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<strong>The</strong> fighting 63<br />
Special Constables in the Troubles, and<br />
presaged the creation of the Ulster Special<br />
Constabulary or 'Specials' on 1 November<br />
1920. Although the Chief of the Imperial<br />
General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, disliked<br />
the fact that most Specials were in the UVF,<br />
in a similar vein to the adoption of<br />
'official' reprisals, their use was probably<br />
the only chance that the Government had<br />
of controlling the forces that had been<br />
unleashed by the Troubles.<br />
IRA operations in<br />
mainland Britain<br />
<strong>The</strong> Troubles were not confined to Ireland<br />
but spilled over on to the mainland where<br />
IRA activists sought to bring the 'war'<br />
home to the British public. Over 1,000<br />
men were on the IRA's books in Britain;<br />
however, only a couple of hundred at most<br />
were active. Between 1920 and July 1921<br />
a total of six people were killed and 19<br />
wounded in bombings and shootings<br />
whilst several thousand <strong>Irish</strong> men and<br />
women were detained for questioning and<br />
around 600 were formally arrested and<br />
charged. Collins, who had joined the <strong>Irish</strong><br />
Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in London,<br />
never saw Britain as the main effort but<br />
viewed his people there as 'the auxiliaries<br />
of our attacking forces'. In reality, the IRA<br />
outside of London and Liverpool was<br />
relatively inactive although the Manchester<br />
battalion was responsible for 16 per cent of<br />
IRA activity in England.<br />
In December 1920, Collins sent Paddy<br />
Daly to London to head up the IRA<br />
campaign. Until Daly's arrival mainland<br />
IRA units had little real idea of Collins'<br />
strategy and as a result missed several<br />
opportunities whilst awaiting orders.<br />
Between February and July 1921 they<br />
intensified their attacks on farms and<br />
factories in revenge for British reprisals<br />
against creameries and farms in Ireland.<br />
Explosives were rarely used, as arson was<br />
their main weapon, and despite the<br />
abundance of firearms they rarely seemed<br />
adequately prepared for direct<br />
confrontation with the police. <strong>The</strong> table on<br />
the previous page, taken from Peter Hart's<br />
book on the IRA at war between 1916 and<br />
1923, illustrates the numbers of casualties<br />
suffered by both sides in mainland Britain.<br />
In Liverpool and Tyneside, IRA men cut<br />
telephone and telegraph lines and there<br />
were several skirmishes between the police<br />
and the IRA in Merseyside. As in Ireland,<br />
the IRA was a police matter and even<br />
though the army played a supporting role,<br />
Special Branch and MI5 adopted a preemptive<br />
policy based on counter-espionage.<br />
<strong>The</strong> British were convinced that the IRA<br />
was a Bolshevik-inspired conspiracy, and<br />
gave the Government the excuse to extend<br />
DORA into a permanent Emergency Powers<br />
Act (1920), giving it extensive powers of<br />
arrest and detention.<br />
On 4 May 1921 an IRA team shot dead<br />
two policemen whilst rescuing the<br />
commander of the Sligo Brigade from a<br />
prison van in Glasgow. Ten days later on<br />
14 May they attacked 15 houses belonging<br />
to RIC Auxiliaries or their relatives, burning<br />
several out and killing one person.<br />
Compared to the bigger IRA organizations<br />
in Carlow, Westmeath and Waterford,<br />
the relatively small mainland IRA with<br />
400-500 activists was much more<br />
aggressive. It burnt out 149 buildings and<br />
caused significant disruption to the Royal<br />
Mail, railways, roads and communication<br />
system at a cost to the British taxpayer<br />
of over £1.5m. <strong>The</strong> cost to the IRA was<br />
five dead, seven wounded and hundreds<br />
arrested.<br />
<strong>The</strong> IRA had a vague idea that attacks on<br />
the mainland would focus attention on the<br />
<strong>Irish</strong> Troubles and undermine the morale of<br />
the British public, thus putting pressure on<br />
the Government. Although Ireland did<br />
feature regularly in the news and took up<br />
a significant amount of police effort, the<br />
campaign played second fiddle to Britain's<br />
other post-war problems. Ultimately the<br />
mainland IRA was a microcosm of its<br />
parent organization, and reflected all its<br />
factions and divisions.