SIGAR HIGH-RISK LIST

HIGH-RISK LIST
effort. The report will provide recommendations to improve ongoing counternarcotics programs
and better address illicit economies to achieve greater success in future complex
contingency operations.
What has Changed since the last High-Risk List
Last year, Afghanistan unveiled a National Drug Action Plan revising its counternarcotics
strategy. Though the United States Government had informed SIGAR in 2015 it would revise its
own strategy, the new strategy has not yet been released. 199
The continued deterioration of security has undermined progress towards curbing opium
cultivation and production. Eradication efforts in 2016 were negligible when compared
to cultivation results and USAID had to temporarily suspend activities on certain alternative
development projects. The United States has ceased the Good Performers Initiative, a
program that rewarded provinces for achieving “poppy-free” status, due to financial management
and capacity issues at the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. 200 The United States recently
launched two alternative-livelihood programs in partnership with the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Development Programme rather than implementing
them through USAID. 201 Though interdiction results have declined since the drawdown of
Coalition forces, the arrival of a Resolute Support Advisory Team has improved coordination
of resources between the SMW and the Counternarcotics Police specialized units. Since the
team’s arrival in February 2016, two of the country’s top drug traffickers have been captured. 202
Questions for Policymakers
From 2008 to 2011, while Coalition forces were active in the province, poppy cultivation in
Helmand Province steadily decreased from 103,590 hectares to 63,307 hectares. The Helmand
program included distributing heavily subsidized wheat seeds, some eradication, and a publicawareness
campaign in the province’s agricultural heartland. Between 2012 and 2014, the trend
reversed dramatically: land under poppy cultivation increased 34% from 2012 to 2013. 203 More
alarming, the area under poppy cultivation within the Helmand Food Zone increased by 50%. 204
The Helmand experience raises an important question as U.S. policymakers look beyond
2016. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) fought hard in 2016 to hold
Helmand in the face of a determined insurgent offensive, but given the potential for the province
to collapse, does the United States have a strategy to combat the “narcotics/insurgency/
corruption nexus”? 205
Other important questions are:
• Has U.S. assistance for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan succeeded in achieving its
overarching goals and objectives?
• Is the Afghan government capable of assuming a lead role and sustaining the fragile
progress made by U.S.-supported counternarcotics operations?
• How can the U.S. implement a more effective strategy? Since the opium trade provides an
important revenue source for the insurgency, can victory be assured so long as the U.S. fails
to address counternarcotics?
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION