learning with professionals - Higgins Counterterrorism Research ...


learning with professionals - Higgins Counterterrorism Research ...

deeply the SSCI was immersed in it. Despite the fact that the two intelligence committee

chairmen were both from Oklahoma, they did not get along and did not work in concert

with one another. The extensive recommendations proposed by the SSCI (Senate Resolution

2198) caught the HPSCI off guard, but the HPSCI struggled to regain lost ground and

emerged with recommendations of its own. In a show of unity that belied the true relationship

between the two committees, the package of reorganization details was offered

jointly by Boren and McCurdy — the bulk of which made it into the FY 1992 Authorization

Bill. 379 The legislation recommended establishing a National Image Agency

(NIA) 380 in line with the Burnett Panel recommendation.

Some of the recommendations in the intelligence authorization bill were not well

received by either the executive branch or the Armed Services committees. The details

were considered “too far reaching.” 381 DCI Gates, in a statement to the Congress on

change in the Intelligence Community, warned of “deep reservations’’ held by CIA,

DMA and the Military Services about a proposed NIA that would include NPIC and

DMA and Military Imagery. He said that he, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Cheney and

CJCS Powell had agreed to approach the problem “a step at a time including at a minimum,

defense making changes to strengthen the coordination and management of tactical

imagery programs and my creation of a small organization that will become part of

this new defense structure.” 382

According to Leo Hazlewood, Gates recognized the fact that imagery problems had to

be solved and was willing to place national imagery assets within the DoD if that would

fix the problems associated with DESERT STORM. He remembered that the real stumbling

block to a NIMA in 1992 was CJCS Colin Powell. 383 Secretary of Defense Cheney

was supportive, telling a staffer, “We need a strong DCI, and we need to support these

DCI initiatives.” 384 General Powell was briefed on the Burnett Panel recommendations

but, convinced that DMA was “not broken,’’ could not be persuaded to include DMA in

the NIMA plan. According to Hazlewood, once Powell “killed NIA,’’ Gates got all the

players together to see what could be done “to fix imagery’’ within the Intelligence Community.

From that meeting, the Central Imagery Office (CIO) was born. 385

The CIA was deemed acceptable by all parties in the executive branch and Congress.

Leo Hazlewood stressed that CIA was an executive branch compromise that the Congress

379 SSCI Professional Staffer interview. The HPSCI and SSCI offered separate bills but the reorganization

effort was offered jointly.

380 Though referred to as NIA from 1992-1995, NIA stood for the IC imagery community plus DMA to

some, minus DMA to others. DMA was opposed to joining an NIA throughout this period, arguing that it was

an imagery user, not producer, and that inclusion into an intelligence agency could jeopardize international mapping

agreements. “NIMA Decision Brief,” October 1995, JCS “Tank” Presentation, Slide 8.

381 SSCI Professional Staffer interview.

382 DCI Gates’ “Statement on Change in the IC, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee Hearings, 1 April 1992,”

American Intelligence Journal (Winter/Spring 1992): 10.

383 Hazlewood interview.

384 Rich Haver, Special Assistant to SecDef Cheney in a conversation with Hazlewood, Hazlewood



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