The Intelligence Review | volume 1 | issue 1

• Will ISIS be defeated or grow stronger in
2016?
• Will there be a peace treaty between the
Taliban and the Afghan government?
• How likely is the possibility of a military
coup in North Korea?
• How likely is the outbreak of a full-scale
civil war in Burundi in 2016?
• Will the European Union’s Schengen Treaty
be abolished?
• Will the per-barrel price of oil continue to
fall in 2016?
• How will Russia’s presence in Syria affect
the strength of Hezbollah?
• Will Iraq edge closer to territorial breakup
in 2016?
• Will there be a change of government in
Venezuela?
• Will there be major pro-Russian unrest in
the Baltics, similar to Ukraine’s?
• How will the Oregon standoff affect the US
anti-federal government movement?
FOREWORD BY JOHN NOMIKOS
EDITED BY JOSEPH FITSANAKIS

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• Will ISIS be defeated or grow stronger in
2016?
• Will there be a peace treaty between the
Taliban and the Afghan government?
• How likely is the possibility of a military
coup in North Korea?
• How likely is the outbreak of a full-scale
civil war in Burundi in 2016?
• Will the European Union’s Schengen Treaty
be abolished?
• Will the per-barrel price of oil continue to
fall in 2016?
• How will Russia’s presence in Syria affect
the strength of Hezbollah?
PUBLISHED BY THE
EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE
CHANTICLEER INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
EDITED BY
JOSEPH FITSANAKIS
COASTAL CAROLINA UNIVERSITY
• Will Iraq edge closer to territorial breakup
in 2016?
• Will there be a change of government in
Venezuela?
• Will there be major pro-Russian unrest in
the Baltics, similar to Ukraine’s?
• How will the Oregon standoff affect the US
anti-federal government movement?
3

European Intelligence Academy www.euintelligenceacademy.eu
The European Intelligence Academy (EIA) was established in 2013 as an international network of
intelligence studies scholars, specialists and students, who are dedicated to promoting research and
scholarship across the European Union (EU), as well as between the EU and other parts of the world.
One of the primary aims of the EIA network is to highlight the work of emerging graduate and
undergraduate scholars in the intelligence studies field, while encouraging cooperation in research and
scholarship between students of intelligence. The EIA is an initiative of the Research Institute for
European and American Studies (RIEAS).
Chanticleer Intelligence Brief www.cibrief.org
The Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB) was established in 2015 as a student-run initiative supported
by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University (CCU) in Conway, South Carolina, United
States. It operates as an ancillary practicum for students in the National Security and Intelligence
Studies program who wish to cultivate and refine their ability to gather, present, and analyze
information in accordance with techniques used in the analytical profession. The goal of the CIB is to
train aspiring intelligence professionals in the art of producing well-researched, impartial and factual
analytical products.
The European Intelligence Academy
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Alimos, 17456, Athens, Greece
Tel/Fax: +30-210-991-1214 (Europe)
++1-423-742-1627 (United States)
Email: rieasinfo@gmail.com
ISBN-13: 978-1535402842
ISBN-10: 1535402849
Copyright © 2016 The European Intelligence Academy (EIA)
All rights reserved, Published in North Charleston, SC, United States, in July 2016.
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No parts of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of the European Intelligence Academy (EIA), or expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed
with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. You are not permitted to circulate this work in any other form and you must
impose this same condition on any acquirer of this volume.
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5

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Table of Contents
Foreword page 09
Dr. John Nomikos
Introduction page 11
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
Will There be Major Pro-Russian Unrest in the Baltics, Similar to Ukraine’s, in 2016? page 15
Emily Clingenpeel
Will the United Socialist Party of Venezuela Come Closer to Losing Power in 2016? page 19
Sarah Harvey
Will the Per-Barrel Price of Oil Continue to Fall in 2016? page 23
Connor Kilgore
How Likely is a Military Coup in North Korea in 2016? page 27
Ryan Haag
Will ISIS be Defeated or Grow Stronger in 2016? page 31
Grant Barratt
Will There Be a Peace Treaty Between the Taliban and the Afghan Government in 2016? page 35
Amy Thomas
Will Iraq Edge Closer to Official Territorial Breakup in 2016? page 39
Amanda Corona
Will Russia’s Military Involvement in Syria Increase the Strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon? page 43
Benjamin Malone
Will a Full-Scale Civil War Erupt in Burundi in 2016? page 47
Matt Hayes
Will the European Union’s Schengen Treaty be Abolished in 2016? page 51
Jeremy Lee
Will the US Anti-Federal Government Movement Gain in Popularity Due to the Oregon Standoff? page 55
Diana Evans
Biographical notes on contributors page 59
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8

Foreword
The Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) was founded in 2006
with the aim of promoting the understanding of international affairs. Special attention is
devoted to transatlantic relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration,
international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian foreign policy as well as
policy-making on national and international markets.
In 2013, RIEAS initiated the European Intelligence Academy (EIA) project in order to promote
the field of intelligence studies in European academic institutions. The EIA aims to advance
the intelligence profession by setting standards, building resources, sharing knowledge within
the intelligence field, and promoting a strong intelligence culture in European Union member
states. It also promotes cross-border research and scholarship cooperation between intelligence
scholars in the EU and scholars in other parts of the world. Furthermore, the EIA highlights
the work of emerging postgraduate and undergraduate scholars in the intelligence studies field
and provides a forum for them to exchange ideas and pursue relevant research. Ultimately,
one of the main goals of the EIA is to connect young scholars who focus their undergraduate
and postgraduate studies on intelligence in Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world.
With that in mind, I welcome the first copy of The Intelligence Review, Vol.1, No.1, July 2016,
edited by Professor Joseph Fitsanakis of Coastal Carolina University’s Intelligence and National
Security Studies program, and published by the EIA in association with the Chanticleer
Intelligence Brief. Well done to all the young scholars whose work has been included in this
publication!
Dr. John Nomikos
Director, European Intelligence Academy
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10

Introduction
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
Assistant Professor, Intelligence and National Security Studies, Coastal Carolina University
Deputy Director, European Intelligence Academy
In the opening lines of his 1966 book Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Sherman
Kent proclaims that “intelligence means knowledge”. He goes on to explain that all intelligence
activity “consists basically of two sorts of operation: [...] the surveillance operation, [namely] the
many ways by which the contemporary world is put under close and systematic observation;
and the research operation, [which describes] attempts to establish meaningful patterns out of
what was observed in the past and attempts to get meaning out of what appears to be going
on now”. The analytical pioneer of the Central Intelligence Agency proposes that the two
operations “are virtually inseparable [and] closely bound together by their common devotion
to the production of knowledge” (Kent 2015:3-4).
Kent’s description of the intelligence process forms the methodological basis of the Chanticleer
Intelligence Brief (CIB). The CIB is a student-led effort supported by the Department of Politics
at Coastal Carolina University, which operates as an ancillary practicum for students in Coastal’s
National Security and Intelligence Studies (INSS) program. The CIB was founded in early
2015 because students in the INSS program asked for it. In the words of Benjamin Malone,
the CIB’s founder and first executive director, the “original vision was for CIB to be designed
for exceptional, dedicated intelligence students who wanted to […] show, at an undergraduate
level, that they are capable of doing more than just graduating with a degree”. In doing so,
students would gain “a better understanding of cultures and bring their regional familiarity to
a whole new level”, he adds (Harvey 2016).
The CIB, then, is an effort to implement Kent’s two-fold understanding of the intelligence process
in the undergraduate environment. The central idea is that students who aspire to master
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intelligence analysis must develop the analytical confidence that comes with region- or topicbased
specialization. They must be, in the classical Greek sense, philomaths, lovers of studying
and learning in depth about their chosen area of expertise. At the same time, and with the
same degree of vigor, CIB analysts must seek to be polymaths. That is, they must develop their
personal method of amassing expertise on a large number of varied subject areas, so that they
can draw on complex bodies of knowledge to answer, with precision, specific questions and
solve specific problems. In the words of Kent, they must be able to “establish meaningful
patterns” so as to “get meaning out of what appears to be going on now” (Kent 2015:4).
Upon joining the CIB, student analysts join ‘Sections’, that is, groups of other analysts who
specialize in a common geographical region. They work collaboratively to issue measurable
periodic forecasts on current topics that relate to their region. Additionally, each analyst is
given the task of answering a specific question concerning an ongoing development that relates
to his or her area of expertise. The following is an example of a question posed to a student
analyst: “what is the likelihood of a military coup taking place in North Korea by the end of
April of this year?”; or, “will Catalonia edge significantly closer to gaining independence from
Spain by June of this year?”. Analysts occupy themselves with their question for an entire
semester. Throughout that time, they are expected to brief the entire CIB analytical team on a
weekly basis, sometimes in the presence of inquisitive veterans of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the United States Intelligence
Community. In the process, student analysts are asked questions and are evaluated on their
written and oral-presentation skills. At the end of the semester, each analyst produces a brief
—though dense— analytical product that aims to provide an informed and accurate forecast
in response to their analytical question.
Long before they reach the end of the semester, CIB analysts begin to see themselves —and,
crucially, to be seen by their peers and even by their professors— as knowledgeable specialists
in their area. They display an unmistakable aura of confidence that only comes with in-depth
mastery of one’s field. This is something that the students carry with them to class, at academic
conferences, in discussions with peers, mentors, graduate school committees, and job
interviewers in the public and private sectors. Since its establishment, the CIB has seen its
current and former members present their research at regional and national conferences,
publish their work in academic journals, perform intelligence task at embassies, private companies
and government agencies, and enter prestigious graduate schools in the United States and
abroad. It is my belief that this volume, which represents a small sample of the CIB’s recent and
timely output, displays the analytical strength and intellectual precision that Sherman Kent had
in mind when he so eloquently outlined the connection between intelligence and knowledge.
References Cited
Harvey, S. (2016) “Innovation, Preparation, Dedication: The Brains Behind Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief”, The Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, 6 February
accessed on 28 June 2016.
Kent, S. (2015) Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
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14

Will There be Major Pro-Russian Unrest in the
Baltics, Similar to Ukraine’s, in 2016?
Emily Clingenpeel
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and accusations of Russian involvement in the Ukraine
crisis in 2014, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have voiced concerns of a
potential Russian invasion on their eastern borders. There has been no substantial evidence of
pro-Russian unrest coming directly from within these countries, something that can be
attributed to their broad acceptance of a Western-style democracy and membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ukraine’s government has been relatively
inefficient since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, because it has broadly reflected the
pro-Russian and pro-Western division among the population. The high level of Russian
influence and anti-Western sentiment in the eastern regions of Ukraine are believed to have
been the main factors that have resulted in the pro-Russian unrest within the country. These
factors are not apparent in the Baltic region, and will likely not result in the same pro-Russian
unrest seen in Ukraine. The perceived aggression that the Baltics see coming from Russia is
likely a result of NATO’s expansion, not the activities of the Baltic countries themselves.
Context
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States transitioned toward a Western-style
democracy more quickly than the remaining twelve newly independent states. They became
members of NATO in 2004, and were therefore granted the military security that came with
Article 5 of the alliance. At the same time, Russia’s loss of the Baltics was not necessarily a
major concern in terms of protecting its national interest. The first post-Soviet Russian
Foreign Ministry assigned the Baltic States to their department that dealt with Scandinavia, not
the department that dealt with the former Soviet Union —a clear indicator of acceptance of
15

the Baltics’ Western orientation (Drobhizeva 1993:2833). The expansion of NATO is much
more publicly scrutinized by Russian leadership than the fact that the Baltic States became
members. NATO has consistently been denounced by the Russian leadership, as they perceive
its expansion to be a threat to their country’s national interests and security (De Luce 2016).
A 1987 verbal agreement between Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and United States (US)
President George H.W. Bush stating that NATO would not expand into central Europe or
place military infrastructure close to Russia’s eastern border has been frequently used by the
Russian leadership to justify their disapproval. However, the successive leaders of either party
were not bound to uphold this agreement (Bender 2016). NATO has since expanded into
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Baltic States.
Ukraine had a much different transition toward independence after the Soviet Union
dissolved. Russians believe that they and the Ukrainians are essentially the same narod, meaning
they are bearers of the same national culture (Solchanyk 1998:539). There are substantial
numbers of ethnic Russians that were integrated into eastern Ukraine, likely providing the
basis for the pro-Russian separatist movements that have made the country unstable since
2014. The government was heavily influenced by Russian political figures and oligarchs, and
was unable to transition toward a Western-style democracy due to Russian opposition
(McMahon 2014). However, the Orange Revolution in 2004 was the first prominent pro-
Western uprising against the pro-Russian government that hinted toward a change. In 2008,
NATO declared that an independent and stable Ukraine was the key to Euro-Atlantic security
and promised the country future membership. In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian
politician, was elected as the Ukrainian president and terminated the Euro-Atlantic security
talks. He was ousted by the parliament and fled to Russia in 2014, sparking a number of pro-
Russian separatist movements against the Ukrainian government. The events that followed led
to an armed conflict between Ukrainian nationalists and the separatists, with accusations of
clandestine Russian and Western support for the two factions.
Implications
The territory of Crimea, originally given to Ukraine by then Russian President Nikita Khrushchev
in 1954, was formally annexed by Russia in March of 2014, although the act was considered
illegal by the United Nations. This led to the notion that Russia’s perceived aggression was
becoming more of a threat to some of the countries in Eastern Europe, namely the Baltic
States and Poland. They essentially called on NATO to provide an increased military presence
in the region to deter the threat that they perceived as coming from Russia. In early 2016, the
US Department of Defense made plans to request $3.4 billion in 2017 to reinforce its military
presence closer to Russia’s western border (Anon. 2016b). Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
stated that NATO welcomed these plans because the eastern part of the alliance would be
more secure with an increased troop presence (Bender 2016). However, Russian Foreign
Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that these moves would create grounds to
implement military plans against Russia and practical steps to push Western military
infrastructure closer to Russia’s border. She also noted that these initiatives were “aggressive”
and NATO was using a non-existent threat from Russia as a pretext. Moscow has consistently
let it be known that any such moves by NATO will be reciprocated (Anon. 2016a).
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Conclusion
The NATO status of the Baltic States automatically categorizes them as an independent and
politically stable state. Russia, already under sanctions for its involvement in eastern Ukraine
and Crimea, has experienced a drastic decline in the ruble and is not economically in a strategic
position to be involved in a major conflict with an alliance of the size of NATO. Without an
organized pro-Russian movement arising from within the Baltics, there is little that Russia will
be able to gain from involving itself in that region. In contrast, Ukraine has had substantial
Russian influence throughout its existence, dating back to the establishment of the Kievan
Rus in the late 9 th century. There are also two major Russian oil pipelines running through
Ukraine that supply Europe with 16 percent of the its natural gas needs (Metelitsa 2014).
Russia does have a major oil pipeline running through the Baltic Sea, but these are declared
international waters and have little impact on the people of the Baltic region. The relative
instability experienced in Ukraine also makes it more likely for grievances —meaning a real or
imagined cause for complaint— to arise among its people. It was far more probable for pro-
Russian unrest to arise in the Baltic States before 2004, when they were not yet NATO
members, than in the present. With no current evidence of an organized pro-Russian
movement in the Baltics, it can be stated with high confidence that there is no prospect of
pro-Russian unrest arising in the region in 2016.
References Cited
Anonymous (2016a) “NATO Allegedly Plans to Approve Military Expansion in Eastern Europe”,
Sputnik International, 6 February
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016b) “Russia Ramping up Military Drills to Cold War Levels, NATO Says”, Fox News,
5 February
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Bender, J. (2016) “NATO is Planning its Largest Military Build-up in Eastern Europe since the Cold
War”, The Business Insider, 6 February < http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-is-planning-its-biggestmilitary-build-up-in-eastern-europe-since-the-cold-war-2016-2>
accessed on 30 April 2016.
De Luce, D. (2016) “If Russia Started a War in the Baltics, NATO Would Lose Quickly”, Foreign Policy,
3 February
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Drobizheva, L. (1993) “Russian Ethnic Attitudes in Changing Political Situation”, Economic and Political
Weekly, 28(51), pp2833-2836.
McMahon, R. (2014) “Ukraine in Crisis”, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 August accessed on 30 April 2016.
Metelitsa, A. (2014) “16% of Natural Gas Consumed in Europe Runs Through Ukraine”, US Energy
Information Administration, 14 March accessed
on 30 April 2016.
Solchanyk, R. (1998) “Russians in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 22,
pp539-553.
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18

Will the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
Come Closer to Losing Power in 2016?
Sarah Harvey
Venezuela has fallen victim to an economic crisis, energy crisis and, most importantly, political
instability. The recent change in power at the National Assembly has posed the question if the
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will continue to have a presence in Miraflores, or
will the right wing continue to sweep the government as it has the legislative branch? Due to
the strong polarization within the current government, it can be stated with high confidence
that the opposition coalition, the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), will successfully topple
the government only with a recall referendum.
Background
For the past 17 years, Venezuela has been under Chavista control. This term refers to the
strong electoral support for the late President Hugo Chavez, a leader of the left-wing PSUV,
who took office in 1999. The PSUV is the socialist political party that resulted from the fusion
of social forces supporting the Bolivarian Revolution. In 2013, Chavez died from cancer, but
not before endorsing the country’s current President, Nicolas Maduro, also a leading member
of the PSUV.
Since the election of Chavez, the National Assembly, comparable to the United States Congress,
has been under PSUV control. However, in the elections of 2015, the opposition coalition,
the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), seized a super majority within the Assembly.
Despite protestations by the pro-Maduro government, the Supreme Court of Venezuela (TSJ)
took matters into its own hands. On January 2, 2016, the TSJ “officially suspended the
swearing in of four incoming legislators [...] pending investigations of voting irregularities in
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Amazonas state” (Rojas 2016). The Amazonas is one of the largest, but sparsely populated,
states within the country. This move prevented the MUD from obtaining a super majority in
the National Assembly.
Efforts by the TSJ and Maduro to maintain control of the Assembly have not stopped there.
During the election campaigns for the Assembly, one of the key campaigning points of the
MUD was passing an Amnesty Law. The law “would benefit high-profile government adversaries
including Leopoldo Lopez, who was arrested in 2014 on accusations that he helped spur a
wave of demonstrations that ultimately left more than 40 people dead” (Ellsworth 2016). The
Assembly indeed approved an amnesty law; however, Maduro can seek to have the law
reviewed by the TSJ, which has repeatedly sided with the President against the Assembly.
Accordingly, the TSJ ruled that the piece of legislature was unconstitutional, stating that it
allowed for impunity.
Recent Developments
According to the Venezuelan Constitution, there are only six ways the President can be
removed from office. The last of these is the most discussed: a recall referendum, which relies
solely on the opinion of the citizens. This process has been started by the opposition members
in the Assembly, attempting to uphold the promises made during their campaign. After
collecting the signatures of over 1 percent of registered voters, the opposition then has to
collect signatures of over 20 percent of the registered voters in order to trigger a referendum.
Lastly, in order to be successful, the referendum has 72 hours to collect more than 7.5 million
supporters. In order for the referendum to succeed, the opposition must collect more
supporters than the voters who backed Maduro in the 2013 presidential election (Anon.
2016a).
The first step in this process has already been taken, and succeeded in collecting three times
the amount of signatures needed in order to initiate the referendum. The National Electoral
Board will then verify the signatures and approve the next step. For the opposition, the most
crucial aspect of this process is time. If the recall is successful within the first four years of the
term, new elections will be held. On the other hand, if Maduro is recalled within the last two
years of his term, the vice president would then act as the serving president, postponing the
change of government for another two years (Anon. 2016b).
Allegedly, the second step within the recall process has been achieved. On June 20, it was
reported by the Venezuelan National Electoral Council (CNE), that the recall has collected
1.97 million signatures. However, the CNE had already disregarded 600,000 signatures during
the validation process (Anon. 2016c). Although this would still account for the necessary number
of signatures, the opposition continues to face its biggest challenge with time constraints.
Analysis
Due to the worsening economic situation in Venezuela, the opposition coalition is gaining support.
Venezuelans across the nation have disputed the Amnesty law, but there is widespread despair
as the country has faced shortages of basic food items, medicine, staple goods, work,
education, and even electricity. Venezuela is also home to one of the highest inflation rates in
the world, a factor that has pushed some to support the MUD simply because they want
20

change (Anon. 2016b). The country currently lacks items such as bread, toilet paper, and
medicine, creating difficulties for daily life. Bread is one of the more prominent examples: it
can take hours of waiting in line just for a single loaf, and even that is usually purchased at an
inflated price. Additionally, the country sits on some of the largest energy reserves in the world;
however, Venezuela choses to rely heavily on hydropower. Unfortunately, it is facing a serious
drought caused by tropical storm El Niño that has cut the Venezuelan work week from five
days down to two days in order to conserve energy. It is possible that the desperate conditions
of the country may drive those with diverging opinions on President Maduro to side with the
opposition MUD.
The recall referendum may be a historic turnaround for Venezuela. If the MUD is successful
in ousting the PSUV, the nature of the country, and the daily lives of its citizens, may well be
transformed. The current administration has taken numerous steps to silence the opposition
press. An example of this can be seen in the involvement of pro-Maduro business groups that
have reportedly been involved in the purchase of the television station Globovision, and daily
newspapers El Universal, El Mundo, and Ultimas Noticias. As the state-owned media has grown,
the private media has disappeared. The late Hugo Chavez took the same actions in shutting
down RCTV, which challenged Chavez’s popularity, as that was the first year Chavez had lost
the popular vote on constitutional reform. Maduro may follow in suit with a decrease in
popularity due to the growing numbers of private media that are being closed. That will prove
significant in determining if a recall referendum will be successful.
According to the Election Guide produced by USAID, there was an approximate 70 percent
voter turnout in the December elections for the National Assembly. Of the 13.6 million votes
cast, 7.72 million were in favor of the MUD (USAID 2016). If this is repeated in the recall
referendum, it will be 200,000 votes more than needed in order for the effort to be successful.
Conclusion
President Maduro won the 2013 election by a small margin, which deems the recall referendum
slightly closer in reach. It can be stated with high confidence that the recall referendum will
achieve the appropriate number of votes in order to oust Maduro. However, it can also be
stated with high confidence that the current administration will do whatever is necessary to
slow down the process, and increase the likelihood of keeping the PSUV in Miraflores.
References Cited
Anonymous (2016a) “7 Key Facts About Venezuela’s Presidential Recall Referendum”, TeleSur, 28
April accessed on 28 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016b) “Venezuela Crisis: Opposition Claims Big Win in Push to Recall Maduro”, BBC
News, 28 April accessed on 28 April
2016.
Anonymous (2016c) “Venezuela Begins Validating Recall Referendum Signatures”, Telesur, 20 June
accessed on 20 June 2016.
Ellsworth, B. (2016) “Venezuela Parliament Approves Amnesty Law, Maduro Vows to Veto”, Reuters,
30 March accessed
on 25 April 2016.
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Rojas, R.B. (2016) “Venezuelan Supreme Court Suspends Swearing in of 4 Incoming Legislators”,
Venezuelanalysis, 2 January accessed on 25 April 2016.
USAID (2016) “Election for National Assembly”, Election Guide accessed on 28 April 2016.
22

Will the Per-Barrel Price of Oil Continue to Fall in
2016?
Connor Kilgore
In January of 2016, the world saw the price of oil diminish to $27.10, the lowest in over 12
years (Hudson 2016). The oversupplied market was a result of increased production by United
States shale companies, as well as increased production by some of the member states of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In a global market where oil reigns
supreme, no country in the world has prospered from the abundance of oil. Today, the price
of oil is just above $47 a barrel. This rise in price can be primarily attributed to members of
OPEC and Russia attempting to maneuver a freeze in output.
Background and Discussion
In February of 2016, Eulogio Del Pino, the Venezuelan Minister of Petroleum, traveled to
several countries in an effort to move up OPEC’s meeting, which was scheduled to occur in
June. Some of the countries he visited included Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These
visits were focused on a single topic: freezing oil output at January levels in order to help
stabilize the global price of oil. Initially, these countries informally agreed to a production
freeze, with the exception of Iran, whose Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, described the
deal as “ridiculous” (Kalantari 2016). Del Pino sought after Russia since, despite not being a
member of OPEC, it is the largest producer of oil in the world. Alexander Novak, the Russian
Energy Minister, agreed to attend the meeting, with the intention to participate in an output
freeze. Saudi Arabia was the most obvious candidate to participate, since it is the largest oil
producer in OPEC. Ali al Naimi, the Saudi Oil Minister, agreed to participate in a freeze talk,
citing a single condition: all other members of OPEC must participate. Qatar was included in
Del Pino’s global itinerary because the Qatar Minister of Energy, Mohammed Saleh al Sada,
is also the current President of OPEC.
23

Russia, Qatar and Venezuela were all willing to participate in a freeze; objections came from
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran had Western nuclear sanctions, many of which targeted its oil
sector, lifted in January. On September 1, 2015 Minister Zanganeh said that Iran was
outputting 2.8 million barrels of oil a day and had the intention of reaching 4.2 million in
output by the end of 2016 (Defterios 2015). Since the sanctions have been lifted, Iran’s oil
output has increased to around 3.4 million barrels a day (Lawler 2016). Iran said that they
should be “left alone,” and would not consider joining freeze talks until their oil output
reached four million barrels a day (Nasseri 2016). This unwillingness to work with Saudi Arabia
led to increased tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which ultimately loomed over the
freeze talks.
On April 17, 2016, 18 countries met in Doha, Qatar with the purported intent of freezing oil
output at January levels until October of 2016 (Anon. 2016b). However, the meeting was to
no avail, as no freeze deal was struck. The cause of this failure can be directly attributed to the
dysfunctional relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Leading up to the meeting, both
the Saudis and the Iranians attempted strategic maneuvers in order to deceive or force the
other into acting uniformly with their wishes. Initially, Saudi Arabia simply asked that Iran sit
in on the freeze talks. Iran agreed to that, but still held firm that they would not participate in
the discussion. Saudi Arabia then went on to say that they would not participate in the freeze
unless Iran did as well. At the beginning of April, Saudi Arabia proceeded to block Iranian oil
tankers from entering Saudi ports, as well as block them from accessing a number of Saudiowned
storage units in Egypt (Anon. 2016a). This attempt at slowing Iranian output failed,
and thus the Saudis agreed to participate in the freeze deal with or without Iran’s consent.
Iran’s lack of eagerness to participate incited Saudi Arabia to ask OPEC that Iran’s invitation
be revoked a week before the meeting, which Iran reacted to apathetically (Anon 2016b), as
they were only attending to appease Saudi Arabia and the international community.
However, on April 16, one day before the meeting in Doha, the Saudi Deputy Crown Prince,
Mohammed bin Salman, said that the Kingdom could increase its output from 10.5 million to
11.5 barrels a day on a day’s notice, and that it could increase daily output to 12.5 million
barrels within six months (Holodny 2016). That was a direct threat of the use of oil as power
in terms of Saudi foreign policy, primarily directed toward Iran. The numerous deliberate
attacks and bluffs executed by Saudi Arabia with the aim to force Iran into the freeze deal
ultimately failed, as Iran decided not to sit in on the talks on the morning of the meeting in
Qatar. Saudi Arabia said they walked into the meeting with the intention of reaching a deal,
but decided that the deal needed to be scrapped and that they would not participate in the
current deal.
Conclusion
Although the deal fell through, the discussion and looming possibility of a freeze has caused
the oil price to rise, as consumers scramble to store cheap oil in bulk. The oil price has risen
recently due to Canada and Africa suffering disruptions in production and pipelines in May.
This caused a decrease in world oil output close to 3.4 million barrels (Puko 2016). Any cut in
oil production from major outputting countries may have an effect on the global price of oil.
It can be stated with high confidence that foreign officials who represent oil exporting
countries have hidden agendas, and that what they say cannot always be assumed to be true.
24

Every country has its own interest in mind first and foremost. It is highly unlikely that the
price of oil will return to $30 a barrel; however, Saudi Arabia and other major oil producing
countries do have the power to make this happen, should they decide that doing so serves
their national interests.
References Cited
Anonymous (2016a) “Saudi Arabia Tries to Slow Iran Oil Exports, Without Much Success”, OilPrice,
4 April accessed on 1 May 2016.
Anonymous (2016b) “Key Facts About the Doha Oil Meeting Collapse”, BBC, 18 April accessed on 1 May 2016.
Defterios, J., and Thompson, M. (2016) “Exclusive: Sanctions Deal will Unleash Iran’s Oil
Production, official says”, CNN, 1 September accessed on 1 May 2016.
Holodny, E. (2016) “Saudi Arabia Says it Can Flood the Oil Market with Over 1 Million Extra Barrels
Right Away”, Business Insider, 16 April accessed on May 1 2016.
Hudson, D. (2016) “Venezuela Proposes OPEC, Non-OPEC Producers Freeze Oil Supply”, Reuters,
11 February accessed on 1 May 2016.
Kalantari, H., and Dipaola, A. (2016) “Iran Calls Proposed Saudi-Russian Oil-output Freeze
‘Ridiculous”, World Oil, 23 February
accessed on 1 May 2016.
Lawler, A. (2016) “OPEC Oil Output Near Record High in April as Iran, Iraq Growth Offsets
Outages: Reuters Survey”, Reuters, 29 April
accessed on 1 May 2016.
Nasseri, L. (2016) “Iran on Oil Freeze: ‘Leave Us Alone’ Until Production Higher”, Bloomberg, 13
March
accessed on 1 May 2016.
Puko, T., Kantchev, E., and Malek, M. (2016) “Oil Prices Slip After Hitting $50 a Barrel”, The Wall
Street Journal, 26 May
accessed on 16 June 2016.
25

26

How Likely is a Military Coup in North Korea in
2016?
Ryan Haag
Based upon historical and contemporary events, regional geopolitics, and the leadership
dynamics inside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), it can be stated with
moderate confidence that a military coup in the DPRK is unlikely through 2016. A military
coup refers to the peaceful or violent removal of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un by military
personnel of the DPRK.
Discussion
Pioneered by Kim Il-sung and established as the official ideology of the DPRK in 1972, the
key driver of domestic affairs in the country is juche philosophy (Lee 2003:105). North Korean
citizens living under juche are “from an early age [...] subject to race-based nationalist
indoctrination and taught that however arduous life is inside of [the DPRK], the outside world
is all the more perilous” (Kourdi 2012:30). The concept of self-sufficiency is also pervasive
and supported through constant propaganda. This mentality carries over into the military,
particularly among the non-elites in the military, who receive little outside information to
contradict juche. Since every male is required to serve in the military, their social classification,
or songbun, determines their specific post. The lower echelon of songbun in the military, known
as the ‘hostile’ class, constantly deals with malnutrition while working on construction and
agricultural projects (Collins 2012:59-65). Consequently, without the energy, resources, or
organization that allows them to mobilize, those within the hostile class are highly unlikely to
stage a coup.
27

However, the current threat Kim Jong-un is facing is within the highest echelon of songbun,
known as the ‘core class’, which is supposed to consist of those most loyal to him. This class
reaches the highest positions in the military and the Korean Workers Party (KWP). There was
reported discontent among this class before the strictest United Nations (UN) sanctions took
place in early March (Mi-jing 2016). However, there are no indications that this discontent will
equal action against Kim Jong-un, considering that ‘core class’ members still receive better
treatment under the military-first politics of the country.
Nevertheless, the defection of 13 DPRK restaurant workers from China, on April 6, 2016,
highlights some dysfunction (Botelho 2016). Workers abroad are supposed to be the most
loyal to the regime, because of their increased chance of being exposed to outside information.
They also often have hereditary connections to the KWP and/or the military. Therefore, a
defection of this magnitude is rare and possibly points to a weakness within the regime. But the
defection of the restaurant workers also highlights a simple pattern: individuals who become
disillusioned with the state would rather defect than rebel. The thousands of DPRK citizens
who have defected over the last few years emphasize this pattern. It was further accentuated
when South Korea announced on April 10 that a DPRK Colonel in the General
Reconnaissance Bureau defected last year (Gale 2016). A particular caveat, though, consists of
the two failed military coups, in 1991 and 1995. In both cases, a single individual that was
supposed to be part of the coups betrayed their co-conspirators and revealed the plots (Ryall
2015).
The defection and discontent is occurring while Kim Jong-un is still trying to solidify his
power. When he first became Supreme Leader in 2011 after the death of his father and
predecessor Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un gradually demoted individuals that had connections
with his father. He clearly did not trust those who had worked closely with his father (Gause
2015:27-33). On December 12, 2013, he furthered proved this by executing his uncle, Jang Sangtaek
(Gause 2015:234). These executions were not unusual as both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jongil
used precisely such a method to maintain control. Consequently, the reported demotion of
General Ri Yong-gil in May is important, but not surprising or damaging to Kim Jong-un’s
power, as he is still developing his relatively young leadership. As a result, present conditions
do not deviate significantly from the status quo.
Furthermore, in October 2015, Kim Jong-un announced that the Seventh Workers’ Party
Congress would occur in May. This is the highest political event in the country and the first
time it has been held in 36 years. It also offered a chance for Kim Jong-un to set the tone of
his leadership for at least the next couple years. It is possible that Kim Jong-un’s overt show
of toughness over the last few months may have been his way of preparing for the event. In
essence, the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic missile tests could be
skewed to enhance the most important high-level meeting in North Korea in decades, and to
uphold Kim Jong-un’s byungjin policy of simultaneous nuclear and economic development,
which was adopted in March 2013. The timing of the Seventh Workers’ Party Congress could
possibly coincide with the tests in order for Kim Jong-un to take credit for the progress. One
noteworthy outcome of the Party Congress was the announcement of a five-year economic
plan, from 2016 to 2020. However, there were few details on implementation. Kim Jong-un
also highlighted the need for global denuclearization and non-proliferation and emphasized
the defensive nature of the DPRK’s nuclear program.
28

At the same time, current international conditions do not significantly threaten Kim Jong-un.
The DPRK sees annual military drills between South Korea and the United States (US) as one
of the reasons why it must maintain nuclear weapons. Even though China has economic and
political influence (more so the former than the latter), the DPRK knows that China does not
want instability on its doorstep. Therefore, Kim Jong-un tries to maintain and increase his
country’s military capabilities to deter any external aggression and legitimize his domestic
status, while simultaneously playing the US and regional countries against one another —a
method Kim Il-sung used quite effectively against the Soviet Union and China during the Cold
War.
When times get tough, juche attempts to explain the situation. One significant part of juche
includes short-term sacrifice for the long-term benefit of the nation. Essentially, “long-term
growth is strengthened as a guiding principle of the economy and people are asked to defer
personal gratification in the present to build for the future” (French 2014:58). Consequently,
the most vital tool that can threaten Kim Jong-un’s power is information that contradicts
juche. Right now this information is gradually making its way through all levels of society, but
not at a rate that threatens his power. Kim Jong-un will continue to ruthlessly crack down on
smuggled contraband and information without retribution from society.
Conclusion
Overall, lower echelons in the military cannot stage a coup due to their songbun classification
level and subsequent treatment by the regime. Even if they become disillusioned, most will
elect to defect or flee, rather than show explicit discontent and risk death, something which
also applies to the higher echelons of the military. Simultaneously, executions and demotions
at the highest level have become the status quo in North Korea, with little resistance from all
levels of society. The timing of the Seventh Workers’ Party Congress seems to be a move by
Kim Jong-un to better his image and possibly institute beneficial policy and economic
directives. As a result, it can be stated with moderate confidence that a military coup in the
DPRK is unlikely through 2016.
References Cited
Botelho, G. and Kwon, K.J. (2016) “13 North Korean Restaurant Workers Defect”, CNN, 13 April.
Collins, R. (2012) “Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System”, The
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Washington DC, 6 June.
French, P. (2014) North Korea: State of Paranoia, Zed Books, London, England.
Gale, A. (2016) “Highly Ranked North Korean Spy Defects to South”, The Wall Street Journal, 11 April.
Gause, K. (2015) “North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics under Kim Jong-un”, The
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Washington DC, 30 October.
Kourdi, J. (2012) The Answers: North Korea, Marshall Cavendish, Singapore.
Lee, G. (2003) “The Political Philosophy of Juche”, Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 3(1), pp105-
112.
Mi-jing K. (2016) “‘Fight or Flight’ For Growing Number of Cadres”, Daily NK, 05 January.
Ryall, J. (2015) “North Korea’s Kim Dynasty Survived ‘Series of Coups’, Says CIA Agent”, The Daily
Telegraph, 08 May.
29

30

Will ISIS be Defeated or Grow Stronger in 2016?
Grant Barratt
It is stated with moderate confidence that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will not be
defeated in 2016. However, ISIS’s strength will become diminished as the group continues to
lose its ability to gain and control territory throughout Iraq and Syria. ISIS’s strength is
measured primarily by the amount of territory the group controls, and the territory it loses.
The group’s goal as a revolutionary state is to create a caliphate, a land governed under sharia
law, in the Middle East. In 2013, ISIS began a military campaign, forcefully taking swaths of
land across Iraq and Syria. As of late 2015 and currently in 2016, their strength continues to
decrease as they lose control of key territories in the region. It is difficult to estimate a specific
span of time in which ISIS will be defeated as a state, as they continue to remain a prominent
fighting force in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan. It is stated with high confidence, however,
that ISIS will not become stronger in 2016.
Context
ISIS is becoming weaker throughout Iraq and Syria due to a variety of factors. First, the introduction
of Russian military forces into Syria after September of 2015 has heavily deteriorated the ISIS
presence in the country. Russian forces deployed after an official request from Bashar al-
Assad, the president of Syria, who called for help to combat militant jihadist groups that are
fighting against the Syrian regime. Since that time, Russian fighter jets and bombers have
continuously targeted ISIS throughout Syria to allow Syrian ground forces to regain key strongholds,
such as the ancient city of Palmyra. Russia also has deployed helicopters, tanks, naval assets,
and ground forces into Syria.
Another factor that is contributing to ISIS’s weakening is the international coalition led by the
United States (US) through Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). OIR is an air campaign tasked
with destroying ISIS, and in recent months has rapidly increased the number of airstrikes
31

conducted against ISIS targets (US Department of Defense). Along with an increased number
of airstrikes, the US and its coalition appear to be shifting targeting strategies in order to heavily
impact ISIS’s infrastructure. These targets include sources of oil revenue, cash houses, and
water supply facilities (Gordon and Schmitt 2015). In addition, the US has deployed a special
operations outfit, Army Delta, to Iraq and Syria to conduct kill or capture missions against
ISIS leadership (Starr 2016).
So far, these strategies seem to directly impact ISIS’s strength. In 2015 and 2016, ISIS lost a
large portion of its territory in Iraq and Syria, which evidently led to loss of income. On a caseby-case
basis, these territories were taken from ISIS by Syrian-Russian alliance forces, Kurdish
Peshmerga forces, or Iraqi Security Forces with the help of US air support. Cities and territories
gained back from ISIS include: Kobane, Ramadi, parts of Fallujah, al-Qaryatain, and Palmyra.
The loss of these territories resulted in ISIS only holding on to two strategic strongholds which
are Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqa, Syria (Dearden 2015).
In addition to losing a large portion of its territory, ISIS’s leadership has been effectively
targeted by the international military effort. This has impacted ISIS’s ability to organize and
command forces. In 2015, ISIS’s leadership was heavily targeted through US drone strikes, as
well as by Special Forces raids aiming to kill or capture leaders ranging from military
commanders to chemical weapons engineers (Hall 2015). One example of such high-profile
targeting is the killing of Abu Muslim Al-Turkmani, who was considered ISIS’s second in
command and governor of ISIS controlled territories. The US confirmed he was killed by an
airstrike in 2015 somewhere near the city of Mosul (Sanchez 2015). Another ISIS leader and
trusted member of the ISIS cabinet, Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi, was also killed outside of
Mosul from an airstrike in 2015 (Tomson 2016).
It is estimated that, due to the massive loss of territory, ISIS will revert to committing
international attacks against soft targets in order to maintain their legitimacy. Examples of ISIS
lashing out directly after losing territory include the downing of a Russian jet liner in October
of 2015 and the Paris attacks carried out in November of 2015, following the loss of Ramadi
in Iraq. This could result in ISIS adopting an al-Qaeda-like strategy that includes large-scale
international attacks over time (Hashim 2014). This seems to be ironic as the al-Qaeda strategy
was originally denounced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the current leader and commander of
ISIS, as leading to the split between the two groups. However, this comes as a direct result of
ISIS losing its ability to hold ground against the mounting offenses launched by Russia, the
US, Iraq forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and Syrian troops.
As ISIS continues to lose territory and infrastructure, more defectors are reaching out to
describe what life is actually like inside ISIS’s caliphate. Multiple defectors have stated that
ISIS’s strength is diminished and fighter morale is at a minimum. This is heavily due to
increased pressure on their sources of revenue, including oil infrastructure, cash houses, and
weapons storage. As of April 2016, it is estimated that ISIS has lost over $800 million in cash
just from targeted airstrikes of their treasury warehouses (Anon. 2016). In the beginning, ISIS
fighters were offered a salary and benefits. Defectors now claim that the group is unable to
pay for basic necessities, such as food and water. In addition, they claim it is now extremely
difficult for ISIS to have recruits gain access to Syria and Iraq due to increased border security
in surrounding countries. This has led ISIS to encourage recruits to travel to Libya, or carry
out attacks in their home countries. (Freytas-Tamura 2015).
32

Conclusion
Over the past few months, my forecast on weather ISIS will be defeated or grow stronger in
2016 has varied. However, I currently estimate that ISIS will not be defeated by the end of the
year. Its strength will continue to be diminished as it loses its ability to launch offenses to gain
and govern additional territory in Iraq and Syria. As its leadership continues to be targeted by
OIR and the international community, fighter morale will continue to decrease and in turn
take the fight out of the forces that remain. As offenses begin to mount against Mosul and
Raqqa, ISIS will hold on to a minimal amount of territory in Iraq and Syria. But with the walls
closing in around ISIS, I estimate that it will revert to an al-Qaeda-like strategy of committing
international attacks to maintain its reputation. This type of strategy will put Russia, as well as
the US and other Western nations, at a higher risk of terrorist attacks.
As of July 2016, this new strategy appears to be unfolding. Through media propaganda, ISIS
called for global Jihad attacks against soft targets during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan,
taking place from June 5 to July 5 of 2016. In June, ISIS was responsible for suicide attacks
across the globe, but mainly in Middle Eastern nations like Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Saudi
Arabia. After ISIS lost a key stronghold in Iraq, Fallujah, suicide attacks increased dramatically
throughout the nation, killing hundreds of civilians. The group has been linked to attacks in
France, Belgium, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and many other countries.
(Jennings 2016). In addition, it is believed that the Orlando, Florida, nightclub shooting that
left more than fifty people dead was inspired by ISIS.
This author has previously recommended that the US continues to target ISIS leadership as
well as combat recruitment efforts in order to avoid attacks on the homeland. Regardless, it is
stated with moderate confidence that ISIS will not be defeated in 2016. I believe the fight
against ISIS will last at a minimum to mid-2017. It is also stated with high confidence that ISIS
will not grow stronger in 2016, as it loses its ability to gain and govern additional territory in
Iraq and Syria.
References Cited
Anonymous (2016) “Islamic State: Up to $800m of Funds Destroyed by Strikes”, BBC News, 26 April
2016 accessed on 19 June 2016.
Dearden, L. (2015) “ISIS Loses 40% of Territory in Iraq and 20% of Territory in Syria as International
Airstrikes Support Ground Operations”, The Independent, 5 January accessed on 22 April 2016.
Freytas-Tamura, K. (2015) “ISIS Defectors Reveal Disillusionment”, The New York Times, 20
September accessed on 21 April 2016.
Gordon, M., and Schmitt, E. (2015) “US Steps up its Attacks on ISIS-Controlled Oil Fields in Syria”,
The New York Times, 12 November ,
accessed on 21 April 2016.
Hall, J. (2015) “The Kill List: Half of ISIS Top Commanders Believed to be Dead”, The Daily Mail, 2
February
accessed on 20
April 2016.
Hashim, A. (2014) “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate”, Middle East Policy, 4(21),
pp69-83.
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Jennings, R. (2016) “Why Malaysia, Known for Moderate Islam, Should Expect More ISIS Attacks”,
Forbes, 6 June
accessed on 9 July 2016.
Sanchez, R. (2015) “Islamic State Deputy Leader Killed in US Airstrike White House Says”, The Daily
Telegraph, 21 August accessed on 21 April
2016.
Starr, B. (2016) “Army’s Delta Force Begins to Target ISIS in Iraq”, CNN, 29 February accessed on 20 April 2016.
Tomson, C. (2016) “ISIS Denies Death of Top Commander, Posts New Picture of Omar al-Shishani”,
Almasdar News, 28 March
accessed on 20 April 2016.
United States Department of Defense (n.d) “Special Report: Operation Inherent Resolve”,
Department of Defense, Washington DC, United States accessed on 20 April 2016.
34

Will There Be a Peace Treaty Between the Taliban
and the Afghan Government in 2016?
Amy Thomas
How close are we to the agreement of an official peace treaty between the Afghan government
and the Taliban? This is a complex question that is directly affected by the current political
instability in Afghanistan, the historical context of the tribal entities, and the governance
vacuum, which pre-dates Afghanistan’s official recognition as a state in 1919. The current
resurgence of the Taliban’s operational strength, leading to their growing political strength in
the past few months, and the growing dissatisfaction with the Kabul government among the
general populace, lend to a complex and multifaceted environment. Due to these conditions I
find it highly unlikely that we will see an official peace treaty agreement between the Afghan
government and the Taliban within the next six months. Instead, I am moderately confident
that we are more likely to see a multilateral agreement between the Taliban and the seven
ethnic groups within Afghanistan. This assessment is due to a number of reasons that include
the death of Mullah Mansour and the current conditions that are unfavorable for either the
Afghan government or the Taliban to rise to and/or maintain power unilaterally.
Recent Developments
In terms of this writing, a peace treaty is understood in its traditional meaning of an agreement
between two or more hostile parties stating that the war between them is over. An official
peace treaty between the Taliban and the Afghan government would mean an end to the armed
attacks by the Taliban on both military and/or government-related targets and against civilian
targets. Additionally it would mean that the Afghan government would cease their attacks
against the Taliban.
35

It is unlikely that the next six months will see a revival of the peace treaty process, which has
been stalled since July of 2015. Back then, the process collapsed after the Afghan government
announced that the Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died in April of 2013. Two days later, the
Taliban confirmed this and announced that Mullah Akhtar Mansour would be their new leader,
(Rasmussen 2015). This in turn led to the breakdown of the peace talks, with Pakistan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the talks would be held at a later date, due to Omar’s
death, (Popalzai 2015).
On May 21, 2016 Mullah Akhtar Mansour was killed in a US drone strike (Anon. 2016b). The
strike occurred in the Dalbandi area of Pakistan’s Balochistan province, without the
authorization of Pakistan, which stated that its sovereignty was violated during the attack.
Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada was named the new Taliban Emir on May 25, 2016 (Mashal
et al. 2016). He is a cleric by training, similar to the late Mullah Omar, and is said to have been
the one issuing the religious statements, or fatwas, supporting the military actions of the late
Mullah Mansour. This change in leadership has a high likelihood of inhibiting the peace
process, as it did in July 2015.
In September 2015, the Taliban successfully took over Kunduz, the capital of northern
Afghanistan’s Kunduz province. The takeover lasted two weeks, during which the Taliban
were able to damage and destroy government offices, free Taliban prisoners kept in the city’s
two jails, and defeat the 7,000-strong government forces with just a “few hundred fighters”
(Norland 2015). This takeover is of importance for the prospect of an official peace treaty
between the Afghan government and the Taliban, as it was the first time since their official
overthrow by US forces that the Taliban had been able to attack, take over, and hold territory.
After the takeover of Kunduz, the Taliban continued to increase their operational capabilities
under the leadership of Mullah Mansour. Despite a leadership split in late October, when
Mullah Rasool left with a splinter group, the Taliban conducted attacks in Kabul and gained
substantial territory in Helmand, pushing back government forces (Walsh 2016). These actions
demonstrated the operational capabilities of the Taliban and helped solidify the Taliban under
Mullah Mansour. Similar attacks have continued under Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, as
the Taliban’s annual spring offensive is continuing.
In January 2016, Pakistan, China, the US and the Afghan government formed the Quadrilateral
Coordination Council (QCG) to restart the process of holding official talks between the
Afghan government and the Taliban (Gady 2016). These talks were arranged to create the
conditions for possible peace treaty negotiations between the Afghan government and the
Taliban, which were ostensibly set to take place before the end of February. However, as of June
2016, there has not been a meeting between the Afghan government and Taliban representatives.
On March 5, 2016, the Taliban issued an official statement on their website, the “Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan”, which stated that they were not participating in peace talks with the
Afghan government. The statement said that “the esteemed leader of Islamic Emirate has not
authorized anyone to participate in this meeting and neither has the Leadership Council of
Islamic Emirate decided to partake in it” (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 2016a). This has in
turn stalled the peace treaty process, as has Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s refusal to
negotiate with anyone who kills civilians and engages in terrorist activities. However, as
President Ghani is refusing to talk, his disapproval rate among the Afghan people is at 76
percent, while and the disapproval rating of the entire Afghan government is at 81 percent
(Hakim 2016).
36

On April 12, 2016, the Taliban issued the official declaration of the start of their annual spring
offensive (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 2016b). They followed up this announcement with
a suicide attack on a military compound in Kabul that killed 64 and injured around 300. The
attack, which was one of the largest on Kabul since 2011 (Pearson et al. 2016), was aimed at
the Afghan government. Such attacks have continued under Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada,
who has been targeting major roads leading to Kabul. The Taliban has formally stated that
they “do not care if Kabul attends peace talks or not”, as they are currently winning
operationally (Anon 2016a).
Conclusion
Due to these statements, the stalled peace treaty process, and the recent switch from a militarybased
leader to that of a clerical leader at the Taliban’s helm, it can be stated with high
confidence that it is unlikely that we will see a peace treaty between the Afghan government
and the Taliban during the next six months. The Taliban is seeing increasing operational
success and a switch in leadership once more, as noted above, and the Afghan government is
facing declining public support. These two factors are important when considering the question
of whether or not we will see an agreement on an official peace treaty process, because they
are the indicators of the intentions and motives of the Afghan government and the Taliban.
With these factors in mind, and the historical success of multilateral agreements among the
seven tribal groups within Afghanistan dating back centuries, it is more likely that there would
be an agreement through a multilateral process between the ethnic groups of Afghanistan,
than between the Taliban and the Afghan government. I am moderately confident in this.
References Cited
Anonymous (2016a) “Taliban: We Don’t Care if Kabul Attends Peace Talks”, Al Jazeera, 26 April
accessed 1 May 2016.
Anonymous (2016b). “Taliban Leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour Killed, Afghans Confirm”, BBC, 22
May accessed on 8 June 2016.
Gady, F. (2016) “Afghanistan to Start Peace Talks with Taliban by the End of February”, The Diplomat,
8 February
1 May 2016.
Hakim, Y. (2016) “President Ghani Calls for Afghans to Remain in Country”, BBC, 31 March 01 May 2016.
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2016a) “Statement of Islamic Emirate Concerning Non-
Participation By Delegates Of Islamic Emirate In Upcoming QCG Meetings”, Shahamat Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan, 5 March
accessed 01 May 2016.
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2016b). “Statement By Leadership Council Of Islamic Emirate
Regarding Inauguration Of Spring Offensive Entitled ‘Operation Omari’”, Shahamat Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, 12 April accessed
1 May 2016.
Mashal, M., Shah, T., and Nader, Z. (2016) “Taliban Name Lesser-Known Cleric as Their New
Leader”, The New York Times, 25 May accessed on 08 June 2016.
37

Pearson, M., Popalzai, M., and Ullah, Z. (2016) “Death Toll Rises after Taliban Attack in Kabul”,
CNN, 20 April accessed 1
May 2016.
Popalzai, M. (2015) “Taliban Confirm Mullah Omar’s Death, Name New Leader”, CNN, 31 July
accessed 1 May 2016.
Rasmussen, S.E. (2015) “Taliban Officially Announce Death of Mullah Omar”, The Guardian, 30 July
accessed 01 May 2016.
Walsh, N.P. (2016) “Afghan Soldier’s Desert as Taliban Push”, CNN, 11 April accessed on 1 May
2016.
38

Will Iraq Edge Closer to Official Territorial Breakup
in 2016?
Amanda Corona
The Daesh insurgency, the Kurdish push for independence, the discontent with the central
government, and the collapsing economic system in Iraq have all prompted questions over the
long-term unity of the state. These sources of tension appear to indicate the possibility of
separate Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia states, as a result of which modern-day Iraq could cease to
exist. However, when assessed individually and in their totality, the tensions are not substantial
enough to pose an existential threat to Iraq’s existence.
Discussion
In the past few months, there have been developments both in support and in opposition to the
idea of a fragmented Iraq. On February 3, 2016, President Massoud Barzani of the autonomous
Kurdistan Regional government in the north of Iraq, once again called for Kurdish independence
(Al-Marashi 2016). President Barzani has also set a date for a referendum in October of 2016
to discuss the “will and opinion” (Lashkari 2016) of the Kurdish people and its leadership.
The opinion of other Kurdish groups, like those in the rival parties of Gorran and Komal,
strongly oppose President Barzani and have openly criticized him (Salih 2016). The biggest
factor in the discontent aimed at Barzani, concerns his extended presidential term. Barzani’s
term ended in August of 2015. However, legal provisions introduced in June of 2013 have
allowed him to remain in power for two more years (Salih 2015). The provisions of 2013 are
not accepted by Kurdish parties, aside from the Kurdistan Democratic Party to which Barzani
belongs. The extended rule of Barzani is viewed as anti-democratic and has been the motivator
behind the second and third largest political parties’ refusal to hold meetings with the KDP to
discuss the worsening economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan (Salih 2016).
39

It is true that the Kurdish push for independence is the most serious factor putting strain on
the unity of Iraq. There is no doubt that the Kurds have had a desire for an independent state
even before the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However their intent does not match their
capabilities. Moreover, there are two factors that are crucial, if a Kurdish state is to become a
reality, namely consistent international support and economic capabilities (Chulov 2016). Starting
with the former, not only do the Kurds lack international support, but their secondary source
of income, second only to the central government in Baghdad, is Turkey. The Kurdistan
Regional Government has been involved in the illegal sale of crude oil from Kirkuk to Turkey
(Ansary 2016). Turkey, however, is not only an unviable prospect as an international supporter
for a Kurdish state, but is in fact known for its hostility towards the Kurdish presence within
its borders, and has condemned the idea of a formation of a Kurdish state countless times.
The economic capabilities also pose a problem for Kurdistan, because an oil driven economy
can only function if the government controls the oil reserves, which the Kurds do not. It is
true that Iraqi Kurdistan possesses oil-rich lands within its borders that are rich enough to
sustain it as a nation. Currently, as part of the Iraqi constitution of 2005, the Kurdistan region
has autonomous control, but it cannot collect revenues made from the sales of oil reserves in
the region (Jawad 2013:13).
Iraqi lands are also threatened militarily by Daesh, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria. Despite being on the rise in the past few years, Daesh lost 40 percent of its territory
since January 2016 and continues to be on the defensive (Dearden 2016). Much of the land
loss by Daesh is a result of the Kurdish fighting force, known as the Peshmerga. In addition
to being known as the supreme ground force, the Peshmerga is also known to have “bulldozed,
blown up and burned down thousands of homes in Arab villages” (Jalal 2016) following their
successes over Daesh. This has increased Arab animosity toward the Kurds.
Another recent development occurred in April, when Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s
idea for the formation of a technocratic cabinet gained parliamentary approval in Baghdad.
The technocratic cabinet came as a result of large-scale protest led by Shia Cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr against government corruption. The goal of the technocratic government is to appoint
ministers based on their experience, expertise and merit, as opposed to the previous system of
party representation. The Kurds, although adamant that their ministerial representation be
maintained at 20 percent in the new cabinet, have been actively involved in the process. The
Kurdish regional government has conducted meetings in Baghdad with other Kurdish parties
to strategize and discuss the matter (Salih 2016).
Implications and Conclusion
The cry for independence by president Barzani is likely a rallying tactic to gain support for his
extended —and what some view as illegitimate— presidency. The infighting between the
Kurdish parties, in addition to their impasse in negotiations with the regional government,
indicates a weak, politically fragmented Kurdistan. The current, broken, Kurdistan is incapable
of successfully attaining or even pursuing independence. The loss of land by the Islamic State
indicates a stronger central government in Baghdad, more so however a stronger Kurdish
influence. The actions of the Peshmerga mimic demographic engineering as they are spreading
their influence through occupation of formerly Arab lands following the defeats of Daesh. In
40

conclusion, despite the Peshmerga taking strides to expand Kurdish lands and spread Kurdish
influence, the inability of the Kurdish government to unite makes independence a distant
dream. Meanwhile, Daesh is weakening and the central administration in Baghdad is becoming
stronger, while galvanizing public support. The successful appointment of minsters for Abadi’s
technocratic cabinet, and the Kurds’ desire to play a role, shows their practical commitment
to the central government in Iraq.
As the primary force pulling Iraq apart, the Kurds do not have the capabilities, and one could
argue that their president does not have the intent, to pursue independence. Therefore, I can
say with high confidence that the lack of resources, the lack of unity between the Kurds, the
decreased presence of Daesh, and the strengthening of the central government, specifically
with the implementation of the technocratic cabinet, ultimately supports the notion that Iraq
is not edging closer to breaking up in the year 2016.
References Cited
Al-Marashi, I. (2016) “The Kurdish Referendum and Barzani’s Political Survival”, Al-Jazeera, 04 February
accessed on 6 February 2016.
Ansary, K.A. and Stanley, B. (2016) “Kurds tighten Grip on North Iraq Oil Fields With Kirkuk”,
Bloomberg, 3 March
accessed on 2 April 2016.
Chulov, M. (2016) “Iraqi Kurdistan President: time has come to redraw Middle East boundaries”, The
Guardian, 22 January
accessed on 30 March 2016.
Dearden, L. (2016) “ISIS ‘Loses 40% of Iraq Territory and 20% in Syria’ as International Air Strikes
Support Ground Operations”, The Independent, 05 January
accessed on 20 March 2016.
Jalal, A. (2016) “Amnesty Says Kurds Now Waging Campaign to Uproot Arabs in North Iraq”,
Reuters, 20 January accessed on 15 March 2016.
Jawad, S.N. (2013) “The Iraqi Constitution, Structural Flaws and Political Implications”, London
School of Economics, Middle East Centre, November, accessed on 20 April 2016.
Lashkari, A. (2016) “Iraqi Kurdish Leader Calls for Non-Binding Independence Referendum”, Reuters,
02 February accessed on 06
February 2016.
Salih, M.A. (2015) “Fate of Kurdish Presidency Divides Iraqi Kurds”, Al-Monitor, 22 May
accessed on 20 April 2016.
Salih, M.A. (2016) “Why Iraq’s Kurds are United in Baghdad and Divided in Erbil”, Al-Monitor, 8
April
accessed on 18 April 2016.
41

42

Will Russia’s Military Involvement in Syria Increase
the Strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon?
Benjamin Malone
For nearly a year, Russian and Hezbollah forces have been working closely to fight armed
rebel groups and militias inside Syria. However, Russia’s involvement in Syria will not have an
effect on Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon. Hezbollah is a militant group that has been labeled
a terrorist organization by the United States (US) and other Western countries, ever since 1983,
when it bombed the US Embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. Emerging
out of the Lebanese Civil war, Hezbollah has evolved into a more legitimate power in Lebanon
over the past twenty years. Hezbollah’s strength can be categorized into two distinct parts:
political and military. Inside Lebanon, Hezbollah’s political wing is a recognized party in the
Lebanese parliament. This intensive involvement in Lebanese politics has allowed the group
to have a substantial amount of influence in recent elections. An example of this is Hezbollah’s
ongoing boycott of the presidential election in parliament, which has resulted in the absence
of a Lebanese president for over two years. Hezbollah’s armed wing works closely with the
Lebanese government and is seen by many as deterrence to Israeli aggression along the
southern border of Lebanon, where the militant group is most prevalent.
Discussion
Since Hezbollah entered the Syrian conflict in 2013, they have progressed from an advisory
position to direct action, and then on to a leadership role. Responsible for training Syrian
forces and planning operations, Hezbollah has made no secret of their involvement and
support for the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (Sullivan 2014:4). One of the main
reasons for their support, which is aimed at ensuring the survival of the Assad regime, is that
his government has played an important part in the transfer of money, weapons and equipment
43

from Iran to Hezbollah (Sullivan 2014:10). There is evidence that the close relationship
between Hezbollah and Assad has enabled the Lebanese militant group to add thousands of
missiles to its arsenal (Entous et al. 2014). After Russia entered the conflict in September of
2015, many countries, including Israel, were concerned about Russia arming Hezbollah with
weapons. Israel has been at odds with Hezbollah since its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which
created the circumstances that led to the formation of Hezbollah.
However, looking at the amount of weapons that Hezbollah acquired before Russia entered
the conflict, refutes the view that Russia is a primary supplier of weapons to Hezbollah. An
even more crucial indicator is the increasingly close relationship between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This relationship became
apparent after the first meeting between the two leaders, which took place soon after Russia
announced its entrance into the Syrian conflict. That initial meeting lead to the establishment
of a direct ‘hotline’ between the two nations’ military forces (Williams 2016). The hotline
established a method of communication and coordination between the two militaries, giving
the impression that Russia and Israel had come to an agreement about the limits of Russia’s
involvement in Syria.
If there is one thing that can be a major factor in Russia’s influence on Hezbollah’s military
power, it would be the experience that the Hezbollah troops will gain from fighting alongside
Russian forces, combined with the knowledge and training provided by the Russians (Corbeil
2016). However, when it comes to combat experience, Hezbollah has been fighting against
various military forces, including Israel’s, for several years before Russia officially entered the
ongoing conflict in Syria.
As stated before, the main reason behind Hezbollah’s inception was to respond to what many
Arabs consider Israeli aggression toward Lebanon. In doing this, Hezbollah has created a
reputation for itself in the region as a defender of Lebanon (Solomon 2015). This view began
to change when Hezbollah became more involved in Syria and began suffering casualties as a
result. As recently as December 2015, reports and interviews indicated that Lebanese citizens
were growing tired of the conflict in Syria (Rosenfeld 2015). Other Lebanese parties and groups
have spoken out strongly against Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria. One such voice has come
from the Future Movement Party, a Sunni group lead by Saad Hariri, who served as Lebanon’s
prime minister from 2009 to 2014. Additionally, many regional powers have come out as vocal
opponents of Hezbollah. One such power is Saudi Arabia, which halted its supply of over 3
billion dollars in military aid to Lebanon in protest for Hezbollah’s influence on the Lebanese
government (Azakir 2016). Recently, the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes six Middle
Eastern countries, voted to officially label Hezbollah a terrorist group (Anon. 2016a).
It is clear that Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has created problems for their political power
in Lebanon. Moreover, Russia’s continued efforts to build relationships in the Middle East,
especially with the Lebanese government and Israel, could be seen as an indicator of Russian
influence over Hezbollah. After Russian President Putin’s unexpected March 15, 2016,
announcement of a withdrawal of the main Russian forces from Syria, the international
community appeared caught off guard. Israel was no exception. Within 24 hours of the
announcement, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin flew in Moscow to voice Israel’s concerns to
President Putin about the sudden withdrawal of Russia’s presence Syria (Keinon 2016). A little
over a month later, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met with Russian President Putin. Going
44

into the meeting, Netanyahu said his goal was to ensure that Russia would not create a vacuum
in Syria for Hezbollah and Iran to fill. Wanting to continue to carry out operations against
Hezbollah, Netanyahu stressed the need to maintain communication with Russia’s Air Force
to avoid “mishaps”. At the end of the meeting, Netanyahu stated that it was “very successful”
(Anon. 2016b). This relationship between Israel and Russia could be interpreted as Russia
giving Israel a form of assurance that Hezbollah will not pose a serious threat to Israel.
However, Russia has defended Hezbollah on a number of occasions, refusing to label them a
terrorist group in spite of other countries’ insistence that they should.
Conclusion
Russia and Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has been based on the mutual goal of keeping an
allied regime in charge of Syria. The two cohorts will continue to rely on each other throughout
the Syrian conflict, unless and until their goals change. Having been given substantial amount
of training from Russia, and having gained the experience of conducting full-scale combat
operations in Syria, Hezbollah’s military wing has been strengthened significantly. However,
the political aspect of Hezbollah’s power can be viewed as though it is at a standstill. In
conclusion, I can state with moderate confidence that, while there are many factors that affect
Hezbollah’s political and military power in Lebanon, Russia is not a major influence, neither
negative nor positive.
References Cited
Anonymous (2016a) “GCC declares Lebanon’s Hezbollah a ‘terrorist’ group”, Al Jazeera, 2 March
, accessed 1 May 2016
Anonymous (2016b) “Netanyahu hails ‘very successful’ meeting with Putin” The Times of Israel, 21 April
accessed May
1 2016.
Azakir, M. (2016) “Saudi Arabia halts $3 billion package to Lebanese army, security aid”, Reuters, 19
February accessed 1 May 2016.
Corbiel, A. (2016) “Hezbollah is learning Russian”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26
February , accessed on 1 May 2016.
Entous, A., Levenson, C., and Barnes, J.E. (2014) “Hezbollah upgrades missile threat to Israel”,
The Wall Street Journal, 2 January accessed on 1 May 2016.
Keinon, H. (2016) “In Moscow, Rivlin to sound out Putin about Russian pullout from Syria”, The
Jerusalem Post, 15 March accessed on 20 June 2016.
Rosenfeld, J. (2015) “Hezbollah fighters are fed up with fighting Syria’s war”, The Daily Beast, 30
December
accessed 1 May 2016
Solomon, A.B. (2015) “As minorities come under attack, Hezbollah portrays itself as their defender”,
The Jerusalem Post, 19 June , accessed on 1 May 2016.
Sullivan, M. (2014) “Hezbollah in Syria”, The Institute for the Study of War, Washington D.C., April.
Williams, D. (2015) “Israel Quiet over ‘hotline’ with Russia”, Reuters, 22 October accessed on
1 May 2016.
45

46

Will a Full-Scale Civil War Erupt in Burundi in
2016?
Matt Hayes
Burundi, one of the poorest countries in the world, has been immersed in an ongoing conflict
since April of 2015, after its President, Pierre Nkurunziza, announced his bid for a third term.
Opposition parties in Burundi argued that Nkurunziza’s third consecutive term as president
would be unconstitutional and thus illegal. Despite criticism from opposition parties, the
African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the United States (US) Department of
State, President Nkurunziza continued his campaign for re-election (Anon. 2015a). When
Nkurunziza announced his bid for a third term, protests and riots erupted throughout
Burundi. Along with the chaos that was taking place in the streets, an attempted coup led by
the former head of the Burundi Intelligence Service, Major General Godefroid Niyombare,
was foiled in May of 2015. President Nkurunziza eventually secured his position as President,
after winning a disputed election in July of 2015.
It has now been over a year since political unrest unfolded throughout Burundi following
President Nkurunziza’s announcement of a third consecutive term. Since then, over 250,000
Burundians have fled to neighboring countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia (Anon. 2016e). Along with over a quarter million people
fleeing the country, over 400 have died in the crisis, 31 of them in April of 2016 alone (Anon.
2016a). Burundi has been subjected to severe criticism from the international community
regarding reports of torture, rape, arbitrary arrests, and extra-judicial killings, and is now being
investigated for these reports of human rights violations (Anon. 2016a). Government security
forces, rebel groups, and opposition parties have blamed each other for the continuing
politically motivated violence that plagues Burundi. The increase in assassinations and
assassination attempts against high-level Burundian officials (Anon. 2016b), combined with
47

the ongoing violence and instability throughout the country, and the United Nations’ (UN)
inability to cope with the conflict due to ill-equipped peacekeepers (Anon. 2016d), have many
worried about a potential full-scale civil war breaking out in Burundi.
Definitions
When assessing the possibility of a full-scale civil war, it is important to define some relevant
terms. Although there is no consensus by scholars in defining the term ‘civil war,’ the Concise
Oxford Dictionary of Politics defines it as “a military conflict centered on territory within a state,
involving combatants from that state, over the political right to control that territory” (McLean
and Alistair 2009). Civil wars usually involve fighting between government forces and between
civilians. Some studies, such as the Correlates of War studies, have tried to quantify a civil war
by the number of deaths or casualties that have occurred from directly related violence. The
study determined that the number of deaths due to related violence would need to be greater
than 1,000 (McLean and Alistair 2009). The next term that needs to be defined is ‘full-scale’. I
have defined a full-scale civil war as one in which both government forces and rebel groups
are equally organized and devoted to fighting one another. Moreover, during the fighting,
peacetime activities are curtailed or significantly reduced to give priority to military objectives.
Discussion
Since the failed coup against Nkurunziza’s government, the president has authorized security
forces to use lethal force against protestors and rebels, in an attempt to retain power. As a
result, hundreds have been killed. Along with giving security forces the ability to exercise lethal
force, President Nkurunziza has also shut down four of the most popular radio stations in
Burundi, making first-hand information difficult to obtain. This action was clearly taken to
deter news of protests and acts of rebellion from spreading in the country (Anon. 2015b).
Arbitrary arrests and disappearances have also been a regular occurrence since the crisis
erupted. There are reports of torture and ill-treatment of individuals under arrest by the
authorities. A recent report by the UN Human Rights Chief, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, showed
that there were over 345 cases of torture and ill-treatment in Burundi. The Burundi Intelligence
Service, Service National de Renseignements, was said to have 67 prisoners in their facility when
the UN Human Rights team visited it. The prisoners were reportedly there for offenses such
as espionage, undermining state security, and illegal possession of arms. Of those, 30 showed
signs of physical torture. Police personnel and the army have also reportedly been using torture
methods, but on a smaller scale (Anon. 2016g).
Along with violence on the citizens of Burundi, officials from the ruling party, the National
Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD),
and military officials have been targeted by rebel groups. On March 22, Lieutenant Colonel
Darius Ikurakure was killed inside of the Defense Ministry in the state capital, Bujumbura. He
was said to be close to the president and has also been accused of arbitrary arrests and killings
by opponents of the ruling party. The gunman was reported to have fled the scene and his
whereabouts remain unknown (Nichols 2016). After a few days, a rebel group known as FOREBU
(Burundian Republican Forces), which was formed with the goal of ousting the president,
claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that “this is just the beginning” (Anon. 2016).
48

Conclusion
President Nkurunziza has operationalized his army and security forces by allowing the use of
lethal force, arrests, and torture to secure his power throughout the nation. While reports of
torture and ill-treatment continue to occur throughout Burundi on a large scale, so do the
politically motivated killings by rebel groups. Both government and rebel groups have taken
steps to try to gain power, creating more instability in the region. Along with the rise of
violence in April, peace talks between the ruling and opposing parties have been delayed
(Anon. 2016c). The signs of a full-scale civil war are all there. Both rebel and government
forces have begun organizing in order to achieve their goals. Government forces have begun
to take action against those who openly oppose the government or are seen as undermining
state security. On the other hand, rebel groups, such as FOREBU, have targeted and killed
high-ranking Burundi officials. Peace talks have been postponed while killings in April have
spiked. With that being said, if a civil war is quantified by how many casualties have occurred,
then the crisis is short by roughly 500 casualties. It can be stated with moderate confidence
that Burundi will not erupt in a full-scale civil war in 2016.
References Cited
Anonymous (2015a) “Burundi anti-President Nkurunziza protests in Bujumbura”, BBC, 28 April
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2015b) “Failed Burundi coup plotters arrested as president returns from Tanzania”, The
Guardian, 28 May 15
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2015c) “Pierre Nkurunziza sworn in as president for third term”, Al Jazeera, 20 August
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016a) “Burundi death toll jumps to 31 in April: UN rights chief”, Reuters, 28 April
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016b) “Burundi: UN rights chief condemns spate of assassinations in Burundi”, All
Africa, 27 April accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016c) “Burundi’s crisis talks postponed”, Africa News, 29 April accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016d) “ICC to investigate past year’s deadly violence in Burundi”, The Washington Post,
25 April
accessed on 30 April
2016.
Anonymous (2016e) “Number of Burundian refugees tops 250,000 since April”, The UN Refugee
Agency, 4 March
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016f) “Rebel group claims responsibility for killing of senior Burundi army officer”,
Africa News, 27 March
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016g) “Torture and illegal detention on the rise in Burundi – UN rights chief”, UN
News Centre, April 18
accessed on 30 April 2016
McLean, I., and McMillan, A. (2009) “The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics”, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom.
49

Muhumuza, R. (2016) “Burundi: Activist group says hundreds of people have recently disappeared
at hands of police as country reels from unrest”, US News & World Report, 13 April
accessed on 30 April 2016.
Nichols, M. (2016) “Senior Burundi pro-government army officer shot dead”, Reuters, 22 March
accessed on 30 April
2016.
50

Will the European Union’s Schengen Treaty be
Abolished in 2016?
Jeremy Lee
Over the course of the last four months I have been researching all developments that directly
or indirectly affect the Schengen Area, in order to answer the question, “will the Schengen
Treaty of the European Union (EU) be abolished in 2016”? First, it is essential to break down
that question to fully understand what I will be addressing, beginning with the EU. The EU
was formed after the World War II to encourage economic cooperation between European
countries, in an effort to prevent future military conflicts (Europa 2016). Today, the EU has
28 member states, with several more prospective members applying to join. The Schengen
Treaty, signed in 1985, is one of the most significant accomplishments of the EU (European
Commission 2008:4). The Schengen Area is a part of Europe, led by the EU, that has abolished
border controls and the need for passports where there is a mutual border between two
Schengen Area member states. It essentially acts as a single country for international travel
purposes, with a common visa policy (European Commission 2008:16). With the exception of
Ireland and the United Kingdom, every member state is required to eventually join the
Schengen Area. There are four states that are not currently in the EU but are still a part of the
Schengen Area: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (European Commission 2008:18).
It is with high confidence that I can state that the Schengen Area will not be abolished in 2016
and below I will analyze why I believe that.
Discussion
The Schengen Area has seen considerable success since its introduction, but today it is
threatened on two fronts. Terrorist attacks in Europe and the migrant crisis are both causing
countries to issue temporary border controls. These controls are completely legal when
implemented for a short amount of time, but the more countries that issue these border
51

controls, the more the Schengen Area is at risk of failing. France issued temporary border
controls after the November 2015 Paris attacks. Other Schengen Treaty member states who
have recently closed their borders due to the migrant crisis include Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Norway, and Sweden (Migration and Home Affairs 2016). These temporary border
controls pose considerable threats to the future of the Schengen Area. That being said, I do
not believe these threats will warrant the abolishment of the Schengen Treaty.
The Schengen Area was originally created to improve economic cooperation and profitability
for European countries. Abolishing the passport free travel area would hit Europe with a
massive economic blow. France Strategie, a think-tank directly attached to Office of the
French Prime Minister, stated this year that “a permanent return to frontier controls in Europe
would cost countries in the Schengen open-borders area about 110 billion euros over the next
decade” (Rose 2016). The report goes on to describe how the reintroduction of full border
controls would be equivalent to a 3 percent tax on trade between countries in the Schengen
area, which would lead to a structural decline in trade of 10 to 20 percent (Rose 2016). The
costs would mainly come from the tourism sector, cross-border workers, and freight transport.
This report was clearly issued to show the long-term economic consequences of abolishing
the Schengen Area. Schengen member-state leaders will look at the numbers and realize that
closing the Schengen Area is not an economically smart solution. The economic impact is
definitely a main reason why the Schengen Area will not be abolished in 2016.
The bigger of the two problems threatening the Schengen Area is the migrant crisis. Greece
has been hit particularly hard by this. The majority of migrants from Syria, Iran, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere, travel by sea from Turkey to Greece, where they attempt to continue on their
journey to countries further into Europe. Over 800,000 migrants arrived in Greece in 2015,
many of them arrived illegally (Anon. 2015). For a long time, Greece was not completely
fulfilling its duties in securing the external border of the Schengen Area, causing other
members to close their borders. The European Commission told Athens in February of this
year that it needed to: improve screening and disembarkation procedures; increase its capacity
to document and house asylum-seekers; and build detention facilities (European Commission
2016). In April, an EU executive said Greece had made significant progress in securing its
border (Anon. 2016a). Greece has been working to improve on all the areas the EU has
indicated, and its borders are becoming more secure. These steps are only increasing the safety
of the Schengen Area, as a crucial external border becomes increasingly safe, thus ensuring the
survival of the treaty.
The biggest step taken so far in resolving the migrant crisis, which would in turn help save the
Schengen Area, has been the EU-Turkey deal. Under the deal, migrants arriving illegally in
Greece after March 20, 2016, are expected to be sent back to Turkey if they do not apply for
asylum or if their claim is rejected. For each Syrian migrant returned to Turkey, the EU is due
to take in another Syrian who has made a legitimate request (Anon. 2016b). Turkey also gets
many other benefits from this agreement, and so far it has had a major impact in slowing down
migrants entering Europe. This deal, along with the western Balkan route effectively being
shut down due to temporary border controls, has reduced significantly the amount of migrants
entering Europe. This gives the EU more time to come up with a permanent solution for the
migrant crisis, and essentially saves the Schengen Area from collapsing from the migrant crisis
for now.
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Conclusion
Throughout the last four months my forecast that the Schengen Area would not collapse has
persisted. When looking at the economic consequences of a potential abolition of the treaty,
Greece securing their external border, and the success of the EU-Turkey deal, it can still be
stated with high confidence that the Schengen Treaty will not be abolished in 2016. It would
not be entirely surprising to start seeing the gradual lifting of some of the current temporary
border controls, sometime towards the end of this year. The Schengen Treaty will survive for
the immediate future, as it is too beneficial to fail. I believe that it will only become stronger
in the coming years, and that a new member or two may even be joining the passport-free
travel area soon.
References Cited
Anonymous (2015) “Migrant crisis: Over one million reach Europe by sea”, BBC, 30 December
accessed on 29 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016a) “EU: Greece made progress on borders, but more needed”, Times of Change, 12
April
accessed on 29 April 2016.
Anonymous (2016b) “Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect”, BBC, 20 March
accessed on 29 April 2016.
Europa (n.d) “The EU in Brief”, The EU, Brussels, Belgium ,
accessed on 29 April 2016.
European Commission (2008) “The Schengen Area”, EU, Brussels, Belgium.
European Commission (2016) “Back to Schengen – A Roadmap”, EU, Brussels, Belgium.
Migration and Home Affairs (2016) “Temporary Reintroduction of Border Controls”, The EU,
Brussels, Belgium , accessed on 29 April 2016.
Rose, M. (2016) “End to Schengen deal would cost Europe 110 billion euros - French adviser”, Reuters,
3 February accessed on 29 April 2016.
53

54

Will the US Anti-Federal Government Movement
Gain in Popularity Due to the Oregon Standoff?
Diana Evans
The group calling itself “Sovereign Citizens” is part of the broader far-right antigovernment
movement in the United States. Members of the Sovereign Citizens hold the view that they
alone, not any government authority —such as police, elected officials and judges— have the
right to decide what is lawful or unlawful. Even though they reside in the United States, members
of the group see themselves as separate, or “sovereign” from the power of the federal
government (Anon. 2010). Notably, many Sovereign Citizens members do not believe that
they should have to pay taxes (Anon. 2015). The movement is notorious for violent crimes, as
well as for crimes involving what some have called “paper terrorism”, namely systematically
using forged documents, filing frivolous lawsuits, or resorting to tax evasion and having
unreported income (Anon. n.d.).
Context
The history of the Sovereign Citizens movement extents as far back as the 1970s. More recently,
however, there have been increasing acts of violence by members of the group, directed mostly
against government officials (Anon. n.d.). One such incident took place in May 2010 in West
Memphis, Arkansas, where a self-proclaimed Sovereign Citizen father-and-son team murdered
two police officers with an assault rifle during a traffic stop. Similarly, in 2014, Cliven Bundy,
a Nevada rancher and leader of the Sovereign Citizens-affiliated group Citizens for Constitutional
Freedom, took up arms along with hundreds of other supporters and aimed them at uniformed
officers of the United States Bureau of Land Management, who were planning to indict him
for illegally grazing his cattle (Dobuzinskis 2016).
55

