Identity & Culture

Autumn 2016 

A Publication based at St Antony’s College 

Identity & Culture 

in the 21 st Century Gulf 

Featuring 

H.E. Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali 

Minister of Culture and Sports 

State of Qatar 

H.E. Shaikha Mai Al-Khalifa 

President 

Bahrain Authority for Culture & Antiquities 

Ali Al-Youha 

Secretary General 

Kuwait National Council for Culture, 

Arts and Letters 

Nada Al Hassan 

Chief of Arab States Unit 

UNESCO 

Foreword by 

Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain

OxGAPS | Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum 

OxGAPS is a University of Oxford platform based at St Antony’s College promoting 

interdisciplinary research and dialogue on the pressing issues facing the region. 

Senior Member: Dr. Eugene Rogan 

Committee: 

Chairman & Managing Editor: Suliman Al-Atiqi 

Vice Chairman & Partnerships: Adel Hamaizia 

Editor: Jamie Etheridge 

Chief Copy Editor: Jack Hoover 

Arabic Content Lead: Lolwah Al-Khater 

Head of Outreach: Mohammed Al-Dubayan 

Communications Manager: Aisha Fakhroo 

Broadcasting & Archiving Officer: Oliver Ramsay Gray 

Research Assistant: Matthew Greene 

Copyright © 2016 OxGAPS Forum 

All rights reserved 

Autumn 2016 

Gulf Affairs is an independent, non-partisan journal organized by OxGAPS, with 

the aim of bridging the voices of scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers to further 

knowledge and dialogue on pressing issues, challenges and opportunities facing the six 

member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 

represent those of OxGAPS, St Antony’s College, or the University of Oxford. 

Contact Details: 

OxGAPS Forum 

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Web: www.oxgaps.org 

Design and Layout by B’s Graphic Communication. 

Email: abarboza@bsgraphic.com 

Cover: A visitor looks at photographs from Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid 

Al Maktoum’s, the Crown Prince of Dubai, personal collection at the Dubai Photo Exhibition 

on 19 March 2016. 

Photo Credits: Cover - Karim Sahib/AFP/Getty Images; 2 - Pool/Bandar Algaloud/ 

Anadolu Agency/Getty Images; 6 - Xinhua/Alamy Stock Photo; 10 - Rabih Moghrabi/ 

AFP/Getty Images; 13 - Nelson Garrido; 17 - Yasser Al-Zayyat/AFP/Getty Images; 22 - 

Marwan Naamani/AFP/Getty Images; 38 - REUTERS/Alamy Stock Photo; 42 - BACA; 

45 - NCCAL; 49 - UNESCO.

The Issue ‘Identity & Culture in the 

21 st Century Gulf’ was supported by:

Table of Contents 

Foreword 

Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain 

iv 

iv 

I. Overview 

Identity and Culture in the 21 st Century Gulf 

Magdalena Karolak, Theme Editor 

vi 

vi 

II. Analysis 

Khaleeji Identity in Contemporary Gulf Politics 

by Gaith Abdulla 

“Emiratization of Identity”: Conscription as a Cultural Tool of Nation-building 

by Eleonora Ardemagni 

Saruq Al-Hadid to Jebel Ali: Dubai’s Evolving Trading Culture 

by Robert Mogielnicki 

IconiCity: Seeking Identity by Building Iconic Architectures in Kuwait 

by Roberto Fabbri 

The Banality of Protest? Twitter Campaigns in Qatar 

by Andrew Leber and Charlotte Lysa 

Monolithic Representations and Orientalist Credence in the UAE 

by Rana AlMutawa 

1 

2 

6 

10 

13 

17 

22 

III. Commentary 

27 

Challenges of Cultural Identity in the GCC 

by Ahmad Al-Dubayan 

The Gulf States’ National Museums 

by Sultan Al Qassemi 

The Local Evolution of Saudi Arabia’s Contemporary Art Scene 

by Alia Al-Senussi 

Understanding the Evolution of the Khaleeji Identity 

by Lulwa Abdulla Al-Misned 

28 

30 

32 

34 

ii Gulf Affairs

Table of Contents 

IV. Interviews 




H.E. Shaikha Mai bint Mohammed Al-Khalifa 

President, Bahrain Authority for Culture & Antiquities 

Kingdom of Bahrain 

Ali Al-Youha 


Kuwait National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters 



UNESCO 

37 

38 

42 

45 

49 

V. Featured Photo Essay and Timeline 

54 

Featured Photo Essay: Walls of the GCC 

by Rana Jarbou 

Timeline 

54 

56 

Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 

iii

Foreword 

Foreword 

by Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain 

In the 1960s, the Gulf states experienced a cultural renaissance 

and the start of intellectual modernization. Khaleeji society 

has evolved over the ensuing 50 years due to four key 

reasons. First is the progressive vision of civil society. This includes 

cultural foundations, institutions, clubs, and non-profit 

organizations as well as poets, sheikhs, thinkers, artists, and 

writers from the region. They all believe in culture and its value 

in evolving society’s virtues, principles, and wisdom. The 

second is communication. Across the region, daily editorials, 

columns, analyses, interviews, TV programs, radio programs 

and more recently, social media have all focused on cultural 

activities, and the cultural dimension of these societies has become 

a facet of daily life. It orients common opinion and adds 

understanding and value to our view of life. 

A third factor that has promoted cultural production and exchange 

across the GCC region is the development of printing 

and translation and the explosion of information available to a 

large segment of the population. Finally, governments of the Gulf states all play an important, central role 

in promoting local cultural production. Through the allocation of funds and encouragement of local societies, 

competitions, awards, and other efforts, public institutions have supported a well-entrenched tradition 

of indigenously-produced arts and culture. Today, the Arabic culture is much more universal than before 

because it has been disseminated internationally through cultural and civilizational centers for dialogue 

established in the big historical cities. 

My own efforts should be understood within the framework of civil society and corporate social responsibility. 

In 1989, I established the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain Foundation, which now functions through 

six bodies: the Prize of Poetic Creativity, the Centre of Intercultural Dialogue, the Institute of Peace, the 

Centre of Communication, the Centre of Social Development, and the Directorate of Libraries. 

We organize and co-organize a number of cultural events with international institutions and finance others, 

forming a bridge between the Arab world and countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Recently, we were 

honored by re-endowing the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain Laudian Chair in Arabic at the University of Oxford, 

which is one of seven other chairs ensuring the same mission in different universities in Chad, China, 

Comoros Islands, France, Italy, Spain, and Togo. 

After 25 years, the foundation is known all over the world, and we have organized 15 conferences and sessions 

in Arabic poetry and intercultural dialogue. We work closely with governmental institutions, international 

bodies, and NGOs, as the goals of the foundation resonate deeply with their missions. For example, 

in 2006, during the Foundation’s 10 th session held in Paris, France, under the auspices of His Excellency 

iv Gulf Affairs

Foreword 

the former French President Jacques Chirac and in coordination with UNESCO, we organized a seminar 

which was described by the former Director-General of UNESCO Koichiro Matsuura as an “excellent opportunity 

to reflect on the notion of intercultural dialogue, as well as on the role of the poet in encouraging 

mutual understanding and respect among cultures.” We are, Matsuura added, “encouraging creativity, 

and enabling it to flourish in a spirit of diversity and freedom. This is one of the best ways of promoting 

cultural vitality and sustaining human development.” 

Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain is a prominent Kuwaiti businessman and founder of the Abdulaziz Saud Al-Babtain 

Foundation. He is also a renowned poet and his first book Bauh Al-Bawadi (Intimations of the Desert) was published 

in 1995. Al-Babtain holds 14 honorary doctorates, has received numerous awards, honors, and medals 

including the Kuwait Order of the Sash from the Amir of Kuwait, Order of Civil Merit from the King of Spain 

and National Order of the Cedar from the President of Lebanon. 


v

I. Overview 

Identity and Culture in the 21 st Century Gulf 

Overview 

by Magdalena Karolak, Theme Editor 

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries entered the 21 st century with greater maturity. Across the 

region, these states consolidated the many political, economic, and social projects that had been in progress 

since independence and state formation in the 20 th century. 

New challenges abound, however, as Gulf millennials enter a rapidly changing world facing regional conflicts 

and socioeconomic pressures. One of the core questions likely to shape the coming decades in the Gulf 

is the issue of identity. States must continue to forge strong national identities, while the creation of the 

GCC has paved the way for the growth of a pan-khaleeji identity. Formation of national identities in the 

Gulf has not been an easy project, as exemplified elsewhere in the Middle East. Religious, ethnic, tribal, 

and settlement cleavages that cut through the population are factors that make identification and loyalty 

with non-state structures more salient. The structures of power often determine these specific patterns of 

identification. Yet, it is also clear that identities, once crystallized, in turn impact the social structure. 

The creation of strong national identities requires anchoring the nation’s history in founding myths shared 

by all citizens. Indeed, a community exists thanks to a shared perception of the past, present, and future 

events that transcends individuals, linking their lives to those of their predecessors and their successors in 

a meaningful way. Attempts to revive and, most importantly, reconstruct history based on present needs, 

are widely observed in the Gulf. New museums, monuments, archaeological sites, and the revival of tradition 

all testify to this need. In the process, new meanings and national narratives are formed. 

However, in search of uniformity and consolidation, what is inscribed in the collective memory often omits 

minority identities that do not easily fit the mainstream. Such strong national identities have been actively 

sought as the GCC attempts to move away from the rentier model and new generations of citizens are 

asked to contribute to their countries in various ways. Gulf newspapers often celebrate the talents and 

achievements of young citizens in various disciplines, while Saudi Arabia recently called on its citizens to 

sacrifice for their country with salary cuts in public jobs. Other types of sacrifice may be even more palpable 

as GCC countries intervene militarily in conflicts at home and abroad. Sacrifice for the country is, in turn, 

cherished through public celebrations of citizens’ commitments and achievements, further strengthening 

national narratives. 

The needs of the present also dictate another trend that shapes the Gulf, that of construction. Lacking 

monuments that could rival others in the Middle East, the GCC countries have embarked on extravagant 

building programs that put Gulf cities on the map among the most impressive architectural undertakings. 

With the tallest building in the world in Dubai (soon to be overshadowed by Jeddah Tower), and many other 

daring constructions and developments on the way, the Gulf cities have been transformed from somewhat 

sleepy trading towns to world centers, places to see and to be seen. The glamour that is a by-product 

of modernity does not undermine the fact that the Gulf strives to continue the legacy of Middle Eastern 

achievements. Many iconic buildings in the GCC stand out juxtaposed with the Egyptian pyramids in the 

Priceless Arabia MasterCard advertisement for the MENA region, for example. So far, facilitated by oil re- 

vi Gulf Affairs

I. Overview 

sources, the Gulf further sets itself as a center of world banking, tourism, trade, shopping, and innovation, 

projecting its identity toward the future with a sense of pride. 

Indeed, in a Middle East torn by conflicts and upheavals, the Gulf seems to hold a special place characterized 

by stability and progress. This search for stability was the reason for the creation of the GCC in the 

first place and makes “othering” from neighboring states easier. Yet, the khaleeji identity tied to the GCC 

project is characterized by fluidity, with cooperation at times closer or further away. However, the need 

for security and preservation of the Gulf’s political systems may dictate closer ties in the future. It is not a 

coincidence that the proposal of a Gulf union followed the GCC intervention in Bahrain. With the rising 

rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over dominance in the Middle East, the GCC project, and hence 

khaleeji identity building, remains as valid as ever. 

Lastly, it is clear that individuals need to self-identify with specific communities, practices, and institutions 

with which they form attachments. The study “Psychological Effects of Globalisation on Young Women 

and Men” conducted by the Dubai School of Government concluded that bilingual students in the UAE 

and Saudi Arabia are bicultural, as they identify with both local and global cultures. The GCC has some 

of the highest per-capita rates of internet use in the world and offers a particularly interesting case study. 

While at this point the internet has not eradicated local cultures, appropriation of cultural elements from 

elsewhere will have important effects in the future. This may raise interest in institutionalizing the protection 

of local cultures, taking into account the large presence of expatriates. In addition, networking 

opportunities offered by the internet have already proved important in the creation of collective identities 

on national and regional levels. The shift towards responsible and active citizenship will no doubt create 

more grassroots activism facilitated by the use of internet. Collective activism may ultimately be based on 

identities of groups that feel left out of the mainstream, bringing us back to the question of strong national 

identities. 

This volume is a fine selection of analyses highlighting the many debates and multi-dimensional developments 

that are taking place. These extremely interesting intersections invite us to closely follow the subject 

of Gulf identities, no doubt leaving us with more questions than answers, which makes the reading even 

more rewarding. 

Dr. Magdalena Karolak is Assistant Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at Zayed University, UAE. She 

has published more than 30 journal articles and book chapters on various aspects of social, political and 

economic transformations in the GCC. 


vii

II. Analysis

II. Analysis 

Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman chairs the meeting of defense ministers of the GCC 

states in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 15 November 2016. 

Khaleeji Identity in Contemporary 

Gulf Politics 

by Gaith Abdulla 

haleeji identity has great potential to explain the contemporary politics and international relations of 

the Gulf. However, it is by no means a widely recognized concept; you’d be hard pressed to find even 

passing reference to the term in the literature on Gulf politics. 1 Khaleeji (meaning ‘of the Gulf’ in Arabic) 

denotes a socio-political regional identity that is shared by citizens of the six Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) states. Khaleeji identity is the next step in the evolution of political identity in the Gulf, which began 

with tribal identities and developed to include national identities with the advent of nation-states in the 

region in the mid-20 th Century. 

Khaleeji identity builds on strong cultural homogeneity within the Gulf states, the result of a long history 

of sustained social engagement and intermarriage. It also features prominently in popular culture, music, 

television, sports, civil society, and reaches all the way to the top decision-making levels of government. 

In the regional milieu, khaleeji identity has had a defining role in the creation and durability of the GCC, 

what is today the most stable and highly functional regional institution in the Middle East. 2 Although fear 

of an expansionist post-revolution Iran was one of the primary motivations behind the establishment of 

this regional architecture, 3 the underlying khaleeji identity common to the Gulf states was the social glue 

that allowed such regionalization to take place. What’s interesting about the GCC is that since its creation 

2 

Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

in 1981 it has become a key driver of khaleeji identity. The GCC is the most tangible manifestation of the 

regional identity and this international institution has “contributed decisively to the creation of a khaleeji 

persona in international relations.” 4 

Khaleeji – in theory 

Despite its significance and potential, khaleeji identity has remained an under-theorized term. This is primarily 

the result of the overriding influence of oil on the conceptualization of the politics of the Gulf. Many 

of the existing theories of the socio-political structures of the Gulf have developed with oil as a central unit 

of analysis. As these conceptions reflect the strategic, political, and economic security concerns of great 

powers (namely the US) in the region, it is only natural that oil has had such a defining role in shaping the 

theories and perceptions of Gulf politics. 5 

Because elite and ruling social classes in the Gulf are the most relevant to oil production and policy, they 

are the most notable classes to account for in the oil-centric theories. And these theories, which are mostly 

concerned with security and oil output from a great power perspective, content themselves by discussing 

the internal dynamics of Gulf states as a relationship of the elite/ruling classes with the rest of ‘society’ 

measured in terms of material resources. 6 The inflated influence of oil, great power strategic interests, and 

the elite/ruling classes on existing theories points to the importance of developing concepts such as khaleeji 

identity that open avenues to constructivist approaches to the politics of the Gulf as opposed to the hawkeyed 

realist conceptualizations. 

Identity and the interests of the state 

Realism plays a big role in the behavior of khaleeji states given the region’s strategic significance. But 

among other nebulous state-society relationships, institutional policy production is often mired in self-interests. 

Hence taking a step back and re-theorizing could possibly yield a better understanding of policy 

production and state behavior in the Gulf. On the other hand, with a sight set beyond material interests 

and security concerns, constructivism recognizes that states are social actors, seeing identity and other 

“ideational forces” as important motivators “on political interests and thus on national security policies.” 7 

From a constructivist perspective, khaleeji identity forms a vital component of Gulf politics and would 

be a cornerstone in any project of regional integration in the Gulf. Constructivism defines regionalism 

as a product of “regional awareness, a shared sense of belonging to a particular regional community. . . 

Therefore, sub-regional integration is dependent on the compatibility of major values relevant to political 

decision-making.” 8 

The potential of a shared regional identity, like khaleeji identity, for policy production and grass-roots regionalization 

is evident. However, bygone failed integration projects based on the perception of a shared 

identity (e.g. Arabism) call for caution. The issues that plague Arabism are for the most part the same problems 

faced in the Gulf, that the project of integration exists at the level of states, is informed by the ruling/ 

elite classes, and lacks functioning democratic avenues. These factors hinder the effective representation 

of the social dimension. 9 

However, the homogeneity of the socio-political climate in the Gulf states is something that did not feature 

in the Arab integration project. This is where khaleeji identity comes to play: it represents not only 

common popular culture, history, traditions and heritage, but also complements the existent prevailing 


3

II. Analysis 

Khaleeji identity forms a vital component of Gulf politics 

and would be a cornerstone in any project of regional 

integration in the Gulf. 

elite classes. 

socio-political identities, namely Arab, Islamic, 

tribal and national identities. This 

regional identity represents a shared political 

culture amongst citizens and not 

only common ideals limited to the ruling/ 

The Middle East today is probably in the worst shape in its modern history. Amidst this, the Gulf states 

contrast starkly with their surroundings. Although by no means unscathed by the turmoil, the six members 

of the GCC find themselves as the most stable and coherently functional states in the region. As the 

rest of the Arab world has ground to a halt, Gulf cities are argued to be the new centers of the region. They 

are now the “nerve center of the contemporary Arab world’s culture, commerce, design, architecture, art 

and academia.” 10 The Gulf states need to reflect on their particularities, strengths, and weaknesses as they 

find themselves occupying positions of power and influence in the Middle East that they are unaccustomed 

to. Khaleeji identity is an invaluable particularity to the Gulf states, both shaping and being shaped by actions 

and policies. It acts as a dynamic force strengthening intra-GCC relations at the elite and grass roots 

levels and informs more coherent and consistent regional interaction. 

The relationship between identity, the state, and society has become more complex and pronounced than 

ever in the history of the Gulf. The roles, actions, and attitudes of the Gulf states are changing, and with 

that the role of identity becomes ever more salient. It is necessary to appreciate the role that khaleeji identity 

plays in the social milieu as a fundamental driver of domestic attitudes and regional and international 

policy positions, as doing so will create more strategic, sustainable, and perhaps democratic policies. Indeed, 

khaleeji identity will remain highly dynamic as it defines the societies and states of the Arab Gulf in 

the 21 st Century. 

Gaith Abdulla is a doctoral candidate at Durham University focusing on khaleeji identity, youth and regionalisation 

in the Gulf. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

A notable exception is Adam Hanieh’s conceptualization of khaleeji capital in his book Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States 

(Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2011). In defining khaleeji capital he explains “The Arabic word khaleej is literally translated as “Gulf” but 

goes beyond a geographic meaning to convey a common pan-Gulf Arab identity that sets the people of the region apart from the rest of the 

Middle East.” (p.2). 

Abdullah Al Shayji, “Salman doctrine is the best option,” Gulf News, April 3, 2016. 

Kristian Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (London: Hurst, 2011). 

Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in a Changing 

Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p.153. In his book, Legrenzi argues that the GCC has been responsible for a Gulf popular identity 

becoming a substantive reality and “working its way into the political and economic landscape of the six Gulf monarchies.” (p.2) 

Current Gulf politics are clearly shaped by U.S. policy and oil security. For example, the U.S. ‘pivot to Asia’ is seen as one of the main 

driving forces behind Saudi Arabia’s newfound assertiveness and hard power projection in the region, the Saudi-led military campaign in 

Yemen being the prime example of this. And the perception is that current record low oil prices have motivated the governments of the 

Gulf states to seek to expedite processes of economic diversification and escape the dependency on oil. See Roberts, David, “Shake up for 

the sheikhs as the oil slump hits home,” Chatham House, June/July 2016. 

4 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

Commonly referred to as the ‘ruling bargain’, in which the elite/ruling classes use their oil money to subsidize their societies in return 

for political acquiescence. See Davidson, Christopher, “Diversification in Abu Dhabi and Dubai: The Impact on National Identity and 

the Ruling Bargain,” in Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States, Alsharekh, A.&R (Springborg London: Saqi 

Books, 2008), 143-153. 

Legrenzi, 46. 

Ibid, 46-47. 

Although Arabism and Arab integration was a populist ideal and had huge popular support in its heyday, the lack of functioning 

democratic apparatus meant this popular dimension was never able to manifest itself in policy production. The contagion effect of the 

Arab Spring is a great example of these deeply ingrained shared attitudes amongst Arabs. See Lynch, Marc. “The Big Think Behind 

the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy. November 28, 2011. 

Sultan Al-Qassemi, “Thriving Gulf Cities Emerge as New Centers of Arab World,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2013. 

Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf |Autumn 2016 5

II. Analysis 

A service man talks with a child during a military show to celebrate the 43 rd anniversary of the founding of the UAE in Abu Dhabi on 1 

December 2014. 

“Emiratization of Identity”: Conscription as a 

Cultural Tool of Nation-building 

by Eleonora Ardemagni 

n 2014, the United Arab Emirates introduced compulsory military service for nationals. However, 

this new requirement will not change the fundamental factors shaping the UAE’s security reality. 

First, Emiratis comprise a tiny percentage of the country’s total population, representing only 20 percent 

of the UAE’s total inhabitants. Secondly, persistent coup-proofing strategies remain fundamental to preserving 

regime stability. The Emiratis maintain a small army that is directly controlled by Abu Dhabi’s 

royal family and contains a mix of ‘asabiyya-based officers and foreign manpower. In addition to a strict 

military rationale, the government’s plan for conscription has a deep cultural intent: the “Emiratization 

of identity.” Emiratization is “a policy of national unity”, 1 and with the introduction of the military draft, 

the government aims to enhance the collective national Emirati identity, which remains fragmented by 

different tribal affiliations, emirate-specific identities, social classes, and the overwhelming numbers of 

expatriates in the country. In recently-unified states, conscription has often helped central institutions to 

build a national political discourse. 2 National identity, as a dynamic set of shared beliefs and historical 

legacies, is a theoretical concept, but at the same time it is an incessant social construction. 3 Looking at 

post-colonial state-building in Arab republics, compulsory military service was a driver of nationalism and 

enhanced regime security. In a time of multidimensional challenges, the UAE’s conscription and military 

engagement abroad may be seen as practical devices to forge a recognizable group identity and a modern 

6 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

and effective national discourse. 

From a federation towards a nation 

The UAE federation-building process has succeeded through top-down policies, even if 

state-centralization is still ongoing. In the 1970s, the UAE’s state-building process was primarily 

rent-driven, but armed forces became late federation-building drivers from the 1990s 

onwards. 4 In 1997, Dubai integrated its military system into a federal one. The modern integration 

into a single force allowed Abu Dhabi to include members from the northern emirates, 

which was important because at least 61 percent of Emirati nationals live in the north. 5 However, 

this did little to expand national identity, as the step was primarily used to expand Abu 

Dhabi’s neo-patrimonial leadership over the whole federation. Today, nation-building is still a 

“work in progress.” 

This work in progress is geared towards nurturing 

a national mythomoteur built on perceived 

myths, memories, and symbols. For example, the 

Bedouin mythology is a fundamental heritage, although 

it is sometimes stereotyped. 6 But it alone 

has not been successful in conveying a sense of belonging among contemporary young Emiratis. 

The politics of militarization has gradually differentiated the UAE from its neighbors. Emirati 

foreign policy is currently driven from a geopolitical and security viewpoint. As a matter of fact, 

the security sector has recently become a pillar of the UAE’s institution-building. The UAE’s 

military engagement in Yemen represents an unprecedented effort in terms of regional security, 

and economic diversification projects target the defense sector more and more, as confirmed 

by the development of Abu Dhabi’s military industrial complex. 

Conscription and geopolitics 

The Emirati government’s decision 

to introduce conscription as a tool 

of nation-building has to be framed 

in a specific geopolitical context. 

In the UAE, compulsory military service involves male citizens between the ages of 18 and 30. 

The service is optional for women, who can serve for nine months with the consent of their parents. 

Federal Law 6/2014 has extended national service from nine to 12 months for high school 

graduates, while it remains two years for nationals with lower levels of education. The 2015- 

2017 Emirati Strategy for the National Service establishes three batches each year of between 

5,000 and 7,000 total recruits. The first phase of national service is about study, exercises, and 

lectures on patriotism. 7 Recruits then join the Presidential Guard for practical training. 

The Emirati government’s decision to introduce conscription as a tool of nation-building has to 

be framed in a specific geopolitical context. Currently, the Middle East is marked by several 

intertwined variables of insecurity which have a direct impact on national identity. First of all, 

the Arab uprisings have introduced into the Emirati public debate ideas such as active citizen 

participation in the decision-making process and government accountability. 

Secondly, the phenomenon of jihadi transnational networks, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic 

State, challenges Arab states, suggesting the physical presence of the imagined umma. 

The objective of these non-state actors is to erode the political legitimacy of traditional states, 

labeling them “un-Islamic” and contesting established boundaries. Such challenges press state 


II. Analysis 

institutions to implement intricate counter-narratives. In the UAE’s case, military service symbolizes 

the rhetoric of a nation that citizens want to proudly defend. 

Thirdly, the political rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional hegemony, where 

sectarianism is a tool of power politics, exacerbates national spirits, prompting states to choose 

alliances and produce counter-alignments. With regard to the Yemeni conflict, the UAE aligned 

with Saudi Arabia from the beginning despite considerable economic interests with Iran, the 

presence of a remarkable Iranian diaspora within the federation, and Dubai’s traditional commercial 

and cultural relations with Tehran. The mission, which serves geopolitics and nation 

building, took precedence over other important interests. 

The Yemeni laboratory: militaries as identity-mobilizers 

The UAE’s military intervention in Yemen has bolstered a sense of national identity among 

Emirati citizens. The federation has been operating in Yemen since March 2015, participating 

first in airstrikes against Shia militias, then heading de facto ground operations in the southern 

regions, with a specific focus on counterterrorism (anti-AQAP operations) within Aden, 

Mukalla and the Abyan region. In the summer of 2015, Abu Dhabi’s Presidential Guard and 

some drafted soldiers were deployed to Yemen, and more than eighty Emirati soldiers have lost 

their lives in Yemen so far. On September 4, 2015, forty-five Emirati soldiers were killed by a 

Houthi attack near Mareb, an unprecedented number of single-day military casualties for the 

federation. 

Since the beginning, UAE official declarations and media coverage framed the unexpected event 

through a patriotic lens: the ‘collective mourning’ was immediately juxtaposed with references 

to the ‘epic of sacrifice’ and the ‘celebration of the Nation,’ evoking the “soldiers martyred 

in Yemen.” 8 To commemorate what happened in Mareb, a day of National Celebration was 

established on November 30. The day also emphasizes the novel nature of the UAE’s military 

commitment abroad, which transcends traditional internal security tasks and marks a “paradigm 

shift” for Gulf military forces. 9 The ‘heroic militaries’ have enhanced a ‘rally around the 

flag’ feeling. They might become identity-mobilizers, the government’s best example of Emirati 

identity. By analyzing the recent Federal National Council’s elections, we see that military 

prestige has started to play a mobilizing role in the electoral competition—of 341 candidates, 46 

came from a police or military career, 10 as well as five out of the 20 who were eventually elected. 

One of those elected, former Dubai chief of the police Matar bin Amira Al-Shamsi, campaigned 

with the slogan “military service and patriotism.” 11 Soldier Khalifa Al-Hamoodi from Fujairah, 

injured in Yemen, received extensive media coverage while he was at the electoral poll to cast 

his ballot. 12 The government hopes that Emiratis will develop communal bonds and an in-group 

awareness by looking at their soldiers, a mindset that would modernize and bolster the Emirati 

mythomoteur. Moreover, the “mediatization” of the militaries sheds light on their new social 

role, which also includes a counter-radicalization message against the phenomenon of foreign 

fighters. From this perspective, the shahid is the heroic soldier or pilot who sacrifices himself to 

protect the nation, not the suicide bomber who kills “the infidels.” 

Conclusion 

It is possible to identify a circular relationship between the UAE’s armed forces and the domes- 

8 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

tic realm. Militaries contribute to a sense of federal belonging and national consciousness. At 

the same time, the country’s institutions are attempting to maximize this bottom-up popular 

phenomenon, introducing top-down measures, such as military conscription, aimed to shape a 

shared collective identity and cope with rising internal security threats. Through military service, 

the federal government aims to promote nationalism above Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood, 

and jihadism. 

For the UAE, yesterday’s challenge was passing from ‘many tribes’ to a ‘unified federation.’ 

Nowadays, the aspiration is instead to construct ‘the Nation,’ where identity generates social 

cohesion and nurtures state legitimacy. 13 The geopolitical context is highly unstable, and the 

UAE has also been confronting the domestic effects of globalization—among them expatriate 

communities which claim for naturalization—raising fear of identity dilution and, to a lesser 

extent, cultural assimilation. Bedouin ancestry and khaleeji culture are essential pillars of the 

UAE’s national identity. Nevertheless, the national mythomoteur seeks new symbols, beliefs, 

and shared myths to face post-modernity, especially now that the Arab Gulf region is marked 

by growing and sometimes competing nationalisms. Therefore, in line with the government’s 

aspirations, conscription is not only a military institution, but rather a cultural tool of nation-building 

and the Emiratization of identity. 

Eleonora Ardemagni is a Gulf Analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation and a regular 

contributor for the Aspen Institute Italy and the Italian Institute for International Political Studies 

(ISPI, Milan). 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

Karen E. Young, The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates: Between the Majilis and the Market 

(Palgrave Macmillan: 2014), p. 33. 

See for instance the case of Italy. Vanda Wilcox, “Encountering Italy: Military Service and National Identity during the First World 

War”, Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol.3, No.2, 2011, 283-302. 

Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 

Eleonora Ardemagni, “United Arab Emirates’ Armed Forces in the Federation-Building Process: Seeking for Ambitious Engagement,” 

International Studies Journal 47, vol.12, no.3, Winter 2016, pp.43-62. 

Victor Gervais, “Du pétrole à l’armée: les stratégies de construction de l’état aux Émirats Arabes Unis,” Institut de Recherche Stratégique 

de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), Études de l’IRSEM 8, 2011. 

Ronald Hawker, “Imagining a Bedouin Past: Stereotypes and Cultural Representation in the Contemporary United Arab Emirates,” 

Beirut Institute for Media Arts conference paper, Lebanese American University, 2013. 

Samir Salama, “National service will reinforce patriotism, national identity, says FNC Speaker,” Gulf News, 16 June, 2014. 

“UAE salutes 45 soldiers martyred in Yemen,” Khaleej Times, 5 September, 2015; The National, “UAE news in review 2015: A year of 

sacrifice and honour for Armed Forces,” 30 December, 2015. 

On this topic, refer to David B. Roberts, “A New Era for Gulf Military Forces,” Gulf Affairs, Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies 

Forum, University of Oxford, Spring 2016, pp.6-8. 

Samir Salama, “Revealed: Names of 341 FNC poll candidates,” Gulf News, 31 August, 2015. 

“Profiles: Meet the preliminary 20 newly elected FNC members,” The National, 4 October, 2015. 

“FNC Election 2015: as it happened,” Gulf News, 3 October, 2015. 

Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East, ed. Mehran Kamrava 

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1-28. 


II. Analysis 

A cargo ship is docked at Jebel Ali port in Dubai, UAE on 14 March 2006. 

Saruq Al-Hadid to Jebel Ali: Dubai’s Evolving 

Trading Culture 

by Robert Mogielnicki 

ecent discoveries at the Saruq Al-Hadid archeological site located outside of Dubai in the United 

Arab Emirates (UAE) demonstrate the emirate’s connection to key trading routes dating as far back 

as 4,000 years ago. In light of the July 2016 inauguration of the Saruq Al-Hadid Archeology Museum by 

Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, it is clear that the government is making 

a conscious effort to reconstruct this early trading identity and promote it broadly to the public. Sheikh 

Mohammed’s comments at the museum’s opening reinforced the links between the archeological museum 

and Dubai’s trading culture: “Museums reflect the culture of the nation.” 1 

Saruq Al-Hadid 

While the museum links the region’s early trading culture to that of today, it is important to note the continual 

evolution of Dubai’s mercantile traditions, which can be broadly categorized into three distinct phases: i) 

Saruq Al-Hadid, ii) Dubai Creek and iii) the proliferation of free zones. The evolution in the location of trading 

hubs and nature of trade over these periods had clear implications for the infrastructure of modern Dubai 

and for the identity of its inhabitants. Indeed, Dubai’s free zones are the modern-day manifestations of the 

trading culture that started in Saruq Al-Hadid and further developed around Dubai Creek. 

10 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

The fortuitous position of Saruq Al-Hadid between strategic trading routes shaped Dubai’s early trading 

culture. The ancient Iron Age site of Saruq Al-Hadid is located in the Rub Al-Khali desert area of Dubai’s 

southern border. Nestled further inland than the coastal cities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the area flourished 

as a center for metalwork manufacturing. Evidence from the site suggests that its inhabitants used 

domesticated camels to facilitate trade to current day Egypt, Syria, Iran, Oman, Bahrain, India, Pakistan, 

and Afghanistan. Rashad Bukhash, director of the Heritage Department of Dubai Municipality, explained 

that the site “shows the age-old tradition of Dubai being a hub for trade even in those days.” 2 Appropriately, 

the Saruq Al-Hadid Archeological Museum is located along the historic Dubai Creek in the Shindagha 

district of Dubai. 

Dubai Creek 

Before the discovery of Saruq Al-Hadid, historians tended to trace the early history of Dubai to the 18 th century 

settlements around Dubai Creek. The arrival of the Al-Maktoum tribe to Dubai in the 1830s helped 

formalize much of the commercial activity around the creek and also encouraged the immigration of new 

waves of Indian and Persian merchants. This early influx of non-Arab merchants helped to shape the modern 

socio-economic demographics of Dubai. Today, Indians serve as the largest national demographic of 

residents in Dubai, with Indians and Pakistanis contributing 

25 and 12 percent respectively to the emirate’s population 

of approximately 2.5 million residents. 3 Similarly, 

Iranians continue to play key roles in social, business 

and advisory circles, and estimates suggest that Iranians 

may account for 16-20 percent of Dubai’s population. 4 

v 

Located in the northeastern corner of the emirate, the Dubai Creek area consists of the historic districts of 

Bur Dubai and Deira. The original spice and gold markets, poignant remnants of the area’s more promising 

past, are situated near the northern shore of the creek in Deira. 

