SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
of attrition. Additionally, SIGAR reviewed payroll documentation and identified several
irregularities, primarily with the data collected and the forms used to facilitate the
salary-disbursement process. 27
Another SIGAR audit found the Afghan National Engineer Brigade (NEB) is incapable of
operating independently, largely due to delays in basic training and in providing engineertraining
equipment, even after USFOR-A lowered the goal to train the NEB by December 31,
2014, to a “partially capable” level. 28
In the area of ANDSF equipment, SIGAR looked at DOD’s accountability for vehicles provided
to the ANDSF. In that 2012 audit report, SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not previously
submitted claims for vehicles damaged or equipment and parts lost or stolen during transit,
and so was not reimbursed by the transportation contractors. Rather, CSTC-A paid separately
for repairs and replacement of missing equipment and parts. SIGAR also observed that
CSTC-A was providing fuel to the ANA for vehicles that had in fact been destroyed. 29 In a 2016
audit report on the ANA Technical Equipment Maintenance Program, SIGAR found that the
capacity of the Afghans to manage the supply chain was lacking, the costs of spare parts were
significantly underestimated, performance metrics did not accurately assess the contractor
performance or progress, ANA maintenance capability did not develop as anticipated, contract
oversight declined due to deteriorating security conditions, and the contractor was paid
based on the number of vehicles in the fleet instead of the number of vehicles repaired. 30
In addition, since 2010, the United States has increasingly shifted from directly purchasing
fuel for the ANDSF to providing on-budget assistance to the ministries of defense and
interior—including direct assistance (bilateral or government-to-government assistance)
and assistance provided through multi-donor trust funds. On-budget assistance is intended
to allow the Afghans more freedom to manage their own budget and to build their capacity
for doing so. 31 However, fuel is easy to steal and easy to sell on the black market. In 2015, the
DOD Inspector General reported on the effectiveness of the ANDSF’s policies and procedures
for the management and accountability of fuel, finding that the Afghan government had
“inadequate” control measures, “leading to gaps and vulnerabilities that increased the probability
of theft and the diversion of fuel.” 32 The theft of fuel not only robs U.S. taxpayers and
damages the reconstruction effort, but stolen fuel and profits from selling it can wind up in
the hands of insurgents. 33 SIGAR has been told that a high percentage of fuel has been stolen
and that Taliban commanders give instructions to their forces to buy weapons, ammunition,
and fuel from the Afghan army and police. SIGAR also has learned that CSTC-A is considering
ending on-budget funding for fuel purchases.
SIGAR has also looked at the program to provide literacy training to ANDSF personnel.
Literacy affects mission success as widespread illiteracy undermines effective training, use of
technical manuals, understanding orders, inventorying equipment, documenting operations,
and other vital military functions. SIGAR was concerned that, despite a $200 million literacytraining
contract, the overall literacy rate of the ANDSF was unknown. The training programs
focused on numbers of graduates; there was no tracking of how many graduates remain on
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION