SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
press briefing that the majority of narcotics funding originates in Helmand and estimated that
Helmand provides 60% of Taliban funding. 182 The general also remarked on the difficulty of
fighting the drug trade in Helmand due to the interconnection between insurgent groups and
criminal networks. He attributed the cause of major fighting in Helmand to the insurgents’
desire to preserve the income from the opium industry. 183
What SIGAR Found
SIGAR reports on opium cultivation have highlighted the ineffectiveness of U.S.-supported
law-enforcement and alternative livelihood programs in combating opium cultivation. 184
Eradication efforts have had minimal impact on production and sometimes fostered resentment
among farmers, who perceived it as a corrupt practice for local officials to extract bribes
in order for their crop to be spared. 185 Some farmers are still responsible for expenses and
loans incurred after the destruction of their opium crop. 186 According to UNODC, only 355
hectares were eradicated this year—the lowest amount since the start of the reconstruction
effort—while cultivation levels reached 201,000 hectares. 187
While the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and its specialized units have led
successful seizures of drugs and precursor chemicals, the seizures are negligible compared
to current production estimates. 188 During the 2016 fiscal year, the CNPA conducted approximately
180 operations resulting in nearly 300 detentions. Over 123,000 kilograms of hashish,
3,100 kilograms of heroin, 9,000 kilograms of heroin, 6,450 kilograms of morphine, and 4,900
kilograms of precursor chemicals were seized. 189
Certain reconstruction projects such as improved irrigation, roads, and agricultural assistance
can actually lead to increased opium cultivation. SIGAR found that affordable deep-well
technology turned 200,000 hectares of desert in southwestern Afghanistan into arable land
over the past decade. Due to relatively high opium prices and the rise of an inexpensive,
skilled, and mobile labor force, much of this newly arable land is dedicated to opium cultivation.
Poppy-growing provinces that were once declared “poppy free” have seen a resurgence
in cultivation. 190
USAID has implemented several alternative-livelihood programs over the past decade with
mixed results. The Kandahar Food Zone, which ended in 2016 and spent over $24 million, has
rehabilitated 17 irrigation canals, benefitting over 22,000 households according to USAID. The
$45.3 million Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program was
extended for an additional three years, but USAID’s own assessment revealed that the majority
of exports went to one country rather than numerous international markets as the program
intended. The portfolio of Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) projects,
costing over $300 million, has also yielded inconsistent results. For instance, RADP-South has
spent nearly $70 million as of September 2016, but only 10,260 hectares of high-value crops had
been cultivated by farmers. Security challenges have also impacted RADP-West activities. 191
In its October 2014 Quarterly Report, SIGAR called for a whole-of-government review of
counternarcotics efforts in reconstruction programs. It also called on international donors
and the new Afghan government to seize the opportunity to include measures to counter the
illicit opium economy in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework’s ministerial review in
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION