MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS Nine steps to a more effective force

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_001_00 (READ ONLY) 12/18/2007 11:16 AM Page 1 

A R M E D F O R C E S J O U R N A L 

JANUARY 2008 ESTABLISHED 1863 $7.95 

Heavy 

and agile 

MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS 

Nine steps to amore effective force 

ALSO 

AFRICA COMMAND’S PROSPECTS 

PHILIP KAO 

AND 

DEBATING THE COIN MANUAL 

MAJ. CHRIS ROGERS 

LT.COL. GIAN GENTILE 

RELIGIOUS BIAS AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP 

BARRY S.FAGIN &LT. COL. JAMES E. PARCO


MISSION EFFECTIVENESS I ORGANIZATION &CHANGE I INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY I SYSTEMS ENGINEERING &INTEGRATION I LOGISTICS I STRATEGY 

Unpredictable threats. 

Adaptive enemies. 

Emerging technologies. 

Increasing cost pressures. 

(How will you beready for what’s next?) 

Know K n o w how. h o w . 

The changes taking place in today’s defense environment areundeniable, and the 

causes areasvaried as they areglobal. Now morethan ever,mission success depends on the ability to 

continually adapt thinking and operations. Fortunately,the global strategy and technology consultants at 

Booz Allen Hamilton can help your team do just that, by working with you to achieve your goals and know 

how. We understand first-hand the demands of today’s changing defense environment, and have the 

knowledge to help you be prepared for what’s next. Now we want to put our thinking to work for you. 

www.boozallen.com/defense 

ww www. w. w bo oz ozal al a le len. n. n co c m/ de d fe fens ns e


COVER PHOTO BY JAMES J. LEE, AFJ; COVER DESIGN BY LISA ZILKA CHAVEZ, AFJ 

Stryker vehicles cross the desert from Mosul to Rawah, Iraq. 

AFJ 

JANUARY 2008 ■ FEATURES 

14 

22 

26 

30 

COVER STORY 

HEAVY ANDAGILE 

Beefing up military equipment to fight future wars 

will take more than a reliance on technology 

BY MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS 

THE BIG CHILL 

Talk of a renewed Cold War underscores common 

misunderstandings of geopolitical flirtation 

BY DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH 

INTO AFRICA 

There are opportunities and pitfalls in stepping up 

U.S. initiatives on a war-ravaged continent 

BY PHILIP KAO 

BOOM AND BUST 

The strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan’s defense 

strategy emerge 

BY CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN 

14 

22 

WWW.ARMEDFORCESJOURNAL.COM JANUARY 2008 AFJ 3 

JAMES J. LEE, AFJ 

DENIS SINYAKOV, AFP


Religious bias and coercion undermine 

military leadership and trust. 

SUBMITTING AN ARTICLE FOR AFJ 

6 CONTRIBUTORS 

8 INSIDE THE BELTWAY 

Asking for more 

BY WILLIAM MATTHEWS 

10 FLASHPOINT 

The Pakistan problem 

BY PETER BROOKES 

36 PERSPECTIVES 

More soup, please 

BY MAJ. CHRIS ROGERS 

COIN: A response 

BY LT. COL. GIAN P. GENTILE 

40 PERSPECTIVES 

A question of faith 

BY BARRY S. FAGIN AND 

LT. COL. JAMES E. PARCO 

48 BLOGS OF WAR 

In a bit of a state 


50 DARTS &LAURELS 

NONWORD 

We welcome articles from outside contributors on 

military and defense-industry-related topics. We 

seek articles that are informative and opinionated, 

designed to provoke thoughtful debate. 

We prefer that you first send an abstract 

describing your purpose and themes. 

An AFJ article must be original work and should 

be a good read that is easily accessible to an expert 

audience across all services, agencies and defenserelated 

industries. 

We edit for house style and make cuts to fit. All AFJ editor decisions are 

final. 

A full set of writer submission guidelines can be found at 

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com. Queries, abstracts and articles 

should be sent to afjeditors@armedforcesjournal.com. 

Correction 

40 

ROB CURTIS, AFJ 

JANUARY 2008 ■ 

DEPARTMENTS 

A caption for a photograph used to illustrate a feature on private contractors 

(“Counterproductive,” November) inadvertently implied that private security contractors are 

used to protect the defense secretary. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command has 

full responsibility for the secretary’s security and private contractors are not used for this 

purpose. We apologize for any confusion. 

AFJ 

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL 

Army Times Publishing Co. 

6883 Commercial Drive 

Springfield, VA 22159 

Editorial telephone: (703) 750-7487 

Editorial fax: (703) 658-8412 

www.armedforcesjournal.com 

EDITOR 

Karen Walker, kwalker@armedforcesjournal.com 

ASSISTANT EDITOR 

Jack Wittman, jwittman@armedforcesjournal.com 

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS 

Peter Brookes, Seth Cropsey, Christopher Griffin, 

William Matthews, Sean D. Naylor, Ralph Peters 

MANAGING EDITOR/OPERATIONS 

Linda Monroe 

PAGE DESIGNERS/COPY EDITORS 

Ameir Ali, Rachel Barth (design editor), Andy 

Charest, Joe Clark, Glen Cullen (deputy copy 

chief), Trigie Ealey, Katie Gill, Cecilia Hadley, Betsy 

Hathaway (design editor), Martha Howard (copy 

chief), Kevin Kaley, Bob Landers, Kevin Lilley, Jay 

McDaniel, Jocquise Robinson, Karen Small (copy 

chief), Angy Stricherz (senior design editor) 

ART DIRECTOR 

Mark Fondersmith, mfonder@atpco.com 

ASSISTANT ART DIRECTOR 

Lisa Zilka Chavez 

GRAPHIC ARTISTS 

John Bretschneider, Chris Broz, 

John Harman, Bryan Smith, Marcia Staimer 

PHOTO DIRECTOR 

Alan Lessig, alessig@atpco.com 

ASSISTANT PHOTO DIRECTOR 

Staci E. McKee 

PHOTOGRAPHERS 

Rob Curtis (senior photographer), Rick Kozak, 

James J. Lee, M. Scott Mahaskey, Sheila Vemmer 

PRESIDENT &PUBLISHER 

Elaine Howard 

EDITOR IN CHIEF 

Tobias Naegele 

SENIOR MANAGING EDITOR 

Robert Hodierne 

© 2008 Army Times Publishing Co. Printed in U.S. 

Subscription rates: $60 one year U.S. and Canada; $145 

one year foreign (air mail). For subscription inquiries 

and orders: (703) 750-7400; fax (703) 658-8314; 

email to cust-svc@atpco.com. Within the U.S. call 

toll free (800) 368-5718. 

Periodicals postage paid at Springfield, Va., and additional 

offices. 

Armed Forces Journal (ISSN 0196-3597) is published 

monthly by Army Times Publishing Co., 6883 

Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 22159. 

Vol. 145, No. 6, Whole No. 5954 

Postmaster: Send address changes to Armed Forces 

Journal, 6883 Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 22159. 

The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, 

Danvers, MA 01923, is licensed to 

authorize photocopying of any article 

herein. Fee is $3 per copy per article, 

limited to 100 copies. Send payment 

to CCC specifying ISSN 0196-3597. 

For reprint requests over 100, contact Defense News Media 

Group Bookstore, 6883 Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 

22159. Phone (888) 750-8099; e-mail 

bookstore@atpco.com 

4 AFJ JANUARY 2008 WWW.ARMEDFORCESJOURNAL.COM


The military’sneed for asight that transitions quickly from long range to close quarters –and from 

light to dark –has given shape to the Trijicon ACOG ® .Its large eye volume helps you acquire 

targets fast, and its exclusive dual-illuminated reticle ensures adistinct aiming point in any light, 

without batteries. No wonder it’sthe uniform choice of the Marines, U.S. Army and Special 

Operations Forces. For more information, call Trijicon at 1-800-338-0563 

or visit www.trijicon.com. 

Trijicon AccuPoint ® 

Variable Power Riflescopes 

Available in 1.25-4x24, 3-9x40 

and 2.5-10x56 

Trijicon TriPower ® 

3-in-1-Illuminated 

Sighting System 

Trijicon Reflex ® 

Dual Illumination 

Reflex Sight 

Trijicon RedDot ® 

Parallax-Free Sight 

Trijicon ® Bright &Tough 

Night Sights 

Trijicon ® TANS 

Tactical Advance 

NightVision System 

q Tritium-Phosphor Lamp 

Aiming reticle glows in 

low-light conditions for 

precise shot placement. 

q Patented Fiber Optics 

Automatically adjust the 

brightness level and contrast 

of the aiming point to 

available light conditions. 

q Anti-Reflective 

Coated Lenses 

Provide superior clarity and 

light-gathering capabilities 

with zero distortion. 

q All-Weather Hard-Anodized 

Housing 

Forged 7075-T6 aircraft 

aluminum alloy makes for 

anearly indestructible 

sighting system. 

TA33 ACOG ® 

Available Reticles 

4 4 

Brilliant Aiming Solutions 

www.trijicon.com Ç 1.800.338.0563 

Wixom, Michigan USA


CONTRIBUTORS 

In this issue 

Army transformation and force modernization are 

doing some things well with the right goals in sight. 

However, there are major disconnects that will leave the 

U.S. vulnerable if they are not soon addressed. That’s the 

principle underpinning Maj. Danny Davis’ examination of 

the strengths and weaknesses of the force modernization 

plan. 

Chief among his concerns are an overreliance on high- 

Karen Walker, Editor tech, networked systems that cannot survive a bloody 

nose in battle,and a potentially fatal tendency to underestimate 

the need for effective heavy armor. 

An Army cavalry officer who fought in Operation Desert Storm in 

1991 and served in Afghanistan in 2005, Davis brings front-line experience 

to his analysis. As an operations officer and capabilities manager 

for Training and Doctrine Command-Future Combat Systems, 

he also sees firsthand the future force technologies as 

they are developed and tested at Fort Bliss, Texas. 

Our feature package this month spans the globe. 

Davis 

Phil Kao looks at the how the U.S. and the new Africa 

Command can best enable Africa to help itself. Dmitry Shlapentokh 

analyzes the frosty rhetoric emanating from Moscow. And Chris 

Griffin examines Taiwan’s defense strategy through 

the lens of its military exercises. 

Kao 

In Perspectives, a lively debate continues on counterinsurgency 

doctrine. Maj. Chris Rogers and Lt. Col. Gian Gentile 

pick their preferred COIN soup-eating utensils; we suspect this meal 

is far from finished. 

Barry Fagin and Lt. Col. Jim Parco co-author a 

thoughtful piece on military leadership and religious 

Griffin 

bias. 

Pete Brookes ponders what’s next for Pakistan and the 

Washington-Karachi relationship. 

And Bill Matthews kicks off with a timely look at what Congress 

Rogers should consider as it weighs how to get the most bang for its 2009 

defense budget bucks. 

kwalker@armedforcesjournal.com 

AFJ 

ARMED FORCES JOURNAL 

ADVERTISING 

VICE PRESIDENT, ADVERTISING 

Donna Peterson, e-mail: dpeters@atpco.com 

phone: (703) 750-8172; fax: (703) 750-8607 

DIRECTOR OF MARKETING 

Maurice Grant, e-mail: mgrant@atpco.com 

phone: (703) 750-8021; fax: (703) 642-7372 

ASSISTANT VP - EASTERN REGION 

Janet Berta, e-mail: jberta@atpco.com 

phone: (703) 642-7335 

ASSISTANT VP - WESTERN REGION 

Amanda Graham, e-mail: agraham@atpco.com 

phone: (703) 750-8678 

SALES REPRESENTATIVES 

NORTH AMERICA 

DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC ACCOUNTS, VA, DC 

Kirk D. Brown, (703) 642-7380 

e-mail: kbrown@atpco.com 

DIRECTOR, MAJOR ACCOUNTS 

Renee Button, (703) 642-7366 

e-mail: rbutton@atpco.com 

NORTHEAST USA 

Kathleen Kenney, (703) 642-7327 

e-mail: kkenney@atpco.com 

WESTERN USA 

Janet Berta, (703) 642-7335 

e-mail: jberta@atpco.com 

SOUTHEAST USA 

Chasie Powell, (703) 750-8748 

e-mail: cpowell@atpco.com 

RECRUITMENT AND EDUCATION ADVERTISING 

Kathryn Turner, (703) 658-8351 

e-mail: kturner@atpco.com 

OUTSIDE NORTH AMERICA 

AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, 

ISRAEL, MIDDLE EAST & GULF REGION, 

SINGAPORE 

Amanda Graham, (703) 750-8678 

e-mail: agraham@atpco.com 

International Sales Coordinator 

Stephanie Fingleton, (703) 658-8426 

e-mail: sfingleton@atpco.com 

BELGIUM, DENMARK, FINLAND, GREECE, INDIA 

LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, 

SOUTH AFRICA, SWEDEN, UNITED KINGDOM 

Diana Scogna 

e-mail: dscogna@defensenews.com 

31 Rue de Tlemcen, 75020 Paris, France 

phone: 33 (14) 315-9829 

FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, SPAIN 

AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND 

Defense and Communication, 

Fabio Lancellotti 

e-mail: fabio.1@wanadoo.fr. 

Emmanuel Archambeaud 

e-mail: earchambeaud@wanadoo.fr 

Axelle Chrismann 

e-mail: achrismann@wanadoo.fr 

48 Bd. Jean-Jaures, 92110 Clichy, France 

phone: 33 (14) 730-7180 

fax: 33 (14) 730-0189 

TURKEY 

phone: 0 (533) 643-3479 

e-mail: eraankara@gmail.com 

SEND ADVERTISING MATERIAL TO: 

Mary Poston, Production Manager 

Armed Forces Journal 

6883 Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 22159 



A1306 

SAIC’s Common Driver Trainer gives Warfighters ahead start. 

I’mconfident it helps bring them home safely. 

©2007 Science Applications International Corporation. All rights reserved. 

Preparing the Warfighter.Wetake it personally. 

Scott is committed to preparing Warfighters and helping them stay safe. This is evident 

in the realistic terrain, battlefield conditions and vehicle handling characteristics they 

experience with SAIC’s driver training and simulation systems. Whether on wheels or 

tracks, when the need is to quickly,safely and economically help Warfighters develop 

battlefield driving skills, it’s comforting to know there are 44,000 SAIC employees just 

like Scott who take their work personally. 

For detailed information and Scott’s personal story,visit www.saic.com/defense A


INSIDE THE BELTWAY 

Asking for more 

Services up the wish-list ante amid fears of a 2009 budget squeeze 

BY WILLIAM MATTHEWS 

I 

n October, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of 

Staff Michael Moseley told the House Armed Services 

Committee they needed an extra $20 billion a year to buy 

all of the planes they say they need. 

The Army says it will need $12 billion or $13 billion a year 

for several years after the Iraq war ends to replace its worn and 

damaged equipment. And if the Navy ever hopes to build a 

313-ship fleet — 33 more ships than it has today — it calculates 

that it needs a shipbuilding budget of about $22 billion a 

year, not the $13.6 billion allocated for 2008. 

In November, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, said the U.S. military needs a budget equal to 4 

percent of the gross domestic product, not the 3.3 percent it’s 

getting now. That’s a $94 billion a year increase. In his budget 

calculations, Mullen wasn’t counting the $200 billion now 

being spent each year on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

How much of the extra money the services say they need 

will wind up in the 2009 budget request the Pentagon sends to 

Congress in early February remains to be seen. But with 

defense spending at its highest (in inflation-adjusted dollars) 

since World War II, some lawmakers have suggested that the 

requests for more simply may be unrealistic. 

In response to the Air Force request for $20 billion more a year, 

Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., chairman of the House Armed Services 

Committee, snapped at Wynne: “Everything of which you speak 

— whether it’s people or planes or equipment — is budget-driven. 

I have heard no word about strategic thought of where the Air 

Force ... fits into the defense and security of our nation.” 

And Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., chairman of the House 

Appropriations subcommittee on defense, warned the Army 

that it is unlikely the service will see most of the next-generation 

vehicles it hopes for from the Future Combat Systems program. 

“As soon as this war is over, the money is going to dry up” 

for FCS, Murtha said after Congress passed the 2008 Defense 

Appropriations Act in November. With that in mind, he said the 

Army should focus on developing the most promising technology 

“spinouts” of the FCS program and install them in the 

tanks, fighting vehicles and other equipment it already owns. 

But the Pentagon is methodically pushing for more. It likely 

sees the 2009 budget as a final opportunity to boost defense 

spending before a new — and possibly Democratic — administration 

starts drafting defense budgets. 

It will be up to Congress to impose any discipline on 

defense spending; but will it, and where might some fiscal 

sense best be applied? 

Lawmakers could start by halting the F-22 program at 183 

planes. That had been the plan since 2004, but defense appropriators 

opened the door to the possibility of more F-22s in the 

2008 defense budget. They suggested the Air Force use $526 

million originally intended to shut down the F-22 production 

line as a down payment on 20 additional planes. 

The Air Force has long insisted it needs at least 381 F-22s, 

and its allies in Congress have been happy to go along with 

that, citing vague threats such as new Russian fighters, the rising 

Chinese military and the performance of the Indian Air 

Force during a war game. 

The most recent boost for the F-22 comes from apparent 

fatigue troubles discovered in the F-15 fleet. The Air Force 

grounded F-15s twice in November, providing F-22 supporters 

an irresistible excuse to call for building more F-22s. 

But there are lots of good reasons to end the F-22. One is 

cost — it’s $360 million per plane. An F-15, by contrast, would 

cost about $60 million. The F-22 was designed in the 1980s to 

shoot down Soviet fighters over Europe. But the Soviet Union 

collapsed long before the F-22 became operational, and the 

Air Force has been looking for missions for it ever since — 

dropping bombs (it can’t carry very many), electronic eavesdropping, 

chasing down cruise missiles fired by enemy ships 

off the U.S. coast. F-22s have played no role in the wars in Iraq 

or Afghanistan. They have not fired a shot in combat. So far, 

the U.S. military hasn’t gotten much for the $62 billion it has 

spent on F-22s. With no Sovietlike threat on the horizon, the 

planned 183 planes augmented by the soon-to-arrive F-35 

Joint Strike Fighters should suffice. 

SINK THE EFV 

While holding the line on F-22, Congress should also kill the 

EFV — the Marine Corps’ expeditionary fighting vehicle. 

Conceived of in 1995, the EFV was supposed to be a highspeed 

amphibious assault vehicle. It was intended to speed 

Marines from ship to shore at 25 knots and then travel overland 

at 45 miles an hour. 

What has been produced so far is a vehicle that breaks 

down every eight hours on average, is unpredictable to steer in 

the water and has increased in price from $12.3 million to 

$22.3 million per vehicle. And the emergence of improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq pointed out another EFV problem. 

The flat hull that enables the vehicle to skim over the 

water appears to make it more vulnerable on land. With a program 

price tag now topping $12.6 billion, up from $8.7 billion, 



and with the first deliveries delayed until 2015, lawmakers 

should give serious thought to pulling the EFV’s plug. 

The coming session of Congress might also be a good time 

to finish what the House Armed Services Committee started 

last spring — ending the Airborne Laser program. Citing the 

“high-risk nature of the ABL program and its history of past 

delays and cost increases, the House Armed Services 

Committee cut $250 million of the $550 million the Missile 

Defense Agency requested. “The committee does not believe it 

is prudent to continue to spend over $500 million a year on a 

high-risk program that will provide very little 

near-term capability,” House lawmakers wrote. 

By 2009, when a four-times-delayed missile 

shoot-down test is scheduled to occur, the 

Airborne Laser will have cost $5.1 billion and 

taken 14 years. If it works — many are skeptical — 

each airborne laser then could cost $1.5 billion. “If 

we continue to move forward on the present 

course, the nation could potentially spend over 

$20 billion on ABL to obtain very limited capability,” 

the Armed Services Committee said. 

House lawmakers wanted to reduce ABL to a 

demonstration program. Given the military’s 

many other requirements, $298 million a year 

is a lot to spend on a demonstration. 

OVERREACTION 

During 2007, Congress showed it can be decisive when it 

wants to be. Lawmakers added $11.6 billion to the Defense 

Appropriations Act so the services can start buying Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The 20- to 40ton 

vehicles are designed to protect troops against IEDs, and 

so far, the Pentagon has ordered more than 8,800 of them. 

This is something Congress needs to keep a close eye on. 

“It’s a perfect example of Congress and the defense industry 

overreacting to a genuine problem,” said Christopher 

Hellman, adefense analyst for the Center for Arms Control 

and Non-Proliferation. Weeks after Congress acted, the Marine 

Corps concluded that its share of the MRAP buy was too high. 

The Corps cut its request for 3,700 MRAPS to 2,300, for a savings 

of about $1.7 billion. The Corps’ logic? As security in Iraq 

improves and the number of U.S. troops in Iraq decreases — 

as it will during 2008 — the need for MRAPs also will diminish. 

For Marines, who usually operate as lightly armed expeditionary 

forces, MRAPs are behemoths that are slow and awk- 

The Pentagon 

likely sees the 

2009 budget 

as a final 

opportunity to 

boost defense 

spending. 

ward to deploy and may find few uses outside Iraq. 

Although the Army is a heavier force, it has spent years trying 

to make itself lighter and more deployable. If the need for 

MRAPs declines, Congress should be quick to cut MRAP buys. 

However, lawmakers should resist Air Force efforts to push 

C-5 cargo planes into retirement. Service leaders say they want 

to retire 30 of the oldest C-5s and buy 30 new C-17s as replacements. 

They’ve been pushing hard for Congress to change legislation 

that prohibits them from retiring C-5s, KC-135Es and 

other planes, including some C-130s, U-2s and B-52s. 

The Air Force accuses Congress of micromanaging 

its fleet. But some lawmakers worry 

that the Air Force is too eager to dispose of old, 

but still useful, aircraft to bolster its seemingly 

insatiable appetite for new aircraft — fighters, 

refueling tankers, helicopters and cargo planes 

large and small. 

The C-5’s biggest supporter may be Sen. Tom 

Carper, D-Del., who argues that despite their age 

— the oldest C-5s are 39 years old — the giant 

planes may be good for another 25 years. New 

avionics, new engines and other upgrades are 

being tested to see whether they reduce the C-5’s 

current high operating costs and rather abysmal 

mission-capable rates. If upgrades work, Carper 

contends the Air Force can have a fleet of rejuvenated, reliable 

C-5s for $11.6 billion total, or $83 million a plane. C-17s, on the 

other hand, cost upwardof $200 million a plane. 

In September, however, the Air Force announced that the 

cost of upgrading C-5s had dramatically jumped. According to 

Air Force calculations, it will cost $16 billion, or $120 million a 

plane. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., called it “strangely peculiar” 

that the Air Force’s new, higher cost estimates were sent to the 

Senate the day before a hearing on the C-5 upgrades. 

“The true cost of the C-5 modernization is in dispute. It is 

not easily determined,” Carper said. 

Three upgraded C-5s are scheduled to undergo test flights 

until June 2010. “We would be wise to abstain from making 

declarations about the C-5M’s growing cost” until the test 

results are in, Carper said. 

It would be wise, too, with defense spending — the base 

budget, war funding, nuclear weapons and other costs — 

already more than $680 billion a year, for Congress to weigh 

what is really needed. But that may be too much to hope for in 

an election year. AFJ 

WWW.ARMEDFORCESJOURNAL.COM JANUARY 2008 AFJ 9


FLASHPOINT 

The Pakistan problem 

Musharraf is a troublesome ally 

BY PETER BROOKES 

P 

erhaps no word better describes Pakistan today than 

“uncertainty.” From questions about the security of its 

nuclear arsenal to its political turmoil, from the resurgence 

of the Taliban and al-Qaida to its trying relations with 

India, the moniker fits. 

Indeed, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in his national 

address Nov. 3, following his decision to suspend the constitution 

and declare a state of emergency, said: 

“Pakistan is at the brink of a very dangerous 

situation.” 

Truer words were, perhaps, never spoken. 

POLITICAL POTHOLES 

Although Musharraf was peacefully sworn 

in as president for a second five-year term 

in late November, after taking off his second 

hat as army chief, there is good reason 

to question whether he will be able to rule 

— or if he even will complete another term. 

Ignoring outside counsel, Musharraf 

imposed emergency rule in Pakistan in 

early November, citing growing militancy. 

The decision plunged the country into crisis 

and support for Musharraf to new 

depths. Critics charge Musharraf wanted to 

neuter an adversarial Supreme Court, fear- 

IRAN 

Indian 

Ocean 

N Miles 

AFGHANISTAN 

0 500 

ing it would invalidate his Oct. 6 election. They were probably 

right, considering Musharraf’s previous donnybrook with the 

judiciary in March. 

But emergency rule is only one aspect of the immense political 

tensions in Pakistan: Enter former prime ministers Benazir 

Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who both returned to Pakistan this 

fall from exile following Musharraf’s 1999 bloodless coup. Both 

intend to make a run for the prime minister’s post in the 

January polls if emergency rule is lifted, ostensibly allowing for 

free and fair elections. Whether either would cooperate with 

Musharraf — or one another — isn’t quite clear. 

Elections in January will bring new leadership to the prime 

minister’s job, an office that shares power with the presidency in 

Pakistan’s political system. Indeed, in the past, Pakistan’s prime 

minister was frequently more powerful than the president. 

PETER BROOKES is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former 

deputy assistant secretary of defense who also served in the Navy, with 

the CIA and on Capitol Hill. 

PAKISTAN 

PAKISTAN 

Karachi 

So what if Musharraf isn’t calling the shots after the polls? 

For American interests, the answer is unclear. Many see 

Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, as a pro- 

West secularist who will promote democracy and human 

rights, battle extremism and terrorism, and keep peace in the 

region. Indeed, the U.S. even helped broker her return from 

self-exile in October and tried to foster a power-sharing 

arrangement between her and the 

general. Emergency rule may now 

have killed any prospect of political 

CHINA 

cooperation between the two. 

But what about Sharif? The former 

prime minister, who accepted a 10- 

Islamabad 

year exile in exchange for the drop- 

Lahore 

ping of corruption and conspiracy 

charges, returned to Pakistan in 

INDIA 

November against Musharraf’s wishes. 

Sharif first tried to return to 

Pakistan in September but was never 

allowed to leave his aircraft at the 

DETAIL 

Islamabad airport, then was sent 

ignominiously back into exile in 

Saudi Arabia. But Sharif was able to 

persuade the Saudi regime to support 

his return, despite a Musharraf visit 

to the kingdom to intervene. If 

Sharif’s star rises, Riyadh could have significant influence in 

Islamabad with the man who was at the helm when Pakistan 

joined the nuclear club in 1998. 

Sharif is seen as much closer to Saudi Arabia’s position on 

the political aspects of Islam, and he could turn into a strategic 

asset for Riyadh in its dealings with an increasingly confident, 

and possibly nuclear, Tehran — Saudi Arabia’s biggest nightmare. 

Some U.S. experts are concerned that Sharif, as leader of 

the Pakistan Muslim League, is close to Pakistani Islamist parties 

and could be soft on radicalism, especially the Taliban. 

These ties also might reverse growth-fostering economic 

reforms. With plenty of bad blood with Washington from his 

days as prime minister, it’s also likely Sharif won’t be as pro- 

U.S. as Musharraf or Bhutto. He’s likely none too pleased by 

the White House’s embrace of the man who overthrew him. 

LOOSE NUKES 

Besides politics, what about other U.S. national security 

interests? 

10 AFJ JANUARY 2008 WWW.ARMEDFORCESJOURNAL.COM 

CHRIS BROZ, AFJ


Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is sworn in as a civilian president at the presidential palace in Islamabad on Nov. 29 after 

giving up his position as Army chief. 

The Pakistanis insist that their nuclear arsenal, of at least 50 

to 100 nuclear weapons, is safely under lock and key. Indeed, 

considering the $100 million in assistance from Washington, 

Musharraf may have the situation in hand. Experts assert the 

program is under the Pakistani military’s control, uses permissive 

action links, keeps nuclear cores and detonators — as 

well as warheads and delivery vehicles — apart, and requires 

two-man authentication, reducing the likelihood of unauthorized 

launches. 

But although all of this is reassuring, one can’t help but be 

haunted by the ghost of A.Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani 

bomb, and his now-infamous assistance to the likes of Iran, 

North Korea, Libya and perhaps others, too. For instance, it’s 

now being posited that Khan’s cohorts also may have had substantive 

contact with Syria, based on Israel’s September strike 

on a suspected nuclear facility near the Turkish border. 

More disturbing, some Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly 

had contact with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida in 

Afghanistan in the days before Sept. 11, 2001. These scientists 

are believed to be in custody today. 

But with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons industry active at some 

12 facilities, the concern of nuclear know-how and material 

proliferating beyond their walls is real, even with recently 

instituted background checks. 

TALIBAN TROUBLE 

The past year has been the deadliest since the Taliban regime 

fell in late 2001. So far, more than 250 soldiers from U.S., coalition 

and NATO-led forces have fallen in Afghanistan. 

Although the ability of Taliban fighters to find refuge in the 

tribal areas of Pakistan hasn’t helped the fight in Afghanistan, 

the turmoil in Pakistani politics, which could prove to be a distraction, 

won’t improve the situation, either. A leaked National 

Security Council document says that although coalition troops 

have been successful in individual military battles against the 

Taliban, the militants still appear to be able to recruit large 

numbers of fighters, many from Pakistan’s Pashtun tribes. 

This year also has proved the worst year for suicide bombings 

in Afghan history. More than 140 suicide bombings were 

carried out by extremists, killing hundreds of Afghan civilians 


AFP


FLASHPOINT 

in 2007. According to the United Nations’ mission in 

Afghanistan, the recruitment of suicide bombers reaches into 

the tribal areas of Pakistan. Pakistani madrassas — religious 

schools — appear to be a major source of these bombers. Of 

course, Pakistani and Afghan authorities, especially Musharraf 

and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, have repeatedly pointed 

the finger at each other for failing to prevent cross-border 

attacks by Taliban militants. But one thing is clear: The problem 

won’t be resolved as long as both sides 

remain in a state of denial about the Taliban 

problem — which has roots in both countries 

— and, instead, keep blaming each other. 

AL-QAIDA ANGST 

Pakistan’s tribal areas are also the home to the 

most robust element of post-9/11 al-Qaida, 

which has vowed for months to bring down 

the Musharraf government, and also to take 

its jihad abroad to Europe — and the U.S. 

Indeed, intelligence agencies have been 

tracking Europeans heading for Pakistan in 

preparation for missions in the West. 

European passports allow easy access to 

Western countries, resulting in attacks such as 

the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. Not surprisingly, 

the U.S. intelligence community’s 

best estimates place al-Qaida’s bin Laden and 

his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, not in 

Afghanistan but in the tribal areas of Pakistan 

along the Pakistani-Afghan border. 

Calling on European governments to abandon the fight in 

Afghanistan, bin Laden issued one of his rare videos in late 

November — the latest in an increasing number of audio and 

video messages produced by al-Qaida’s al-Sahab media outfit. 

Al-Sahab has issued more than 90 messages this year — double 

the number in 2006. Some speculate that the step-up in al- 

Qaida communications is a disturbing sign of how secure the 

group’s leadership feels in Pakistan’s frontier region. This, 

unfortunately, coincides with a notable lack of al-Qaida operatives 

killed or captured recently in Pakistan, despite what is 

reportedly a treasure trove of actionable intelligence passed on 

to Pakistani intelligence and security forces. In fairness, it 

should be noted that a large number — indeed, hundreds — 

of al-Qaida operatives, including senior 9/11 mastermind 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, have been captured in Pakistan 

since 9/11. Some analysts believe this shortcoming has more 

to do with a lack of Pakistani political resolve and the military’s 

unwillingness to act against fellow Muslims than the ability of 

these extremists to evade Pakistani forces. 

INDIA ISSUES 

Some speculate 

the step-up 

in al-Qaida 

communications 

is a disturbing 

sign of how 

secure the 

group’s 

leadership feels 

in Pakistan’s 

frontier region. 

Although Pakistan seems to be swimming in a sea of chaos 

with its political problems and the challenges of al-Qaida and 

the Taliban, its future relationship with its 

rival and nuclear neighbor, India, cannot be 

ignored. Even though relations between 

Islamabad and New Delhi have been relatively 

stable in recent years, even improved, India 

has no interest in seeing jihadis of any sort — 

al-Qaida, Taliban or Kashmiri — take over 

Pakistan, especially while Kashmir remains 

unresolved. 

Kashmir, a land both Pakistan and India 

have claimed since their birth in 1947, contains 

the seeds of conflict that has the potential 

for escalation, especially in light of India’s 

superior conventional forces. Representative 

of this concern, as chief of the army, 

Musharraf led the 1999 border clash with 

India at Kargil in an ill-advised land grab. 

Sharif tried to fire Musharraf over the disaster, 

leading to the general’s coup against the former 

prime minister.More troubling, as president, 

Musharraf allowed tensions to rise to 

the boiling point with India in 2002, which 

some believemight have led both countries to look into the 

nuclear abyss if not for American diplomatic intervention. 

A country such as Pakistan — the world’s second most populous 

Muslim nation, which shares borders with India, China, 

Afghanistan and Iran — is of unquestionable strategic importance 

to American interests. Not to mention, Pakistan’s location 

near the mouth of the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf 

is significant for issues of energy security. And one can’t ignore 

the fact that 50 percent to 75 percent of U.S. supplies for 

Afghanistan fly over, or go through, Pakistan. 

The challenge for the U.S. will be to successfully manage 

this relationship, which won’t be easy but is critical to 

American homeland security, the battle against radicalism, 

fighting terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation and stability in 

South Asia. AFJ 


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_013_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:40 AM Page 13


COVER STORY 

Heavy

&0107_AFJ_DOM_00_014_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:44 AM Page 15 

JAMES J. LEE, AFJ 

Nine steps to a more effective force 

BY MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS 

agile 

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS MODERNIZING AND transforming 

itself into a force designed to dominate all challengers 

in any future battle. At the heart of this transformation is the 

concept of network-centric warfare, which seeks to exploit technology 

and link dispersed war-fighting platforms, soldiers and a 

vast array of intelligence assets and sensors, with various means 

of attack. Although some components of the Defense 

Department’s efforts are outstanding and promise significant 

advantage to future American forces, other elements are so far 

off the mark that if remedial actions are not taken, American 

forces could suffer a significant battlefield defeat in a future war. 

Our defense modernization program had its genesis in the 

aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Before the initiation 

of hostilities, the Iraqi Army was widely portrayed in the 

media as a menacing force, hardened by years of war with 

Iran, loaded with thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, and 

protected by a sophisticated web of modern air-defense 

weapons. When the U.S.-led coalition utterly routed Saddam 

Hussein’s forces from Kuwait, the victory was widely viewed as 

a product of America’s technological prowess and heralded the 

beginnings of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The years 

that followed saw an abundance of articles written by military 

MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS is an Army cavalry officer who fought in 

Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and served in Afghanistan in 2005. He 

is the operations officer for Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities 

Manager-Future Combat Systems at Fort Bliss, Texas. The views 

expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those 

of the Army, Defense Department or U.S. government. 

thinkers who shared their vision of what this revolution would 

mean for the U.S. and how it would transform the way wars 

were fought. A number of prominent flag officers in the 

Defense Department led the way. 

One of the initial proponents of RMA theory was Adm. 

William A. Owens, at the time vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. In February 1996, he wrote “The Emerging U.S. 

System-of-Systems,” in which he laid out his vision of future 

warfare that would rely heavily on technology and feature the 

RMA prominently. That was followed a few years later by then- 

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, who announced his 

intent to make Owens’ ideas operational in the form of a “family 

of systems” known as Future Combat Systems (FCS). The 

ideas laid out by these two men, and effectively adopted as 

Defense Department policy in a series of documents published 

shortly after, established the conceptual underpinning 

that would later be used to create the future force. Some components 

of this high-tech vision are demonstrably outstanding, 

while others, regrettably, are decidedly not. 

The U.S. Army senior leadership articulated its vision of 

what the future Army would be capable of in the 2004 Army 

Transformation Roadmap: “Knowledge-based Army forces 

exploit advanced information technologies and space-based 

assets for network-enabled battle command, while fully integrated 

within the joint, interagency and multinational environment. 

Unlike past, predictable operations, Army forces 

respond within days and fight on arrival in the joint operations 

area through multiple entry points. These capabilities allow 

the JFC [joint forces commander] to pre-empt enemy actions, 



We must not fall prey to the belief that awesome technology 

will always provide us combat overmatch against all opponents. 

assure access, seize the initiative and shape the battle space.” 

But given the current state of technology, the probability of 

future development in nations across the globe, and a historical 

perspective on the performance of new and emerging technologies 

in the past, does this theory stand up to rigorous examination? 

I argue that it does not. Aside from a near-faith-based, 

unsubstantiated belief in the efficacy of technology to do anything 

and everything imaginable, one of the primary factors 

upon which this assessment is based is its failure to give proper 

consideration to the capabilities of the future enemy force. 

One of the major problems in discussing the foundations for 

our modernization program is that the very military victory 

hailed as the proof of American technological dominance — 

Desert Storm (and later the conventional phase of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom) — was not primarily a result of technology. It 

resulted from a combination of two factors: (1) the American 

force was highly trained, well-led and effectively equipped; and 

(2) the Iraq force was pathetically led, even more poorly trained 

and marginally equipped. In other words, no matter what we 

did in Desert Storm and OIF, the U.S. would have won. Had we 

faced a competent foe, we may well have won anyway, but we 

would have seen the limits of technology. As it is, we cite Desert 

Storm as unimpeachable proof of the dominant ability of our 

current military technology, and most of our projections about 

future capability envision an enemy as impotent as Iraq. Our 

failure to create a force based on facing a credible, robust and 

capable enemy force that has access to modern technology and 

is as clever as we are in its deadly application is one of the greatest 

failures of our modernization program. 

UNPROTECTED AND UNREALISTIC 

But the greatest threat such an unrealistic view of combat poses 

to our future force is the misguided decision to reduce both the 

amount of armor protection for the fighting vehicles and the 

number of vehicles themselves without any substantive data. 

Army plans call for the creation of 15 FCS brigade combat 

teams (FBCTs) by 2030. Each of these FBCTs will be composed 

of 14 systems, including manned and unmanned ground vehicles, 

two classes of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), a comprehensive 

network, plus the soldier (for a detailed description of 

the entire FCS system, see the Army FCS Web site at http:// 

www.army.mil/ fcs). In the perfectly valid interest of lowering 

logistical requirements, the Army chose to use a common chassis 

for all FCS vehicles. The consequence of that decision was 

the design of vehicles that are less armored than existing plat- 

forms and therefore less survivable in combat, which is illogical 

when one considers the certainty that time and technology will 

continue to see the development of stronger and more powerful 

weapon systems. How then, does it make sense to design a 

future fighting platform less survivable than today’s vehicles? 

Consider recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The enemy in both of those wars is not a shell of the powerful 

future enemy we may someday face, and yet this decidedly 

low-tech, insurgent enemy has been able to scrounge for sufficient 

numbers of powerful roadside weapons that haveforced 

the U.S. to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to add armor 

to every combat vehicle in our inventory — including the 70ton 

M1 Abrams tank and the 30-ton Bradley Fighting Vehicle. 

If we recognize the need to upgrade the armor protection on 

the vehicles in our fleet that already possess the greatest 

degree of protection, what logic could lead one to conclude 

that it makes sense to develop lighter vehicles, possessing less 

armored protection, potentially going up against a state 

equipped with a full arsenal of modern weapons? The Defense 

Department’s apparent answer: Information. 

PAINFUL LESSON 1 

Operation Anaconda conducted against al-Qaida in Afghanistan 

in March 2002 provides painful lessons about the limitations 

of technology. In a paper for the Army War College, then- 

Lt. Col. H.R. McMaster described the key points of that battle: 

“On March 2, infantry air assaulted almost directly on top of 

undetected enemy positions. Soldiers came under immediate 

fire from small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and 

machineguns as their helicopters landed. Battalion and 

brigade command posts were pinned down and commanders 

fought alongside their men. Apache helicopters responding to 

provide direct fire support were hit and rendered inoperable. 

The planned second lift of soldiers had to be cancelled. Some 

units were pinned down by enemy fire during the first night of 

the battle and through the next day; they, including many of 

the wounded, could not be extracted until the following night. 

The unit had deployed with no artillery under the assumption 

that surveillance combined with precision fires from the air 

would be adequate. Even the most precise bombs proved ineffective 

against small, elusive groups of enemy infantry so soldiers 

relied heavily on small mortars. As the fight developed 

over the next ten days, it became apparent that over half of the 

enemy positions and at least three hundred fifty al Qaeda 

fighters had gone undetected.” 



Significantly increasing the armor on the planned Mounted 

Combat System would give FCS a vehicle that could go head 

to head with the best Chinese and Russian tanks. 

It is reasonable to ask how, 11 years after Desert Storm, with 

billions of dollars spent on refining the technological advances 

so touted a decade earlier, we encountered such stiff resistance 

against an enemy that had no UAVs, no access to satellites, no 

armored vehicles, no digitized battle command network, no 

helicopters and very little in the way of sophisticated weaponry. 

Since the early 1990s, senior military leaders have been 

preaching what amounts to a faith-based belief in the efficacy 

of future technology. We are always told that “soon” we will see 

“unprecedented” capabilities as a result of technology, and that 

our troops, so equipped, will enjoy “overmatch” against any 

opponent. However, when it has come to combat operations in 

which theory has met reality, a different story has emerged. 

PAINFUL LESSON 2 

An equally problematic encounter occurred during the initial 

march to Baghdad by our mechanized forces. One of the leading 

elements of the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) drive to 

Baghdad, Lt. Col. Ernest Marcone, battalion commander in 

3ID’s 69th Armored Regiment, approached a key bridge over 

the Euphrates River that would be necessary for the advance to 

the capital by the remainder of the division. Every technological 

advantage should have belonged to Marcone’s armor battalion, 

particularly with respect to intelligence of enemy movements. 

The Iraqi enemy had access to no satellites, limited 

ARMY ILLUSTRATION 

radio communications, no UAVs, no fighter jets, no helicopters 

and only rudimentary command-and-control technology. 

The U.S. side was equipped with unprecedented 

technology. During the war, hundreds of aircraft- and satellitemounted 

motion sensors, heat detectors, and image and communications 

eavesdroppers hovered above Iraq. The armed 

services coordinated their actions as never before. U.S. commanders 

in Qatar and Kuwait enjoyed 42 times the bandwidth 

available to their counterparts in the first Persian Gulf War. 

High-bandwidth links were set up for intelligence units in the 

field. A new vehicle-tracking system marked the location of 

key U.S. fighting units and even allowed text e-mails to reach 

front-line tanks. This digital firepower convinced many in the 

Pentagon that the war could be fought with a far smaller force 

than the one it expected to encounter. If ever there was going 

to be overmatch, it should have been here. But as in Afghanistan, 

when theory met reality in combat, reality prevailed 

because even a technologically overmatched enemy has a vote 

in the outcome. 

As Marcone’s battalion approached the bridge, he was 

unable to get intelligence on the nature of the threat he might 

face. According to a November 2004 article in Technology 

Review, “How Technology Failed in Iraq,”as the battle developed, 

“the situation grew threatening. Marcone arrayed his 

battalion in a defensive position on the far side of the bridge 

and awaited the arrival of bogged-down reinforcements. One 

communications intercept did reach him: a single Iraqi 

brigade was moving south from the airport. But Marcone says 

no sensors, no network, conveyed the far more dangerous 

reality, which confronted him at 3:00 a.m. April 3. He faced not 

one brigade but three: between 25 and 30 tanks, plus 70 to 80 

armored personnel carriers, artillery, and between 5,000 and 

10,000 Iraqi soldiers coming from three directions.” 

Because the American soldiers were so well-trained and wellequipped, 

in both cases they were able to overcome the uncertainty 

created by the failure of technology. In our current force, 

soldiers don’t expect to have all the information. They are 

explicitly trained to expect that intelligence reports are approximations, 

and that once contact is made they discover ground 

truth, adapt to the situation presented and still expect to prevail. 

In the future force, however, it will be far more difficult for soldiers 

to overcome inaccurate or incomplete intelligence reports 

because the platforms in which they’ll fight are physically less 

capable of surviving direct-fire engagements in combat. 

The concept of our future ground force is such that it trades 



The greatest threat to our future force is the misguided decision to 

reduce armor protection and the number of fighting vehicles. 

armor protection for enhanced information, positing that with 

dominant battlespace knowledge, we will know where the 

enemy is and what he is doing, and take pre-emptive action 

against him. Thus, we always gain and maintain the initiative, 

keeping enemy forces continually off balance and on the 

defensive. 

But as these two critical tactical vignettes show, the other 

side is quite capable; the technology upon which we primarily 

base our intelligence, communication and precision strike 

capabilities will not always do what we hope; and at other 

times, circumstances simply will not be in our favor. If we do 

not have a force like Marcone had at that Euphrates bridge — 

heavily armored tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that 

enabled him to fight for information in an uncertain environment 

— then we will at times be at a disadvantage against an 

enemy who is so equipped. 

MODERNIZATION’S MISMATCHES 

To ensure, therefore, our future force does not encounter a situation 

in which it is overmatched by an enemy force, we must 

conduct a thorough force-on-force analysis of potential future 

opponents. Only by making a direct comparison to these 

forces can one hope to determine whether the correct course 

of action has been taken in terms of future development. 

Without question, the country that currently possesses the 

most robust military capability and is investing most heavily 

for the future is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

This article takes no position on the likelihood of whether 

the PRC and the U.S. ever will go to war, but addresses the 

capabilities that these two giants possess now and are likely to 

possess in the future and illuminates potential Chinese advantages 

over future American forces. 

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in an effort to create 

combat forces with the ability to effectively execute China’s 

emerging modernization doctrine, has been improving its 

training in terms of realism and sophistication with a focus on 

joint and combined-arms operations. In recent years, China 

has increased the difficulty of training exercises by presenting 

its leaders with unexpected problems. In January, the PLA 

General Staff Department (GSD) issued its 2007 Training 

Guidelines, which emphasizerealism. 

It is clear that China’s doctrine and supporting training 

programs are focused on precisely the capabilities the U.S. 

possesses now and is likely to have in the future. China has 

also invested heavily in the weapon systems needed to attack 

American vulnerabilities. China has aggressively produced an 

entire array of high-tech systems and advanced weapons 

designed to attack areas of American vulnerability, particularly 

in regard to FCS. It is for this reason we must be cautious 

when touting the strengths of the system; we must not 

fail to take into consideration that other intelligent people 

are actively engaged in seeking ways to defeat U.S. military 

capabilities. 

MADE IN AMERICA — AND EVERYWHERE ELSE 

The world has not stood passively by since Desert Storm. It has 

studied American performance in extraordinary detail and 

spent billions of dollars and years of research focused on the 

desire to defeat the most prominent capabilities we have now 

and those we are projected to have in the future. We, therefore, 

must be sober and aware of what capabilities the world is producing, 

expend considerable mental power trying to devise 

counteractions and, perhaps above all, shed the hubris 

endemic throughout our force that would have us believe we 

cannot possibly be challenged on a conventional battlefield. 

The facts argue persuasively against such belief. 

It is critical that with eyes wide open, we educate ourselves 

as to global military developments, analyze those capabilities 

in light of our platforms and systems, ascertain our areas of 

potential vulnerability — and then constantly seek ways to 

mitigate those vulnerabilities, acknowledge that our opponent 

will score some victories, and with that understanding, seek 

solutions that will allow us to win anyway. If we always prepare 

ourselves to face the best capabilities a potential enemy might 

throw at us, we will have a chance to win every time. 

Ironically, the Defense Department claims to use such a 

“capabilities-based” approach to future force development. 

According to Defense’s 2002 Annual Report to the President 

and the Congress, although it is impossible to know which state 

or group of states might pose a future threat to the U.S. or its 

vital national interests, it is possible “to anticipate the capabilities 

that an adversary might employ to coerce its neighbors, 

deter the U.S. from acting in defense of its allies and friends, or 

directly attack the U.S. or its deployed forces. A capabilitiesbased 

model ... requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military 

forces will need to deter and defeat. ... Because such adversaries 

are looking for U.S. military vulnerabilities and building 

capabilities to exploit them, the department is shoring up 

potential weak spots to close off such avenues of attack.” If 

actions followed these words, then this essay would be hailing 



the Defense Department’s focus. Unfortunately, there is a significant 

mismatch between stated policy and actions. 

In the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army 

defines “Future Challenge Risk” as “anticipating future 

threats and adjusting capabilities to maintain a military 

advantage against them.” And yet when it explicitly defines 

this risk in relation to the FCS, it lists three ways by which it 

will attain this goal: providing program stability through testing 

and procurement; spiraling capabilities forward; and 

accelerating the fielding of an intelligence distribution system. 

There is no mention of any analysis of current or emerging 

enemy capabilities. 

It is my assessment that the three essential enemy capabilities 

the U.S. must focus on are: 

å Future adversaries who possess rapidly evolving technological 

capabilities that will soon — and in some key categories 

already do — give them skills equal to those of the U.S. 

These categories include (but are not limited to) deployed 

satellite constellations for navigation, intelligence-gathering, 

communication, and telemetry for precision-guided weapons; 

the ability to shoot down U.S. satellites, deploy fleets of 

unmanned aerial systems and field increasingly modern fighter 

jets and bombers; and advanced C4ISR capabilities. 

å Future adversaries who are developing increasingly powerful 

armored vehicles, particularly main battle tanks designed to 

go head to head with the M1 Abrams tank, along with more 

sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles, precision-fired artillery 

pieces and advanced rotary-winged aircraft designed to allow 

them to compete on the conventional battlefield against the U.S. 

å Future adversaries who seek to mitigate U.S. strengths by 

fighting in cities, intermingling with civilian populations; make 

use of new and existing signature-reduction technology; discover 

creative ways to deceive our expansive sensor array; and employ 

robust countertechnology forces designed to interfere with, 

deceive, corrupt and destroy U.S. computer and communication 

systems; and aggressively seek to shoot down UAVs. 

Our future force is designed to go against an enemy who has 

only a few of the capabilities listed above; if unforeseen circumstances 

in the future were to require it to fight against an enemy 

who is able to do most of the things on the above list, our force 

would be vulnerable to defeat. The U.S. should, therefore, shift 

course immediately and embark on a path expressly designed 

to create a military able to defeat the best that any enemy could 

throw at us, endure a bloody nose (because it must be clearly 

understood that a worthy opponent can inflict lethal blows), 

ARMY 

Information technology is a critical tool on the modern 

battlefield, but it can lead us to exaggerate our capabilities. 

and provide the means to win despite his best efforts. To accomplish 

that objective, the Defense Department in general and the 

Army in particular must make changes to its futures programs. 

OUR BEST CHANCE 

Making recommendations for change does not imply we would 

junk all the modernization efforts conducted to date by the 

Defense Department or the Army. Many — indeed, most — elements 

of current modernization are good to excellent, both in 

theory and practice. For example, Army senior leaders are correct 

in their assessment that the global trend is clearly moving 

toward network-enabled forces that use sensors, unmanned 

aerial platforms, satellites, precision-guided weapons, and other 

advanced computer and communications gear; as an economic 

and military superpower, the U.S. must ensure it remains the 

world leader in this movement. Moreover, a number of elements 

of the FCS program ought to be supported and in some 

cases expanded. Several classes of robot vehicles already have 

demonstrated notable utility in combat; the none-line-of-sight 

launch system, mortar and cannon all provide significant 

improvements over existing capabilities. The concept of linking 

platforms via an integrated network is sound. Linking sensor 

fields with aerial platforms and soldier observations enables the 

forces to attack targets outside direct-fire range and provides the 



Too often, we exaggerate what technology can do for us 

and underestimate what the enemy can do. 

Army with the ability to increase lethality. 

Although many aspects of the FCS system have great potential, 

significant vulnerabilities also exist. Problems arise when 

the network experiences latency or when the enemy force successfully 

attacks the UAVs, disables or destroys the sensors, 

knocks down the satellites, successfully employs camouflage, 

deceives the sensors, or employs a mass attack that can’t be 

destroyed fast enough. In such cases, the FCS system as 

designed would be at a marked disadvantage because, 

stripped of its ability to engage beyond line of sight and out of 

contact, it could not trade body blows with a heavily armored 

enemy and survive. The first step in rectifying this deficiency 

must be either to increase significantly the armor protection of 

the Mounted Combat System (FCS’ main direct-fire system) or 

expressly produce a new tank for the FBCT that can go head to 

head with high quality systems such as the Ukrainian T84U, 

the Chinese Type 99 and/or the Russian Black Eagle. 

BRING BACK THE CAVALRY 

One of the most significant errors committed during Army 

reorganization was the elimination of the heavy divisional cavalry 

squadron. Before being disbanded, this organization was 

composed of three ground troops equipped with 27 tanks, 41 

Bradleys and six mortars, and two aerial reconnaissance 

troops equipped with 16 OH-58 Scout helicopters. This formation 

had the ability to conduct reconnaissance in any environment 

conceivable. If bad weather, poor intelligence or just the 

fog of war clouded the situation, the squadron could develop 

the situation for the supported maneuver commander so that 

when he had to engage the enemy, he had an adequate picture 

of the enemy. As programmed, FCS has replaced this robust 

formation with what’s known as an RSTA (reconnaissance, surveillance, 

target acquisition) squadron composed of four platoons 

of UAVs and two aerial reconnaissance troops composed 

of 10 scout helicopters. 

Within each combined-arms brigade there exists a lightly 

armored ground reconnaissance troop, but the RSTA squadron 

has no ground troops, only aerial assets. In an ideal environment, 

these platforms would be able to provide valuable information 

to the maneuver commander but would have only a limited 

ability to thoroughly conduct route reconnaissance, limited 

capability to find enemy forces making effective use of camouflage, 

and no ability to engage enemy forces with direct fire. But 

the biggest weakness of all is its susceptibility to being grounded 

by bad weather and shot down by enemy anti-air assets. 

During both Desert Storm and OIF, significant dust storms 

covered the battle area at the most inopportune times, 

grounding virtually all tactical UAVs and helicopters. That did 

not represent a serious problem to the Army’s ground forces in 

either war because they possessed a sufficiently robust and 

powerful armored reconnaissance force with which to fight for 

information. I fought with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 

at the Battle of 73 Easting in a blinding sandstorm in 1991. We 

would have preferred to have had the aero scouts flying the 

normal six to 10 kilometers in front of us, but their absence 

represented limited concern to us because our ground troops 

found the enemy and had enough indigenous firepower and 

armored protection to survive any unexpected encounter. Had 

an FCS-equipped force run into the same sandstorm, all its 

aerial platforms would have been grounded, denying the supported 

maneuver force commander of information about 

enemy disposition or strength and requiring him to engage 

blindly. It is critical, then, that the reconnaissance squadron be 

reorganized to include ground troops equipped with the ability 

to fight for information when conditions are not optimal. To 

go into combat in the future with vulnerable reconnaissance 

capability would be unwise. 

Virtually every competent armed force possesses unmanned 

aerial systems, and a growing number possess the ability to 

attack space-based platforms. Therefore, we must create the 

ability within our force to both defend against such attacks and 

to launch counterstrikes. Like it or not, space has been added 

as a dimension of war. Our potential adversaries possess the 

ability to shoot down, blind, deceiveor outright destroy the 

space platforms upon which we critically rely. If we don’t protect 

our satellites and improve our ability to employ precision 

weapons against hostile enemy forces, we incur an avoidable, 

unacceptable vulnerability. 

THE ESSENTIAL UAV 

Because of its effect on the tactical and operational fight, the 

UAV has become a key asset of the battlefield commander. In 

the context of global force modernization, most discussion to 

date about UAVs has centered on their ability to perform ISR 

and precision strike functions, but there has been far too little 

discussion regarding counter-UAV operations. If it is agreed 

that the UAV is a valuable tool used by both sides in an operation, 

it stands to reason then that there is also value in denying 

this ability to our opponent. Just as a common part of a conventional 

battle plan on the ground is the counter-reconnais- 



The Desert Storm victory, cited as proof of U.S. technological 

dominance, was primarily the result of a highly trained, wellled 

American force engaging an impotent foe. 

sance phase to identify enemy intentions and strip away 

enemy reconnaissance assets, likewise it now must become a 

requirement to conduct counter-UAV operations to identify 

enemy intentions/capabilities and to strip away the enemy’s 

fleet of drones and blind him to our intentions. 

We must, therefore, develop a UAV variant whose purpose it 

is to seek out and destroy enemy platforms. When one considers 

that China has virtually identical UAV variants to the FCS’ 

Class I and IV vehicles, it becomes clearer why it is important 

to develop this counter-UAV capability. If we believe the possession 

of these platforms serves a critical function in precision-fire 

engagements, then it becomes all the more important 

to deny the enemy the ability to target our force with same. 

But although the UAV has importance at the tactical and 

operational level, satellites have great significance to the joint 

force commander at the strategic level. The loss of UAVs might 

affect companies, battalions and brigades; the loss of satellites 

affects a nation’s entire force. We need redundant capabilities, 

and we must not rely exclusively on those assets to perform 

critical functions. We need to employ things such as stationary 

inflatables, remotely piloted vehicles and other alternative 

technologies to satellites that will limit our vulnerability. 

China, Russia and other states in Asia are developing new 

fleets of fighter jets intended for use as close-air support for 

AFP 

maneuver units. The last contested air campaign conducted by 

the U.S. was the Linebacker II offensive against North Vietnam 

in December 1972. Since then, we have faced the fearsome 

Grenadans, the horrible Haitians, the mighty Serbian military 

and the “elite” Republican Guardof Iraq — none of whom had 

anything resembling a credible air force. It would be a tragic 

mistake, however, to assume that condition will continue into 

infinity. So long as potential enemies of the U.S. possess the 

capacity to strike American ground troops with attack aviation, 

we must maintain air defense units at the tactical level. 

Numerous senior Defense Department leaders have emphasized 

their intent to develop the capacity to build a force capable 

of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. If we want to 

be capable of executing that intent and pose a serious operational 

threat to future enemies, we must posses the necessary 

assets. To meet that requirement, we need a sufficient number 

of transport aircraft large and tough enough to do the job. 

In an October memorandum to senior leaders of the U.S. 

Military Academy, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey wrote: “We 

must create the strategic national military airlift and air-to-air 

refuel capability (600+ C-17 aircraft) to project national military 

and humanitarian power in the global environment. We 

currently have an inadequate capability with 150 aircraft supported 

by an aging refueling fleet. ... If we are to pose a serious 

deterrent capability in the dangerous world arena, then we 

must credibly be able to project power back into future combat 

areas to sustain allies at risk. The C-17 represents the 

capacity to carry out this strategic power projections mission.” 

Complementing the aircraft, we also need to expand and 

modernize landing-strip-building “Red Horse” squadrons. A 

Red Horse squadron is an engineer unit designed to perform 

damage repair required for recovery of critical Air Force facilities 

and utility systems, and aircraft launch and recovery. In 

addition, RedHorse units accomplish engineer support for 

bed-down of weapon systems required to initiate and sustain 

operations in an austere, bare-base environment, including 

remote hostile locations. These formations should be strengthened 

and increased in number to provide the joint force with 

the capability to establish airfields where none previously 

existed. We need to give the force commander the ability to 

send in airborne or air assault troops to secure a piece of 

selected terrain suitable for the construction of an airfield, 

protect the approaches, then insert a Red Horse squadron, 

FORCE MODERNIZATION continued on Page 46 



big 

chill 

Talk of a renewed 

Cold War underscores 

common misunderstanding 

of geopolitical flirtation 

BY DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH 

DENIS SINYAKOV, AFP The


THOSE OBSERVING CURRENT RUSSIAN-AMERICAN, 

Russian-European and European-American relationships 

might assume that the Cold War is back in a new edition. The 

U.S. plan to place an anti-ballistic missile system in Europe 

seems to signal a new chill in the Russian-Western relationship. 

The U.S. claims it is just a preventive measure against Iran 

and other “rogue” states. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismisses 

these claims and says it is designed to tip the balance 

of power toward the West — implicitly a continuation of the 

Ronald Reagan “Star Wars” program of more than a generation 

ago to protect the West from a Soviet missile attack. The rancor 

over missiles goes along with other harsh statements by Putin, 

one in Munich and another during a celebration of the Soviet 

Union’s victory in World War II, when he compared — at least 

in the view of some pundits — the U.S. to Nazi Germany. 

The rancor over the Iraq war — when the split between the 

U.S. and what former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 

called Old Europe threatened the very existence of NATO — 

seems to be gone. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and even 

the new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, have demonstrated 

friendliness to the U.S. This rekindling of relations seems to 

have put an end to rumors of divorce from the U.S. The trans- 

Atlantic geopolitical marriage is, surprisingly enough, especially 

strong on the French side. 

The trans-Atlantic marriage of the U.S. and Old Europe 

seems to have been restored, and the West once again stands 

firm against Russia. Putin has been chastised for falling back 

on Soviet-style smashing of dissent and bullying small Russian 

neighbors, and Russia again has emerged as the anti-Western, 

Asian/Eurasian country it was for decades, if not centuries. But 

the external picture could be deceptive, and a close look suggests 

the situation is very different. The Russia/West European 

trend continues, and the rekindling of love between Europe 

and the U.S. is deceptive or, perhaps, a prelude to a new marriage 

contract. This provides Russia a good chance to pursue 

its policy of European integration, or at least a close relationship 

with Europe. In general, geopolitical arrangements have 

continued to be quite fluid. 

The notion that the West is once again united and poses a 

mortal threat for Russia, as was often the case in the past, 

implies a certain Russian response. Russia’s policy for centuries 

DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH is an associate professor of history at 

Indiana University South Bend. He graduated from Moscow State 

University and has taught at Harvard and Stanford universities. 

has been to search for allies. In the 13th century, Prince 

Alexander embraced the Mongols to counter an attack from the 

West. More recently, Stalin courted the Japanese when he saw a 

Nazi onslaught in the future. And today, Putin, if he sees a united 

West as a real military threat, also should look to the East, 

even more so because of Russia’s apparent natural ally — Iran. 

Regardless of whether the current American/Iranian standoff 

will lead to war, Iran and the U.S. are sworn enemies. Iran's 

strong anti-American stance makes it seem a perfect candidate 

for a military alliance with Russia. In fact, some influential 

Russian intellectuals, such as Alexander Dugin, regard 

alliance with Iran as the linchpin of Russia’s greatness — the 

way to create a mighty Eurasian empire and end American 

global domination. Dugin and similar-thinking pundits have 

even suggested that Russia should help Iran develop nuclear 

weapons, which would limit America’s ability to engage in 

wars of aggression. 

ARMING IRAN 

This musing about rapprochement with Iran is not abstract 

talk. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has actively engaged in the 

sale of weapons to Iran and, some observers suggest, provided 

the know-how for potential Iranian development of 

nuclear weapons. Russia began to build the Iranian nuclear 

plant at Bushehr when Boris Yeltsin was professing 

unbounded love for the West in general and the U.S. in particular. 

Putin apparently proceeded in the same direction. He 

sold Iran sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles, continued the 

work at Bushehr, and continued to reiterate that Russia is a 

faithful and dedicated Iranian partner that would not let the 

U.S. attack Iran. One might suggest, in what seems to be 

increasing tension in the West, that Putin would make a more 

decisive move toward Iran. 

But the unexpected happened. In response to President 

Bush’s assertion that new bases in Poland and the Czech 

Republic would serve to counter an Iranian missile attack, 

Putin proposed instead that the U.S. use the Russian-controlled 

Kabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Putin was implying 

that the Americans could control Iranian moves much better 

from near the Iranian border than from Central/Eastern 

Europe. The message, at least from the Russian perspective, is 

clear: Russia does not regard Iran as a potential ally or care 

much about the Iranian attitude. Russia’s attention is still 

directed to Europe, and Putin believes that a geopolitical or 

economic marriage with Europe is possible, despite all the ver- 



The Cold War rhetoric of Russia and some members of the Western 

community conceals more complicated drifts in global politics. 

bal rancor and saber-rattling. Russia’s claim is not groundless, 

because it can offer what Europe needs — gas and oil. The 

relationship between Old Europe and the U.S. is far from trouble-free. 

And this also provides Russia with a good chance to 

woo Europe, regardless of harsh statements from European 

capitals. 

LORD OF GAS AND OIL 

Chinese leaders have emphasized that China’s present rise will 

be “peaceful.” This is not just diplomatic politeness. In the 

present world, a state’s power and influence depend in many 

ways on its economic resources. And China’s increasing economic 

might — its peaceful “weapon” — could indeed lead to 

a position of global power different from that in the past. 

Russia has followed this road, and assumed that it has influence 

over Europe because of natural resources, not missiles. 

The country’s final rapprochement with the continent ultimately 

depends on European dependence on Russian monopolization 

of gas and oil. In May, Putin achieved an apparent 

landmark deal with the key gas-producing countries in Central 

Asia, which ensured a supply of gas to “Old Europe” or, more 

precisely, to Germany. 

The reasons for Central Asian leaders to strike the deal with 

Russia but not with the U.S., which still has bases in the 

region, were manifold. One major reason is security. Central 

Asia is extremely insecure. Post-Soviet poverty and the presence 

of Iran and especially Afghanistan make the region a 

powder keg for revolts and the rise of fundamentalism. At the 

beginning of the Bush administration, the Central Asian countries 

assumed that the U.S. presence would guarantee their 

security, a major reason why they allowed American bases in 

the area. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made 

them question America’s ability to guarantee their security. 

Russia has emerged as a viable alternative. Russia’s protracted 

war in Chechnya demonstrated that despite all its problems 

with the Russian army, it can endure conflict much longer 

than the U.S. 

Chechenization of the conflict looks much more successful 

than Iraqization and, of course, Vietnamization. This consideration 

played the most important role in seeing Russia as the 

more reliable patron. The subsequent gas deal made Russia 

crucially important for the delivery of at least a good part of 

Central Asian gas to Europe. Russians believed that this economic 

pragmatism will finally push Europe to embrace Russia 

and that the supposed rekindling of a marriage between 

America and Old Europe should be taken with a grain of salt. 

For all the importance of the relationship of Europe and the 

U.S. and Russia, the most important for Europeans is still their 

internal relationships. They have reached an important milestone: 

Despite Polish and U.K. objections, an agreement 

signed in June considerably strengthens the European Union 

(EU). It creates a stronger presidency and a more unified foreign 

policy. In fact, the EU, after almost two years of slumber, 

is moving in the direction of being a sort of United States of 

Europe. The biggest states, the Charlemagne core — those that 

emerged 1,000 years ago from Charlemagne’s empire, mostly 

Germany and France — will benefit most from the new 

arrangements and emerge as the leaders of the new grand 

state. But whether they have indeed resumed their love affair 

with the U.S. needs to be scrutinized. Observers who see such 

a move usually point to Sarkozy’s positive approach to the U.S. 

Some have even proclaimed that he is the most pro-American 

French leader since Louis XVI, the king executed during the 

French Revolution. This seems to be a remarkable sign of 

rekindled love if we remember that the French were the 

strongest opponent of the U.S. in West Europe. 

But one should accept this external manifestation with 

skepticism. As everybody knows, it is not firm handshakes and 

external cordiality but contracts leading to paychecks that 

count in the world of business and academia, and politics, as 

well. And so far, the French have offered nothing. France has 

not one soldier in Iraq and no visible increased presence in 

Afghanistan. France made clear that the bases planned in the 

Czech Republic and Poland are American and are not 

approved by all Europeans. And both France and Germany 

have implied that even if Russia is not in America’s mind — as 

claimed — the Kabala radar station in Azerbaijan is a good 

option for a missile defense base. 

Of most importance is Germany’s position. Merkel publicly 

scolded Putin for his authoritarian drive, but she willingly 

accepted Putin’s plan to build a gas pipeline through the Baltic 

Sea directly to Germany, bypassing Poland, eliciting a strong 

protest by Poland and others that wish to put a stop to the 

enterprise. The Russians can plainly see an Old Europe whose 

goal is the creation of a unified Europe, a megastate that Old 

Europe would lead. A good relationship with Russia would be 

crucial. To start with, Russian natural resources — especially 

gas — would be essential for the European economic 

machine. As a matter of fact, the Europeans have little choice 

— most of the gas from Central Asia also will be controlled by 



Russia if the May agreement goes through. And the fact that 

most, if not all, gas would be controlled by Germany, the central 

state in the Charlemagne core, would help streamline the 

cohesiveness of the European Union and discipline wayward 

members such as Poland. 

Those who observed the recent clash between Poland and 

Old Europe members of the EU, especially Germany, could 

assume that it was exclusively 

because of Poland’s reluctance to play 

second fiddle in European arrangements. 

This is true, but it is not the 

only truth. Poland played the role of 

Trojan horse, an American proxy. 

Germany and other Old Europeans 

approached the U.S. decision to place 

the missile defense system in Poland 

as implicitly directed against not 

Iranians, or even Russians, but Old 

Europe. 

The Americans are, of course, not 

concerned about actual French or 

German attacks. The bases ensure 

America’s presence in Europe and prevent 

solidification of the EU as a 

megastate whose economic and 

geopolitical weight could exceed its 

own. Here, the monopolization of the 

gas supply in the hands of Germany 

and other Old Europe states could 

upset American designs. The gas 

should compel Poland to be a good 

member of the EU, not just a junior 

American partner — an American 

Trojan horse in Europe. For Russia, the 

gas and, to some degree, oil supply should provide insurance 

that Europe will not discard Russia and will proceed with longterm 

economic and geopolitical rapprochement. But, does this 

overture toward the U.S. need not be taken seriously? No, it is 

just the other side of the Old Europe geopolitical posture. 

While preserving its general pro-European direction, Russia 

has made advances toward its neighbors on the East and even 

winked at Washington. Indeed, despite his harsh statements 

toward the U.S., Putin has noted that he regards Bush as a 

“good person.” Finally, the U.S. — facing increasing geopolitical 

and economic difficulties — has started to change its pos- 

Vladimir Putin meets with Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad in Tehran. 

ture. At the beginning of the Bush presidency, the ruling elite 

fully believed in the U.S.’s absolute preponderance, pretty 

much discarding diplomatic niceties. It was assumed that the 

American military fist would solve any problems, that 

American diplomacy could be reduced to the simple, no-nonsense 

parlance of the Spartans from the recent movie “300.” As 

U.S. problems in the Middle East mount, diplomatic sophistication 

has acquired more importance. 

Despite the harsh statements, 

the pro-Western, and especially the 

pro-European, direction of Russia’s 

foreign policy has continued. Russia 

believes that its control of the flow of 

oil and, especially, gas — ensured by 

the recent agreement in Central Asia 

— will compel Old Europe to continue 

its rapprochement with Russia. 

Old Europe is now most concerned 

with consolidation of the 

European Union, the creation of a 

new megastate and a unified foreign 

policy. While trying to rearrange the 

relationship with a post-imperial and 

much weaker U.S., Old Europe at the 

same time does not want to spoil its 

relationship with Russia, which it 

needs for economic and geopolitical 

reasons. The relationship provides 

Old Europe with a solidified EU, plus 

bargaining chips in dealing with 

Washington. Sending positive signals, 

its leaders have intimated that they 

would not mind reasserting trans- 

Atlantic relations, but on a new basis: 

A united Europe should be an equal partner, and the trans- 

Atlantic alliance should not preclude Europeans engaging with 

other powers, regardless of their relationship with Washington. 

Thus, the Cold War rhetoric of Russia and some members of 

the Western community actually conceals much more complicated 

drifts in global politics and Russia’s place in it. It also 

implies that global arrangements are quite fluid and the most 

unexpected combinations might emerge in the future. All this 

requires observers to be attentive to new trends and avoid 

rigid model-making that supposedly explains all events in the 

past, present and future. AFJ 


BEHROUZ MEHRI, AFP


Into 

Africa 

There are opportunities 

and pitfalls in stepping up 

U.S. initiatives on a 

war-ravaged continent 

BY PHILIP KAO


NASA SATELLITE IMAGE 

AFRICA CONTINUES TO BE, FOR MANY, THAT HOPELESS 

and impenetrable heart of darkness — a continent ravaged by 

disease, poverty, corruption and eternal violence. Will the close 

of the 21st century offer a different outlook? 

At worst, and amid the rubble of time, the human voice still 

may find a way to utter the cadences of despair and protest. 

But let us hope for better. Africa has piqued the interest of 

Western governments and, most notably, defense institutions 

in the aftermath of Sept. 11. The U.S. has created a separate 

geographic combatant command dedicated solely to Africa. 

President Bush said that “Africa Command will enhance our 

efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and 

promote our common goals of development, health, education, 

democracy and economic growth in Africa.” 

The Defense Department is concerned with the growing 

threat of terrorism — the unknowns emanating from 

“ungoverned spaces” — and with securing economic and 

energy interests. Drawing from the three Ds (diplomacy, development 

and defense), Western countries such as the U.S. are 

stepping up their initiatives in Africa. As an example, the U.S. 

is working on regional engagement strategies in the Gulf of 

Guinea that look to cross-link military actions with nonmilitary 

interagency processes and economic development outcomes. 

Africa, which was once (and may still be for some) the 

object of desire for the so-called civilizing mission, is now 

more than just a laboratory site for military administrators and 

defense bureaucracies. 

The post-9/11 ethos and largesse of defense budgets has 

allowed the U.S. military to task itself substantially with more 

nontraditional defense missions. The DIME paradigm (diplomatic, 

information, military and economic) still reigns over 

our operational planning consciousness. In essence, DIME 

amounts to the various national instruments of power available 

for deployment in theater. Because Africa’s challenges 

have more to do with diplomacy (politics), information and 

economic development, the Defense Department is stuck in a 

bit of a quagmire. For one thing, development goals, and what 

some military planners have coined “netcentric peace,” suggest 

that the U.S. military should be organized to support 

other nonmilitary agencies, but because of our global pres- 

PHILIP KAO is a civil servant with the U.S. Joint Forces Command. He 

was educated at the University of Chicago and the London School of 

Economics. His views do not reflect those of the U.S. Government or 

U.S. Joint Forces Command. 

ence and resource delivery capabilities, we are going to be, 

more often than not, in the lead, unfortunately. 

Given the global security concerns at the dawn of the 21st 

century, it is no surprise that leading militaries around the 

world view security as a precursor to sustainable development 

and a foundation for effective nation-building. The thesis that 

security is a necessary aspect of development is hard to disagree 

with, but even the most obvious and well-intentioned 

tautologies have their limits. In certain cases, there is a positive 

correlation between increased security and economic development. 

Such a statistical relationship, however, is not a universal 

axiom of development; it is clearer that the relationship 

between security and development is one of mere correlation, 

and rarely straightforward causation. 

Above all else, there is, indeed, a role for an enhanced 

African military capability to better curb and respond to violent 

conflicts internally. In conjunction with adequate institutional 

frameworks, a robust and well-trained African military may 

help to cultivate a democratically infused political will by raising 

social capital in the name of unity, human rights and stability. 

However, professionalizing militaries in Africa should never 

become a mere end goal, per se. One of the crucial issues really 

amounts to asking: Is an emboldened and professional African 

military (whether at the level of individual African countries or 

in the form of an African Standby Force) a vehicle for positive 

change, or a catalyst for explosive violence? Pundits over the 

years have looked to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and 

the People’s Armed Police as an informative example of how a 

robust, organized and sufficiently funded military can stimulate 

and direct investments toward modernization, institution 

building and control. Needless to say, China’s initiatives are 

controversial because of their ideological import. The ideology 

of self-sufficiency in Maoist China paved the way temporarily 

for basic investment and marshalling of resources, but even 

these initiatives were soon felt to be inadequate, exhibiting 

what in development studies is commonly referred to as “path 

dependency.” In fact, China began divesting former militaryowned 

enterprises back in the 1980s to jump-start economic 

growth and to make state-business enterprises less corrupt and 

more efficient. In the long and short of it, Africa is not faced 

with conventional Westphalian nation-state enemies outside its 

continent, and does not have at its fingertips a unifying pool of 

ideologies to mobilize. Rather, over the course of its history, the 

real enemy for Africa has been unsuccessful interventions in 

the name of colonialism and progress. 



The real ‘enemy’ for Africa has been unsuccessful interventions 

in the name of colonialism and progress. 

The military is often seen as part of the problem and not the 

solution, but recently, institutional planners have turned to the 

military as an enabler for marshalling resources and delivering 

development — whether in Iraq or Africa. To begin with, several 

policymakers see military institutions as playing a crucial 

role in education. Military outreach in Africa is more specifically 

oriented towardtraining the trainers and enhancing regional 

disaster-response capabilities. Aside from professionalizing 

African militaries, Western militaries are making their presence 

felt in humanitarian projects via consulting and logistics support. 

In working with host-nation governments, Western militaries 

aim to instill a culture of planning and to support the 

buildup of institutional frameworks. An unstated assumption 

in all of this is that militaries are postured to lend assistance in 

the realm of governance, because they represent the crucible of 

society’s positive values and possess deep knowledge of leadership, 

authority and organizational planning. 

In its role as a security provider, the military also has been 

touted as playing an invaluable part in assisting economic development. 

Military-to-military partnerships help to shape the 

political economy for stimulating pro-growth investment and 

entrepreneurialism, and capturing positive economic spill-over 

effects. Military planners are also pressed to ensure that the 

breakdown of traditional group solidarities does not turn violent. 

Effective security can prevent local dispute mechanisms from 

turning sour and spreading more corruption by resuscitating 

state structures and facilitating the legitimate delivery and 

(re)distribution of resources. As a juncture for the interagency, 

military partnerships act as a lightning rod, calling forth nonmilitary 

agencies and organizations to plan more effectively together. 

Despite political differences and nuances, what the U.S. 

shares with other countries is an interest in a stable, peaceful 

and prosperous Africa. Foreign militaries in Africa can help 

respond to humanitarian crises by providing training and logistics 

support, but in the end, peaceful and legitimate political 

settlements, sustainable economic growth and humanitariancrisis 

management reside with the final stakeholders: Africans. 

AVOIDING DISASTER 

Before moving ahead, it is crucial to understand that military 

interventions in African politics and the economy have been, for 

the most part, disastrous. Good intentions delivered and packaged 

in the form of military-to-military training, along with 

other regional security engagement initiatives that involve both 

military and nonmilitary entities, have certainly caught the 

attention of military leaders. On the upside, there is potential in 

advancing working partnerships with Africans to cultivate 

mutual training objectives and co-evolve new domains of interest, 

such as promoting and enhancing maritime sector development 

— which encapsulates both security and economic development 

aspects. On a less positive note, African militaries historically 

have been used to control people (i.e. slaves), and 

negative sentiments and wounds very well may linger that 

inhibit African militaries from making constructive inroads into 

contemporary African politics. Additionally, the buildup of an 

African Armed Forces may benefit soldiers economically, but for 

the rest of the populace, the effects of militarization may 

increase social stratification, exacerbating inequality, and thus 

undermining one of the main tenets of human development. 

The best way to support Africans is to enable them to make 

better decisions, while having them shape choices that matter 

most to them. A good approach would be to enable Africans to 

develop and leverage the necessary planning toolkits and 

methodologies in accordance with their own timetables. 

African militaries should continue developing greater security 

awareness and enforcement capabilities by seeking out and 

developing key partnerships that will help them maximize their 

assets, and coordinating the necessary changes in governance 

and institutional frameworks. The problems in Africa have less 

to do with traditional warfare than complex contingencies that 

straddle peacekeeping, disease, natural disasters, human rights 

abuses and emergent civil-military relationships. Western militaries 

and governments can help by lending credible and continuous 

support in terms of resources and, most importantly, 

intellectual capital. International partnerships in Africa must 

foster trust and invest in a long-term commitment. 

On another note, economic dependence as a result of tied 

aid and debt mismanagement functioned to keep African 

countries from realizing economic growth in the 1980s and 

1990s. Any future military outreach should shy away from 

installing new modes of dependency for the continent. 

Military engagements in Africa should never leave Africans 

worse off. In fact, mismanaged political relationships and economic 

debt may instigate further corruption and violence. 

Regardless of whether the future militaries of Africa reside 

more prominently within each nation-state — to be called 

upon for regional cooperation — or form an African Standby 

Force, there are many common and recurring challenges. To 

begin with, African militaries must be funded adequately in 

terms of both equipment and pay. Centralization of funds is 



one possibility for allowing nations to provide assistance during 

crises in areas outside their immediate sovereignties and 

interests. Funds must be made available for training so that 

battalions that have to cross linguistic and cultural barriers 

know how to operate together, realize common operating procedures 

and agree on definitions, especially with respect to end 

states. Additionally, governments and 

stakeholders must identify the spectrum 

of resources and types of money available 

for different mission sets. In terms of 

education, there is still much to be 

desired by embedding peacekeeping and 

human rights aspects more thoroughly in 

the military planning process. To offer 

one final example, African-grown militaries 

might look to ensure that civil 

police organizations are brought into the 

fold to reap the benefits from training, 

technology, and ongoing changes in doctrine 

and standard operating procedures. 

International militaries have a substantial 

educational role to play here. 

PROCEED WITH CAUTION 

Interventions to prop up military capacities 

and capabilities in Africa need to proceed 

cautiously, rather than impatiently. 

The international community must take 

certain actions to avoid potential misunderstandings 

and future disasters. In particular, 

there are five areas where governments 

and militaries around the world — helping Africa help 

itself — can add incredible value. 

First of all, Western countries such as the U.S. are increasingly 

viewing China’s involvement in Africa as threatening. These 

concerns exhibit similar fears and attributes as those coming 

out of China’s recent bid for Unocal Corp. Competition is not 

necessarily absolutely inimical to national security. During the 

early period of the Cold War, China’s involvement in Africa was 

spearheaded by Mao’s attempt to treat African countries (e.g. 

Mozambique and Angola) first and foremost as a flank against 

Western powers. China also sought to support nations undergoing 

similar revolutions in the Third World as a show of its 

political commitment and solidarity. With the dominance of 

world markets and global capitalism, geopolitics is slightly dif- 

U.S. training efforts should help African 

militaries to help themselves. 

ferent today. Instead of ostracizing China, the U.S. — along 

with other countries — need to begin partnering with China to 

share responsibility in Africa. Countries should look to partner 

with China, not only because of its growing bed of resources, 

but also because Africa is becoming more amenable to the 

Beijing model of strict government control and high economic 

growth. No matter what, political interaction 

in Africa should not leave the continent, 

once again, the passive victim in an 

imperial race for resources. 

Secondly, successful partnerships are 

always a two-way street. To create meaningful 

working relationships, Western 

countries need to be in a position and 

mind-set to be able to learn something 

from Africans. Without this, any involvement 

in Africa will be stuck in an 

unhealthy power relation, with the delineation 

of a technical superior holding the 

seat of legitimacy and a passive inferior 

looking to resist and subvert “knowledge.” 

Western countries still have much to learn 

from Africa, including social entrepreneurship, 

the strength and beauty of human 

diversity, human rights, and dignity. 

Thirdly, Western militaries are already 

cognizant that their uniformed presence 

in humanitarian outreach can be a detriment. 

Military-to-military training does 

not pose a problem, but in the context of 

development work and humanitarian- 

crisis response, armed military presence can be off-putting 

and counterproductive in certain contexts. Additionally, in recognizing 

that engagements in Africa need to have more of a 

civilian face, Western countries should educate their own nongovernmental 

organizations and nonmilitary communities 

before unleashing dysfunctional civilian-military relationships 

and half-worked-out interagency constructs in the field. 

Next, drawing on the theme of economic development, 

Western governments and militaries need to spend more time 

in their assessment of the relationships between security and 

development. Military and commercial ties play a significant 

role in the economies of most countries. In a recent ethno- 


AFP 

AFRICA continued on Page 44


Boom 

and 

strengths and weaknesses 

of Taiwan’s defense strategy emerge bustThe 

BY CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN


SAM YEH, AFP 

A MOCK DEFENSE OF TAIWAN’S BUSTLING SUAO BAY 

naval base in May, conducted as a part of the Han Kuang, or 

“Chinese Glory,” live-fire military exercises,presented a snapshot 

of Taiwan’s evolving military. New capabilities were on 

display, but the failures of antiquated weapons stole the show. 

Civilian officials in the viewing stand demanded explanations, 

a far cry from the island’s long history of military domination 

under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 

Taiwan’s progress was apparent, but so was the array of 

challenges in military strategy, procurement and personnel 

reform if the island is going to be able to defend itself in the 

future. 

These challenges are rooted in the transformation of 

Taiwan’s military strategy since 2000, when Chen Shui-bian of 

the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) beat the long-ruling 

Kuomintang (KMT) to become president of the Republic of 

China (ROC). Chen inherited an army-centric military that had 

been designed over nearly 50 years of KMT rule to focus on the 

defense of the island’s physical territory. Chen feared this focus 

would turn Taiwan’s densely populated cities into urban combat 

zones if conflict with China ever came, and instead decided 

to pursue “decisive offshore operations” that would employ 

air and naval power to carry the fight into the Taiwan Strait 

and, if necessary, to the mainland. The immediate obstacle for 

Chen’s strategy was Washington’s reluctance to sell Taipei the 

types of advanced weapons systems necessary for such a 

defensive strategy after the U.S. promised to reduce its sales to 

Taiwan in a 1982 Sino-American joint communiqué. 

The election of President Bush provided Chen an opportunity 

to break through this barrier. In April 2001, Bush famously 

declared that he would do “whatever it takes” to defend the 

island, despite the absence of a formal security treaty, and 

approved a series of arms sales that by the summer of 2003 

would amount to $30 billion on the table. This flood of offers 

followed two decades during which Taipei had never 

processed a single purchase from the U.S. greater than $500 

and quickly blew bureaucratic circuits at Taiwan’s Ministry of 

National Defense, which found itself responsible for mountains 

of documentation on planning, programming, budgets 

and systems analysis. 

As Washington sent a slew of arms offers in Taiwan’s direc- 

CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN is a research associate in Asian studies at 

the American Enterprise Institute. 

tion, the ROC was undergoing fundamental reforms to the way 

its military did business and related to its civilian leadership. 

In 2002 and 2003, Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan 

(LY), adopted the National Defense Law and National Defense 

Organization Act, which former U.S. Defense Department official 

Mark Stokes has compared to being “equal to the U.S. 

National Defense Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 

1986 combined.” These laws established firm civilian leadership 

over the military, creating an institution inside the 

Ministry of National Defense equivalent to Washington’s Office 

of the Secretary of Defense — a civilian organization to oversee 

almost every facet of Taiwan’s defense policy. 

While the newly reorganized bureaucracy was grappling 

with a previously unimaginable series of arms sales offers, 

Taiwan’s political leadership was also trying to find its own 

bearings. Just as the KMT found itself in the unaccustomed 

role of the political opposition, the Legislative Yuan was newly 

empowered to exercise oversight and budgetary control over 

the government. When the Chen government requested that 

the LY approve a single $18 billion “special budget” to pay for 

the procurement of submarines, P-3C maritime patrol aircraft 

and Patriot missile batteries, the KMT balked. The subsequent 

stalemate over defense spending has begun to undermine 

Washington’s confidence in Taipei’s commitment to its own 

defense. 

Although Taiwan’s military too often feels it is caught in the 

crossfire among these many changes, it is nonetheless taking 

substantive steps towardestablishing a force that can execute 

the types of offshore operations it has been charged with conducting. 

When I visited Taipei in May to observe the 23rd 

annual Han Kuang exercises, I saw these changes first-hand, 

as well as the major barriers that Taiwan’s military must yet 

overcome. 

ORGANIZING FOR OFFSHORE OPERATIONS 

Since 2000, Taiwan’s strategy of decisive offshore operations 

has served multiple goals. It has sought to remove Taiwan’s 

population and economic centers from the battlefield. It has 

shifted power away from the army, a service that many DPP 

leaders identified as being an anti-democratic element of the 

old regime and bolstered the relative prestige of the navy and 

air force. Most importantly, it is also a response to the “revolution 

in military affairs,” a shift in war fighting that has left relatively 

static, army-centric forces vulnerable to more integrated 



Taiwan’s strategy of decisive offshore operations has served 

multiple goals. 

militaries with strong air and naval capabilities — the model 

that Beijing is pursuing today. 

The problem that such operations pose is that they require 

a military reorganization that is time-consuming, expensive, 

and necessitates fundamental changes in personnel and command 

structures. The Chinese term for this task captures the 

concept neatly: xinxihua, which translates to the clumsy 

English term, “informationalization.” The centerpiece of the 

Taiwanese military’s effort to catch up with the challenge of 

informationalization is the Po Sheng (Broad Victory) program, 

a $2.3 billion modernization effort launched in 2003 to 

enhance the C4ISR capabilities of its military. 

The centrality of the Po Sheng program to Taiwan’s broader 

modernization effort is captured simply by the fact that for 

years, its aircraft and naval vessels could not effectively communicate 

with one another, its soldiers depended upon cell 

phones more than radios, and its central military command, 

the Joint Operations Control Center (JOCC), could not monitor 

military operations in real time. The net consequence of 

these deficiencies was that the goal of joint operations 

remained a dream: Without the means to share data and integrate 

command structures, the Taiwanese military services 

could not expect but to fight independently, implying a 

sequence of air, naval and land battles as each service met an 

invading force from the mainland. 

Although Taiwan’s C4ISR program is a work in progress, its 

successes so far were demonstrated by the structure of the 

April 16-20 Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted by the 

Taiwanese military as the first leg of the Han Kuang exercises. 

The CPX was an extensive, five-day war game that linked 

Taiwan’s various field headquarters to the JOCC, where game 

managers created a scenario that forced the military to 

respond to a rapidly evolving crisis scenario through the joint 

employment of Taiwan’s military forces. 

The CPX posited a scenario set in 2012 in which mainland 

China launched a massive attack in response to Taipei’s intransigence 

toward Beijing’s demands for unification talks. The 

scenario captured the principal concerns of Taiwan’s defense 

leadership today.The mainland prefaced its assault with a 

massive missile barrage that destroyed much of the island’s 

infrastructure and military installations, and the two-week 

timeline of the hypothetical scenario represented Taipei’s fear 

that the mainland would attempt to execute an invasion 

before American forces could reach the theater. 

In the CPX scenario, mainland China employed a two- 

phased strategy in its assault on Taiwan. The first phase was an 

air war in which Beijing sought to destroy Taiwan’s air defenses 

and wreak havoc on the Taiwanese government. China has 

invested heavily in means to target Taiwan’s air defense in 

recent years, including its purchase of Israeli-made Harpy 

anti-radiation drones, which are designed to home in on and 

destroy the radiation emissions of air defense radars. Even 

where Taiwan’s radar systems are not vulnerable, it suffers 

from a notable lack of logistical support for its air defenses. 

Many surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems are outdated, and 

it can be difficult for Taipei to procure spare missiles from 

Washington. 

Over the initial days of combat, the CPX scenario predicted 

that the mainland would seek to exploit its suppression of 

Taiwanese air defenses to establish air superiority over the 

Taiwan Strait. China already possesses some 400 fourth-generation 

aircraft, comprising advanced Su-27, J-11 and Su-30 

fighters poised to attack Taiwan, and is investing to upgrade 

the rest of its air fleet by 2012. While ever more advanced 

Chinese aircraft patrol the skies, they will be supported from 

the ground by S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missile batteries, 

which will be able to strike any aircraft flying over Taiwan’s 

west coast. 

The final portion of China’s first-phase operations was the 

employment of its short- and medium-range ballistic missile 

batteries, as well as airstrikes and special operations forces, to 

strike a wide array of civilian and military targets on the island. 

These attacks disrupted the government and forced Taiwan’s 

military to seek shelter in hardened bunkers. While these 

attacks occurred, the bulk of Taiwan’s military was sheltered on 

the east coast of the island, where PRC submarine forces were 

attempting to force a blockade on the movement of ships into 

and out of port. Although the CPX planners assumed that 

Taiwan would be bloodied in the opening phase of a war, they 

also argued that it would be possible to save the bulk of the 

force. 

In the second phase of the exercise, Chinese forces attempted 

a major amphibious landing on Taiwanese soil, forcing the 

ROC military to employ its decisive offshore battle concept in 

a joint naval-air interdiction of the amphibious force. Having 

assembled the bulk of its naval and air power on the east coast 

of Taiwan, the military had a single-shot opportunity to interdict 

and destroy the amphibious Chinese force. According to 

CPX planners, the penultimate battle was so successful in the 

game that the red force had to be reconstituted for the follow- 



A Taiwanese F-16 fighter takes off from a highway during the 

Han Kuang exercise in May. 

ing land battle. The stakes involved in this single battle were 

emphasized when Taiwan’s deputy chief of general staff for 

operations and planning told The Associated Press afterward 

that because of China’s superior submarines and jet fighters, 

“we would suffer great damage to our force.” 

The successful interdiction of the Chinese amphibious 

force was also a source of much controversy in Washington 

when Taiwanese briefers announced after the exercise that 

their military had employed a “tactical shore-based missile for 

fire suppression” to buy the striking force a window when 

China’s missile forces, radar stations and airfields would be 

temporarily crippled. This euphemism was widely interpreted 

to be a reference to the HsiungFeng-2E (HF-2E) land attack 

cruise missile that Taiwan reportedly has been developing for 

several years, and immediately prompted U.S. criticism. 

National Security Council official Dennis Wilder stated that 

“offensive capabilities on either side of the Strait are destabilizing 

and therefore not in the interest of peace and security,” 

and called on neither Taipei nor Beijing to develop ballistic or 

cruise missiles. 

Despite Washington’s criticism, Taipei will likely continue to 

develop the HF-2E or similar systems that allow it to attack the 

Chinese mainland directly. According to the predictions of the 

CPX scenario, after all, the capability to strike China’s air 

SAM YEH, AFP 

defenses will be a central component to any interdiction of an 

amphibious force headed for Taiwan. More important, 

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense believes that the Han 

Kuang CPX exercise demonstrated that the offshore decisive 

battle strategy is the key to victory if Beijing should attempt to 

invade the island. But no plan survives contact with the 

enemy, and it remains to be seen whether Taiwan will develop 

the necessary capabilities for its actual forces to conduct the 

type of interdiction operation that was the key to the CPX scenario 

victory. 

THE CHALLENGE OF PROCUREMENT 

Even the most finely tuned strategy cannot succeed if the military 

is unprepared to execute it, and on May 15-18, the 

Taiwanese military conducted a series of field training exercises 

(FTX) to test the concepts developed in the April CPX simulation. 

The Han Kuang FTX is the island’s largest annual livefire 

exercise and is, indeed, one of the rare opportunities for 

Taiwan’s troops to use live fire in their training. The first, and 

most telegenic, exercise was the landing of pairs of fighter aircraft 

— F-16s, Mirage 2000s and Indigenous Defense Fighters 

(IDFs) — on a strip of Taiwan’s main highway near Taizhong 

on April 15 to demonstrate how the ROC Air Force would protect 

its aircraft even if its airfields were destroyed by Chinese 

missile and special operations forces attacks. The islandwide 

exercises soon expanded to include offshore defenses, engagements 

with mock paratroopers and preparations at bases on 

Taiwan’s east coast to break out of a blockade. 

The May 16 exercises at Suao Naval Base in Ilan County 

were one portion of these exercises, testing the type of interdiction 

battle that Taiwan is betting its victory in a real conflict 

with the mainland. The Suao exercise involved some 2,163 

military personnel from the three services and was conducted 

as a series of missile launches at aircraft drones and ships from 

a combination of air, ground and sea-based platforms. The 

action involving Kidd-class destroyers occurred some 72 kilometers 

from the viewing stand but gradually ranged into Suao 

Bay, where the majority of interceptions involved direct fires 

from AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, as well as a combination 

of F-16s, Mirage 2000s and IDFs. 

The beginning of the exercises was wholly successful, as a 

variety of naval platforms and all of the aircraft involved in the 

exercise destroyed their targets, but the exercise took a turn for 

the worse when the ROC Army’s missile corps repeatedly failed 

to strike targets with Hawk, Chaparral and Avenger missiles. 



Taipei will likely continue to develop the HF-2E or similar systems 

that allow it to attack the Chinese mainland directly. 

The medium-range surface-to-air Hawk missile was tested relatively 

early in the exercise, but one of the missiles failed upon 

firing and crash-landed into a cemetery before reaching the 

coast. The Chaparral, a ground-launched version of the air-toair 

Sidewinder missile, had a less spectacular failure when the 

first missile launched failed to hit its assigned target, necessitating 

a successful strike by a backup missile. 

The most unsatisfactory mark was posted by an Avenger 

missile system that failed to hit its target drone at all. Using a 

Humvee-launched version of the Stinger missile, the Avenger 

operators tried twice to strike a relatively low and slowly flying 

drone target, failing on both attempts. The drone made its prescribed 

flight path over Suao Bay, turned and returned to the 

ocean, presumably having dropped its imaginary payload 

somewhere near the viewing stand. 

The failure of the missile strikes at Suao Bay is a reminder 

that if the Taiwanese government is going to fully implement a 

strategy of pushing future battles with China offshore, it must 

have the necessary military equipment to do so. The mixed 

fleet of fighter aircraft delivered over the 1990s is a useful start, 

and the Kidd-class destroyers are a major step forward for 

Taiwan’s navy, but the country still faces several major capability 

gaps. 

The first of these is the threat posed by China’s growing missile 

capabilities, which the Taiwanese Ministry of National 

Defense estimates has almost doubled since 2000 to nearly 

800 Dongfeng-11A and Dongfeng-15A short- and mediumrange 

missiles. In 2001, the U.S. and Taiwan agreed to a twotracked 

response to this missile threat. The first track emphasizes 

hardened C4ISR and other continuity of government 

measures to ensure that even a significant missile strike will 

not fundamentally cripple Taiwan. The second track was the 

combined upgrading of Taiwan’s existing Patriot missile 

launchers to Patriot Advance Capability 3 (PAC-3) batteries, as 

well as the purchase of six additional PAC-3 fire units. 

The PAC-3 offer was ultimately included in the “special 

budget” that Chen submitted to the LY in late 2003 and that 

included funding to develop a diesel-electric submarine program 

and purchase P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. The special 

budget stalled as the KMT-controlled legislature dug its heels 

in and focused instead on a bruising political fight with Chen 

through the 2004 election and beyond. Only in June did the LY 

pass a budget to cover the upgrade for its existing Patriot batteries, 

losing some four years on the procurement of a vital 

defensive system that can compliment such aging systems as 

the Hawk and Chaparral, which were phased out of the U.S. 

military in the 1990s. 

The passage of the 2007 defense budget also raised an additional 

procurement challenge as Taiwan looks at its mixed fleet 

of F-16s, Mirage 2000 and IDF aircraft. In June, the LY 

approved a $400 million budget to begin purchasing 

American-made F-16C/D aircraft, a significant upgrade on its 

existing air forces. Moreover, the added F-16s would complement 

the broader Po Sheng C4ISR effort, because it would 

increase the number of Taiwan’s fighters that are directly tied 

into the JOCC’s operational picture through the Link-16 tactical 

data communications system. 

Despite these advantages of procuring the new aircraft, 

Taiwan’s request for new F-16 sales has been shunned by 

Washington in response to a brewing political fight over the 

country’s planned referendum on whether to apply to the 

U.N. under the name of “Taiwan,” instead of the constitutional 

title of “Republic of China.” In short, while the U.S. has 

accused Taiwan of treating defense spending as a domestic 

political football, it does the same when it tries to use the 

approval of sales as a stick or carrot in its management of 

cross-Strait relations. 



Attempts to strike target drones with surface-to-air missiles 

were largely unsuccessful during Taiwan’s Han Kuang 

military exercise. 

Procurement will remain a litmus test of Taiwan’s ability to 

implement its national defensive strategy. Continuing to build 

on the June 2007 budget is one way for Taiwan to make a more 

credible demonstration in this regard, but even a wellequipped 

Taiwanese military will face significant obstacles to 

achieving its maximum possible effectiveness. 

When President Chen first arrived in office in April 2000, he 

inherited a military that was staffed with some 400,000 conscripts 

who served between two- and three-year terms based 

upon their military specialties. The troops perceived this system 

as unfair, unnecessary, and corrupt — a 2001 survey 

revealed that some 50 percent of enlisted men believed that if 

they had come from richer families, they could have avoided 

military service altogether, while only 15 percent viewed conscription 

as vital to national survival. For Chen’s strategy of 

fighting Taiwan’s defense, conscription was inefficient, a drain 

on precious budgetary resources and a system that bolstered 

the army’s traditional domination among the military services. 

The Chen government decided to shift away from the 

SAM YEH, AFP 

expensive and inefficient manpower system by simultaneously 

dismantling the conscription system and investing in the 

development of an all-volunteer force (AVF). Overall troop 

numbers have fallen by more than 125,000 men, and conscription 

commitments have fallen precipitously in recent years to 

only 12 months from 2008, but creating an AVF has proved 

more difficult. Volunteer recruitment began in 2004, but less 

than 30,000 soldiers have been recruited for service to date. 

The promised pay raises for volunteers have been difficult to 

implement, and the military’s claims that it will have a force 

that is 60 percent volunteer by 2008 is only possible by counting 

officers and NCOs who re-enlisted following the end of 

their conscription terms. 

The result of this process is that the enlistment durations of 

many Taiwanese soldiers, sailors and airmen has fallen in 

recent years, but there has been little increase in volunteer 

troops to fill the gap. As a result, Taiwan’s weapons systems will 

soon be manned by troops who only have two to three months 

of training before shipping out to serve their nine-month 

durations of service. The implications for Taiwan’s military 

preparedness were demonstrated at exercises I attended on 

May 17 at the Hukou army base in Hsinchu County, about 

50 kilometers southwest of Taipei. 

The Hukou exercise involved a simulated airborne invasion 

in which the red force troops captured a series of Taiwanese 

command posts, followed by a simulated blue force counterlanding 

and armored assault. Because of a combination of 

rainy weather and perhaps responding to a training accident 

the week before in which the crash of an F-5F Tiger II trainer 

killed a three Singaporean soldiers on the base, there were no 

actual airborne troop maneuvers (helicopters flew in and out 

without carrying any soldiers) or strikes by F-16 and IDF fighters 

that were supposed to be supporting the attack. 

The culmination of the Hukou exercise was a joint maneuver 

by M60A3 Patton tanks, CM21 Armored Personnel Carriers 

(APCs) and infantry troops to destroy targets and take objectives 

downrange from the observing stand. To some degree, 

the exercise reflected Taiwan’s military tradition of doing more 

with less: the CM21 APCs were built indigenously by adapting 

the American-made M113 armored personnel carrier hull to 

include a set of side gun hatches that permit the soldiers traveling 

inside to fire from the vehicle. 

But the Hukou exercise was also notable because the lines 

TAIWAN continued on Page 44 



PERSPECTIVES 

More soup, please 

COIN manual provides guidance for modern-day tactical commanders 

BY MAJ. CHRIS ROGERS 

I 

n his thought-provoking article “Eating soup with a spoon” 

[AFJ, September], Lt. Col. Gian Gentile argues that our current 

doctrine on counterinsurgency lacks the fundamental 

essence of war: fighting. The foundation of this claim rests on 

two paradoxes that appear in the first chapter of the manual 

and that he claims establish the theoretical 

framework for how the rest of the doctrine 

should be read. 

These two paradoxes do and should 

frame the thinking of the reader, but I disagree 

that this framework contains the 

reader; rather, it provides a framework 

upon which the tactical commander can 

and should build. 

The paradoxes that Gentile references — 

“tactical successes guarantee nothing” and 

“the more you protect yourself, the less 

secure you are” — have both, in my experience 

serving in a combined arms battalion 

in Baghdad for the past year, been borne 

out to be absolutely true. What is interesting 

is that they are both true for counterinsurgency 

operations and also for conventional 

warfare. Narrowing the scope of the 

application of the paradoxes gives insufficient 

credit to our tactical commanders and 

senior leaders in their individual and combined 

abilities to understand our doctrinal framework and apply it in 

an ambiguous, complex and lethal environment. After more 

than a year in western Baghdad, I’ve observed that there still 

exists — despite the paradoxes — plenty of fight left in our 

doctrine and in our Army. 

In the case of “tactical success guarantees nothing,” the idea 

is presented that the tactical commander interprets this paradox 

as “tactics, in and of themselves, just are not that important.” 

Nothing could be further from the truth. Tactics are the 

fundamental building blocks of all military action — they are, 

as defined by doctrine, the employment of units in combat. If 

they were not important, we would, by extension, have no use 

for military forces. 

MAJ. CHRIS ROGERS has served in light infantry, mechanized infantry 

and combined arms battalions through his 15-year Army career. During 

the past 12 months in Baghdad, he served first as the operations officer 

and now as the executive officer of 1-5 Cavalry. 

The tactical commander and student of our profession who 

applies the construct of operational design knows that tactical 

successes must be linked to strategic goals — which, according 

to the very theorist whom Gentile quotes — are crucial to 

achieving the desired political outcome. The apparent paradox 

that “tactical success guarantees nothing” 

simply means that tactical success may not 

achieve the outcome our strategic planners 

and policymakers had envisioned. I believe 

history clearly bears out that in every war 

that has produced both a winner and a 

loser, the losing side has had to accept the 

fact that its tactics — no matter how effective 

or successful at any given time — ultimately 

did not guarantee victory. 

The salient point from this paradox is 

not that tactics mean nothing — it is that 

tactics must be employed as part of a larger 

design aimed at achieving strategic 

goals. Something close to this thought is 

offered when the article states that the tactical 

commander “comes away thinking 

that he has to move beyond tactics, he 

can’t just focus on raids, he can’t just focus 

on killing the enemy, because just doing 

those things and not the other important 

operations in COIN means he will ultimately 

fail.” Absolutely, he will most likely fail, but employing “the 

other important operations in COIN” are still tactical — they 

are just not kinetic and offensive and about killing. In short, 

tactics are not merely limited to killing the enemy. What 

becomes the crux of this argument is how “tactics” are defined 

or, more precisely, which definition is chosen. 

According to FM 1-02, “Operational Terms and Graphics,” 

there are two similar definitions for the word “tactics” — one 

provided by the Army, the other by the Defense Department. 

The Army defines tactics as “The employment of units in combat. 

It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of 

units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy in 

order to translate potential combat power into victorious battles 

and engagements.” 

This definition is clearly rooted in the era of force-on-force, 

conventional battle. That does not make it bad, by any stretch 

— but it is either incomplete or too complete to the point of 

being restrictive. By being incomplete, I believe that the sec- 


JOHN HARMAN, AFJ


ond half of the definition, beginning with the phrase “It 

includes,” should continue with the often-assumed extension 

“but is not limited to.” This logical extension would not limit 

the thinking, imagination or employment of combat forces by 

the tactical commander. However, it would allow that commander 

to build upon the theoretical framework rather than 

letting the doctrinal definition box him in. 

The Defense Department definition is similar, 

yet less restrictive (because it is less complete) in 

that the purpose is not related to “victorious battles 

and engagements” but instead focuses on 

achieving potential. It defines tactics as “the 

employment of units in combat, and the ordered 

arrangement and maneuver of units in relation 

to each other and/or to the enemy in order to 

use their full potentialities.” This definition — 

focusing on potential — does not impose restrictions, 

either written or assumed, on tactical commanders, but 

allows them the flexibility to employ their forces to achieve 

objectives across a full range of possibilities. 

The definitions essentially say the same thing, but the 

choice of the words used in each definition forces the tactical 

commander to make interpretations about their functionality. 

The lieutenant and lieutenant colonel who, no matter what 

the analysis of the environment and enemy situation reveals, 

come to focus solely on raids and killing the enemy are the 

officers who subscribe to the definition that tactics must be 

limited to battles and engagements. These officers have no 

place in counterinsurgency warfare. Lieutenants and lieutenant 

colonels who choose to focus on the potential of their 

unit across a full spectrum of capabilities presume that tactical 

units are capable of much more than killing the enemy — in 

fact, they may be capable of “the other important operations 

in COIN.” 

This confusion between the application of these two interpretations 

of tactics is highlighted by a meeting between 

opposing commanders in the years following the Vietnam War: 

the now highly publicized return of Army Col. Harry Summers 

to Hanoi in 1975. While meeting with his North Vietnamese 

counterpart, a Col. Tu, he proclaimed, “You know, you never 

defeated us on the battlefield.” Tu responded, “That may be so, 

but it is also irrelevant.” 

The U.S. may have been better at killing the Viet Cong and 

the North Vietnamese Army, but that didn’t matter — they 

were not better at employing their forces in a manner that 

Author’s 

response 

Lt. Col. Gian 

Gentile continues 

the debate. 

See Page 39. 

made a difference. Their tactics did not lead to strategic effects 

— they appeared successful because they were killing the 

enemy by the bushel — but in truth, they were ineffective 

because the killing did not lead to achieving strategic aims that 

resulted in the desired political outcome. 

The modern-day Army has taught us that at the tactical 

level, planning horizons were short. They were 

short because we applied the restrictive defini- 

tion of tactics. We planned, trained and 

employed our forces almost exclusively in battles 

and engagements. We spent months preparing 

for National Training Center rotations and drilled 

our staffs on how to plan more quickly — how to 

shorten the process to be able to employ our 

forces in the shortest amount of time possible. In 

the counterinsurgency in Iraq, that world is gone; 

our planning horizons, in many cases, extend 

well beyond a battalion’s time in country. We do not plan battles 

and engagements, we are forced to plan the employment 

of our forces across a broader range of options over a longer 

period of time — we employ tactics across multiple lines of 

operation. It is not always kinetic, it is not always killing, but it 

is still tactics. 

One of the lines of operation that, when kinetic fighting is 

most prevalent, tends to draw the most attention is that of 

“security.” The point of security operations in counterinsurgency, 

however, is not that they should focus inward — at our 

own soldiers — but outward toward the populace that we are 

trying to influence. It is not a matter of where we sit, where we 

stand or even where we sleep at night, but rather it is about 

how we employ our forces (remember that phrase, our tactics) 

and on what or whom they focus. Put simply, the emphasis is 

on a group of people other than ourselves. In a counterinsurgency, 

the people are, most often, the objective — much like in 

conventional operations, terrain or the enemy is the 

objective.In the example that Gentile provides, it is possible to 

illustrate an important point about how and where we focus 

our efforts to achieve a desired outcome. Col. Joshua 

Chamberlain at the battle of Little Round Top was defending a 

piece of terrain that protected the entire flank of the Union 

Army. While he was concerned for the security of his forces, 

and he placed them on that hill to afford them maximum protection, 

he understood that his ultimate objective was not the 

protection of his men, but the protection of the Union Army 

by way of that decisive piece of terrain. After fighting off sever- 



PERSPECTIVES 

al waves of infantrymen from atop the hill, he was faced with 

the dilemma of how best to deny that terrain to the enemy 

with limited resources. He chose to leave the hill — and the 

protection it afforded — to do the only remaining thing that 

could ultimately protect the Union Army. We all remember the 

call to “fix bayonets” in the theatrical representation of that 

battle, just before Chamberlain led his men to charge down 

the hill to a resounding tactical victory. It was not a dogmatic 

application of a method — it was a focusing of his combat 

power at the right time, at the right place, at the right objective, 

with both his mission and his men in mind. 

While serving in western Baghdad, our battalion 

has, as have many others, simultaneous- 

ly operated from both the relatively austere 

combat outposts and the relatively plush forward 

operating bases, such as Camp Liberty. 

We have focused, at the right time and place, 

on the population, while still providing adequate 

protection for our soldiers. It has been 

neither dogmatic nor has it resulted in 

supreme tactical vulnerability. On the contrary, 

it has, as can be seen all across Baghdad these 

days, resulted in the tactical defeat of al-Qaida 

in Iraq, a call from Muqtada al-Sadr to cease 

direct action against coalition forces, and a 

period during which total attacks against coalition 

forces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Iraqi 

civilians have reached a two-year low in 

Baghdad and across all of Iraq. In the village of 

Amariyah, where my battalion operates, we 

have not seen an improvised explosive device 

or an attack on American soldiers or ISF for 

nearly three months. This has allowed us to 

focus our tactics on other lines of operation — the “other 

important operations in COIN.” This focus has subsequently 

resulted in economic growth, re-opening scores of local businesses, 

the formation of a functional local council, and has 

allowed essential services — headed by the Belidiyah, which is 

predominately Shiite — to return to the streets of this Sunnidominated 

community and begin removing trash and restoring 

electrical power. 

This current state in Amariyah does not mean we have not 

made mistakes; we have made plenty. Nor does it mean that 

the use of combat outposts that resulted from the surge of 

available combat power is the sole reason for this significant 

In some cases, 

to achieve the 

strategic 

objectives and 

the desired 

political 

outcome, our 

tactics must 

not be “blunt 

and violent 

and dirty.” 

decline in enemy actions. There were many other factors in 

this complex interaction between friendly and enemy forces 

— such as the employment of local volunteer forces, the establishment 

of safe neighborhoods, and the effective coordination 

between conventional and special operating forces — that 

ultimately worked in concert with the combat outposts to 

achieve an overwhelming effect on the enemy’s capabilities. 

Finally, it does not mean that Gentile made mistakes or did 

not achievetactical successes during his tour in western 

Baghdad — I have seen first-hand the results of many of his 

successes. What it does mean, however, is that as a battalion — 

and as an Army — we have learned from both 

our successes and our failures how to apply our 

doctrine according to the circumstances in 

which we find ourselves. 

Fighting has not left the ranks of the Army — 

on the contrary, we have come to realize that 

fighting encompasses an even greater range of 

options available to the tactical commander. 

We have learned that we may fight the enemy 

not only by killing him, but also by denying 

him the very comforts of his own protection — 

the ability to hide amongst the local populace. 

We fight him with bullets when he presents 

himself, or we root him out with intelligence 

derived from our own forces — or, better yet, 

from intelligence provided by the local populace 

— and we fight him with services, money 

and information. In the complexities of winning 

the peace, these are all necessary tools in 

fighting counterinsurgency warfare. 

We who grew up in the Army knowing 

Vietnam only from the history books may long 

for the good old days of force-on-force battles and an enemy 

who will stand and fight. But the reality is that we have to fight 

the war we are in. In some cases, to achieve the strategic 

objectives and the desired political outcome, our tactics must 

not be “blunt and violent and dirty.” 

The fight has not left our doctrine, it has not left our Army, 

and it has most certainly not left our soldiers — it has simply 

grown and adapted to the circumstances of our environment. 

Our tactical commanders and senior leaders have used our 

doctrine the way it was intended, as a guide for employing 

U.S. forces under varying, difficult and often nonviolent circumstances 

in a vague and complex environment. AFJ 



Our COIN doctrine removes the enemy from the essence of war 

BY LT. COL. GIAN P. GENTILE 

T 

he centerpiece of the Army’s operational doctrine is no 

longer FM 3-0, “Operations,” it is FM 3-24, “Counterinsurgency.” 

The full implications of this shift are, as 

yet, unknown, but the conventional wisdom that the era of 

battles and wars of decision — as Clausewitz described them 

in “On War” — is a thing of the past seems to have prevailed. 

For the moment, the application of counterinsurgency 

practices embodied in FM 3-24 are being touted as bringing 

about substantial security progress during the “surge.” 

However, we may be misreading or seeing too much in the 

events of the past few months in Iraq, and building a counterinsurgency-only 

Army that puts our ability to address non- 

COIN contingencies at risk. Maj. Chris Rogers raises important 

points that deserve serious consideration. 

From 1976-1982, more than 110 articles written for military 

magazines and journals fundamentally questioned the emerging 

operational doctrine that would become known as AirLand 

Battle. Today, however, by my count, there have been no more 

than five or six articles over the past three years that deeply challenge 

FM 3-24 (including its early drafts) and the fact that it has 

become our Army’s overall operational doctrine. 

My basic argument in “Eating soup with a spoon” was that 

the theoretical premise of the manual embodied in Chapter 

One’s various paradoxes,specifically two emblematic ones, 

removed the essence of war — fighting — from its pages. This 

was largely an impressionistic view of the manual based on 

my personal experience in western Baghdad as a tactical battalion 

commander in 2006. Rogers has a different impression 

of the manual based on his experience in Baghdad in 2007. He 

claims that I argued that a fighting spirit has left our Army and 

our soldiers,which I absolutely did not and never would do. 

However, his critique of my article does present the popular 

case for focusing narrowly on counterinsurgency to the point 

where, I fear, it may cloud our ability to see things as they actually 

are and then devise plans and military policy for a future that may 

not exist. It is as if our COIN doctrine, with all of its seductive simplicity, 

operates like a secret recipe: “do this, and then this, and at 

the right moment add this and ... you win,” as scholar Michael 

Vlahos shrewdly noted in a recent issue of Military Review. 

The belief that COIN doctrine and its application in places 

LT. COL. GIAN GENTILE commanded 8-10 Cavalry armored reconnaissance 

squadron for three years until his posting last year to the U.S. 

Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. He commanded his squadron during 

a deployment to western Baghdad in 2006. 

such as Baghdad has reduced levels of violence since last summer 

is widespread and, to be sure, it has played a role. Still, a 

number of other factors in a complex country such as Iraq 

with a population of 25 million, including the decision to ally 

with our former enemies (e.g., the non-al-Qaida Sunni insurgents), 

the pause in activities by Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al 

Mahdi, and the separation of rival factions in Baghdad stemming 

from sectarian cleansing in 2006-2007, have all arguably 

played an even bigger role. Our leaders and soldiers have 

seized these opportunities — embracing FM 3-24’s mantra to 

“learn and adapt” — but, in the absence of these other emerging 

conditions, levels of violence very likely would have 

remained high or even higher in the face of additional troops 

and new counterinsurgency methods. 

Yet, the predisposition to focus exclusively on ourselves and 

our doctrine leads us potentially to violate the guidance of one 

of the oldest philosophers of war, Sun Tzu, to know oneself and 

the enemy and the environment, too. Our doctrine directs us to 

believe that in a counterinsurgency war, the people are the center 

of gravity. In this theory, the enemy is removed from the 

essence of war and placed at the fringes. Then, within this socalled 

war devoid of an enemy, applied scientific processes align 

the people to their government. Because the enemy is removed 

as the central element in war, the element of friction in war is 

gone, too. With the recent lowering of violence in Iraq, we 

assume that counterinsurgency doctrine applied by competent 

military outfits has reduced and almost removed the enemy 

from the equation in Baghdad. It is very possible, however, that 

the enemy has removed himself temporarily and is waiting for 

the opportunity to renew the fight when he feels ready. 

This is obviously an explanation that many in and out of 

uniform will not want to hear because it appears to downplay 

our sacrifices in blood and treasure and the practical effects of 

applied counterinsurgency doctrine in Baghdad. But it is, 

nonetheless, an explanation that must not be disregarded. It 

needs to be considered in a measured way as we look to future 

policy in Iraq, as well as the Army’s ability to carry out COIN 

and non-COIN operations elsewhere. 

In a conflict such as the one in Iraq, there is no certainty. As 

Georgetown University scholar Colin Kahl warns in his recent 

review of FM 3-24, overconfidence in ourselves and in the manual’s 

validity may tempt us, and others, to take us down this 

road more often in the future. There might be certain roads, 

however, on which we should not be traveling, even if we have 

plenty of soup to eat for sustenance and cocksureness. AFJ 



PERSPECTIVES 

A question of faith 

Religious bias and coercion undermine military leadership and trust 

BY BARRY S. FAGIN AND LT. COL. JAMES E. PARCO 

C 

ompetent leadership is fundamental to military effectiveness. 

Although there are countless definitions of 

leadership, the simple truth is that leadership is merely 

influencing others to act in concert toward achieving a goal 

that they might not have achieved on their own. The art of 

leadership speaks to a leader’s ability to appropriately influence 

subordinate behavior in a given situation. To do so, leaders 

can invoke several forms power: legitimate, reward, coercive, 

expert and referent. 

Although there is a time and place for 

rewards, punishment and a rank-based system 

for giving orders, the most effective 

units are traditionally those with leaders 

who rely less on sticks and carrots and more 

on the transformational aspects of leadership. 

When leaders rely on expert and referent 

power to influence subordinate behavior, 

research indicates that their units exhibit 

greater levels of morale and cohesion 

leading to increased levels of mutual trust. 

Leaders who possess knowledge viewed 

to be relevant and valued by others have 

license to exercise power over others who 

yield to their expertise. One of the more 

recent and impassioned calls for increased 

expertise within the ranks of senior leadership 

was put forth by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling 

on these pages [“A Failure in Generalship,” 

May]. Regardless of whether one agrees 

with his claims, it is hard to contest his basic premise that 

expertise matters greatly in a prescriptive approach to positively 

influencing follower behavior to achieve a common goal. 

But even more so than expert power, it is likely that referent 

power has the greatest potential for developing the necessary 

dependent relationship between a leader and his followers. 

Referent power is the cornucopia of values, expectations, 

training, education and life experience that is attractive to followers. 

To the extent that a follower places value on a particu- 

BARRY S. FAGIN is a professor at the Air Force Academy. 

LT. COL. JAMES E. PARCO is associate professor, Department of 

Strategy and Leadership, at the Air Force Air Command and Staff 

College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. The views expressed in this article 

are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force, 

the Defense Department or the U.S. government. 

lar leader because of who the leader is, the leader has referent 

power over the follower. To influence followers, leaders have 

only their knowledge and intuition on which to rely to guide 

them — both largely determined by their education and life 

experiences. When encountering a situation in which the 

leader has neither training nor experience, he tends to rely on 

his value system — those ideals from which his beliefs and 

actions flow. In many cases, these values are manifest in the 

type of individual whom the armed services 

attracts and are consistent with the core 

values of the various military institutions. 

We refer to the internalization of these 

values as character. Most would agree that 

character is paramount to the military 

leader. Men and women of high character 

have an advantage because followers typically 

respect those with high levels of character 

more so than those without. In terms 

of referent power, those with strong character 

often have more referent power over followers 

compared with those perceived to 

have lesser character, especially in organizations 

where culture revolves around articulated 

core values. It is important to note that 

it is not so much the actual measurable difference 

in comparing the character of different 

leaders but rather the follower’s perception 

of what sound character is within 

context of the organizational culture. 

If having the right values yields high referent power to an 

individual, then we could conclude that if he is properly 

trained and competent (sufficient expert power) for the position 

of responsibility to which he is assigned (level of legitimate 

power), he has the potential to positively influence subordinate 

behavior. To the extent that he can build trust within 

his unit, he is poised to be an effective leader. But it also is 

important to note that referent power isn’t a possession to be 

obtained by a leader, but rather a dependency created by the 

follower. This is a monumental aspect for effective leaders to 

comprehend because of the great responsibility they have to 

satisfy the dependency in an appropriate fashion. The successful 

leader will note what behaviors are appropriate and 

inappropriate in terms of their organizational — and 

constitutional — responsibilities as leaders. 

So why do otherwise effective leaders fail? In the most ambigu- 


ROB CURTIS, AFJ


ous of situations, it is an individual’s character that informs her of 

how to behave in the course of influencing others. Particularly in 

situations that have ethical dimensions, possessing the “right values” 

and “right character” is of extreme importance so leaders 

may rely on “good judgment” at critical moments. In times of 

great crisis, it is unlikely that leaders will have had specific training 

on what course of action to take — particularly in the presence of 

ambiguity or when facing ethical dilemmas. It is at such times 

that leaders rely on their character and values 

to make the decisions they believe to be best. 

But from what are an individual’s ethical values 

derived? Again, education and experience; 

and for many, this is where religious 

training might enter the fray. Sometimes the 

best-intentioned people invoke behaviors 

based on tenets of their religion, even if 

unknowingly, because they fundamentally 

believe them to be the best course of action. 

A classic example emerged during the 

late 1990s and early 2000s, when the Air 

Force Academy was working through a multitude 

of sexual harassment issues. Some 

argued that the genesis of the problems was 

a “failure of leadership,” and others claimed 

it was because the academy had lost sight 

of its values. Not long afterward, the “Bring 

Me Men” ramp was changed to the “Core Values” ramp and 

new leaders were inserted to bring the institution through the 

dark period by reinstating its values. From a power perspective, 

the institution placed importance on the need for its leaders 

to have relevant expertise and strong character to correct 

the issues at hand. More than anything, the institution needed 

a leader — an exemplar — with tremendous referent power to 

turn the tide and rebuild the trust within the organization. By 

bringing in commanders and staff who were regarded as 

exceptionally moral, the organizational climate that was 

claimed to be responsible for the sexual harassment scandals 

was “fixed,” but it was then replaced with another 

organizational climate that turned out to be conducive to religious 

intolerance. 

ONE PROBLEM SOLVED, A NEW ONE CREATED 

Well-meaning people doing what they believed was best 

“fixed” sexual harassment at the cost of creating an entirely 

new problem. This was no more a “failure of leadership” than 

Well-meaning 

people doing what 

they believed was 

best “fixed” sexual 

harassment at the 

cost of creating an 

entirely new 

problem: religious 

intolerance. 

a brick is guilty of sinking. The real failure was likely not having 

sufficient organizational structures in place to preserve the 

wide-reaching expertise needed to collectively navigate the 

institution through its more challenging periods. As organizational 

expertise waned in light of excessive personnel turnover, 

the stress on the institution became too much to withstand. 

Not only did it become evident that policies, procedures and 

training were lacking, but more disturbingly, few individuals in 

the organization who could have directed 

and helped manage the change remained 

at the institution to recognize the deficiencies 

and make pre-emptive course corrections. 

Absent the sufficient relevant expertise, 

many leaders relied on their character 

to gain the trust and respect of their followers, 

while also doing what they could to 

strengthen the character of their followers. 

Whether intentional or not, a climate conducive 

to religious proselytization emerged. 

Such examples are neither unique nor 

confined to the Air Force Academy or even 

the Air Force at large. Over the past several 

years, the popular press has reported on 

more than one general officer who has 

articulated his value system in a way that 

has created controversy. Appearing in uniform 

and speaking before a religious group in 2003, Army Lt. 

Gen. William Boykin claimed that Islamic extremists hated the 

U.S. because “we’re a Christian nation, because our foundation 

and our roots are Judeo-Christians ... and the enemy is a 

guy named Satan.” Upon investigation, it was revealed that 

these weren’t flippant comments made out of context. 

Ten years earlier, the record showed that Boykin told an 

audience about a particular Army battle against a Muslim warlord 

in Somalia: “I knew my God was bigger than his. I knew 

that my God was a real God and his was an idol.” Last summer, 

the Defense Department Inspector General’s Office released a 

report finding that seven officers, including four generals, 

engaged in misconduct by allowing an evangelical Christian 

group to come into their Pentagon offices and film them in 

uniform using their official titles to bear witness to Jesus 

Christ. Clearly, the issue at hand is what the criteria should be 

for superiors who wish to expand their referent power to satisfy 

the dependencies created in their followers, particularly 

when one’s personal religious beliefs come into play. 



PERSPECTIVES 

In the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 

manifested in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom in 

1786, which formed the basis of the First Amendment of the 

Constitution, two things are clear. First, they anticipated the 

tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the 

Establishment Clause. The passionate and intense debate with 

regard to government’s role in religion (and vice versa) that was 

evidently common in their day is relatively unchanged more 

than two centuries later. And second, they apparently 

understood the need to frame the church-state debate in the 

simplest terms: There should “be a high wall” between the two. 

Both men recognized that our individual civil rights should 

have no dependence on our religious opinions any more than 

our opinions in chemistry or calculus. In Jefferson’s words, 

“believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 

between man and his God, that he owes account to none other 

for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government 

reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with 

sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which 

declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an 

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, 

thus building a wall of separation between church and State.” 

Similarly, James Madison believed that “an alliance or coalition” 

between government and religion “cannot be too carefully 

guarded against.” “Every new and successful example therefore 

of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters 

is of importance,” he wrote. “Religion and government will 

both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together.” 

The history books and legal archives are replete with supporting 

facts and court decisions, but the message is the same 

as Jefferson and Madison intended. The two shouldn’t mix, but 

when they do, beware. 

Thus, the criteria for what a leader can and cannot do in 

terms of advocating religious beliefs in the capacity of his official 

position seems fairly clear. This is why every officer of the 

U.S. armed forces takes a single oath of allegiance to one 

thing: not to the president or to the nation generally, but to the 

U.S. Constitution. The liberty and freedoms for which our 

forefathers fought so valiantly depend on its survival and 

enforcement. However, as illustrated by the popular press stories 

alleging “religious misconduct” by senior leaders, it is clear 

that some individual leaders genuinely face a dilemma 

between upholding their constitutional oath and adhering to 

the mandates of their religious faith tradition. 

This dilemma can probably be best understood by consid- 

ering the unique challenges that evangelical faith traditions 

face in a military environment. On the one hand, members of 

the military live with the fact that they could be asked to surrender 

their lives at any moment. Those who see combat face 

life-and-death issues on a regular basis and are forced to grapple 

with the fundamental questions of existence in a way those 

they protect likely will never face. 

This means that for many, if not most, in the military, 

religion is part and parcel of their original decision to serve, 

their loyalty to country and family, and their source of strength 

in times of great stress. Although patriotism and loyalty to the 

Constitution are the only common requirements for military 

service, it’s unrealistic to expect the spiritual beliefs of soldiers 

to vanish once they put on a uniform. Indeed, the explicit 

enforcement of such a requirement prior to enlistment would 

likely cause the armed forces to shrink to unacceptable levels. 

But a genuine danger exists for military organizations when 

their leaders cross the line of acceptable religious expression, 

particularly when on duty or while in uniform. 

The fact that we observe instances of religious misconduct is 

telling, but not entirely surprising. For leaders who yearn to be 

increasingly effective, we should expect them to use all the tools 

available to them to gain the trust and respect of those under 

them. And it seems apparent from the noted examples that these 

leaders used the appeal of religious convictions to generate referent 

power among those around them. For those followers who 

share the religious convictions of the leader, the act of promoting 

one’s religiosity may very well increase the referent power of the 

leader dramatically, and in light of the religious demographics of 

the armed forces, such an act would likely appeal to the majority. 

But quite the opposite effect occurs with those in the minority 

when they are denied the trust and respect of their leader so that 

their perception, well-founded or not, is that they are regarded as 

second-class citizens, service members and human beings. 

AN OFFICER’S OATH 

Leaders’ statements in the form of mere platitudes about 

respect, dignity and teamwork in the face of such facts are insufficient 

to reinstate referent power. Instead, a direct and forceful 

affirmation of military service is required: All men and women 

in uniform operate under the same presumption of high ethical 

standards, loyalty, patriotism and integrity, regardless of professed 

religious belief or lack thereof. To help eliminate the evident 

lack of trust created by the events over the past few years of 

pervasive religiosity, we would like to see all officers in positions 



of command publicly attest to the truth of the statement below. 

We call it the “Oath of Equal Character” (previously published in 

The Humanist, September). We believe that a public affirmation 

of this oath would go a long way toward removing any doubts 

followers may have about how they might be viewed. And for 

every leader who utters it forthrightly and honestly, it would go 

a long way toward building on the foundation by which they 

wield referent power over all those in their command. 

The Oath of Equal Character 

(Note: We have written the oath from a Christian’s perspectivebut 

would expect “Muslim,” “Jew,” 

“atheist,” “Buddhist,” “Hindu,” “Wiccan,” 

“nontheist” or any other chosen identification 

to be used as applicable.) 

“I am a . I will not use my position 

to influence individuals or the chain of 

command to adopt , because I 

believe that soldiers who are not 

are just as trustworthy,honorable and good 

as those who are. Their standards are as high 

as mine. Their integrity is beyond reproach. 

They will not lie, cheat or steal, and they will 

not fail when called upon to serve.Itrust 

them completely and without reservation. 

They can trust me in exactly the same way.” 

It does no good to say, as some clearly 

will, that the above states the obvious. Our 

interaction with military members from 

non-evangelical, nonmajority faith traditions tells us that they 

believe their character is impugned on a regular basis because 

of their differing belief systems. If something like the statement 

above had been articulated clearly and forcefully from 

the senior leaders under fire, the religious climate of many 

subunits of the armed forces would be very different — and 

better — today. 

Consider, for example, how the following situations might have 

been different had the Oath of Equal Character been involved: 

å In 2004, fliers promoting Mel Gibson’s “The Passion of the 

Christ” were placed on tables at the Air Force Academy’s dining 

facility during the mandatory lunch formation. 

å PowerPoint slides were shown at mandatory briefings 

routinely promoting organizationally endorsed Bible studies 

or “Thoughts for the Day” from the Christian New Testament, 

even in the presence of allied international officers who do not 

share these beliefs. 

Those who believe 

that those who 

don’t share their 

religious beliefs are 

less likely to have 

good character 

should leave the 

military and seek 

another career. 

å What if, instead of asserting the “right to evangelize the 

unchurched” — as the Air Force chaplaincy did in a July 12, 

2005, New York Times article — the Air Force chaplaincy had 

publicly endorsed the Oath of Equal Character? 

It is imperative for leaders to prescriptively consider their own 

actions and estimate their effect on those that they intend to 

influence in a proper manner. Leaders who attempt to increase 

their influence over subordinates by promoting their religiosity 

risk destroying trust within the rank and file over whom they preside 

and, more disturbingly, risk abdicating their Oath of 

Allegiance. Even if being a good leader is 

independent of being a good follower, it is of 

paramount importance for leaders to continually 

get inside the hearts and minds of 

their subordinates, shed their biases and 

perspectives, and instead genuinely attempt 

to see the world through the eyes of those 

who yearn to be dependent upon them for 

the wisdom, guidance and support to do 

what is required to remain the most effective 

fighting force in defense of our nation’s 

freedom. As leaders foster dependencies 

among their followers, it also is paramount 

that such power not be abused. 

Our armed forces have grappled with 

racial and gender discrimination over the 

decades and continue to strive to provide 

every military member the equal opportunity 

to succeed. But in the face of different belief systems, we 

must recognize the need to maintain the plurality of belief systems 

within our organizations and refrain from taking any 

actions that might adversely influence followers to believe differently 

than they may otherwise and independently choose. 

The only permissible discrimination in the armed forces is 

in the ability to do a job. There can be no other. Beliefs remain 

a right and a privilege, and freedom of conscience is among 

the oldest and most precious freedoms enshrined in the history 

of America’s founding. But as members of the armed forces, 

we have all taken an Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution of 

the United States. Those who believe that those who don’t 

share their religious beliefs are less likely to have good character 

should leave the military and seek another career. 

Exercising referent power over followers by using one’s faith 

tradition in the capacity of a governmental official is subversive 

to our constitutional values AFJ 



AFRICA continued from Page 29 TAIWAN continued from Page 35 

graphic study of economic regulation in 

Chad, author Janet Roitman discovers 

that the military-commercial nexus does 

not undermine the nation-state, but 

rather exists alongside state fiscal authority 

and control. Sometimes, the relationship 

is antagonistic, but at other times, it 

is one of complicity. Illicit trade and rent 

seekers in the informal economy provide 

the government with secondary and tertiary 

income and wealth redistribution. 

Policymakers and military planners need 

to abandon simplistic rhetoric to gain a 

better assessment of the economic 

dynamics on the ground, especially in 

understanding the reproduction of systems 

of licit and illicit trade. A sophisticated 

understanding of politics, culture 

and economics can arise from a sincere 

engagement with African militaries. 

Additionally, militaries in Africa 

should not be trained to view the outbreak 

of civil war and conflict as somehow 

alien and exogenous to an otherwise 

peaceful status quo. Social 

processes always consist of violent currents 

and volatility. By simplifying the 

message and pushing the same old 

rhetoric of transparency, regulation and 

market discipline, Africans will continue 

to view Western countries as hypocritical 

and untrustworthy. 

Lastly, we need to start thinking more 

creatively — and less land-centrically. To 

this effect, Western countries can make a 

positive contribution towardimproving 

maritime security. Even though most 

countries in the Gulf of Guinea have 

small navies, if any, there is a need to 

help African coastal countries take full 

stock of their maritime assets. Increased 

maritime domain awareness will allow 

African countries to manage and control 

the channeling and distribution of 

resources towardpro-growth policies 

and strategies. A greater network of 

African countries involved in shoring up 

criminal activity, human trafficking, 

piracy and the exploitation of valuable 

economic resources will help to invigorate 

the need for identifying key gaps in 

governance structures. By investing in 

maritime security development, African 

navies working alongside their Western 

military counterparts can contribute to 

economic development. 

Employing the military for political 

and economic interventions is difficult, 

and rather tendentious, especially given 

our recent experience post-9/11. If anything, 

African military forces in the 

future, whether they are organized and 

owned by respective countries or under 

the aegis of the African Union in the 

form of an African Standby Force, should 

embody institutional-governing checks 

and balances to stave off the spread of 

corruption. African military forces 

should focus on responding to humanitarian 

and natural crises rather than conventional 

warfare, even though violent 

conflicts do occur during complex crises. 

Far from just pouring more money into 

Africa and expecting institutional change 

as the result of military-to-military 

engagements, Africa would do much 

better to realize and come to terms with 

its own needs and self-assessments. 

Working partnerships can help Africans 

capitalize and groom the required stock 

of assets, but the key issue is not determining 

externally what the right model 

should be for Africa. Harnessing time 

into the equation will allow the participatory 

process to unfold, ensuring that 

Africans are ultimately the empowered 

stakeholders. Extrapolating from static 

state models will not hold water, especially 

when African countries are in a 

position to move substantially and 

dynamically along the growth curve. 

There has to be a dialectic process 

among and between institutions and 

nations involving resource identification 

and (re)distribution during dynamic 

periods of growth and change. 

Furthermore, economic growth does 

not have to be violent; development is 

not a de facto promethean process 

involving the inevitable cycle of human 

bloodshed. Rather than treating Africa 

as just another battlefield tilled over 

again for resource hoarding and hegemonic 

chest-beating, a more enlightened 

approach suggests that instead of 

polarizing and dividing the world in 

antagonizing competition, Africa can be 

the road to Damascus for realizing a 

more civilized geopolitics based on 

equality. By enabling Africa to help 

itself, we may usher in a new political 

paradigm for the world based on 

human rights, civilized economic 

growth and true development. AFJ 

of maneuver for the units participating 

in the final joint armor and infantry 

assault exercise were strictly proscribed 

in advance and diverged toward individual 

target ranges rather than a single 

objective. As a consequence, the participating 

units did not demonstrate the 

ability to provide covering fire while 

moving forward in alternating lanes of 

advance. The commanding officer of 

the drill explained afterwards that he 

had ordered the troops and tanks “not 

to proceed at top speed, because it is 

extremely muddy and slippery because 

of the rain,” but the exercise still raised 

questions about the progress of training 

Taiwan’s troops for complex, joint operations 

in the future. 

Reflecting the unpopularity of the 

conscription system, KMT presidential 

candidate Ma Ying-jeou promised in a 

September 2007 speech that he will 

move Taiwan to a wholly all-volunteer 

force within three to four years if he is 

elected, but this is a challenge that the 

DPP government has pursued for years 

with only partial success. Moving from 

conscription to an AVF is a tremendous 

challenge, and the country will very 

likely maintain some form of conscript 

system to man its reserves even after 

the transition is complete. But the task 

for Taipei is clear — it must develop a 

sufficiently robust personnel structure 

to operate the ever more sophisticated 

weapon systems that it seeks to deploy. 

U.S. ROLE IN TAIWAN DEFENSE 

Taiwan’s 2007 Han Kuang exercises were 

a test of the military strategy of taking 

Taiwan’s defense offshore and fighting 

jointly. The exercises demonstrated that 

such a strategy is within Taiwan’s grasp 

but also served as a reminder that 

Taiwan’s military is yet undergoing a 

wrenching transformation as it adapts 

to greater civilian control and a more 

professionalized force, carries out major 

arms purchases, and maintains an 

increasingly antiquated arsenal. This 

effort will require years before it is completed 

to the satisfaction of policymakers 

in either Taipei or Washington, be 

they DPP or KMT, Republican or 

Democrat. 

The U.S. has played a positive, bipartisan 

role in this effort. The decision to 



support major upgrades to Taiwan’s 

C4ISR system dates back to the latter 

years of the administration of President 

Clinton, and the American interest in 

Taiwan’s possessing a credible selfdefense 

will long outlast the final years 

of the Bush administration. 

Washington can take concrete steps in 

guaranteeing that this interest continues 

to be realized. 

As Taiwan continues to improve and 

test its C4ISR capabilities, its potential 

to serve as an ad hoc coalition partner 

in the event of either a cross-Strait crisis 

or a humanitarian disaster in the region 

will grow significantly. Under the Po 

Sheng program, Taiwan has procured a 

set of capabilities that can plug directly 

into the U.S. C4ISR system in the western 

Pacific, both providing and receiving 

critical data when the two sides 

work together. If the U.S. is to bolster 

this latent ability, it must enhance the 

level of dialogue between the two sides. 

One example would be to lift the nearly 

30-year ban on visits to Taiwan by serving 

U.S. flag and general officers, so the 

managers of American command-andcontrol 

systems could visit their colleagues 

at Taiwan’s JOCC and field 

headquarters. 

The U.S. should also support Taiwan’s 

continued acquisition of weapons systems 

for its defense. Although Taiwan’s 

defense spending as a share of GDP 

remains at a relatively low 2.7 percent, 

both the DPP and KMT candidates in 

March’s presidential election have indicated 

that they plan to increase it past 3 

percent. As Taiwan seeks to shoulder a 

larger share of the defense burden, 

Washington should also play a more 

productive role. 

The recent experience with Taiwan’s 

request to purchase F-16s is a clear 

example of how not to handle this relationship. 

Taipei’s regular arms purchases 

should be handled as a matter of 

course in U.S. security assistance and 

sales programs, not as an instrument 

for punishing or rewarding Taipei’s 

behavior on tangential matters. 

Likewise, the CPX seems to have 

demonstrated a useful role for a 

Taiwanese land-attack cruise missile. 

Washington may not prefer that Taiwan 

develop that particular capability, but it 

is not obvious why Taipei should be 

expected to foreswear options for striking 

military facilities on the mainland 

while it lives under the shadow of 

Beijing’s growing missiles force. 

Finally, the Han Kuang exercises serve 

as a reminder that although Taiwan 

aims to defend itself through the initial 

stages of a conflict with the People’s 

Republic of China, its military would 

suffer tremendous attrition during such 

a conflict. The U.S. must be prepared to 

accept a leading role in the defense of 

Taiwan, including providing a major 

naval and tactical air presence in 

defense, even in the face of advanced 

Chinese submarine and SAM capabilities. 

Surviving Taiwanese forces would 

also require significant logistical support 

after the opening weeks of a conflict. 

While no one seeks a war in the Taiwan 

Strait, such a scenario is yet a plausible 

outcome and one that demands 

Washington remain prepared. AFJ 

IN ACOMBAT ZONE, THIRST 

SHOULD NOT BE THE ENEMY. 

TheMECOLightweight WaterPurifier –the LWP–can be set 

up and operated byone soldier in 45 minutes or less. Itprovides 

safe potablewatertoearly entry, highly mobile forces 

throughoutthe spectrumofconflict in peaceand war, 

andwill providequalitywatersupportto remote units 

anddetachments wheredistribution of bulk water 

is notfeasible or practical. It’s extremelysimple 

to operate with virtually hands-free functionality. 

Yet the advanced process controls allow the 

operator to treat ANY WATER–ANYWHERE 

withoutspecial chemicals, trainingorequipment 

modifications. 

The MECO LWP is presently deployed atseveral Forward 

Operating Bases incentral Baghdad, Iraq and Afghanistan 

–fighting thewar on terror. 

For more information visit www.mecomilitary.com or call 1(866) 363-0813. 



FORCE MODERNIZATION continued from Page 21 

which would use state-of-the-art components 

to construct an airfield capable 

of handling C-17 transports within 12 

hours of arrival. Once completed, an 

aerial beachhead would be established 

and expanded to serve as a rapidly 

emplaced aerial point for forced-entry 

operations. 

Just as we need to bolster our ability 

to transport maneuver forces via C-17, 

we likewise need to modernize and 

increase our capacity to move heavy 

forces rapidly via fast sealift. To increase 

the deterrent our military poses to any 

nation considering military action 

against the U.S., we need to continue 

the development of capable, fast sea 

transport and invest in the development 

of sea basing for power projection of 

land forces. Although air transport can 

rapidly emplace forces, it would take an 

inordinate number of sorties to move 

heavy forces into an area when that was 

required. Sealift — fast sealift — would 

give the U.S. the ability to insert forces 

into an emergency immediately if needed, 

but then rapidly deploy forces heavy 

enough to engage anything the enemy 

could throw out, and sustain those 

forces over the long term. Associated 

with this capability is the concept of “sea 

basing.” The concept is still not mature, 

but the idea holds great potential. If the 

Navy can figure a way to safeguard a 

floating base so that it is not overly vulnerable 

to anti-shipping weapons, this 

capability could add significantly to 

America’s power projection capability. 

OWNING THE SKIES 

Historically speaking, nothing gives an 

army the chance to dominate on the 

ground like an air force that dominates 

the skies. It is said that the arm of decision 

is the ground force, but history has 

provided strong evidence that the nation 

that owns the skies owns the ground. 

Certainly, air power alone cannot win 

major wars, but without it, ground 

forces become extremely vulnerable. In 

the future, we may well succeed in producing 

the most powerful land force in 

the world. But for that force to win the 

nation’s wars at the lowest possible cost, 

it is imperative that we own the skies. 

Whether it’s the F-22, the F-35 Joint 

Strike Fighter or some other airframe, 

the U.S. must invest to ensure the Air 

Force continues to dominate the skies. 

Without question, as technology has 

advanced and proliferated over the past 

three or four decades, ballistic and 

guided missiles have become the 

weapon of choice for militaries across 

the world. Our defense against them 

must likewise increase. 

China, Russia, India and Pakistan, of 

course, have highly advanced arsenals 

of tactical and theater missiles. But 

there are scores of other nations — such 

as Iran and North Korea — that have a 

growing and sophisticated capability in 

this area. If we do not invest in a robust 

capability to defend against this rapidly 

advancing threat, whatever force we put 

in the field will be increasingly vulnerable. 

It is critical that we build a robust 

and credible missile defense, both at the 

tactical and theater levels. 

Force modernization is not all about 

platforms, softwareand high technology. 

A modernization program also must 

include a training development program. 

If we advance the way we fight by 

adding new capabilities, we must concurrently 

train our troops how best to 

apply them. As we develop new fighting 

doctrine and equip the force with the 

latest technology, we must never fail to 

understand that war is a brutish, 

bloody, chaotic and unpredictable 

affair. It is important, therefore, that as 

we design training plans to support new 

concepts it be done with the understanding 

that the essential principles of 

war are not negated by modernization. 

Today, our Army is sharply focused 

on the counterinsurgency fight, which is 

appropriate. But the requirement to 

succeed in the present fight must not 

detract from the need to prepare for 

tougher fights in the future. Bluntly put, 

the counterinsurgency fight does not 

represent an existential threat to the 

U.S. It may cause problems, it may 

result in a loss of prestige, but the U.S. 

isn’t going to collapse, even if we overtly 

lost in Iraq; get preparation for the conventional 

fight wrong, however, and we 

run the risk of being unprepared for an 

enemy that has the ability to inflict catastrophic 

damage both to our armed 

forces and the American way of life. 

Getting transformation right and effec- 

tive combat-focused training are 

absolute requirements to prevent that 

from happening. 

We must tailor our future training 

programs to counter the capabilities 

inherent in the countries with the most 

potent military capabilities. We must, 

therefore, resist the temptation to conduct 

command-post exercises, simulations 

and field-training exercises that 

are so scripted and controlled that 

everything always works, communications 

are always up, and significant time 

is always given for preparation, 

rehearsals, etc. More problematic, however, 

is our tendency to portray an 

enemy force that is docile, unimaginativeand 

poorly equipped. 

I have participated in numerous division-level 

Warfighter exercises and 

corps command-post exercises, and 

countless numbers of simulation exercises 

at the battalion level and below. In 

virtually every one of these, the enemy 

force is equipped with significantly 

weaker forces than those of the friendly 

unit. Particularly at the division level, 

rehearsals and practice exercises are 

done months in advance of the Warfighter, 

and often as much as two weeks 

before the exercise, headquarters and 

signal troops will establish the division 

main command post to ensure that 

every phone line, every satellite communications 

device and every radio is 

up and running. I recall the commanding 

general exploding during one 

exercise because one of his telephones 

went down. I wondered what this officer 

would have done in combat when half 

his assets were down as a result of a 

combination of terrain masking, atmospheric 

conditions and enemy action. 

While we spend enormous amounts 

of money developing and fielding awesome 

technology, we must not fall prey 

to the belief that such equipment 

always will provide us combat overmatch 

against all opponents. Presently, 

we depict exactly this in the vast majority 

of our training exercises and simulations. 

To give our future forces the best 

chance of success when we face a tough 

opponent, we must reverse this trend. 

To summarize, the following nine 

changes and additions should be made 

to the Defense Department 



modernization program: 

1. Improve the armored protection of 

our armored fighting platforms. 

2. Increase the ability of reconnaissance 

forces to fight for information in a 

degraded mode. 

3. Implement a counter-UAV and 

space-defense program. 

4. Return air defense to the tactical 

formation in recognition of improving 

threat capabilities. 

5. Expand our air transport fleet to 

enable rapid strategic and operational 

movement and maneuver. 

6. Improve the ability of land forces to 

engage in operations worldwide via fast 

sealift and sea basing. 

7. Field significant numbers of 

advanced fighter aircraft to ensure air 

superiority. 

8. Strengthen missile defense. 

9. Place an increased emphasis on 

training the force in light of emerging 

capabilities with a focus on the realities 

of ground combat. 

If substantive changes are not made 

in the way the Defense Department 

transforms the Army, based on the correlation 

of forces and overall analysis of 

the preceding sections of this study, the 

U.S. faces the very real possibility that if 

it takes on a determined, well-equipped 

and well-trained foe, we could suffer 

our first major defeat since the Chinese 

hordes came pouring across the Yalu 

River in North Korea on Thanksgiving 

Day 1950. 

Too often, we exaggerate what technology 

can do for us and underestimate 

what the enemy can do. Of our own 

volition, we have reduced the combat 

power of current organizations in the 

hope that technology will give us an 

advantage in the future; in the belief 

that our air- and space-based intelligence 

platforms will always give us critical 

information about the enemy, we 

have dissolved the most powerful 

reconnaissance formation in our 

nation’s history and replaced it with an 

organization that has no ground reconnaissance 

capability; we are replacing 

what has been proven in combat as the 

world’s best main battle tank with a 

“As marketing weapons, 

reprints rank exceptionally 

high asadown-right value.” 

--Jay Conrad Levinson, Guerilla Marketing Weapons 

Their uses are endless ... 

•Trade Show Handouts 

•Direct Mail Campaigns 

•Sales Force Material 

•News Releases 

•Education &Training Handouts 

•Media &Press Kit Enclosures 

•Investor &Stockholder Information 

•Valuable Website Materials 

Your best sales tool 

is only aphone call away 

1.888.750.8099 

lightly armored vehicle that cannot survive 

direct-fire engagements with 

enemy tanks and which depends on an 

uninterrupted flow of information for 

its survival; despite numerous, highlevel 

Defense Department and governmental 

studies explicitly quantifying 

China’s military modernization and the 

specific threats it poses to future 

American forces, no changes to formations 

or fighting doctrine have occurred; 

and almost exclusively, we prepare our 

forces to face a docile, weak and 

unimaginative enemy in future combat, 

despite the potentially hostile forces in 

the world today with demonstrated 

capabilities well above those we depict. 

Although we are heading in the 

wrong direction, the future has not yet 

been irreversibly determined. 

There is still time to make course corrections. 

But if we hold on to current 

plans despite the presence of so much 

evidence that demands change, the 

future battlefield could become an 

American tragedy. 

The time for action is now. AFJ 



BLOGS OF WAR 

In a bit of a State 

Sympathy runs dry for Rice’s fiasco-laden agency 


W 

ith any luck, fall 2007 will one day be regarded as the 

nadir of the State Department’s fortunes. During 

September hearings, Ambassador to Iraq Ryan 

Crocker said progress there was based on a grass-roots rejection 

of al-Qaida, not a State-brokered compromise among Iraq’s fractured 

political leadership. Less than a week later, Blackwater USA 

security contractors escorting State officials to the Baghdad 

Green Zone caused at least 17 Iraqi fatalities in a 

controversial firefight. Finally, when a handful of 

foreign service officers (FSOs) decried compulsory 

service in Iraq as a “potential death sentence” 

at a November town hall meeting, the 

department’s eviscerated morale was revealed 

for the whole world to see. 

The town hall kerfuffle has initiated a 

friendly-fire barrage from milbloggers, most of 

whom are unsympathetic to the State 

Department’s plight. “Abu Muqawama” 

intones that “State has brought this one on 

themselves” by publicly complaining when 

soldiers — and many FSOs — are serving quietly 

and effectively in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

“Subsunk” at Blackfive pipes in that although both FSOs and 

military service members take an oath to obey the 

Constitution and serve the country, “it just appears that some 

folks place more weight on their oaths than others.” 

A few bloggers have been more empathetic. “Akinoluna,” a 

female Marine supply sergeant who has daily contact with 

American diplomats while serving at a U.S. Embassy, observes 

that “State Department employees spend most of their careers 

overseas and many of those years [are] at ... hardship posts. ... I 

can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard military people complaining 

about being outside of the United States, but I’ve never 

heard a foreign service officer say that. Usually they are complaining 

about being forced back to D.C. for a couple years.” 

Raising the level of debate, Matt Armstrong at 

MountainRunner lays the blame for the fiascoes on the failure 

of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s agenda of “transformational 

diplomacy”: “Rice has not prepared her department 

for the mission she’s suddenly demanded. We’re now four 

years into Iraq, six years into Afghanistan, and her department 

still hasn’t mobilized ... for war to the extent that even a few 

months ago Crocker had to go public with staffing problems. 

State/DynCorp have messed up policing. State permitted 

(some, like me, might say encouraged) their security escorts to 

BLOG ROLL 

ABU MUQAWAMA 

http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com 

BLACKFIVE 

http://www.blackfive.net 

AKINOLUNA 

http:// akinoluna.blogspot.com 

MOUNTAINRUNNER 

http://mountainrunner.us 

DIPNOTE 

http://blogs.state.gov 

take an overly aggressive posture because of screwed up priorities. 

And State hasn’t intervened when American reconstruction 

contractors screw the Iraqi government.” 

The tempest in the milblogosphere has been matched by 

intensive navel-gazing on the part of diplomat bloggers. The 

State Department’s official blog site, DipNote, has been a hub 

of contention on the matter, for although the postings generally 

represent official policy, the comment sections 

have provided FSOs a forum where they can 

vent and present all sides of the issue. 

One of the most controversial DipNote postings 

has been an open letter from John Matel, 

a long-serving FSO who is leading a provincial 

reconstruction team (PRT) in Iraq. Advising his 

“vexed and overwrought colleagues” to “take a 

deep breath and calm down,” he reminds FSOs 

that although he would just as well not have to 

babysit anyone who does not want to join his 

PRT, he suggests that his colleagues who are 

not willing to serve at the president’s discretion 

might best “consider the type of job that does 

not require worldwide availability.” 

Matel’s posting set off a chain of comments that ranged from 

denunciations of the “cowardice” of FSOs by one retired Army 

officer to accusations that Matel would have made a model fascist 

stooge. One of the most thoughtful observations was contributed 

by an FSO in Portugal, who criticizes the absence of 

proper training for FSOs, even after six years of war: “At the end 

of the day, taking FSOs with no Arabic language skills, no Middle 

Eastern experience, no job-specific skills (repairing electrical 

grids? water systems?), and especially no security training, and 

sending them to Iraq is foolish. Hundreds of FSOs are in Arabic 

training right now; job-specific training is lagging but underway. 

These people will probably do good work in Iraq when ready. 

Many of those being sent now, however, are just totems, sent for 

no other reason than to show that they are there.” 

In late November, Defense Secretary Robert Gates joined the 

fray when he challenged U.S. civilian agencies to undertake a 

greater share of the burden for post-conflict stabilization and 

reconstruction. Generously deflecting blame from his colleague 

Rice toward a decade of dystrophy, as the post-Cold War “peace 

dividend” was largely paid by the State Department, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development and the former U.S. 

Information Agency, he called for developing such civilian 

capacity as a sufficiently funded State Department and a readi- 



ly deployable corps of civilians who can fill the technical jobs 

required to accomplish reconstruction operations. 

Gates frames the problem perfectly. Just as many of the 

technical skills required for stabilization and reconstruction 

are not inculcated through military training, nor will they ever 

be native to even the best-trained diplomat. This is why the 

reserves and National Guard have been in such high demand 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, for they deliver civilian expertise in 

such fields as policing and civil engineering that neither the 

full-time soldier nor the statesman can be expected to master. 

But even with the development of such a civilian capability, 

which the State Department’s coordinator for reconstruction 

and stabilization hopes to develop into a several-thousandstrong 

deployable corps of civilian experts, State will still require 

a cultural shift to manage such missions. This is one point on 

Subscribe 

Today! 

Save 37% 

Off The $7.95 Cover Price 

12 Issues Only $60! 

Go to: 

www.armedforcesjournal.com 

or call 1.800.368.5718 and reference code #H79VA 

which the debate on DipNote and other professional sources 

diverge: What makes the best foreign service officer? The master 

of memo writing and diplomatic communication? Or the manager 

who can oversee a range of reconstruction projects and 

extract performance from the civilians and soldiers under his 

watch? Both skill sets may be necessary, but the department 

does not have a tradition of training and promoting the latter. 

The crisis in Foggy Bottom, as well as Gates’ call for reform, 

has opened a window for reforming the State Department in 

preparation for what will likely remain a “Long War” against 

Islamist extremism. If this opportunity is embraced, then State 

has an opportunity to reverse its slide into interagency irrelevancy. 

If this opportunity is missed, State appears poised to 

continue disappointing its military counterparts and to fail to 

effect American foreign policy. AFJ 



DARTS & LAURELS 

Nuking it out MRAP rethink Health check 

TO PRESIDENT BUSH, 

for losing the propaganda 

battle over the 

Iran nukes fiasco. It’s 

bad enough that the 

U.S. again is being served humble pie 

over weapons-of-mass-destruction allegations. 

But this time around, it would 

have been wise for the White House to 

have eaten the pie, however unappetizing. 

Instead, just two days after the intelligence 

report said Iran halted its nuclear 

weapons program four years ago, Bush 

told Tehran to “come clean” about its 

nuclear activities. No one believes that 

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 

is up to anything good. But the 

U.S. handed a public relations gem to a 

tyrant who will use it for all it’s worth. 

Rather than continue the saber-rattling 

rhetoric from such a poor position, Bush 

and his key advisers need to stop, 

regroup and work out a plan that outsmarts 

a dangerous but containable 

threat. 

TO GEN. JAMES T. 

CONWAY, for having 

the courage to do a 

sharp about-face and 

cut the Marine Corps’ 

request for bomb-resistant vehicles 

from 3,700 to 2,300. 

The original plan was for every 

Marine outside the wire in Iraq to travel 

in a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

(MRAP) vehicle. Lawmakers, to their 

credit, quickly stepped up to the plate 

and pushed hard to get billions of dollars 

of funding for the MRAP program. 

Which made it an even tougher call 

for the Corps’ commandant to admit 

this probably is not a good use of taxpayers’ 

money. But Conway’s decision 

was based on changing conditions and 

the recognition that the less-than-agile 

MRAP vehicles would risk the Corps’ 

ability to execute its core expeditionary 

mission. 

FORUM PICK From our online discussion boards 

“ One of the major factors responsible for the near-debacle in 

Iraq is the total failure of law and order due to the complete 

absence of both the Army and the police from carrying out 

internal security duties in terrain that they knew inside out. 

What is happening now was both predictable and 

avoidable. So, must we allow to go unanswered questions 

as to why the intellectual horsepower in and available to 

Congress, the White House, the State Department, the 

Pentagon and Central Command failed to realize that it 

would not be necessary or helpful to disband both the Iraqi 

Army and police after Saddam was taken out?” 

Post your thoughts and continue the debate at http://www.armedforces 

journal.com/forums. 

—BARRISTER 

TO THE ARMY, for its 

handling of the case of 

Lt. Elizabeth Whiteside, 

the reservist who led a 

unit of medics in Iraq 

and then suffered a 

mental breakdown, possibly triggered 

by the stresses of war, during which she 

waved a gun at a psychiatric nurse on 

her unit, fired into the ceiling, then shut 

herself in a room and shot herself in the 

stomach. 

Whiteside, whose story was detailed 

in The Washington Post, was taken to 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 

where she was diagnosed with severe 

mental disorder. Yet the Army offered 

her only the chance to resign under a 

status that would have left her without 

the veterans’ medical benefits she will 

need as the result of her severe 

injuries. The Army also filed criminal 

charges against her for endangering 

the life of another soldier and for 

attempting suicide. 

In December, the investigating officer 

conducting a preliminary hearing recommended 

that the charges be dismissed, 

saying it was the only moral 

course.Army leaders from top to bottom 

must all recognize the critical 

importance of protecting — and, where 

necessary, healing — the mental health 

of its war-stressed soldiers. 


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_051_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 9:48 AM Page 51


General Tactical Vehicles 

The JLTV Team sm 

If the JLTV was just another truck, 

anyone could build it. 

The JLTV is more than amilitary truck—it’s arevolutionary combat tactical system. 

Only the team with aproven track record in design, development, systemsintegration, 

and production of both combat and tactical vehicles will make the JLTV asuccess. 

General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General have combined these core 

competencies and joined forces as General Tactical Vehicles. 

General Tactical Vehicles ...Strength of The JLTV Team. 

www.generaltacticalvehicles.com

MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS Nine steps to a more effective force

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?