MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS Nine steps to a more effective force

MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS Nine steps to a more effective force

MAJ. DANIEL L. DAVIS Nine steps to a more effective force


Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_001_00 (READ ONLY) 12/18/2007 11:16 AM Page 1<br />

A R M E D F O R C E S J O U R N A L<br />

JANUARY 2008 ESTABLISHED 1863 $7.95<br />

Heavy<br />

and agile<br />

<strong>MAJ</strong>. <strong>DANIEL</strong> L. <strong>DAVIS</strong><br />

<strong>Nine</strong> <strong>steps</strong> <strong>to</strong> a<strong>more</strong> <strong>effective</strong> <strong>force</strong><br />

ALSO<br />



AND<br />


<strong>MAJ</strong>. CHRIS ROGERS<br />




0107_AFJ_DOM_00_002_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 9:54 AM Page 2<br />


Unpredictable threats.<br />

Adaptive enemies.<br />

Emerging technologies.<br />

Increasing cost pressures.<br />

(How will you beready for what’s next?)<br />

Know K n o w how. h o w .<br />

The changes taking place in <strong>to</strong>day’s defense environment areundeniable, and the<br />

causes areasvaried as they areglobal. Now <strong>more</strong>than ever,mission success depends on the ability <strong>to</strong><br />

continually adapt thinking and operations. Fortunately,the global strategy and technology consultants at<br />

Booz Allen Hamil<strong>to</strong>n can help your team do just that, by working with you <strong>to</strong> achieve your goals and know<br />

how. We understand first-hand the demands of <strong>to</strong>day’s changing defense environment, and have the<br />

knowledge <strong>to</strong> help you be prepared for what’s next. Now we want <strong>to</strong> put our thinking <strong>to</strong> work for you.<br />

www.boozallen.com/defense<br />

ww www. w. w bo oz ozal al a le len. n. n co c m/ de d fe fens ns e

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_003_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:43 AM Page 3<br />


Stryker vehicles cross the desert from Mosul <strong>to</strong> Rawah, Iraq.<br />

AFJ<br />


14<br />

22<br />

26<br />

30<br />



Beefing up military equipment <strong>to</strong> fight future wars<br />

will take <strong>more</strong> than a reliance on technology<br />

BY <strong>MAJ</strong>. <strong>DANIEL</strong> L. <strong>DAVIS</strong><br />


Talk of a renewed Cold War underscores common<br />

misunderstandings of geopolitical flirtation<br />



There are opportunities and pitfalls in stepping up<br />

U.S. initiatives on a war-ravaged continent<br />



The strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan’s defense<br />

strategy emerge<br />


14<br />

22<br />




0107_AFJ_DOM_00_004_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:43 AM Page 4<br />

Religious bias and coercion undermine<br />

military leadership and trust.<br />




Asking for <strong>more</strong><br />



The Pakistan problem<br />



More soup, please<br />

BY <strong>MAJ</strong>. CHRIS ROGERS<br />

COIN: A response<br />



A question of faith<br />



48 BLOGS OF WAR<br />

In a bit of a state<br />




We welcome articles from outside contribu<strong>to</strong>rs on<br />

military and defense-industry-related <strong>to</strong>pics. We<br />

seek articles that are informative and opinionated,<br />

designed <strong>to</strong> provoke thoughtful debate.<br />

We prefer that you first send an abstract<br />

describing your purpose and themes.<br />

An AFJ article must be original work and should<br />

be a good read that is easily accessible <strong>to</strong> an expert<br />

audience across all services, agencies and defenserelated<br />

industries.<br />

We edit for house style and make cuts <strong>to</strong> fit. All AFJ edi<strong>to</strong>r decisions are<br />

final.<br />

A full set of writer submission guidelines can be found at<br />

http://www.armed<strong>force</strong>sjournal.com. Queries, abstracts and articles<br />

should be sent <strong>to</strong> afjedi<strong>to</strong>rs@armed<strong>force</strong>sjournal.com.<br />

Correction<br />

40<br />


JANUARY 2008 ■<br />


A caption for a pho<strong>to</strong>graph used <strong>to</strong> illustrate a feature on private contrac<strong>to</strong>rs<br />

(“Counterproductive,” November) inadvertently implied that private security contrac<strong>to</strong>rs are<br />

used <strong>to</strong> protect the defense secretary. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command has<br />

full responsibility for the secretary’s security and private contrac<strong>to</strong>rs are not used for this<br />

purpose. We apologize for any confusion.<br />

AFJ<br />


Army Times Publishing Co.<br />

6883 Commercial Drive<br />

Springfield, VA 22159<br />

Edi<strong>to</strong>rial telephone: (703) 750-7487<br />

Edi<strong>to</strong>rial fax: (703) 658-8412<br />

www.armed<strong>force</strong>sjournal.com<br />

EDITOR<br />

Karen Walker, kwalker@armed<strong>force</strong>sjournal.com<br />


Jack Wittman, jwittman@armed<strong>force</strong>sjournal.com<br />


Peter Brookes, Seth Cropsey, Chris<strong>to</strong>pher Griffin,<br />

William Matthews, Sean D. Naylor, Ralph Peters<br />


Linda Monroe<br />


Ameir Ali, Rachel Barth (design edi<strong>to</strong>r), Andy<br />

Charest, Joe Clark, Glen Cullen (deputy copy<br />

chief), Trigie Ealey, Katie Gill, Cecilia Hadley, Betsy<br />

Hathaway (design edi<strong>to</strong>r), Martha Howard (copy<br />

chief), Kevin Kaley, Bob Landers, Kevin Lilley, Jay<br />

McDaniel, Jocquise Robinson, Karen Small (copy<br />

chief), Angy Stricherz (senior design edi<strong>to</strong>r)<br />


Mark Fondersmith, mfonder@atpco.com<br />


Lisa Zilka Chavez<br />


John Bretschneider, Chris Broz,<br />

John Harman, Bryan Smith, Marcia Staimer<br />


Alan Lessig, alessig@atpco.com<br />


Staci E. McKee<br />


Rob Curtis (senior pho<strong>to</strong>grapher), Rick Kozak,<br />

James J. Lee, M. Scott Mahaskey, Sheila Vemmer<br />


Elaine Howard<br />


Tobias Naegele<br />


Robert Hodierne<br />

© 2008 Army Times Publishing Co. Printed in U.S.<br />

Subscription rates: $60 one year U.S. and Canada; $145<br />

one year foreign (air mail). For subscription inquiries<br />

and orders: (703) 750-7400; fax (703) 658-8314;<br />

email <strong>to</strong> cust-svc@atpco.com. Within the U.S. call<br />

<strong>to</strong>ll free (800) 368-5718.<br />

Periodicals postage paid at Springfield, Va., and additional<br />

offices.<br />

Armed Forces Journal (ISSN 0196-3597) is published<br />

monthly by Army Times Publishing Co., 6883<br />

Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 22159.<br />

Vol. 145, No. 6, Whole No. 5954<br />

Postmaster: Send address changes <strong>to</strong> Armed Forces<br />

Journal, 6883 Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 22159.<br />

The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive,<br />

Danvers, MA 01923, is licensed <strong>to</strong><br />

authorize pho<strong>to</strong>copying of any article<br />

herein. Fee is $3 per copy per article,<br />

limited <strong>to</strong> 100 copies. Send payment<br />

<strong>to</strong> CCC specifying ISSN 0196-3597.<br />

For reprint requests over 100, contact Defense News Media<br />

Group Books<strong>to</strong>re, 6883 Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA<br />

22159. Phone (888) 750-8099; e-mail<br />

books<strong>to</strong>re@atpco.com<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_005_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:49 AM Page 5<br />

The military’sneed for asight that transitions quickly from long range <strong>to</strong> close quarters –and from<br />

light <strong>to</strong> dark –has given shape <strong>to</strong> the Trijicon ACOG ® .Its large eye volume helps you acquire<br />

targets fast, and its exclusive dual-illuminated reticle ensures adistinct aiming point in any light,<br />

without batteries. No wonder it’sthe uniform choice of the Marines, U.S. Army and Special<br />

Operations Forces. For <strong>more</strong> information, call Trijicon at 1-800-338-0563<br />

or visit www.trijicon.com.<br />

Trijicon AccuPoint ®<br />

Variable Power Riflescopes<br />

Available in 1.25-4x24, 3-9x40<br />

and 2.5-10x56<br />

Trijicon TriPower ®<br />

3-in-1-Illuminated<br />

Sighting System<br />

Trijicon Reflex ®<br />

Dual Illumination<br />

Reflex Sight<br />

Trijicon RedDot ®<br />

Parallax-Free Sight<br />

Trijicon ® Bright &Tough<br />

Night Sights <br />

Trijicon ® TANS<br />

Tactical Advance<br />

NightVision System<br />

q Tritium-Phosphor Lamp<br />

Aiming reticle glows in<br />

low-light conditions for<br />

precise shot placement.<br />

q Patented Fiber Optics<br />

Au<strong>to</strong>matically adjust the<br />

brightness level and contrast<br />

of the aiming point <strong>to</strong><br />

available light conditions.<br />

q Anti-Reflective<br />

Coated Lenses<br />

Provide superior clarity and<br />

light-gathering capabilities<br />

with zero dis<strong>to</strong>rtion.<br />

q All-Weather Hard-Anodized<br />

Housing<br />

Forged 7075-T6 aircraft<br />

aluminum alloy makes for<br />

anearly indestructible<br />

sighting system.<br />

TA33 ACOG ®<br />

Available Reticles<br />

4 4<br />

Brilliant Aiming Solutions<br />

www.trijicon.com Ç 1.800.338.0563<br />

Wixom, Michigan USA

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_006_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:43 AM Page 6<br />


In this issue<br />

Army transformation and <strong>force</strong> modernization are<br />

doing some things well with the right goals in sight.<br />

However, there are major disconnects that will leave the<br />

U.S. vulnerable if they are not soon addressed. That’s the<br />

principle underpinning Maj. Danny Davis’ examination of<br />

the strengths and weaknesses of the <strong>force</strong> modernization<br />

plan.<br />

Chief among his concerns are an overreliance on high-<br />

Karen Walker, Edi<strong>to</strong>r tech, networked systems that cannot survive a bloody<br />

nose in battle,and a potentially fatal tendency <strong>to</strong> underestimate<br />

the need for <strong>effective</strong> heavy armor.<br />

An Army cavalry officer who fought in Operation Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm in<br />

1991 and served in Afghanistan in 2005, Davis brings front-line experience<br />

<strong>to</strong> his analysis. As an operations officer and capabilities manager<br />

for Training and Doctrine Command-Future Combat Systems,<br />

he also sees firsthand the future <strong>force</strong> technologies as<br />

they are developed and tested at Fort Bliss, Texas.<br />

Our feature package this month spans the globe.<br />

Davis<br />

Phil Kao looks at the how the U.S. and the new Africa<br />

Command can best enable Africa <strong>to</strong> help itself. Dmitry Shlapen<strong>to</strong>kh<br />

analyzes the frosty rhe<strong>to</strong>ric emanating from Moscow. And Chris<br />

Griffin examines Taiwan’s defense strategy through<br />

the lens of its military exercises.<br />

Kao<br />

In Perspectives, a lively debate continues on counterinsurgency<br />

doctrine. Maj. Chris Rogers and Lt. Col. Gian Gentile<br />

pick their preferred COIN soup-eating utensils; we suspect this meal<br />

is far from finished.<br />

Barry Fagin and Lt. Col. Jim Parco co-author a<br />

thoughtful piece on military leadership and religious<br />

Griffin<br />

bias.<br />

Pete Brookes ponders what’s next for Pakistan and the<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n-Karachi relationship.<br />

And Bill Matthews kicks off with a timely look at what Congress<br />

Rogers should consider as it weighs how <strong>to</strong> get the most bang for its 2009<br />

defense budget bucks.<br />

kwalker@armed<strong>force</strong>sjournal.com<br />

AFJ<br />




Donna Peterson, e-mail: dpeters@atpco.com<br />

phone: (703) 750-8172; fax: (703) 750-8607<br />


Maurice Grant, e-mail: mgrant@atpco.com<br />

phone: (703) 750-8021; fax: (703) 642-7372<br />


Janet Berta, e-mail: jberta@atpco.com<br />

phone: (703) 642-7335<br />


Amanda Graham, e-mail: agraham@atpco.com<br />

phone: (703) 750-8678<br />




Kirk D. Brown, (703) 642-7380<br />

e-mail: kbrown@atpco.com<br />

DIRECTOR, <strong>MAJ</strong>OR ACCOUNTS<br />

Renee But<strong>to</strong>n, (703) 642-7366<br />

e-mail: rbut<strong>to</strong>n@atpco.com<br />


Kathleen Kenney, (703) 642-7327<br />

e-mail: kkenney@atpco.com<br />


Janet Berta, (703) 642-7335<br />

e-mail: jberta@atpco.com<br />


Chasie Powell, (703) 750-8748<br />

e-mail: cpowell@atpco.com<br />


Kathryn Turner, (703) 658-8351<br />

e-mail: kturner@atpco.com<br />





Amanda Graham, (703) 750-8678<br />

e-mail: agraham@atpco.com<br />

International Sales Coordina<strong>to</strong>r<br />

Stephanie Fingle<strong>to</strong>n, (703) 658-8426<br />

e-mail: sfingle<strong>to</strong>n@atpco.com<br />




Diana Scogna<br />

e-mail: dscogna@defensenews.com<br />

31 Rue de Tlemcen, 75020 Paris, France<br />

phone: 33 (14) 315-9829<br />



Defense and Communication,<br />

Fabio Lancellotti<br />

e-mail: fabio.1@wanadoo.fr.<br />

Emmanuel Archambeaud<br />

e-mail: earchambeaud@wanadoo.fr<br />

Axelle Chrismann<br />

e-mail: achrismann@wanadoo.fr<br />

48 Bd. Jean-Jaures, 92110 Clichy, France<br />

phone: 33 (14) 730-7180<br />

fax: 33 (14) 730-0189<br />

TURKEY<br />

phone: 0 (533) 643-3479<br />

e-mail: eraankara@gmail.com<br />


Mary Pos<strong>to</strong>n, Production Manager<br />

Armed Forces Journal<br />

6883 Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 22159<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_007_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 9:56 AM Page 7<br />

A1306<br />

SAIC’s Common Driver Trainer gives Warfighters ahead start.<br />

I’mconfident it helps bring them home safely.<br />

©2007 Science Applications International Corporation. All rights reserved.<br />

Preparing the Warfighter.Wetake it personally.<br />

Scott is committed <strong>to</strong> preparing Warfighters and helping them stay safe. This is evident<br />

in the realistic terrain, battlefield conditions and vehicle handling characteristics they<br />

experience with SAIC’s driver training and simulation systems. Whether on wheels or<br />

tracks, when the need is <strong>to</strong> quickly,safely and economically help Warfighters develop<br />

battlefield driving skills, it’s comforting <strong>to</strong> know there are 44,000 SAIC employees just<br />

like Scott who take their work personally.<br />

For detailed information and Scott’s personal s<strong>to</strong>ry,visit www.saic.com/defense A

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_008_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:34 AM Page 8<br />


Asking for <strong>more</strong><br />

Services up the wish-list ante amid fears of a 2009 budget squeeze<br />


I<br />

n Oc<strong>to</strong>ber, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of<br />

Staff Michael Moseley <strong>to</strong>ld the House Armed Services<br />

Committee they needed an extra $20 billion a year <strong>to</strong> buy<br />

all of the planes they say they need.<br />

The Army says it will need $12 billion or $13 billion a year<br />

for several years after the Iraq war ends <strong>to</strong> replace its worn and<br />

damaged equipment. And if the Navy ever hopes <strong>to</strong> build a<br />

313-ship fleet — 33 <strong>more</strong> ships than it has <strong>to</strong>day — it calculates<br />

that it needs a shipbuilding budget of about $22 billion a<br />

year, not the $13.6 billion allocated for 2008.<br />

In November, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint<br />

Chiefs of Staff, said the U.S. military needs a budget equal <strong>to</strong> 4<br />

percent of the gross domestic product, not the 3.3 percent it’s<br />

getting now. That’s a $94 billion a year increase. In his budget<br />

calculations, Mullen wasn’t counting the $200 billion now<br />

being spent each year on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.<br />

How much of the extra money the services say they need<br />

will wind up in the 2009 budget request the Pentagon sends <strong>to</strong><br />

Congress in early February remains <strong>to</strong> be seen. But with<br />

defense spending at its highest (in inflation-adjusted dollars)<br />

since World War II, some lawmakers have suggested that the<br />

requests for <strong>more</strong> simply may be unrealistic.<br />

In response <strong>to</strong> the Air Force request for $20 billion <strong>more</strong> a year,<br />

Rep. Ike Skel<strong>to</strong>n, D-Mo., chairman of the House Armed Services<br />

Committee, snapped at Wynne: “Everything of which you speak<br />

— whether it’s people or planes or equipment — is budget-driven.<br />

I have heard no word about strategic thought of where the Air<br />

Force ... fits in<strong>to</strong> the defense and security of our nation.”<br />

And Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., chairman of the House<br />

Appropriations subcommittee on defense, warned the Army<br />

that it is unlikely the service will see most of the next-generation<br />

vehicles it hopes for from the Future Combat Systems program.<br />

“As soon as this war is over, the money is going <strong>to</strong> dry up”<br />

for FCS, Murtha said after Congress passed the 2008 Defense<br />

Appropriations Act in November. With that in mind, he said the<br />

Army should focus on developing the most promising technology<br />

“spinouts” of the FCS program and install them in the<br />

tanks, fighting vehicles and other equipment it already owns.<br />

But the Pentagon is methodically pushing for <strong>more</strong>. It likely<br />

sees the 2009 budget as a final opportunity <strong>to</strong> boost defense<br />

spending before a new — and possibly Democratic — administration<br />

starts drafting defense budgets.<br />

It will be up <strong>to</strong> Congress <strong>to</strong> impose any discipline on<br />

defense spending; but will it, and where might some fiscal<br />

sense best be applied?<br />

Lawmakers could start by halting the F-22 program at 183<br />

planes. That had been the plan since 2004, but defense appropria<strong>to</strong>rs<br />

opened the door <strong>to</strong> the possibility of <strong>more</strong> F-22s in the<br />

2008 defense budget. They suggested the Air Force use $526<br />

million originally intended <strong>to</strong> shut down the F-22 production<br />

line as a down payment on 20 additional planes.<br />

The Air Force has long insisted it needs at least 381 F-22s,<br />

and its allies in Congress have been happy <strong>to</strong> go along with<br />

that, citing vague threats such as new Russian fighters, the rising<br />

Chinese military and the performance of the Indian Air<br />

Force during a war game.<br />

The most recent boost for the F-22 comes from apparent<br />

fatigue troubles discovered in the F-15 fleet. The Air Force<br />

grounded F-15s twice in November, providing F-22 supporters<br />

an irresistible excuse <strong>to</strong> call for building <strong>more</strong> F-22s.<br />

But there are lots of good reasons <strong>to</strong> end the F-22. One is<br />

cost — it’s $360 million per plane. An F-15, by contrast, would<br />

cost about $60 million. The F-22 was designed in the 1980s <strong>to</strong><br />

shoot down Soviet fighters over Europe. But the Soviet Union<br />

collapsed long before the F-22 became operational, and the<br />

Air Force has been looking for missions for it ever since —<br />

dropping bombs (it can’t carry very many), electronic eavesdropping,<br />

chasing down cruise missiles fired by enemy ships<br />

off the U.S. coast. F-22s have played no role in the wars in Iraq<br />

or Afghanistan. They have not fired a shot in combat. So far,<br />

the U.S. military hasn’t gotten much for the $62 billion it has<br />

spent on F-22s. With no Sovietlike threat on the horizon, the<br />

planned 183 planes augmented by the soon-<strong>to</strong>-arrive F-35<br />

Joint Strike Fighters should suffice.<br />


While holding the line on F-22, Congress should also kill the<br />

EFV — the Marine Corps’ expeditionary fighting vehicle.<br />

Conceived of in 1995, the EFV was supposed <strong>to</strong> be a highspeed<br />

amphibious assault vehicle. It was intended <strong>to</strong> speed<br />

Marines from ship <strong>to</strong> shore at 25 knots and then travel overland<br />

at 45 miles an hour.<br />

What has been produced so far is a vehicle that breaks<br />

down every eight hours on average, is unpredictable <strong>to</strong> steer in<br />

the water and has increased in price from $12.3 million <strong>to</strong><br />

$22.3 million per vehicle. And the emergence of improvised<br />

explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq pointed out another EFV problem.<br />

The flat hull that enables the vehicle <strong>to</strong> skim over the<br />

water appears <strong>to</strong> make it <strong>more</strong> vulnerable on land. With a program<br />

price tag now <strong>to</strong>pping $12.6 billion, up from $8.7 billion,<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_008_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:34 AM Page 9<br />

and with the first deliveries delayed until 2015, lawmakers<br />

should give serious thought <strong>to</strong> pulling the EFV’s plug.<br />

The coming session of Congress might also be a good time<br />

<strong>to</strong> finish what the House Armed Services Committee started<br />

last spring — ending the Airborne Laser program. Citing the<br />

“high-risk nature of the ABL program and its his<strong>to</strong>ry of past<br />

delays and cost increases, the House Armed Services<br />

Committee cut $250 million of the $550 million the Missile<br />

Defense Agency requested. “The committee does not believe it<br />

is prudent <strong>to</strong> continue <strong>to</strong> spend over $500 million a year on a<br />

high-risk program that will provide very little<br />

near-term capability,” House lawmakers wrote.<br />

By 2009, when a four-times-delayed missile<br />

shoot-down test is scheduled <strong>to</strong> occur, the<br />

Airborne Laser will have cost $5.1 billion and<br />

taken 14 years. If it works — many are skeptical —<br />

each airborne laser then could cost $1.5 billion. “If<br />

we continue <strong>to</strong> move forward on the present<br />

course, the nation could potentially spend over<br />

$20 billion on ABL <strong>to</strong> obtain very limited capability,”<br />

the Armed Services Committee said.<br />

House lawmakers wanted <strong>to</strong> reduce ABL <strong>to</strong> a<br />

demonstration program. Given the military’s<br />

many other requirements, $298 million a year<br />

is a lot <strong>to</strong> spend on a demonstration.<br />


During 2007, Congress showed it can be decisive when it<br />

wants <strong>to</strong> be. Lawmakers added $11.6 billion <strong>to</strong> the Defense<br />

Appropriations Act so the services can start buying Mine<br />

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The 20- <strong>to</strong> 40<strong>to</strong>n<br />

vehicles are designed <strong>to</strong> protect troops against IEDs, and<br />

so far, the Pentagon has ordered <strong>more</strong> than 8,800 of them.<br />

This is something Congress needs <strong>to</strong> keep a close eye on.<br />

“It’s a perfect example of Congress and the defense industry<br />

overreacting <strong>to</strong> a genuine problem,” said Chris<strong>to</strong>pher<br />

Hellman, adefense analyst for the Center for Arms Control<br />

and Non-Proliferation. Weeks after Congress acted, the Marine<br />

Corps concluded that its share of the MRAP buy was <strong>to</strong>o high.<br />

The Corps cut its request for 3,700 MRAPS <strong>to</strong> 2,300, for a savings<br />

of about $1.7 billion. The Corps’ logic? As security in Iraq<br />

improves and the number of U.S. troops in Iraq decreases —<br />

as it will during 2008 — the need for MRAPs also will diminish.<br />

For Marines, who usually operate as lightly armed expeditionary<br />

<strong>force</strong>s, MRAPs are behemoths that are slow and awk-<br />

The Pentagon<br />

likely sees the<br />

2009 budget<br />

as a final<br />

opportunity <strong>to</strong><br />

boost defense<br />

spending.<br />

ward <strong>to</strong> deploy and may find few uses outside Iraq.<br />

Although the Army is a heavier <strong>force</strong>, it has spent years trying<br />

<strong>to</strong> make itself lighter and <strong>more</strong> deployable. If the need for<br />

MRAPs declines, Congress should be quick <strong>to</strong> cut MRAP buys.<br />

However, lawmakers should resist Air Force efforts <strong>to</strong> push<br />

C-5 cargo planes in<strong>to</strong> retirement. Service leaders say they want<br />

<strong>to</strong> retire 30 of the oldest C-5s and buy 30 new C-17s as replacements.<br />

They’ve been pushing hard for Congress <strong>to</strong> change legislation<br />

that prohibits them from retiring C-5s, KC-135Es and<br />

other planes, including some C-130s, U-2s and B-52s.<br />

The Air Force accuses Congress of micromanaging<br />

its fleet. But some lawmakers worry<br />

that the Air Force is <strong>to</strong>o eager <strong>to</strong> dispose of old,<br />

but still useful, aircraft <strong>to</strong> bolster its seemingly<br />

insatiable appetite for new aircraft — fighters,<br />

refueling tankers, helicopters and cargo planes<br />

large and small.<br />

The C-5’s biggest supporter may be Sen. Tom<br />

Carper, D-Del., who argues that despite their age<br />

— the oldest C-5s are 39 years old — the giant<br />

planes may be good for another 25 years. New<br />

avionics, new engines and other upgrades are<br />

being tested <strong>to</strong> see whether they reduce the C-5’s<br />

current high operating costs and rather abysmal<br />

mission-capable rates. If upgrades work, Carper<br />

contends the Air Force can have a fleet of rejuvenated, reliable<br />

C-5s for $11.6 billion <strong>to</strong>tal, or $83 million a plane. C-17s, on the<br />

other hand, cost upwardof $200 million a plane.<br />

In September, however, the Air Force announced that the<br />

cost of upgrading C-5s had dramatically jumped. According <strong>to</strong><br />

Air Force calculations, it will cost $16 billion, or $120 million a<br />

plane. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., called it “strangely peculiar”<br />

that the Air Force’s new, higher cost estimates were sent <strong>to</strong> the<br />

Senate the day before a hearing on the C-5 upgrades.<br />

“The true cost of the C-5 modernization is in dispute. It is<br />

not easily determined,” Carper said.<br />

Three upgraded C-5s are scheduled <strong>to</strong> undergo test flights<br />

until June 2010. “We would be wise <strong>to</strong> abstain from making<br />

declarations about the C-5M’s growing cost” until the test<br />

results are in, Carper said.<br />

It would be wise, <strong>to</strong>o, with defense spending — the base<br />

budget, war funding, nuclear weapons and other costs —<br />

already <strong>more</strong> than $680 billion a year, for Congress <strong>to</strong> weigh<br />

what is really needed. But that may be <strong>to</strong>o much <strong>to</strong> hope for in<br />

an election year. AFJ<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_010_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:34 AM Page 10<br />


The Pakistan problem<br />

Musharraf is a troublesome ally<br />


P<br />

erhaps no word better describes Pakistan <strong>to</strong>day than<br />

“uncertainty.” From questions about the security of its<br />

nuclear arsenal <strong>to</strong> its political turmoil, from the resurgence<br />

of the Taliban and al-Qaida <strong>to</strong> its trying relations with<br />

India, the moniker fits.<br />

Indeed, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in his national<br />

address Nov. 3, following his decision <strong>to</strong> suspend the constitution<br />

and declare a state of emergency, said:<br />

“Pakistan is at the brink of a very dangerous<br />

situation.”<br />

Truer words were, perhaps, never spoken.<br />


Although Musharraf was peacefully sworn<br />

in as president for a second five-year term<br />

in late November, after taking off his second<br />

hat as army chief, there is good reason<br />

<strong>to</strong> question whether he will be able <strong>to</strong> rule<br />

— or if he even will complete another term.<br />

Ignoring outside counsel, Musharraf<br />

imposed emergency rule in Pakistan in<br />

early November, citing growing militancy.<br />

The decision plunged the country in<strong>to</strong> crisis<br />

and support for Musharraf <strong>to</strong> new<br />

depths. Critics charge Musharraf wanted <strong>to</strong><br />

neuter an adversarial Supreme Court, fear-<br />

IRAN<br />

Indian<br />

Ocean<br />

N Miles<br />


0 500<br />

ing it would invalidate his Oct. 6 election. They were probably<br />

right, considering Musharraf’s previous donnybrook with the<br />

judiciary in March.<br />

But emergency rule is only one aspect of the immense political<br />

tensions in Pakistan: Enter former prime ministers Benazir<br />

Bhut<strong>to</strong> and Nawaz Sharif, who both returned <strong>to</strong> Pakistan this<br />

fall from exile following Musharraf’s 1999 bloodless coup. Both<br />

intend <strong>to</strong> make a run for the prime minister’s post in the<br />

January polls if emergency rule is lifted, ostensibly allowing for<br />

free and fair elections. Whether either would cooperate with<br />

Musharraf — or one another — isn’t quite clear.<br />

Elections in January will bring new leadership <strong>to</strong> the prime<br />

minister’s job, an office that shares power with the presidency in<br />

Pakistan’s political system. Indeed, in the past, Pakistan’s prime<br />

minister was frequently <strong>more</strong> powerful than the president.<br />

PETER BROOKES is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former<br />

deputy assistant secretary of defense who also served in the Navy, with<br />

the CIA and on Capi<strong>to</strong>l Hill.<br />



Karachi<br />

So what if Musharraf isn’t calling the shots after the polls?<br />

For American interests, the answer is unclear. Many see<br />

Bhut<strong>to</strong>, the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, as a pro-<br />

West secularist who will promote democracy and human<br />

rights, battle extremism and terrorism, and keep peace in the<br />

region. Indeed, the U.S. even helped broker her return from<br />

self-exile in Oc<strong>to</strong>ber and tried <strong>to</strong> foster a power-sharing<br />

arrangement between her and the<br />

general. Emergency rule may now<br />

have killed any prospect of political<br />

CHINA<br />

cooperation between the two.<br />

But what about Sharif? The former<br />

prime minister, who accepted a 10-<br />

Islamabad<br />

year exile in exchange for the drop-<br />

Lahore<br />

ping of corruption and conspiracy<br />

charges, returned <strong>to</strong> Pakistan in<br />

INDIA<br />

November against Musharraf’s wishes.<br />

Sharif first tried <strong>to</strong> return <strong>to</strong><br />

Pakistan in September but was never<br />

allowed <strong>to</strong> leave his aircraft at the<br />

DETAIL<br />

Islamabad airport, then was sent<br />

ignominiously back in<strong>to</strong> exile in<br />

Saudi Arabia. But Sharif was able <strong>to</strong><br />

persuade the Saudi regime <strong>to</strong> support<br />

his return, despite a Musharraf visit<br />

<strong>to</strong> the kingdom <strong>to</strong> intervene. If<br />

Sharif’s star rises, Riyadh could have significant influence in<br />

Islamabad with the man who was at the helm when Pakistan<br />

joined the nuclear club in 1998.<br />

Sharif is seen as much closer <strong>to</strong> Saudi Arabia’s position on<br />

the political aspects of Islam, and he could turn in<strong>to</strong> a strategic<br />

asset for Riyadh in its dealings with an increasingly confident,<br />

and possibly nuclear, Tehran — Saudi Arabia’s biggest nightmare.<br />

Some U.S. experts are concerned that Sharif, as leader of<br />

the Pakistan Muslim League, is close <strong>to</strong> Pakistani Islamist parties<br />

and could be soft on radicalism, especially the Taliban.<br />

These ties also might reverse growth-fostering economic<br />

reforms. With plenty of bad blood with Washing<strong>to</strong>n from his<br />

days as prime minister, it’s also likely Sharif won’t be as pro-<br />

U.S. as Musharraf or Bhut<strong>to</strong>. He’s likely none <strong>to</strong>o pleased by<br />

the White House’s embrace of the man who overthrew him.<br />


Besides politics, what about other U.S. national security<br />

interests?<br />



0107_AFJ_DOM_00_010_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:34 AM Page 11<br />

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is sworn in as a civilian president at the presidential palace in Islamabad on Nov. 29 after<br />

giving up his position as Army chief.<br />

The Pakistanis insist that their nuclear arsenal, of at least 50<br />

<strong>to</strong> 100 nuclear weapons, is safely under lock and key. Indeed,<br />

considering the $100 million in assistance from Washing<strong>to</strong>n,<br />

Musharraf may have the situation in hand. Experts assert the<br />

program is under the Pakistani military’s control, uses permissive<br />

action links, keeps nuclear cores and de<strong>to</strong>na<strong>to</strong>rs — as<br />

well as warheads and delivery vehicles — apart, and requires<br />

two-man authentication, reducing the likelihood of unauthorized<br />

launches.<br />

But although all of this is reassuring, one can’t help but be<br />

haunted by the ghost of A.Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani<br />

bomb, and his now-infamous assistance <strong>to</strong> the likes of Iran,<br />

North Korea, Libya and perhaps others, <strong>to</strong>o. For instance, it’s<br />

now being posited that Khan’s cohorts also may have had substantive<br />

contact with Syria, based on Israel’s September strike<br />

on a suspected nuclear facility near the Turkish border.<br />

More disturbing, some Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly<br />

had contact with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida in<br />

Afghanistan in the days before Sept. 11, 2001. These scientists<br />

are believed <strong>to</strong> be in cus<strong>to</strong>dy <strong>to</strong>day.<br />

But with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons industry active at some<br />

12 facilities, the concern of nuclear know-how and material<br />

proliferating beyond their walls is real, even with recently<br />

instituted background checks.<br />


The past year has been the deadliest since the Taliban regime<br />

fell in late 2001. So far, <strong>more</strong> than 250 soldiers from U.S., coalition<br />

and NATO-led <strong>force</strong>s have fallen in Afghanistan.<br />

Although the ability of Taliban fighters <strong>to</strong> find refuge in the<br />

tribal areas of Pakistan hasn’t helped the fight in Afghanistan,<br />

the turmoil in Pakistani politics, which could prove <strong>to</strong> be a distraction,<br />

won’t improve the situation, either. A leaked National<br />

Security Council document says that although coalition troops<br />

have been successful in individual military battles against the<br />

Taliban, the militants still appear <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong> recruit large<br />

numbers of fighters, many from Pakistan’s Pashtun tribes.<br />

This year also has proved the worst year for suicide bombings<br />

in Afghan his<strong>to</strong>ry. More than 140 suicide bombings were<br />

carried out by extremists, killing hundreds of Afghan civilians<br />



0107_AFJ_DOM_00_012_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:35 AM Page 12<br />


in 2007. According <strong>to</strong> the United Nations’ mission in<br />

Afghanistan, the recruitment of suicide bombers reaches in<strong>to</strong><br />

the tribal areas of Pakistan. Pakistani madrassas — religious<br />

schools — appear <strong>to</strong> be a major source of these bombers. Of<br />

course, Pakistani and Afghan authorities, especially Musharraf<br />

and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, have repeatedly pointed<br />

the finger at each other for failing <strong>to</strong> prevent cross-border<br />

attacks by Taliban militants. But one thing is clear: The problem<br />

won’t be resolved as long as both sides<br />

remain in a state of denial about the Taliban<br />

problem — which has roots in both countries<br />

— and, instead, keep blaming each other.<br />


Pakistan’s tribal areas are also the home <strong>to</strong> the<br />

most robust element of post-9/11 al-Qaida,<br />

which has vowed for months <strong>to</strong> bring down<br />

the Musharraf government, and also <strong>to</strong> take<br />

its jihad abroad <strong>to</strong> Europe — and the U.S.<br />

Indeed, intelligence agencies have been<br />

tracking Europeans heading for Pakistan in<br />

preparation for missions in the West.<br />

European passports allow easy access <strong>to</strong><br />

Western countries, resulting in attacks such as<br />

the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. Not surprisingly,<br />

the U.S. intelligence community’s<br />

best estimates place al-Qaida’s bin Laden and<br />

his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, not in<br />

Afghanistan but in the tribal areas of Pakistan<br />

along the Pakistani-Afghan border.<br />

Calling on European governments <strong>to</strong> abandon the fight in<br />

Afghanistan, bin Laden issued one of his rare videos in late<br />

November — the latest in an increasing number of audio and<br />

video messages produced by al-Qaida’s al-Sahab media outfit.<br />

Al-Sahab has issued <strong>more</strong> than 90 messages this year — double<br />

the number in 2006. Some speculate that the step-up in al-<br />

Qaida communications is a disturbing sign of how secure the<br />

group’s leadership feels in Pakistan’s frontier region. This,<br />

unfortunately, coincides with a notable lack of al-Qaida operatives<br />

killed or captured recently in Pakistan, despite what is<br />

reportedly a treasure trove of actionable intelligence passed on<br />

<strong>to</strong> Pakistani intelligence and security <strong>force</strong>s. In fairness, it<br />

should be noted that a large number — indeed, hundreds —<br />

of al-Qaida operatives, including senior 9/11 mastermind<br />

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, have been captured in Pakistan<br />

since 9/11. Some analysts believe this shortcoming has <strong>more</strong><br />

<strong>to</strong> do with a lack of Pakistani political resolve and the military’s<br />

unwillingness <strong>to</strong> act against fellow Muslims than the ability of<br />

these extremists <strong>to</strong> evade Pakistani <strong>force</strong>s.<br />


Some speculate<br />

the step-up<br />

in al-Qaida<br />

communications<br />

is a disturbing<br />

sign of how<br />

secure the<br />

group’s<br />

leadership feels<br />

in Pakistan’s<br />

frontier region.<br />

Although Pakistan seems <strong>to</strong> be swimming in a sea of chaos<br />

with its political problems and the challenges of al-Qaida and<br />

the Taliban, its future relationship with its<br />

rival and nuclear neighbor, India, cannot be<br />

ignored. Even though relations between<br />

Islamabad and New Delhi have been relatively<br />

stable in recent years, even improved, India<br />

has no interest in seeing jihadis of any sort —<br />

al-Qaida, Taliban or Kashmiri — take over<br />

Pakistan, especially while Kashmir remains<br />

unresolved.<br />

Kashmir, a land both Pakistan and India<br />

have claimed since their birth in 1947, contains<br />

the seeds of conflict that has the potential<br />

for escalation, especially in light of India’s<br />

superior conventional <strong>force</strong>s. Representative<br />

of this concern, as chief of the army,<br />

Musharraf led the 1999 border clash with<br />

India at Kargil in an ill-advised land grab.<br />

Sharif tried <strong>to</strong> fire Musharraf over the disaster,<br />

leading <strong>to</strong> the general’s coup against the former<br />

prime minister.More troubling, as president,<br />

Musharraf allowed tensions <strong>to</strong> rise <strong>to</strong><br />

the boiling point with India in 2002, which<br />

some believemight have led both countries <strong>to</strong> look in<strong>to</strong> the<br />

nuclear abyss if not for American diplomatic intervention.<br />

A country such as Pakistan — the world’s second most populous<br />

Muslim nation, which shares borders with India, China,<br />

Afghanistan and Iran — is of unquestionable strategic importance<br />

<strong>to</strong> American interests. Not <strong>to</strong> mention, Pakistan’s location<br />

near the mouth of the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf<br />

is significant for issues of energy security. And one can’t ignore<br />

the fact that 50 percent <strong>to</strong> 75 percent of U.S. supplies for<br />

Afghanistan fly over, or go through, Pakistan.<br />

The challenge for the U.S. will be <strong>to</strong> successfully manage<br />

this relationship, which won’t be easy but is critical <strong>to</strong><br />

American homeland security, the battle against radicalism,<br />

fighting terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation and stability in<br />

South Asia. AFJ<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_013_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:40 AM Page 13

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_014_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:44 AM Page 14<br />



&0107_AFJ_DOM_00_014_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:44 AM Page 15<br />


<strong>Nine</strong> <strong>steps</strong> <strong>to</strong> a <strong>more</strong> <strong>effective</strong> <strong>force</strong><br />

BY <strong>MAJ</strong>. <strong>DANIEL</strong> L. <strong>DAVIS</strong><br />

agile<br />


itself in<strong>to</strong> a <strong>force</strong> designed <strong>to</strong> dominate all challengers<br />

in any future battle. At the heart of this transformation is the<br />

concept of network-centric warfare, which seeks <strong>to</strong> exploit technology<br />

and link dispersed war-fighting platforms, soldiers and a<br />

vast array of intelligence assets and sensors, with various means<br />

of attack. Although some components of the Defense<br />

Department’s efforts are outstanding and promise significant<br />

advantage <strong>to</strong> future American <strong>force</strong>s, other elements are so far<br />

off the mark that if remedial actions are not taken, American<br />

<strong>force</strong>s could suffer a significant battlefield defeat in a future war.<br />

Our defense modernization program had its genesis in the<br />

aftermath of Operation Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm in 1991. Before the initiation<br />

of hostilities, the Iraqi Army was widely portrayed in the<br />

media as a menacing <strong>force</strong>, hardened by years of war with<br />

Iran, loaded with thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, and<br />

protected by a sophisticated web of modern air-defense<br />

weapons. When the U.S.-led coalition utterly routed Saddam<br />

Hussein’s <strong>force</strong>s from Kuwait, the vic<strong>to</strong>ry was widely viewed as<br />

a product of America’s technological prowess and heralded the<br />

beginnings of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The years<br />

that followed saw an abundance of articles written by military<br />

<strong>MAJ</strong>. <strong>DANIEL</strong> L. <strong>DAVIS</strong> is an Army cavalry officer who fought in<br />

Operation Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm in 1991 and served in Afghanistan in 2005. He<br />

is the operations officer for Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities<br />

Manager-Future Combat Systems at Fort Bliss, Texas. The views<br />

expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those<br />

of the Army, Defense Department or U.S. government.<br />

thinkers who shared their vision of what this revolution would<br />

mean for the U.S. and how it would transform the way wars<br />

were fought. A number of prominent flag officers in the<br />

Defense Department led the way.<br />

One of the initial proponents of RMA theory was Adm.<br />

William A. Owens, at the time vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs<br />

of Staff. In February 1996, he wrote “The Emerging U.S.<br />

System-of-Systems,” in which he laid out his vision of future<br />

warfare that would rely heavily on technology and feature the<br />

RMA prominently. That was followed a few years later by then-<br />

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, who announced his<br />

intent <strong>to</strong> make Owens’ ideas operational in the form of a “family<br />

of systems” known as Future Combat Systems (FCS). The<br />

ideas laid out by these two men, and <strong>effective</strong>ly adopted as<br />

Defense Department policy in a series of documents published<br />

shortly after, established the conceptual underpinning<br />

that would later be used <strong>to</strong> create the future <strong>force</strong>. Some components<br />

of this high-tech vision are demonstrably outstanding,<br />

while others, regrettably, are decidedly not.<br />

The U.S. Army senior leadership articulated its vision of<br />

what the future Army would be capable of in the 2004 Army<br />

Transformation Roadmap: “Knowledge-based Army <strong>force</strong>s<br />

exploit advanced information technologies and space-based<br />

assets for network-enabled battle command, while fully integrated<br />

within the joint, interagency and multinational environment.<br />

Unlike past, predictable operations, Army <strong>force</strong>s<br />

respond within days and fight on arrival in the joint operations<br />

area through multiple entry points. These capabilities allow<br />

the JFC [joint <strong>force</strong>s commander] <strong>to</strong> pre-empt enemy actions,<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_016_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:45 AM Page 16<br />

We must not fall prey <strong>to</strong> the belief that awesome technology<br />

will always provide us combat overmatch against all opponents.<br />

assure access, seize the initiative and shape the battle space.”<br />

But given the current state of technology, the probability of<br />

future development in nations across the globe, and a his<strong>to</strong>rical<br />

perspective on the performance of new and emerging technologies<br />

in the past, does this theory stand up <strong>to</strong> rigorous examination?<br />

I argue that it does not. Aside from a near-faith-based,<br />

unsubstantiated belief in the efficacy of technology <strong>to</strong> do anything<br />

and everything imaginable, one of the primary fac<strong>to</strong>rs<br />

upon which this assessment is based is its failure <strong>to</strong> give proper<br />

consideration <strong>to</strong> the capabilities of the future enemy <strong>force</strong>.<br />

One of the major problems in discussing the foundations for<br />

our modernization program is that the very military vic<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

hailed as the proof of American technological dominance —<br />

Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm (and later the conventional phase of Operation<br />

Iraqi Freedom) — was not primarily a result of technology. It<br />

resulted from a combination of two fac<strong>to</strong>rs: (1) the American<br />

<strong>force</strong> was highly trained, well-led and <strong>effective</strong>ly equipped; and<br />

(2) the Iraq <strong>force</strong> was pathetically led, even <strong>more</strong> poorly trained<br />

and marginally equipped. In other words, no matter what we<br />

did in Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm and OIF, the U.S. would have won. Had we<br />

faced a competent foe, we may well have won anyway, but we<br />

would have seen the limits of technology. As it is, we cite Desert<br />

S<strong>to</strong>rm as unimpeachable proof of the dominant ability of our<br />

current military technology, and most of our projections about<br />

future capability envision an enemy as impotent as Iraq. Our<br />

failure <strong>to</strong> create a <strong>force</strong> based on facing a credible, robust and<br />

capable enemy <strong>force</strong> that has access <strong>to</strong> modern technology and<br />

is as clever as we are in its deadly application is one of the greatest<br />

failures of our modernization program.<br />


But the greatest threat such an unrealistic view of combat poses<br />

<strong>to</strong> our future <strong>force</strong> is the misguided decision <strong>to</strong> reduce both the<br />

amount of armor protection for the fighting vehicles and the<br />

number of vehicles themselves without any substantive data.<br />

Army plans call for the creation of 15 FCS brigade combat<br />

teams (FBCTs) by 2030. Each of these FBCTs will be composed<br />

of 14 systems, including manned and unmanned ground vehicles,<br />

two classes of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), a comprehensive<br />

network, plus the soldier (for a detailed description of<br />

the entire FCS system, see the Army FCS Web site at http://<br />

www.army.mil/ fcs). In the perfectly valid interest of lowering<br />

logistical requirements, the Army chose <strong>to</strong> use a common chassis<br />

for all FCS vehicles. The consequence of that decision was<br />

the design of vehicles that are less ar<strong>more</strong>d than existing plat-<br />

forms and therefore less survivable in combat, which is illogical<br />

when one considers the certainty that time and technology will<br />

continue <strong>to</strong> see the development of stronger and <strong>more</strong> powerful<br />

weapon systems. How then, does it make sense <strong>to</strong> design a<br />

future fighting platform less survivable than <strong>to</strong>day’s vehicles?<br />

Consider recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.<br />

The enemy in both of those wars is not a shell of the powerful<br />

future enemy we may someday face, and yet this decidedly<br />

low-tech, insurgent enemy has been able <strong>to</strong> scrounge for sufficient<br />

numbers of powerful roadside weapons that have<strong>force</strong>d<br />

the U.S. <strong>to</strong> spend hundreds of billions of dollars <strong>to</strong> add armor<br />

<strong>to</strong> every combat vehicle in our inven<strong>to</strong>ry — including the 70<strong>to</strong>n<br />

M1 Abrams tank and the 30-<strong>to</strong>n Bradley Fighting Vehicle.<br />

If we recognize the need <strong>to</strong> upgrade the armor protection on<br />

the vehicles in our fleet that already possess the greatest<br />

degree of protection, what logic could lead one <strong>to</strong> conclude<br />

that it makes sense <strong>to</strong> develop lighter vehicles, possessing less<br />

ar<strong>more</strong>d protection, potentially going up against a state<br />

equipped with a full arsenal of modern weapons? The Defense<br />

Department’s apparent answer: Information.<br />


Operation Anaconda conducted against al-Qaida in Afghanistan<br />

in March 2002 provides painful lessons about the limitations<br />

of technology. In a paper for the Army War College, then-<br />

Lt. Col. H.R. McMaster described the key points of that battle:<br />

“On March 2, infantry air assaulted almost directly on <strong>to</strong>p of<br />

undetected enemy positions. Soldiers came under immediate<br />

fire from small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and<br />

machineguns as their helicopters landed. Battalion and<br />

brigade command posts were pinned down and commanders<br />

fought alongside their men. Apache helicopters responding <strong>to</strong><br />

provide direct fire support were hit and rendered inoperable.<br />

The planned second lift of soldiers had <strong>to</strong> be cancelled. Some<br />

units were pinned down by enemy fire during the first night of<br />

the battle and through the next day; they, including many of<br />

the wounded, could not be extracted until the following night.<br />

The unit had deployed with no artillery under the assumption<br />

that surveillance combined with precision fires from the air<br />

would be adequate. Even the most precise bombs proved in<strong>effective</strong><br />

against small, elusive groups of enemy infantry so soldiers<br />

relied heavily on small mortars. As the fight developed<br />

over the next ten days, it became apparent that over half of the<br />

enemy positions and at least three hundred fifty al Qaeda<br />

fighters had gone undetected.”<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_016_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:45 AM Page 17<br />

Significantly increasing the armor on the planned Mounted<br />

Combat System would give FCS a vehicle that could go head<br />

<strong>to</strong> head with the best Chinese and Russian tanks.<br />

It is reasonable <strong>to</strong> ask how, 11 years after Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm, with<br />

billions of dollars spent on refining the technological advances<br />

so <strong>to</strong>uted a decade earlier, we encountered such stiff resistance<br />

against an enemy that had no UAVs, no access <strong>to</strong> satellites, no<br />

ar<strong>more</strong>d vehicles, no digitized battle command network, no<br />

helicopters and very little in the way of sophisticated weaponry.<br />

Since the early 1990s, senior military leaders have been<br />

preaching what amounts <strong>to</strong> a faith-based belief in the efficacy<br />

of future technology. We are always <strong>to</strong>ld that “soon” we will see<br />

“unprecedented” capabilities as a result of technology, and that<br />

our troops, so equipped, will enjoy “overmatch” against any<br />

opponent. However, when it has come <strong>to</strong> combat operations in<br />

which theory has met reality, a different s<strong>to</strong>ry has emerged.<br />


An equally problematic encounter occurred during the initial<br />

march <strong>to</strong> Baghdad by our mechanized <strong>force</strong>s. One of the leading<br />

elements of the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) drive <strong>to</strong><br />

Baghdad, Lt. Col. Ernest Marcone, battalion commander in<br />

3ID’s 69th Ar<strong>more</strong>d Regiment, approached a key bridge over<br />

the Euphrates River that would be necessary for the advance <strong>to</strong><br />

the capital by the remainder of the division. Every technological<br />

advantage should have belonged <strong>to</strong> Marcone’s armor battalion,<br />

particularly with respect <strong>to</strong> intelligence of enemy movements.<br />

The Iraqi enemy had access <strong>to</strong> no satellites, limited<br />


radio communications, no UAVs, no fighter jets, no helicopters<br />

and only rudimentary command-and-control technology.<br />

The U.S. side was equipped with unprecedented<br />

technology. During the war, hundreds of aircraft- and satellitemounted<br />

motion sensors, heat detec<strong>to</strong>rs, and image and communications<br />

eavesdroppers hovered above Iraq. The armed<br />

services coordinated their actions as never before. U.S. commanders<br />

in Qatar and Kuwait enjoyed 42 times the bandwidth<br />

available <strong>to</strong> their counterparts in the first Persian Gulf War.<br />

High-bandwidth links were set up for intelligence units in the<br />

field. A new vehicle-tracking system marked the location of<br />

key U.S. fighting units and even allowed text e-mails <strong>to</strong> reach<br />

front-line tanks. This digital firepower convinced many in the<br />

Pentagon that the war could be fought with a far smaller <strong>force</strong><br />

than the one it expected <strong>to</strong> encounter. If ever there was going<br />

<strong>to</strong> be overmatch, it should have been here. But as in Afghanistan,<br />

when theory met reality in combat, reality prevailed<br />

because even a technologically overmatched enemy has a vote<br />

in the outcome.<br />

As Marcone’s battalion approached the bridge, he was<br />

unable <strong>to</strong> get intelligence on the nature of the threat he might<br />

face. According <strong>to</strong> a November 2004 article in Technology<br />

Review, “How Technology Failed in Iraq,”as the battle developed,<br />

“the situation grew threatening. Marcone arrayed his<br />

battalion in a defensive position on the far side of the bridge<br />

and awaited the arrival of bogged-down rein<strong>force</strong>ments. One<br />

communications intercept did reach him: a single Iraqi<br />

brigade was moving south from the airport. But Marcone says<br />

no sensors, no network, conveyed the far <strong>more</strong> dangerous<br />

reality, which confronted him at 3:00 a.m. April 3. He faced not<br />

one brigade but three: between 25 and 30 tanks, plus 70 <strong>to</strong> 80<br />

ar<strong>more</strong>d personnel carriers, artillery, and between 5,000 and<br />

10,000 Iraqi soldiers coming from three directions.”<br />

Because the American soldiers were so well-trained and wellequipped,<br />

in both cases they were able <strong>to</strong> overcome the uncertainty<br />

created by the failure of technology. In our current <strong>force</strong>,<br />

soldiers don’t expect <strong>to</strong> have all the information. They are<br />

explicitly trained <strong>to</strong> expect that intelligence reports are approximations,<br />

and that once contact is made they discover ground<br />

truth, adapt <strong>to</strong> the situation presented and still expect <strong>to</strong> prevail.<br />

In the future <strong>force</strong>, however, it will be far <strong>more</strong> difficult for soldiers<br />

<strong>to</strong> overcome inaccurate or incomplete intelligence reports<br />

because the platforms in which they’ll fight are physically less<br />

capable of surviving direct-fire engagements in combat.<br />

The concept of our future ground <strong>force</strong> is such that it trades<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_018_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:44 AM Page 18<br />

The greatest threat <strong>to</strong> our future <strong>force</strong> is the misguided decision <strong>to</strong><br />

reduce armor protection and the number of fighting vehicles.<br />

armor protection for enhanced information, positing that with<br />

dominant battlespace knowledge, we will know where the<br />

enemy is and what he is doing, and take pre-emptive action<br />

against him. Thus, we always gain and maintain the initiative,<br />

keeping enemy <strong>force</strong>s continually off balance and on the<br />

defensive.<br />

But as these two critical tactical vignettes show, the other<br />

side is quite capable; the technology upon which we primarily<br />

base our intelligence, communication and precision strike<br />

capabilities will not always do what we hope; and at other<br />

times, circumstances simply will not be in our favor. If we do<br />

not have a <strong>force</strong> like Marcone had at that Euphrates bridge —<br />

heavily ar<strong>more</strong>d tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that<br />

enabled him <strong>to</strong> fight for information in an uncertain environment<br />

— then we will at times be at a disadvantage against an<br />

enemy who is so equipped.<br />


To ensure, therefore, our future <strong>force</strong> does not encounter a situation<br />

in which it is overmatched by an enemy <strong>force</strong>, we must<br />

conduct a thorough <strong>force</strong>-on-<strong>force</strong> analysis of potential future<br />

opponents. Only by making a direct comparison <strong>to</strong> these<br />

<strong>force</strong>s can one hope <strong>to</strong> determine whether the correct course<br />

of action has been taken in terms of future development.<br />

Without question, the country that currently possesses the<br />

most robust military capability and is investing most heavily<br />

for the future is the People’s Republic of China (PRC).<br />

This article takes no position on the likelihood of whether<br />

the PRC and the U.S. ever will go <strong>to</strong> war, but addresses the<br />

capabilities that these two giants possess now and are likely <strong>to</strong><br />

possess in the future and illuminates potential Chinese advantages<br />

over future American <strong>force</strong>s.<br />

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in an effort <strong>to</strong> create<br />

combat <strong>force</strong>s with the ability <strong>to</strong> <strong>effective</strong>ly execute China’s<br />

emerging modernization doctrine, has been improving its<br />

training in terms of realism and sophistication with a focus on<br />

joint and combined-arms operations. In recent years, China<br />

has increased the difficulty of training exercises by presenting<br />

its leaders with unexpected problems. In January, the PLA<br />

General Staff Department (GSD) issued its 2007 Training<br />

Guidelines, which emphasizerealism.<br />

It is clear that China’s doctrine and supporting training<br />

programs are focused on precisely the capabilities the U.S.<br />

possesses now and is likely <strong>to</strong> have in the future. China has<br />

also invested heavily in the weapon systems needed <strong>to</strong> attack<br />

American vulnerabilities. China has aggressively produced an<br />

entire array of high-tech systems and advanced weapons<br />

designed <strong>to</strong> attack areas of American vulnerability, particularly<br />

in regard <strong>to</strong> FCS. It is for this reason we must be cautious<br />

when <strong>to</strong>uting the strengths of the system; we must not<br />

fail <strong>to</strong> take in<strong>to</strong> consideration that other intelligent people<br />

are actively engaged in seeking ways <strong>to</strong> defeat U.S. military<br />

capabilities.<br />


The world has not s<strong>to</strong>od passively by since Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm. It has<br />

studied American performance in extraordinary detail and<br />

spent billions of dollars and years of research focused on the<br />

desire <strong>to</strong> defeat the most prominent capabilities we have now<br />

and those we are projected <strong>to</strong> have in the future. We, therefore,<br />

must be sober and aware of what capabilities the world is producing,<br />

expend considerable mental power trying <strong>to</strong> devise<br />

counteractions and, perhaps above all, shed the hubris<br />

endemic throughout our <strong>force</strong> that would have us believe we<br />

cannot possibly be challenged on a conventional battlefield.<br />

The facts argue persuasively against such belief.<br />

It is critical that with eyes wide open, we educate ourselves<br />

as <strong>to</strong> global military developments, analyze those capabilities<br />

in light of our platforms and systems, ascertain our areas of<br />

potential vulnerability — and then constantly seek ways <strong>to</strong><br />

mitigate those vulnerabilities, acknowledge that our opponent<br />

will score some vic<strong>to</strong>ries, and with that understanding, seek<br />

solutions that will allow us <strong>to</strong> win anyway. If we always prepare<br />

ourselves <strong>to</strong> face the best capabilities a potential enemy might<br />

throw at us, we will have a chance <strong>to</strong> win every time.<br />

Ironically, the Defense Department claims <strong>to</strong> use such a<br />

“capabilities-based” approach <strong>to</strong> future <strong>force</strong> development.<br />

According <strong>to</strong> Defense’s 2002 Annual Report <strong>to</strong> the President<br />

and the Congress, although it is impossible <strong>to</strong> know which state<br />

or group of states might pose a future threat <strong>to</strong> the U.S. or its<br />

vital national interests, it is possible “<strong>to</strong> anticipate the capabilities<br />

that an adversary might employ <strong>to</strong> coerce its neighbors,<br />

deter the U.S. from acting in defense of its allies and friends, or<br />

directly attack the U.S. or its deployed <strong>force</strong>s. A capabilitiesbased<br />

model ... requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military<br />

<strong>force</strong>s will need <strong>to</strong> deter and defeat. ... Because such adversaries<br />

are looking for U.S. military vulnerabilities and building<br />

capabilities <strong>to</strong> exploit them, the department is shoring up<br />

potential weak spots <strong>to</strong> close off such avenues of attack.” If<br />

actions followed these words, then this essay would be hailing<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_018_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:44 AM Page 19<br />

the Defense Department’s focus. Unfortunately, there is a significant<br />

mismatch between stated policy and actions.<br />

In the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army<br />

defines “Future Challenge Risk” as “anticipating future<br />

threats and adjusting capabilities <strong>to</strong> maintain a military<br />

advantage against them.” And yet when it explicitly defines<br />

this risk in relation <strong>to</strong> the FCS, it lists three ways by which it<br />

will attain this goal: providing program stability through testing<br />

and procurement; spiraling capabilities forward; and<br />

accelerating the fielding of an intelligence distribution system.<br />

There is no mention of any analysis of current or emerging<br />

enemy capabilities.<br />

It is my assessment that the three essential enemy capabilities<br />

the U.S. must focus on are:<br />

å Future adversaries who possess rapidly evolving technological<br />

capabilities that will soon — and in some key categories<br />

already do — give them skills equal <strong>to</strong> those of the U.S.<br />

These categories include (but are not limited <strong>to</strong>) deployed<br />

satellite constellations for navigation, intelligence-gathering,<br />

communication, and telemetry for precision-guided weapons;<br />

the ability <strong>to</strong> shoot down U.S. satellites, deploy fleets of<br />

unmanned aerial systems and field increasingly modern fighter<br />

jets and bombers; and advanced C4ISR capabilities.<br />

å Future adversaries who are developing increasingly powerful<br />

ar<strong>more</strong>d vehicles, particularly main battle tanks designed <strong>to</strong><br />

go head <strong>to</strong> head with the M1 Abrams tank, along with <strong>more</strong><br />

sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles, precision-fired artillery<br />

pieces and advanced rotary-winged aircraft designed <strong>to</strong> allow<br />

them <strong>to</strong> compete on the conventional battlefield against the U.S.<br />

å Future adversaries who seek <strong>to</strong> mitigate U.S. strengths by<br />

fighting in cities, intermingling with civilian populations; make<br />

use of new and existing signature-reduction technology; discover<br />

creative ways <strong>to</strong> deceive our expansive sensor array; and employ<br />

robust countertechnology <strong>force</strong>s designed <strong>to</strong> interfere with,<br />

deceive, corrupt and destroy U.S. computer and communication<br />

systems; and aggressively seek <strong>to</strong> shoot down UAVs.<br />

Our future <strong>force</strong> is designed <strong>to</strong> go against an enemy who has<br />

only a few of the capabilities listed above; if unforeseen circumstances<br />

in the future were <strong>to</strong> require it <strong>to</strong> fight against an enemy<br />

who is able <strong>to</strong> do most of the things on the above list, our <strong>force</strong><br />

would be vulnerable <strong>to</strong> defeat. The U.S. should, therefore, shift<br />

course immediately and embark on a path expressly designed<br />

<strong>to</strong> create a military able <strong>to</strong> defeat the best that any enemy could<br />

throw at us, endure a bloody nose (because it must be clearly<br />

unders<strong>to</strong>od that a worthy opponent can inflict lethal blows),<br />

ARMY<br />

Information technology is a critical <strong>to</strong>ol on the modern<br />

battlefield, but it can lead us <strong>to</strong> exaggerate our capabilities.<br />

and provide the means <strong>to</strong> win despite his best efforts. To accomplish<br />

that objective, the Defense Department in general and the<br />

Army in particular must make changes <strong>to</strong> its futures programs.<br />


Making recommendations for change does not imply we would<br />

junk all the modernization efforts conducted <strong>to</strong> date by the<br />

