Inside Libya

Middle East Council 

Inside Libya 

Chaos in the mediterranean 

Kwasi Kwarteng MP 

Leo Docherty 

March 2017

Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Conservative Middle East Council INSIDE LIBYA: CHAOS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

KEY FINDINGS 

• Field Marshal Haftar sees his mission as fighting jihadist terrorism. 

• A large degree of order and governance exists in Eastern Libya. 

• Despite being under pressure, the East remains stable while the West is plagued 

by disorder and insecurity. 

• The House of Representatives is a nucleus for the development of a Libyan 

Parliamentary system, and has a geographical reach across Libya. 

• Western Libya, particularly Tripoli itself, is dominated by warlords and criminal 

gangs; they all have an interest in prolonging the relative confusion in the West. 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 

• The UK should urgently engage with Haftar, the LNA and the HoR 

• The UK should support the LNA to secure Libya’s borders and bring an end to 

the illegal trafficking of people from Libya’s sea ports. 

• The UK should reconsider its view of the GNA and acknowledge its limited 

capacity to deliver any kind of governance or security for Libya. 

1


DELEGATION TO LIBYA – MARCH 2017 

OVERVIEW 

In the first week of March 2017 CMEC Vice Chairman Kwasi Kwarteng MP, and 

CMEC Director Leo Docherty, travelled to Libya to meet the Commander of the 

Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. They also met the 

Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh, and members of the 

House of Representatives. 

The purpose of the delegation was to gain a deeper understanding of the situation inside 

Libya itself. Since the revolution and overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 the political 

and economic conditions of that country remain extremely fluid. The enthusiastic optimism 

associated with the visit of Prime Minister David Cameron to Tripoli and Benghazi in September 

2011, accompanied by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, has not been sustained. For the 

British government, Libya became less of a priority, while responsibility for fixing Libya’s 

many intractable problems, mostly regarding security and political governance, were left to the 

UN and EU. 

Despite the best efforts of these organisations, Libya appears to many observers as nothing 

other than a failed state. Riven by militias, home to ISIS and Al Qaeda, and with unguarded 

borders, Libya appears simply incapable of constraining the movement of tens of thousands 

of migrants who travel through Africa to Europe every year. It has been plausibly argued that 

the UK, despite its central role in the toppling of Gaddafi, has simply not paid enough attention 

to Libya since 2011. 

The delegation travelled to Libya on a flight from Alexandria to Al Bayda. From Al Bayda the 

CMEC team travelled by road to Al Rajma (near Benghazi), Al Marj and Tobruk, from where a 

flight was eventually taken back to Alexandria. The meetings took place in Field Marshal Haftar’s 

Military Camp in Al Rajma, in and around the city of Al Bayda and in Tobruk. The circuitous 

route afforded ample opportunity to closely observe the situation on the ground. 

The visit took place against the background of attacks against the LNA-held oil terminals of 

Al Sider and Ras Lanuf, on the western edge of Libya’s oil crescent, by militias aligned with the 

Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli but reportedly containing jihadist elements. 

The loss of the oil terminal is a significant operational setback for the LNA. A counter attack is 

now underway and the battle continues as this report goes to press. 

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KEY FINDINGS 

1. Field Marshal Haftar sees his mission as fighting jihadist terrorism. 

Field Marshal Haftar has a very clear focus on the operational challenge of defeating the jihadist militias in the 

west of Libya. He struck the delegation very much as an operational solider, a ‘soldiers’s soldier’, who did not 

concern himself with grand political strategy. Despite the ongoing attacks in the oil crescent, Haftar appeared 

composed and confident when the delegation met him. He sees himself as a Libyan nationalist and describes his 

mission as ridding Libya of the multitude of militias - both Islamist and criminal - that dominate the western 

half of the country. Although an observant Muslim, he appears to be largely secular in his world view. 

Haftar appears to be a self-confident military man, who is proud of his achievements. He described to the 

delegation a series of military operations over the last three years, often in minute detail. He spoke about the 

worsening security situation in Libya and the rise of jihadist militias that encouraged him to lead a military 

offensive against them. This became known as Operation Karama - Dignity. 

In 2014 I called for people to gather in Rajma with their own weapons…300 people came. We attacked the 

headquarters of the Islamists in Hawari, west of Benghazi and killed their leaders…after this 3,000 people joined 

us. Now we have 60,000. 

Benghazi is now free of jihadists, only a few remain on the western edge. 

Haftar points out that the LNA, since taking control of the oil crescent in September 2016, has allowed the oil 

to flow and the revenues to continue to be paid unhindered to the National Oil Company (NOC). 

…the funds go to the NOC and then to the Central Bank…but they are in the hands of the militias – the militias 

call the shots and Libyans are still poor… 

Haftar described his determination to secure the oil crescent and re-take the lost terminals. He also outlined his 

belief in the LNA’s ability – if enhanced militarily - to pacify the Jufra region in Southern Libya. Haftar sees his 

mission as a national project covering all of Libya. 

Both Haftar and the Speaker of the HoR described their desire for close relations with the United Kingdom. 

Haftar appealed for British help: 

We can end this chaos but we call on your government to help us… 

One of Haftar’s senior advisers described the suspicions many Libyans have about the presence of UK Special 

Forces in Libya who, while they are known to be present in the East, are not actively engaging with the LNA. 

There is a large degree of scepticism over UK’s role and intentions given the discreet supported currently given 

by other major powers. The adviser stated: 

People are asking – the Egyptians are backing us, the UAE, France and the Russians are backing us…the 

Americans probably will do…what are the British waiting for? 

3


2. A large degree of order and governance exists in Eastern Libya. 

During the long road trips between Al Bayda, Al Rajma and Tobruk many well organised police and 

military check points could be seen. Traffic police were also visible. In the urban centres normal civilian 

life appeared to be going ahead unhindered by any security concern. Shops and restaurants were busy 

with customers. It was striking to the delegation that every soldier we saw appeared well equipped, and 

dressed in a distinctive military uniform. 

One unusual sight the delegation witnessed was a queue of around two hundred people outside 

the Wahda Bank in Al Marj. These people were waiting to take cash from their bank accounts. Such 

withdrawals have been severely restricted due to the withholding of funds from the East of Libya by 

the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli. This is set against an economic backdrop in which Libya’s GDP 

has, according to some measures, roughly halved since the revolution of 2011. 

3. Despite being under pressure, the East remains stable while the West is 

plagued by disorder and insecurity. 

Field Marshal Haftar and the LNA complain about a lack of money. 

The recent successful attacks by militias against LNA forces in the oil crescent show that the LNA is 

militarily vulnerable. Despite the LNA reportedly receiving some military support from the UAE, Egypt, 

and Russia, it is by all accounts under-trained and under-equipped. 

Despite controlling the oil crescent since September 2016, Haftar has not stopped the flow of oil from 

Libya’s oil crescent. Revenues from sales of oil to the international market are still flowing to the 

National Oil company and the Libyan Central Bank. 

The LNA continues to be adversely affected by the reported failure of the Libyan Central Bank to honour 

its agreement to send 40% of oil revenues to Benghazi, while 60% is reportedly received by Tripoli. 

Meanwhile, in the west a large number of different militias – some criminal, some jihadist – prevail. 

These include ISIS, Ansar Al Sharia, the Derna Mujahidin Shura Council, the Islamist Ajdabiya 

Revolutionaries Shura Council, Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, Special Deterrent Force (Tripoli) and the 

Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (a coalition of Islamist militias, including Ansar Al Sharia, 

the 17 February Brigade and the Rafallah Al Sahati Brigade).* 

In the west many of the militia leaders, such as Abdelhakim Belhadj and Khaled Al Sharif, were involved 

with the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an organisation with loose links to Al Qaeda. Other 

leaders, such as Salah Badi and Ali Al Sallabi, were imprisoned under the Gaddafi regime. The political 

motivations of these different agents remain unclear. They do not have any organised political 

programmes, nor do they operate under party political labels. On the other hand, they have been 

effective at creating militias on the ground, and carving themselves positions of power and influence. 

* A full list of militias can be found in the Appendix on Page 11 

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The commitment of such people to a strong, functioning central government in Libya is doubtful. 

Many people feel that these militia leaders are direct beneficiaries of the ongoing political instability in 

Libya. The militia men have a vested interest in prolonging the chaos. 

These militias reportedly derive significant income from the trafficking of migrants through Libya towards sea 

ports in Western Libya where they embark for Italy and Europe - in many cases perishing at sea. 

It is reported that the GNA and President Serraj have absolutely no control over any geographical area 

of Western Libya. Their means of confronting the jihadist militant groups are negligible. The GNA has 

conspicuously failed to secure Libya’s borders with the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, Algeria 

and Tunisia. They have consequently done little to stem the flow of illegally trafficked migrants towards 

the Mediterranean coast. 

The President of the GNA, Fayez Serraj, is derided in the East as an ineffectual figurehead who remains 

at the mercy of militias in and around Tripoli. The GNA has no military capability of its own, while 

President Serraj was dismissed to us as a foreigner of indiscriminate Levantine origin – his father 

was described as being a Palestinian immigrant who worked for the British Army during the Second 

World War. Serraj was also derided for having been an unimpressive performer in the HoR before he 

was selected as president; he reportedly never made a speech. 

Putting these statements and suggestions together, it would appear that much of Serraj’s support is 

derived from militia leaders, who naturally benefit from the disorder and lack of central government in 

the West. Militia leaders, such Abdelhakim Belhaj, are directly benefiting from the traffic in migrants. 

Each migrant has to pay up to US$1,000 to be trafficked to Europe. A strong central government in 

Libya would naturally be a threat to this nefarious line of business. The point which cannot be stressed 

enough is that many are benefitting financially, and in terms of status and prestige, from the continuing 

political chaos in the west of Libya. 

Security within Tripoli itself was described as “very poor”. A member of the HoR, elected to a 

constituency in Libya’s Southern region and former resident of Tripoli said: 

Tripoli is like Paris by day, like Kandahar by night 

Another important centre of power in the West is the city of Misrata. It is a prosperous sea port, and 

a significant economic centre with a large presence of various militia. Misrata is reportedly backed 

financially and militarily by Qatar, Turkey and Sudan. It is perhaps the largest obstacle to the LNA’s 

attempt to unify Libya under one command. 

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4. The House of Representatives is a nucleus for the development of a Libyan 

Parliamentary system, and has a geographical reach across Libya. 

The House of Representatives (HoR) – now sitting in Tobruk after its flight from Tripoli in the summer 

of 2014 - is composed of 188 Members of whom around 130-150 reportedly still attend meetings. 

Significantly, 32 Members are women, and the HoR apparently has a broad reach across the whole of 

Libya. On the day the delegation visited 114 Members were reported to be sitting. 

Members of the HoR are a varied collection of political activists; they do not necessarily all support 

Haftar and the LNA. Most of the Members that the delegation met expressed gratitude that the LNA 

had provided the security to allow the HoR to continue sitting in Tobruk. 

The delegation met two female MPs, one of whom, as a representative for the Tebu tribe in Murzuq, 

Southern Libya, voiced her complete support for the LNA. Murzuq is roughly 1,500 km from Tobruk. 

Members of the HoR expressed dismay that their assembly was no longer supported by the international 

community. A Member representing a constituency in Libya’s Western Mountains said: 

We are baffled by the position of Britain…and the support given to the GNA…which is reliant on the 

Islamist militias…it is not democratic. 

The HoR, having been elected in 2014, is a flawed and somewhat disorganised body. It does, however, 

offer a starting point for Libya’s democratic development if the country can achieve a measure of political 

stability in the near future. 

6


RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. The UK should urgently engage with Haftar, the LNA and the HoR and 

support their efforts to defeat the Islamist militias in Western Libya. A united, 

democratic Libya can only progress if the country is pacified. The LNA is the 

only means of achieving this. 

2. The UK should support the LNA to secure Libya’s borders bring an end to 

the illegal trafficking of people from Libya’s sea ports. This is urgent on 

both humanitarian and security grounds. 

3. The UK should reconsider its view of the GNA and acknowledge its limited 

capacity to deliver any kind of governance or security for Libya. 

“I decline utterly to be impartial between the fire brigade and the fire.” 

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL 

7


LIBYA TIMELINE 2011-17 

2011 January/February The Arab spring spreads to Libya and violence breaks out between 

security forces and anti-Gaddafi rebels. 

2011 March UN Security Council authorises a no-fly zone over Libya and NATO 

launch air strikes. 

2011 August The main opposition group the National Transitional Council (NTC) 

announce a ‘Constitutional Declaration’ to form a General National 

Congress (GNC) after the fall of Gaddafi. 

2011 October 20 Gaddafi is apprehended and killed in Sirte. 

2012 August The NTC transfers power to the GNC which was elected in July. 

A schism emerges over the direction of the new state: the role of Islam in 

politics and the role of the ‘revolutionary’ militias. 

2012 September The US Ambassador is killed in Benghazi after a wave of Islamist attacks. 

2013 Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood and their allies) control the GNC and push 

through a law expelling Gaddafi-era officials from public life. 

Prime Minister Ali Zeidan is temporarily kidnapped. 

2014 February Unrest and violence explodes after the GNC refuse to step-down after its 

mandate expires. In response, General Khalifa Haftar a former Gaddafi 

officer, who had returned to Libya in 2011, announces a failed coup on 

television. GNC concede to hold elections by the summer. 

2014 May PM Zeidan is forced from office and is replaced by Minister of 

Defence Abdullah AlThinni. 

Despite failing in his coup, General Haftar launches a military campaign 

(Operation Dignity) in Benghazi against Islamists responsible for 

assassinating liberals and security personnel. 

2014 June A new parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) is elected to replace 

the GNC. Islamist factions are marginalised in the HoR. In response, 

militias aligned to the GNC launch Operation Libya Dawn to purge the 

capital of liberals and Haftar supporters. 

2014 August The campaign is successful and Islamists seize control of Tripoli and western 

Libya. The HoR and the government of PM AlThinni are forced to relocate 

to the eastern city of Tobruk and AlBayda respectively. 

8


2014 September Back in the capital, the Islamists reconvene the GNC and appoint the 

Government of National Salvation under the premiership of Omar al Hassi. 

Libya’s political system is divided between two rival authorities in the east 

and west and the country descends into civil war. 

2015 January The UN brokers peace talks between representatives of the GNC and HoR. 

2015 February Islamic State extend their influence to the western city of Sirte. 

2015 March HoR appoint Haftar leader of the Libyan National Army. 

2015 December UN Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) is signed creating a Presidency 

Council, Government of National Accord (GNA) under the leadership of 

Faiez al-Serraj and High State Council. 

2016 January The HoR refuses to endorse the GNA cabinet, primarily because a provision 

in the LPA would side-line General Haftar and place him under the control 

of the GNA. 

2016 March The GNA arrives in Tripoli by boat from Tunisia despite the threat of 

arrest by Khalifa Ghwell, the Prime Minister of the Government of 

National Salvation. 

2016 August The HoR vetoes the GNA cabinet for a second time. 

2016 September Haftar captures the Gulf of Sirte’s ‘oil crescent’ from GNA aligned militias 

and is promoted to Field Marshal by HoR speaker Agilah Saleh. 

2016 October Khalifa Ghwell of the Government of National Salvation attempts a coup 

against the GNA but fails due to a lack of support. 

2016 November Haftar meets Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow for 

the second time since July to secure military support. Haftar claims that 

Russia will help to end the UN arms embargo. 

The GNA exerts little authority with the country facing an economic 

crisis with shortages in fuel, electricity, and medical supplies; a rise in 

food prices and the devaluation of the dinar. 

9


2016 December Militias from Misrata, aligned to the GNA, force Islamic State from Sirte. 

2017 January GNA deputy leader Musa Al Koni resigns citing government failure, 

this is followed by the resignation of Labour Minister, Ali Qalma. 

Oil exports hit a three-year high of 708,000bpd (output in 2010 was 

1.6m bpd) 

Haftar tours a Russian aircraft carrier and speaks to Defence Minister 

Sergei Shoigu. Russia previously endorsed Haftar as a future member 

of the Libyan leadership. 

Militias loyal to Al-Ghwell of the Government of National Salvation 

attempt another failed coup, separately, violence erupts with Haftar 

forces and GNA Misrata forces in the south. 

Egypt holds the latest in a series of meetings with Libyan and regional 

actors and UN envoy Martin Kobler to discuss revising the LPA to 

include Haftar. 

2017 February EU leaders in Malta discuss proposals to stem the flow of migrants, one of 

which is migrant camps funded by Italy. 181,000 refugees arrived in Italy in 

2016 – this is a 20% increase since 2015. Of the 181,000, 90% set off 

from Libya. 

10


APPENDIX - LIBYAN MILITIAS AND ISLAMIST GROUPS 

Ansar Al Sharia 

Ansar Al Sharia is a radical Islamist group formed by revolutionary fighters in 2012. The group came to 

prominence in Benghazi after its members led a demonstration demanding the imposition of sharia law. 

The group was widely believed to have been involved in the 2012 attack on the US embassy in Benghazi 

which resulted in the death of US Ambassador, Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Ansar Al 

Sharia was later designated a terrorist organisation by the US. Its members are comprised of fighters who 

participated in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and the group has a presence throughout Libya. The group 

has strong ties to Al Qaeda and has made several public statements supporting them. In 2014, Ansar Al 

Sharia’s Benghazi division amalgamated with other groups to form the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura 

Council. The group has been targeted by Field Marshal Haftar’s forces. 

Ahmed Abu Khattala 

Ahmed Abu Khattala is a Benghazi native and former Abu Slim prisoner who participated in the 

anti-Gaddafi rebellion in 2011. He commanded the Abu Ubaida bin al Jarrah Battalion and was accused 

of assassinating prominent military officer, Abd Al Fattah Yunis in July 2011. His group joined Ansar Al 

Sharia and participated in the 2012 assault on the US embassy in Benghazi. Khattala was accused of 

being a ringleader in the attack and was subsequently captured by US Special Forces in June 2014 and 

transferred to the United States. He is currently awaiting trial. 

Islamic State (ISIS) 

In 2014, ISIS established a presence in the east of Libya as jihadists who had fought in Iraq and Syria 

returned home. But it was not until 2015 that ISIS, capitalising on the civil war, extended their 

influence to the western city of Sirte. The group perpetrated attacks in several Libyan cities and 

maintained a presence in Derna, Sabratha and Benghazi. While comprising native Libyans, the majority 

of ISIS’s forces came from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen among others. In May 2016, a Government of 

National Accord (GNA) aligned militia launched an offensive – Al Bunyan al Marsus (solid structure) - 

to recapture Sirte. The heavily dominated Misrata militia was supplemented with fighters from Tripoli 

and western Libya. The operation in Sirte was supported by American airstrikes and British Special 

Forces. In Benghazi, Field Marshal Haftar and his Libyan National Army, launched an offensive against 

ISIS with strategic support from French Special Forces. On 7 December 2016, the GNA announced 

that ISIS had been driven from Sirte. 

Former Libya Dawn Alliance 

In the summer of 2014, a coalition of disparate Islamist and non-Islamist militias from Misrata, Zawiya, 

Gharyan and Tripoli formed ‘Operation Libya Dawn’ to counter Field Marshal Haftar’s ‘Operation 

Dignity’. The General National Congress (GNC) backed Libya Dawn alliance included the Libya Shield 

Force, Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room (whose members where accused of kidnapping Prime 

Minister Ali Zeidan in 2013), Muslim Brotherhood, and the Amazigh tribe. Backed by Turkey, the 

alliance successfully drove the Zintan brigades from the capital and western Libya fell under Islamist 

control. In 2015, the alliance disbanded because of tensions between the Misrata and Tripoli factions. 

Salah Badi 

Salah Badi is a militia leader from Misrata commanding the Jabhat al Samud (Steadfast Front). Badi is 

a former Gaddafi military officer who was later imprisoned as a regime opponent. Upon his release, 

Badi led forces from Misrata in the anti-Gaddafi revolution. In 2012, he successfully contested the GNC 

elections but resigned his post in 2014. He was a key figure in the Libya Dawn alliance and supports 

Khalifa Ghwell. Badi is opposed to both the GNA and Field Marshal Haftar. He was credited with 

disrupting the arrival of the GNA to Tripoli in March 2016. Badi is a central figure in the newly formed 

Libyan National Guard designed to maintain Islamists in Tripoli. 

