />
commitment abroad, which transcends traditional internal security tasks and marks a “paradigm<br />
shift” for Gulf military forces. 9 The ‘heroic militaries’ have enhanced a ‘rally around the<br />
flag’ feeling. They might become identity-mobilizers, the government’s best example of Emirati<br />
identity. By analyzing the recent Federal National Council’s elections, we see that military<br />
prestige has started to play a mobilizing role in the electoral competition—of 341 candidates, 46<br />
came from a police or military career, 10 as well as five out of the 20 who were eventually elected.<br />
One of those elected, former Dubai chief of the police Matar bin Amira Al-Shamsi, campaigned<br />
with the slogan “military service and patriotism.” 11 Soldier Khalifa Al-Hamoodi from Fujairah,<br />
injured in Yemen, received extensive media coverage while he was at the electoral poll to cast<br />
his ballot. 12 The government hopes that Emiratis will develop communal bonds and an in-group<br />
awareness by looking at their soldiers, a mindset that would modernize and bolster the Emirati<br />
mythomoteur. Moreover, the “mediatization” of the militaries sheds light on their new social<br />
role, which also includes a counter-radicalization message against the phenomenon of foreign<br />
fighters. From this perspective, the shahid is the heroic soldier or pilot who sacrifices himself to<br />
protect the nation, not the suicide bomber who kills “the infidels.”<br />
Conclusion<br />
It is possible to identify a circular relationship between the UAE’s armed forces and the domes-<br />
8 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
tic realm. Militaries contribute to a sense of federal belonging and national consciousness. At<br />
the same time, the country’s institutions are attempting to maximize this bottom-up popular<br />
phenomenon, introducing top-down measures, such as military conscription, aimed to shape a<br />
shared collective identity and cope with rising internal security threats. Through military service,<br />
the federal government aims to promote nationalism above Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood,<br />
and jihadism.<br />
For the UAE, yesterday’s challenge was passing from ‘many tribes’ to a ‘unified federation.’<br />
Nowadays, the aspiration is instead to construct ‘the Nation,’ where identity generates social<br />
cohesion and nurtures state legitimacy. 13 The geopolitical context is highly unstable, and the<br />
UAE has also been confronting the domestic effects of globalization—among them expatriate<br />
communities which claim for naturalization—raising fear of identity dilution and, to a lesser<br />
extent, cultural assimilation. Bedouin ancestry and khaleeji culture are essential pillars of the<br />
UAE’s national identity. Nevertheless, the national mythomoteur seeks new symbols, beliefs,<br />
and shared myths to face post-modernity, especially now that the Arab Gulf region is marked<br />
by growing and sometimes competing nationalisms. Therefore, in line with the government’s<br />
aspirations, conscription is not only a military institution, but rather a cultural tool of nation-building<br />
and the Emiratization of identity.<br />
Eleonora Ardemagni is a Gulf Analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation and a regular<br />
contributor for the Aspen Institute Italy and the Italian Institute for International Political Studies<br />
(ISPI, Milan).<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
Karen E. Young, The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates: Between the Majilis and the Market<br />
(Palgrave Macmillan: 2014), p. 33.<br />
See for instance the case of Italy. Vanda Wilcox, “Encountering Italy: Military Service and National <strong>Identity</strong> during the First World<br />
War”, Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol.3, No.2, 2011, 283-302.<br />
Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).<br />
Eleonora Ardemagni, “United Arab Emirates’ Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process: Seeking for Ambitious Engagement,”<br />
International Studies Journal 47, vol.12, no.3, Winter 2016, pp.43-62.<br />
Victor Gervais, “Du pétrole à l’armée: les stratégies de construction de l’état aux Émirats Arabes Unis,” Institut de Recherche Stratégique<br />
de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), Études de l’IRSEM 8, 2011.<br />
Ronald Hawker, “Imagining a Bedouin Past: Stereotypes and Cultural Representation in the Contemporary United Arab Emirates,”<br />
Beirut Institute for Media Arts conference paper, Lebanese American University, 2013.<br />
Samir Salama, “National service will reinforce patriotism, national identity, says FNC Speaker,” Gulf News, 16 June, 2014.<br />
“UAE salutes 45 soldiers martyred in Yemen,” Khaleej Times, 5 September, 2015; The National, “UAE news in review 2015: A year of<br />
sacrifice and honour for Armed Forces,” 30 December, 2015.<br />
On this topic, refer to David B. Roberts, “A New Era for Gulf Military Forces,” Gulf Affairs, Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies<br />
Forum, University of Oxford, Spring 2016, pp.6-8.<br />
Samir Salama, “Revealed: Names of 341 FNC poll candidates,” Gulf News, 31 August, 2015.<br />
“Profiles: Meet the preliminary 20 newly elected FNC members,” The National, 4 October, 2015.<br />
“FNC Election 2015: as it happened,” Gulf News, 3 October, 2015.<br />
Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, ed. Mehran Kamrava<br />
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1-28.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 9
II. Analysis<br />
A cargo ship is docked at Jebel Ali port in Dubai, UAE on 14 March 2006.<br />
Saruq Al-Hadid to Jebel Ali: Dubai’s Evolving<br />
Trading <strong>Culture</strong><br />
by Robert Mogielnicki<br />
ecent discoveries at the Saruq Al-Hadid archeological site located outside of Dubai in the United<br />
Arab Emirates (UAE) demonstrate the emirate’s connection to key trading routes dating as far back<br />
as 4,000 years ago. In light of the July 2016 inauguration of the Saruq Al-Hadid Archeology Museum by<br />
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, it is clear that the government is making<br />
a conscious effort to reconstruct this early trading identity and promote it broadly to the public. Sheikh<br />
Mohammed’s comments at the museum’s opening reinforced the links between the archeological museum<br />
and Dubai’s trading culture: “Museums reflect the culture of the nation.” 1<br />
Saruq Al-Hadid<br />
While the museum links the region’s early trading culture to that of today, it is important to note the continual<br />
evolution of Dubai’s mercantile traditions, which can be broadly categorized into three distinct phases: i)<br />
Saruq Al-Hadid, ii) Dubai Creek and iii) the proliferation of free zones. The evolution in the location of trading<br />
hubs and nature of trade over these periods had clear implications for the infrastructure of modern Dubai<br />
and for the identity of its inhabitants. Indeed, Dubai’s free zones are the modern-day manifestations of the<br />
trading culture that started in Saruq Al-Hadid and further developed around Dubai Creek.<br />
10 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
The fortuitous position of Saruq Al-Hadid between strategic trading routes shaped Dubai’s early trading<br />
culture. The ancient Iron Age site of Saruq Al-Hadid is located in the Rub Al-Khali desert area of Dubai’s<br />
southern border. Nestled further inland than the coastal cities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the area flourished<br />
as a center for metalwork manufacturing. Evidence from the site suggests that its inhabitants used<br />
domesticated camels to facilitate trade to current day Egypt, Syria, Iran, Oman, Bahrain, India, Pakistan,<br />
and Afghanistan. Rashad Bukhash, director of the Heritage Department of Dubai Municipality, explained<br />
that the site “shows the age-old tradition of Dubai being a hub for trade even in those days.” 2 Appropriately,<br />
the Saruq Al-Hadid Archeological Museum is located along the historic Dubai Creek in the Shindagha<br />
district of Dubai.<br />
Dubai Creek<br />
Before the discovery of Saruq Al-Hadid, historians tended to trace the early history of Dubai to the 18 th century<br />
settlements around Dubai Creek. The arrival of the Al-Maktoum tribe to Dubai in the 1830s helped<br />
formalize much of the commercial activity around the creek and also encouraged the immigration of new<br />
waves of Indian and Persian merchants. This early influx of non-Arab merchants helped to shape the modern<br />
socio-economic demographics of Dubai. Today, Indians serve as the largest national demographic of<br />
residents in Dubai, with Indians and Pakistanis contributing<br />
25 and 12 percent respectively to the emirate’s population<br />
of approximately 2.5 million residents. 3 Similarly,<br />
Iranians continue to play key roles in social, business<br />
and advisory circles, and estimates suggest that Iranians<br />
may account for 16-20 percent of Dubai’s population. 4<br />
v<br />
Located in the northeastern corner of the emirate, the Dubai Creek area consists of the historic districts of<br />
Bur Dubai and Deira. The original spice and gold markets, poignant remnants of the area’s more promising<br />
past, are situated near the northern shore of the creek in Deira.<br />
Although it served as a bustling commercial hub for centuries, the creek’s shallow waters prevented the<br />
trading hub from receiving large maritime vessels. After various attempts to dredge the creek throughout<br />
the later part of the 20 th century, as well as the opening of Port Rashid in 1972, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed<br />
Al-Maktoum commenced plans to construct the Jebel Ali Port a further 50 kilometers along the coastline<br />
toward Abu Dhabi.<br />
Free Zones<br />
The evolution in the location of trading<br />
hubs and nature of trade over these<br />
periods had clear implications for the<br />
infrastructure of modern Dubai and<br />
for the identity of its inhabitants.<br />
The Jebel Ali Port heralded a new age in Dubai’s trading legacy—the Free Zone Era. The Jebel Ali Free<br />
Zone Authority (JAFZA), originally created in 1985 to facilitate the warehousing and storage of shipments<br />
entering the port, became the first free zone to operate in Dubai. Today, the free zone hosts over 7,000<br />
companies and houses approximately 60,000 residents. The success of Jebel Ali served as a model for other<br />
well-known free zones, including the Dubai Airport Free Zone Authority (DAFZA) and the Dubai Multi<br />
Commodities Centre (DMCC). And while earlier trading cultures in Dubai naturally developed around<br />
strategic locations, the rise of free zones represented a more direct, pragmatic development of Dubai’s trading<br />
culture on the part of the government.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 11
II. Analysis<br />
Table 1: Free Zone Distribution in the UAE<br />
Broadly speaking, a free zone is a duty-free area<br />
outside of customs control. The traditional free zone<br />
model consists of a physical location wherein firms<br />
are incentivized to increase domestic exports, generate<br />
foreign direct investment (FDI), employ locals,<br />
and transfer new technologies and skills to the national<br />
workforce. However, a critical component of<br />
free zones in Dubai involves the right for foreign investors<br />
to maintain 100% ownership of their companies,<br />
rather than sharing ownership with a local<br />
Emirati citizen. Currently, there are approximately<br />
24 functioning free zones operating in Dubai, and<br />
the number of Dubai-based free zones vastly outnumbers<br />
those in neighboring emirates (Figure 1). 5<br />
Yet not all free zones in the emirate conform to the standard free zone definition or emulate the Jebel Ali<br />
Free Zone model. TECOM Group, a developer and operator of business communities and member of Dubai<br />
Holding, manages eleven free zones that contain 5,100 companies and employ 76,000 people. The group<br />
refers to these free zones as ‘business communities,’ and they tend to be less involved with imports and exports.<br />
Instead, these business communities function as knowledge hubs that attract a diverse demographic<br />
of human capital and offer a varied set of commercial, tourist, and residential services. 6 For example,<br />
Dubai residents can live, work and shop in Dubai Media City. When compared to more traditional zones<br />
like Jebel Ali Free Zone and the Dubai Airport Free Zone, TECOM Group’s free zones are seamlessly integrated<br />
into the social fabric of Dubai.<br />
While the traders of Saruq Al-Hadid and Dubai Creek settled in strategic overland trading routes or along<br />
natural saltwater inlets, the trading culture of 21 st century Dubai was shaped predominantly by manmade<br />
projects. Technological innovations in cargo shipping, commercial aviation, and services further changed<br />
the nature of trade, and Dubai’s government responded by developing the most advanced free zone sector<br />
in the region. Free zones shifted the nexus of trade away from Dubai Creek and distributed commercial<br />
activity more broadly throughout the emirate. At the same time, these new commercial hubs attracted<br />
foreign professionals, tourists, and residents from across the globe. Free zones will continue to dominate<br />
Dubai’s trading culture for the foreseeable future, but it is important to remember that these zones are<br />
intrinsically linked to a much older trading legacy.<br />
Robert Mogielnicki is a DPhil candidate in Oriental Studies and member of Magdalen College where he<br />
examines the political economy of free zones in GCC countries.<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
“Mohammed bin Rashid inaugurates Saruq Al Hadid museum at Al Shindagha,” Emirates News Agency, July 4, 2016.<br />
Sajila Saseendran, “Dubai’s trade links date back 4,000 years,” Gulf News, July 22, 2016.<br />
Statistics from Euromonitor; reported in Khamis, Jumana, “Indians, Pakistanis make up 37% of Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman population,” Gulf<br />
News, August 6, 2015.<br />
Jure Snoj, “UAE’s population – by nationality,” Business Qatar Magazine, April 12, 2015.<br />
Based on the author’s latest D.Phil research on free zones in the GCC. However, it is important to note that new zones are often emerging<br />
and announcements for new zones appear regularly.<br />
Well-known free zones operated by TECOM Group include Dubai Internet City, Dubai Media City, Knowledge Village and Dubai International<br />
Academic City.<br />
12 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
View of Sharq district with Al-Hamra tower in the center. Kuwait City, Kuwait, 2015.<br />
IconiCity: Seeking <strong>Identity</strong> by Building Iconic<br />
Architectures in Kuwait<br />
by Roberto Fabbri 1<br />
he Emirates Airlines website welcomes visitors by stating that Dubai’s iconic architecture is not only<br />
encouraged, but “actively pursued.” A subsequent list of evidence describing extreme heights, unconventional<br />
shapes, and cutting-edge materials supports the claim. 2 The Gulf states have turned to architecture<br />
as a way to build globally-recognized skylines. This wave of new, iconic buildings is often an attempt to<br />
build an urban uniqueness which, moreover, is part of the quest for a stronger national and social identity.<br />
A landmark is traditionally a symbol that raises a sense of belonging in the local population, but normally<br />
monuments are few in the urban fabric, and they are limited to specific spaces of public interest. But what<br />
happens when the city itself becomes composed of a significant number of icons, and the urban fabric is<br />
just the “in between”? Kuwait is an interesting case in the Gulf because it has a more consolidated pre-existing<br />
urban form, and these ‘new objects’ are not related at any level, neither in scale nor in language to<br />
the surrounding context. The current transformation process focuses on the development of isolated elements,<br />
self-standing on their own plot and auto-referential. Around them, the connective fabric is left with<br />
poor design and modest construction quality.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 13
II. Analysis<br />
Icon & media<br />
The architectural press normally welcomes these ‘photogenic’ buildings and presents the city not by its<br />
‘nature’ but by its ‘suit.’ One can argue that, apart from the different layers of reading or meaning that a<br />
building can generate, architecture is the expression of the society that produces it. In other words, architects<br />
and clients are transforming the building into a sort of ‘tridimensional logo’ implementing a series of<br />
design choices: an unusual, unique, and symbolic shape different from any other ‘competitor.’ There are<br />
certain requirements: The icon shall be a technical challenge that raises engineering to an extremely high<br />
standard, where complexity consolidates its identity. Size is another crucial aspect, and specifically the<br />
vertical dimension. Iconic architecture has to be big to stand out in the city fabric. Furthermore, the name<br />
and the fame of the designer are also major factors in establishing an iconic building.<br />
This design approach often brings these buildings very close to an industrial-design object, self-centered<br />
and self-referent. Consequentially iconic architecture has, in most cases, a conflicting dialogue with its<br />
context, because it is meant to communicate to a worldwide audience, while the local ‘assimilation’ is more<br />
problematic.<br />
Iconizing Kuwait<br />
Iconic buildings are a worldwide phenomenon, and the examples in the Gulf are not too different from<br />
what is happening in the rest of the world. One could argue that prestige projects are more prevalent in the<br />
region due to the lack of pre-existing local monuments which can catalyze the sense of belonging. However,<br />
this would not entirely reflect reality, since at the very initial inception of the urban and social modernization<br />
in the Gulf in the mid-20 th century, the construction of representative buildings was at the center<br />
of every governmental plan. 3 Today, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Dubai have all become archetypes for cities in<br />
transformation in the region, while Kuwait, on the other hand, is somehow different from its neighbors.<br />
Kuwait has a more complex urban fabric and a longer urban history, one punctuated by a large number<br />
of highly experimental projects since the early 1950s. 4 The city is also in transformation, but the vision is<br />
less evident, cohesive, and advertised than in the other Gulf states. In the last decade many projects were<br />
announced to modernize the city and keep pace with the region, including a new airport, two new towers<br />
for the Central Bank and the National Bank of Kuwait, and a new hospital center, among others.<br />
The city center is now also in transformation, and despite the fact that this part of the city would need<br />
more consolidation than ‘intrusions,’ the construction of skyscrapers is now mostly focused here, where<br />
large plots are abandoned or under-used. These are mostly initiatives by private actors investing in separate<br />
plots without a coordinated vision. The ‘in between’ is a non-space left with no integrated functions or<br />
quality: a very loose and undefined canvas amid vertical objects unrelated to each other or the city itself.<br />
In contrast, Yasser Mahgoub’s reading of the build environment of Kuwait concludes that multiple identities<br />
should be accepted as a natural result of the actions of different groups in the society, and architecture<br />
is the representation of this local contemporary condition and desire. 5 In principle, this argument is convincing,<br />
but the quid pro quo is the acceptance of a heterogeneous approach to shapes, forms, and languages.<br />
This tradeoff was well described in the early 1960s by Saba George Shiber in his critique of Kuwait City’s<br />
transformation: “Architecture became an exercise in acrobatics and not an endeavor in creation, economics<br />
and organicism. . . . It has become rare to find lines anchored to the earth. Instead, they all seem pivoted<br />
14 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
to point restively to outer space.” 6 Paraphrasing<br />
Shiber, proportions, shapes, materials, colors, and<br />
placements are so different that it is very difficult<br />
to perceive urban unity.<br />
In 2011 Kuwait City received its own internationally<br />
recognizable iconic building: Al-Hamra tower.<br />
It has everything necessary to be considered an icon: a prominent designer, oversized structure, technical<br />
challenges, and a unique shape. It is not difficult to imagine the role that this 400-meter high business hub<br />
plays in the skyline of the city. Its sculptural shape and flaring walls demanded extreme engineering work<br />
and placed Al-Hamra among the world’s most complex tall buildings.<br />
The official company brochure highlights a long list of technical data and new records achieved: the tallest<br />
carved skyscraper in concrete, the largest office building in the country, and the largest stone façade. 7<br />
Among other technical marvels, one specific design solution is worth mentioning. The tower is, in a way,<br />
site-specific. Its design is still not related to the urban scale nor to the city context, but it is partially the result<br />
of solar condition studies. The tower is oriented so that the inclined flaring wall protects and shades the<br />
southern elevation, where the desert sun can be more powerful. Nevertheless, when the building touches<br />
the ground there is no sign of urban mitigation or integration with the fabric. It sits on its own plot just like<br />
any other object in the surrounding area, demonstrating once again the lack of urban design of this part of<br />
the city.<br />
Gary Haney, from the design firm SOM, 8 defines Al-Hamra as “a statement (that) will be the landmark of<br />
Kuwait for the next generation.” 9 In general, the local population seems to have embraced Al-Hamra as a<br />
new landmark. On the contrary, tenants did not find it completely attractive: the high-end shopping mall<br />
on the lower levels provides a vast array of restaurants and boutiques, but a large number of office floors<br />
are still empty. So what kind of statement does Haney refer to? Which ideals or which shared feelings<br />
will the future generations of Kuwait see in this tower? An answer comes from the brochure issued by the<br />
building management company: “Hamra is a business monument!” 10 So the icon is a monument, and in a<br />
contemporary commercial-oriented society the monument is essentially a ‘business memorial.’<br />
Connecting the past to the present<br />
Iconic architecture has, in most cases, a conflicting<br />
dialogue with its context, because it<br />
is meant to communicate to a worldwide audience,<br />
while the local ‘assimilation’ is more<br />
problematic.<br />
In the same brochure a picture showcases Al-Hamra facing the sea with the Kuwait Towers, the country’s<br />
1970s national monument, in the background. The intention probably was to present a sense of continuity<br />
with the past despite the fact that to make space for the new tower, one of the oldest cinemas in town, a<br />
vivid expression of 1960s modern heritage, was demolished. All this leads to a few considerations on how<br />
much the two towers reflect the changing needs of Kuwaiti society in their current time. Just like Al-Hamra,<br />
the Kuwait Towers are definitely an icon representing the country’s goals of modernization, but the<br />
latter also form a narrative space recounting the motivations behind a project of public interest. The towers<br />
are a water reservoir with all the meanings that water has in a desert land like Kuwait. With their shape,<br />
materials, position, and scale, the Kuwait Towers are evocative objects that bring back memories of the<br />
past, reminding the country of its roots.<br />
On the other end, Al-Hamra does not show any sense of continuity with the past. It is presented to the<br />
public as a display of current financial power, but it could be better interpreted as an expression of a higher<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 15
II. Analysis<br />
level of confidence in the country. The lack of trust and the uncertain international situation in the aftermath<br />
of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait virtually froze, with a few exceptions, major investments for<br />
more than a decade.<br />
This traumatic event and its long tail arrested the drive toward modernization that had been consistently<br />
pursued for over 40 years through the erection of highly symbolic architecture. Unlike other Gulf countries,<br />
recent iconic architecture in Kuwait seems to express a general feeling of recovered confidence, perfectly<br />
reflected in bald technical features, more than the quest for a national identity or the homogenized vision<br />
of a contemporary city.<br />
Dr. Roberto Fabbri is an architect and professor at University of Monterrey; he worked five years in Kuwait<br />
and is the co-author of Modern Architecture Kuwait 1949-89 (2016).<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
Acknowledgement: This research and paper was developed during a fellowship research program at the Center for Gulf Studies – American<br />
University of Kuwait.<br />
“Iconic Dubai Architecture | Sightseeing in Dubai | Discover Dubai | Emirates,” www.emirates.com, accessed 01 September, 2016.<br />
Compare for example Todd Reisz’s analysis of the World Trade Center in Dubai, in Structures of Memory, catalogue of the exhibition of<br />
the National Pavilion United Arab Emirates, La Biennale di Venezia, 2014, pp. 81-82.<br />
Regarding Kuwait’s architectural production in the recent past, see Roberto Fabbri, Sara Saragoça Soares, and Ricardo Camacho, Modern<br />
Architecture Kuwait 1949-89 (NiggliVerlag: Zurich, 2016).<br />
Yasser Mahgoub, “Hyper <strong>Identity</strong>: the Case of Kuwaiti Architecture,”Archnet-IJAR, International Journal of Islamic Architecture, 1:1<br />
(March 2007): 84.<br />
Saba George Shiber, “Architecture and Urban Aesthetics in Kuwait: Significance or Superficiality,” The Kuwait Urbanization: Documentation,<br />
Analysis, Critique (Governmental Press: Kuwait, 1964), 306.<br />
Al Hamra Business Tower Facts and Figures, www.alhamra.com.kw, accessed 2 October, 2016.<br />
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill was the lead consultant, together with Al Jazeera as local partner, Al-Ahmadiah as contractor, and Turner<br />
as project manager.<br />
“Record breaker,” Gulf Construction Online, accessed 22 Sept. 2016<br />
Al-Hamra Tower, Company Brochure, undated, p.20<br />
16 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
Kuwaiti men rally in front of the parliament building to demand the dissolution of the 2009 parliament in Kuwait City, Kuwait on 1<br />
October 2012.<br />
G<br />
The Banality of Protest? Twitter Campaigns in Qatar<br />
by Andrew Leber and Charlotte Lysa<br />
iven restrictions on public protest and political organizing across much of the Arab Gulf, a New York<br />
Times reporter noted in 2011 that social media seemed “tailor-made for Saudi Arabia” and its fellow<br />
monarchies. 1 In the midst of the Arab Spring, online pages for the now-defunct Eastern Province Revolution<br />
helped coordinate protests in the Kingdom, even as @angryarabiya—now in exile in Denmark after<br />
repeated arrests—documented the violent suppression of demonstrations in Bahrain on Twitter.<br />
In the years since, though, protests have disappeared as Gulf governments have variously deterred activists<br />
with harsh crackdowns and forestalled grievances with generous handouts. Subsequent portrayals of<br />
Gulf social media have shifted to emphasize the online expression of collective identities over the potential<br />
for collective action, however much the two may be linked. Alexandra Siegel has highlighted the Gulf as<br />
a key nexus of polarizing sectarian rhetoric on Twitter, driven by the regional rivalry between the mostly<br />
Sunni Gulf monarchies and Shia Iran. 2 At the opposite extreme, social media platforms are presented as<br />
windows into the region’s conspicuous consumption, exemplified by young and restless Kuwaiti men posing<br />
with exotic animals in the VICE documentary “The Illegal Big Cats of Instagram.” 3<br />
Beyond broad sectarian clashes and individual excess, the enduring image of GCC nationals as “rentier<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 17
II. Analysis<br />
citizens” prevails, supposing quiescent subjects content to receive handouts fuelled by state-controlled oil<br />
and gas revenue. The dearth of formal institutions of accountability—aside from a dysfunctional parliament<br />
in Kuwait and a few minor elected bodies—militates against most individuals effecting meaningful<br />
political or policy change through official channels.<br />
Yet discontent, though muted, is far from absent online. Citizens lodge many claims and complaints with<br />
‘the government’ on Twitter, Facebook, and even Snapchat. Much as these online campaigns can seem<br />
banal, only reinforcing a transactional relationship between ruler and subject, they lead Gulf citizens to<br />
articulate a sense of political and social identity from below, in contrast with top-down visions engineered<br />
by the region’s ruling elites.<br />
On the campaign trail<br />
This dynamic has played out even in Qatar, which is domestically quiet and has less of the overt online surveillance<br />
increasingly visible in the neighboring United Arab Emirates. 4 Unlike elsewhere in the MENA<br />
region, where various formal parliaments (however unrepresentative) have been operational for decades,<br />
Qatar has no tradition of formal political representation beyond a heavily circumscribed Municipal Council.<br />
One article by Justin Gengler, among the few insightful articles on Qatar’s body politic, outlines the many<br />
factors that militate against political activism, from a small native population to the country’s extreme<br />
per-capita resource wealth. 5 To be sure, collective protests against foreign oil companies helped foster a<br />
sense of a “Qatari” national identity in the 1950s and 1960s, linking merchants, slaves, and free Qataris on<br />
the peninsula. 6 For more than 30 years, though, most citizens’ public complaints about government agencies<br />
and regulations have been channeled through a state-run call-in radio show entitled “Good Morning,<br />
My Beloved Country.” 7<br />
The challenge for researchers interested in<br />
Gulf political identities is to document and analyze<br />
discussions of rights and responsibilities<br />
across a wide range of online communities.<br />
When semi-official complaints go nowhere,<br />
though, Qataris on Twitter and other social<br />
media often act in tandem with influential columnists<br />
and cartoonists to push back against<br />
corporations and state agencies they portray as<br />
unresponsive, incompetent, and even corrupt.<br />
As Hootan Shambayati noted in the case of Iran, the largesse of oil-rich states can often channel citizens’<br />
discontent along moral and ideological vectors rather than quelling it outright. 8 Accordingly, many Twitter<br />
campaigns in Qatar are instances of “moral panic,” denouncing cultural displays deemed to cater to an elite<br />
image of Qatar as a cosmopolitan “world city” at the expense of its conservative native population.<br />
In early 2016, a widespread Twitter protest targeted the British-American film “The Danish Girl,” which is<br />
about a transgender woman in the 1920s, on the hashtag #No_To_Showing_The_Danish_Girl. The Ministry<br />
of <strong>Culture</strong> soon tweeted back that they had decided to ban the movie. 9 Similar controversy has attended<br />
other performances, such as Australian singer Kylie Minogue, with events coordinators going so far as<br />
to announce performers at the last possible minute to forestall the potential for protest. 10<br />
While rarely straying into overt political demands, citizens also regularly criticize the performance of government<br />
agencies and state-owned enterprises. Qatar Airways was subject to an online campaign driven<br />
by customers demanding better service and more employment opportunities for Qataris. 11 Schools, hospi-<br />
18 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
tals, and roads frequently attract criticism, with proposed fee hikes in government schools almost provoking<br />
a boycott in 2013. 12<br />
Instead of quietly accepting their government’s stewardship, citizens ratchet their development expectations<br />
ever-higher in the knowledge that their country possesses vast financial resources. The more these<br />
online discussions link government missteps to a perceived lack of accountability and transparency, the<br />
more they reinforce the idea of a Qatari body politic denied real input on key matters of social and economic<br />
development.<br />
Death and denial<br />
Two recent online protests exemplify these processes and reflect an online political presence that is far<br />
more populist and conservative than the liberal, cosmopolitan image often presented by Qatar’s rulers.<br />
This past May, one Twitter campaign stemmed from the death of Qatari Shorooq Al-Sulaiti in a government-run<br />
women’s hospital following complications from childbirth. When her husband’s official inquiries<br />
into the circumstances of her death went nowhere, he reached out to prominent columnist Faisal Al-Marzuqi.<br />
13 Al-Marzuqi in turn targeted the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) Twitter account with criticisms,<br />
popularizing hashtags such as #We_Are_All_ Shorooq_Al_Sulaiti. Ultimately, the online campaign attracted<br />
coverage from Arabic newspapers Al-Raya and Al-Arab as well as the English-language website<br />
Doha News, in addition to a number of pointed satirical cartoons. 14 The Ministry finally issued a public update<br />
on the investigation on July 14 th , which was followed by a brief lull in online activity (Figure 1). Sulaiti’s<br />
husband as well as Al-Marzuqi and other Qataris have continued their online criticisms, though, with<br />
the public prosecutor’s office finally opening an investigation into the ongoing case this past September. 15<br />
Figure 1: Twitter activity mentioning Shorooq Al-Sulaiti,<br />
July 2016.<br />
Figure 2: Hashtags targeting Doha News,<br />
August 2016.<br />
# of Tweets<br />
0 100 200 300 400 500<br />
All Tweets<br />
Targetting MOPH<br />
Al-Raya<br />
Article<br />
MOPH<br />
Response<br />
Jul 01 Jul 04 Jul 07 Jul 10 Jul 13 Jul 16 Jul 19 Jul 22 Jul 25 Jul 28<br />
July 1-28, 2016<br />
# of Tweets<br />
0 100 200 300 400 500<br />
Doha News op-ed<br />
published<br />
Response op-eds<br />
published<br />
Aug 01 Aug 03 Aug 05 Aug 07 Aug 09 Aug 11 Aug 13<br />
August 1-14, 2016<br />
A more recent incident of “moral panic” occurred after Doha News published an opinion piece about the<br />
difficulties of being Qatari and gay. 16 This provoked a furious online response by many Qatari Twitter-users<br />
outraged by the perceived assault on public morality and Qatar’s Islamic character. First, one minor<br />
commentator for Al-Sharq touched off #We_Demand_The_Investigation_Of_Doha_News, with some users<br />
tagging the Ministry of Interior (@MOI_Qatar) trying to provoke a more forceful response from the<br />
state. 17 Columnist Maryam Al-Khater stoked further calls for government action through an article in<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 19
II. Analysis<br />
Al-Sharq and on Twitter with the hashtag #Stop_Promotion_Of_Vice_In_Qatar. In both, she implored<br />
the government to take firm action to shut down the website. 18 Despite an intense spate of initial activity,<br />
though, the hashtags failed to gain much momentum or high-level support on Twitter, dropping from use<br />
just a few days later (Figure 2).<br />
Conclusion<br />
Various aspects of a nebulous “rentier state theory” have dominated academic discussion of the Gulf for<br />
decades, expressing the sense that the vast oil wealth of these monarchies has allowed them to “buy off”<br />
discontent time and again. Yet even in Qatar, which is wealthiest per-capita in the GCC and has practically<br />
no organized political opposition, nationals have come to use online forums such as Twitter to express<br />
and reinforce a sense of Qatari identity. The challenge for researchers interested in Gulf political identities<br />
is to document and analyze discussions of rights and responsibilities across a wide range of online communities,<br />
as GCC citizens migrate to newer platforms such as Instagram and Snapchat.<br />
At their core, these discussions contribute to a sense of citizenship that demands accountability in state<br />
spending and government services as well as the right to define what it truly means to be Qatari, often<br />
against elite projects of national identity formation. 19 The more this identity is reinforced, the easier it<br />
becomes for citizens to challenge or otherwise prod their government. Witness, for example, the mounting<br />
success of various campaigns to bar regional figures from visiting the country, or growing exasperation in<br />
some quarters with the power of the online “mob.” 20 Likewise, more government spending seems unlikely<br />
to quell further instances of moral panic in Qatar, given that fully eliminating the country’s cosmopolitan<br />
veneer would exact a high price on the global image the country’s leaders have crafted.<br />
Ultimately, as an emerging discourse of citizens’ rights encourages economic and moral claims against<br />
the state, GCC governments such as Qatar, with diminished cash reserves at their disposal, may find it<br />
difficult to renegotiate implicit social contracts without employing greater repression or affording greater<br />
representation.<br />
Andrew Leber is a PhD student at Harvard University, Department of Government. Charlotte Lysa is a PhD<br />
candidate at the University of Oslo, Department of <strong>Culture</strong> Studies and Oriental Languages.<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
Neil MacFarquhar, “Social Media Help Keep the Door Open to Sustained Dissent Inside Saudi Arabia,” The New York Times, 15 June,<br />
2011.<br />
Alexandra Siegel, “Sectarian Twitter Wars: Sunni-Shia Conflict and Cooperation in the Digital Age,” Carnegie Endowment, 20 December<br />
2015, pgs. 9-12; For more on sectarian polarization in the Gulf, see also Matthieson, Toby, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,<br />
and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).<br />
“The Illegal Big Cats of Instagram,” VICE Media, March 25, 2015.<br />
See, for example, the United Arab Emirates’ increasingly stringent guidelines on which social media posts can run afoul of federal laws.<br />
Sinclair, Kyle, “Be aware of UAE privacy laws when posting Facebook content, TRA warns,” The National, 20 May, 2014.<br />
Justin Gengler, “Collective Frustration, But No Collective Action, in Qatar,” Middle East Reporting Project, 7 December, 2013.<br />
Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Merchants and Rulers in Kuwait and Qatar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),<br />
141-145.<br />
Hassan Ayat Bihi, “Complete Change for ‘Good Morning, My Beloved Country,” Al-Arab, 27 December 2015, http://www.alarab.qa/<br />
story/743338/<br />
Hootan Shambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran,”<br />
20 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
Comparative Politics 26, no. 3 (April 1994), pp 308, 324-325.<br />
Peter Kovessy, “Cinemas stop showing ‘The Danish Girl’ after ban in Qatar,” Doha News, 11 January 2016.<br />
Performances of Gwen Stefani and Pharrell Williams at the 2015 Men’s Handball World Championship were confirmed just days ahead<br />
of time for this reason. Author interview, PR consultant, Doha, 20 January 2015.<br />
Despite preferential hiring for Qataris throughout the public sector and strict quotas for the private sector, there is a widespread perception<br />
among Qataris that expatriate labor is implicitly favored.<br />
Shabina Khatiri, “Irate over tuition increases, some locals call for school boycott,” Doha News, 19 September, 2013.<br />
Media figures such as Marzuqi, Hassan al-Sai and Abdullah al-Athbah thus serve as powerful gatekeepers within Qatari society, advancing<br />
stories that conform to their own views on government and society.<br />
“Complete Details of Death of Shorouq al-Sulaiti during Childbirth,” Al-Raya, 12 July, 2016. ; Mohammad Abd al-Lateef. Twitter post. 30 June,<br />
2016. 4:00p.m. EST. https://twitter.com/mo7md_alateef/status/748607145063616513/photo/1; Saad al-Muhannadi, Twitter post, 13<br />
July 2016, 12:28 AM EST. https://twitter.com/S3d_78/status/753082153487982592/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw<br />
“Prosecutor forms committee to investigate death of Shorouq al-Sulaiti,” Al-Raya, 19 September 2016. <br />
Majid al-Qatari (pseudonym), “What it’s like to be gay and Qatari,” Doha News, 5 August 2016.<br />
Hassan Hamoud, Twitter Post, 5 August 2016, 4:30pm EST. <br />
Maryam al-Khater, “What is Manliness in Qatar?” Al-Sharq, 8 August, 2016. <br />
For more on such elite projects, see “Gulf Societies in Transition: National <strong>Identity</strong> and National Projects in the Arab Gulf States.”<br />
Workshop Report #3 (2016). The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.<br />
“Complete List of People Banned from Entering Qatar by Order of the People… Latest is Al-Afasi,” Rassd, 13 June 2015. ; AlAnood Al Thani, “Twitter mobs and what it means to be Qatari,” Doha News, 20 August, 2016.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 21
II. Analysis<br />
Emirati men perform a traditional dance late on 28 October 2014 during a festival in the city of Al-Ain celebrating traditional culture.<br />
Monolithic Representations and<br />
Orientalist Credence in the UAE<br />
by Rana AlMutawa<br />
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) doesn’t have a rich culture, what’s there other than yola dances,<br />
falconry and lugaimat?” Ironically, this remark was not made by a Westerner with Orientalist assumptions,<br />
but by an Emirati. While many Emiratis would instantly disagree with that statement, they<br />
are still likely to think of their heritage within the confines of the images described above. The scenes of<br />
women frying lugaimat and men dancing the yola are constantly repeated in heritage festivals. They are<br />
charming to witness once or twice, but grow stale with each repetition. While the local cultures of the UAE<br />
(and wider Gulf) are diverse and varied, the official national narratives often promote a monolithic history<br />
with a narrow, standardized set of ideas and images of culture, such as the ones described above.<br />
It is likely that cultural homogeneity is promoted because local diversity is seen as an obstacle to loyalty to<br />
the state. Emirati scholar Ali Khalifa stated that “political loyalty to one’s tribe has not as yet given way<br />
to loyalty to the state as an abstract political concept.” 1 While tribal affiliations pose some challenges for<br />
GCC states, ethnic and cultural diversity may be seen as even more problematic. At the very least, tribes<br />
portray images of Bedouins and “pure” Arabs, in line with the image Gulf states often promote. Ethnic and<br />
cultural diversity among local citizens, however, indicates that a part of the nation’s history is non-Arab<br />
and disputes the storyline of a shared culture and heritage. In attempts to create national cohesion, the<br />
22 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
local cultures in the UAE, and much of the Gulf, are portrayed as homogenous, pure, Bedouin, Arab cultures.<br />
These monolithic depictions consequently end up sidelining integral parts of khaleeji history and<br />
culture—such as the Ajami, Baluch, and East African cultures. 2 It is therefore unfortunate, but not surprising,<br />
when Emirati citizens believe that their culture is best represented by ahistorical and stereotypical<br />
depictions of the lugaimat and the yola—ones which are not too different from Orientalist depictions of the<br />
region.<br />
Cultural homogeneity and Orientalist depictions<br />
James Onley states that the populations of the Gulf have been historically intermingled with those of the<br />
Indian Ocean to the extent that it is difficult to ascertain whether some khaleejis are Arabized Persians or<br />
Persianized Arabs. 3 These influences are still prevalent today: the Indian Ocean’s influence can be found<br />
in khaleeji food, dialects, and even song and dance. East Africans who were enslaved in the Gulf brought<br />
their music with them, and this music has come to represent traditional, local music in the Gulf. 4 However,<br />
acknowledgment of this diversity is uncommon. The African influence on khaleeji culture is rarely mentioned,<br />
and African-influenced music is depicted as Arab. 5 Similarly, Clive Holes states that the diversity<br />
of the dialects is eroding as Gulf citizens move towards a single standardized khaleeji dialect. 6 This standardization<br />
often projects a homogeneous and “pure Arab,” Bedouin image which is similar to some of the<br />
simplified and Orientalist depictions of the Gulf region.<br />
Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that Ajamis, Baluchs and East Africans (among other groups) have<br />
inhabited the Gulf for a long time, and when these cultures are excluded from the national narrative, a<br />
large part of the nation’s history and heritage is similarly excluded. While GCC states may differ in terms<br />
of their portrayals of identity and their citizens’ perceptions of it, most of these states homogenize local<br />
histories and cultures within their respective national narratives. Neil Partrick argues that the Gulf states<br />
have long ignored differences within local society and favored representation of culture and history that<br />
fits the national narrative, one which promotes a Bedouin, tribal identity. 7 Similarly, Anh Nga Longva<br />
states that Kuwaitis define their identity by differentiating themselves from the foreigners within their<br />
countries—at times, these “foreigners” are other citizens who are not considered ‘purely’ native. 8 Ernest<br />
Gellner states that nationalism, which fuels these perceptions, is spread through a “high culture,” such as<br />
that of schoolbooks and newspapers, while Ziad Fahmy finds that nationalism spread in Egypt through<br />
what he terms a “medium” culture of audio and television that used local dialects. 9 High and medium<br />
cultures, schoolbooks, heritage festivals, and radio are all tools that promote the official national narrative<br />
and shape the perceived boundaries of national culture and identity.<br />
The case of the UAE<br />
When taking the UAE as a GCC-representative case study, one can find many examples of the way social<br />
reproductions champion the tribal, Arab narrative. One of the examples comes from the advertisements<br />
for the Mleiha archeological sites. Mleiha, a village in Sharjah, has sites dating back some 130,000 years<br />
ago. 10 Instead of capturing the essence of the ancient site, the dedicated website, Discover Mleiha, strangely<br />
describes ancient Mleiha as depicting “traditional Emirati life” and “ancient Bedouin culture.” Clearly, the<br />
legacy of the Stone Age hunters represented at this site is neither “traditional Emirati” nor representative<br />
of “Bedouin culture.” 11 Whatever the reason may be for the use of this type of language, it is certainly<br />
not the only example. Al Bastakiya, a traditional neighborhood in Dubai previously inhabited by Ajami<br />
Emiratis originally from Bastak, Iran, has become a prominent tourist attraction. However, its name was<br />
changed to Al Fahidi, with the argument that Al Fahidi was the area’s original name. 12 The renaming<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 23
While Gulf states promote a narrative of<br />
homogeneity to create an “imagined community”<br />
that bonds citizens to one another,<br />
they are simultaneously promoting a<br />
narrow and rigid sense of identity.<br />
of the neighborhood is a further step on the road to<br />
homogenous Arabization.<br />
Similarly, festivals, museums, and ‘traditional’ TV<br />
shows which aim to reinvent the past center on the<br />
Bedouin cultures almost entirely. The Millionaire<br />
Poet, a TV show for Nabati poets, promotes Bedouin<br />
poetry, and Qasr Al-Hosn Festival, a major traditional<br />
festival in Abu Dhabi, features activities associated with Arab, Bedouin life, such as falconry and<br />
yola dances. 13 This is not to say that non-Bedouin backgrounds have been wholly excluded—an Emirati<br />
director’s movie on a prominent Emirati Sufi received an award in the UAE, and a popular Ramadan cartoon<br />
shown on local channels depicts Ajami Emiratis as central characters. 14 However, these examples are<br />
much fewer, and sometimes not as public, as efforts of heritage revival that center on the pure, Arab, Bedouin<br />
image. Thus, simplified images that depict a “pure Arab” way of life are often used to embody Emirati<br />
identity, while ones that do not fit that criteria—such as the Mleiha sites, or even well-known activities<br />
like pearl-diving—are often removed from the context they existed in. What is therefore left to represent<br />
Emirati identity are simplified and romanticized Orientalist depictions of a desert life.<br />
Possible consequences of monolithic representations of identity<br />
Historical accuracy is usually not as influential in informing a national consciousness as national narratives<br />
are. While Emiratis are aware that there are many natives of Ajami, Baluch, or East African<br />
backgrounds, they do not necessarily view these diverse cultures as representative of Emirati culture and<br />
heritage. In fact, some might consider a strong association with them as a form of un-belonging. For example,<br />
Partrick cites an Omani analyst who states that Omani minorities, such as the Baluchs, have an<br />
incomplete sense of belonging to Oman. The consequence of such exclusivist narratives manifests in the<br />
examples of khaleejis who downplay their own heritage to fit in with the national narrative. Indeed, Onley<br />
found that Emiratis of Ajami background sought to downplay their ethnic roots. 15 Similarly, Sultan Al-Qassemi<br />
recounts an unnamed Ajami Emirati who changed his last name to an Arab-sounding name, stating<br />
that he witnessed the same phenomenon happening among many other Ajamis and Baluchs. 16<br />
While Gulf states promote a narrative of homogeneity to create an “imagined community” that bonds<br />
citizens to one another, they are simultaneously promoting a narrow and rigid sense of identity that excludes<br />
a large part of the nation’s socio- and ethno-historic DNA. These monolithic representations strip<br />
the region from countless of its histories, cultures, and stories, giving credence to Orientalist stereotypes<br />
that depict the region as lacking in history and culture. The myth of the dearth of history and culture in<br />
the Gulf becomes engrained even in the minds of its own citizens: rather than understanding the roles<br />
of natives from Ajami, Bedouin, Baluch and East African backgrounds in shaping a local society rich in<br />
culture, many start believing that their history and heritage is confined to standardized depictions of the<br />
desert, the lugaimat, or the yola.<br />
Rana AlMutawa is an Emirati instructor and researcher at Zayed University in Dubai, UAE.<br />
1<br />
2<br />
Ali Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates – Unity in Fragmentation (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 99.<br />
James Onley, “Transnational Merchant Families in the Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Gulf,” in The Gulf Family: Kinship and Politics,<br />
edited by Alanoud Alsharekh (London: Al Saqi Books and London Middle East Institute SOAS, 2007), 37- 56.<br />
24 Gulf Affairs
II. Analysis<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
Ibid and James Onley, “Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf: The Case of the Safar Family,” in Transnational Connections<br />
and the Arab Gulf, edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 59-89.<br />
Aisha Bilkhair, “Afro-Emirati: A Unique Historical Experience,” UNESCO, (2006) and Joseph Braude, “Feature: Africans in the Arabian<br />
(Persian) Gulf,” Afropop, (2007).<br />
Bilkhair, “Afro-Emirati”.<br />
Clive Holes, “Language and <strong>Identity</strong> in the Arabian Gulf,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:2 (2011): 129-145.<br />
Neil Partrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States,” LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf<br />
States, (2009)<br />
Partrick (2009), and Anh Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Social Political<br />
System in Kuwait”, in Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and <strong>Identity</strong> in the Arab States of the Gulf, edited by Paul Dresch and James<br />
Piscatori (London: IBTauris, 2005).<br />
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) and Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial<br />
<strong>Culture</strong> and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919” (PhD Diss., University of Arizona, 2007).<br />
Sabah Jasim, Margarethe Rose Uerpmann and Hans-Peter Uerpmann, Mleiha: The Unwritten History (London: Medina Publishing,<br />
2015).<br />
Discover Mleiha, http://www.discovermleiha.ae/, accessed 28 September, 2016.<br />
Roland Hawker, “Al Fahidi vs. Al Bastakiya: Who Cares and Why,”6 March, 2016, accessed September 28, 2016.<br />
Hala Khalaf, “Million’s Poet Returns with 48 poets Competing for Dh15 million Prize,” The National, UAE. 8 February 2016.<br />
Saeed Saeed, “The animated series Shaabiat Al Cartoon has attracted a lot of fans, and with good reason,” The National, UAE, 24 August<br />
2011.<br />
Onley 2004, 2007, ibid.<br />
Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi, Facebook post, June 27, 2016.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 25
III. Commentary<br />
GCC Security Amid Regional Crises | Spring 2016 23
III. Commentary<br />
Historical contact<br />
At the end of the 19 th century, cultural contact<br />
with the West began as a result of a new age of<br />
global trade and colonization. This contact triggered<br />
a local questioning of culture and identity.<br />
It also encouraged the growth of local education,<br />
civil and social programs, and the expansion of<br />
political awareness—particularly in Bahrain and<br />
Kuwait. Expanding at a time of growing Arab<br />
nationalism, this contact also further enhanced<br />
political awareness and increased interest in indigenous<br />
heritage, culture, and identity.<br />
Challenges of Cultural<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> in the GCC<br />
by Ahmad Al-Dubayan<br />
Marrying heritage and culture with<br />
the demands of the modern world<br />
hroughout the history of the Gulf, and until<br />
the end of the 19 th century, the region was<br />
not considered an important exporter of Islamic<br />
or Arab culture in its best form, in comparison<br />
to cultural centers such as Baghdad, Cairo,<br />
Damascus, Fez, and Medina. Cultural production<br />
was mostly localized despite extensive<br />
trading relations with India, Persia, and even<br />
the Far East. The people along the Gulf coast<br />
looked to the aforementioned Arab cultural centers<br />
as models of civilized Arabic and Islamic<br />
culture, from which they imported traditions.<br />
With the dawn of the oil age, the Gulf placed itself<br />
on the global economic and political map as a<br />
group of modern nation states. The region became<br />
a platform for trade and international commerce.<br />
Globalization accelerated cultural exchanges, and<br />
modern technology and communication aroused<br />
further interest in culture and identity within the<br />
Gulf states.<br />
The Gulf’s identity challenge<br />
Today, the Gulf faces a few key issues with regards<br />
to its identity, including the lack of a single,<br />
unified political vision, weakness of national education,<br />
changes within Islamic and Arab culture,<br />
and the creeping influence of English and the erosion<br />
of formal Arabic in everyday life.<br />
Despite similarity and shared social, cultural,<br />
and religious fabric, Gulf states do not have a unified<br />
political vision of the future for the region as<br />
a whole. Since the Arab Spring, the Gulf has increasingly<br />
diverged along different political lines<br />
and visions, most evidently on the issues of Egypt<br />
and Syria.<br />
While Gulf societies are largely regarded as predominantly<br />
Islamic in nature, this is seldom addressed<br />
from a cultural and identity standpoint in<br />
28 Gulf Affairs
III. Commentary<br />
national education curricula. Religious education<br />
in schools focuses mostly on practical dimensions,<br />
failing to sufficiently present religion as a structure<br />
of culture that finds its roots in Islamic civilization<br />
or regional history. This results in a local<br />
culture that stands little hope to maintain itself in<br />
the face of globalization, especially in light of phenomena<br />
such as foreign education, media, and social<br />
networking. The increasingly diversified and<br />
internationalized nature of Gulf economies and<br />
labor markets has facilitated the erosion of the<br />
Arabic language as an everyday medium for business<br />
in both the public and private sectors. Gulf<br />
states have undertaken initiatives to address such<br />
problems and support culture and identity, with<br />
national programs, events, exhibitions, and activities<br />
generally falling under national heritage<br />
authorities. However, these unfortunately mostly<br />
come outside the national curricula, addressing<br />
later stages of the cultural “identity question.”<br />
The tribal identity<br />
Younger generations face a challenge to<br />
develop an identity that can encompass<br />
both tribal and Islamic heritages while<br />
also meeting the needs of the modern<br />
world.<br />
identities that can encompass both tribal and Islamic<br />
heritages while also meeting the needs of<br />
the modern world. Institutional and educational<br />
initiatives have not yet established a middle path<br />
for the new generation, helping them to protect<br />
the values of their own culture while also connecting<br />
with the rest of the Gulf in a manner that<br />
both accommodates a modern world and meets<br />
its challenges.<br />
Dr. Ahmad Al-Dubayan is the Director General of<br />
the Islamic Cultural Centre in London, editor of<br />
the Islamic Quarterly, and an Arabic and Islamic<br />
Studies curriculum development expert.<br />
The tribal element historically presented a form<br />
of local cultural cohesion and production. In the<br />
modern Gulf, however, it fails to accommodate<br />
the increasingly diversified nature and accompanying<br />
cultural challenges present in Gulf societies.<br />
While the tribal element could be said to be<br />
slowly fading away, many phenomena report its<br />
existence, such as camel beauty pageants and local<br />
tribal poetry, reinforcing the tribe as an identity<br />
umbrella. Recent security events in the region,<br />
however, such as operation “Decisive Storm” in<br />
Yemen, have reinforced in some Gulf states elements<br />
of shared culture and identity, of Islamic<br />
and Arab elements, and notions of shared heroism<br />
and memory, ingredients of a collective identity.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Younger generations face a challenge to develop<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 29
III. Commentary<br />
The Gulf States’<br />
National Museums<br />
by Sultan Al Qassemi<br />
Iconic buildings and collections battleground<br />
for future identity<br />
uch has been written about what French academic<br />
Alexandre Kazerouni terms ‘visibility<br />
museums,’ such as the Louvre Abu Dhabi and the<br />
Museum of Islamic Art in Qatar. Elaborating in<br />
Ibraaz, Kuwaiti artist Monira Al Qadiri writes that<br />
visibility museums, rather than recreating the traditional<br />
heritage museums “filled with dioramas,<br />
maps, archeological artefacts and Arabic books”<br />
are conceived from the outset with recognized<br />
brand name architects and most certainly a significant<br />
budget. Aimed at preserving Gulf heritage<br />
and serving a slate of political ends, these national<br />
museums could emerge as a major battleground for<br />
identity and local viewpoints just as smaller, independent<br />
museums and galleries in the region experience<br />
exponential growth.<br />
The mega museum<br />
In the coming few years, the Gulf will see the rise of<br />
a multitude of ‘visibility museums’ designed and<br />
built by heavyweight architects. In 2017, Qatar<br />
will be inaugurating a major new museum designed<br />
by French architect and Pritzker prize<br />
winner Jean Nouvel. The $434 million museum<br />
in the shape of a desert rose is built around the<br />
former palace of Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim<br />
Al-Thani who ruled Qatar from 1913 to 1949.<br />
In 1999, Saudi Arabia opened its National Museum<br />
in Riyadh, which was designed by Raymond<br />
Moriyama, a Canadian of Japanese descent.<br />
It comes with an accompanying building<br />
called the Darat of King Abdul Aziz, designed<br />
by Jordanian architect Rasem Badran. Danish<br />
architect Knud Holscher was invited in 1982 to<br />
design the Bahrain National Museum, while<br />
Frenchman Michel Ecochard (1905-1985) was<br />
the architect behind the Kuwait National Museum<br />
that opened in 1983, which is undergoing<br />
a significant makeover and expansion. The fact<br />
that the latter two countries were the first to<br />
create visibility national museums may be attributed<br />
to Bahrain and Kuwait being the first<br />
two Gulf states to discover oil, in 1932 and 1937<br />
respectively. They were also the most politically<br />
developed and had the most advanced educational<br />
sector in the region at the time.<br />
Lying on the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula,<br />
the Sultanate of Oman has just inaugurated<br />
a National Museum in Muscat designed<br />
by Jasper Jacob Associates in conjunction with<br />
Arts Architecture International, both British<br />
based firms. Muscat is embarking on another<br />
major project called the Oman Renaissance Museum<br />
near the Al-Hajar Mountains designed<br />
by the Australian firm Cox Howlett & Bailey<br />
Woodland. The UAE has commissioned Foster<br />
+ Partners to design the Zayed National Museum,<br />
which has yet to be awarded. Perhaps the<br />
most interesting of these will be the new $132<br />
million Etihad Museum in Dubai that was designed<br />
by Moriyama & Teshima Architects, who<br />
also designed the Saudi National Museum.<br />
These planned mega museums contrast with<br />
past mini-national museums across the Gulf.<br />
Examples include Al Ain National Museum—<br />
which opened on November 2 nd 1971, exactly<br />
one month before the UAE was formed—and<br />
30 Gulf Affairs
III. Commentary<br />
the aforementioned Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim<br />
Al-Thani museum in Qatar. These museums no<br />
longer align with the global ambitions of these<br />
Gulf states.<br />
Heritage and visibility<br />
But what factors drive these Gulf states to embark<br />
on such a major drive to build national museums?<br />
First, these national museums are intended as<br />
domestic political messages to these states’ citizenries.<br />
The museums are being built to instil a<br />
sense of pride in the citizens of these countries<br />
and to cultivate a sense of belonging and identity.<br />
They also showcase to citizens the governments’<br />
commitments to maintain national identity in<br />
a globalizing world. In almost all Gulf states,<br />
schools are required to take students—especially<br />
citizens—to visit national museums on guided<br />
tours. Many of these museums utilize the latest<br />
technologies, such as interactive panels, to capture<br />
the attention of the teenaged and younger<br />
visitors.<br />
In 2012 Qatar Museums organized an exhibition<br />
titled Mal Lawal (translated as ‘Belonging to the<br />
Past’) in which Qatari citizens and residents were<br />
invited to share historic artefacts with the public,<br />
an event that was billed as ‘Uniquely Local.’<br />
It was an ingenious way of uncovering private<br />
collections, some of which will no doubt end up in<br />
the national museum through donations, which<br />
Gulf citizens are making ever more regularly.<br />
The Zayed National Museum and Qatar National<br />
Museum have started to record the oral history<br />
of the older citizens who witnessed the transformation<br />
of their countries—these will presumably<br />
be broadcast when these museums open.<br />
There is a genuine risk that these museums<br />
will become museums of static historical<br />
relics rather than a reflection of the dynamism<br />
that these states are experiencing.<br />
These museums are also political statements with<br />
their size, location, and contents to be carefully<br />
vetted. Often these museums will exclude certain<br />
categories such as minorities or even the slave<br />
trade. That said, Qatar should be commended for<br />
its inauguration of the Bin Jelmood house, which<br />
is the first museum in the Gulf dedicated to the<br />
slave trade in the region. It is, however, unknown<br />
if slavery will be featured in the National Museum<br />
down the road or if it will be compartmentalized<br />
into Bin Jelmood. These museums also tell<br />
history through the eyes of the victors, who are<br />
traditionally the ruling families of the Gulf and<br />
their allies. There is, for instance, little or no mention<br />
of those who have been vanquished or defeated<br />
in the past.<br />
Windows to the Gulf<br />
These national museums are also means to educate<br />
the millions of foreigners who live in or visit<br />
the Gulf states about the original inhabitants of<br />
the lands, whom foreigners seldom have a chance<br />
to interact with. Signing up major architects also<br />
helps Gulf governments to make these museums<br />
appealing to international visitors. A famous architectural<br />
brand would come with certain expectations<br />
of quality and standards.<br />
Despite their grandeur and important collections,<br />
national museums will face challenges. In addition<br />
to omitting certain segments of society, there<br />
is a genuine risk that these museums will become<br />
museums of static historical relics rather than a<br />
reflection of the dynamism that these states are<br />
experiencing. Only the Etihad Museum in Dubai<br />
has an explicit mandate to cover the years between<br />
1968 to 1974, and for good reason, since<br />
it is a museum dedicated to an event. The other<br />
national museums would do well to avoid becoming<br />
fortresses for the past instead of beacons of an<br />
evolving vibrant culture. The Gulf states are in a<br />
race against time, with demographics and rapidly<br />
accelerating globalization of their youth challenging<br />
efforts to preserve traditional identity. In this<br />
struggle, national museums have emerged as<br />
major battlefields.<br />
Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi is a UAE based writer<br />
and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 31
III. Commentary<br />
A unique Saudi viewpoint<br />
The leading cultural practitioners in Saudi Arabia<br />
(artists, curators and patrons) incorporate<br />
uniquely Saudi qualities in their work—qualities<br />
related to Islam, Saudi society, the monarchy and<br />
the nature of Saudi power and the ways in which<br />
that power has either a direct or invisible hand in<br />
cultural production.<br />
The Local Evolution of Saudi<br />
Arabia’s Contemporary<br />
Art Scene<br />
by Alia Al-Senussi<br />
Local art scene flourishes in<br />
Saudi Arabia<br />
audi Arabia has witnessed an explosion of<br />
S local art production in the 21 st century, driven<br />
in large part by a variety of grassroots efforts.<br />
These efforts are often tied to traditional centers<br />
of artistic production like the Abha arts community<br />
or the Hijaz, a crossroads of pilgrims and<br />
commerce. The exponential growth of and interest<br />
in art in the Kingdom has spurred a surge<br />
in local collectors and enthusiasm, especially for<br />
art with a local viewpoint or voice. Despite its<br />
grassroots origins, something uniquely Saudi,<br />
art continues to be patronized and overseen by<br />
the kingdom’s ruling elite.<br />
Saudi patrons have now mobilized in an unprecedented<br />
way to support local arts and bring<br />
non-Saudis to Jeddah (and elsewhere) to experience<br />
contemporary art in the Kingdom and also<br />
general Saudi culture. This is not particular to<br />
just Saudi Arabia but linked to a general reawakening<br />
of the importance of art and culture in the<br />
non-Western world, a recognition that art and<br />
culture play important roles in domestic politics,<br />
international relations, and power structures.<br />
Unlike its neighbors, Saudi Arabia has yet to garner<br />
significant press and attention for its cultural<br />
activities. But within the Kingdom there is an<br />
increasingly rich and continuously evolving cultural<br />
scene fed by artists, patrons, and interested<br />
locals.<br />
The celebrated artist Ahmed Mater, in ‘Young<br />
Soul Rebels’ (published in Asia Art Pacific in December<br />
2012), discusses the local climate in an<br />
explicit way in terms of market signifiers but his<br />
text is easily read as a manifesto on larger issues<br />
of what culture means to him and his fellow artists:<br />
“2012 was an important year for me and for<br />
many artists in Saudi Arabia. We decided to come<br />
back to the original movement of contemporary<br />
art which began in my hometown of Abha over 10<br />
years ago, and to return again to the source and<br />
foundation for our inspiration—namely our role<br />
in this society.”<br />
Mater continues to explain that “As Saudi artists,<br />
we seek to find a system and platform relevant to<br />
our local context, we seek to preserve and nurture<br />
our communal voice. Because we know that only<br />
32 Gulf Affairs
III. Commentary<br />
through a solid, paced and strong movement can<br />
we make our way upstream, against the current<br />
of society and its potential to materialism. We are<br />
full of nervous optimism about the potential of<br />
this real movement. We believe that art galleries,<br />
institutions, organizations, ministries, patrons,<br />
local and social media can support each other to<br />
instigate and develop a movement that will become<br />
part of the change needed in this society.”<br />
The evolution of art and patronage<br />
Even as Saudi artists explore increasingly diverse<br />
subject matters, members of the ruling elite<br />
establish organizations to shape and oversee the<br />
growing field. For example, the recent creation<br />
of the non-profit Saudi Art Council (SAC) was<br />
an important step forward in bringing a more<br />
official voice to the Saudi art world. The body is<br />
chaired by a senior member of the royal family,<br />
HRH Princess Jawaher bint Majid bin Abdulaziz<br />
Al Saud, and comprised of a selection of the Saudi<br />
commercial elite.<br />
Museums are a prosaic part of life in most Western<br />
developed countries, but they do not exist in<br />
such a visible manner in Saudi Arabia. This only<br />
magnifies the importance of organizations like<br />
the SAC and Edge of Arabia, the non-profit arts<br />
organization co-founded by Mater and his fellow<br />
artists and activists Abdulnasser Gharem and<br />
Stephen Stapleton.<br />
Even as Saudi artists explore increasingly<br />
diverse subject matters, members<br />
of the ruling elite establish organizations<br />
to shape and oversee the growing<br />
field.<br />
only recently adopted in a direct manner with the<br />
museum.<br />
However, senior government officials and members<br />
of the royal family have involved themselves<br />
with cultural initiatives more frequently as official<br />
as well as non-official representatives of the<br />
state. Ahmed Mater expressed how cultural production<br />
and politically charged arts are important<br />
to Saudi artists, as opposed to those who cater to<br />
outside tastes: “How can we paint butterflies and<br />
scenes of the past when our region is in turmoil<br />
and change is upon us?”<br />
Alia Al-Senussi is a Phd Candidate at SOAS,<br />
University of London, and a global representative<br />
and consultant at Art Basel; she holds a variety<br />
of not-for-profit board and committee positions<br />
which promote patronage of the arts such as with<br />
Tate, ICA London, Serpentine Galleries, The Chinati<br />
Foundation, Guggenheim and Art Dubai.<br />
On the other hand, the involvement of Western<br />
museums in the discourse and happenings in the<br />
region informs their cultural development and<br />
is integral to the evolution of the regional scene,<br />
providing an external counterpoint to the more<br />
insular goings-on. <strong>Culture</strong> can be a description<br />
of the contemporary situation of a society and a<br />
reference point for scholarship related to political<br />
movements and the structure of power. Saudi<br />
Arabia is no different from any other nation<br />
with a nascent and evolving art scene, and the<br />
relationship between visual culture and power<br />
in Saudi Arabia is something that the state has<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 33
III. Commentary<br />
any stimulating object, whether physically present<br />
or imagined into being. We memorized folk<br />
songs and played with dolls handmade from<br />
whatever raw materials we could find. By night<br />
time, we were ready for the universal bedtime<br />
story delivered by our mothers, grandmothers,<br />
and aunts.<br />
Understanding the Evolution<br />
of the Khaleeji <strong>Identity</strong><br />
by Lulwa Abdulla Al-Misned<br />
A<br />
Modernity threatens the future of<br />
traditional khaleeji lifestyle<br />
Khaleeji (male) or Khaleejiyah (female) is a<br />
person from one of the Gulf Cooperation Council<br />
(GCC) states—or ‘Gulfie’ in colloquial English.<br />
My Gulfie generation was born in the late fifties,<br />
sixties, and seventies and witnessed the creation of<br />
the GCC states and the formalization of the khaleeji<br />
identity. We were taught in the earliest formal<br />
classrooms by the first non-khaleeji Arab-immigrants,<br />
who had strong Arab nationalist pride and<br />
enforced a heavy sense of Islamic religious values.<br />
By the 1980s, we were pushed into the labor market<br />
to pursue our careers, often in semi-segregated<br />
work environments. We lived in extended families<br />
with many siblings and cousins in closely connected<br />
houses with open yards. The boundaries between<br />
homes were almost nonexistent, and kids ran about<br />
crossing hypothetical property lines in pursuit of<br />
We are the generation that had the best of both<br />
worlds. We were parented by a hardy pre-oil<br />
generation but grew up with the early years of<br />
the hydrocarbon economy, and we were given<br />
the benefits of free public goods and services,<br />
education, health, and housing, all facilitated<br />
by the rent of the extractive oil industry. It was<br />
a homogenous, integrated environment that<br />
found itself propelled into a much larger world.<br />
We knew who we were in the definitive sense,<br />
but we were to encounter several drivers of cultural<br />
change.<br />
How times have changed<br />
We, in our turn, parented a generation raised<br />
within the new city states in the Gulf. The<br />
mechanics of this change remain vivid in my<br />
memory. Starting in the 1980s, our generation<br />
pioneered the dual-bread-winning-parents approach<br />
in order to accommodate a contemporary<br />
khaleeji lifestyle. This approach would manifest<br />
in families building large villas with tall walls<br />
encompassing them. These walls stood white<br />
and vertical in silent declaration of their proprietary<br />
existence. Behind them came tiled yards,<br />
subsidized utilities, and imported domestic labor.<br />
It became the standard for the khaleeji lifestyle.<br />
This was made possible thanks to a hefty<br />
distribution of oil-rents through guaranteed<br />
public sector employment for both genders.<br />
Governments owned the hydrocarbon assets and<br />
distributed these rents through various transfer<br />
mechanisms, without the need for public taxation.<br />
As such, they became agents of gradual<br />
class formation in societies that had never been<br />
structured vertically. The role of the tribe faded,<br />
34 Gulf Affairs
III. Commentary<br />
by the decline of the political and economic functions<br />
of the tribal structure, into an immaterial<br />
self-image anchor called upon only in ceremonial<br />
events. The nation-state was to take over the<br />
formation of self-identity. The institutional formation<br />
of the modern state and the formation of<br />
the civil society did not fully materialize due to<br />
the polarization of social power in governments’<br />
hands. Government transfers became handouts<br />
that were allocated based on political loyalty.<br />
With the absence of the legislative requirements<br />
permitting collective association and assembly,<br />
there was no chance for ‘socialization’ to build up<br />
civic virtues and develop the self- image of a citizen<br />
rather than one of a subject.<br />
Capital cities within the GCC such as Abu Dhabi,<br />
Doha, Manama, and Riyadh underwent rapid<br />
development and relied on social capital growth<br />
to satisfy the demands of expanding economies.<br />
The optimal size of the economy was not based<br />
on calculations of the maximum extraction rate<br />
of hydrocarbon assets, as we all know. The extraction<br />
levels were determined most of the time<br />
by demand in the international markets for these<br />
strategic commodities.<br />
The changing nature of our neighborhoods<br />
In light of this rapid transformation, the spirit of<br />
the fareej, the indigenous Gulfie community, was<br />
difficult to perfectly preserve with the influx of<br />
expatriate neighbors from diverse cultural backgrounds.<br />
A new phase of “multiculturalism” in the<br />
Gulf was born as the nature of expat populations<br />
changed from the low skilled male workers who<br />
came to help build the infrastructure of these capital<br />
cities to expat professionals who came with<br />
their families to work in the growing industrial<br />
and services sectors.<br />
These professionals lived on long-term work permits<br />
and raised their children within the Gulf’s<br />
cities. Foreign embassies that represent large expatriate<br />
communities worked to establish schools<br />
for their citizens’ children. Within Gulf cities, both<br />
Khaleeji identity continues to evolve<br />
along a path that rejects and reduces<br />
the value of its traditional heritage.<br />
nationals and expats shop at the same malls, buy<br />
from the same grocery stores, and go to the same<br />
cinemas. These interactions are reminders that<br />
our realities include other identities and cultures.<br />
Over time a double value system was created.<br />
The traditional and the modern, each brought<br />
by different drivers of cultural change, fueled<br />
the creation of a complex and often contradictory<br />
self-image. This explains the adherence to national<br />
cultures in some situations but the relaxation<br />
of tradition in others.<br />
The decline of the middle class<br />
The welfare states that the Gulf governments<br />
raised through the first few decades of oil rent<br />
had become unsustainable with the fluctuation<br />
of hydrocarbon revenues. That brought many<br />
economic and social challenges, such as growing<br />
youth unemployment and struggles with housing<br />
and social safety net programs. One important<br />
result was the decline of the middle class, which<br />
had been gradually formed by educated professional<br />
nationals. Moreover, a new “super class”<br />
was formed that became dependent on government<br />
transfers through procurements, agency<br />
privileges for international contracts, and business<br />
licenses with exclusivity rights. Class polarization<br />
in the Gulf societies became another factor<br />
impacting the sense of one community and one<br />
culture.<br />
Ongoing de-Arabization<br />
The phenomenon of the ‘third culture kid’ prevailed<br />
among our children. During the first decade<br />
of the 21 st century, a new cultural nucleus<br />
of American and European higher education<br />
centers was established. These universities built<br />
regional campuses with the latest architectural<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 35
III. Commentary<br />
design, high-tech classrooms, and guaranteed<br />
student numbers and numerous financial incentives.<br />
These campuses drive cultural change<br />
by omitting the national cultural context from<br />
their programs and activities.<br />
Educational reform introduced English as a<br />
primary medium of study, undermining the region’s<br />
Arabic cultural heritage. The influence of<br />
foreign consultancy services like the US-based<br />
Rand Corporation, McKinsey and Co, Price<br />
Waterhouse Coopers and Booz Allen have been<br />
perceived by many locals as a wave of cultural<br />
imperialism in the aftermath of the September<br />
11 tragedy. Furthermore, neglecting the Arabic<br />
language as a paradigm of culture by using English<br />
as the medium of learning from the early<br />
years of childhood is a real challenge to children’s<br />
self-identification as Arab. Generations of<br />
our children and grandchildren are cut off from<br />
many aspects of their history, literature, folklore,<br />
and lifestyle.<br />
Under threat from its own impetus to modernize,<br />
from external influences and government<br />
pressure, the khaleeji identity continues<br />
to evolve along a path that rejects and reduces<br />
the value of its traditional heritage. It’s unclear<br />
what this will mean for the future of the identity<br />
of the khaleeji peoples.<br />
Dr. Lulwa Al-Misned is a former Assistant Secretary<br />
General of the Gulf Organization for Industrial<br />
Consulting and is currently a free-lance<br />
writer and consultant in the areas of public policy<br />
and social reform in the GCC region.<br />
During the last decade, technology has been the<br />
main driver of cultural change. This process is<br />
facilitated by advanced communication channels<br />
and global marketing of cultural products<br />
by transnational mega conglomerates. The current<br />
preference is for pop culture, social media,<br />
and interactive video games delivered with a<br />
“postmodern” set of values. This “current” culture<br />
for many thinkers is not universal and not<br />
even based on the classical Western culture. The<br />
heritage of freedom, justice, and democracy that<br />
prevailed in the Western liberal cultural history<br />
has become devoid of meaning and decontextualized.<br />
We live in an era of aggressive inward<br />
individualism that is shaped and controlled by<br />
market interests rather than moral criteria.<br />
The boundaries of such totalitarian virtual dominance<br />
are amorphous, and so is the khaleeji<br />
identity today.<br />
36 Gulf Affairs
IV. Interviews
IV. Interviews<br />
H.E. Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali<br />
Minister of <strong>Culture</strong> and Sports<br />
State of Qatar<br />
Gulf Affairs: The Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong>, Arts & Heritage has led the cultural scene for many<br />
years in the state of Qatar. What is your evaluation of the role of the Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong> and<br />
Sports that was established in 2016 after the merger of both the Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong>, Arts &<br />
Heritage and the Ministry of Youth and Sports, which was established in 2013?<br />
Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali: The Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong> and Sports has a leading role to play in society and<br />
is keen to enhance knowledge and development in all fields. Not only does it lead the cultural scene, but<br />
it is concerned with public affairs as well as with all fields that share its noble mission like education and<br />
media.<br />
The merging of both ministries comes as a structural reform which does not aim to change the terminology,<br />
but to change perceptions and efficiency of the work in each sector. We cannot assess the role of the<br />
ministry in a matter of months, in the sense of a scientific evaluation. Still, we can determine the nature<br />
of the steps that have been made and their impact in bringing about a shift in our perception of the role of<br />
the ministry itself in this historic stage—it makes sense to outline our vision and strategic plan in light of<br />
the historical reality witnessed by the State of Qatar. We announced the vision of the ministry just months<br />
after the initial merger and are currently working on the strategic plan. We inaugurated a number of<br />
cultural centers with a new perception of the cultural work to be performed and with the aim of giving creative<br />
individuals more independence in running their affairs, discussing their causes and expressing their<br />
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IV. Interviews<br />
creative product. We launched the Theater’s Affairs Center, the Cultural Conscience Center, the Music’s<br />
Affairs Center, The Cultural and Heritage Events Center, and Diwan Al-Arab Center. These are executive<br />
structures to embrace intellectuals and to influence society by creating a cultural public opinion as well as<br />
stimulating cultural movement.<br />
Unlike traditional cultural ministries, which limited the scope of their work to the executive role only, the<br />
ministry will develop the public strategy by providing follow-up, patronage, and governance. We live in a<br />
changing world and our society needs a qualitative transformation in the work performed by the ministry<br />
without dominating the cultural work.<br />
The Ministry does not claim that it owns culture but rather seeks to provide the proper environment to<br />
build a national culture for intellectuals and innovators to help them push the society forward.<br />
Gulf Affairs: How would you sum up the vision of the Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong> and Sports concerning<br />
arts and culture in Qatar?<br />
Al Ali: In every historic stage, culture needs a vision to build society and to fulfill its intellectual, psychological<br />
and aesthetic security needs. <strong>Culture</strong> works as a safety valve, which enhances its steps towards<br />
achieving a better future and forming a character that distinguishes it from other societies. It gives society<br />
a special position in the cultural action of nations.<br />
For that reason, the ministry chose its vision to gear “towards a conscious society with an authentic sentiment<br />
and a healthy body”. This vision is based on the orientations of His Highness Emir Tamim bin<br />
Hamad Al Thani, who referred to the value system taking hold in Qatari society as follows:<br />
“The Qatari people have always been long known for their good manners, generosity and humbleness.<br />
They work more and talk less. They have always helped the oppressed. I am afraid that we may miss the<br />
opportunity to pass on these core values: the values of work, humbleness, good manners and treating others<br />
with respect. We must make sure that the youth find a meaning to their lives in all of this and under<br />
the conditions of this consumptive civilization.”<br />
There is a convergence between these lofty ideals and the vision of Qatar 2030. Our common ambition is to<br />
build a new society. Thus, the vision of the Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong> is based on those two principles. Its pillars<br />
are awareness, consciousness, and body, which form the main foundations of building a society.<br />
We deeply need to think about our reality, to get hold of its tools and to explore its methods to be able to<br />
use them. Awareness forms the base for both work and methodology. It preserves facts and gives great<br />
importance to ideas in order to reach mental common sense and establish a way of thinking which depends<br />
on the realization of the cultural and social environment. We are in much need of these inherent<br />
values derived from the ideals of our ancestors and entrenched in our collective consciousness to protect<br />
our personality. Not only is our consciousness filled with such values but also branches off into sensation,<br />
perception, attention and imagination which grow with experience. We can only concentrate awareness<br />
and consciousness strongly within a healthy body.<br />
Gulf Affairs: Artistic expression takes different forms, which involve changing values. Notably,<br />
in spite of the successful use of technology in Qatari cultural production, heritage remains<br />
the main source for such production. How do you see this problematic relationship,<br />
which somehow may look contradictory?<br />
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Al Ali: It is true that creative expressions develop and take different forms according to time and place.<br />
Such forms create new visions and methods. Thus, we cannot separate expression from its form and content.<br />
Even though creative expression benefited from modern technology, this does not contradict the desire<br />
of some creative individuals to use heritage and to harness its content.<br />
Some may consider heritage as a rigid material, nothing more than a legacy that is passed on from ancestors<br />
through generations as if a mummified object. This is not what we have in mind as a meaning of heritage.<br />
This meaning is more of a legacy than heritage. What we mean by heritage is the vibrant energy that<br />
stands the test of time and lives within us now and in the future. If we recognize the difference between<br />
heritage and legacy, we will be able to realize the intrinsic value of common ownership of what is symbolic,<br />
including firm and constant values of society and elements of its identity. They may change with time to<br />
adapt to developments and our perspective of the society we want to build.<br />
The problem in dealing with heritage is the excessive use of old forms in creative fields such as music. We<br />
encourage creative people to deal with traditional molds in a creative and innovative way to renovate the<br />
social spirit. This way music will keep abreast with the times without betraying its essence. I do not think<br />
there is any contradiction between heritage and available technology. The big problem lies with those who<br />
are incapable of making this pairing possible. I think that creative expressions of whatever form should<br />
reflect the reality of their society and time, and they should contain a new vision and a new project for the<br />
society in a creative and artistic form, as this is the real purpose of creativity.<br />
Gulf Affairs: For decades, the educated Arab elite have been a significant cultural stream for<br />
artistic production in Qatar and have helped to establish it. Can we talk today about an educated<br />
elite among the rising generation capable of carrying the artistic and cultural load?<br />
Al Ali: It is undeniable that the Arab elite played a role in enhancing the Qatari cultural experience. For<br />
decades, our society embraced the Arab cultural momentum. However, we cannot overlook the role of the<br />
youth and the new generation in our cultural perception. We do not tend to classify society into new and old<br />
elites, but we classify it according to methodology, believing that the movement of culture depends mainly<br />
on communication between Arab cultural generations in general. Exchanging and transferring experiences<br />
among generations creates diversity, which invigorates the general cultural movement. Conflict or<br />
discontinuity between generations may be the reason behind the rupture we see in culture today.<br />
Intra-culture discontinuity is a necessary thing for development, but it is based on both separation and<br />
communication at the same time. The new generation should not ignore the feats of the previous elite who<br />
should not behave in a tutelary or authoritarian manner. We believe in the Qatari youth’s ability to create<br />
a paradigm shift when they take in the experience of the Arab elite and understand the challenges faced<br />
by Qatari society to achieve the desired response.<br />
Gulf Affairs: Qatar played a prominent role in the Arab uprising that took a different turn in<br />
the last three years. What is the impact of these events on culture and arts in Qatar and in the<br />
region as a whole?<br />
Al Ali: Qatar believes in the self-determination right of all peoples. Thus, it spared no effort in helping<br />
those peoples who seek freedom and a better future. Qatar welcomed the Arab uprising out of respect for<br />
the will of the peoples and considered it a paradigm shift that has a positive impact on the entire region.<br />
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Undoubtedly, this uprising will affect culture and arts. Consequently, innovators will find a new environment<br />
of freedom and their creative expressions will take new forms. Cultural momentum needs freedom,<br />
which is inseparable from creativity. The intellectuals will be able to discuss the causes of their country<br />
with boldness and in full communication with society. Thus, political transformations change the perception<br />
of society.<br />
Though none of this has yet been achieved, it shows the huge responsibility that must be shouldered by the<br />
intellectuals and innovators at this historic stage in particular. They have a social role to play. They have to<br />
deliberate the problems of their peoples and contribute to the change of beliefs, opinions, and mentalities.<br />
It is a huge choice that will have consequences not only for the countries which witnessed the uprising, but<br />
also for the entire region.<br />
The Qatari cultural scene interacted with the aspirations of the Arab intellectuals in the countries which<br />
witnessed the uprising by opening the fields of expression and participation in the events. This contact of<br />
Qatari intellectuals and innovators with this new “wave” will undoubtedly create additional enthusiasm to<br />
believe in the role of culture in building the future vision of Qatar.<br />
Gulf Affairs: Are you concerned about the fact that the attention given to sports by youth and<br />
supported by the state within the GCC states notably exceeds that of culture?<br />
Al Ali: The attention given to sports is a result of the larger media coverage despite the priority given to<br />
the youth culture. In addition, scoring goals is much clearer and faster in sports than in culture. This is due<br />
to the different nature of each field, without creating a predominance of one over the other. Both culture<br />
and sports share roles in society while each field has its own particularity and choices while being integrated.<br />
Our vision expressed such integration, bearing in mind that awareness and consciousness should be<br />
built within a healthy body. I am not concerned about measurements of attention to each field as it is not<br />
a matter of quantity but of degree and quality. Changing and enlightening mentalities through cultural<br />
expression takes more time. It is not an automatic thing to do and is not related to a particular period. The<br />
more we realize what we aspire from culture and sports at our particular moment in civilization, the better<br />
we will be able to give enough attention to each one of them.<br />
Gulf Affairs: Finally, the previous Doha Cultural Festival successfully became a significant<br />
cultural forum in the Arab region. Why did it stop? Are there any plans to bring it back?<br />
Al Ali: Qatar went through many cultural experiences, including the Doha Cultural Festival, which kicked<br />
off its first round in 2002. Still, each historic stage requires forms and means to present the artistic product<br />
or accomplish cultural projects. Thanks to the forums and festivals held by several cultural bodies, Doha<br />
became a cultural beacon. However, merging all these events into only one festival does not reflect the<br />
vitality of culture that extends all year long. At this point, holding festivals is not our main concern, but<br />
empowering intellectuals and innovators to reach creativity is.<br />
Supporting all events with a vision that advances Qatari society, as well as serious thinking about our cultural<br />
priorities, are more important than cultural show off. The question is what did all these festivals and<br />
forums change in our way of thinking, conduct, and preferences? I think this is the core question, which will<br />
guide our plans for the future.<br />
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IV. Interviews<br />
H.E. Shaikha Mai bint Mohammed Al-Khalifa<br />
President, Bahrain Authority for <strong>Culture</strong> & Antiquities<br />
Kingdom of Bahrain<br />
Gulf Affairs: What are the objectives of the newly founded Bahrain Authority for <strong>Culture</strong> and<br />
Antiquities?<br />
Shaikha Mai Al-Khalifa: In many ways the strength, richness, and authenticity of Bahraini culture has<br />
always been a major component of modern day Bahraini society. One cannot understand Bahrain and its<br />
people, the make-up of the society, its open minded, tolerant, and progressive nature, without acquiring<br />
an in depth knowledge of its history and its culture. That is precisely why Bahrain recognized that it was<br />
absolutely necessary for the Kingdom to place culture, history, and archeology in the center of the Kingdom’s<br />
national agenda. The establishment of the Bahrain Authority for <strong>Culture</strong> and Antiquities as an<br />
independent body with a wide and encompassing mandate is therefore a natural and logical manifestation<br />
of this national priority. The Authority is therefore mandated with exploration, protection, and promotion<br />
of Bahrain’s rich history and both tangible and intangible cultural wealth. The mandate of the Authority is<br />
crucial for the image, the perception, and the appreciation of modern day Bahrain for its citizens as much<br />
as for the world at large.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What are the major achievements of the Bahraini authorities in the area of culture<br />
in recent years?<br />
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Al-Khalifa: We can confidently say that in the relatively short history of the Authority, many achievements<br />
and success stories were realized. In addition to the continuous, day to day work of maintaining and<br />
protecting cultural heritage, important infrastructures were established on the ground, such as several<br />
specialized museums as well as the establishment of the National Theater designed and built with state of<br />
the art standards. To date, the Theater hosted several renowned national and international performances<br />
that were enjoyed by the people of Bahrain and its visitors. The Authority also succeeded in naming Manama<br />
as Arab Capital of <strong>Culture</strong> (2012), Arab Capital of Tourism (2013), and Asian Capital of Tourism<br />
(2014), while Al Muharaq was named Islamic Capital of culture. In addition, the Authority was able to<br />
launch an important project on knowledge transfer as well as embark on several research and translation<br />
projects placing Bahraini culture and literature on the international stage. The Authority is today bringing<br />
the world to Bahrain and taking Bahrain to the world.<br />
Gulf Affairs: How would you describe the role of Bahrain in promoting culture in the Gulf<br />
region and beyond?<br />
Al-Khalifa: The progressive, open minded, and international character of the Bahraini society makes it<br />
one of the best ambassadors for transmitting the wealth and authentic deep-rooted culture of the Gulf<br />
societies to the world at large. This is a crucial task today in a world that is becoming increasingly intolerant<br />
and is suffering from serious stereotyping of each other’s culture. The proper understanding of the<br />
richness and the beauty of the diversity of every culture is essential in building a better world. Bahrain<br />
understands very well its role in today’s world and in taking the culture of the Gulf societies to the world,<br />
and the Authority is one of its important vehicles in achieving this important task.<br />
Gulf Affairs: Bahrain is a country rich in cultural heritage and with a very long history: what<br />
is the impact of this heritage on the Bahraini identity? How would you define the Bahraini<br />
identity in the 21 st century?<br />
Al-Khalifa: Societies are the product of their history, their people, their place, and their unique resulting<br />
culture; Bahrain is no exception. As an island that was home to the most ancient civilizations, Bahrain<br />
acquired many rich cultural features of openness, ability to connect easily with other cultures as well as a<br />
variety of skills connected to sea life, trade, and services. Such characters are still very important features<br />
of the Bahraini society. That is why Bahrainis today are tolerant, accommodating, and friendly. They are<br />
also naturally skilled at trade, crafts, and services. The recognition and listing of the “pearl trail” as a UNE-<br />
SCO World Heritage Site is an example of a rich heritage in skills, trade, and services. Bahraini people today<br />
are without doubt the product of a culture that is rich, unique, and worthy of international recognition.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What is the role of women in promoting Bahraini culture and shaping the Bahraini<br />
identity?<br />
Al-Khalifa: Regardless of gender, we are living in an encouraging atmosphere in the Kingdom of Bahrain,<br />
where both men and women can work creatively in various fields based on the principle of equal opportunities.<br />
The Bahraini woman has always played a significant role economically and socially. In the era prior<br />
to the discovery of oil in the 1930s, she worked hard to support her family while her husband was away<br />
on long diving trips, thus the Bahraini woman has left her mark throughout history. In fact, any national<br />
achievement is hardly devoid of the contributions of Bahraini women.<br />
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Gulf Affairs: In recent years GCC countries have undertaken a variety of efforts to preserve<br />
and celebrate their history. What initiatives were undertaken in Bahrain and how do they fit<br />
in the national tourism strategy?<br />
Al-Khalifa: Bahrain has always been very active within the GCC group, especially in the field of cultural<br />
preservation and cultural promotion, which, as you correctly noted, has been a GCC priority. The best<br />
manifestation can be seen in Bahrain’s success and distinction in the tourism industry. We believe that<br />
culture is the story of the people, and tourism is the publisher and distributer of the story. The importance<br />
that we place on tourism is, therefore, the best way of demonstrating the respect and value we place on our<br />
cultural heritage. We want the world to know about it; we want the world to enjoy it; we want the world to<br />
come visit Bahrain, and that is why we promote tourism.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What are the future plans for the promotion of culture in Bahrain?<br />
Al-Khalifa: We will continue to work hard on the preservation and the promotion of our cultural heritage.<br />
There are many initiatives in the planning. We are planning to establish a dedicated cultural TV channel,<br />
promote cruises to visit some of our cultural sites, and introduce “light and sound” shows to selected cultural<br />
and archeological sites. These are some examples of our future plans on the ground. Our mission, however,<br />
remains the preservation, the presentation, and the promotion of the beautiful story of our people.<br />
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IV. Interviews<br />
Ali Al-Youha<br />
Secretary General<br />
Kuwait National Council for <strong>Culture</strong>, Arts and Letters (NCCAL)<br />
Gulf Affairs: What is the mandate and scope of the National Council for <strong>Culture</strong>, Arts and<br />
Letters?<br />
Ali Al-Youha: The National Council for <strong>Culture</strong>, Arts and Letters was established by Emiri Decree on July<br />
17, 1973 as an independent public body, chaired by the Minister of Information, with a board consisting of<br />
a number of representatives from other public departments and arts, culture and literary circles. Over 40<br />
years old, the Council’s role has grown alongside Kuwait’s journey as a country. Its primary duties include<br />
educational, literary, artistic, and cultural development nationally, in addition to developing relations with<br />
similar Arab and international counterparts. Its role includes:<br />
•Surveying and conducting studies on the Kuwaiti cultural landscape and current efforts of other<br />
departments.<br />
•Conducting studies on the status of culture and its development and direction in Kuwait.<br />
•Record collecting and conserving.<br />
•Publishing, including magazines, journals, dictionaries, and books generally.<br />
•Events and outreach: the Council is regularly active in establishing a number of events, including<br />
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conferences, forums, festivals and national competitions, with the aim of developing cultural communication<br />
and awareness.<br />
•Public and civil cultural engagement and promotion.<br />
•Preservation of local and Arab heritage and the promotion of literary culture through series and<br />
ad hoc publications.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What have been the primary achievements of the NCCAL over the past few years?<br />
Al-Youha: Since its inception, the Council has succeeded in supporting and organizing Kuwaiti cultural<br />
and artistic movements and consequently established, over four decades, regular cultural phenomena that<br />
reflect the Kuwaiti social landscape. These efforts included:<br />
•Kuwait International Book Fair: a book fair prominent internationally and within the Arab world<br />
running since 1975.<br />
•The Annual Qurain Cultural Festival: launched in 1994 and eventually transforming from a mere<br />
‘festival’ to an artistic and literary phenomenon within the GCC and Arab-wide.<br />
•Specialized festivals including: The Youth Cultural Festival, The Kuwait Theatrical Festival, The<br />
International Music Festival, The Future Generation Cultural Festival, and The Summer Cultural<br />
Festival.<br />
•Energizing the idea of Arabic and International cultural weeks.<br />
•Exhibitions in fine arts.<br />
In addition, the Council is a regular contributor to and supporter of many published materials that attract<br />
unprecedented readership in the Arab cultural arena, including:<br />
•“Aalam Al-Ma’rifah” (World of Knowledge): a series of monthly published short books (since 1978).<br />
•“Al-Masrah Al-Aalami” (Global Theatre): a series of global theatrical plays from foreign languages,<br />
translated to Arabic (since 1969).<br />
•“Aalam Al-Fikr” (World of Intellect): a quarterly containing articles and research with a diversity<br />
of academic cultural, artistic, and historical research (since 1970).<br />
•“Al-Thaqafah Al-‘Alamiyah” (Global <strong>Culture</strong>): a magazine publishing translated material on cultural,<br />
artistic, and literary affairs (since 1980).<br />
•“Ebda’at ‘Alamiya” (Global Creations/Fantasy): a series of global theatrical plays, translated to<br />
Arabic (since 1969).<br />
The Council’s other achievements include its support for the creation of national theatre groups, in addition<br />
to the preservation and management of historical architecture and national heritage. The Council is<br />
also party to a number of agreements and memorandums with Arab and other foreign counterparts.<br />
Gulf Affairs: How do you describe the state of the cultural movement in Kuwait and what<br />
would you say are some of its unique attributes?<br />
Al-Youha: The Kuwaiti government places immense interest and care in culture and even relies on culture<br />
as a key to increased human awareness more generally. Many factors have contributed to making<br />
Kuwait an Arab regional cultural beacon, including the diversity of the population, the tolerance for which<br />
Kuwaitis are known, and their love for culture and arts. The Kuwaiti cultural movement, its roots, and its<br />
figures are considered among the most noteworthy in the Arab region and are among the reasons Kuwait<br />
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was chosen as a capital for Arab culture and a capital for Islamic culture in 2001 and 2006 respectively.<br />
The strength of the Kuwaiti cultural movement relies on active publishing and strong roots in theatre, fine<br />
arts, literature, poetry, music, and many other activities.<br />
The Kuwaiti cultural scene has included from its early beginnings, which pre-date independence, the active<br />
contribution of women, especially in literature and the arts. This is in addition to increased youth<br />
participation, especially in recent years. The role the Council plays, in addition to other governmental<br />
departments and the private sector, supports this cultural scene with a constant number of initiatives<br />
and achievements, affording a notably cultural visage to Kuwait that we take pride in sharing locally and<br />
globally.<br />
Gulf Affairs: How does the NCCAL contribute to supporting the cultural and artistic movement<br />
in the country?<br />
Al-Youha: As mentioned earlier, as per the Council’s roles and decree of establishment, the Council supports<br />
and sponsors a wide range of activities, including talents in writing, literature, acting, music, and<br />
other arts. Two examples of how the Council supports these sectors are the Kuwaiti National Encouragement<br />
Prize, which is given annually for achievements in different cultural and educational fields, and<br />
the Kuwaiti National Recognition Prize, given for notable cultural and social contributions. These awards<br />
come in addition to the Council’s role in supporting other activities in collaboration with local societies and<br />
clubs such as publishing, short movies, play scripts, and other art forms.<br />
Moreover, the Council provides regular training on heritage preservation and restoration at many of Kuwait’s<br />
heritage sites, both on its mainland and islands. I would also like to note the signing of a bilateral<br />
agreement with the Department of History at Kuwait University for archaeological exploration and preservation.<br />
Gulf Affairs: Despite being a small country, Kuwait exhibits a lot of cultural diversity. Can you<br />
tell us more about the characteristics of Kuwaiti identity and how you see them reflected in<br />
today’s culture and art?<br />
Al-Youha: The cultural diversity and lively nature found in the Kuwaiti cultural movement owes itself<br />
to a number of factors, including, as mentioned earlier, the social tolerance and openness to ‘the other,’<br />
as is evident from trends in migration to Kuwait by a number of nationalities, especially Arab. This is accompanied<br />
by the constant Kuwaiti desire and inclination for the cultural, artistic, and literary exchange,<br />
amongst other factors. The combination of such internal and external factors creates what one may deem<br />
today as Kuwait’s current cultural visage, perhaps most known for its openness and tolerance to others’<br />
contributions, without incurring a negative backlash to the Kuwaiti identity.<br />
In turn, the Council, within its professional specializations and obligations and alongside other public institutions<br />
and civil society organizations, has over the decades contributed to the instilment of this identity.<br />
The contribution comes from all segments of society including schools and their activities, Kuwait University’s<br />
research on all aspects relating to identity, iconic public figures, voluntary efforts, and others directed<br />
towards children.<br />
This joint effort has given birth to significant cultural and literary output, be it in theatre, novels and<br />
writing more generally, or travel, without departing from the foundation of the Kuwaiti national identity,<br />
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primarily rooted in openness, tolerance, and acceptance of the other.<br />
Gulf Affairs: With the advent of social media, how have you seen this impact the cultural movement<br />
in Kuwait, particularly among the youth segment?<br />
Al-Youha: It may be more plausible for one to speak of the positives of the social media revolution than it<br />
is to speak of the negatives on the cultural scene, especially when referring to the young population.<br />
Today we see the rise of a unique constellation of young Kuwaitis, from both genders, who have been<br />
given the chance to translate and widely disseminate their work thanks to advances in communications.<br />
The latest of such examples was the award winning “Saq Al-Bamboo” (The Bamboo Stalk) novel by Saud<br />
Al-Sanousi, winner of the International Prize for Arabic Fiction—supported by the Booker Prize Foundation—whose<br />
work was turned into a television series. Similarly, there are many other authors whose work<br />
found greater recognition due to social media networking.<br />
Statistically speaking, Kuwaiti society is highly active in such platforms, developing the ability to use them<br />
in responsible means that have served the cultural scene rather than harmed it in any way. The young<br />
population, in particular, actively uses social networking to promote arts, including fine arts, caricatures,<br />
short stories, and as a means to promote workshops and seminars. I also think that Kuwaiti society is<br />
immune to the potential negative social and cultural impacts of globalization because of its long-standing<br />
openness that precedes phenomena such as social media networking. Consequently, Kuwaitis have succeeded<br />
over decades to incorporate diversity without divorcing from the roots of their cultural identity.<br />
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IV. Interviews<br />
Nada Al Hassan<br />
Chief of Arab States Unit<br />
UNESCO<br />
Gulf Affairs: How does UNESCO collaborate with Arab states in the Gulf region?<br />
Nada Al Hassan: UNESCO collaborates at different levels with the Arab states in the Gulf region through<br />
its office in Doha, which is responsible for the Gulf cluster. This office ensures close collaboration with Gulf<br />
countries for the implementation of UNESCO programs. In the area of culture, UNESCO supports Arab<br />
states in the Gulf region in the implementation of the cultural conventions they have ratified and with<br />
their cultural activities at large.<br />
The Arab states of the Gulf have all ratified the World Heritage Convention. By doing so they have committed<br />
to respect the requirements of the Convention in protecting their cultural and natural heritage, be<br />
it inscribed or not on the World Heritage List, through appropriate legislative and management modalities<br />
and protection measures, to ensure its transmission to future generations. This, in itself, is very important<br />
and very demanding.<br />
UNESCO supports the Gulf countries as State Parties to the World Heritage Convention in implementing<br />
these requirements, in particular at the sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, through technical<br />
and policy advice and training. It also supports them in preparing new nominations for inscription on the<br />
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World Heritage List. For instance, UNESCO has supported Saudi Arabia in preparing the nomination file<br />
of Al-Hijr Archaeological Site (Madâin Sâlih), advised Qatar on the preparation of Al-Zubarah nomination<br />
file, and we are currently supporting Kuwait in preparing the nomination file of the Kuwait Towers (Abraj<br />
al-Kuwait). We also involve civil servants and experts from the region in our training activities, regional<br />
and international policy-making workshops, and international meetings and conferences.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What does UNESCO view as some of the most important cultural and heritage<br />
projects in the region?<br />
Al Hassan: There are a number of interesting cultural and heritage projects in the region. Each country<br />
has its own style or focus. Of particular interest are the museums and cultural institutions established by<br />
Qatar Museums, which have considerably raised the level of cultural institutions in the Arab states to compete<br />
with similar institutions at the international level. The urban conservation and revitalization projects<br />
undertaken by the Bahrain Authority for <strong>Culture</strong> and Antiquities in Manama and the interpretation and<br />
presentation of their archaeological sites, such as the site museum of Qalat al Bahrain, are valuable initiatives.<br />
The art fairs and shows such as Art Dubai and the Sharjah Biennial have become hubs for discovering<br />
new talent at the international level. In Saudi Arabia and Oman for example, the focus is on conserving<br />
historical sites and on studying and conserving historic cities and cultural landscapes. Much has been<br />
going on in the region in the past years—there is a real dynamism in some Gulf countries, directed either<br />
towards historic sites or towards creativity, or both.<br />
Gulf Affairs: How would you characterize the heritage of the Gulf states? How does the Gulf<br />
identity shape its view toward its cultural heritage and preservation of culture? What is<br />
unique or interesting about the Gulf cultural heritage or identity?<br />
Al Hassan: Cultural heritage in the Gulf states cannot be defined as a single entity or typology. It varies<br />
from region to region, from country to country, from rock-art prehistoric sites to ancient civilizations such<br />
as the Dilmun dynasty, from Nabatean sites, to Islamic cities and forts and later to human settlements<br />
linked to the pearl trade, to name but a few. This diversity counters the narrative about the Gulf states<br />
being one compact culture versus a multitude of influences and historical layers. Indeed, very rarely do<br />
people visit the Gulf states as a cultural destination, but this is changing now thanks to the change in the<br />
cultural policies of Gulf governments. Some are investing considerably in cultural activities, the revitalization<br />
of historical cities, and making their historical sites become destinations for visits.<br />
As in any country in the world, public institutions make choices related to which cultural heritage they<br />
want to value and protect. What’s interesting is how the options in the Arab states of the Gulf region are<br />
growing to include not only Islamic architecture but also ancient sites and pearl trade settlements. In<br />
Kuwait, there is even a strong interest for preserving architectural buildings from the Modern Movement<br />
period. Public policies are steadily embracing the diversity of cultural heritage in the Gulf region; this is<br />
very interesting indeed.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What are the challenges and the opportunities related to the creation, conservation,<br />
and maintenance of the status of World Heritage sites in the Gulf region?<br />
Al Hassan: Often sites with national or regional value claim a World Heritage status, but this is not the<br />
idea of the World Heritage Convention. When a country ratifies the Convention, it doesn’t mean that they<br />
50 Gulf Affairs
IV. Interviews<br />
need to inscribe all the cultural and natural heritage they have on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Cultural<br />
and natural heritage in one country is an invaluable asset that we have the responsibility to protect<br />
collectively. In this sense, and although UNESCO promotes the inscription of sites on the World Heritage<br />
List, I strongly believe that what is important for a given country is to conserve the legacy it has received<br />
from past generations, study it, and pass it on to the next ones, regardless of its international status. This<br />
being said, the challenge of nominating new sites for inscription on the World Heritage List is not an easy<br />
one. First of all, it is about inventorying cultural and natural heritage and creating a Tentative List that<br />
bears a potential outstanding universal value; second, it is about protecting those sites with the adequate<br />
legislation and ensuring their management; third, it is about preparing a solid nomination file that abides<br />
by very detailed and specialized technical requirements, with appropriate arguments and an appropriate<br />
narrative that demonstrate their outstanding universal value, authenticity and integrity.<br />
A nomination file for the inscription on the World Heritage List is not a mere file prepared by a handful<br />
of experts. It is a process of reflection, identification, research, and demonstration, as well as a process by<br />
which management and protection measures are developed to be adequate to a potential World Heritage<br />
status of a given site.<br />
When nomination files are prepared by national teams that engage in the process of justification, management,<br />
and protection, the results are much more interesting because there is a strong sense of national<br />
ownership. This is because the nomination process is a moment in time that fosters capacity building and<br />
institution building towards cultural heritage protection. This is also why UNESCO insists on the importance<br />
of participative and inclusive planning.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What role do you see for local communities in the management and conservation<br />
of heritage?<br />
Al Hassan: Local communities are viewed as the owners, users, and protectors of sites. Their role is crucial<br />
in ensuring good management and in keeping sites alive; they are the main beneficiaries of sites and they<br />
are their best custodians. Their involvement needs to start from the very beginning of any inscription process.<br />
This will allow building with them, not only an inscription file, but above all a management system<br />
in which they are actors and beneficiaries. Only then can you create a win-win situation between public<br />
institutions and local communities. Indeed, the World Heritage Committee has attributed a growing role<br />
to local communities in the processes and management systems of inscribed sites. The recently adopted<br />
policy on World Heritage and Sustainable Development places local communities at the center of World<br />
Heritage conservation and management.<br />
Gulf Affairs: Have Gulf countries contributed to the conservation of heritage outside of the<br />
Gulf region, for instance, Arab or Islamic heritage?<br />
Al Hassan: Numerous initiatives funded by Gulf countries have contributed to the conservation of cultural<br />
heritage in the Arab region, such as in the Old City of Jerusalem. Other contributions support UNESCO’s<br />
response in the areas affected by conflicts and natural disasters. However, much more is needed in terms<br />
of contribution and exchange with other Arab countries, in particular in view of the ravaging conflicts in<br />
the Middle East, which destroyed much of their cultural heritage.<br />
A meaningful contribution to the region’s cultural and natural heritage is also undertaken through the<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 51
IV. Interviews<br />
work of the Arab Regional Centre for World Heritage created in Bahrain in 2011. The Centre provides<br />
technical support to the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in the Arab region and undertakes<br />
a number of training programs and operational and technical assistance activities.<br />
Gulf Affairs: What future directions and what improvements in the preservation of heritage<br />
would you suggest in the Gulf region?<br />
Al Hassan: Again, I can’t see that there is one type of cultural heritage in the Gulf states that requires one<br />
type of intervention. I would like to stress the importance of the authenticity of sites and call for limiting<br />
rebuilding and reconstructing lost structures with new materials. This is a practice that I have witnessed<br />
often at some sites in the region. I would also suggest not to overdo things. Very often, less is more, and<br />
doing a lot can transform authentic sites into Disneyland-like sites; here, I would raise the red flag. It is<br />
important not to fall into this trap. Moreover, historic cities such as Jeddah and the historic district of<br />
Dubai need to be conserved by avoiding gentrification and keeping life and economic activities in them, as<br />
opposed to turning them into open-air museums that are bound to die.<br />
We face many challenges in the Arab states: our heritage institutions need great support, our managers<br />
and civil servants need training and exchange at the regional and international levels, our legislation<br />
needs improvement, and our local communities need to be more engaged, to start with through education<br />
curricula. This is a long road where the Arab states of the Gulf region can contribute considerably.<br />
52 Gulf Affairs
Featured Photo Essay<br />
Featured Photo Essay: Walls of the GCC<br />
by Rana Jarbou<br />
One can easily see the impact of the GCC cities’<br />
rapid modernization by looking at their visual<br />
culture and urban discourse, which are manifest<br />
in graffiti. However, finding graffiti in the Gulf<br />
states is challenging. Only a few buildings have<br />
become canvases for graffiti artists and writers,<br />
and they are mostly found in old villages in<br />
Bahrain, scattered among Kuwait’s abandoned<br />
pre-invasion structures, or in Qatif, Saudi Arabia.<br />
With little-to-no open-air public spaces, one can<br />
go long distances searching for a mere expression<br />
or drawing.<br />
It is not a mystery why public spaces are impoverished<br />
or even nonexistent in such wealthy oil-rich<br />
countries. There are few green spaces and shaded<br />
streets, and thus there exists little street interface.<br />
These countries afford only isolated spaces,<br />
such as shopping malls and commercial centers,<br />
to which people most often need to drive. With the<br />
exception of the Dubai Metro, which only opened<br />
a few years ago, the poor public transportation<br />
systems in most Gulf cities cause over-dependence<br />
on vehicles. The lack of a rich and integrated<br />
graffiti culture reflects the ensuing absence of<br />
Bahrain<br />
“Oh Allah, bless Muhammad & the family of Muhammad.” Sar, Bahrain.<br />
To pray for and send blessings for prophet Muhammad is a common<br />
practice for Muslims on many occasions, especially during prayer.<br />
Bahrain’s closed-off village communities are rich with calligraphy<br />
ranging from Quranic verses to religious supplications and aphorisms,<br />
depicting a sense of belonging and collective social memory, as some of<br />
them emphasize the Shia identity.<br />
In conjunction with the beautiful calligraphy and paintings, dissenting<br />
graffiti is in abundance, marked by the village communities’ ongoing<br />
struggle. Sectarian tensions are manifest on these angry walls, ranging<br />
from displays of unequal education and employment opportunities<br />
among Bahrainis as well as their undermined representation in the political<br />
process. This graffiti, at the entrance of Sar village reads “Steadfast<br />
street,” marking the village boundaries. Police and protestors often<br />
clash at these village passageways.<br />
Kuwait<br />
“Free Kuwait” and “Long live Kuwait” Kuwait City, Kuwait. In the<br />
Kuwaiti capital, many abandoned buildings and houses from the Iraqi<br />
invasion in 1990 remain as canvases for graffiti writers and street artists.<br />
It is unknown when these walls were graffitied, but their western<br />
pop-culture aesthetics and influences are discernable. Some nationalist<br />
and religious graffiti can also be found among western idols, popularized<br />
symbols and graffiti fonts.<br />
Like other cities in the GCC, graffiti in Kuwait is scattered across the<br />
city with various aesthetics and purposes ranging from the emerging<br />
popular art to the Bidoun (stateless people) writings calling for statehood.<br />
Still dominating this range is graffiti in the spaces where there<br />
are remnants of war.<br />
Oman<br />
Some western inspired graffiti in Muscat’s outskirts, among the very<br />
little graffiti to be found in Oman. Nationalism and rap are prevailing<br />
themes. “Oman is one pulse” is one common Arabic phrase written<br />
across the island, found even on rocks and canoes.<br />
“In the name of Allah” is graffitied on an aluminum structure in the<br />
middle of Wahiba sands, in the Rub’ al Khali (empty quarter) desert.<br />
Religious graffiti, particularly “remember Allah,” “There is no God but<br />
Allah,” and “Allahu Akbar” are some of the most abundant in all GCC<br />
countries.<br />
54
Featured Photo Essay<br />
an urban ecosystem of social and public spaces,<br />
and thus the lack of outdoor activities and relations.<br />
This is why graffiti has become confined to villages<br />
and residential areas, where there is a sense<br />
of community. Censorship and surveillance play<br />
roles, too. And yet even on the clean white walls of<br />
the new oasis cities, people have left their marks.<br />
The walls of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain harbor<br />
some degree of social and political commentary,<br />
but for the most part religion, love, poetry and<br />
song lyrics, tribal codes, nationalism (and nostalgia<br />
for one’s homeland), football, hip hop, and digital<br />
codes (such as blackberry pin numbers) seem<br />
to be dominating the graffiti culture of these “cities<br />
of salt.”<br />
Rana Jarbou is an independent media artist who<br />
researches and documents graffiti and street art<br />
throughout the Arab world. These photos are a<br />
sample of graffiti captured from 2007 to present<br />
as part of an ongoing project documenting graffiti<br />
as counter-narrative.<br />
Qatar<br />
In the Doha outskirts and areas inhabited by expat communities, there<br />
is much graffiti that asserts one’s racial or national identity. “Baluch”<br />
is one dominant identity marked on Doha’s walls, though Oman and<br />
the UAE are more populated by them. 50 Cent is idolized here, in line<br />
with many of the western hip hop icons celebrated in other GCC cities.<br />
“No wind shakes you, bu Azooz” comes from the old Arabic proverb, “oh<br />
mountain, no wind shakes you,” to mean you’re so strong and resilient,<br />
and it became a common expression used in numerous colloquial song<br />
lyrics. Bu Azooz is a name tag and also seen here are 3-digit tribal<br />
codes, a common graffiti practice in the Gulf.<br />
Saudi Arabia<br />
“Harby and the wafa’ (loyalty) is my path.” Ha’il, Saudi Arabia. “Harby”<br />
is in reference to the Harb tribe. This rhythmic phrase is a common<br />
practice among young proud tribalists, adding to the “I am here” graffiti<br />
motif to say “I am from here.” In addition to their digital codes, ranging<br />
from blackberry pin numbers, online social profiles and other modes of<br />
communication, there are 3-digit codes signifying tribes’ names. Along<br />
with these codes and rhyming in colloquial dialect are proud tribal slogans<br />
and they extend to other Gulf countries.<br />
“Oh, time, I wish I know what is coming in my life before I pay the price,<br />
I’m losing it.” Al Hilla, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Lyrics from the song,<br />
“Jizaty,” meaning “my reward” by the Saudi hip hop artist Klash (short<br />
for Kalashnikov). Saudi Arabia’s graffiti culture is very rich and diverse,<br />
reflective of the very disparate communities across the country<br />
with themes ranging from joyriding to love.<br />
United Arab<br />
Emirates<br />
Graffiti is uncommon in Abu Dhabi, and in the UAE for that matter,<br />
apart from the infamous Dubai writer Arcadia Blank. However, there<br />
are a few tags and phrases lurking behind an alleyway here or there,<br />
such as joyriding (hajwalah) references to Quranic verses in English.<br />
This graffitied phrase is on a main highway heading towards Saadiyat<br />
Island and it reads, “Rest in peace, the soldiers of this nation,” assumingly<br />
in reference to the ongoing war in Yemen.<br />
It is more common to find graffiti in the smaller local and expat communities<br />
and towns in the UAE, with themes including hip hop, religion,<br />
rebellion and profanity as is depicted here in Sharjah.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 55
V. Timeline<br />
2008<br />
Select Cultural-related Events and Developments across the GCC since 2008<br />
Dubai’s Technology and Media Free Zone Authority (TECOM) introduces the Gulf Film Festival and Competition<br />
March 31: The al Dhafra Festival happens for the first time; the festival holds a camel pageant and other events and<br />
activities known to the region for centuries.<br />
October: Qatar releases its Qatar National Vision 2030 program outlining goals to increase cultural awareness,<br />
gender parity, youth participation, and introduce Qatarization quotas.<br />
November 22: Museum of Islamic Art in Doha opens showcasing Islamic art and architecture, the first of its kind in<br />
the Arab World.<br />
2009<br />
December 31: Construction of the Burj Khalifa is completed. The structure has become a symbol of Dubai and the<br />
emirate’s modernity.<br />
2010<br />
May: Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohammed Al Qassimi, ruler of Sharjah, approves the Heart of Sharjah project, the largest<br />
heritage project to date in the Gulf that will highlight the historic transformation of the emirate.<br />
November 25: Plans for Sheikh Zayed National Museum unveiled.<br />
December: ‘Mathaf: Arab Museum of Modern Art’ opens in Doha. It serves as Qatar’s centerpiece for modern and<br />
contemporary art and is now holding over 9,000 works, making it the world’s largest specialized collection of its kind.<br />
2011<br />
December 21: King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia proposes that all six GCC member states transition<br />
from cooperation into a union, and Gulf Arab leaders adopt the Riyadh Declaration calling for a “single entity.”<br />
December: GCC adopts ID card as proof of identity for GCC citizens in both public and private sectors.<br />
2012<br />
Manama, Bahrain designated “Arab Capital of <strong>Culture</strong>” for the year 2012 by the Arab League and under UNESCO.<br />
May 24: Dubai government sets an agenda to preserve national identity.<br />
June 30: Bahrain’s Pearling Trail is inscribed as a UNESCO world heritage site, the second such site in the country.<br />
November 28: UAE releases national charter outlining a code of values and conduct for Emirati citizens in an effort<br />
to define Emirati character and culture.<br />
56 Gulf Affairs
V. Timeline<br />
2013<br />
Dubai Museum records over 1 million visitors for the first time.<br />
Qatar-UK 2013’s year of culture celebrated the long-standing relationship between Qatar and the UK. The bilateral<br />
cultural exchange program was an initiative of the Qatar Museums Authority, developed in partnership with the<br />
British Council, Qatar’s Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong>, Arts and Heritage, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.<br />
April 1: Saudi Arabia begins construction on the tallest structure in the world, the Jeddah Tower, which is planned<br />
to reach over one kilometer in height.<br />
July 8: Qatar’s al Zubarah archaeological site is inaugurated as the country’s first UNESCO world heritage site.<br />
2014<br />
Sharjah, UAE designated as a “Capital of Islamic <strong>Culture</strong>” for the year 2014 by the Islamic Conference of <strong>Culture</strong><br />
Ministers.<br />
Historic Jeddah is inscribed as a UNESCO world heritage site, commemorating the city’s multicultural role as a<br />
major Red Sea port and as the historic gate to Mecca for Hajj pilgrims.<br />
January 27: Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed sets up global tourism body to market ‘Brand Dubai,’ an initiative aiming<br />
to boost the emirate’s global image and bring in more visitors and tourists.<br />
December: Kuwait’s Abraj Al-Kuwait is nominated as a UNESCO world heritage site for the tower’s representation<br />
of Kuwait national identity.<br />
December: Qatar opens Al-Wakra Heritage Village, a replica of a traditional Qatari village designed to blend traditional<br />
aesthetic with modern society.<br />
December 1: UAE National Archives partners with Google for digital exhibition on the foundation of the country.<br />
2015<br />
February 10: Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid forms the Gender Balance Council to show Dubai’s keenness to increase<br />
the roles of young Emirati women in the nation’s progress.<br />
March 3: Saudi Arabia’s Art Council creates an exhibition to explore the history of the country’s contemporary arts<br />
scene.<br />
March 17: Dubai hosts the Arab Social Media Influencers Summit, emphasizing ideas that connect people in innovative<br />
ways.<br />
March 19: Bahrain pushes for a pan-GCC media strategy in line with the region’s traditions and principles<br />
September 14: GCC Undersecretaries of <strong>Culture</strong> underscore the importance of strengthening a Gulf identity through<br />
joint activities and events.<br />
<strong>Identity</strong> & <strong>Culture</strong> in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016<br />
57
V. Timeline<br />
2016<br />
Kuwait designated as a “Capital of Islamic <strong>Culture</strong>” for the year 2016 by the Islamic Conference of <strong>Culture</strong> Ministers.<br />
February 3: Saudi Arabia marks the Al-Janadriyah Festival’s 30 th anniversary as a key mechanism for preserving<br />
culture and a traditional Saudi national identity.<br />
February 8: The UAE transforms the Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong> into the Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong> and Knowledge Development<br />
and creates a mixed-gender Youth National Council to advise the government.<br />
April 7: Saudi Arabia announces a plan to introduce permanent residence for foreigners.<br />
April 20: The UAE’s Federal National Council forms a special committee to address the rising trend of mixed-marriages<br />
in the country, a phenomenon the Council says may impact national identity.<br />
April 26: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 identifies national identity and pride as a major theme, and calls to strengthen<br />
and preserve ancient cultural sites and traditional practices while working to integrate the nation into global cultural<br />
circuits.<br />
April 30: UAE Ministry of <strong>Culture</strong> and Knowledge announces workers’ day tribute in nod to the country’s large<br />
expatriate workforce.<br />
July 30: Oman opens its National Museum, an institution that aims to preserve the components of Omani cultural<br />
heritage by supporting research and scientific and historical studies, and heritage conservation plans.<br />
August 31: The 2,000-seat Dubai Opera opens.<br />
September 13: The UAE announces the World’s First Global Cultural Leadership Summit for April 2017.<br />
58 Gulf Affairs
Call for Articles<br />
Higher Education in the Gulf States: Present & Future<br />
Submission due date: Friday, December 16, 2016<br />
Word limit: 1,000 – 1,500 words<br />
Gulf Affairs invites scholars to submit original analytical articles for its upcoming issue entitled<br />
“Higher Education in the Gulf States: Present & Future.”<br />
Gulf Affairs is a journal founded by OxGAPS | Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum, a University of Oxford-based<br />
platform. The journal is exclusively dedicated to furthering knowledge and dialogue on the pressing issues<br />
and challenges facing the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi<br />
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Each issue is dedicated to a particular theme, allowing for a comprehensive<br />
coverage from various analytical perspectives and fields of study. Accepted articles are submitted to reviewers for<br />
comment prior to publication.<br />
To capture the complexity of the various issues and challenges around Gulf Energy Producers, articles are encouraged<br />
from a wide range of disciplinary lenses including: Economics, Politics/Political Economy, International Relations,<br />
Law, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Area Studies, Education and History. Balanced articles supported by sufficient<br />
and credible sources which offer a unique perspective on the theme will likely be accepted for<br />
1<br />
publication.<br />
Gulf Affairs welcomes analytical articles on (though not limited to) the following areas:<br />
• What is the state of higher education in the GCC region and how is it preparing citizens for the labor market?<br />
• How have scholarships played a role in the higher education system? What are the trends of study abroad<br />
experiences and their impacts?<br />
• How is the expansion of private universities and international branch campuses in the Gulf changing traditional<br />
public education across the region? What is the interplay of the increasing usage of English as a<br />
language of instruction in Arabic speaking societies?<br />
• What are unique attributes and characteristics of student life/activities across GCC campuses? How is<br />
co-education in universities viewed by these societies?<br />
• What is the status of Technical and Vocational Education & Training and how is this evolving? How do or<br />
should multi-national organizations contribute to hands on training? What is the availability of such opportunities<br />
and other internships?<br />
• What are the leading research/scientific outputs and in which areas are the Gulf states behind?<br />
• How should higher education institutions in the Gulf be ranked/measured and which metrics are applicable?<br />
• What are the factors impacting teacher recruitment and turnover and how does this influence the quality of<br />
education?<br />
Submission Guidelines: Please send articles to gulfaffairs@oxgaps.org by Friday, December 16, 2016. Authors<br />
whose articles have been accepted for review will be notified within two weeks after the submission<br />
deadline<br />
1 For citing and referencing, use Chicago Manual of Style endnotes.<br />
Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum | St Antony’s College, 62 Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 6JF, UK<br />
www.oxgaps.org
www.oxgaps.org