Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information



The OIGs also identified improvements in various practices and

processes of the partners involved in counterterrorism. At DHS, a lack of unity

in its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access to

classified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reporting

processes, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective and

valuable to the IC than it could be. DOJ can improve its counterterrorism

information sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidated

internal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effective

utilization for the United States Attorney’s Offices’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory

Council (ATAC) meetings. Further, the FBI should spur participation

associated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and improve its efforts to

obtain partners’ input in the process of identifying and prioritizing

counterterrorism threats. Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative

program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear

strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the National Counterterrorism

Center (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in the

field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions. At the state and local

level, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused on

sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities. Further, varying

requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal

agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.

Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing

of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation’s ability to

prevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and

Recommendations section of the report.


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