11


Sadiq Al Ghariani 

Sheikh Sadiq Al Ghariani, the grand mufti, is Libya’s highest spiritual leader. Born in Al Bayda, 

Ghariani is an outspoken Salafist-oriented leader, who supported the anti-Gaddafi uprising as 

legitimate and was later appointed to the Dar Al Ifta, Libya’s leading religious authority. He argued that 

voting for parties that wanted to restrict sharia to be ‘un-Islamic’. In 2013, Gharianai issued a fatwa 

banning unaccompanied women from travelling. The following year, Ghariani issued inflammatory 

statements in support of Libya Dawn and was accused of directing operations from London. Ghariani 

is strongly opposed to the GNA and is an ally of Khalifa Ghwell. He has also called for a jihad against 

Field Marshal Haftar. 

Khalifa Ghwell 

Khalifa Ghwell is the Prime Minister of the defunct Government of National Salvation, which rests on 

the rump of the dissolved GNC. A former engineer from the city of Misrata, Ghwell was appointed 

Prime Minister after Omar Al Hassi’s dismissal in March 2015. Ghwell is openly hostile to the GNA 

and has refused to accept their authority. In October 2016 and January 2017, militias aligned to Ghwell 

launched two unsuccessful coups against the GNA. The newly formed LNG - comprising of militias 

from Misrata and Amazigh – has backed the Government of National Salvation. In February 2017, 

forces aligned to Ghwell launched an unsuccessful assassination attempt on GNA Prime Minister, Fayez 

Serraj. 

Ali Al Sallabi 

Ali Al Sallabi is a member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and Al Watan (Homeland) 

Party. The son of a founding member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Benghazi, Sallabi spent eight years 

in the Abu Slim prison under Gaddafi. After which he lived in exile in Qatar and later negotiated with 

the Gaddafi regime on behalf of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Sallabi is closely tied to Abdul 

hakim Belhadj and was influential during the 2011 revolution, supporting the Tripoli Military Council 

and criticising the National Transitional Council (NTC) as ‘secular’. He is connected to controversial 

Muslim Brotherhood leader, Yusuf Al Qaradawi who has been accused of having links to terrorist 

groups. Sallabi is considered to be an important Islamist power broker and has been consulted by 

UN Special Representative Martin Kobler. 

Former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 

The LIFG is a defunct Islamist group formed in the 1990s with the aim of overthrowing the Gaddafi 

regime. Many of its fighters joined the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. 

On return to Libya, the group launched an insurgency campaign and attempted to assassinate Gaddafi 

on three occasions. In retaliation, the regime killed and imprisoned many of its fighters in Abu Slim. 

Several LIFG leaders escaped to Afghanistan where they formed ties with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 

During the late 2000s, the regime released many of the LIFG’s leadership after negotiations 

Ali Al Sallabi. Many of these figures rose to prominence in the 2011 revolution and later became 

involved in Libya’s political transition participating in elections and serving in the government. 

The LIFG was, at the very least, loosely connected to Al Qaeda. While the leadership never publically 

supported Al Qaeda’s campaign against the West, and in fact, denounced a suggestion that the LIFG 

joined Al Qaeda in 2007, numerous LIFG members did join Al Qaeda’s ranks. One of whom, 

Abu Yahya Al Libi was Al Qaeda’s deputy leader. 

Abdel hakim Belhadj aka Abu Abdullah Al Sadiq 

Abdel hakim Belhadj is a former Islamist commander and current leader of the Al Watan Party. 

The Tripolitan participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union and later developed ties to both 

the Taliban and Al Qaeda. He was emir of the now defunct LIFG whose aim was to overthrow the 

Gaddafi regime. In 2004, Belhadj was arrested in a joint CIA-MI6 operation in Thailand and rendered 

back to Libya. He spent seven years in the Abu Slim prison. After the fall of the regime, Belhadj left the 

Tripoli Military Council to unsuccessfully contest the GNC elections in 2012. He took part in the 

dialogue that resulted in the United Nations backed Libyan Political Agreement in 2015. Belhadj 

is reported to have vast business interests including: health care, property, air transport and media. 

In January 2017, the British Supreme Court ruled that Belhadj was entitled to pursue legal action 

against the Government for authorising his rendition to Libya. 

12

Sami Al Saadi 

Sami Al Saadi is a former high ranking member of the LIFG and founder of the Umma al Wasat 

(Moderate nation) party. In 1988, the Tripolitan left for Afghanistan where he participated in the war 

against the Soviet Union. He was described as the LIFG’s ‘key ideologue’ and was reportedly christened 

the ‘sheikh of the Arabs’ by former Taliban commander Mullah Omar. In 2004, Saadi was arrested in 

a joint UK-US operation and rendered to Libya where he subsequently tortured at the hands of the 

regime. Saadi spent the next six years in prison before his release in 2010. In December 2012, the UK 

government paid Saadi £2.2 million in compensation but did not accept liability for his rendition. When 

Abdel hakim Belhadj formed the Al Watan party, Saad formed a rival more ‘Islamic’ Umma al Wasat 

party. In 2012 elections, his party came third in the capital. He joined Prime Minister Zeidan’s cabinet 

but resigned months later. 

Khaled Al Sharif 

A noted Islamist from Tripoli, Khaled Al Sharif was the deputy emir of the LIFG and spent time in 

Afghanistan until the United States’ intervention in 2001. In April 2003, Al Sharif was captured in 

Pakistan and returned to Afghanistan accused of having ties to Al Qaeda. After spending two years in 

a detention centre in Afghanistan, Sharif was rendered to Libya in 2005 where he spent the next 

five years in prison. During the revolution, Sharif formed the National Guard militia, which aimed to 

prevent the escape of Gaddafi loyalists and imprisoned them in its own detention centres. In early 2013, 

Al Sharif was appointed Deputy Defence Minister in charge of borders and protection of key facilities. 

He was later sacked after reportedly being involved with arming militia groups. In 2014, forces under 

his command participated in the Libya Dawn operation in Tripoli. 

Mohammed Abu Sidra 

Mohammed Abu Sidra is an Islamist leader from Benghazi was a GNC Member of Parliament. He was 

imprisoned as a regime opponent under Colonel Gaddafi. Field Marshal Haftar accused Sidra of 

supporting Islamic terrorism. 

Abdel Wahab Mohamed Qaid aka Abu Idris Al Libi 

Abdel Wahab Mohamed Qaid was the sixth highest ranking member of the LIFG, (and brother of late 

Abu Yahya Libi, the deputy leader of Al Qaeda). After spells in Tunisia, Pakistan and other Islamists 

training grounds, Qaid returned to Libya in 1995 where he was arrested by the Gaddafi regime and 

spent the next 16 years in the Abu Slim prison. In 2011, he participated in the anti-Gaddafi uprising. 

Qaid joined the Umma al Wasat party and in 2012 was elected to the GNC representing his home city 

of Murzuq. In Congress he led the hard-line Islamic and Salafist political bloc, Al Wafa (the Blood of 

the Martyrs). 

Other prominent militia groups 

• Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (a coalition of Islamist militias operating largely in 

eastern Libya, including Ansar Al Sharia, the 17 February Brigade and the Rafallah Al Sahati 

Brigade) 

• Derna Mujahidin Shura Council (Derna, eastern Libya) 

• Islamist Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council (Ajdabiya, north-eastern Libya) 

• Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigade (Tripoli) 

• Special Deterrent Force (Tripoli) 

It should be noted that many of the groups which started in the East, such as the Benghazi Revolutionaries 

Shura Council, now operate in the west of Libya. Most of the militia leaders mentioned in this survey are 

now based in Tripoli, Misrata and the west of the country.

Middle East Council 

KWASI KWARTENG MP 

Kwasi Kwarteng is the Member of Parliament for Spelthorne in Surrey. 

He is the succesful author of a number of books including Ghosts of Empire: 

Britain’s Legacies in the Modern World. 

LEO DOCHERTY 

Leo Docherty is the Director of the Conservative Middle East Council (CMEC). 

He is the author of Desert of Death: A Soldier’s Journey From Iraq to 

Afghanistan. 

Conservative Middle East Council 

55 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QL 

t: +44 (0) 20 7340 6007 

e: info@cmec.org.uk 

w: www.cmec.org.uk 

@CMECnews 

The views expressed herein are those of the authors not of the 

Conservative Middle East Council or the Conservative Party.

Inside Libya

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