SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
• Some 48% of firms in Afghanistan were expected to give gifts or pay bribes to secure a
government contract.
• Approximately 60% of firms in Afghanistan were expected to give gifts or pay bribes to
secure a construction permit.
• About 24% of firms in Afghanistan were expected to give gifts or pay bribes to secure
an import license. 70
Reducing corruption and increasing accountability are important components of the
U.S. reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States has designated
numerous programs or activities to directly or indirectly strengthen the ability of Afghan
government institutions to combat corruption. In 2010, in line with a commitment to
provide more assistance directly to the Afghan government, the United States and other
donors promised technical assistance to develop the Afghan government’s capacity to
reduce corruption. 71
SIGAR has been working with the Afghan government to reduce corruption. For
example, SIGAR investigated a case along with the U.S. military and the Afghan government
that prevented millions in U.S. funds from being lost to corruption. Following a 2013
SIGAR audit that found CSTC-A lacked sufficient accountability over fuel procured for the
Afghan Army, CSTC-A turned responsibility for procuring ANA fuel over to the Ministry of
Defense (MOD).
SIGAR’s subsequent work, however, identified problems with the MOD’s ability to manage
and account for on-budget assistance used to pay for fuel. In 2015, SIGAR uncovered
corruption in the award of a nearly $1 billion, multi-year Afghan MOD fuel contract. The
breakthrough in this case came after SIGAR and CSTC-A briefed President Ashraf Ghani on
February 1, 2015, that four contractors had engaged in price-fixing, bid-rigging, and bribery
prior to the award of the MOD fuel contract, criminally increasing its cost to the Afghan
government and the American taxpayer by more than $214 million. 72
Following the briefing, President Ghani immediately suspended the MOD officials
involved in the fuel contract award, cancelled the entire contract, warned the contractors
involved of possible debarment, and assigned an independent Afghan investigator to look
into the award of the MOD fuel contract, as well as that of an additional 11 MOD contracts
for other commodities. Such rapid and decisive action sends a strong signal in a country
routinely rated as one of the world’s most corrupt. The fuel scandal accelerated plans to
reform Afghan government procurement with the replacement of the Special Procurement
Commission (SPC) with a National Procurement Commission (NPC) chaired by President
Ashraf Ghani himself. A SIGAR Investigations Directorate representative attends the
weekly NPC meetings. Generally, the only non-Afghan representatives at the NPC meetings
are from CSTC-A and SIGAR.
In September 2016, SIGAR released a follow-up to its 2009 report on Afghanistan’s
High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO). The new report found that the HOO
still suffered from a lack of independence and authority to fulfill its mandate, a lack of
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION