DT e-Paper 08 March 2017

2
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2017
DT
News
CIA sensed Bangladesh
independence was inevitable
The CIA recently made available online several thousand documents on Bangladesh’s pre- and
post-independence events. Today Dhaka Tribune publishes the CIA’s early predictions
about East Pakistan’s emancipation and observations about the strength and weakness of an
independent Bangladesh, the second of a series of exclusive stories
• Probir Kumar Sarker
As the chances of East Pakistan
getting separated from West Pakistan
increased sharply following
the December 1970 elections which
reflected the people’s resistance
against exploitation and dominance,
the CIA observed in early
March that Bangladesh’s future under
the rule of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s
Awami League would not be
a smooth journey either.
The report stated that an independent
East Pakistan would begin
with some assets, notably in the
political realm but also including
an ethnically homogenous population.
But it would “face economic
problems of staggering proportions
because of its dearth of natural resources,
its burgeoning population,
and its lack of capital, economic infrastructure,
and entrepreneurial
and technical skills.”
The dominant agricultural sector
– mostly dependent on jute –
could make little headway unless
flood waters were controlled, the
CIA said, adding that the process
would require considerable capital.
The intelligence memorandum
“East Pakistan: An Independent
Nation?” dated March 1, 1971 and
published online in January this
year gives a glimpse of erstwhile
East Pakistan’s strength and limitations,
from agriculture to industrial
growth and poor condition of the
Bangali army men.
The secret document was prepared
by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated within the
Directorate of Intelligence.
Economic situation
The rapid population growth was
mentioned as the top economic
factor in the report estimating the
number of people to be 73-75 million
in East Pakistan, a land area
about the size of Florida or Arkansas,
with 90% rural population and
20% literacy rate.
Based on a conservative growth
rate, the CIA predicted that the
population would be 115m in 1985
and 180m in 2000.
The average per capita income
of East Pakistan was about $60, far
below that in West Pakistan and
Inspired by Bangabandhu’s historic speech on March 7, 1971, retired army personnel assembled at Outer Stadium in Dhaka to
prepare for the Liberation War
RASHID TALUKDER/ PHOTO SOURCE: MUKTIJUDDHO E-ARCHIVE TRUST
not much higher than the level
in 1948.
According to the 1961 census,
only 4.3% of the East Pakistani labour
force was engaged in manufacturing,
almost entirely in smallscale
industry.
Private enterprise was generally
very inefficient in East Pakistan,
where “numerous small, uneconomic
shops produce similar products,
using outdated methods and
without sufficient capital for expansion,”
the report said.
There had been little private
investment in East Pakistan in
comparison with the West wing,
accounting to about 25% of the national
total. Capital was largely in
the hands of a few wealthy families
who had migrated from Pakistan,
India and Myanmar.
Much of the managerial class
resident of East Pakistan was
“composed of Urdu-speaking Muslim
refugees [known as Biharis]
from India, who have never been
accepted by the Bangalis and who
would probably move to West Pakistan
if the East wing became independent.”
The CIA underscored the need
for more workers with technical
skills for the development of an independent
East Pakistan.
Jute was the main cash crop at
that time while 45% of the total industrial
workforce was engaged in
manufacturing jute products. But
jute products had already started
facing competition in the world
markets from synthetics, the report
said.
The agricultural sector used to
face massive setback due to annual
flooding and drought, while the
country was also subject to high
salinity and devastating cyclones.
The November 1970 cyclone killed
at least 500,000 people in coastal
areas.
East Pakistan was also facing
power shortages and frequent outages
due to lack of mineral resources.
Until 1970, the country had only
one gas field in Sylhet for power
generation and producing fertiliser.
“There are no easily exploitable
coal fields in East Pakistan …
hydroelectric power possibilities
in East Pakistan are limited.” A
nuclear power plant was set to be
constructed at Rooppur of Pabna
with the support of Belgium in five
years.
Lack of adequate transport system
was another reason behind
sluggish growth in East Pakistan.
Civil service and foreign ties
In 1965, there were 151 Bangalis in
the civil service out of a nationwide
total of 461, the CIA report
said, adding: “Under Mujibur Rahman,
however, a civil service might
not have as great a role to play.”
As of late 1970, only a few government
agencies drew as many as
half of their employees from East
Pakistan. Many Bangalis had held
lesser positions in the bureaucracy
below the elite civil service level.
In 1970, only 11 out of 53 Pakistani
heads of missions were Bangalis.
“Mujib is relatively well travelled
and has expressed himself on
certain foreign policy aspects. He
favours the restoration of trade ties
with India and the peaceful settlement
of outstanding disputes.
The CIA anticipated that the independence
of East Pakistan might
give rise to dreams among Bangalis
on both sides and concern in
New Delhi over the formation of a
“Greater Bengal.”
“The AL does not appear to be
particularly sympathetic to communist
China, and some AL leaders
seem suspicious of Chinese intentions,”
the CIA document reads.
The US is apparently held in
high esteem by several senior AL
leaders. At the same time, the report
stated, “there have been frequent
contacts between Soviet diplomats
and AL leaders, and Soviet
assistance after the cyclone of 1970
was substantial.” •
PAGE 1 PHOTO CAPTION
Flanked by Awami League leaders,
Bangabandhu holds a press
conference at his Dhanmondi 32
residence in Dhaka on March 3, 1971
after ‘talks’ with Yahya Khan and
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto failed