During the early stages of the group’s existence, the beliefs of its members focused on anti-
Semitism and racism, of which many current African-American members of the Sovereign
Citizens movement appear to be unaware. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, in
the 1980s the movement attracted large numbers of anti-Semites and white supremacists because
“sovereign theories originated in groups that saw Jews as working behind the scenes to manipulate
financial institutions and control the government” (Anon. n.d.). Today the movement propagates
the erroneous theory that a type of “common law” was put in place by America’s founding
fathers, but was subsequently replaced by a different legal code through a secret conspiracy of
government bureaucrats. The latter, claim the Sovereign Citizens, has turned what used to be
free people into slaves, and is enabling “secret government forces [that] have a vested interest
in keeping them that way” (Anon. n.d.).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has classified the Sovereign Citizens as a “domestic
terrorist movement”. According to the Bureau, its members “operate as individuals without
established leadership and only come together in loosely affiliated groups to train, help each
other with paperwork, or socialize and talk about their ideology” (FBI 2011). Moreover, the
group serves as an umbrella movement that has given birth to a host of smaller far-right groups
in recent years. Examples of such groups are the Oath Keepers, the Pacific Patriots Network,
the 3 Percenters, and the Citizens for Constitutional Freedom —also referred to as the “Bundy
Group”. These groups do not share the same degree of extremist beliefs, and have been known
to disagree with each other’s views and tactics.
The Oregon Standoff
On January 2, 2016, brothers Ammon and Ryan Bundy (sons of Cliven Bundy and leaders in
the Bundy Group) started the occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Harney
Country, Oregon. It has been reported that the brothers found a ring of keys that they used
to break into the federal facility when it was not staffed during the New Year holidays. The
occupation was aimed to protest the case of a father and son who had received a jail sentence
for committing arson on public lands adjoining their ranch (Morlin 2016). Heavily armed
supporters of the Bundy Group, many of them members of other militia groups (Anon. 2016c),
arrived from all corners of the country including Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Oklahoma
and New Hampshire, to participate in the occupation (Tuohy and Ritter 2016). The Oath
Keepers were also directly involved in the occupation and subsequent standoff. However, unlike
the Bundy group and the Pacific Patriots Network, they did not join the protests, nor did they
take up arms against law enforcement and federal officials. Instead, they facilitated a partial
evacuation of the women and children from the scene of the occupation following news of an
armed confrontation with police on January 26 (Anon. 2016b).
Earlier during the occupation, one of the Bundy brothers, Ryan Bundy, told The Oregonian
newspaper that he and other armed self-described “patriots” were “willing to kill and be killed
if necessary” (Morlin 2016) in defense of their beliefs. The standoff did result in one death.
On February 26, Citizens for Constitutional Freedom member Robert Finicum was shot dead
at a traffic stop while attempting to pull a weapon out of his coat jacket in the presence of
Oregon State Police and FBI officers who had surrounded him. Along with the Bundy brothers,
Finicum was part of a group of occupiers that was headed to a community meeting in a nearby
town. During the stop, Ammon and Ryan Bundy were arrested. Ten other members of the
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occupation group were arrested on that day (Anon. 2016c). Eventually, a message issued through
Ammon Bundy’s attorney urged other occupiers to stand down. Some members, including
Ammon Bundy’s father, Cliven Bundy, told the supporters otherwise. Some of them, such as
David Fry, insisted that they were willing to die for their cause, saying, “I’ll pass on and move
on to the next life. I don’t know [how it will end], but I’m willing to go that far” (Anon. 2016c).
Eventually, however, the occupation and standoff ended without further casualties. The occupation
lasted for 41 days. Everyone involved was arrested. The Bundy brothers are currently sitting
in jail, facing conspiracy and weapons charges. Ammon and Ryan Bundy also face charges for
participating in the 2014 standoff at the ranch of their father, Cliven Bundy. The latter was
arrested for the 2014 standoff while on his way to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge to
participate in the occupation. Recently, the Bundy brothers unsuccessfully asked the court to
“dismiss the indictments, arguing that the federal government lacks jurisdiction over the land
that includes the wildlife sanctuary in eastern Oregon’s Harney County” (Bernstein 2016).
Implications
Following the arrest of the occupation’s leaders and the death of Finicum, outrage poured out
among the supporters of the movement. In the minds of some supporters, the occupation and
Finicum’s murder, which they saw as unjustified, strengthened the status and credibility of the
Sovereign Citizens movement by proving that that they were indeed at war with the federal
government (Hatewatch 2016). In the eyes of the movement’s supporters, Finicum has
become a martyr for their cause (ibid.). However, these feelings are far from universal within
the anti-federal government movement. For instance, the Oath Keepers have denounced the
Citizens for Constitutional Freedom and opposed the occupation of the Malheur Refuge
because, according to one of their communiqués, “it harms the Movement. [The Bundy
Group] has become the aggressors and, by doing so, loses the moral high ground” (Anon.
2016a). The Bundy group has also been criticized by rightwing activists for hindering the antifederal
government movement by resorting to extremely radical actions. Similarly, even
though a number of mainstream Republican Party supporters share some beliefs with the
broader anti-government movement, such as limiting federal government regulations, the
2016 presidential candidates did not support the movement’s methods. Characteristically,
Texas Senator and 2016 Presidential candidate Ted Cruz said he hoped for a peaceful
resolution to the standoff (Natour and Barajas 2016). The leading candidate in the race for the
candidacy, Donald Trump, said: “you have to maintain law and order, no matter what” and
“you cannot let people take over federal property” (Krueger 2016).
Conclusion
If the goal of the Oregon occupation and subsequent standoff was to unite the anti-federal
government right, and to increase the appeal of Sovereign Citizens among Republican Party
voters, then it clearly failed. Even though the standoff itself was marked by the participation
of numerous far-right militants from across the country, much of the broader movement
viewed it as ultimately damaging. Therefore, it can be stated with high confidence that the
Oregon standoff will not in itself galvanize the ranks of the Sovereign Citizens and its satellite
groups. However, the Sovereign Citizens movement has been around for decades and is today
far from dissipating. Recent events, such as the killing of five police officers in Dallas, Texas,
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in July 2016, will continue to radicalize adherents of far-right ideologies and supply the
Sovereign Citizens with sufficient membership to keep the organization alive, and maybe even
growing. Therefore, it can be stated with high confidence that the Sovereign Citizens
movement will remain a staple domestic terrorist group for the foreseeable future and will
continue to pose a threat to federal, state and local law enforcement personnel.
References Cited
Anonymous (2010) “Domestic Terrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement”, The Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Washington, DC, 13 April 2010 .
Anonymous (2015) “Incident List: ‘Sovereigns’ and the Law”, Southern Poverty Law Center .
Anonymous (2016a) “Ammon Bundy: Martyr or Revolutionary?”, Oath Keepers, 3 January 2016 < https:
//www.oathkeepers.org/ammon-bundy-martyr-or-revolutionary>.
Anonymous (2016b) “Finding Keepers”, The Economist, 27 February 2016, .
Anonymous (2016c) “Oregon Standoff: A Chronicle of an Occupation”, The Oregonian, 14 February
2016 .
Anonymous (n.d.) “Sovereign Citizens Movement”, Southern Poverty Law Center .
Bernstein, M. (2016) “Ammon Bundy Had Intended Refuge Occupation to End up in Civil Court,
Lawyers Say”, The Oregonian, 09 May 2016 .
Dobuzinskis, A. (2016) “Cliven Bundy Standoff Brews over Cattle on Federal Land”, The Huffington
Post, 10 May 2016 .
FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section (2011) “Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic Threat
to Law Enforcement”, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011 .
Hatewatch Staff (2016) “In the Aftermath of LaVoy Finicum’s Death, Growing Number of Rallies
Push Martyrdom Narrative”, Southern Poverty Law Center, 3 May 2016 .
Krueger, K. (2016) “Trump Campaign Official Praises ‘Great Success’ Of Bundy Standoff”, TPM
LiveWire, 14 January 2016 .
Morlin, B. (2016) “Bundy Sons Lead Antigovernment Extremists, Militia in Takeover of Federal
Wildlife Headquarters in Oregon”, Southern Poverty Law Center, 04 January 2016 .
Natour, R. and Barajas, J. (2016) “What Do the Presidential Candidates Think About the Militia Takeover
in Oregon?”, PBS Newshour, 4 January 2016 .
Tuohy, L. and Ritter, K. (2016)”Federal Authorities Rounded Up 12 People in Five States Thursday”,
U.S. News & World Report, 04 March 2016 .
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Biographical Notes on Contributors
GRANT BARRATT, from Monroe, Connecticut, is a recent graduate from the Intelligence and
National Security Studies program at Coastal Carolina University. In 2016 he served as an analyst
in the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief’s Middle East Section, specializing in militant groups and
counter-terrorist operations in the region. He also served as the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief’s
Chief Recruitment Officer. His other interests include counter-terrorism, law enforcement intelligence
and weaponry capabilities. In addition to his undergraduate degree, Grant received a certificate
in Intelligence Analysis from the Advanced Technical Intelligence Center in Ohio.
EMILY CLINGENPEEL is a senior from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, majoring in Intelligence and National
Security Studies with a minor in Global Studies at Coastal Carolina University. She specializes in Eastern
European and Russian affairs and in 2016 served as an analyst in the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief’s
Europe Section. In the fall of 2016 she will be attending the American Institute for Foreign Study
at the Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University in St. Petersburg, Russia.
AMANDA CORONA is from Houston, Texas. She recently received her bachelor’s degree in Intelligence
and National Security Studies with a minor in Geographic Information Systems from Coastal Carolina
University. She is currently a graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George
Washington University, pursuing a master’s degree in Security Policy Studies. In 2016, she was the
Middle East Section chief for the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, specializing in Iraq with a focus on
domestic ethnic politics and inter-governmental relations. Her research interests include regional
security, non-state actors, and international relations.
DIANA EVANS, from Sandwich, Massachusetts, is a recent graduate of Coastal Carolina University’s
Intelligence and National Security Studies program. In 2016 she held the post of Communication
Officer in the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, where she also headed the Americas Section. She has
an interest in human intelligence and intelligence collection and has conducted research on the
impact of biometric security measures on operational travel. She has presented papers at several
conferences and symposia. Her paper entitled “Defending Against Cyber Espionage: The US Office
of Personnel Management Hack as a Case Study in Information Assurance” (co-authored with Sarah
Harvey) will be included in the peer-reviewed Proceedings of the 30th National Conference on
Undergraduate Research, which will be published by the University of North Carolina in 2016.
RYAN HAAG is a senior from Frederick, Maryland. He is a major in Intelligence and National Security
Studies and a minor in Geographic Information Systems at Coastal Carolina University. In 2016 he
served as Quality Assurance Officer in the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, where he was also an
analyst and head of the Asia and Africa Section, specializing in North Korean politics. His interests
include geospatial intelligence, human intelligence and psychological operations.
SARAH HARVEY, from Cumberland, Maryland, is a recent graduate of Coastal Carolina University’s
Intelligence and National Security Studies program. She specializes in Venezuelan politics and political
corruption, and has a strong interest in information assurance. Her paper entitled “Defending Against
Cyber Espionage: The US Office of Personnel Management Hack as a Case Study in Information
Assurance” (co-authored with Diana Evans), was recently accepted for publication in the Proceedings
of the 30th National Conference on Undergraduate Research, which will be published by the University
of North Carolina in November of 2016.
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MATT HAYES is a senior from Union, New Jersey, majoring in Intelligence and National Security
Studies at Coastal Carolina University. In 2016 he was an analyst in the Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief’s Asia and Africa Section, specializing in Central Africa. His research interests include law
enforcement intelligence, counterterrorism, and geospatial intelligence.
CONNOR KILGORE, from Reading, Pennsylvania, is in his junior year at Coastal Carolina University,
where he is majoring in Intelligence and National Security Studies with a minor in Global Studies.
In 2016 he was an analyst in the Americas Section of the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, specializing
in energy security and international relations. In May 2016 he was appointed to serve as an officer
in the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief’s Executive Team.
JEREMY LEE is a senior from Geneva, Illinois, majoring in Intelligence and National Security Studies
at Coastal Carolina University. He is an analyst in the Europe Section of the Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief and also serves as the organization’s Chief Operations Officer. Jeremy specializes in the European
Union with an emphasis on Schengen Area security issues. He has also worked as an intelligence
and security analyst for the Exelon Corporation, which is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.
BENJAMIN MALONE is majoring in Intelligence and National Security Studies and minoring in Middle
East Studies at Coastal Carolina University. In 2015 he founded and served as the first Executive
Director of the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, a flagship student-run initiative at Coastal Carolina
University that utilizes multiple open-source collection platforms to improve students’ ability to
gather, analyze, and present information. Ben has also served on numerous student leadership
committees and advised student organizations and initiatives relating to intelligence and national
security.
AMY THOMAS, from New Holland, Ohio, is a recent graduate from Coastal Carolina University,
where she received a degree in Intelligence and National Security Studies. As part of the Chanticleer
Intelligence Brief, she was an analyst for the Asia and Africa Section, with a focus on Afghanistan
and the Afghan Taliban. Her interests lie in counter-terrorism with a focus on the sociology and
generational change in leaders of non-state actors, especially the Afghan Taliban.
JOSEPH FITSANAKIS, PhD, is Assistant Professor of Politics in the Intelligence and National Security
Studies program at Coastal Carolina University. Before joining Coastal, Dr. Fitsanakis founded the
Security and Intelligence Studies program at King University, where he also directed the King
Institute for Security and Intelligence Studies. He has written extensively on subjects such as international
espionage, intelligence tradecraft, counterintelligence, wiretapping, cyberespionage, transnational
crime and intelligence reform. He is a frequent contributor to television and radio and senior editor
at intelNews.org, an ACI-indexed scholarly blog that is cataloged through the US Library of Congress.
JOHN NOMIKOS, PhD, is Director at the Research Institute for European and American Studies
(RIEAS), Chairman of the Mediterranean Council for Intelligence Studies (MCIS), Chairman of the
Greek Intelligence Studies Association (GISA), Chairman of the European Intelligence Academy (EIA),
and Founding Editor of the Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence (JMBI). He is Assistant
Professor at Webster University (Athens Campus), and Visiting Scholar at the John Naisbitt
University in Serbia and the University of Rome (Tre) in Italy. He was previously Adjunct Professor
at the Department of International Relations at the University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus).
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