Although it served as a bustling commercial hub for centuries, the creek’s shallow waters prevented the 

trading hub from receiving large maritime vessels. After various attempts to dredge the creek throughout 

the later part of the 20 th century, as well as the opening of Port Rashid in 1972, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed 

Al-Maktoum commenced plans to construct the Jebel Ali Port a further 50 kilometers along the coastline 

toward Abu Dhabi. 

Free Zones 

The evolution in the location of trading 

hubs and nature of trade over these 

periods had clear implications for the 

infrastructure of modern Dubai and 

for the identity of its inhabitants. 

The Jebel Ali Port heralded a new age in Dubai’s trading legacy—the Free Zone Era. The Jebel Ali Free 

Zone Authority (JAFZA), originally created in 1985 to facilitate the warehousing and storage of shipments 

entering the port, became the first free zone to operate in Dubai. Today, the free zone hosts over 7,000 

companies and houses approximately 60,000 residents. The success of Jebel Ali served as a model for other 

well-known free zones, including the Dubai Airport Free Zone Authority (DAFZA) and the Dubai Multi 

Commodities Centre (DMCC). And while earlier trading cultures in Dubai naturally developed around 

strategic locations, the rise of free zones represented a more direct, pragmatic development of Dubai’s trading 

culture on the part of the government. 


II. Analysis 

Table 1: Free Zone Distribution in the UAE 

Broadly speaking, a free zone is a duty-free area 

outside of customs control. The traditional free zone 

model consists of a physical location wherein firms 

are incentivized to increase domestic exports, generate 

foreign direct investment (FDI), employ locals, 

and transfer new technologies and skills to the national 

workforce. However, a critical component of 

free zones in Dubai involves the right for foreign investors 

to maintain 100% ownership of their companies, 

rather than sharing ownership with a local 

Emirati citizen. Currently, there are approximately 

24 functioning free zones operating in Dubai, and 

the number of Dubai-based free zones vastly outnumbers 

those in neighboring emirates (Figure 1). 5 

Yet not all free zones in the emirate conform to the standard free zone definition or emulate the Jebel Ali 

Free Zone model. TECOM Group, a developer and operator of business communities and member of Dubai 

Holding, manages eleven free zones that contain 5,100 companies and employ 76,000 people. The group 

refers to these free zones as ‘business communities,’ and they tend to be less involved with imports and exports. 

Instead, these business communities function as knowledge hubs that attract a diverse demographic 

of human capital and offer a varied set of commercial, tourist, and residential services. 6 For example, 

Dubai residents can live, work and shop in Dubai Media City. When compared to more traditional zones 

like Jebel Ali Free Zone and the Dubai Airport Free Zone, TECOM Group’s free zones are seamlessly integrated 

into the social fabric of Dubai. 

While the traders of Saruq Al-Hadid and Dubai Creek settled in strategic overland trading routes or along 

natural saltwater inlets, the trading culture of 21 st century Dubai was shaped predominantly by manmade 

projects. Technological innovations in cargo shipping, commercial aviation, and services further changed 

the nature of trade, and Dubai’s government responded by developing the most advanced free zone sector 

in the region. Free zones shifted the nexus of trade away from Dubai Creek and distributed commercial 

activity more broadly throughout the emirate. At the same time, these new commercial hubs attracted 

foreign professionals, tourists, and residents from across the globe. Free zones will continue to dominate 

Dubai’s trading culture for the foreseeable future, but it is important to remember that these zones are 

intrinsically linked to a much older trading legacy. 

Robert Mogielnicki is a DPhil candidate in Oriental Studies and member of Magdalen College where he 

examines the political economy of free zones in GCC countries. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

“Mohammed bin Rashid inaugurates Saruq Al Hadid museum at Al Shindagha,” Emirates News Agency, July 4, 2016. 

Sajila Saseendran, “Dubai’s trade links date back 4,000 years,” Gulf News, July 22, 2016. 

Statistics from Euromonitor; reported in Khamis, Jumana, “Indians, Pakistanis make up 37% of Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman population,” Gulf 

News, August 6, 2015. 

Jure Snoj, “UAE’s population – by nationality,” Business Qatar Magazine, April 12, 2015. 

Based on the author’s latest D.Phil research on free zones in the GCC. However, it is important to note that new zones are often emerging 

and announcements for new zones appear regularly. 

Well-known free zones operated by TECOM Group include Dubai Internet City, Dubai Media City, Knowledge Village and Dubai International 

Academic City. 

12 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

View of Sharq district with Al-Hamra tower in the center. Kuwait City, Kuwait, 2015. 

IconiCity: Seeking Identity by Building Iconic 

Architectures in Kuwait 

by Roberto Fabbri 1 

he Emirates Airlines website welcomes visitors by stating that Dubai’s iconic architecture is not only 

encouraged, but “actively pursued.” A subsequent list of evidence describing extreme heights, unconventional 

shapes, and cutting-edge materials supports the claim. 2 The Gulf states have turned to architecture 

as a way to build globally-recognized skylines. This wave of new, iconic buildings is often an attempt to 

build an urban uniqueness which, moreover, is part of the quest for a stronger national and social identity. 

A landmark is traditionally a symbol that raises a sense of belonging in the local population, but normally 

monuments are few in the urban fabric, and they are limited to specific spaces of public interest. But what 

happens when the city itself becomes composed of a significant number of icons, and the urban fabric is 

just the “in between”? Kuwait is an interesting case in the Gulf because it has a more consolidated pre-existing 

urban form, and these ‘new objects’ are not related at any level, neither in scale nor in language to 

the surrounding context. The current transformation process focuses on the development of isolated elements, 

self-standing on their own plot and auto-referential. Around them, the connective fabric is left with 

poor design and modest construction quality. 


II. Analysis 

Icon & media 

The architectural press normally welcomes these ‘photogenic’ buildings and presents the city not by its 

‘nature’ but by its ‘suit.’ One can argue that, apart from the different layers of reading or meaning that a 

building can generate, architecture is the expression of the society that produces it. In other words, architects 

and clients are transforming the building into a sort of ‘tridimensional logo’ implementing a series of 

design choices: an unusual, unique, and symbolic shape different from any other ‘competitor.’ There are 

certain requirements: The icon shall be a technical challenge that raises engineering to an extremely high 

standard, where complexity consolidates its identity. Size is another crucial aspect, and specifically the 

vertical dimension. Iconic architecture has to be big to stand out in the city fabric. Furthermore, the name 

and the fame of the designer are also major factors in establishing an iconic building. 

This design approach often brings these buildings very close to an industrial-design object, self-centered 

and self-referent. Consequentially iconic architecture has, in most cases, a conflicting dialogue with its 

context, because it is meant to communicate to a worldwide audience, while the local ‘assimilation’ is more 

problematic. 

Iconizing Kuwait 

Iconic buildings are a worldwide phenomenon, and the examples in the Gulf are not too different from 

what is happening in the rest of the world. One could argue that prestige projects are more prevalent in the 

region due to the lack of pre-existing local monuments which can catalyze the sense of belonging. However, 

this would not entirely reflect reality, since at the very initial inception of the urban and social modernization 

in the Gulf in the mid-20 th century, the construction of representative buildings was at the center 

of every governmental plan. 3 Today, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Dubai have all become archetypes for cities in 

transformation in the region, while Kuwait, on the other hand, is somehow different from its neighbors. 

Kuwait has a more complex urban fabric and a longer urban history, one punctuated by a large number 

of highly experimental projects since the early 1950s. 4 The city is also in transformation, but the vision is 

less evident, cohesive, and advertised than in the other Gulf states. In the last decade many projects were 

announced to modernize the city and keep pace with the region, including a new airport, two new towers 

for the Central Bank and the National Bank of Kuwait, and a new hospital center, among others. 

The city center is now also in transformation, and despite the fact that this part of the city would need 

more consolidation than ‘intrusions,’ the construction of skyscrapers is now mostly focused here, where 

large plots are abandoned or under-used. These are mostly initiatives by private actors investing in separate 

plots without a coordinated vision. The ‘in between’ is a non-space left with no integrated functions or 

quality: a very loose and undefined canvas amid vertical objects unrelated to each other or the city itself. 

In contrast, Yasser Mahgoub’s reading of the build environment of Kuwait concludes that multiple identities 

should be accepted as a natural result of the actions of different groups in the society, and architecture 

is the representation of this local contemporary condition and desire. 5 In principle, this argument is convincing, 

but the quid pro quo is the acceptance of a heterogeneous approach to shapes, forms, and languages. 

This tradeoff was well described in the early 1960s by Saba George Shiber in his critique of Kuwait City’s 

transformation: “Architecture became an exercise in acrobatics and not an endeavor in creation, economics 

and organicism. . . . It has become rare to find lines anchored to the earth. Instead, they all seem pivoted 

14 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

to point restively to outer space.” 6 Paraphrasing 

Shiber, proportions, shapes, materials, colors, and 

placements are so different that it is very difficult 

to perceive urban unity. 

In 2011 Kuwait City received its own internationally 

recognizable iconic building: Al-Hamra tower. 

It has everything necessary to be considered an icon: a prominent designer, oversized structure, technical 

challenges, and a unique shape. It is not difficult to imagine the role that this 400-meter high business hub 

plays in the skyline of the city. Its sculptural shape and flaring walls demanded extreme engineering work 

and placed Al-Hamra among the world’s most complex tall buildings. 

The official company brochure highlights a long list of technical data and new records achieved: the tallest 

carved skyscraper in concrete, the largest office building in the country, and the largest stone façade. 7 

Among other technical marvels, one specific design solution is worth mentioning. The tower is, in a way, 

site-specific. Its design is still not related to the urban scale nor to the city context, but it is partially the result 

of solar condition studies. The tower is oriented so that the inclined flaring wall protects and shades the 

southern elevation, where the desert sun can be more powerful. Nevertheless, when the building touches 

the ground there is no sign of urban mitigation or integration with the fabric. It sits on its own plot just like 

any other object in the surrounding area, demonstrating once again the lack of urban design of this part of 

the city. 

Gary Haney, from the design firm SOM, 8 defines Al-Hamra as “a statement (that) will be the landmark of 

Kuwait for the next generation.” 9 In general, the local population seems to have embraced Al-Hamra as a 

new landmark. On the contrary, tenants did not find it completely attractive: the high-end shopping mall 

on the lower levels provides a vast array of restaurants and boutiques, but a large number of office floors 

are still empty. So what kind of statement does Haney refer to? Which ideals or which shared feelings 

will the future generations of Kuwait see in this tower? An answer comes from the brochure issued by the 

building management company: “Hamra is a business monument!” 10 So the icon is a monument, and in a 

contemporary commercial-oriented society the monument is essentially a ‘business memorial.’ 

Connecting the past to the present 

Iconic architecture has, in most cases, a conflicting 

dialogue with its context, because it 

is meant to communicate to a worldwide audience, 

while the local ‘assimilation’ is more 

problematic. 

In the same brochure a picture showcases Al-Hamra facing the sea with the Kuwait Towers, the country’s 

1970s national monument, in the background. The intention probably was to present a sense of continuity 

with the past despite the fact that to make space for the new tower, one of the oldest cinemas in town, a 

vivid expression of 1960s modern heritage, was demolished. All this leads to a few considerations on how 

much the two towers reflect the changing needs of Kuwaiti society in their current time. Just like Al-Hamra, 

the Kuwait Towers are definitely an icon representing the country’s goals of modernization, but the 

latter also form a narrative space recounting the motivations behind a project of public interest. The towers 

are a water reservoir with all the meanings that water has in a desert land like Kuwait. With their shape, 

materials, position, and scale, the Kuwait Towers are evocative objects that bring back memories of the 

past, reminding the country of its roots. 

On the other end, Al-Hamra does not show any sense of continuity with the past. It is presented to the 

public as a display of current financial power, but it could be better interpreted as an expression of a higher 


II. Analysis 

level of confidence in the country. The lack of trust and the uncertain international situation in the aftermath 

of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait virtually froze, with a few exceptions, major investments for 

more than a decade. 

This traumatic event and its long tail arrested the drive toward modernization that had been consistently 

pursued for over 40 years through the erection of highly symbolic architecture. Unlike other Gulf countries, 

recent iconic architecture in Kuwait seems to express a general feeling of recovered confidence, perfectly 

reflected in bald technical features, more than the quest for a national identity or the homogenized vision 

of a contemporary city. 

Dr. Roberto Fabbri is an architect and professor at University of Monterrey; he worked five years in Kuwait 

and is the co-author of Modern Architecture Kuwait 1949-89 (2016). 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

Acknowledgement: This research and paper was developed during a fellowship research program at the Center for Gulf Studies – American 

University of Kuwait. 

“Iconic Dubai Architecture | Sightseeing in Dubai | Discover Dubai | Emirates,” www.emirates.com, accessed 01 September, 2016. 

Compare for example Todd Reisz’s analysis of the World Trade Center in Dubai, in Structures of Memory, catalogue of the exhibition of 

the National Pavilion United Arab Emirates, La Biennale di Venezia, 2014, pp. 81-82. 

Regarding Kuwait’s architectural production in the recent past, see Roberto Fabbri, Sara Saragoça Soares, and Ricardo Camacho, Modern 

Architecture Kuwait 1949-89 (NiggliVerlag: Zurich, 2016). 

Yasser Mahgoub, “Hyper Identity: the Case of Kuwaiti Architecture,”Archnet-IJAR, International Journal of Islamic Architecture, 1:1 

(March 2007): 84. 

Saba George Shiber, “Architecture and Urban Aesthetics in Kuwait: Significance or Superficiality,” The Kuwait Urbanization: Documentation, 

Analysis, Critique (Governmental Press: Kuwait, 1964), 306. 

Al Hamra Business Tower Facts and Figures, www.alhamra.com.kw, accessed 2 October, 2016. 

Skidmore, Owings & Merrill was the lead consultant, together with Al Jazeera as local partner, Al-Ahmadiah as contractor, and Turner 

as project manager. 

“Record breaker,” Gulf Construction Online, accessed 22 Sept. 2016 

Al-Hamra Tower, Company Brochure, undated, p.20 

16 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

Kuwaiti men rally in front of the parliament building to demand the dissolution of the 2009 parliament in Kuwait City, Kuwait on 1 

October 2012. 

G 

The Banality of Protest? Twitter Campaigns in Qatar 

by Andrew Leber and Charlotte Lysa 

iven restrictions on public protest and political organizing across much of the Arab Gulf, a New York 

Times reporter noted in 2011 that social media seemed “tailor-made for Saudi Arabia” and its fellow 

monarchies. 1 In the midst of the Arab Spring, online pages for the now-defunct Eastern Province Revolution 

helped coordinate protests in the Kingdom, even as @angryarabiya—now in exile in Denmark after 

repeated arrests—documented the violent suppression of demonstrations in Bahrain on Twitter. 

In the years since, though, protests have disappeared as Gulf governments have variously deterred activists 

with harsh crackdowns and forestalled grievances with generous handouts. Subsequent portrayals of 

Gulf social media have shifted to emphasize the online expression of collective identities over the potential 

for collective action, however much the two may be linked. Alexandra Siegel has highlighted the Gulf as 

a key nexus of polarizing sectarian rhetoric on Twitter, driven by the regional rivalry between the mostly 

Sunni Gulf monarchies and Shia Iran. 2 At the opposite extreme, social media platforms are presented as 

windows into the region’s conspicuous consumption, exemplified by young and restless Kuwaiti men posing 

with exotic animals in the VICE documentary “The Illegal Big Cats of Instagram.” 3 

Beyond broad sectarian clashes and individual excess, the enduring image of GCC nationals as “rentier 


II. Analysis 

citizens” prevails, supposing quiescent subjects content to receive handouts fuelled by state-controlled oil 

and gas revenue. The dearth of formal institutions of accountability—aside from a dysfunctional parliament 

in Kuwait and a few minor elected bodies—militates against most individuals effecting meaningful 

political or policy change through official channels. 

Yet discontent, though muted, is far from absent online. Citizens lodge many claims and complaints with 

‘the government’ on Twitter, Facebook, and even Snapchat. Much as these online campaigns can seem 

banal, only reinforcing a transactional relationship between ruler and subject, they lead Gulf citizens to 

articulate a sense of political and social identity from below, in contrast with top-down visions engineered 

by the region’s ruling elites. 

On the campaign trail 

This dynamic has played out even in Qatar, which is domestically quiet and has less of the overt online surveillance 

increasingly visible in the neighboring United Arab Emirates. 4 Unlike elsewhere in the MENA 

region, where various formal parliaments (however unrepresentative) have been operational for decades, 

Qatar has no tradition of formal political representation beyond a heavily circumscribed Municipal Council. 

One article by Justin Gengler, among the few insightful articles on Qatar’s body politic, outlines the many 

factors that militate against political activism, from a small native population to the country’s extreme 

per-capita resource wealth. 5 To be sure, collective protests against foreign oil companies helped foster a 

sense of a “Qatari” national identity in the 1950s and 1960s, linking merchants, slaves, and free Qataris on 

the peninsula. 6 For more than 30 years, though, most citizens’ public complaints about government agencies 

and regulations have been channeled through a state-run call-in radio show entitled “Good Morning, 

My Beloved Country.” 7 

The challenge for researchers interested in 

Gulf political identities is to document and analyze 

discussions of rights and responsibilities 

across a wide range of online communities. 

When semi-official complaints go nowhere, 

though, Qataris on Twitter and other social 

media often act in tandem with influential columnists 

and cartoonists to push back against 

corporations and state agencies they portray as 

unresponsive, incompetent, and even corrupt. 

As Hootan Shambayati noted in the case of Iran, the largesse of oil-rich states can often channel citizens’ 

discontent along moral and ideological vectors rather than quelling it outright. 8 Accordingly, many Twitter 

campaigns in Qatar are instances of “moral panic,” denouncing cultural displays deemed to cater to an elite 

image of Qatar as a cosmopolitan “world city” at the expense of its conservative native population. 

In early 2016, a widespread Twitter protest targeted the British-American film “The Danish Girl,” which is 

about a transgender woman in the 1920s, on the hashtag #No_To_Showing_The_Danish_Girl. The Ministry 

of Culture soon tweeted back that they had decided to ban the movie. 9 Similar controversy has attended 

other performances, such as Australian singer Kylie Minogue, with events coordinators going so far as 

to announce performers at the last possible minute to forestall the potential for protest. 10 

While rarely straying into overt political demands, citizens also regularly criticize the performance of government 

agencies and state-owned enterprises. Qatar Airways was subject to an online campaign driven 

by customers demanding better service and more employment opportunities for Qataris. 11 Schools, hospi- 

18 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

tals, and roads frequently attract criticism, with proposed fee hikes in government schools almost provoking 

a boycott in 2013. 12 

Instead of quietly accepting their government’s stewardship, citizens ratchet their development expectations 

ever-higher in the knowledge that their country possesses vast financial resources. The more these 

online discussions link government missteps to a perceived lack of accountability and transparency, the 

more they reinforce the idea of a Qatari body politic denied real input on key matters of social and economic 

development. 

Death and denial 

Two recent online protests exemplify these processes and reflect an online political presence that is far 

more populist and conservative than the liberal, cosmopolitan image often presented by Qatar’s rulers. 

This past May, one Twitter campaign stemmed from the death of Qatari Shorooq Al-Sulaiti in a government-run 

women’s hospital following complications from childbirth. When her husband’s official inquiries 

into the circumstances of her death went nowhere, he reached out to prominent columnist Faisal Al-Marzuqi. 

13 Al-Marzuqi in turn targeted the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) Twitter account with criticisms, 

popularizing hashtags such as #We_Are_All_ Shorooq_Al_Sulaiti. Ultimately, the online campaign attracted 

coverage from Arabic newspapers Al-Raya and Al-Arab as well as the English-language website 

Doha News, in addition to a number of pointed satirical cartoons. 14 The Ministry finally issued a public update 

on the investigation on July 14 th , which was followed by a brief lull in online activity (Figure 1). Sulaiti’s 

husband as well as Al-Marzuqi and other Qataris have continued their online criticisms, though, with 

the public prosecutor’s office finally opening an investigation into the ongoing case this past September. 15 

Figure 1: Twitter activity mentioning Shorooq Al-Sulaiti, 

July 2016. 

Figure 2: Hashtags targeting Doha News, 

August 2016. 

# of Tweets 

0 100 200 300 400 500 

All Tweets 

Targetting MOPH 

Al-Raya 

Article 

MOPH 

Response 

Jul 01 Jul 04 Jul 07 Jul 10 Jul 13 Jul 16 Jul 19 Jul 22 Jul 25 Jul 28 

July 1-28, 2016 

# of Tweets 

0 100 200 300 400 500 

Doha News op-ed 

published 

Response op-eds 

published 

Aug 01 Aug 03 Aug 05 Aug 07 Aug 09 Aug 11 Aug 13 

August 1-14, 2016 

A more recent incident of “moral panic” occurred after Doha News published an opinion piece about the 

difficulties of being Qatari and gay. 16 This provoked a furious online response by many Qatari Twitter-users 

outraged by the perceived assault on public morality and Qatar’s Islamic character. First, one minor 

commentator for Al-Sharq touched off #We_Demand_The_Investigation_Of_Doha_News, with some users 

tagging the Ministry of Interior (@MOI_Qatar) trying to provoke a more forceful response from the 

state. 17 Columnist Maryam Al-Khater stoked further calls for government action through an article in 


II. Analysis 

Al-Sharq and on Twitter with the hashtag #Stop_Promotion_Of_Vice_In_Qatar. In both, she implored 

the government to take firm action to shut down the website. 18 Despite an intense spate of initial activity, 

though, the hashtags failed to gain much momentum or high-level support on Twitter, dropping from use 

just a few days later (Figure 2). 

Conclusion 

Various aspects of a nebulous “rentier state theory” have dominated academic discussion of the Gulf for 

decades, expressing the sense that the vast oil wealth of these monarchies has allowed them to “buy off” 

discontent time and again. Yet even in Qatar, which is wealthiest per-capita in the GCC and has practically 

no organized political opposition, nationals have come to use online forums such as Twitter to express 

and reinforce a sense of Qatari identity. The challenge for researchers interested in Gulf political identities 

is to document and analyze discussions of rights and responsibilities across a wide range of online communities, 

as GCC citizens migrate to newer platforms such as Instagram and Snapchat. 

At their core, these discussions contribute to a sense of citizenship that demands accountability in state 

spending and government services as well as the right to define what it truly means to be Qatari, often 

against elite projects of national identity formation. 19 The more this identity is reinforced, the easier it 

becomes for citizens to challenge or otherwise prod their government. Witness, for example, the mounting 

success of various campaigns to bar regional figures from visiting the country, or growing exasperation in 

some quarters with the power of the online “mob.” 20 Likewise, more government spending seems unlikely 

to quell further instances of moral panic in Qatar, given that fully eliminating the country’s cosmopolitan 

veneer would exact a high price on the global image the country’s leaders have crafted. 

Ultimately, as an emerging discourse of citizens’ rights encourages economic and moral claims against 

the state, GCC governments such as Qatar, with diminished cash reserves at their disposal, may find it 

difficult to renegotiate implicit social contracts without employing greater repression or affording greater 

representation. 

Andrew Leber is a PhD student at Harvard University, Department of Government. Charlotte Lysa is a PhD 

candidate at the University of Oslo, Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Neil MacFarquhar, “Social Media Help Keep the Door Open to Sustained Dissent Inside Saudi Arabia,” The New York Times, 15 June, 

2011. 

Alexandra Siegel, “Sectarian Twitter Wars: Sunni-Shia Conflict and Cooperation in the Digital Age,” Carnegie Endowment, 20 December 

2015, pgs. 9-12; For more on sectarian polarization in the Gulf, see also Matthieson, Toby, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, 

and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 

“The Illegal Big Cats of Instagram,” VICE Media, March 25, 2015. 

See, for example, the United Arab Emirates’ increasingly stringent guidelines on which social media posts can run afoul of federal laws. 

Sinclair, Kyle, “Be aware of UAE privacy laws when posting Facebook content, TRA warns,” The National, 20 May, 2014. 

Justin Gengler, “Collective Frustration, But No Collective Action, in Qatar,” Middle East Reporting Project, 7 December, 2013. 

Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Merchants and Rulers in Kuwait and Qatar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 

141-145. 

Hassan Ayat Bihi, “Complete Change for ‘Good Morning, My Beloved Country,” Al-Arab, 27 December 2015, http://www.alarab.qa/ 

story/743338/ 

Hootan Shambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran,” 

20 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

Comparative Politics 26, no. 3 (April 1994), pp 308, 324-325. 

Peter Kovessy, “Cinemas stop showing ‘The Danish Girl’ after ban in Qatar,” Doha News, 11 January 2016. 

Performances of Gwen Stefani and Pharrell Williams at the 2015 Men’s Handball World Championship were confirmed just days ahead 

of time for this reason. Author interview, PR consultant, Doha, 20 January 2015. 

Despite preferential hiring for Qataris throughout the public sector and strict quotas for the private sector, there is a widespread perception 

among Qataris that expatriate labor is implicitly favored. 

Shabina Khatiri, “Irate over tuition increases, some locals call for school boycott,” Doha News, 19 September, 2013. 

Media figures such as Marzuqi, Hassan al-Sai and Abdullah al-Athbah thus serve as powerful gatekeepers within Qatari society, advancing 

stories that conform to their own views on government and society. 

“Complete Details of Death of Shorouq al-Sulaiti during Childbirth,” Al-Raya, 12 July, 2016. ; Mohammad Abd al-Lateef. Twitter post. 30 June, 

2016. 4:00p.m. EST. https://twitter.com/mo7md_alateef/status/748607145063616513/photo/1; Saad al-Muhannadi, Twitter post, 13 

July 2016, 12:28 AM EST. https://twitter.com/S3d_78/status/753082153487982592/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw 

“Prosecutor forms committee to investigate death of Shorouq al-Sulaiti,” Al-Raya, 19 September 2016. 

Majid al-Qatari (pseudonym), “What it’s like to be gay and Qatari,” Doha News, 5 August 2016. 

Hassan Hamoud, Twitter Post, 5 August 2016, 4:30pm EST. 

Maryam al-Khater, “What is Manliness in Qatar?” Al-Sharq, 8 August, 2016. 

For more on such elite projects, see “Gulf Societies in Transition: National Identity and National Projects in the Arab Gulf States.” 

Workshop Report #3 (2016). The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. 

“Complete List of People Banned from Entering Qatar by Order of the People… Latest is Al-Afasi,” Rassd, 13 June 2015. ; AlAnood Al Thani, “Twitter mobs and what it means to be Qatari,” Doha News, 20 August, 2016. 


II. Analysis 

Emirati men perform a traditional dance late on 28 October 2014 during a festival in the city of Al-Ain celebrating traditional culture. 

Monolithic Representations and 

Orientalist Credence in the UAE 

by Rana AlMutawa 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) doesn’t have a rich culture, what’s there other than yola dances, 

falconry and lugaimat?” Ironically, this remark was not made by a Westerner with Orientalist assumptions, 

but by an Emirati. While many Emiratis would instantly disagree with that statement, they 

are still likely to think of their heritage within the confines of the images described above. The scenes of 

women frying lugaimat and men dancing the yola are constantly repeated in heritage festivals. They are 

charming to witness once or twice, but grow stale with each repetition. While the local cultures of the UAE 

(and wider Gulf) are diverse and varied, the official national narratives often promote a monolithic history 

with a narrow, standardized set of ideas and images of culture, such as the ones described above. 

It is likely that cultural homogeneity is promoted because local diversity is seen as an obstacle to loyalty to 

the state. Emirati scholar Ali Khalifa stated that “political loyalty to one’s tribe has not as yet given way 

to loyalty to the state as an abstract political concept.” 1 While tribal affiliations pose some challenges for 

GCC states, ethnic and cultural diversity may be seen as even more problematic. At the very least, tribes 

portray images of Bedouins and “pure” Arabs, in line with the image Gulf states often promote. Ethnic and 

cultural diversity among local citizens, however, indicates that a part of the nation’s history is non-Arab 

and disputes the storyline of a shared culture and heritage. In attempts to create national cohesion, the 

22 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

local cultures in the UAE, and much of the Gulf, are portrayed as homogenous, pure, Bedouin, Arab cultures. 

These monolithic depictions consequently end up sidelining integral parts of khaleeji history and 

culture—such as the Ajami, Baluch, and East African cultures. 2 It is therefore unfortunate, but not surprising, 

when Emirati citizens believe that their culture is best represented by ahistorical and stereotypical 

depictions of the lugaimat and the yola—ones which are not too different from Orientalist depictions of the 

region. 

Cultural homogeneity and Orientalist depictions 

James Onley states that the populations of the Gulf have been historically intermingled with those of the 

Indian Ocean to the extent that it is difficult to ascertain whether some khaleejis are Arabized Persians or 

Persianized Arabs. 3 These influences are still prevalent today: the Indian Ocean’s influence can be found 

in khaleeji food, dialects, and even song and dance. East Africans who were enslaved in the Gulf brought 

their music with them, and this music has come to represent traditional, local music in the Gulf. 4 However, 

acknowledgment of this diversity is uncommon. The African influence on khaleeji culture is rarely mentioned, 

and African-influenced music is depicted as Arab. 5 Similarly, Clive Holes states that the diversity 

of the dialects is eroding as Gulf citizens move towards a single standardized khaleeji dialect. 6 This standardization 

often projects a homogeneous and “pure Arab,” Bedouin image which is similar to some of the 

simplified and Orientalist depictions of the Gulf region. 

Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that Ajamis, Baluchs and East Africans (among other groups) have 

inhabited the Gulf for a long time, and when these cultures are excluded from the national narrative, a 

large part of the nation’s history and heritage is similarly excluded. While GCC states may differ in terms 

of their portrayals of identity and their citizens’ perceptions of it, most of these states homogenize local 

histories and cultures within their respective national narratives. Neil Partrick argues that the Gulf states 

have long ignored differences within local society and favored representation of culture and history that 

fits the national narrative, one which promotes a Bedouin, tribal identity. 7 Similarly, Anh Nga Longva 

states that Kuwaitis define their identity by differentiating themselves from the foreigners within their 

countries—at times, these “foreigners” are other citizens who are not considered ‘purely’ native. 8 Ernest 

Gellner states that nationalism, which fuels these perceptions, is spread through a “high culture,” such as 

that of schoolbooks and newspapers, while Ziad Fahmy finds that nationalism spread in Egypt through 

what he terms a “medium” culture of audio and television that used local dialects. 9 High and medium 

cultures, schoolbooks, heritage festivals, and radio are all tools that promote the official national narrative 

and shape the perceived boundaries of national culture and identity. 

The case of the UAE 

When taking the UAE as a GCC-representative case study, one can find many examples of the way social 

reproductions champion the tribal, Arab narrative. One of the examples comes from the advertisements 

for the Mleiha archeological sites. Mleiha, a village in Sharjah, has sites dating back some 130,000 years 

ago. 10 Instead of capturing the essence of the ancient site, the dedicated website, Discover Mleiha, strangely 

describes ancient Mleiha as depicting “traditional Emirati life” and “ancient Bedouin culture.” Clearly, the 

legacy of the Stone Age hunters represented at this site is neither “traditional Emirati” nor representative 

of “Bedouin culture.” 11 Whatever the reason may be for the use of this type of language, it is certainly 

not the only example. Al Bastakiya, a traditional neighborhood in Dubai previously inhabited by Ajami 

Emiratis originally from Bastak, Iran, has become a prominent tourist attraction. However, its name was 

changed to Al Fahidi, with the argument that Al Fahidi was the area’s original name. 12 The renaming 


While Gulf states promote a narrative of 

homogeneity to create an “imagined community” 

that bonds citizens to one another, 

they are simultaneously promoting a 

narrow and rigid sense of identity. 

of the neighborhood is a further step on the road to 

homogenous Arabization. 

Similarly, festivals, museums, and ‘traditional’ TV 

shows which aim to reinvent the past center on the 

Bedouin cultures almost entirely. The Millionaire 

Poet, a TV show for Nabati poets, promotes Bedouin 

poetry, and Qasr Al-Hosn Festival, a major traditional 

festival in Abu Dhabi, features activities associated with Arab, Bedouin life, such as falconry and 

yola dances. 13 This is not to say that non-Bedouin backgrounds have been wholly excluded—an Emirati 

director’s movie on a prominent Emirati Sufi received an award in the UAE, and a popular Ramadan cartoon 

shown on local channels depicts Ajami Emiratis as central characters. 14 However, these examples are 

much fewer, and sometimes not as public, as efforts of heritage revival that center on the pure, Arab, Bedouin 

image. Thus, simplified images that depict a “pure Arab” way of life are often used to embody Emirati 

identity, while ones that do not fit that criteria—such as the Mleiha sites, or even well-known activities 

like pearl-diving—are often removed from the context they existed in. What is therefore left to represent 

Emirati identity are simplified and romanticized Orientalist depictions of a desert life. 

Possible consequences of monolithic representations of identity 

Historical accuracy is usually not as influential in informing a national consciousness as national narratives 

are. While Emiratis are aware that there are many natives of Ajami, Baluch, or East African 

backgrounds, they do not necessarily view these diverse cultures as representative of Emirati culture and 

heritage. In fact, some might consider a strong association with them as a form of un-belonging. For example, 

Partrick cites an Omani analyst who states that Omani minorities, such as the Baluchs, have an 

incomplete sense of belonging to Oman. The consequence of such exclusivist narratives manifests in the 

examples of khaleejis who downplay their own heritage to fit in with the national narrative. Indeed, Onley 

found that Emiratis of Ajami background sought to downplay their ethnic roots. 15 Similarly, Sultan Al-Qassemi 

recounts an unnamed Ajami Emirati who changed his last name to an Arab-sounding name, stating 

that he witnessed the same phenomenon happening among many other Ajamis and Baluchs. 16 

While Gulf states promote a narrative of homogeneity to create an “imagined community” that bonds 

citizens to one another, they are simultaneously promoting a narrow and rigid sense of identity that excludes 

a large part of the nation’s socio- and ethno-historic DNA. These monolithic representations strip 

the region from countless of its histories, cultures, and stories, giving credence to Orientalist stereotypes 

that depict the region as lacking in history and culture. The myth of the dearth of history and culture in 

the Gulf becomes engrained even in the minds of its own citizens: rather than understanding the roles 

of natives from Ajami, Bedouin, Baluch and East African backgrounds in shaping a local society rich in 

culture, many start believing that their history and heritage is confined to standardized depictions of the 

desert, the lugaimat, or the yola. 

Rana AlMutawa is an Emirati instructor and researcher at Zayed University in Dubai, UAE. 

1 

2 

Ali Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates – Unity in Fragmentation (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 99. 

James Onley, “Transnational Merchant Families in the Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Gulf,” in The Gulf Family: Kinship and Politics, 

edited by Alanoud Alsharekh (London: Al Saqi Books and London Middle East Institute SOAS, 2007), 37- 56. 

24 Gulf Affairs

II. Analysis 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

Ibid and James Onley, “Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf: The Case of the Safar Family,” in Transnational Connections 

and the Arab Gulf, edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 59-89. 

Aisha Bilkhair, “Afro-Emirati: A Unique Historical Experience,” UNESCO, (2006) and Joseph Braude, “Feature: Africans in the Arabian 

(Persian) Gulf,” Afropop, (2007). 

Bilkhair, “Afro-Emirati”. 

Clive Holes, “Language and Identity in the Arabian Gulf,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:2 (2011): 129-145. 

Neil Partrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States,” LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf 

States, (2009) 

Partrick (2009), and Anh Nga Longva, “Neither Autocracy nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Social Political 

System in Kuwait”, in Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, edited by Paul Dresch and James 

Piscatori (London: IBTauris, 2005). 

Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) and Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial 

Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919” (PhD Diss., University of Arizona, 2007). 

Sabah Jasim, Margarethe Rose Uerpmann and Hans-Peter Uerpmann, Mleiha: The Unwritten History (London: Medina Publishing, 

2015). 

Discover Mleiha, http://www.discovermleiha.ae/, accessed 28 September, 2016. 

Roland Hawker, “Al Fahidi vs. Al Bastakiya: Who Cares and Why,”6 March, 2016, accessed September 28, 2016. 

Hala Khalaf, “Million’s Poet Returns with 48 poets Competing for Dh15 million Prize,” The National, UAE. 8 February 2016. 

Saeed Saeed, “The animated series Shaabiat Al Cartoon has attracted a lot of fans, and with good reason,” The National, UAE, 24 August 

2011. 

Onley 2004, 2007, ibid. 

Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi, Facebook post, June 27, 2016. 



GCC Security Amid Regional Crises | Spring 2016 23


Historical contact 

At the end of the 19 th century, cultural contact 

with the West began as a result of a new age of 

global trade and colonization. This contact triggered 

a local questioning of culture and identity. 

It also encouraged the growth of local education, 

civil and social programs, and the expansion of 

political awareness—particularly in Bahrain and 

Kuwait. Expanding at a time of growing Arab 

nationalism, this contact also further enhanced 

political awareness and increased interest in indigenous 

heritage, culture, and identity. 

Challenges of Cultural 

Identity in the GCC 

by Ahmad Al-Dubayan 

Marrying heritage and culture with 

the demands of the modern world 

hroughout the history of the Gulf, and until 

the end of the 19 th century, the region was 

not considered an important exporter of Islamic 

or Arab culture in its best form, in comparison 

to cultural centers such as Baghdad, Cairo, 

Damascus, Fez, and Medina. Cultural production 

was mostly localized despite extensive 

trading relations with India, Persia, and even 

the Far East. The people along the Gulf coast 

looked to the aforementioned Arab cultural centers 

as models of civilized Arabic and Islamic 

culture, from which they imported traditions. 

With the dawn of the oil age, the Gulf placed itself 

on the global economic and political map as a 

group of modern nation states. The region became 

a platform for trade and international commerce. 

Globalization accelerated cultural exchanges, and 

modern technology and communication aroused 

further interest in culture and identity within the 

Gulf states. 

The Gulf’s identity challenge 

Today, the Gulf faces a few key issues with regards 

to its identity, including the lack of a single, 

unified political vision, weakness of national education, 

changes within Islamic and Arab culture, 

and the creeping influence of English and the erosion 

of formal Arabic in everyday life. 

Despite similarity and shared social, cultural, 

and religious fabric, Gulf states do not have a unified 

political vision of the future for the region as 

a whole. Since the Arab Spring, the Gulf has increasingly 

diverged along different political lines 

and visions, most evidently on the issues of Egypt 

and Syria. 

While Gulf societies are largely regarded as predominantly 

Islamic in nature, this is seldom addressed 

from a cultural and identity standpoint in 

28 Gulf Affairs


national education curricula. Religious education 

in schools focuses mostly on practical dimensions, 

failing to sufficiently present religion as a structure 

of culture that finds its roots in Islamic civilization 

or regional history. This results in a local 

culture that stands little hope to maintain itself in 

the face of globalization, especially in light of phenomena 

such as foreign education, media, and social 

networking. The increasingly diversified and 

internationalized nature of Gulf economies and 

labor markets has facilitated the erosion of the 

Arabic language as an everyday medium for business 

in both the public and private sectors. Gulf 

states have undertaken initiatives to address such 

problems and support culture and identity, with 

national programs, events, exhibitions, and activities 

generally falling under national heritage 

authorities. However, these unfortunately mostly 

come outside the national curricula, addressing 

later stages of the cultural “identity question.” 

The tribal identity 

Younger generations face a challenge to 

develop an identity that can encompass 

both tribal and Islamic heritages while 

also meeting the needs of the modern 

world. 

identities that can encompass both tribal and Islamic 

heritages while also meeting the needs of 

the modern world. Institutional and educational 

initiatives have not yet established a middle path 

for the new generation, helping them to protect 

the values of their own culture while also connecting 

with the rest of the Gulf in a manner that 

both accommodates a modern world and meets 

its challenges. 

Dr. Ahmad Al-Dubayan is the Director General of 

the Islamic Cultural Centre in London, editor of 

the Islamic Quarterly, and an Arabic and Islamic 

Studies curriculum development expert. 

The tribal element historically presented a form 

of local cultural cohesion and production. In the 

modern Gulf, however, it fails to accommodate 

the increasingly diversified nature and accompanying 

cultural challenges present in Gulf societies. 

While the tribal element could be said to be 

slowly fading away, many phenomena report its 

existence, such as camel beauty pageants and local 

tribal poetry, reinforcing the tribe as an identity 

umbrella. Recent security events in the region, 

however, such as operation “Decisive Storm” in 

Yemen, have reinforced in some Gulf states elements 

of shared culture and identity, of Islamic 

and Arab elements, and notions of shared heroism 

and memory, ingredients of a collective identity. 

Conclusion 

Younger generations face a challenge to develop 



The Gulf States’ 

National Museums 

by Sultan Al Qassemi 

Iconic buildings and collections battleground 

for future identity 

uch has been written about what French academic 

Alexandre Kazerouni terms ‘visibility 

museums,’ such as the Louvre Abu Dhabi and the 

Museum of Islamic Art in Qatar. Elaborating in 

Ibraaz, Kuwaiti artist Monira Al Qadiri writes that 

visibility museums, rather than recreating the traditional 

heritage museums “filled with dioramas, 

maps, archeological artefacts and Arabic books” 

are conceived from the outset with recognized 

brand name architects and most certainly a significant 

budget. Aimed at preserving Gulf heritage 

and serving a slate of political ends, these national 

museums could emerge as a major battleground for 

identity and local viewpoints just as smaller, independent 

museums and galleries in the region experience 

exponential growth. 

The mega museum 

In the coming few years, the Gulf will see the rise of 

a multitude of ‘visibility museums’ designed and 

built by heavyweight architects. In 2017, Qatar 

will be inaugurating a major new museum designed 

by French architect and Pritzker prize 

winner Jean Nouvel. The $434 million museum 

in the shape of a desert rose is built around the 

former palace of Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim 

Al-Thani who ruled Qatar from 1913 to 1949. 

In 1999, Saudi Arabia opened its National Museum 

in Riyadh, which was designed by Raymond 

Moriyama, a Canadian of Japanese descent. 

It comes with an accompanying building 

called the Darat of King Abdul Aziz, designed 

by Jordanian architect Rasem Badran. Danish 

architect Knud Holscher was invited in 1982 to 

design the Bahrain National Museum, while 

Frenchman Michel Ecochard (1905-1985) was 

the architect behind the Kuwait National Museum 

that opened in 1983, which is undergoing 

a significant makeover and expansion. The fact 

that the latter two countries were the first to 

create visibility national museums may be attributed 

to Bahrain and Kuwait being the first 

two Gulf states to discover oil, in 1932 and 1937 

respectively. They were also the most politically 

developed and had the most advanced educational 

sector in the region at the time. 

Lying on the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula, 

the Sultanate of Oman has just inaugurated 

a National Museum in Muscat designed 

by Jasper Jacob Associates in conjunction with 

Arts Architecture International, both British 

based firms. Muscat is embarking on another 

major project called the Oman Renaissance Museum 

near the Al-Hajar Mountains designed 

by the Australian firm Cox Howlett & Bailey 

Woodland. The UAE has commissioned Foster 

+ Partners to design the Zayed National Museum, 

which has yet to be awarded. Perhaps the 

most interesting of these will be the new $132 

million Etihad Museum in Dubai that was designed 

by Moriyama & Teshima Architects, who 

also designed the Saudi National Museum. 

These planned mega museums contrast with 

past mini-national museums across the Gulf. 

Examples include Al Ain National Museum— 

which opened on November 2 nd 1971, exactly 

one month before the UAE was formed—and 

30 Gulf Affairs


the aforementioned Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim 

Al-Thani museum in Qatar. These museums no 

longer align with the global ambitions of these 

Gulf states. 

Heritage and visibility 

But what factors drive these Gulf states to embark 

on such a major drive to build national museums? 

First, these national museums are intended as 

domestic political messages to these states’ citizenries. 

The museums are being built to instil a 

sense of pride in the citizens of these countries 

and to cultivate a sense of belonging and identity. 

They also showcase to citizens the governments’ 

commitments to maintain national identity in 

a globalizing world. In almost all Gulf states, 

schools are required to take students—especially 

citizens—to visit national museums on guided 

tours. Many of these museums utilize the latest 

technologies, such as interactive panels, to capture 

the attention of the teenaged and younger 

visitors. 

In 2012 Qatar Museums organized an exhibition 

titled Mal Lawal (translated as ‘Belonging to the 

Past’) in which Qatari citizens and residents were 

invited to share historic artefacts with the public, 

an event that was billed as ‘Uniquely Local.’ 

It was an ingenious way of uncovering private 

collections, some of which will no doubt end up in 

the national museum through donations, which 

Gulf citizens are making ever more regularly. 

The Zayed National Museum and Qatar National 

Museum have started to record the oral history 

of the older citizens who witnessed the transformation 

of their countries—these will presumably 

be broadcast when these museums open. 

There is a genuine risk that these museums 

will become museums of static historical 

relics rather than a reflection of the dynamism 

that these states are experiencing. 

These museums are also political statements with 

their size, location, and contents to be carefully 

vetted. Often these museums will exclude certain 

categories such as minorities or even the slave 

trade. That said, Qatar should be commended for 

its inauguration of the Bin Jelmood house, which 

is the first museum in the Gulf dedicated to the 

slave trade in the region. It is, however, unknown 

if slavery will be featured in the National Museum 

down the road or if it will be compartmentalized 

into Bin Jelmood. These museums also tell 

history through the eyes of the victors, who are 

traditionally the ruling families of the Gulf and 

their allies. There is, for instance, little or no mention 

of those who have been vanquished or defeated 

in the past. 

Windows to the Gulf 

These national museums are also means to educate 

the millions of foreigners who live in or visit 

the Gulf states about the original inhabitants of 

the lands, whom foreigners seldom have a chance 

to interact with. Signing up major architects also 

helps Gulf governments to make these museums 

appealing to international visitors. A famous architectural 

brand would come with certain expectations 

of quality and standards. 

Despite their grandeur and important collections, 

national museums will face challenges. In addition 

to omitting certain segments of society, there 

is a genuine risk that these museums will become 

museums of static historical relics rather than a 

reflection of the dynamism that these states are 

experiencing. Only the Etihad Museum in Dubai 

has an explicit mandate to cover the years between 

1968 to 1974, and for good reason, since 

it is a museum dedicated to an event. The other 

national museums would do well to avoid becoming 

fortresses for the past instead of beacons of an 

evolving vibrant culture. The Gulf states are in a 

race against time, with demographics and rapidly 

accelerating globalization of their youth challenging 

efforts to preserve traditional identity. In this 

struggle, national museums have emerged as 

major battlefields. 

Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi is a UAE based writer 

and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute 

Washington, D.C. 



A unique Saudi viewpoint 

The leading cultural practitioners in Saudi Arabia 

(artists, curators and patrons) incorporate 

uniquely Saudi qualities in their work—qualities 

related to Islam, Saudi society, the monarchy and 

the nature of Saudi power and the ways in which 

that power has either a direct or invisible hand in 

cultural production. 

The Local Evolution of Saudi 

Arabia’s Contemporary 

Art Scene 

by Alia Al-Senussi 

Local art scene flourishes in 

Saudi Arabia 

audi Arabia has witnessed an explosion of 

S local art production in the 21 st century, driven 

in large part by a variety of grassroots efforts. 

These efforts are often tied to traditional centers 

of artistic production like the Abha arts community 

or the Hijaz, a crossroads of pilgrims and 

commerce. The exponential growth of and interest 

in art in the Kingdom has spurred a surge 

in local collectors and enthusiasm, especially for 

art with a local viewpoint or voice. Despite its 

grassroots origins, something uniquely Saudi, 

art continues to be patronized and overseen by 

the kingdom’s ruling elite. 

Saudi patrons have now mobilized in an unprecedented 

way to support local arts and bring 

non-Saudis to Jeddah (and elsewhere) to experience 

contemporary art in the Kingdom and also 

general Saudi culture. This is not particular to 

just Saudi Arabia but linked to a general reawakening 

of the importance of art and culture in the 

non-Western world, a recognition that art and 

culture play important roles in domestic politics, 

international relations, and power structures. 

Unlike its neighbors, Saudi Arabia has yet to garner 

significant press and attention for its cultural 

activities. But within the Kingdom there is an 

increasingly rich and continuously evolving cultural 

scene fed by artists, patrons, and interested 

locals. 

The celebrated artist Ahmed Mater, in ‘Young 

Soul Rebels’ (published in Asia Art Pacific in December 

2012), discusses the local climate in an 

explicit way in terms of market signifiers but his 

text is easily read as a manifesto on larger issues 

of what culture means to him and his fellow artists: 

“2012 was an important year for me and for 

many artists in Saudi Arabia. We decided to come 

back to the original movement of contemporary 

art which began in my hometown of Abha over 10 

years ago, and to return again to the source and 

foundation for our inspiration—namely our role 

in this society.” 

Mater continues to explain that “As Saudi artists, 

we seek to find a system and platform relevant to 

our local context, we seek to preserve and nurture 

our communal voice. Because we know that only 

32 Gulf Affairs


through a solid, paced and strong movement can 

we make our way upstream, against the current 

of society and its potential to materialism. We are 

full of nervous optimism about the potential of 

this real movement. We believe that art galleries, 

institutions, organizations, ministries, patrons, 

local and social media can support each other to 

instigate and develop a movement that will become 

part of the change needed in this society.” 

The evolution of art and patronage 

Even as Saudi artists explore increasingly diverse 

subject matters, members of the ruling elite 

establish organizations to shape and oversee the 

growing field. For example, the recent creation 

of the non-profit Saudi Art Council (SAC) was 

an important step forward in bringing a more 

official voice to the Saudi art world. The body is 

chaired by a senior member of the royal family, 

HRH Princess Jawaher bint Majid bin Abdulaziz 

Al Saud, and comprised of a selection of the Saudi 

commercial elite. 

Museums are a prosaic part of life in most Western 

developed countries, but they do not exist in 

such a visible manner in Saudi Arabia. This only 

magnifies the importance of organizations like 

the SAC and Edge of Arabia, the non-profit arts 

organization co-founded by Mater and his fellow 

artists and activists Abdulnasser Gharem and 

Stephen Stapleton. 

Even as Saudi artists explore increasingly 

diverse subject matters, members 

of the ruling elite establish organizations 

to shape and oversee the growing 

field. 

only recently adopted in a direct manner with the 

museum. 

However, senior government officials and members 

of the royal family have involved themselves 

with cultural initiatives more frequently as official 

as well as non-official representatives of the 

state. Ahmed Mater expressed how cultural production 

and politically charged arts are important 

to Saudi artists, as opposed to those who cater to 

outside tastes: “How can we paint butterflies and 

scenes of the past when our region is in turmoil 

and change is upon us?” 

Alia Al-Senussi is a Phd Candidate at SOAS, 

University of London, and a global representative 

and consultant at Art Basel; she holds a variety 

of not-for-profit board and committee positions 

which promote patronage of the arts such as with 

Tate, ICA London, Serpentine Galleries, The Chinati 

Foundation, Guggenheim and Art Dubai. 

On the other hand, the involvement of Western 

museums in the discourse and happenings in the 

region informs their cultural development and 

is integral to the evolution of the regional scene, 

providing an external counterpoint to the more 

insular goings-on. Culture can be a description 

of the contemporary situation of a society and a 

reference point for scholarship related to political 

movements and the structure of power. Saudi 

Arabia is no different from any other nation 

with a nascent and evolving art scene, and the 

relationship between visual culture and power 

in Saudi Arabia is something that the state has 



any stimulating object, whether physically present 

or imagined into being. We memorized folk 

songs and played with dolls handmade from 

whatever raw materials we could find. By night 

time, we were ready for the universal bedtime 

story delivered by our mothers, grandmothers, 

and aunts. 

Understanding the Evolution 

of the Khaleeji Identity 

by Lulwa Abdulla Al-Misned 

A 

Modernity threatens the future of 

traditional khaleeji lifestyle 

Khaleeji (male) or Khaleejiyah (female) is a 

person from one of the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) states—or ‘Gulfie’ in colloquial English. 

My Gulfie generation was born in the late fifties, 

sixties, and seventies and witnessed the creation of 

the GCC states and the formalization of the khaleeji 

identity. We were taught in the earliest formal 

classrooms by the first non-khaleeji Arab-immigrants, 

who had strong Arab nationalist pride and 

enforced a heavy sense of Islamic religious values. 

By the 1980s, we were pushed into the labor market 

to pursue our careers, often in semi-segregated 

work environments. We lived in extended families 

with many siblings and cousins in closely connected 

houses with open yards. The boundaries between 

homes were almost nonexistent, and kids ran about 

crossing hypothetical property lines in pursuit of 

We are the generation that had the best of both 

worlds. We were parented by a hardy pre-oil 

generation but grew up with the early years of 

the hydrocarbon economy, and we were given 

the benefits of free public goods and services, 

education, health, and housing, all facilitated 

by the rent of the extractive oil industry. It was 

a homogenous, integrated environment that 

found itself propelled into a much larger world. 

We knew who we were in the definitive sense, 

but we were to encounter several drivers of cultural 

change. 

How times have changed 

We, in our turn, parented a generation raised 

within the new city states in the Gulf. The 

mechanics of this change remain vivid in my 

memory. Starting in the 1980s, our generation 

pioneered the dual-bread-winning-parents approach 

in order to accommodate a contemporary 

khaleeji lifestyle. This approach would manifest 

in families building large villas with tall walls 

encompassing them. These walls stood white 

and vertical in silent declaration of their proprietary 

existence. Behind them came tiled yards, 

subsidized utilities, and imported domestic labor. 

It became the standard for the khaleeji lifestyle. 

This was made possible thanks to a hefty 

distribution of oil-rents through guaranteed 

public sector employment for both genders. 

Governments owned the hydrocarbon assets and 

distributed these rents through various transfer 

mechanisms, without the need for public taxation. 

As such, they became agents of gradual 

class formation in societies that had never been 

structured vertically. The role of the tribe faded, 

34 Gulf Affairs


by the decline of the political and economic functions 

of the tribal structure, into an immaterial 

self-image anchor called upon only in ceremonial 

events. The nation-state was to take over the 

formation of self-identity. The institutional formation 

of the modern state and the formation of 

the civil society did not fully materialize due to 

the polarization of social power in governments’ 

hands. Government transfers became handouts 

that were allocated based on political loyalty. 

With the absence of the legislative requirements 

permitting collective association and assembly, 

there was no chance for ‘socialization’ to build up 

civic virtues and develop the self- image of a citizen 

rather than one of a subject. 

Capital cities within the GCC such as Abu Dhabi, 

Doha, Manama, and Riyadh underwent rapid 

development and relied on social capital growth 

to satisfy the demands of expanding economies. 

The optimal size of the economy was not based 

on calculations of the maximum extraction rate 

of hydrocarbon assets, as we all know. The extraction 

levels were determined most of the time 

by demand in the international markets for these 

strategic commodities. 

The changing nature of our neighborhoods 

In light of this rapid transformation, the spirit of 

the fareej, the indigenous Gulfie community, was 

difficult to perfectly preserve with the influx of 

expatriate neighbors from diverse cultural backgrounds. 

A new phase of “multiculturalism” in the 

Gulf was born as the nature of expat populations 

changed from the low skilled male workers who 

came to help build the infrastructure of these capital 

cities to expat professionals who came with 

their families to work in the growing industrial 

and services sectors. 

These professionals lived on long-term work permits 

and raised their children within the Gulf’s 

cities. Foreign embassies that represent large expatriate 

communities worked to establish schools 

for their citizens’ children. Within Gulf cities, both 

Khaleeji identity continues to evolve 

along a path that rejects and reduces 

the value of its traditional heritage. 

nationals and expats shop at the same malls, buy 

from the same grocery stores, and go to the same 

cinemas. These interactions are reminders that 

our realities include other identities and cultures. 

Over time a double value system was created. 

The traditional and the modern, each brought 

by different drivers of cultural change, fueled 

the creation of a complex and often contradictory 

self-image. This explains the adherence to national 

cultures in some situations but the relaxation 

of tradition in others. 

The decline of the middle class 

The welfare states that the Gulf governments 

raised through the first few decades of oil rent 

had become unsustainable with the fluctuation 

of hydrocarbon revenues. That brought many 

economic and social challenges, such as growing 

youth unemployment and struggles with housing 

and social safety net programs. One important 

result was the decline of the middle class, which 

had been gradually formed by educated professional 

nationals. Moreover, a new “super class” 

was formed that became dependent on government 

transfers through procurements, agency 

privileges for international contracts, and business 

licenses with exclusivity rights. Class polarization 

in the Gulf societies became another factor 

impacting the sense of one community and one 

culture. 

Ongoing de-Arabization 

The phenomenon of the ‘third culture kid’ prevailed 

among our children. During the first decade 

of the 21 st century, a new cultural nucleus 

of American and European higher education 

centers was established. These universities built 

regional campuses with the latest architectural 



design, high-tech classrooms, and guaranteed 

student numbers and numerous financial incentives. 

These campuses drive cultural change 

by omitting the national cultural context from 

their programs and activities. 

Educational reform introduced English as a 

primary medium of study, undermining the region’s 

Arabic cultural heritage. The influence of 

foreign consultancy services like the US-based 

Rand Corporation, McKinsey and Co, Price 

Waterhouse Coopers and Booz Allen have been 

perceived by many locals as a wave of cultural 

imperialism in the aftermath of the September 

11 tragedy. Furthermore, neglecting the Arabic 

language as a paradigm of culture by using English 

as the medium of learning from the early 

years of childhood is a real challenge to children’s 

self-identification as Arab. Generations of 

our children and grandchildren are cut off from 

many aspects of their history, literature, folklore, 

and lifestyle. 

Under threat from its own impetus to modernize, 

from external influences and government 

pressure, the khaleeji identity continues 

to evolve along a path that rejects and reduces 

the value of its traditional heritage. It’s unclear 

what this will mean for the future of the identity 

of the khaleeji peoples. 

Dr. Lulwa Al-Misned is a former Assistant Secretary 

General of the Gulf Organization for Industrial 

Consulting and is currently a free-lance 

writer and consultant in the areas of public policy 

and social reform in the GCC region. 

During the last decade, technology has been the 

main driver of cultural change. This process is 

facilitated by advanced communication channels 

and global marketing of cultural products 

by transnational mega conglomerates. The current 

preference is for pop culture, social media, 

and interactive video games delivered with a 

“postmodern” set of values. This “current” culture 

for many thinkers is not universal and not 

even based on the classical Western culture. The 

heritage of freedom, justice, and democracy that 

prevailed in the Western liberal cultural history 

has become devoid of meaning and decontextualized. 

We live in an era of aggressive inward 

individualism that is shaped and controlled by 

market interests rather than moral criteria. 

The boundaries of such totalitarian virtual dominance 

are amorphous, and so is the khaleeji 

identity today. 

36 Gulf Affairs

IV. Interviews





Gulf Affairs: The Ministry of Culture, Arts & Heritage has led the cultural scene for many 

years in the state of Qatar. What is your evaluation of the role of the Ministry of Culture and 

Sports that was established in 2016 after the merger of both the Ministry of Culture, Arts & 

Heritage and the Ministry of Youth and Sports, which was established in 2013? 

Salah bin Ghanem Al Ali: The Ministry of Culture and Sports has a leading role to play in society and 

is keen to enhance knowledge and development in all fields. Not only does it lead the cultural scene, but 

it is concerned with public affairs as well as with all fields that share its noble mission like education and 

media. 

The merging of both ministries comes as a structural reform which does not aim to change the terminology, 

but to change perceptions and efficiency of the work in each sector. We cannot assess the role of the 

ministry in a matter of months, in the sense of a scientific evaluation. Still, we can determine the nature 

of the steps that have been made and their impact in bringing about a shift in our perception of the role of 

the ministry itself in this historic stage—it makes sense to outline our vision and strategic plan in light of 

the historical reality witnessed by the State of Qatar. We announced the vision of the ministry just months 

after the initial merger and are currently working on the strategic plan. We inaugurated a number of 

cultural centers with a new perception of the cultural work to be performed and with the aim of giving creative 

individuals more independence in running their affairs, discussing their causes and expressing their 

38 Gulf Affairs


creative product. We launched the Theater’s Affairs Center, the Cultural Conscience Center, the Music’s 

Affairs Center, The Cultural and Heritage Events Center, and Diwan Al-Arab Center. These are executive 

structures to embrace intellectuals and to influence society by creating a cultural public opinion as well as 

stimulating cultural movement. 

Unlike traditional cultural ministries, which limited the scope of their work to the executive role only, the 

ministry will develop the public strategy by providing follow-up, patronage, and governance. We live in a 

changing world and our society needs a qualitative transformation in the work performed by the ministry 

without dominating the cultural work. 

The Ministry does not claim that it owns culture but rather seeks to provide the proper environment to 

build a national culture for intellectuals and innovators to help them push the society forward. 

Gulf Affairs: How would you sum up the vision of the Ministry of Culture and Sports concerning 

arts and culture in Qatar? 

Al Ali: In every historic stage, culture needs a vision to build society and to fulfill its intellectual, psychological 

and aesthetic security needs. Culture works as a safety valve, which enhances its steps towards 

achieving a better future and forming a character that distinguishes it from other societies. It gives society 

a special position in the cultural action of nations. 

For that reason, the ministry chose its vision to gear “towards a conscious society with an authentic sentiment 

and a healthy body”. This vision is based on the orientations of His Highness Emir Tamim bin 

Hamad Al Thani, who referred to the value system taking hold in Qatari society as follows: 

“The Qatari people have always been long known for their good manners, generosity and humbleness. 

They work more and talk less. They have always helped the oppressed. I am afraid that we may miss the 

opportunity to pass on these core values: the values of work, humbleness, good manners and treating others 

with respect. We must make sure that the youth find a meaning to their lives in all of this and under 

the conditions of this consumptive civilization.” 

There is a convergence between these lofty ideals and the vision of Qatar 2030. Our common ambition is to 

build a new society. Thus, the vision of the Ministry of Culture is based on those two principles. Its pillars 

are awareness, consciousness, and body, which form the main foundations of building a society. 

We deeply need to think about our reality, to get hold of its tools and to explore its methods to be able to 

use them. Awareness forms the base for both work and methodology. It preserves facts and gives great 

importance to ideas in order to reach mental common sense and establish a way of thinking which depends 

on the realization of the cultural and social environment. We are in much need of these inherent 

values derived from the ideals of our ancestors and entrenched in our collective consciousness to protect 

our personality. Not only is our consciousness filled with such values but also branches off into sensation, 

perception, attention and imagination which grow with experience. We can only concentrate awareness 

and consciousness strongly within a healthy body. 

Gulf Affairs: Artistic expression takes different forms, which involve changing values. Notably, 

in spite of the successful use of technology in Qatari cultural production, heritage remains 

the main source for such production. How do you see this problematic relationship, 

which somehow may look contradictory? 



Al Ali: It is true that creative expressions develop and take different forms according to time and place. 

Such forms create new visions and methods. Thus, we cannot separate expression from its form and content. 

Even though creative expression benefited from modern technology, this does not contradict the desire 

of some creative individuals to use heritage and to harness its content. 

Some may consider heritage as a rigid material, nothing more than a legacy that is passed on from ancestors 

through generations as if a mummified object. This is not what we have in mind as a meaning of heritage. 

This meaning is more of a legacy than heritage. What we mean by heritage is the vibrant energy that 

stands the test of time and lives within us now and in the future. If we recognize the difference between 

heritage and legacy, we will be able to realize the intrinsic value of common ownership of what is symbolic, 

including firm and constant values of society and elements of its identity. They may change with time to 

adapt to developments and our perspective of the society we want to build. 

The problem in dealing with heritage is the excessive use of old forms in creative fields such as music. We 

encourage creative people to deal with traditional molds in a creative and innovative way to renovate the 

social spirit. This way music will keep abreast with the times without betraying its essence. I do not think 

there is any contradiction between heritage and available technology. The big problem lies with those who 

are incapable of making this pairing possible. I think that creative expressions of whatever form should 

reflect the reality of their society and time, and they should contain a new vision and a new project for the 

society in a creative and artistic form, as this is the real purpose of creativity. 

Gulf Affairs: For decades, the educated Arab elite have been a significant cultural stream for 

artistic production in Qatar and have helped to establish it. Can we talk today about an educated 

elite among the rising generation capable of carrying the artistic and cultural load? 

Al Ali: It is undeniable that the Arab elite played a role in enhancing the Qatari cultural experience. For 

decades, our society embraced the Arab cultural momentum. However, we cannot overlook the role of the 

youth and the new generation in our cultural perception. We do not tend to classify society into new and old 

elites, but we classify it according to methodology, believing that the movement of culture depends mainly 

on communication between Arab cultural generations in general. Exchanging and transferring experiences 

among generations creates diversity, which invigorates the general cultural movement. Conflict or 

discontinuity between generations may be the reason behind the rupture we see in culture today. 

Intra-culture discontinuity is a necessary thing for development, but it is based on both separation and 

communication at the same time. The new generation should not ignore the feats of the previous elite who 

should not behave in a tutelary or authoritarian manner. We believe in the Qatari youth’s ability to create 

a paradigm shift when they take in the experience of the Arab elite and understand the challenges faced 

by Qatari society to achieve the desired response. 

Gulf Affairs: Qatar played a prominent role in the Arab uprising that took a different turn in 

the last three years. What is the impact of these events on culture and arts in Qatar and in the 

region as a whole? 

Al Ali: Qatar believes in the self-determination right of all peoples. Thus, it spared no effort in helping 

those peoples who seek freedom and a better future. Qatar welcomed the Arab uprising out of respect for 

the will of the peoples and considered it a paradigm shift that has a positive impact on the entire region. 

40 Gulf Affairs


Undoubtedly, this uprising will affect culture and arts. Consequently, innovators will find a new environment 

of freedom and their creative expressions will take new forms. Cultural momentum needs freedom, 

which is inseparable from creativity. The intellectuals will be able to discuss the causes of their country 

with boldness and in full communication with society. Thus, political transformations change the perception 

of society. 

Though none of this has yet been achieved, it shows the huge responsibility that must be shouldered by the 

intellectuals and innovators at this historic stage in particular. They have a social role to play. They have to 

deliberate the problems of their peoples and contribute to the change of beliefs, opinions, and mentalities. 

It is a huge choice that will have consequences not only for the countries which witnessed the uprising, but 

also for the entire region. 

The Qatari cultural scene interacted with the aspirations of the Arab intellectuals in the countries which 

witnessed the uprising by opening the fields of expression and participation in the events. This contact of 

Qatari intellectuals and innovators with this new “wave” will undoubtedly create additional enthusiasm to 

believe in the role of culture in building the future vision of Qatar. 

Gulf Affairs: Are you concerned about the fact that the attention given to sports by youth and 

supported by the state within the GCC states notably exceeds that of culture? 

Al Ali: The attention given to sports is a result of the larger media coverage despite the priority given to 

the youth culture. In addition, scoring goals is much clearer and faster in sports than in culture. This is due 

to the different nature of each field, without creating a predominance of one over the other. Both culture 

and sports share roles in society while each field has its own particularity and choices while being integrated. 

Our vision expressed such integration, bearing in mind that awareness and consciousness should be 

built within a healthy body. I am not concerned about measurements of attention to each field as it is not 

a matter of quantity but of degree and quality. Changing and enlightening mentalities through cultural 

expression takes more time. It is not an automatic thing to do and is not related to a particular period. The 

more we realize what we aspire from culture and sports at our particular moment in civilization, the better 

we will be able to give enough attention to each one of them. 

Gulf Affairs: Finally, the previous Doha Cultural Festival successfully became a significant 

cultural forum in the Arab region. Why did it stop? Are there any plans to bring it back? 

Al Ali: Qatar went through many cultural experiences, including the Doha Cultural Festival, which kicked 

off its first round in 2002. Still, each historic stage requires forms and means to present the artistic product 

or accomplish cultural projects. Thanks to the forums and festivals held by several cultural bodies, Doha 

became a cultural beacon. However, merging all these events into only one festival does not reflect the 

vitality of culture that extends all year long. At this point, holding festivals is not our main concern, but 

empowering intellectuals and innovators to reach creativity is. 

Supporting all events with a vision that advances Qatari society, as well as serious thinking about our cultural 

priorities, are more important than cultural show off. The question is what did all these festivals and 

forums change in our way of thinking, conduct, and preferences? I think this is the core question, which will 

guide our plans for the future. 



H.E. Shaikha Mai bint Mohammed Al-Khalifa 

President, Bahrain Authority for Culture & Antiquities 

Kingdom of Bahrain 

Gulf Affairs: What are the objectives of the newly founded Bahrain Authority for Culture and 

Antiquities? 

Shaikha Mai Al-Khalifa: In many ways the strength, richness, and authenticity of Bahraini culture has 

always been a major component of modern day Bahraini society. One cannot understand Bahrain and its 

people, the make-up of the society, its open minded, tolerant, and progressive nature, without acquiring 

an in depth knowledge of its history and its culture. That is precisely why Bahrain recognized that it was 

absolutely necessary for the Kingdom to place culture, history, and archeology in the center of the Kingdom’s 

national agenda. The establishment of the Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities as an 

independent body with a wide and encompassing mandate is therefore a natural and logical manifestation 

of this national priority. The Authority is therefore mandated with exploration, protection, and promotion 

of Bahrain’s rich history and both tangible and intangible cultural wealth. The mandate of the Authority is 

crucial for the image, the perception, and the appreciation of modern day Bahrain for its citizens as much 

as for the world at large. 

Gulf Affairs: What are the major achievements of the Bahraini authorities in the area of culture 

in recent years? 

42 Gulf Affairs


Al-Khalifa: We can confidently say that in the relatively short history of the Authority, many achievements 

and success stories were realized. In addition to the continuous, day to day work of maintaining and 

protecting cultural heritage, important infrastructures were established on the ground, such as several 

specialized museums as well as the establishment of the National Theater designed and built with state of 

the art standards. To date, the Theater hosted several renowned national and international performances 

that were enjoyed by the people of Bahrain and its visitors. The Authority also succeeded in naming Manama 

as Arab Capital of Culture (2012), Arab Capital of Tourism (2013), and Asian Capital of Tourism 

(2014), while Al Muharaq was named Islamic Capital of culture. In addition, the Authority was able to 

launch an important project on knowledge transfer as well as embark on several research and translation 

projects placing Bahraini culture and literature on the international stage. The Authority is today bringing 

the world to Bahrain and taking Bahrain to the world. 

Gulf Affairs: How would you describe the role of Bahrain in promoting culture in the Gulf 

region and beyond? 

Al-Khalifa: The progressive, open minded, and international character of the Bahraini society makes it 

one of the best ambassadors for transmitting the wealth and authentic deep-rooted culture of the Gulf 

societies to the world at large. This is a crucial task today in a world that is becoming increasingly intolerant 

and is suffering from serious stereotyping of each other’s culture. The proper understanding of the 

richness and the beauty of the diversity of every culture is essential in building a better world. Bahrain 

understands very well its role in today’s world and in taking the culture of the Gulf societies to the world, 

and the Authority is one of its important vehicles in achieving this important task. 

Gulf Affairs: Bahrain is a country rich in cultural heritage and with a very long history: what 

is the impact of this heritage on the Bahraini identity? How would you define the Bahraini 

identity in the 21 st century? 

Al-Khalifa: Societies are the product of their history, their people, their place, and their unique resulting 

culture; Bahrain is no exception. As an island that was home to the most ancient civilizations, Bahrain 

acquired many rich cultural features of openness, ability to connect easily with other cultures as well as a 

variety of skills connected to sea life, trade, and services. Such characters are still very important features 

of the Bahraini society. That is why Bahrainis today are tolerant, accommodating, and friendly. They are 

also naturally skilled at trade, crafts, and services. The recognition and listing of the “pearl trail” as a UNE- 

SCO World Heritage Site is an example of a rich heritage in skills, trade, and services. Bahraini people today 

are without doubt the product of a culture that is rich, unique, and worthy of international recognition. 

Gulf Affairs: What is the role of women in promoting Bahraini culture and shaping the Bahraini 

identity? 

Al-Khalifa: Regardless of gender, we are living in an encouraging atmosphere in the Kingdom of Bahrain, 

where both men and women can work creatively in various fields based on the principle of equal opportunities. 

The Bahraini woman has always played a significant role economically and socially. In the era prior 

to the discovery of oil in the 1930s, she worked hard to support her family while her husband was away 

on long diving trips, thus the Bahraini woman has left her mark throughout history. In fact, any national 

achievement is hardly devoid of the contributions of Bahraini women. 


43


Gulf Affairs: In recent years GCC countries have undertaken a variety of efforts to preserve 

and celebrate their history. What initiatives were undertaken in Bahrain and how do they fit 

in the national tourism strategy? 

Al-Khalifa: Bahrain has always been very active within the GCC group, especially in the field of cultural 

preservation and cultural promotion, which, as you correctly noted, has been a GCC priority. The best 

manifestation can be seen in Bahrain’s success and distinction in the tourism industry. We believe that 

culture is the story of the people, and tourism is the publisher and distributer of the story. The importance 

that we place on tourism is, therefore, the best way of demonstrating the respect and value we place on our 

cultural heritage. We want the world to know about it; we want the world to enjoy it; we want the world to 

come visit Bahrain, and that is why we promote tourism. 

Gulf Affairs: What are the future plans for the promotion of culture in Bahrain? 

Al-Khalifa: We will continue to work hard on the preservation and the promotion of our cultural heritage. 

There are many initiatives in the planning. We are planning to establish a dedicated cultural TV channel, 

promote cruises to visit some of our cultural sites, and introduce “light and sound” shows to selected cultural 

and archeological sites. These are some examples of our future plans on the ground. Our mission, however, 

remains the preservation, the presentation, and the promotion of the beautiful story of our people. 

44 Gulf Affairs


Ali Al-Youha 


Kuwait National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters (NCCAL) 

Gulf Affairs: What is the mandate and scope of the National Council for Culture, Arts and 

Letters? 

Ali Al-Youha: The National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters was established by Emiri Decree on July 

17, 1973 as an independent public body, chaired by the Minister of Information, with a board consisting of 

a number of representatives from other public departments and arts, culture and literary circles. Over 40 

years old, the Council’s role has grown alongside Kuwait’s journey as a country. Its primary duties include 

educational, literary, artistic, and cultural development nationally, in addition to developing relations with 

similar Arab and international counterparts. Its role includes: 

•Surveying and conducting studies on the Kuwaiti cultural landscape and current efforts of other 

departments. 

•Conducting studies on the status of culture and its development and direction in Kuwait. 

•Record collecting and conserving. 

•Publishing, including magazines, journals, dictionaries, and books generally. 

•Events and outreach: the Council is regularly active in establishing a number of events, including 



conferences, forums, festivals and national competitions, with the aim of developing cultural communication 

and awareness. 

•Public and civil cultural engagement and promotion. 

•Preservation of local and Arab heritage and the promotion of literary culture through series and 

ad hoc publications. 

Gulf Affairs: What have been the primary achievements of the NCCAL over the past few years? 

Al-Youha: Since its inception, the Council has succeeded in supporting and organizing Kuwaiti cultural 

and artistic movements and consequently established, over four decades, regular cultural phenomena that 

reflect the Kuwaiti social landscape. These efforts included: 

•Kuwait International Book Fair: a book fair prominent internationally and within the Arab world 

running since 1975. 

•The Annual Qurain Cultural Festival: launched in 1994 and eventually transforming from a mere 

‘festival’ to an artistic and literary phenomenon within the GCC and Arab-wide. 

•Specialized festivals including: The Youth Cultural Festival, The Kuwait Theatrical Festival, The 

International Music Festival, The Future Generation Cultural Festival, and The Summer Cultural 

Festival. 

•Energizing the idea of Arabic and International cultural weeks. 

•Exhibitions in fine arts. 

In addition, the Council is a regular contributor to and supporter of many published materials that attract 

unprecedented readership in the Arab cultural arena, including: 

•“Aalam Al-Ma’rifah” (World of Knowledge): a series of monthly published short books (since 1978). 

•“Al-Masrah Al-Aalami” (Global Theatre): a series of global theatrical plays from foreign languages, 

translated to Arabic (since 1969). 

•“Aalam Al-Fikr” (World of Intellect): a quarterly containing articles and research with a diversity 

of academic cultural, artistic, and historical research (since 1970). 

•“Al-Thaqafah Al-‘Alamiyah” (Global Culture): a magazine publishing translated material on cultural, 

artistic, and literary affairs (since 1980). 

•“Ebda’at ‘Alamiya” (Global Creations/Fantasy): a series of global theatrical plays, translated to 

Arabic (since 1969). 

The Council’s other achievements include its support for the creation of national theatre groups, in addition 

to the preservation and management of historical architecture and national heritage. The Council is 

also party to a number of agreements and memorandums with Arab and other foreign counterparts. 

Gulf Affairs: How do you describe the state of the cultural movement in Kuwait and what 

would you say are some of its unique attributes? 

Al-Youha: The Kuwaiti government places immense interest and care in culture and even relies on culture 

as a key to increased human awareness more generally. Many factors have contributed to making 

Kuwait an Arab regional cultural beacon, including the diversity of the population, the tolerance for which 

Kuwaitis are known, and their love for culture and arts. The Kuwaiti cultural movement, its roots, and its 

figures are considered among the most noteworthy in the Arab region and are among the reasons Kuwait 

46 Gulf Affairs


was chosen as a capital for Arab culture and a capital for Islamic culture in 2001 and 2006 respectively. 

The strength of the Kuwaiti cultural movement relies on active publishing and strong roots in theatre, fine 

arts, literature, poetry, music, and many other activities. 

The Kuwaiti cultural scene has included from its early beginnings, which pre-date independence, the active 

contribution of women, especially in literature and the arts. This is in addition to increased youth 

participation, especially in recent years. The role the Council plays, in addition to other governmental 

departments and the private sector, supports this cultural scene with a constant number of initiatives 

and achievements, affording a notably cultural visage to Kuwait that we take pride in sharing locally and 

globally. 

Gulf Affairs: How does the NCCAL contribute to supporting the cultural and artistic movement 

in the country? 

Al-Youha: As mentioned earlier, as per the Council’s roles and decree of establishment, the Council supports 

and sponsors a wide range of activities, including talents in writing, literature, acting, music, and 

other arts. Two examples of how the Council supports these sectors are the Kuwaiti National Encouragement 

Prize, which is given annually for achievements in different cultural and educational fields, and 

the Kuwaiti National Recognition Prize, given for notable cultural and social contributions. These awards 

come in addition to the Council’s role in supporting other activities in collaboration with local societies and 

clubs such as publishing, short movies, play scripts, and other art forms. 

Moreover, the Council provides regular training on heritage preservation and restoration at many of Kuwait’s 

heritage sites, both on its mainland and islands. I would also like to note the signing of a bilateral 

agreement with the Department of History at Kuwait University for archaeological exploration and preservation. 

Gulf Affairs: Despite being a small country, Kuwait exhibits a lot of cultural diversity. Can you 

tell us more about the characteristics of Kuwaiti identity and how you see them reflected in 

today’s culture and art? 

Al-Youha: The cultural diversity and lively nature found in the Kuwaiti cultural movement owes itself 

to a number of factors, including, as mentioned earlier, the social tolerance and openness to ‘the other,’ 

as is evident from trends in migration to Kuwait by a number of nationalities, especially Arab. This is accompanied 

by the constant Kuwaiti desire and inclination for the cultural, artistic, and literary exchange, 

amongst other factors. The combination of such internal and external factors creates what one may deem 

today as Kuwait’s current cultural visage, perhaps most known for its openness and tolerance to others’ 

contributions, without incurring a negative backlash to the Kuwaiti identity. 

In turn, the Council, within its professional specializations and obligations and alongside other public institutions 

and civil society organizations, has over the decades contributed to the instilment of this identity. 

The contribution comes from all segments of society including schools and their activities, Kuwait University’s 

research on all aspects relating to identity, iconic public figures, voluntary efforts, and others directed 

towards children. 

This joint effort has given birth to significant cultural and literary output, be it in theatre, novels and 

writing more generally, or travel, without departing from the foundation of the Kuwaiti national identity, 



primarily rooted in openness, tolerance, and acceptance of the other. 

Gulf Affairs: With the advent of social media, how have you seen this impact the cultural movement 

in Kuwait, particularly among the youth segment? 

Al-Youha: It may be more plausible for one to speak of the positives of the social media revolution than it 

is to speak of the negatives on the cultural scene, especially when referring to the young population. 

Today we see the rise of a unique constellation of young Kuwaitis, from both genders, who have been 

given the chance to translate and widely disseminate their work thanks to advances in communications. 

The latest of such examples was the award winning “Saq Al-Bamboo” (The Bamboo Stalk) novel by Saud 

Al-Sanousi, winner of the International Prize for Arabic Fiction—supported by the Booker Prize Foundation—whose 

work was turned into a television series. Similarly, there are many other authors whose work 

found greater recognition due to social media networking. 

Statistically speaking, Kuwaiti society is highly active in such platforms, developing the ability to use them 

in responsible means that have served the cultural scene rather than harmed it in any way. The young 

population, in particular, actively uses social networking to promote arts, including fine arts, caricatures, 

short stories, and as a means to promote workshops and seminars. I also think that Kuwaiti society is 

immune to the potential negative social and cultural impacts of globalization because of its long-standing 

openness that precedes phenomena such as social media networking. Consequently, Kuwaitis have succeeded 

over decades to incorporate diversity without divorcing from the roots of their cultural identity. 

48 Gulf Affairs




UNESCO 

Gulf Affairs: How does UNESCO collaborate with Arab states in the Gulf region? 

Nada Al Hassan: UNESCO collaborates at different levels with the Arab states in the Gulf region through 

its office in Doha, which is responsible for the Gulf cluster. This office ensures close collaboration with Gulf 

countries for the implementation of UNESCO programs. In the area of culture, UNESCO supports Arab 

states in the Gulf region in the implementation of the cultural conventions they have ratified and with 

their cultural activities at large. 

The Arab states of the Gulf have all ratified the World Heritage Convention. By doing so they have committed 

to respect the requirements of the Convention in protecting their cultural and natural heritage, be 

it inscribed or not on the World Heritage List, through appropriate legislative and management modalities 

and protection measures, to ensure its transmission to future generations. This, in itself, is very important 

and very demanding. 

UNESCO supports the Gulf countries as State Parties to the World Heritage Convention in implementing 

these requirements, in particular at the sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, through technical 

and policy advice and training. It also supports them in preparing new nominations for inscription on the 



World Heritage List. For instance, UNESCO has supported Saudi Arabia in preparing the nomination file 

of Al-Hijr Archaeological Site (Madâin Sâlih), advised Qatar on the preparation of Al-Zubarah nomination 

file, and we are currently supporting Kuwait in preparing the nomination file of the Kuwait Towers (Abraj 

al-Kuwait). We also involve civil servants and experts from the region in our training activities, regional 

and international policy-making workshops, and international meetings and conferences. 

Gulf Affairs: What does UNESCO view as some of the most important cultural and heritage 

projects in the region? 

Al Hassan: There are a number of interesting cultural and heritage projects in the region. Each country 

has its own style or focus. Of particular interest are the museums and cultural institutions established by 

Qatar Museums, which have considerably raised the level of cultural institutions in the Arab states to compete 

with similar institutions at the international level. The urban conservation and revitalization projects 

undertaken by the Bahrain Authority for Culture and Antiquities in Manama and the interpretation and 

presentation of their archaeological sites, such as the site museum of Qalat al Bahrain, are valuable initiatives. 

The art fairs and shows such as Art Dubai and the Sharjah Biennial have become hubs for discovering 

new talent at the international level. In Saudi Arabia and Oman for example, the focus is on conserving 

historical sites and on studying and conserving historic cities and cultural landscapes. Much has been 

going on in the region in the past years—there is a real dynamism in some Gulf countries, directed either 

towards historic sites or towards creativity, or both. 

Gulf Affairs: How would you characterize the heritage of the Gulf states? How does the Gulf 

identity shape its view toward its cultural heritage and preservation of culture? What is 

unique or interesting about the Gulf cultural heritage or identity? 

Al Hassan: Cultural heritage in the Gulf states cannot be defined as a single entity or typology. It varies 

from region to region, from country to country, from rock-art prehistoric sites to ancient civilizations such 

as the Dilmun dynasty, from Nabatean sites, to Islamic cities and forts and later to human settlements 

linked to the pearl trade, to name but a few. This diversity counters the narrative about the Gulf states 

being one compact culture versus a multitude of influences and historical layers. Indeed, very rarely do 

people visit the Gulf states as a cultural destination, but this is changing now thanks to the change in the 

cultural policies of Gulf governments. Some are investing considerably in cultural activities, the revitalization 

of historical cities, and making their historical sites become destinations for visits. 

As in any country in the world, public institutions make choices related to which cultural heritage they 

want to value and protect. What’s interesting is how the options in the Arab states of the Gulf region are 

growing to include not only Islamic architecture but also ancient sites and pearl trade settlements. In 

Kuwait, there is even a strong interest for preserving architectural buildings from the Modern Movement 

period. Public policies are steadily embracing the diversity of cultural heritage in the Gulf region; this is 

very interesting indeed. 

Gulf Affairs: What are the challenges and the opportunities related to the creation, conservation, 

and maintenance of the status of World Heritage sites in the Gulf region? 

Al Hassan: Often sites with national or regional value claim a World Heritage status, but this is not the 

idea of the World Heritage Convention. When a country ratifies the Convention, it doesn’t mean that they 

50 Gulf Affairs


need to inscribe all the cultural and natural heritage they have on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Cultural 

and natural heritage in one country is an invaluable asset that we have the responsibility to protect 

collectively. In this sense, and although UNESCO promotes the inscription of sites on the World Heritage 

List, I strongly believe that what is important for a given country is to conserve the legacy it has received 

from past generations, study it, and pass it on to the next ones, regardless of its international status. This 

being said, the challenge of nominating new sites for inscription on the World Heritage List is not an easy 

one. First of all, it is about inventorying cultural and natural heritage and creating a Tentative List that 

bears a potential outstanding universal value; second, it is about protecting those sites with the adequate 

legislation and ensuring their management; third, it is about preparing a solid nomination file that abides 

by very detailed and specialized technical requirements, with appropriate arguments and an appropriate 

narrative that demonstrate their outstanding universal value, authenticity and integrity. 

A nomination file for the inscription on the World Heritage List is not a mere file prepared by a handful 

of experts. It is a process of reflection, identification, research, and demonstration, as well as a process by 

which management and protection measures are developed to be adequate to a potential World Heritage 

status of a given site. 

When nomination files are prepared by national teams that engage in the process of justification, management, 

and protection, the results are much more interesting because there is a strong sense of national 

ownership. This is because the nomination process is a moment in time that fosters capacity building and 

institution building towards cultural heritage protection. This is also why UNESCO insists on the importance 

of participative and inclusive planning. 

Gulf Affairs: What role do you see for local communities in the management and conservation 

of heritage? 

Al Hassan: Local communities are viewed as the owners, users, and protectors of sites. Their role is crucial 

in ensuring good management and in keeping sites alive; they are the main beneficiaries of sites and they 

are their best custodians. Their involvement needs to start from the very beginning of any inscription process. 

This will allow building with them, not only an inscription file, but above all a management system 

in which they are actors and beneficiaries. Only then can you create a win-win situation between public 

institutions and local communities. Indeed, the World Heritage Committee has attributed a growing role 

to local communities in the processes and management systems of inscribed sites. The recently adopted 

policy on World Heritage and Sustainable Development places local communities at the center of World 

Heritage conservation and management. 

Gulf Affairs: Have Gulf countries contributed to the conservation of heritage outside of the 

Gulf region, for instance, Arab or Islamic heritage? 

Al Hassan: Numerous initiatives funded by Gulf countries have contributed to the conservation of cultural 

heritage in the Arab region, such as in the Old City of Jerusalem. Other contributions support UNESCO’s 

response in the areas affected by conflicts and natural disasters. However, much more is needed in terms 

of contribution and exchange with other Arab countries, in particular in view of the ravaging conflicts in 

the Middle East, which destroyed much of their cultural heritage. 

A meaningful contribution to the region’s cultural and natural heritage is also undertaken through the 



work of the Arab Regional Centre for World Heritage created in Bahrain in 2011. The Centre provides 

technical support to the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in the Arab region and undertakes 

a number of training programs and operational and technical assistance activities. 

Gulf Affairs: What future directions and what improvements in the preservation of heritage 

would you suggest in the Gulf region? 

Al Hassan: Again, I can’t see that there is one type of cultural heritage in the Gulf states that requires one 

type of intervention. I would like to stress the importance of the authenticity of sites and call for limiting 

rebuilding and reconstructing lost structures with new materials. This is a practice that I have witnessed 

often at some sites in the region. I would also suggest not to overdo things. Very often, less is more, and 

doing a lot can transform authentic sites into Disneyland-like sites; here, I would raise the red flag. It is 

important not to fall into this trap. Moreover, historic cities such as Jeddah and the historic district of 

Dubai need to be conserved by avoiding gentrification and keeping life and economic activities in them, as 

opposed to turning them into open-air museums that are bound to die. 

We face many challenges in the Arab states: our heritage institutions need great support, our managers 

and civil servants need training and exchange at the regional and international levels, our legislation 

needs improvement, and our local communities need to be more engaged, to start with through education 

curricula. This is a long road where the Arab states of the Gulf region can contribute considerably. 

52 Gulf Affairs

Featured Photo Essay 

Featured Photo Essay: Walls of the GCC 

by Rana Jarbou 

One can easily see the impact of the GCC cities’ 

rapid modernization by looking at their visual 

culture and urban discourse, which are manifest 

in graffiti. However, finding graffiti in the Gulf 

states is challenging. Only a few buildings have 

become canvases for graffiti artists and writers, 

and they are mostly found in old villages in 

Bahrain, scattered among Kuwait’s abandoned 

pre-invasion structures, or in Qatif, Saudi Arabia. 

With little-to-no open-air public spaces, one can 

go long distances searching for a mere expression 

or drawing. 

It is not a mystery why public spaces are impoverished 

or even nonexistent in such wealthy oil-rich 

countries. There are few green spaces and shaded 

streets, and thus there exists little street interface. 

These countries afford only isolated spaces, 

such as shopping malls and commercial centers, 

to which people most often need to drive. With the 

exception of the Dubai Metro, which only opened 

a few years ago, the poor public transportation 

systems in most Gulf cities cause over-dependence 

on vehicles. The lack of a rich and integrated 

graffiti culture reflects the ensuing absence of 

Bahrain 

“Oh Allah, bless Muhammad & the family of Muhammad.” Sar, Bahrain. 

To pray for and send blessings for prophet Muhammad is a common 

practice for Muslims on many occasions, especially during prayer. 

Bahrain’s closed-off village communities are rich with calligraphy 

ranging from Quranic verses to religious supplications and aphorisms, 

depicting a sense of belonging and collective social memory, as some of 

them emphasize the Shia identity. 

In conjunction with the beautiful calligraphy and paintings, dissenting 

graffiti is in abundance, marked by the village communities’ ongoing 

struggle. Sectarian tensions are manifest on these angry walls, ranging 

from displays of unequal education and employment opportunities 

among Bahrainis as well as their undermined representation in the political 

process. This graffiti, at the entrance of Sar village reads “Steadfast 

street,” marking the village boundaries. Police and protestors often 

clash at these village passageways. 

Kuwait 

“Free Kuwait” and “Long live Kuwait” Kuwait City, Kuwait. In the 

Kuwaiti capital, many abandoned buildings and houses from the Iraqi 

invasion in 1990 remain as canvases for graffiti writers and street artists. 

It is unknown when these walls were graffitied, but their western 

pop-culture aesthetics and influences are discernable. Some nationalist 

and religious graffiti can also be found among western idols, popularized 

symbols and graffiti fonts. 

Like other cities in the GCC, graffiti in Kuwait is scattered across the 

city with various aesthetics and purposes ranging from the emerging 

popular art to the Bidoun (stateless people) writings calling for statehood. 

Still dominating this range is graffiti in the spaces where there 

are remnants of war. 

Oman 

Some western inspired graffiti in Muscat’s outskirts, among the very 

little graffiti to be found in Oman. Nationalism and rap are prevailing 

themes. “Oman is one pulse” is one common Arabic phrase written 

across the island, found even on rocks and canoes. 

“In the name of Allah” is graffitied on an aluminum structure in the 

middle of Wahiba sands, in the Rub’ al Khali (empty quarter) desert. 

Religious graffiti, particularly “remember Allah,” “There is no God but 

Allah,” and “Allahu Akbar” are some of the most abundant in all GCC 

countries. 

54

Featured Photo Essay 

an urban ecosystem of social and public spaces, 

and thus the lack of outdoor activities and relations. 

This is why graffiti has become confined to villages 

and residential areas, where there is a sense 

of community. Censorship and surveillance play 

roles, too. And yet even on the clean white walls of 

the new oasis cities, people have left their marks. 

The walls of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain harbor 

some degree of social and political commentary, 

but for the most part religion, love, poetry and 

song lyrics, tribal codes, nationalism (and nostalgia 

for one’s homeland), football, hip hop, and digital 

codes (such as blackberry pin numbers) seem 

to be dominating the graffiti culture of these “cities 

of salt.” 

Rana Jarbou is an independent media artist who 

researches and documents graffiti and street art 

throughout the Arab world. These photos are a 

sample of graffiti captured from 2007 to present 

as part of an ongoing project documenting graffiti 

as counter-narrative. 

Qatar 

In the Doha outskirts and areas inhabited by expat communities, there 

is much graffiti that asserts one’s racial or national identity. “Baluch” 

is one dominant identity marked on Doha’s walls, though Oman and 

the UAE are more populated by them. 50 Cent is idolized here, in line 

with many of the western hip hop icons celebrated in other GCC cities. 

“No wind shakes you, bu Azooz” comes from the old Arabic proverb, “oh 

mountain, no wind shakes you,” to mean you’re so strong and resilient, 

and it became a common expression used in numerous colloquial song 

lyrics. Bu Azooz is a name tag and also seen here are 3-digit tribal 

codes, a common graffiti practice in the Gulf. 

Saudi Arabia 

“Harby and the wafa’ (loyalty) is my path.” Ha’il, Saudi Arabia. “Harby” 

is in reference to the Harb tribe. This rhythmic phrase is a common 

practice among young proud tribalists, adding to the “I am here” graffiti 

motif to say “I am from here.” In addition to their digital codes, ranging 

from blackberry pin numbers, online social profiles and other modes of 

communication, there are 3-digit codes signifying tribes’ names. Along 

with these codes and rhyming in colloquial dialect are proud tribal slogans 

and they extend to other Gulf countries. 

“Oh, time, I wish I know what is coming in my life before I pay the price, 

I’m losing it.” Al Hilla, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Lyrics from the song, 

“Jizaty,” meaning “my reward” by the Saudi hip hop artist Klash (short 

for Kalashnikov). Saudi Arabia’s graffiti culture is very rich and diverse, 

reflective of the very disparate communities across the country 

with themes ranging from joyriding to love. 

United Arab 

Emirates 

Graffiti is uncommon in Abu Dhabi, and in the UAE for that matter, 

apart from the infamous Dubai writer Arcadia Blank. However, there 

are a few tags and phrases lurking behind an alleyway here or there, 

such as joyriding (hajwalah) references to Quranic verses in English. 

This graffitied phrase is on a main highway heading towards Saadiyat 

Island and it reads, “Rest in peace, the soldiers of this nation,” assumingly 

in reference to the ongoing war in Yemen. 

It is more common to find graffiti in the smaller local and expat communities 

and towns in the UAE, with themes including hip hop, religion, 

rebellion and profanity as is depicted here in Sharjah. 


V. Timeline 

2008 

Select Cultural-related Events and Developments across the GCC since 2008 

Dubai’s Technology and Media Free Zone Authority (TECOM) introduces the Gulf Film Festival and Competition 

March 31: The al Dhafra Festival happens for the first time; the festival holds a camel pageant and other events and 

activities known to the region for centuries. 

October: Qatar releases its Qatar National Vision 2030 program outlining goals to increase cultural awareness, 

gender parity, youth participation, and introduce Qatarization quotas. 

November 22: Museum of Islamic Art in Doha opens showcasing Islamic art and architecture, the first of its kind in 

the Arab World. 

2009 

December 31: Construction of the Burj Khalifa is completed. The structure has become a symbol of Dubai and the 

emirate’s modernity. 

2010 

May: Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohammed Al Qassimi, ruler of Sharjah, approves the Heart of Sharjah project, the largest 

heritage project to date in the Gulf that will highlight the historic transformation of the emirate. 

November 25: Plans for Sheikh Zayed National Museum unveiled. 

December: ‘Mathaf: Arab Museum of Modern Art’ opens in Doha. It serves as Qatar’s centerpiece for modern and 

contemporary art and is now holding over 9,000 works, making it the world’s largest specialized collection of its kind. 

2011 

December 21: King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia proposes that all six GCC member states transition 

from cooperation into a union, and Gulf Arab leaders adopt the Riyadh Declaration calling for a “single entity.” 

December: GCC adopts ID card as proof of identity for GCC citizens in both public and private sectors. 

2012 

Manama, Bahrain designated “Arab Capital of Culture” for the year 2012 by the Arab League and under UNESCO. 

May 24: Dubai government sets an agenda to preserve national identity. 

June 30: Bahrain’s Pearling Trail is inscribed as a UNESCO world heritage site, the second such site in the country. 

November 28: UAE releases national charter outlining a code of values and conduct for Emirati citizens in an effort 

to define Emirati character and culture. 

56 Gulf Affairs

V. Timeline 

2013 

Dubai Museum records over 1 million visitors for the first time. 

Qatar-UK 2013’s year of culture celebrated the long-standing relationship between Qatar and the UK. The bilateral 

cultural exchange program was an initiative of the Qatar Museums Authority, developed in partnership with the 

British Council, Qatar’s Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 

April 1: Saudi Arabia begins construction on the tallest structure in the world, the Jeddah Tower, which is planned 

to reach over one kilometer in height. 

July 8: Qatar’s al Zubarah archaeological site is inaugurated as the country’s first UNESCO world heritage site. 

2014 

Sharjah, UAE designated as a “Capital of Islamic Culture” for the year 2014 by the Islamic Conference of Culture 

Ministers. 

Historic Jeddah is inscribed as a UNESCO world heritage site, commemorating the city’s multicultural role as a 

major Red Sea port and as the historic gate to Mecca for Hajj pilgrims. 

January 27: Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed sets up global tourism body to market ‘Brand Dubai,’ an initiative aiming 

to boost the emirate’s global image and bring in more visitors and tourists. 

December: Kuwait’s Abraj Al-Kuwait is nominated as a UNESCO world heritage site for the tower’s representation 

of Kuwait national identity. 

December: Qatar opens Al-Wakra Heritage Village, a replica of a traditional Qatari village designed to blend traditional 

aesthetic with modern society. 

December 1: UAE National Archives partners with Google for digital exhibition on the foundation of the country. 

2015 

February 10: Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid forms the Gender Balance Council to show Dubai’s keenness to increase 

the roles of young Emirati women in the nation’s progress. 

March 3: Saudi Arabia’s Art Council creates an exhibition to explore the history of the country’s contemporary arts 

scene. 

March 17: Dubai hosts the Arab Social Media Influencers Summit, emphasizing ideas that connect people in innovative 

ways. 

March 19: Bahrain pushes for a pan-GCC media strategy in line with the region’s traditions and principles 

September 14: GCC Undersecretaries of Culture underscore the importance of strengthening a Gulf identity through 

joint activities and events. 


57

V. Timeline 

2016 

Kuwait designated as a “Capital of Islamic Culture” for the year 2016 by the Islamic Conference of Culture Ministers. 

February 3: Saudi Arabia marks the Al-Janadriyah Festival’s 30 th anniversary as a key mechanism for preserving 

culture and a traditional Saudi national identity. 

February 8: The UAE transforms the Ministry of Culture into the Ministry of Culture and Knowledge Development 

and creates a mixed-gender Youth National Council to advise the government. 

April 7: Saudi Arabia announces a plan to introduce permanent residence for foreigners. 

April 20: The UAE’s Federal National Council forms a special committee to address the rising trend of mixed-marriages 

in the country, a phenomenon the Council says may impact national identity. 

April 26: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 identifies national identity and pride as a major theme, and calls to strengthen 

and preserve ancient cultural sites and traditional practices while working to integrate the nation into global cultural 

circuits. 

April 30: UAE Ministry of Culture and Knowledge announces workers’ day tribute in nod to the country’s large 

expatriate workforce. 

July 30: Oman opens its National Museum, an institution that aims to preserve the components of Omani cultural 

heritage by supporting research and scientific and historical studies, and heritage conservation plans. 

August 31: The 2,000-seat Dubai Opera opens. 

September 13: The UAE announces the World’s First Global Cultural Leadership Summit for April 2017. 

58 Gulf Affairs

Call for Articles 

Higher Education in the Gulf States: Present & Future 

Submission due date: Friday, December 16, 2016 

Word limit: 1,000 – 1,500 words 

Gulf Affairs invites scholars to submit original analytical articles for its upcoming issue entitled 

“Higher Education in the Gulf States: Present & Future.” 

Gulf Affairs is a journal founded by OxGAPS | Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum, a University of Oxford-based 

platform. The journal is exclusively dedicated to furthering knowledge and dialogue on the pressing issues 

and challenges facing the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Each issue is dedicated to a particular theme, allowing for a comprehensive 

coverage from various analytical perspectives and fields of study. Accepted articles are submitted to reviewers for 

comment prior to publication. 

To capture the complexity of the various issues and challenges around Gulf Energy Producers, articles are encouraged 

from a wide range of disciplinary lenses including: Economics, Politics/Political Economy, International Relations, 

Law, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Area Studies, Education and History. Balanced articles supported by sufficient 

and credible sources which offer a unique perspective on the theme will likely be accepted for 

1 

publication. 

Gulf Affairs welcomes analytical articles on (though not limited to) the following areas: 

• What is the state of higher education in the GCC region and how is it preparing citizens for the labor market? 

• How have scholarships played a role in the higher education system? What are the trends of study abroad 

experiences and their impacts? 

• How is the expansion of private universities and international branch campuses in the Gulf changing traditional 

public education across the region? What is the interplay of the increasing usage of English as a 

language of instruction in Arabic speaking societies? 

• What are unique attributes and characteristics of student life/activities across GCC campuses? How is 

co-education in universities viewed by these societies? 

• What is the status of Technical and Vocational Education & Training and how is this evolving? How do or 

should multi-national organizations contribute to hands on training? What is the availability of such opportunities 

and other internships? 

• What are the leading research/scientific outputs and in which areas are the Gulf states behind? 

• How should higher education institutions in the Gulf be ranked/measured and which metrics are applicable? 

• What are the factors impacting teacher recruitment and turnover and how does this influence the quality of 

education? 

Submission Guidelines: Please send articles to gulfaffairs@oxgaps.org by Friday, December 16, 2016. Authors 

whose articles have been accepted for review will be notified within two weeks after the submission 

deadline 

1 For citing and referencing, use Chicago Manual of Style endnotes. 

Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum | St Antony’s College, 62 Woodstock Road, Oxford, OX2 6JF, UK 

www.oxgaps.org

www.oxgaps.org

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