SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
payments are sent directly into the employee’s bank account. 45 According to CSTC-A, this
structure will dramatically reduce the potential for nonexistent personnel to be entered into
APPS, although it will not completely eliminate the risk of paying for “ghost” personnel.
Routine checks are required to determine that personnel are properly accounted for and are
still actively serving in the ANDSF. 46
What has Changed since the last High-Risk List
The number of armed groups opposing the Afghan government has increased since
Operation Enduring Freedom mission ended on December 31, 2014, and Afghan forces
took lead responsibility for their country’s security. During a press briefing on December 2,
2016, Resolute Support (RS) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) commander General
Nicholson said 20 terrorist groups were present in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. 47
The Taliban and other insurgents have gained territory over the past two years.
Approximately 63.4% of the country’s districts are under Afghan government control or influence
as of August 28, 2016, a decrease from the 70.5% reported as of January 29, 2016. During
a press briefing on September 23, 2016, General Nicholson reported 68–70% of the population
lived in those districts. 48 Of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 258 districts were
under government control (88 districts) or influence (170), 33 districts (in 16 provinces) were
under insurgent control (8) or influence (25), and 116 districts were “contested.” 49 USFOR-A
described contested districts as having “negligible meaningful impact from insurgents.” 50
The ANDSF implemented a “sustainable security strategy” in the summer of 2016 that
may have increased the number of districts controlled or influenced by insurgents. The new
strategy prioritizes the use of available resources by following a “hold-fight-disrupt” methodology.
51 The Resolute Support Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications described the
sustainable security strategy as maintaining control of certain, but not all, areas of the country.
The ANDSF will immediately act against insurgent activity in a hold-or-fight area, such
as key population centers, major economic arteries, and the Ring Road. In other areas the
ANDSF will disrupt insurgent operations when resources permit, but will no longer seek to
hold on or fight for those areas. 52
Reports of “ghost” soldiers and police continue to surface. In January 2016, media reported
that the price of maintaining ghost soldiers on the rolls was being paid on the battlefield, as
the number of troops fighting alongside “ghost soldiers” is a fraction of the men required
for the fight. 53 In June 2016, the Helmand Province police chief claimed half of the Helmand
police consisted of ghost personnel. 54 In late July, General Nicholson sent a letter to the
Minister of Interior outlining the actions required to reduce or eliminate ghost police as a condition
for continued U.S. support. 55
After the 2014 withdrawal of most U.S. and Coalition forces from Helmand, the Afghan
Army’s 215th Corps, which is responsible for security in Helmand, began to suffer setbacks.
In late 2015, insurgents began occupying parts of Helmand Province. As a result the United
States sent additional U.S. Army soldiers to help rebuild and reinforce the beleaguered
215th Corps. 56
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION