The Intelligence Review | volume 1 | issue 2 |

million in aid, given through weapons, military training, and other supplies that supported
the government in the Syrian Civil War. On September 30, 2015, Russia became officially
involved in the Syrian conflict on the side of President Assad (Dugulin 2016). Russia
conducted airstrikes primarily on sites occupied by opposition forces. This military
campaign, Operation Vozmezdie (Retribution), claimed to target areas held by ISIS, but
did not distinguish between it and other Sunni rebel groups, such as the al-Nusra Front.
By fusing all opposition against President Assad with ISIS, Russia broadened the target on
its back (Williams and Souza 2016:24). Hardly a month after Operation Vozmezdie began,
the first threats were issued against Russia. A group of 41 different Syrian rebel groups,
including powerful opposition forces like the Levant Front and Islam Army, issued a
caustic statement against Russia, saying that “any occupation force to our beloved country
is a legitimate target” (Williams and Souza 2016:26). This joint threat was made by a
sizeable number of Islamist groups in tandem, with several others coming directly from
the individual groups themselves. On October 12, 2015, Abu Muhammed al-Julani,
spokesman for al-Nusra Front, released an audio recording online calling for retaliatory
attacks against “eastern crusaders” —Russia— and “a mujahideen [force] in the Caucasus
to distract” Russia away from Syria by shifting the state’s focus inward (Williams and Souza
2016:26). The very next day, October 13, 2015, the now-deceased spokesman for ISIS,
Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, called for “Islamic youth everywhere [to] ignite Jihad against
the Russians and Americans” (Williams and Souza 2016:26). A subsequent threat from
ISIS, issued on July 30, 2016 read: “Listen, O Putin, we will come to you in Russia, we will
kill you all in your homes, Allah willing” (Williams and Souza 2016:26-27).
Recent Developments
These threats held considerable leverage. On October 31, 2015, two weeks after al-
Adnani’s call to action, a Russian plane heading from Egypt to the Russian city of St.
Petersburg was downed over the Egyptian desert near Hasana, in the Sinai Peninsula. All
224 people on board were Russian and all were killed in the crash. This crash is now the
deadliest disaster in Russian aviation history. ISIS took responsibility for the attack and
claimed that it was in response to Russian airstrikes in Syria (Williams and Souza 2016:26).
Calls to action on Russian soil had not fallen on deaf ears either. On December 29, 2015,
a gunman opened fire at a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) world heritage site in Derbent, Dagestan. That day happened to
be the site’s 2,000th anniversary, attracting the largest crowds of the year, with most of the
visitors being local residents. One person was killed and 11 others were injured. ISIS, the
group responsible, publicly boasted its ability to reach far into Russian territory. This is
one of several small-scale attacks that have occurred since September 2015. Most ended
with the same results; a small number of fatalities with a larger amount of injuries (Anon.
2015). Perhaps the most gruesome of these terrorist attacks in Russia happened on March
2, 2016. A nanny from Uzbekistan decapitated the 4 year-old Russian girl she was taking
care of, and proceeded to set the family’s flat on fire (Anon. 2016d). It was reported that
the woman shouted, “Allah told me to do it” in the street while the fire raged on (Williams
and Souza 2016:27-28). When taken into custody, the woman claimed she was inspired by
a video released by ISIS of a militant decapitating a suspected Russian Federal Security
Service (FSB) officer operating in Syria (Williams and Souza 2016:28).
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