Defense Department or the Army. Many — indeed, most — elements<br />

of current modernization are good <strong>to</strong> excellent, both in<br />

theory and practice. For example, Army senior leaders are correct<br />

in their assessment that the global trend is clearly moving<br />

<strong>to</strong>ward network-enabled <strong>force</strong>s that use sensors, unmanned<br />

aerial platforms, satellites, precision-guided weapons, and other<br />

advanced computer and communications gear; as an economic<br />

and military superpower, the U.S. must ensure it remains the<br />

world leader in this movement. Moreover, a number of elements<br />

of the FCS program ought <strong>to</strong> be supported and in some<br />

cases expanded. Several classes of robot vehicles already have<br />

demonstrated notable utility in combat; the none-line-of-sight<br />

launch system, mortar and cannon all provide significant<br />

improvements over existing capabilities. The concept of linking<br />

platforms via an integrated network is sound. Linking sensor<br />

fields with aerial platforms and soldier observations enables the<br />

<strong>force</strong>s <strong>to</strong> attack targets outside direct-fire range and provides the<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_020_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:44 AM Page 20<br />

Too often, we exaggerate what technology can do for us<br />

and underestimate what the enemy can do.<br />

Army with the ability <strong>to</strong> increase lethality.<br />

Although many aspects of the FCS system have great potential,<br />

significant vulnerabilities also exist. Problems arise when<br />

the network experiences latency or when the enemy <strong>force</strong> successfully<br />

attacks the UAVs, disables or destroys the sensors,<br />

knocks down the satellites, successfully employs camouflage,<br />

deceives the sensors, or employs a mass attack that can’t be<br />

destroyed fast enough. In such cases, the FCS system as<br />

designed would be at a marked disadvantage because,<br />

stripped of its ability <strong>to</strong> engage beyond line of sight and out of<br />

contact, it could not trade body blows with a heavily ar<strong>more</strong>d<br />

enemy and survive. The first step in rectifying this deficiency<br />

must be either <strong>to</strong> increase significantly the armor protection of<br />

the Mounted Combat System (FCS’ main direct-fire system) or<br />

expressly produce a new tank for the FBCT that can go head <strong>to</strong><br />

head with high quality systems such as the Ukrainian T84U,<br />

the Chinese Type 99 and/or the Russian Black Eagle.<br />


One of the most significant errors committed during Army<br />

reorganization was the elimination of the heavy divisional cavalry<br />

squadron. Before being disbanded, this organization was<br />

composed of three ground troops equipped with 27 tanks, 41<br />

Bradleys and six mortars, and two aerial reconnaissance<br />

troops equipped with 16 OH-58 Scout helicopters. This formation<br />

had the ability <strong>to</strong> conduct reconnaissance in any environment<br />

conceivable. If bad weather, poor intelligence or just the<br />

fog of war clouded the situation, the squadron could develop<br />

the situation for the supported maneuver commander so that<br />

when he had <strong>to</strong> engage the enemy, he had an adequate picture<br />

of the enemy. As programmed, FCS has replaced this robust<br />

formation with what’s known as an RSTA (reconnaissance, surveillance,<br />

target acquisition) squadron composed of four pla<strong>to</strong>ons<br />

of UAVs and two aerial reconnaissance troops composed<br />

of 10 scout helicopters.<br />

Within each combined-arms brigade there exists a lightly<br />

ar<strong>more</strong>d ground reconnaissance troop, but the RSTA squadron<br />

has no ground troops, only aerial assets. In an ideal environment,<br />

these platforms would be able <strong>to</strong> provide valuable information<br />

<strong>to</strong> the maneuver commander but would have only a limited<br />

ability <strong>to</strong> thoroughly conduct route reconnaissance, limited<br />

capability <strong>to</strong> find enemy <strong>force</strong>s making <strong>effective</strong> use of camouflage,<br />

and no ability <strong>to</strong> engage enemy <strong>force</strong>s with direct fire. But<br />

the biggest weakness of all is its susceptibility <strong>to</strong> being grounded<br />

by bad weather and shot down by enemy anti-air assets.<br />

During both Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm and OIF, significant dust s<strong>to</strong>rms<br />

covered the battle area at the most inopportune times,<br />

grounding virtually all tactical UAVs and helicopters. That did<br />

not represent a serious problem <strong>to</strong> the Army’s ground <strong>force</strong>s in<br />

either war because they possessed a sufficiently robust and<br />

powerful ar<strong>more</strong>d reconnaissance <strong>force</strong> with which <strong>to</strong> fight for<br />

information. I fought with the 2nd Ar<strong>more</strong>d Cavalry Regiment<br />

at the Battle of 73 Easting in a blinding sands<strong>to</strong>rm in 1991. We<br />

would have preferred <strong>to</strong> have had the aero scouts flying the<br />

normal six <strong>to</strong> 10 kilometers in front of us, but their absence<br />

represented limited concern <strong>to</strong> us because our ground troops<br />

found the enemy and had enough indigenous firepower and<br />

ar<strong>more</strong>d protection <strong>to</strong> survive any unexpected encounter. Had<br />

an FCS-equipped <strong>force</strong> run in<strong>to</strong> the same sands<strong>to</strong>rm, all its<br />

aerial platforms would have been grounded, denying the supported<br />

maneuver <strong>force</strong> commander of information about<br />

enemy disposition or strength and requiring him <strong>to</strong> engage<br />

blindly. It is critical, then, that the reconnaissance squadron be<br />

reorganized <strong>to</strong> include ground troops equipped with the ability<br />

<strong>to</strong> fight for information when conditions are not optimal. To<br />

go in<strong>to</strong> combat in the future with vulnerable reconnaissance<br />

capability would be unwise.<br />

Virtually every competent armed <strong>force</strong> possesses unmanned<br />

aerial systems, and a growing number possess the ability <strong>to</strong><br />

attack space-based platforms. Therefore, we must create the<br />

ability within our <strong>force</strong> <strong>to</strong> both defend against such attacks and<br />

<strong>to</strong> launch counterstrikes. Like it or not, space has been added<br />

as a dimension of war. Our potential adversaries possess the<br />

ability <strong>to</strong> shoot down, blind, deceiveor outright destroy the<br />

space platforms upon which we critically rely. If we don’t protect<br />

our satellites and improve our ability <strong>to</strong> employ precision<br />

weapons against hostile enemy <strong>force</strong>s, we incur an avoidable,<br />

unacceptable vulnerability.<br />


Because of its effect on the tactical and operational fight, the<br />

UAV has become a key asset of the battlefield commander. In<br />

the context of global <strong>force</strong> modernization, most discussion <strong>to</strong><br />

date about UAVs has centered on their ability <strong>to</strong> perform ISR<br />

and precision strike functions, but there has been far <strong>to</strong>o little<br />

discussion regarding counter-UAV operations. If it is agreed<br />

that the UAV is a valuable <strong>to</strong>ol used by both sides in an operation,<br />

it stands <strong>to</strong> reason then that there is also value in denying<br />

this ability <strong>to</strong> our opponent. Just as a common part of a conventional<br />

battle plan on the ground is the counter-reconnais-<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_020_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:44 AM Page 21<br />

The Desert S<strong>to</strong>rm vic<strong>to</strong>ry, cited as proof of U.S. technological<br />

dominance, was primarily the result of a highly trained, wellled<br />

American <strong>force</strong> engaging an impotent foe.<br />

sance phase <strong>to</strong> identify enemy intentions and strip away<br />

enemy reconnaissance assets, likewise it now must become a<br />

requirement <strong>to</strong> conduct counter-UAV operations <strong>to</strong> identify<br />

enemy intentions/capabilities and <strong>to</strong> strip away the enemy’s<br />

fleet of drones and blind him <strong>to</strong> our intentions.<br />

We must, therefore, develop a UAV variant whose purpose it<br />

is <strong>to</strong> seek out and destroy enemy platforms. When one considers<br />

that China has virtually identical UAV variants <strong>to</strong> the FCS’<br />

Class I and IV vehicles, it becomes clearer why it is important<br />

<strong>to</strong> develop this counter-UAV capability. If we believe the possession<br />

of these platforms serves a critical function in precision-fire<br />

engagements, then it becomes all the <strong>more</strong> important<br />

<strong>to</strong> deny the enemy the ability <strong>to</strong> target our <strong>force</strong> with same.<br />

But although the UAV has importance at the tactical and<br />

operational level, satellites have great significance <strong>to</strong> the joint<br />

<strong>force</strong> commander at the strategic level. The loss of UAVs might<br />

affect companies, battalions and brigades; the loss of satellites<br />

affects a nation’s entire <strong>force</strong>. We need redundant capabilities,<br />

and we must not rely exclusively on those assets <strong>to</strong> perform<br />

critical functions. We need <strong>to</strong> employ things such as stationary<br />

inflatables, remotely piloted vehicles and other alternative<br />

technologies <strong>to</strong> satellites that will limit our vulnerability.<br />

China, Russia and other states in Asia are developing new<br />

fleets of fighter jets intended for use as close-air support for<br />

AFP<br />

maneuver units. The last contested air campaign conducted by<br />

the U.S. was the Linebacker II offensive against North Vietnam<br />

in December 1972. Since then, we have faced the fearsome<br />

Grenadans, the horrible Haitians, the mighty Serbian military<br />

and the “elite” Republican Guardof Iraq — none of whom had<br />

anything resembling a credible air <strong>force</strong>. It would be a tragic<br />

mistake, however, <strong>to</strong> assume that condition will continue in<strong>to</strong><br />

infinity. So long as potential enemies of the U.S. possess the<br />

capacity <strong>to</strong> strike American ground troops with attack aviation,<br />

we must maintain air defense units at the tactical level.<br />

Numerous senior Defense Department leaders have emphasized<br />

their intent <strong>to</strong> develop the capacity <strong>to</strong> build a <strong>force</strong> capable<br />

of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. If we want <strong>to</strong><br />

be capable of executing that intent and pose a serious operational<br />

threat <strong>to</strong> future enemies, we must posses the necessary<br />

assets. To meet that requirement, we need a sufficient number<br />

of transport aircraft large and <strong>to</strong>ugh enough <strong>to</strong> do the job.<br />

In an Oc<strong>to</strong>ber memorandum <strong>to</strong> senior leaders of the U.S.<br />

Military Academy, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey wrote: “We<br />

must create the strategic national military airlift and air-<strong>to</strong>-air<br />

refuel capability (600+ C-17 aircraft) <strong>to</strong> project national military<br />

and humanitarian power in the global environment. We<br />

currently have an inadequate capability with 150 aircraft supported<br />

by an aging refueling fleet. ... If we are <strong>to</strong> pose a serious<br />

deterrent capability in the dangerous world arena, then we<br />

must credibly be able <strong>to</strong> project power back in<strong>to</strong> future combat<br />

areas <strong>to</strong> sustain allies at risk. The C-17 represents the<br />

capacity <strong>to</strong> carry out this strategic power projections mission.”<br />

Complementing the aircraft, we also need <strong>to</strong> expand and<br />

modernize landing-strip-building “Red Horse” squadrons. A<br />

Red Horse squadron is an engineer unit designed <strong>to</strong> perform<br />

damage repair required for recovery of critical Air Force facilities<br />

and utility systems, and aircraft launch and recovery. In<br />

addition, RedHorse units accomplish engineer support for<br />

bed-down of weapon systems required <strong>to</strong> initiate and sustain<br />

operations in an austere, bare-base environment, including<br />

remote hostile locations. These formations should be strengthened<br />

and increased in number <strong>to</strong> provide the joint <strong>force</strong> with<br />

the capability <strong>to</strong> establish airfields where none previously<br />

existed. We need <strong>to</strong> give the <strong>force</strong> commander the ability <strong>to</strong><br />

send in airborne or air assault troops <strong>to</strong> secure a piece of<br />

selected terrain suitable for the construction of an airfield,<br />

protect the approaches, then insert a Red Horse squadron,<br />

FORCE MODERNIZATION continued on Page 46<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_022_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:35 AM Page 22<br />

big<br />

chill<br />

Talk of a renewed<br />

Cold War underscores<br />

common misunderstanding<br />

of geopolitical flirtation<br />



0107_AFJ_DOM_00_022_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:35 AM Page 23<br />


Russian-European and European-American relationships<br />

might assume that the Cold War is back in a new edition. The<br />

U.S. plan <strong>to</strong> place an anti-ballistic missile system in Europe<br />

seems <strong>to</strong> signal a new chill in the Russian-Western relationship.<br />

The U.S. claims it is just a preventive measure against Iran<br />

and other “rogue” states. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismisses<br />

these claims and says it is designed <strong>to</strong> tip the balance<br />

of power <strong>to</strong>ward the West — implicitly a continuation of the<br />

Ronald Reagan “Star Wars” program of <strong>more</strong> than a generation<br />

ago <strong>to</strong> protect the West from a Soviet missile attack. The rancor<br />

over missiles goes along with other harsh statements by Putin,<br />

one in Munich and another during a celebration of the Soviet<br />

Union’s vic<strong>to</strong>ry in World War II, when he compared — at least<br />

in the view of some pundits — the U.S. <strong>to</strong> Nazi Germany.<br />

The rancor over the Iraq war — when the split between the<br />

U.S. and what former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld<br />

called Old Europe threatened the very existence of NATO —<br />

seems <strong>to</strong> be gone. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and even<br />

the new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, have demonstrated<br />

friendliness <strong>to</strong> the U.S. This rekindling of relations seems <strong>to</strong><br />

have put an end <strong>to</strong> rumors of divorce from the U.S. The trans-<br />

Atlantic geopolitical marriage is, surprisingly enough, especially<br />

strong on the French side.<br />

The trans-Atlantic marriage of the U.S. and Old Europe<br />

seems <strong>to</strong> have been res<strong>to</strong>red, and the West once again stands<br />

firm against Russia. Putin has been chastised for falling back<br />

on Soviet-style smashing of dissent and bullying small Russian<br />

neighbors, and Russia again has emerged as the anti-Western,<br />

Asian/Eurasian country it was for decades, if not centuries. But<br />

the external picture could be deceptive, and a close look suggests<br />

the situation is very different. The Russia/West European<br />

trend continues, and the rekindling of love between Europe<br />

and the U.S. is deceptive or, perhaps, a prelude <strong>to</strong> a new marriage<br />

contract. This provides Russia a good chance <strong>to</strong> pursue<br />

its policy of European integration, or at least a close relationship<br />

with Europe. In general, geopolitical arrangements have<br />

continued <strong>to</strong> be quite fluid.<br />

The notion that the West is once again united and poses a<br />

mortal threat for Russia, as was often the case in the past,<br />

implies a certain Russian response. Russia’s policy for centuries<br />

DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH is an associate professor of his<strong>to</strong>ry at<br />

Indiana University South Bend. He graduated from Moscow State<br />

University and has taught at Harvard and Stanford universities.<br />

has been <strong>to</strong> search for allies. In the 13th century, Prince<br />

Alexander embraced the Mongols <strong>to</strong> counter an attack from the<br />

West. More recently, Stalin courted the Japanese when he saw a<br />

Nazi onslaught in the future. And <strong>to</strong>day, Putin, if he sees a united<br />

West as a real military threat, also should look <strong>to</strong> the East,<br />

even <strong>more</strong> so because of Russia’s apparent natural ally — Iran.<br />

Regardless of whether the current American/Iranian standoff<br />

will lead <strong>to</strong> war, Iran and the U.S. are sworn enemies. Iran's<br />

strong anti-American stance makes it seem a perfect candidate<br />

for a military alliance with Russia. In fact, some influential<br />

Russian intellectuals, such as Alexander Dugin, regard<br />

alliance with Iran as the linchpin of Russia’s greatness — the<br />

way <strong>to</strong> create a mighty Eurasian empire and end American<br />

global domination. Dugin and similar-thinking pundits have<br />

even suggested that Russia should help Iran develop nuclear<br />

weapons, which would limit America’s ability <strong>to</strong> engage in<br />

wars of aggression.<br />


This musing about rapprochement with Iran is not abstract<br />

talk. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has actively engaged in the<br />

sale of weapons <strong>to</strong> Iran and, some observers suggest, provided<br />

the know-how for potential Iranian development of<br />

nuclear weapons. Russia began <strong>to</strong> build the Iranian nuclear<br />

plant at Bushehr when Boris Yeltsin was professing<br />

unbounded love for the West in general and the U.S. in particular.<br />

Putin apparently proceeded in the same direction. He<br />

sold Iran sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles, continued the<br />

work at Bushehr, and continued <strong>to</strong> reiterate that Russia is a<br />

faithful and dedicated Iranian partner that would not let the<br />

U.S. attack Iran. One might suggest, in what seems <strong>to</strong> be<br />

increasing tension in the West, that Putin would make a <strong>more</strong><br />

decisive move <strong>to</strong>ward Iran.<br />

But the unexpected happened. In response <strong>to</strong> President<br />

Bush’s assertion that new bases in Poland and the Czech<br />

Republic would serve <strong>to</strong> counter an Iranian missile attack,<br />

Putin proposed instead that the U.S. use the Russian-controlled<br />

Kabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Putin was implying<br />

that the Americans could control Iranian moves much better<br />

from near the Iranian border than from Central/Eastern<br />

Europe. The message, at least from the Russian perspective, is<br />

clear: Russia does not regard Iran as a potential ally or care<br />

much about the Iranian attitude. Russia’s attention is still<br />

directed <strong>to</strong> Europe, and Putin believes that a geopolitical or<br />

economic marriage with Europe is possible, despite all the ver-<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_024_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:40 AM Page 24<br />

The Cold War rhe<strong>to</strong>ric of Russia and some members of the Western<br />

community conceals <strong>more</strong> complicated drifts in global politics.<br />

bal rancor and saber-rattling. Russia’s claim is not groundless,<br />

because it can offer what Europe needs — gas and oil. The<br />

relationship between Old Europe and the U.S. is far from trouble-free.<br />

And this also provides Russia with a good chance <strong>to</strong><br />

woo Europe, regardless of harsh statements from European<br />

capitals.<br />


Chinese leaders have emphasized that China’s present rise will<br />

be “peaceful.” This is not just diplomatic politeness. In the<br />

present world, a state’s power and influence depend in many<br />

ways on its economic resources. And China’s increasing economic<br />

might — its peaceful “weapon” — could indeed lead <strong>to</strong><br />

a position of global power different from that in the past.<br />

Russia has followed this road, and assumed that it has influence<br />

over Europe because of natural resources, not missiles.<br />

The country’s final rapprochement with the continent ultimately<br />

depends on European dependence on Russian monopolization<br />

of gas and oil. In May, Putin achieved an apparent<br />

landmark deal with the key gas-producing countries in Central<br />

Asia, which ensured a supply of gas <strong>to</strong> “Old Europe” or, <strong>more</strong><br />

precisely, <strong>to</strong> Germany.<br />

The reasons for Central Asian leaders <strong>to</strong> strike the deal with<br />

Russia but not with the U.S., which still has bases in the<br />

region, were manifold. One major reason is security. Central<br />

Asia is extremely insecure. Post-Soviet poverty and the presence<br />

of Iran and especially Afghanistan make the region a<br />

powder keg for revolts and the rise of fundamentalism. At the<br />

beginning of the Bush administration, the Central Asian countries<br />

assumed that the U.S. presence would guarantee their<br />

security, a major reason why they allowed American bases in<br />

the area. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made<br />

them question America’s ability <strong>to</strong> guarantee their security.<br />

Russia has emerged as a viable alternative. Russia’s protracted<br />

war in Chechnya demonstrated that despite all its problems<br />

with the Russian army, it can endure conflict much longer<br />

than the U.S.<br />

Chechenization of the conflict looks much <strong>more</strong> successful<br />

than Iraqization and, of course, Vietnamization. This consideration<br />

played the most important role in seeing Russia as the<br />

<strong>more</strong> reliable patron. The subsequent gas deal made Russia<br />

crucially important for the delivery of at least a good part of<br />

Central Asian gas <strong>to</strong> Europe. Russians believed that this economic<br />

pragmatism will finally push Europe <strong>to</strong> embrace Russia<br />

and that the supposed rekindling of a marriage between<br />

America and Old Europe should be taken with a grain of salt.<br />

For all the importance of the relationship of Europe and the<br />

U.S. and Russia, the most important for Europeans is still their<br />

internal relationships. They have reached an important miles<strong>to</strong>ne:<br />

Despite Polish and U.K. objections, an agreement<br />

signed in June considerably strengthens the European Union<br />

(EU). It creates a stronger presidency and a <strong>more</strong> unified foreign<br />

policy. In fact, the EU, after almost two years of slumber,<br />

is moving in the direction of being a sort of United States of<br />

Europe. The biggest states, the Charlemagne core — those that<br />

emerged 1,000 years ago from Charlemagne’s empire, mostly<br />

Germany and France — will benefit most from the new<br />

arrangements and emerge as the leaders of the new grand<br />

state. But whether they have indeed resumed their love affair<br />

with the U.S. needs <strong>to</strong> be scrutinized. Observers who see such<br />

a move usually point <strong>to</strong> Sarkozy’s positive approach <strong>to</strong> the U.S.<br />

Some have even proclaimed that he is the most pro-American<br />

French leader since Louis XVI, the king executed during the<br />

French Revolution. This seems <strong>to</strong> be a remarkable sign of<br />

rekindled love if we remember that the French were the<br />

strongest opponent of the U.S. in West Europe.<br />

But one should accept this external manifestation with<br />

skepticism. As everybody knows, it is not firm handshakes and<br />

external cordiality but contracts leading <strong>to</strong> paychecks that<br />

count in the world of business and academia, and politics, as<br />

well. And so far, the French have offered nothing. France has<br />

not one soldier in Iraq and no visible increased presence in<br />

Afghanistan. France made clear that the bases planned in the<br />

Czech Republic and Poland are American and are not<br />

approved by all Europeans. And both France and Germany<br />

have implied that even if Russia is not in America’s mind — as<br />

claimed — the Kabala radar station in Azerbaijan is a good<br />

option for a missile defense base.<br />

Of most importance is Germany’s position. Merkel publicly<br />

scolded Putin for his authoritarian drive, but she willingly<br />

accepted Putin’s plan <strong>to</strong> build a gas pipeline through the Baltic<br />

Sea directly <strong>to</strong> Germany, bypassing Poland, eliciting a strong<br />

protest by Poland and others that wish <strong>to</strong> put a s<strong>to</strong>p <strong>to</strong> the<br />

enterprise. The Russians can plainly see an Old Europe whose<br />

goal is the creation of a unified Europe, a megastate that Old<br />

Europe would lead. A good relationship with Russia would be<br />

crucial. To start with, Russian natural resources — especially<br />

gas — would be essential for the European economic<br />

machine. As a matter of fact, the Europeans have little choice<br />

— most of the gas from Central Asia also will be controlled by<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_024_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:40 AM Page 25<br />

Russia if the May agreement goes through. And the fact that<br />

most, if not all, gas would be controlled by Germany, the central<br />

state in the Charlemagne core, would help streamline the<br />

cohesiveness of the European Union and discipline wayward<br />

members such as Poland.<br />

Those who observed the recent clash between Poland and<br />

Old Europe members of the EU, especially Germany, could<br />

assume that it was exclusively<br />

because of Poland’s reluctance <strong>to</strong> play<br />

second fiddle in European arrangements.<br />

This is true, but it is not the<br />

only truth. Poland played the role of<br />

Trojan horse, an American proxy.<br />

Germany and other Old Europeans<br />

approached the U.S. decision <strong>to</strong> place<br />

the missile defense system in Poland<br />

as implicitly directed against not<br />

Iranians, or even Russians, but Old<br />

Europe.<br />

The Americans are, of course, not<br />

concerned about actual French or<br />

German attacks. The bases ensure<br />

America’s presence in Europe and prevent<br />

solidification of the EU as a<br />

megastate whose economic and<br />

geopolitical weight could exceed its<br />

own. Here, the monopolization of the<br />

gas supply in the hands of Germany<br />

and other Old Europe states could<br />

upset American designs. The gas<br />

should compel Poland <strong>to</strong> be a good<br />

member of the EU, not just a junior<br />

American partner — an American<br />

Trojan horse in Europe. For Russia, the<br />

gas and, <strong>to</strong> some degree, oil supply should provide insurance<br />

that Europe will not discard Russia and will proceed with longterm<br />

economic and geopolitical rapprochement. But, does this<br />

overture <strong>to</strong>ward the U.S. need not be taken seriously? No, it is<br />

just the other side of the Old Europe geopolitical posture.<br />

While preserving its general pro-European direction, Russia<br />

has made advances <strong>to</strong>ward its neighbors on the East and even<br />

winked at Washing<strong>to</strong>n. Indeed, despite his harsh statements<br />

<strong>to</strong>ward the U.S., Putin has noted that he regards Bush as a<br />

“good person.” Finally, the U.S. — facing increasing geopolitical<br />

and economic difficulties — has started <strong>to</strong> change its pos-<br />

Vladimir Putin meets with Mahmoud<br />

Ahmadinejad in Tehran.<br />

ture. At the beginning of the Bush presidency, the ruling elite<br />

fully believed in the U.S.’s absolute preponderance, pretty<br />

much discarding diplomatic niceties. It was assumed that the<br />

American military fist would solve any problems, that<br />

American diplomacy could be reduced <strong>to</strong> the simple, no-nonsense<br />

parlance of the Spartans from the recent movie “300.” As<br />

U.S. problems in the Middle East mount, diplomatic sophistication<br />

has acquired <strong>more</strong> importance.<br />

Despite the harsh statements,<br />

the pro-Western, and especially the<br />

pro-European, direction of Russia’s<br />

foreign policy has continued. Russia<br />

believes that its control of the flow of<br />

oil and, especially, gas — ensured by<br />

the recent agreement in Central Asia<br />

— will compel Old Europe <strong>to</strong> continue<br />

its rapprochement with Russia.<br />

Old Europe is now most concerned<br />

with consolidation of the<br />

European Union, the creation of a<br />

new megastate and a unified foreign<br />

policy. While trying <strong>to</strong> rearrange the<br />

relationship with a post-imperial and<br />

much weaker U.S., Old Europe at the<br />

same time does not want <strong>to</strong> spoil its<br />

relationship with Russia, which it<br />

needs for economic and geopolitical<br />

reasons. The relationship provides<br />

Old Europe with a solidified EU, plus<br />

bargaining chips in dealing with<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n. Sending positive signals,<br />

its leaders have intimated that they<br />

would not mind reasserting trans-<br />

Atlantic relations, but on a new basis:<br />

A united Europe should be an equal partner, and the trans-<br />

Atlantic alliance should not preclude Europeans engaging with<br />

other powers, regardless of their relationship with Washing<strong>to</strong>n.<br />

Thus, the Cold War rhe<strong>to</strong>ric of Russia and some members of<br />

the Western community actually conceals much <strong>more</strong> complicated<br />

drifts in global politics and Russia’s place in it. It also<br />

implies that global arrangements are quite fluid and the most<br />

unexpected combinations might emerge in the future. All this<br />

requires observers <strong>to</strong> be attentive <strong>to</strong> new trends and avoid<br />

rigid model-making that supposedly explains all events in the<br />

past, present and future. AFJ<br />



0107_AFJ_DOM_00_026_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:40 AM Page 26<br />

In<strong>to</strong><br />

Africa<br />

There are opportunities<br />

and pitfalls in stepping up<br />

U.S. initiatives on a<br />

war-ravaged continent<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_026_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:40 AM Page 27<br />



and impenetrable heart of darkness — a continent ravaged by<br />

disease, poverty, corruption and eternal violence. Will the close<br />

of the 21st century offer a different outlook?<br />

At worst, and amid the rubble of time, the human voice still<br />

may find a way <strong>to</strong> utter the cadences of despair and protest.<br />

But let us hope for better. Africa has piqued the interest of<br />

Western governments and, most notably, defense institutions<br />

in the aftermath of Sept. 11. The U.S. has created a separate<br />

geographic combatant command dedicated solely <strong>to</strong> Africa.<br />

President Bush said that “Africa Command will enhance our<br />

efforts <strong>to</strong> bring peace and security <strong>to</strong> the people of Africa and<br />

promote our common goals of development, health, education,<br />

democracy and economic growth in Africa.”<br />

The Defense Department is concerned with the growing<br />

threat of terrorism — the unknowns emanating from<br />

“ungoverned spaces” — and with securing economic and<br />

energy interests. Drawing from the three Ds (diplomacy, development<br />

and defense), Western countries such as the U.S. are<br />

stepping up their initiatives in Africa. As an example, the U.S.<br />

is working on regional engagement strategies in the Gulf of<br />

Guinea that look <strong>to</strong> cross-link military actions with nonmilitary<br />

interagency processes and economic development outcomes.<br />

Africa, which was once (and may still be for some) the<br />

object of desire for the so-called civilizing mission, is now<br />

<strong>more</strong> than just a labora<strong>to</strong>ry site for military administra<strong>to</strong>rs and<br />

defense bureaucracies.<br />

The post-9/11 ethos and largesse of defense budgets has<br />

allowed the U.S. military <strong>to</strong> task itself substantially with <strong>more</strong><br />

nontraditional defense missions. The DIME paradigm (diplomatic,<br />

information, military and economic) still reigns over<br />

our operational planning consciousness. In essence, DIME<br />

amounts <strong>to</strong> the various national instruments of power available<br />

for deployment in theater. Because Africa’s challenges<br />

have <strong>more</strong> <strong>to</strong> do with diplomacy (politics), information and<br />

economic development, the Defense Department is stuck in a<br />

bit of a quagmire. For one thing, development goals, and what<br />

some military planners have coined “netcentric peace,” suggest<br />

that the U.S. military should be organized <strong>to</strong> support<br />

other nonmilitary agencies, but because of our global pres-<br />

PHILIP KAO is a civil servant with the U.S. Joint Forces Command. He<br />

was educated at the University of Chicago and the London School of<br />

Economics. His views do not reflect those of the U.S. Government or<br />

U.S. Joint Forces Command.<br />

ence and resource delivery capabilities, we are going <strong>to</strong> be,<br />

<strong>more</strong> often than not, in the lead, unfortunately.<br />

Given the global security concerns at the dawn of the 21st<br />

century, it is no surprise that leading militaries around the<br />

world view security as a precursor <strong>to</strong> sustainable development<br />

and a foundation for <strong>effective</strong> nation-building. The thesis that<br />

security is a necessary aspect of development is hard <strong>to</strong> disagree<br />

with, but even the most obvious and well-intentioned<br />

tau<strong>to</strong>logies have their limits. In certain cases, there is a positive<br />

correlation between increased security and economic development.<br />

Such a statistical relationship, however, is not a universal<br />

axiom of development; it is clearer that the relationship<br />

between security and development is one of mere correlation,<br />

and rarely straightforward causation.<br />

Above all else, there is, indeed, a role for an enhanced<br />

African military capability <strong>to</strong> better curb and respond <strong>to</strong> violent<br />

conflicts internally. In conjunction with adequate institutional<br />

frameworks, a robust and well-trained African military may<br />

help <strong>to</strong> cultivate a democratically infused political will by raising<br />

social capital in the name of unity, human rights and stability.<br />

However, professionalizing militaries in Africa should never<br />

become a mere end goal, per se. One of the crucial issues really<br />

amounts <strong>to</strong> asking: Is an emboldened and professional African<br />

military (whether at the level of individual African countries or<br />

in the form of an African Standby Force) a vehicle for positive<br />

change, or a catalyst for explosive violence? Pundits over the<br />

years have looked <strong>to</strong> the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and<br />

the People’s Armed Police as an informative example of how a<br />

robust, organized and sufficiently funded military can stimulate<br />

and direct investments <strong>to</strong>ward modernization, institution<br />

building and control. Needless <strong>to</strong> say, China’s initiatives are<br />

controversial because of their ideological import. The ideology<br />

of self-sufficiency in Maoist China paved the way temporarily<br />

for basic investment and marshalling of resources, but even<br />

these initiatives were soon felt <strong>to</strong> be inadequate, exhibiting<br />

what in development studies is commonly referred <strong>to</strong> as “path<br />

dependency.” In fact, China began divesting former militaryowned<br />

enterprises back in the 1980s <strong>to</strong> jump-start economic<br />

growth and <strong>to</strong> make state-business enterprises less corrupt and<br />

<strong>more</strong> efficient. In the long and short of it, Africa is not faced<br />

with conventional Westphalian nation-state enemies outside its<br />

continent, and does not have at its fingertips a unifying pool of<br />

ideologies <strong>to</strong> mobilize. Rather, over the course of its his<strong>to</strong>ry, the<br />

real enemy for Africa has been unsuccessful interventions in<br />

the name of colonialism and progress.<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_028_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:39 AM Page 28<br />

The real ‘enemy’ for Africa has been unsuccessful interventions<br />

in the name of colonialism and progress.<br />

The military is often seen as part of the problem and not the<br />

solution, but recently, institutional planners have turned <strong>to</strong> the<br />

military as an enabler for marshalling resources and delivering<br />

development — whether in Iraq or Africa. To begin with, several<br />

policymakers see military institutions as playing a crucial<br />

role in education. Military outreach in Africa is <strong>more</strong> specifically<br />

oriented <strong>to</strong>wardtraining the trainers and enhancing regional<br />

disaster-response capabilities. Aside from professionalizing<br />

African militaries, Western militaries are making their presence<br />

felt in humanitarian projects via consulting and logistics support.<br />

In working with host-nation governments, Western militaries<br />

aim <strong>to</strong> instill a culture of planning and <strong>to</strong> support the<br />

buildup of institutional frameworks. An unstated assumption<br />

in all of this is that militaries are postured <strong>to</strong> lend assistance in<br />

the realm of governance, because they represent the crucible of<br />

society’s positive values and possess deep knowledge of leadership,<br />

authority and organizational planning.<br />

In its role as a security provider, the military also has been<br />

<strong>to</strong>uted as playing an invaluable part in assisting economic development.<br />

Military-<strong>to</strong>-military partnerships help <strong>to</strong> shape the<br />

political economy for stimulating pro-growth investment and<br />

entrepreneurialism, and capturing positive economic spill-over<br />

effects. Military planners are also pressed <strong>to</strong> ensure that the<br />

breakdown of traditional group solidarities does not turn violent.<br />

Effective security can prevent local dispute mechanisms from<br />

turning sour and spreading <strong>more</strong> corruption by resuscitating<br />

state structures and facilitating the legitimate delivery and<br />

(re)distribution of resources. As a juncture for the interagency,<br />

military partnerships act as a lightning rod, calling forth nonmilitary<br />

agencies and organizations <strong>to</strong> plan <strong>more</strong> <strong>effective</strong>ly <strong>to</strong>gether.<br />

Despite political differences and nuances, what the U.S.<br />

shares with other countries is an interest in a stable, peaceful<br />

and prosperous Africa. Foreign militaries in Africa can help<br />

respond <strong>to</strong> humanitarian crises by providing training and logistics<br />

support, but in the end, peaceful and legitimate political<br />

settlements, sustainable economic growth and humanitariancrisis<br />

management reside with the final stakeholders: Africans.<br />


Before moving ahead, it is crucial <strong>to</strong> understand that military<br />

interventions in African politics and the economy have been, for<br />

the most part, disastrous. Good intentions delivered and packaged<br />

in the form of military-<strong>to</strong>-military training, along with<br />

other regional security engagement initiatives that involve both<br />

military and nonmilitary entities, have certainly caught the<br />

attention of military leaders. On the upside, there is potential in<br />

advancing working partnerships with Africans <strong>to</strong> cultivate<br />

mutual training objectives and co-evolve new domains of interest,<br />

such as promoting and enhancing maritime sec<strong>to</strong>r development<br />

— which encapsulates both security and economic development<br />

aspects. On a less positive note, African militaries his<strong>to</strong>rically<br />

have been used <strong>to</strong> control people (i.e. slaves), and<br />

negative sentiments and wounds very well may linger that<br />

inhibit African militaries from making constructive inroads in<strong>to</strong><br />

contemporary African politics. Additionally, the buildup of an<br />

African Armed Forces may benefit soldiers economically, but for<br />

the rest of the populace, the effects of militarization may<br />

increase social stratification, exacerbating inequality, and thus<br />

undermining one of the main tenets of human development.<br />

The best way <strong>to</strong> support Africans is <strong>to</strong> enable them <strong>to</strong> make<br />

better decisions, while having them shape choices that matter<br />

most <strong>to</strong> them. A good approach would be <strong>to</strong> enable Africans <strong>to</strong><br />

develop and leverage the necessary planning <strong>to</strong>olkits and<br />

methodologies in accordance with their own timetables.<br />

African militaries should continue developing greater security<br />

awareness and en<strong>force</strong>ment capabilities by seeking out and<br />

developing key partnerships that will help them maximize their<br />

assets, and coordinating the necessary changes in governance<br />

and institutional frameworks. The problems in Africa have less<br />

<strong>to</strong> do with traditional warfare than complex contingencies that<br />

straddle peacekeeping, disease, natural disasters, human rights<br />

abuses and emergent civil-military relationships. Western militaries<br />

and governments can help by lending credible and continuous<br />

support in terms of resources and, most importantly,<br />

intellectual capital. International partnerships in Africa must<br />

foster trust and invest in a long-term commitment.<br />

On another note, economic dependence as a result of tied<br />

aid and debt mismanagement functioned <strong>to</strong> keep African<br />

countries from realizing economic growth in the 1980s and<br />

1990s. Any future military outreach should shy away from<br />

installing new modes of dependency for the continent.<br />

Military engagements in Africa should never leave Africans<br />

worse off. In fact, mismanaged political relationships and economic<br />

debt may instigate further corruption and violence.<br />

Regardless of whether the future militaries of Africa reside<br />

<strong>more</strong> prominently within each nation-state — <strong>to</strong> be called<br />

upon for regional cooperation — or form an African Standby<br />

Force, there are many common and recurring challenges. To<br />

begin with, African militaries must be funded adequately in<br />

terms of both equipment and pay. Centralization of funds is<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_028_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:39 AM Page 29<br />

one possibility for allowing nations <strong>to</strong> provide assistance during<br />

crises in areas outside their immediate sovereignties and<br />

interests. Funds must be made available for training so that<br />

battalions that have <strong>to</strong> cross linguistic and cultural barriers<br />

know how <strong>to</strong> operate <strong>to</strong>gether, realize common operating procedures<br />

and agree on definitions, especially with respect <strong>to</strong> end<br />

states. Additionally, governments and<br />

stakeholders must identify the spectrum<br />

of resources and types of money available<br />

for different mission sets. In terms of<br />

education, there is still much <strong>to</strong> be<br />

desired by embedding peacekeeping and<br />

human rights aspects <strong>more</strong> thoroughly in<br />

the military planning process. To offer<br />

one final example, African-grown militaries<br />

might look <strong>to</strong> ensure that civil<br />

police organizations are brought in<strong>to</strong> the<br />

fold <strong>to</strong> reap the benefits from training,<br />

technology, and ongoing changes in doctrine<br />

and standard operating procedures.<br />

International militaries have a substantial<br />

educational role <strong>to</strong> play here.<br />


Interventions <strong>to</strong> prop up military capacities<br />

and capabilities in Africa need <strong>to</strong> proceed<br />

cautiously, rather than impatiently.<br />

The international community must take<br />

certain actions <strong>to</strong> avoid potential misunderstandings<br />

and future disasters. In particular,<br />

there are five areas where governments<br />

and militaries around the world — helping Africa help<br />

itself — can add incredible value.<br />

First of all, Western countries such as the U.S. are increasingly<br />

viewing China’s involvement in Africa as threatening. These<br />

concerns exhibit similar fears and attributes as those coming<br />

out of China’s recent bid for Unocal Corp. Competition is not<br />

necessarily absolutely inimical <strong>to</strong> national security. During the<br />

early period of the Cold War, China’s involvement in Africa was<br />

spearheaded by Mao’s attempt <strong>to</strong> treat African countries (e.g.<br />

Mozambique and Angola) first and foremost as a flank against<br />

Western powers. China also sought <strong>to</strong> support nations undergoing<br />

similar revolutions in the Third World as a show of its<br />

political commitment and solidarity. With the dominance of<br />

world markets and global capitalism, geopolitics is slightly dif-<br />

U.S. training efforts should help African<br />

militaries <strong>to</strong> help themselves.<br />

ferent <strong>to</strong>day. Instead of ostracizing China, the U.S. — along<br />

with other countries — need <strong>to</strong> begin partnering with China <strong>to</strong><br />

share responsibility in Africa. Countries should look <strong>to</strong> partner<br />

with China, not only because of its growing bed of resources,<br />

but also because Africa is becoming <strong>more</strong> amenable <strong>to</strong> the<br />

Beijing model of strict government control and high economic<br />

growth. No matter what, political interaction<br />

in Africa should not leave the continent,<br />

once again, the passive victim in an<br />

imperial race for resources.<br />

Secondly, successful partnerships are<br />

always a two-way street. To create meaningful<br />

working relationships, Western<br />

countries need <strong>to</strong> be in a position and<br />

mind-set <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong> learn something<br />

from Africans. Without this, any involvement<br />

in Africa will be stuck in an<br />

unhealthy power relation, with the delineation<br />

of a technical superior holding the<br />

seat of legitimacy and a passive inferior<br />

looking <strong>to</strong> resist and subvert “knowledge.”<br />

Western countries still have much <strong>to</strong> learn<br />

from Africa, including social entrepreneurship,<br />

the strength and beauty of human<br />

diversity, human rights, and dignity.<br />

Thirdly, Western militaries are already<br />

cognizant that their uniformed presence<br />

in humanitarian outreach can be a detriment.<br />

Military-<strong>to</strong>-military training does<br />

not pose a problem, but in the context of<br />

development work and humanitarian-<br />

crisis response, armed military presence can be off-putting<br />

and counterproductive in certain contexts. Additionally, in recognizing<br />

that engagements in Africa need <strong>to</strong> have <strong>more</strong> of a<br />

civilian face, Western countries should educate their own nongovernmental<br />

organizations and nonmilitary communities<br />

before unleashing dysfunctional civilian-military relationships<br />

and half-worked-out interagency constructs in the field.<br />

Next, drawing on the theme of economic development,<br />

Western governments and militaries need <strong>to</strong> spend <strong>more</strong> time<br />

in their assessment of the relationships between security and<br />

development. Military and commercial ties play a significant<br />

role in the economies of most countries. In a recent ethno-<br />


AFP<br />

AFRICA continued on Page 44

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_030_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:39 AM Page 30<br />

Boom<br />

and<br />

strengths and weaknesses<br />

of Taiwan’s defense strategy emerge bustThe<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_030_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:39 AM Page 31<br />

SAM YEH, AFP<br />


naval base in May, conducted as a part of the Han Kuang, or<br />

“Chinese Glory,” live-fire military exercises,presented a snapshot<br />

of Taiwan’s evolving military. New capabilities were on<br />

display, but the failures of antiquated weapons s<strong>to</strong>le the show.<br />

Civilian officials in the viewing stand demanded explanations,<br />

a far cry from the island’s long his<strong>to</strong>ry of military domination<br />

under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.<br />

Taiwan’s progress was apparent, but so was the array of<br />

challenges in military strategy, procurement and personnel<br />

reform if the island is going <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong> defend itself in the<br />

future.<br />

These challenges are rooted in the transformation of<br />

Taiwan’s military strategy since 2000, when Chen Shui-bian of<br />

the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) beat the long-ruling<br />

Kuomintang (KMT) <strong>to</strong> become president of the Republic of<br />

China (ROC). Chen inherited an army-centric military that had<br />

been designed over nearly 50 years of KMT rule <strong>to</strong> focus on the<br />

defense of the island’s physical terri<strong>to</strong>ry. Chen feared this focus<br />

would turn Taiwan’s densely populated cities in<strong>to</strong> urban combat<br />

zones if conflict with China ever came, and instead decided<br />

<strong>to</strong> pursue “decisive offshore operations” that would employ<br />

air and naval power <strong>to</strong> carry the fight in<strong>to</strong> the Taiwan Strait<br />

and, if necessary, <strong>to</strong> the mainland. The immediate obstacle for<br />

Chen’s strategy was Washing<strong>to</strong>n’s reluctance <strong>to</strong> sell Taipei the<br />

types of advanced weapons systems necessary for such a<br />

defensive strategy after the U.S. promised <strong>to</strong> reduce its sales <strong>to</strong><br />

Taiwan in a 1982 Sino-American joint communiqué.<br />

The election of President Bush provided Chen an opportunity<br />

<strong>to</strong> break through this barrier. In April 2001, Bush famously<br />

declared that he would do “whatever it takes” <strong>to</strong> defend the<br />

island, despite the absence of a formal security treaty, and<br />

approved a series of arms sales that by the summer of 2003<br />

would amount <strong>to</strong> $30 billion on the table. This flood of offers<br />

followed two decades during which Taipei had never<br />

processed a single purchase from the U.S. greater than $500<br />

and quickly blew bureaucratic circuits at Taiwan’s Ministry of<br />

National Defense, which found itself responsible for mountains<br />

of documentation on planning, programming, budgets<br />

and systems analysis.<br />

As Washing<strong>to</strong>n sent a slew of arms offers in Taiwan’s direc-<br />

CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN is a research associate in Asian studies at<br />

the American Enterprise Institute.<br />

tion, the ROC was undergoing fundamental reforms <strong>to</strong> the way<br />

its military did business and related <strong>to</strong> its civilian leadership.<br />

In 2002 and 2003, Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan<br />

(LY), adopted the National Defense Law and National Defense<br />

Organization Act, which former U.S. Defense Department official<br />

Mark S<strong>to</strong>kes has compared <strong>to</strong> being “equal <strong>to</strong> the U.S.<br />

National Defense Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of<br />

1986 combined.” These laws established firm civilian leadership<br />

over the military, creating an institution inside the<br />

Ministry of National Defense equivalent <strong>to</strong> Washing<strong>to</strong>n’s Office<br />

of the Secretary of Defense — a civilian organization <strong>to</strong> oversee<br />

almost every facet of Taiwan’s defense policy.<br />

While the newly reorganized bureaucracy was grappling<br />

with a previously unimaginable series of arms sales offers,<br />

Taiwan’s political leadership was also trying <strong>to</strong> find its own<br />

bearings. Just as the KMT found itself in the unaccus<strong>to</strong>med<br />

role of the political opposition, the Legislative Yuan was newly<br />

empowered <strong>to</strong> exercise oversight and budgetary control over<br />

the government. When the Chen government requested that<br />

the LY approve a single $18 billion “special budget” <strong>to</strong> pay for<br />

the procurement of submarines, P-3C maritime patrol aircraft<br />

and Patriot missile batteries, the KMT balked. The subsequent<br />

stalemate over defense spending has begun <strong>to</strong> undermine<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n’s confidence in Taipei’s commitment <strong>to</strong> its own<br />

defense.<br />

Although Taiwan’s military <strong>to</strong>o often feels it is caught in the<br />

crossfire among these many changes, it is nonetheless taking<br />

substantive <strong>steps</strong> <strong>to</strong>wardestablishing a <strong>force</strong> that can execute<br />

the types of offshore operations it has been charged with conducting.<br />

When I visited Taipei in May <strong>to</strong> observe the 23rd<br />

annual Han Kuang exercises, I saw these changes first-hand,<br />

as well as the major barriers that Taiwan’s military must yet<br />

overcome.<br />


Since 2000, Taiwan’s strategy of decisive offshore operations<br />

has served multiple goals. It has sought <strong>to</strong> remove Taiwan’s<br />

population and economic centers from the battlefield. It has<br />

shifted power away from the army, a service that many DPP<br />

leaders identified as being an anti-democratic element of the<br />

old regime and bolstered the relative prestige of the navy and<br />

air <strong>force</strong>. Most importantly, it is also a response <strong>to</strong> the “revolution<br />

in military affairs,” a shift in war fighting that has left relatively<br />

static, army-centric <strong>force</strong>s vulnerable <strong>to</strong> <strong>more</strong> integrated<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_032_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:39 AM Page 32<br />

Taiwan’s strategy of decisive offshore operations has served<br />

multiple goals.<br />

militaries with strong air and naval capabilities — the model<br />

that Beijing is pursuing <strong>to</strong>day.<br />

The problem that such operations pose is that they require<br />

a military reorganization that is time-consuming, expensive,<br />

and necessitates fundamental changes in personnel and command<br />

structures. The Chinese term for this task captures the<br />

concept neatly: xinxihua, which translates <strong>to</strong> the clumsy<br />

English term, “informationalization.” The centerpiece of the<br />

Taiwanese military’s effort <strong>to</strong> catch up with the challenge of<br />

informationalization is the Po Sheng (Broad Vic<strong>to</strong>ry) program,<br />

a $2.3 billion modernization effort launched in 2003 <strong>to</strong><br />

enhance the C4ISR capabilities of its military.<br />

The centrality of the Po Sheng program <strong>to</strong> Taiwan’s broader<br />

modernization effort is captured simply by the fact that for<br />

years, its aircraft and naval vessels could not <strong>effective</strong>ly communicate<br />

with one another, its soldiers depended upon cell<br />

phones <strong>more</strong> than radios, and its central military command,<br />

the Joint Operations Control Center (JOCC), could not moni<strong>to</strong>r<br />

military operations in real time. The net consequence of<br />

these deficiencies was that the goal of joint operations<br />

remained a dream: Without the means <strong>to</strong> share data and integrate<br />

command structures, the Taiwanese military services<br />

could not expect but <strong>to</strong> fight independently, implying a<br />

sequence of air, naval and land battles as each service met an<br />

invading <strong>force</strong> from the mainland.<br />

Although Taiwan’s C4ISR program is a work in progress, its<br />

successes so far were demonstrated by the structure of the<br />

April 16-20 Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted by the<br />

Taiwanese military as the first leg of the Han Kuang exercises.<br />

The CPX was an extensive, five-day war game that linked<br />

Taiwan’s various field headquarters <strong>to</strong> the JOCC, where game<br />

managers created a scenario that <strong>force</strong>d the military <strong>to</strong><br />

respond <strong>to</strong> a rapidly evolving crisis scenario through the joint<br />

employment of Taiwan’s military <strong>force</strong>s.<br />

The CPX posited a scenario set in 2012 in which mainland<br />

China launched a massive attack in response <strong>to</strong> Taipei’s intransigence<br />

<strong>to</strong>ward Beijing’s demands for unification talks. The<br />

scenario captured the principal concerns of Taiwan’s defense<br />

leadership <strong>to</strong>day.The mainland prefaced its assault with a<br />

massive missile barrage that destroyed much of the island’s<br />

infrastructure and military installations, and the two-week<br />

timeline of the hypothetical scenario represented Taipei’s fear<br />

that the mainland would attempt <strong>to</strong> execute an invasion<br />

before American <strong>force</strong>s could reach the theater.<br />

In the CPX scenario, mainland China employed a two-<br />

phased strategy in its assault on Taiwan. The first phase was an<br />

air war in which Beijing sought <strong>to</strong> destroy Taiwan’s air defenses<br />

and wreak havoc on the Taiwanese government. China has<br />

invested heavily in means <strong>to</strong> target Taiwan’s air defense in<br />

recent years, including its purchase of Israeli-made Harpy<br />

anti-radiation drones, which are designed <strong>to</strong> home in on and<br />

destroy the radiation emissions of air defense radars. Even<br />

where Taiwan’s radar systems are not vulnerable, it suffers<br />

from a notable lack of logistical support for its air defenses.<br />

Many surface-<strong>to</strong>-air missile (SAM) systems are outdated, and<br />

it can be difficult for Taipei <strong>to</strong> procure spare missiles from<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n.<br />

Over the initial days of combat, the CPX scenario predicted<br />

that the mainland would seek <strong>to</strong> exploit its suppression of<br />

Taiwanese air defenses <strong>to</strong> establish air superiority over the<br />

Taiwan Strait. China already possesses some 400 fourth-generation<br />

aircraft, comprising advanced Su-27, J-11 and Su-30<br />

fighters poised <strong>to</strong> attack Taiwan, and is investing <strong>to</strong> upgrade<br />

the rest of its air fleet by 2012. While ever <strong>more</strong> advanced<br />

Chinese aircraft patrol the skies, they will be supported from<br />

the ground by S-300PMU2 surface-<strong>to</strong>-air missile batteries,<br />

which will be able <strong>to</strong> strike any aircraft flying over Taiwan’s<br />

west coast.<br />

The final portion of China’s first-phase operations was the<br />

employment of its short- and medium-range ballistic missile<br />

batteries, as well as airstrikes and special operations <strong>force</strong>s, <strong>to</strong><br />

strike a wide array of civilian and military targets on the island.<br />

These attacks disrupted the government and <strong>force</strong>d Taiwan’s<br />

military <strong>to</strong> seek shelter in hardened bunkers. While these<br />

attacks occurred, the bulk of Taiwan’s military was sheltered on<br />

the east coast of the island, where PRC submarine <strong>force</strong>s were<br />

attempting <strong>to</strong> <strong>force</strong> a blockade on the movement of ships in<strong>to</strong><br />

and out of port. Although the CPX planners assumed that<br />

Taiwan would be bloodied in the opening phase of a war, they<br />

also argued that it would be possible <strong>to</strong> save the bulk of the<br />

<strong>force</strong>.<br />

In the second phase of the exercise, Chinese <strong>force</strong>s attempted<br />

a major amphibious landing on Taiwanese soil, forcing the<br />

ROC military <strong>to</strong> employ its decisive offshore battle concept in<br />

a joint naval-air interdiction of the amphibious <strong>force</strong>. Having<br />

assembled the bulk of its naval and air power on the east coast<br />

of Taiwan, the military had a single-shot opportunity <strong>to</strong> interdict<br />

and destroy the amphibious Chinese <strong>force</strong>. According <strong>to</strong><br />

CPX planners, the penultimate battle was so successful in the<br />

game that the red <strong>force</strong> had <strong>to</strong> be reconstituted for the follow-<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_032_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:39 AM Page 33<br />

A Taiwanese F-16 fighter takes off from a highway during the<br />

Han Kuang exercise in May.<br />

ing land battle. The stakes involved in this single battle were<br />

emphasized when Taiwan’s deputy chief of general staff for<br />

operations and planning <strong>to</strong>ld The Associated Press afterward<br />

that because of China’s superior submarines and jet fighters,<br />

“we would suffer great damage <strong>to</strong> our <strong>force</strong>.”<br />

The successful interdiction of the Chinese amphibious<br />

<strong>force</strong> was also a source of much controversy in Washing<strong>to</strong>n<br />

when Taiwanese briefers announced after the exercise that<br />

their military had employed a “tactical shore-based missile for<br />

fire suppression” <strong>to</strong> buy the striking <strong>force</strong> a window when<br />

China’s missile <strong>force</strong>s, radar stations and airfields would be<br />

temporarily crippled. This euphemism was widely interpreted<br />

<strong>to</strong> be a reference <strong>to</strong> the HsiungFeng-2E (HF-2E) land attack<br />

cruise missile that Taiwan reportedly has been developing for<br />

several years, and immediately prompted U.S. criticism.<br />

National Security Council official Dennis Wilder stated that<br />

“offensive capabilities on either side of the Strait are destabilizing<br />

and therefore not in the interest of peace and security,”<br />

and called on neither Taipei nor Beijing <strong>to</strong> develop ballistic or<br />

cruise missiles.<br />

Despite Washing<strong>to</strong>n’s criticism, Taipei will likely continue <strong>to</strong><br />

develop the HF-2E or similar systems that allow it <strong>to</strong> attack the<br />

Chinese mainland directly. According <strong>to</strong> the predictions of the<br />

CPX scenario, after all, the capability <strong>to</strong> strike China’s air<br />

SAM YEH, AFP<br />

defenses will be a central component <strong>to</strong> any interdiction of an<br />

amphibious <strong>force</strong> headed for Taiwan. More important,<br />

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense believes that the Han<br />

Kuang CPX exercise demonstrated that the offshore decisive<br />

battle strategy is the key <strong>to</strong> vic<strong>to</strong>ry if Beijing should attempt <strong>to</strong><br />

invade the island. But no plan survives contact with the<br />

enemy, and it remains <strong>to</strong> be seen whether Taiwan will develop<br />

the necessary capabilities for its actual <strong>force</strong>s <strong>to</strong> conduct the<br />

type of interdiction operation that was the key <strong>to</strong> the CPX scenario<br />

vic<strong>to</strong>ry.<br />


Even the most finely tuned strategy cannot succeed if the military<br />

is unprepared <strong>to</strong> execute it, and on May 15-18, the<br />

Taiwanese military conducted a series of field training exercises<br />

(FTX) <strong>to</strong> test the concepts developed in the April CPX simulation.<br />

The Han Kuang FTX is the island’s largest annual livefire<br />

exercise and is, indeed, one of the rare opportunities for<br />

Taiwan’s troops <strong>to</strong> use live fire in their training. The first, and<br />

most telegenic, exercise was the landing of pairs of fighter aircraft<br />

— F-16s, Mirage 2000s and Indigenous Defense Fighters<br />

(IDFs) — on a strip of Taiwan’s main highway near Taizhong<br />

on April 15 <strong>to</strong> demonstrate how the ROC Air Force would protect<br />

its aircraft even if its airfields were destroyed by Chinese<br />

missile and special operations <strong>force</strong>s attacks. The islandwide<br />

exercises soon expanded <strong>to</strong> include offshore defenses, engagements<br />

with mock paratroopers and preparations at bases on<br />

Taiwan’s east coast <strong>to</strong> break out of a blockade.<br />

The May 16 exercises at Suao Naval Base in Ilan County<br />

were one portion of these exercises, testing the type of interdiction<br />

battle that Taiwan is betting its vic<strong>to</strong>ry in a real conflict<br />

with the mainland. The Suao exercise involved some 2,163<br />

military personnel from the three services and was conducted<br />

as a series of missile launches at aircraft drones and ships from<br />

a combination of air, ground and sea-based platforms. The<br />

action involving Kidd-class destroyers occurred some 72 kilometers<br />

from the viewing stand but gradually ranged in<strong>to</strong> Suao<br />

Bay, where the majority of interceptions involved direct fires<br />

from AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, as well as a combination<br />

of F-16s, Mirage 2000s and IDFs.<br />

The beginning of the exercises was wholly successful, as a<br />

variety of naval platforms and all of the aircraft involved in the<br />

exercise destroyed their targets, but the exercise <strong>to</strong>ok a turn for<br />

the worse when the ROC Army’s missile corps repeatedly failed<br />

<strong>to</strong> strike targets with Hawk, Chaparral and Avenger missiles.<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_034_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:38 AM Page 34<br />

Taipei will likely continue <strong>to</strong> develop the HF-2E or similar systems<br />

that allow it <strong>to</strong> attack the Chinese mainland directly.<br />

The medium-range surface-<strong>to</strong>-air Hawk missile was tested relatively<br />

early in the exercise, but one of the missiles failed upon<br />

firing and crash-landed in<strong>to</strong> a cemetery before reaching the<br />

coast. The Chaparral, a ground-launched version of the air-<strong>to</strong>air<br />

Sidewinder missile, had a less spectacular failure when the<br />

first missile launched failed <strong>to</strong> hit its assigned target, necessitating<br />

a successful strike by a backup missile.<br />

The most unsatisfac<strong>to</strong>ry mark was posted by an Avenger<br />

missile system that failed <strong>to</strong> hit its target drone at all. Using a<br />

Humvee-launched version of the Stinger missile, the Avenger<br />

opera<strong>to</strong>rs tried twice <strong>to</strong> strike a relatively low and slowly flying<br />

drone target, failing on both attempts. The drone made its prescribed<br />

flight path over Suao Bay, turned and returned <strong>to</strong> the<br />

ocean, presumably having dropped its imaginary payload<br />

somewhere near the viewing stand.<br />

The failure of the missile strikes at Suao Bay is a reminder<br />

that if the Taiwanese government is going <strong>to</strong> fully implement a<br />

strategy of pushing future battles with China offshore, it must<br />

have the necessary military equipment <strong>to</strong> do so. The mixed<br />

fleet of fighter aircraft delivered over the 1990s is a useful start,<br />

and the Kidd-class destroyers are a major step forward for<br />

Taiwan’s navy, but the country still faces several major capability<br />

gaps.<br />

The first of these is the threat posed by China’s growing missile<br />

capabilities, which the Taiwanese Ministry of National<br />

Defense estimates has almost doubled since 2000 <strong>to</strong> nearly<br />

800 Dongfeng-11A and Dongfeng-15A short- and mediumrange<br />

missiles. In 2001, the U.S. and Taiwan agreed <strong>to</strong> a twotracked<br />

response <strong>to</strong> this missile threat. The first track emphasizes<br />

hardened C4ISR and other continuity of government<br />

measures <strong>to</strong> ensure that even a significant missile strike will<br />

not fundamentally cripple Taiwan. The second track was the<br />

combined upgrading of Taiwan’s existing Patriot missile<br />

launchers <strong>to</strong> Patriot Advance Capability 3 (PAC-3) batteries, as<br />

well as the purchase of six additional PAC-3 fire units.<br />

The PAC-3 offer was ultimately included in the “special<br />

budget” that Chen submitted <strong>to</strong> the LY in late 2003 and that<br />

included funding <strong>to</strong> develop a diesel-electric submarine program<br />

and purchase P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. The special<br />

budget stalled as the KMT-controlled legislature dug its heels<br />

in and focused instead on a bruising political fight with Chen<br />

through the 2004 election and beyond. Only in June did the LY<br />

pass a budget <strong>to</strong> cover the upgrade for its existing Patriot batteries,<br />

losing some four years on the procurement of a vital<br />

defensive system that can compliment such aging systems as<br />

the Hawk and Chaparral, which were phased out of the U.S.<br />

military in the 1990s.<br />

The passage of the 2007 defense budget also raised an additional<br />

procurement challenge as Taiwan looks at its mixed fleet<br />

of F-16s, Mirage 2000 and IDF aircraft. In June, the LY<br />

approved a $400 million budget <strong>to</strong> begin purchasing<br />

American-made F-16C/D aircraft, a significant upgrade on its<br />

existing air <strong>force</strong>s. Moreover, the added F-16s would complement<br />

the broader Po Sheng C4ISR effort, because it would<br />

increase the number of Taiwan’s fighters that are directly tied<br />

in<strong>to</strong> the JOCC’s operational picture through the Link-16 tactical<br />

data communications system.<br />

Despite these advantages of procuring the new aircraft,<br />

Taiwan’s request for new F-16 sales has been shunned by<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n in response <strong>to</strong> a brewing political fight over the<br />

country’s planned referendum on whether <strong>to</strong> apply <strong>to</strong> the<br />

U.N. under the name of “Taiwan,” instead of the constitutional<br />

title of “Republic of China.” In short, while the U.S. has<br />

accused Taiwan of treating defense spending as a domestic<br />

political football, it does the same when it tries <strong>to</strong> use the<br />

approval of sales as a stick or carrot in its management of<br />

cross-Strait relations.<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_034_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:38 AM Page 35<br />

Attempts <strong>to</strong> strike target drones with surface-<strong>to</strong>-air missiles<br />

were largely unsuccessful during Taiwan’s Han Kuang<br />

military exercise.<br />

Procurement will remain a litmus test of Taiwan’s ability <strong>to</strong><br />

implement its national defensive strategy. Continuing <strong>to</strong> build<br />

on the June 2007 budget is one way for Taiwan <strong>to</strong> make a <strong>more</strong><br />

credible demonstration in this regard, but even a wellequipped<br />

Taiwanese military will face significant obstacles <strong>to</strong><br />

achieving its maximum possible <strong>effective</strong>ness.<br />

When President Chen first arrived in office in April 2000, he<br />

inherited a military that was staffed with some 400,000 conscripts<br />

who served between two- and three-year terms based<br />

upon their military specialties. The troops perceived this system<br />

as unfair, unnecessary, and corrupt — a 2001 survey<br />

revealed that some 50 percent of enlisted men believed that if<br />

they had come from richer families, they could have avoided<br />

military service al<strong>to</strong>gether, while only 15 percent viewed conscription<br />

as vital <strong>to</strong> national survival. For Chen’s strategy of<br />

fighting Taiwan’s defense, conscription was inefficient, a drain<br />

on precious budgetary resources and a system that bolstered<br />

the army’s traditional domination among the military services.<br />

The Chen government decided <strong>to</strong> shift away from the<br />

SAM YEH, AFP<br />

expensive and inefficient manpower system by simultaneously<br />

dismantling the conscription system and investing in the<br />

development of an all-volunteer <strong>force</strong> (AVF). Overall troop<br />

numbers have fallen by <strong>more</strong> than 125,000 men, and conscription<br />

commitments have fallen precipi<strong>to</strong>usly in recent years <strong>to</strong><br />

only 12 months from 2008, but creating an AVF has proved<br />

<strong>more</strong> difficult. Volunteer recruitment began in 2004, but less<br />

than 30,000 soldiers have been recruited for service <strong>to</strong> date.<br />

The promised pay raises for volunteers have been difficult <strong>to</strong><br />

implement, and the military’s claims that it will have a <strong>force</strong><br />

that is 60 percent volunteer by 2008 is only possible by counting<br />

officers and NCOs who re-enlisted following the end of<br />

their conscription terms.<br />

The result of this process is that the enlistment durations of<br />

many Taiwanese soldiers, sailors and airmen has fallen in<br />

recent years, but there has been little increase in volunteer<br />

troops <strong>to</strong> fill the gap. As a result, Taiwan’s weapons systems will<br />

soon be manned by troops who only have two <strong>to</strong> three months<br />

of training before shipping out <strong>to</strong> serve their nine-month<br />

durations of service. The implications for Taiwan’s military<br />

preparedness were demonstrated at exercises I attended on<br />

May 17 at the Hukou army base in Hsinchu County, about<br />

50 kilometers southwest of Taipei.<br />

The Hukou exercise involved a simulated airborne invasion<br />

in which the red <strong>force</strong> troops captured a series of Taiwanese<br />

command posts, followed by a simulated blue <strong>force</strong> counterlanding<br />

and ar<strong>more</strong>d assault. Because of a combination of<br />

rainy weather and perhaps responding <strong>to</strong> a training accident<br />

the week before in which the crash of an F-5F Tiger II trainer<br />

killed a three Singaporean soldiers on the base, there were no<br />

actual airborne troop maneuvers (helicopters flew in and out<br />

without carrying any soldiers) or strikes by F-16 and IDF fighters<br />

that were supposed <strong>to</strong> be supporting the attack.<br />

The culmination of the Hukou exercise was a joint maneuver<br />

by M60A3 Pat<strong>to</strong>n tanks, CM21 Ar<strong>more</strong>d Personnel Carriers<br />

(APCs) and infantry troops <strong>to</strong> destroy targets and take objectives<br />

downrange from the observing stand. To some degree,<br />

the exercise reflected Taiwan’s military tradition of doing <strong>more</strong><br />

with less: the CM21 APCs were built indigenously by adapting<br />

the American-made M113 ar<strong>more</strong>d personnel carrier hull <strong>to</strong><br />

include a set of side gun hatches that permit the soldiers traveling<br />

inside <strong>to</strong> fire from the vehicle.<br />

But the Hukou exercise was also notable because the lines<br />

TAIWAN continued on Page 44<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_036_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:38 AM Page 36<br />


More soup, please<br />

COIN manual provides guidance for modern-day tactical commanders<br />

BY <strong>MAJ</strong>. CHRIS ROGERS<br />

I<br />

n his thought-provoking article “Eating soup with a spoon”<br />

[AFJ, September], Lt. Col. Gian Gentile argues that our current<br />

doctrine on counterinsurgency lacks the fundamental<br />

essence of war: fighting. The foundation of this claim rests on<br />

two paradoxes that appear in the first chapter of the manual<br />

and that he claims establish the theoretical<br />

framework for how the rest of the doctrine<br />

should be read.<br />

These two paradoxes do and should<br />

frame the thinking of the reader, but I disagree<br />

that this framework contains the<br />

reader; rather, it provides a framework<br />

upon which the tactical commander can<br />

and should build.<br />

The paradoxes that Gentile references —<br />

“tactical successes guarantee nothing” and<br />

“the <strong>more</strong> you protect yourself, the less<br />

secure you are” — have both, in my experience<br />

serving in a combined arms battalion<br />

in Baghdad for the past year, been borne<br />

out <strong>to</strong> be absolutely true. What is interesting<br />

is that they are both true for counterinsurgency<br />

operations and also for conventional<br />

warfare. Narrowing the scope of the<br />

application of the paradoxes gives insufficient<br />

credit <strong>to</strong> our tactical commanders and<br />

senior leaders in their individual and combined<br />

abilities <strong>to</strong> understand our doctrinal framework and apply it in<br />

an ambiguous, complex and lethal environment. After <strong>more</strong><br />

than a year in western Baghdad, I’ve observed that there still<br />

exists — despite the paradoxes — plenty of fight left in our<br />

doctrine and in our Army.<br />

In the case of “tactical success guarantees nothing,” the idea<br />

is presented that the tactical commander interprets this paradox<br />

as “tactics, in and of themselves, just are not that important.”<br />

Nothing could be further from the truth. Tactics are the<br />

fundamental building blocks of all military action — they are,<br />

as defined by doctrine, the employment of units in combat. If<br />

they were not important, we would, by extension, have no use<br />

for military <strong>force</strong>s.<br />

<strong>MAJ</strong>. CHRIS ROGERS has served in light infantry, mechanized infantry<br />

and combined arms battalions through his 15-year Army career. During<br />

the past 12 months in Baghdad, he served first as the operations officer<br />

and now as the executive officer of 1-5 Cavalry.<br />

The tactical commander and student of our profession who<br />

applies the construct of operational design knows that tactical<br />

successes must be linked <strong>to</strong> strategic goals — which, according<br />

<strong>to</strong> the very theorist whom Gentile quotes — are crucial <strong>to</strong><br />

achieving the desired political outcome. The apparent paradox<br />

that “tactical success guarantees nothing”<br />

simply means that tactical success may not<br />

achieve the outcome our strategic planners<br />

and policymakers had envisioned. I believe<br />

his<strong>to</strong>ry clearly bears out that in every war<br />

that has produced both a winner and a<br />

loser, the losing side has had <strong>to</strong> accept the<br />

fact that its tactics — no matter how <strong>effective</strong><br />

or successful at any given time — ultimately<br />

did not guarantee vic<strong>to</strong>ry.<br />

The salient point from this paradox is<br />

not that tactics mean nothing — it is that<br />

tactics must be employed as part of a larger<br />

design aimed at achieving strategic<br />

goals. Something close <strong>to</strong> this thought is<br />

offered when the article states that the tactical<br />

commander “comes away thinking<br />

that he has <strong>to</strong> move beyond tactics, he<br />

can’t just focus on raids, he can’t just focus<br />

on killing the enemy, because just doing<br />

those things and not the other important<br />

operations in COIN means he will ultimately<br />

fail.” Absolutely, he will most likely fail, but employing “the<br />

other important operations in COIN” are still tactical — they<br />

are just not kinetic and offensive and about killing. In short,<br />

tactics are not merely limited <strong>to</strong> killing the enemy. What<br />

becomes the crux of this argument is how “tactics” are defined<br />

or, <strong>more</strong> precisely, which definition is chosen.<br />

According <strong>to</strong> FM 1-02, “Operational Terms and Graphics,”<br />

there are two similar definitions for the word “tactics” — one<br />

provided by the Army, the other by the Defense Department.<br />

The Army defines tactics as “The employment of units in combat.<br />

It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of<br />

units in relation <strong>to</strong> each other, the terrain and the enemy in<br />

order <strong>to</strong> translate potential combat power in<strong>to</strong> vic<strong>to</strong>rious battles<br />

and engagements.”<br />

This definition is clearly rooted in the era of <strong>force</strong>-on-<strong>force</strong>,<br />

conventional battle. That does not make it bad, by any stretch<br />

— but it is either incomplete or <strong>to</strong>o complete <strong>to</strong> the point of<br />

being restrictive. By being incomplete, I believe that the sec-<br />



0107_AFJ_DOM_00_036_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:38 AM Page 37<br />

ond half of the definition, beginning with the phrase “It<br />

includes,” should continue with the often-assumed extension<br />

“but is not limited <strong>to</strong>.” This logical extension would not limit<br />

the thinking, imagination or employment of combat <strong>force</strong>s by<br />

the tactical commander. However, it would allow that commander<br />

<strong>to</strong> build upon the theoretical framework rather than<br />

letting the doctrinal definition box him in.<br />

The Defense Department definition is similar,<br />

yet less restrictive (because it is less complete) in<br />

that the purpose is not related <strong>to</strong> “vic<strong>to</strong>rious battles<br />

and engagements” but instead focuses on<br />

achieving potential. It defines tactics as “the<br />

employment of units in combat, and the ordered<br />

arrangement and maneuver of units in relation<br />

<strong>to</strong> each other and/or <strong>to</strong> the enemy in order <strong>to</strong><br />

use their full potentialities.” This definition —<br />

focusing on potential — does not impose restrictions,<br />

either written or assumed, on tactical commanders, but<br />

allows them the flexibility <strong>to</strong> employ their <strong>force</strong>s <strong>to</strong> achieve<br />

objectives across a full range of possibilities.<br />

The definitions essentially say the same thing, but the<br />

choice of the words used in each definition <strong>force</strong>s the tactical<br />

commander <strong>to</strong> make interpretations about their functionality.<br />

The lieutenant and lieutenant colonel who, no matter what<br />

the analysis of the environment and enemy situation reveals,<br />

come <strong>to</strong> focus solely on raids and killing the enemy are the<br />

officers who subscribe <strong>to</strong> the definition that tactics must be<br />

limited <strong>to</strong> battles and engagements. These officers have no<br />

place in counterinsurgency warfare. Lieutenants and lieutenant<br />

colonels who choose <strong>to</strong> focus on the potential of their<br />

unit across a full spectrum of capabilities presume that tactical<br />

units are capable of much <strong>more</strong> than killing the enemy — in<br />

fact, they may be capable of “the other important operations<br />

in COIN.”<br />

This confusion between the application of these two interpretations<br />

of tactics is highlighted by a meeting between<br />

opposing commanders in the years following the Vietnam War:<br />

the now highly publicized return of Army Col. Harry Summers<br />

<strong>to</strong> Hanoi in 1975. While meeting with his North Vietnamese<br />

counterpart, a Col. Tu, he proclaimed, “You know, you never<br />

defeated us on the battlefield.” Tu responded, “That may be so,<br />

but it is also irrelevant.”<br />

The U.S. may have been better at killing the Viet Cong and<br />

the North Vietnamese Army, but that didn’t matter — they<br />

were not better at employing their <strong>force</strong>s in a manner that<br />

Author’s<br />

response<br />

Lt. Col. Gian<br />

Gentile continues<br />

the debate.<br />

See Page 39.<br />

made a difference. Their tactics did not lead <strong>to</strong> strategic effects<br />

— they appeared successful because they were killing the<br />

enemy by the bushel — but in truth, they were in<strong>effective</strong><br />

because the killing did not lead <strong>to</strong> achieving strategic aims that<br />

resulted in the desired political outcome.<br />

The modern-day Army has taught us that at the tactical<br />

level, planning horizons were short. They were<br />

short because we applied the restrictive defini-<br />

tion of tactics. We planned, trained and<br />

employed our <strong>force</strong>s almost exclusively in battles<br />

and engagements. We spent months preparing<br />

for National Training Center rotations and drilled<br />

our staffs on how <strong>to</strong> plan <strong>more</strong> quickly — how <strong>to</strong><br />

shorten the process <strong>to</strong> be able <strong>to</strong> employ our<br />

<strong>force</strong>s in the shortest amount of time possible. In<br />

the counterinsurgency in Iraq, that world is gone;<br />

our planning horizons, in many cases, extend<br />

well beyond a battalion’s time in country. We do not plan battles<br />

and engagements, we are <strong>force</strong>d <strong>to</strong> plan the employment<br />

of our <strong>force</strong>s across a broader range of options over a longer<br />

period of time — we employ tactics across multiple lines of<br />

operation. It is not always kinetic, it is not always killing, but it<br />

is still tactics.<br />

One of the lines of operation that, when kinetic fighting is<br />

most prevalent, tends <strong>to</strong> draw the most attention is that of<br />

“security.” The point of security operations in counterinsurgency,<br />

however, is not that they should focus inward — at our<br />

own soldiers — but outward <strong>to</strong>ward the populace that we are<br />

trying <strong>to</strong> influence. It is not a matter of where we sit, where we<br />

stand or even where we sleep at night, but rather it is about<br />

how we employ our <strong>force</strong>s (remember that phrase, our tactics)<br />

and on what or whom they focus. Put simply, the emphasis is<br />

on a group of people other than ourselves. In a counterinsurgency,<br />

the people are, most often, the objective — much like in<br />

conventional operations, terrain or the enemy is the<br />

objective.In the example that Gentile provides, it is possible <strong>to</strong><br />

illustrate an important point about how and where we focus<br />

our efforts <strong>to</strong> achieve a desired outcome. Col. Joshua<br />

Chamberlain at the battle of Little Round Top was defending a<br />

piece of terrain that protected the entire flank of the Union<br />

Army. While he was concerned for the security of his <strong>force</strong>s,<br />

and he placed them on that hill <strong>to</strong> afford them maximum protection,<br />

he unders<strong>to</strong>od that his ultimate objective was not the<br />

protection of his men, but the protection of the Union Army<br />

by way of that decisive piece of terrain. After fighting off sever-<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_038_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:38 AM Page 38<br />


al waves of infantrymen from a<strong>to</strong>p the hill, he was faced with<br />

the dilemma of how best <strong>to</strong> deny that terrain <strong>to</strong> the enemy<br />

with limited resources. He chose <strong>to</strong> leave the hill — and the<br />

protection it afforded — <strong>to</strong> do the only remaining thing that<br />

could ultimately protect the Union Army. We all remember the<br />

call <strong>to</strong> “fix bayonets” in the theatrical representation of that<br />

battle, just before Chamberlain led his men <strong>to</strong> charge down<br />

the hill <strong>to</strong> a resounding tactical vic<strong>to</strong>ry. It was not a dogmatic<br />

application of a method — it was a focusing of his combat<br />

power at the right time, at the right place, at the right objective,<br />

with both his mission and his men in mind.<br />

While serving in western Baghdad, our battalion<br />

has, as have many others, simultaneous-<br />

ly operated from both the relatively austere<br />

combat outposts and the relatively plush forward<br />

operating bases, such as Camp Liberty.<br />

We have focused, at the right time and place,<br />

on the population, while still providing adequate<br />

protection for our soldiers. It has been<br />

neither dogmatic nor has it resulted in<br />

supreme tactical vulnerability. On the contrary,<br />

it has, as can be seen all across Baghdad these<br />

days, resulted in the tactical defeat of al-Qaida<br />

in Iraq, a call from Muqtada al-Sadr <strong>to</strong> cease<br />

direct action against coalition <strong>force</strong>s, and a<br />

period during which <strong>to</strong>tal attacks against coalition<br />

<strong>force</strong>s, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Iraqi<br />

civilians have reached a two-year low in<br />

Baghdad and across all of Iraq. In the village of<br />

Amariyah, where my battalion operates, we<br />

have not seen an improvised explosive device<br />

or an attack on American soldiers or ISF for<br />

nearly three months. This has allowed us <strong>to</strong><br />

focus our tactics on other lines of operation — the “other<br />

important operations in COIN.” This focus has subsequently<br />

resulted in economic growth, re-opening scores of local businesses,<br />

the formation of a functional local council, and has<br />

allowed essential services — headed by the Belidiyah, which is<br />

predominately Shiite — <strong>to</strong> return <strong>to</strong> the streets of this Sunnidominated<br />

community and begin removing trash and res<strong>to</strong>ring<br />

electrical power.<br />

This current state in Amariyah does not mean we have not<br />

made mistakes; we have made plenty. Nor does it mean that<br />

the use of combat outposts that resulted from the surge of<br />

available combat power is the sole reason for this significant<br />

In some cases,<br />

<strong>to</strong> achieve the<br />

strategic<br />

objectives and<br />

the desired<br />

political<br />

outcome, our<br />

tactics must<br />

not be “blunt<br />

and violent<br />

and dirty.”<br />

decline in enemy actions. There were many other fac<strong>to</strong>rs in<br />

this complex interaction between friendly and enemy <strong>force</strong>s<br />

— such as the employment of local volunteer <strong>force</strong>s, the establishment<br />

of safe neighborhoods, and the <strong>effective</strong> coordination<br />

between conventional and special operating <strong>force</strong>s — that<br />

ultimately worked in concert with the combat outposts <strong>to</strong><br />

achieve an overwhelming effect on the enemy’s capabilities.<br />

Finally, it does not mean that Gentile made mistakes or did<br />

not achievetactical successes during his <strong>to</strong>ur in western<br />

Baghdad — I have seen first-hand the results of many of his<br />

successes. What it does mean, however, is that as a battalion —<br />

and as an Army — we have learned from both<br />

our successes and our failures how <strong>to</strong> apply our<br />

doctrine according <strong>to</strong> the circumstances in<br />

which we find ourselves.<br />

Fighting has not left the ranks of the Army —<br />

on the contrary, we have come <strong>to</strong> realize that<br />

fighting encompasses an even greater range of<br />

options available <strong>to</strong> the tactical commander.<br />

We have learned that we may fight the enemy<br />

not only by killing him, but also by denying<br />

him the very comforts of his own protection —<br />

the ability <strong>to</strong> hide amongst the local populace.<br />

We fight him with bullets when he presents<br />

himself, or we root him out with intelligence<br />

derived from our own <strong>force</strong>s — or, better yet,<br />

from intelligence provided by the local populace<br />

— and we fight him with services, money<br />

and information. In the complexities of winning<br />

the peace, these are all necessary <strong>to</strong>ols in<br />

fighting counterinsurgency warfare.<br />

We who grew up in the Army knowing<br />

Vietnam only from the his<strong>to</strong>ry books may long<br />

for the good old days of <strong>force</strong>-on-<strong>force</strong> battles and an enemy<br />

who will stand and fight. But the reality is that we have <strong>to</strong> fight<br />

the war we are in. In some cases, <strong>to</strong> achieve the strategic<br />

objectives and the desired political outcome, our tactics must<br />

not be “blunt and violent and dirty.”<br />

The fight has not left our doctrine, it has not left our Army,<br />

and it has most certainly not left our soldiers — it has simply<br />

grown and adapted <strong>to</strong> the circumstances of our environment.<br />

Our tactical commanders and senior leaders have used our<br />

doctrine the way it was intended, as a guide for employing<br />

U.S. <strong>force</strong>s under varying, difficult and often nonviolent circumstances<br />

in a vague and complex environment. AFJ<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_038_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:38 AM Page 39<br />

Our COIN doctrine removes the enemy from the essence of war<br />


T<br />

he centerpiece of the Army’s operational doctrine is no<br />

longer FM 3-0, “Operations,” it is FM 3-24, “Counterinsurgency.”<br />

The full implications of this shift are, as<br />

yet, unknown, but the conventional wisdom that the era of<br />

battles and wars of decision — as Clausewitz described them<br />

in “On War” — is a thing of the past seems <strong>to</strong> have prevailed.<br />

For the moment, the application of counterinsurgency<br />

practices embodied in FM 3-24 are being <strong>to</strong>uted as bringing<br />

about substantial security progress during the “surge.”<br />

However, we may be misreading or seeing <strong>to</strong>o much in the<br />

events of the past few months in Iraq, and building a counterinsurgency-only<br />

Army that puts our ability <strong>to</strong> address non-<br />

COIN contingencies at risk. Maj. Chris Rogers raises important<br />

points that deserve serious consideration.<br />

From 1976-1982, <strong>more</strong> than 110 articles written for military<br />

magazines and journals fundamentally questioned the emerging<br />

operational doctrine that would become known as AirLand<br />

Battle. Today, however, by my count, there have been no <strong>more</strong><br />

than five or six articles over the past three years that deeply challenge<br />

FM 3-24 (including its early drafts) and the fact that it has<br />

become our Army’s overall operational doctrine.<br />

My basic argument in “Eating soup with a spoon” was that<br />

the theoretical premise of the manual embodied in Chapter<br />

One’s various paradoxes,specifically two emblematic ones,<br />

removed the essence of war — fighting — from its pages. This<br />

was largely an impressionistic view of the manual based on<br />

my personal experience in western Baghdad as a tactical battalion<br />

commander in 2006. Rogers has a different impression<br />

of the manual based on his experience in Baghdad in 2007. He<br />

claims that I argued that a fighting spirit has left our Army and<br />

our soldiers,which I absolutely did not and never would do.<br />

However, his critique of my article does present the popular<br />

case for focusing narrowly on counterinsurgency <strong>to</strong> the point<br />

where, I fear, it may cloud our ability <strong>to</strong> see things as they actually<br />

are and then devise plans and military policy for a future that may<br />

not exist. It is as if our COIN doctrine, with all of its seductive simplicity,<br />

operates like a secret recipe: “do this, and then this, and at<br />

the right moment add this and ... you win,” as scholar Michael<br />

Vlahos shrewdly noted in a recent issue of Military Review.<br />

The belief that COIN doctrine and its application in places<br />

LT. COL. GIAN GENTILE commanded 8-10 Cavalry ar<strong>more</strong>d reconnaissance<br />

squadron for three years until his posting last year <strong>to</strong> the U.S.<br />

Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. He commanded his squadron during<br />

a deployment <strong>to</strong> western Baghdad in 2006.<br />

such as Baghdad has reduced levels of violence since last summer<br />

is widespread and, <strong>to</strong> be sure, it has played a role. Still, a<br />

number of other fac<strong>to</strong>rs in a complex country such as Iraq<br />

with a population of 25 million, including the decision <strong>to</strong> ally<br />

with our former enemies (e.g., the non-al-Qaida Sunni insurgents),<br />

the pause in activities by Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al<br />

Mahdi, and the separation of rival factions in Baghdad stemming<br />

from sectarian cleansing in 2006-2007, have all arguably<br />

played an even bigger role. Our leaders and soldiers have<br />

seized these opportunities — embracing FM 3-24’s mantra <strong>to</strong><br />

“learn and adapt” — but, in the absence of these other emerging<br />

conditions, levels of violence very likely would have<br />

remained high or even higher in the face of additional troops<br />

and new counterinsurgency methods.<br />

Yet, the predisposition <strong>to</strong> focus exclusively on ourselves and<br />

our doctrine leads us potentially <strong>to</strong> violate the guidance of one<br />

of the oldest philosophers of war, Sun Tzu, <strong>to</strong> know oneself and<br />

the enemy and the environment, <strong>to</strong>o. Our doctrine directs us <strong>to</strong><br />

believe that in a counterinsurgency war, the people are the center<br />

of gravity. In this theory, the enemy is removed from the<br />

essence of war and placed at the fringes. Then, within this socalled<br />

war devoid of an enemy, applied scientific processes align<br />

the people <strong>to</strong> their government. Because the enemy is removed<br />

as the central element in war, the element of friction in war is<br />

gone, <strong>to</strong>o. With the recent lowering of violence in Iraq, we<br />

assume that counterinsurgency doctrine applied by competent<br />

military outfits has reduced and almost removed the enemy<br />

from the equation in Baghdad. It is very possible, however, that<br />

the enemy has removed himself temporarily and is waiting for<br />

the opportunity <strong>to</strong> renew the fight when he feels ready.<br />

This is obviously an explanation that many in and out of<br />

uniform will not want <strong>to</strong> hear because it appears <strong>to</strong> downplay<br />

our sacrifices in blood and treasure and the practical effects of<br />

applied counterinsurgency doctrine in Baghdad. But it is,<br />

nonetheless, an explanation that must not be disregarded. It<br />

needs <strong>to</strong> be considered in a measured way as we look <strong>to</strong> future<br />

policy in Iraq, as well as the Army’s ability <strong>to</strong> carry out COIN<br />

and non-COIN operations elsewhere.<br />

In a conflict such as the one in Iraq, there is no certainty. As<br />

George<strong>to</strong>wn University scholar Colin Kahl warns in his recent<br />

review of FM 3-24, overconfidence in ourselves and in the manual’s<br />

validity may tempt us, and others, <strong>to</strong> take us down this<br />

road <strong>more</strong> often in the future. There might be certain roads,<br />

however, on which we should not be traveling, even if we have<br />

plenty of soup <strong>to</strong> eat for sustenance and cocksureness. AFJ<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_040_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:37 AM Page 40<br />


A question of faith<br />

Religious bias and coercion undermine military leadership and trust<br />


C<br />

ompetent leadership is fundamental <strong>to</strong> military <strong>effective</strong>ness.<br />

Although there are countless definitions of<br />

leadership, the simple truth is that leadership is merely<br />

influencing others <strong>to</strong> act in concert <strong>to</strong>ward achieving a goal<br />

that they might not have achieved on their own. The art of<br />

leadership speaks <strong>to</strong> a leader’s ability <strong>to</strong> appropriately influence<br />

subordinate behavior in a given situation. To do so, leaders<br />

can invoke several forms power: legitimate, reward, coercive,<br />

expert and referent.<br />

Although there is a time and place for<br />

rewards, punishment and a rank-based system<br />

for giving orders, the most <strong>effective</strong><br />

units are traditionally those with leaders<br />

who rely less on sticks and carrots and <strong>more</strong><br />

on the transformational aspects of leadership.<br />

When leaders rely on expert and referent<br />

power <strong>to</strong> influence subordinate behavior,<br />

research indicates that their units exhibit<br />

greater levels of morale and cohesion<br />

leading <strong>to</strong> increased levels of mutual trust.<br />

Leaders who possess knowledge viewed<br />

<strong>to</strong> be relevant and valued by others have<br />

license <strong>to</strong> exercise power over others who<br />

yield <strong>to</strong> their expertise. One of the <strong>more</strong><br />

recent and impassioned calls for increased<br />

expertise within the ranks of senior leadership<br />

was put forth by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling<br />

on these pages [“A Failure in Generalship,”<br />

May]. Regardless of whether one agrees<br />

with his claims, it is hard <strong>to</strong> contest his basic premise that<br />

expertise matters greatly in a prescriptive approach <strong>to</strong> positively<br />

influencing follower behavior <strong>to</strong> achieve a common goal.<br />

But even <strong>more</strong> so than expert power, it is likely that referent<br />

power has the greatest potential for developing the necessary<br />

dependent relationship between a leader and his followers.<br />

Referent power is the cornucopia of values, expectations,<br />

training, education and life experience that is attractive <strong>to</strong> followers.<br />

To the extent that a follower places value on a particu-<br />

BARRY S. FAGIN is a professor at the Air Force Academy.<br />

LT. COL. JAMES E. PARCO is associate professor, Department of<br />

Strategy and Leadership, at the Air Force Air Command and Staff<br />

College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. The views expressed in this article<br />

are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force,<br />

the Defense Department or the U.S. government.<br />

lar leader because of who the leader is, the leader has referent<br />

power over the follower. To influence followers, leaders have<br />

only their knowledge and intuition on which <strong>to</strong> rely <strong>to</strong> guide<br />

them — both largely determined by their education and life<br />

experiences. When encountering a situation in which the<br />

leader has neither training nor experience, he tends <strong>to</strong> rely on<br />

his value system — those ideals from which his beliefs and<br />

actions flow. In many cases, these values are manifest in the<br />

type of individual whom the armed services<br />

attracts and are consistent with the core<br />

values of the various military institutions.<br />

We refer <strong>to</strong> the internalization of these<br />

values as character. Most would agree that<br />

character is paramount <strong>to</strong> the military<br />

leader. Men and women of high character<br />

have an advantage because followers typically<br />

respect those with high levels of character<br />

<strong>more</strong> so than those without. In terms<br />

of referent power, those with strong character<br />

often have <strong>more</strong> referent power over followers<br />

compared with those perceived <strong>to</strong><br />

have lesser character, especially in organizations<br />

where culture revolves around articulated<br />

core values. It is important <strong>to</strong> note that<br />

it is not so much the actual measurable difference<br />

in comparing the character of different<br />

leaders but rather the follower’s perception<br />

of what sound character is within<br />

context of the organizational culture.<br />

If having the right values yields high referent power <strong>to</strong> an<br />

individual, then we could conclude that if he is properly<br />

trained and competent (sufficient expert power) for the position<br />

of responsibility <strong>to</strong> which he is assigned (level of legitimate<br />

power), he has the potential <strong>to</strong> positively influence subordinate<br />

behavior. To the extent that he can build trust within<br />

his unit, he is poised <strong>to</strong> be an <strong>effective</strong> leader. But it also is<br />

important <strong>to</strong> note that referent power isn’t a possession <strong>to</strong> be<br />

obtained by a leader, but rather a dependency created by the<br />

follower. This is a monumental aspect for <strong>effective</strong> leaders <strong>to</strong><br />

comprehend because of the great responsibility they have <strong>to</strong><br />

satisfy the dependency in an appropriate fashion. The successful<br />

leader will note what behaviors are appropriate and<br />

inappropriate in terms of their organizational — and<br />

constitutional — responsibilities as leaders.<br />

So why do otherwise <strong>effective</strong> leaders fail? In the most ambigu-<br />



0107_AFJ_DOM_00_040_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:37 AM Page 41<br />

ous of situations, it is an individual’s character that informs her of<br />

how <strong>to</strong> behave in the course of influencing others. Particularly in<br />

situations that have ethical dimensions, possessing the “right values”<br />

and “right character” is of extreme importance so leaders<br />

may rely on “good judgment” at critical moments. In times of<br />

great crisis, it is unlikely that leaders will have had specific training<br />

on what course of action <strong>to</strong> take — particularly in the presence of<br />

ambiguity or when facing ethical dilemmas. It is at such times<br />

that leaders rely on their character and values<br />

<strong>to</strong> make the decisions they believe <strong>to</strong> be best.<br />

But from what are an individual’s ethical values<br />

derived? Again, education and experience;<br />

and for many, this is where religious<br />

training might enter the fray. Sometimes the<br />

best-intentioned people invoke behaviors<br />

based on tenets of their religion, even if<br />

unknowingly, because they fundamentally<br />

believe them <strong>to</strong> be the best course of action.<br />

A classic example emerged during the<br />

late 1990s and early 2000s, when the Air<br />

Force Academy was working through a multitude<br />

of sexual harassment issues. Some<br />

argued that the genesis of the problems was<br />

a “failure of leadership,” and others claimed<br />

it was because the academy had lost sight<br />

of its values. Not long afterward, the “Bring<br />

Me Men” ramp was changed <strong>to</strong> the “Core Values” ramp and<br />

new leaders were inserted <strong>to</strong> bring the institution through the<br />

dark period by reinstating its values. From a power perspective,<br />

the institution placed importance on the need for its leaders<br />

<strong>to</strong> have relevant expertise and strong character <strong>to</strong> correct<br />

the issues at hand. More than anything, the institution needed<br />

a leader — an exemplar — with tremendous referent power <strong>to</strong><br />

turn the tide and rebuild the trust within the organization. By<br />

bringing in commanders and staff who were regarded as<br />

exceptionally moral, the organizational climate that was<br />

claimed <strong>to</strong> be responsible for the sexual harassment scandals<br />

was “fixed,” but it was then replaced with another<br />

organizational climate that turned out <strong>to</strong> be conducive <strong>to</strong> religious<br />

in<strong>to</strong>lerance.<br />


Well-meaning people doing what they believed was best<br />

“fixed” sexual harassment at the cost of creating an entirely<br />

new problem. This was no <strong>more</strong> a “failure of leadership” than<br />

Well-meaning<br />

people doing what<br />

they believed was<br />

best “fixed” sexual<br />

harassment at the<br />

cost of creating an<br />

entirely new<br />

problem: religious<br />

in<strong>to</strong>lerance.<br />

a brick is guilty of sinking. The real failure was likely not having<br />

sufficient organizational structures in place <strong>to</strong> preserve the<br />

wide-reaching expertise needed <strong>to</strong> collectively navigate the<br />

institution through its <strong>more</strong> challenging periods. As organizational<br />

expertise waned in light of excessive personnel turnover,<br />

the stress on the institution became <strong>to</strong>o much <strong>to</strong> withstand.<br />

Not only did it become evident that policies, procedures and<br />

training were lacking, but <strong>more</strong> disturbingly, few individuals in<br />

the organization who could have directed<br />

and helped manage the change remained<br />

at the institution <strong>to</strong> recognize the deficiencies<br />

and make pre-emptive course corrections.<br />

Absent the sufficient relevant expertise,<br />

many leaders relied on their character<br />

<strong>to</strong> gain the trust and respect of their followers,<br />

while also doing what they could <strong>to</strong><br />

strengthen the character of their followers.<br />

Whether intentional or not, a climate conducive<br />

<strong>to</strong> religious proselytization emerged.<br />

Such examples are neither unique nor<br />

confined <strong>to</strong> the Air Force Academy or even<br />

the Air Force at large. Over the past several<br />

years, the popular press has reported on<br />

<strong>more</strong> than one general officer who has<br />

articulated his value system in a way that<br />

has created controversy. Appearing in uniform<br />

and speaking before a religious group in 2003, Army Lt.<br />

Gen. William Boykin claimed that Islamic extremists hated the<br />

U.S. because “we’re a Christian nation, because our foundation<br />

and our roots are Judeo-Christians ... and the enemy is a<br />

guy named Satan.” Upon investigation, it was revealed that<br />

these weren’t flippant comments made out of context.<br />

Ten years earlier, the record showed that Boykin <strong>to</strong>ld an<br />

audience about a particular Army battle against a Muslim warlord<br />

in Somalia: “I knew my God was bigger than his. I knew<br />

that my God was a real God and his was an idol.” Last summer,<br />

the Defense Department Inspec<strong>to</strong>r General’s Office released a<br />

report finding that seven officers, including four generals,<br />

engaged in misconduct by allowing an evangelical Christian<br />

group <strong>to</strong> come in<strong>to</strong> their Pentagon offices and film them in<br />

uniform using their official titles <strong>to</strong> bear witness <strong>to</strong> Jesus<br />

Christ. Clearly, the issue at hand is what the criteria should be<br />

for superiors who wish <strong>to</strong> expand their referent power <strong>to</strong> satisfy<br />

the dependencies created in their followers, particularly<br />

when one’s personal religious beliefs come in<strong>to</strong> play.<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_042_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:37 AM Page 42<br />


In the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison<br />

manifested in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom in<br />

1786, which formed the basis of the First Amendment of the<br />

Constitution, two things are clear. First, they anticipated the<br />

tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the<br />

Establishment Clause. The passionate and intense debate with<br />

regard <strong>to</strong> government’s role in religion (and vice versa) that was<br />

evidently common in their day is relatively unchanged <strong>more</strong><br />

than two centuries later. And second, they apparently<br />

unders<strong>to</strong>od the need <strong>to</strong> frame the church-state debate in the<br />

simplest terms: There should “be a high wall” between the two.<br />

Both men recognized that our individual civil rights should<br />

have no dependence on our religious opinions any <strong>more</strong> than<br />

our opinions in chemistry or calculus. In Jefferson’s words,<br />

“believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely<br />

between man and his God, that he owes account <strong>to</strong> none other<br />

for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government<br />

reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with<br />

sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which<br />

declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an<br />

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,<br />

thus building a wall of separation between church and State.”<br />

Similarly, James Madison believed that “an alliance or coalition”<br />

between government and religion “cannot be <strong>to</strong>o carefully<br />

guarded against.” “Every new and successful example therefore<br />

of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters<br />

is of importance,” he wrote. “Religion and government will<br />

both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed <strong>to</strong>gether.”<br />

The his<strong>to</strong>ry books and legal archives are replete with supporting<br />

facts and court decisions, but the message is the same<br />

as Jefferson and Madison intended. The two shouldn’t mix, but<br />

when they do, beware.<br />

Thus, the criteria for what a leader can and cannot do in<br />

terms of advocating religious beliefs in the capacity of his official<br />

position seems fairly clear. This is why every officer of the<br />

U.S. armed <strong>force</strong>s takes a single oath of allegiance <strong>to</strong> one<br />

thing: not <strong>to</strong> the president or <strong>to</strong> the nation generally, but <strong>to</strong> the<br />

U.S. Constitution. The liberty and freedoms for which our<br />

forefathers fought so valiantly depend on its survival and<br />

en<strong>force</strong>ment. However, as illustrated by the popular press s<strong>to</strong>ries<br />

alleging “religious misconduct” by senior leaders, it is clear<br />

that some individual leaders genuinely face a dilemma<br />

between upholding their constitutional oath and adhering <strong>to</strong><br />

the mandates of their religious faith tradition.<br />

This dilemma can probably be best unders<strong>to</strong>od by consid-<br />

ering the unique challenges that evangelical faith traditions<br />

face in a military environment. On the one hand, members of<br />

the military live with the fact that they could be asked <strong>to</strong> surrender<br />

their lives at any moment. Those who see combat face<br />

life-and-death issues on a regular basis and are <strong>force</strong>d <strong>to</strong> grapple<br />

with the fundamental questions of existence in a way those<br />

they protect likely will never face.<br />

This means that for many, if not most, in the military,<br />

religion is part and parcel of their original decision <strong>to</strong> serve,<br />

their loyalty <strong>to</strong> country and family, and their source of strength<br />

in times of great stress. Although patriotism and loyalty <strong>to</strong> the<br />

Constitution are the only common requirements for military<br />

service, it’s unrealistic <strong>to</strong> expect the spiritual beliefs of soldiers<br />

<strong>to</strong> vanish once they put on a uniform. Indeed, the explicit<br />

en<strong>force</strong>ment of such a requirement prior <strong>to</strong> enlistment would<br />

likely cause the armed <strong>force</strong>s <strong>to</strong> shrink <strong>to</strong> unacceptable levels.<br />

But a genuine danger exists for military organizations when<br />

their leaders cross the line of acceptable religious expression,<br />

particularly when on duty or while in uniform.<br />

The fact that we observe instances of religious misconduct is<br />

telling, but not entirely surprising. For leaders who yearn <strong>to</strong> be<br />

increasingly <strong>effective</strong>, we should expect them <strong>to</strong> use all the <strong>to</strong>ols<br />

available <strong>to</strong> them <strong>to</strong> gain the trust and respect of those under<br />

them. And it seems apparent from the noted examples that these<br />

leaders used the appeal of religious convictions <strong>to</strong> generate referent<br />

power among those around them. For those followers who<br />

share the religious convictions of the leader, the act of promoting<br />

one’s religiosity may very well increase the referent power of the<br />

leader dramatically, and in light of the religious demographics of<br />

the armed <strong>force</strong>s, such an act would likely appeal <strong>to</strong> the majority.<br />

But quite the opposite effect occurs with those in the minority<br />

when they are denied the trust and respect of their leader so that<br />

their perception, well-founded or not, is that they are regarded as<br />

second-class citizens, service members and human beings.<br />


Leaders’ statements in the form of mere platitudes about<br />

respect, dignity and teamwork in the face of such facts are insufficient<br />

<strong>to</strong> reinstate referent power. Instead, a direct and <strong>force</strong>ful<br />

affirmation of military service is required: All men and women<br />

in uniform operate under the same presumption of high ethical<br />

standards, loyalty, patriotism and integrity, regardless of professed<br />

religious belief or lack thereof. To help eliminate the evident<br />

lack of trust created by the events over the past few years of<br />

pervasive religiosity, we would like <strong>to</strong> see all officers in positions<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_042_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:37 AM Page 43<br />

of command publicly attest <strong>to</strong> the truth of the statement below.<br />

We call it the “Oath of Equal Character” (previously published in<br />

The Humanist, September). We believe that a public affirmation<br />

of this oath would go a long way <strong>to</strong>ward removing any doubts<br />

followers may have about how they might be viewed. And for<br />

every leader who utters it forthrightly and honestly, it would go<br />

a long way <strong>to</strong>ward building on the foundation by which they<br />

wield referent power over all those in their command.<br />

The Oath of Equal Character<br />

(Note: We have written the oath from a Christian’s perspectivebut<br />

would expect “Muslim,” “Jew,”<br />

“atheist,” “Buddhist,” “Hindu,” “Wiccan,”<br />

“nontheist” or any other chosen identification<br />

<strong>to</strong> be used as applicable.)<br />

“I am a . I will not use my position<br />

<strong>to</strong> influence individuals or the chain of<br />

command <strong>to</strong> adopt , because I<br />

believe that soldiers who are not <br />

are just as trustworthy,honorable and good<br />

as those who are. Their standards are as high<br />

as mine. Their integrity is beyond reproach.<br />

They will not lie, cheat or steal, and they will<br />

not fail when called upon <strong>to</strong> serve.Itrust<br />

them completely and without reservation.<br />

They can trust me in exactly the same way.”<br />

It does no good <strong>to</strong> say, as some clearly<br />

will, that the above states the obvious. Our<br />

interaction with military members from<br />

non-evangelical, nonmajority faith traditions tells us that they<br />

believe their character is impugned on a regular basis because<br />

of their differing belief systems. If something like the statement<br />

above had been articulated clearly and <strong>force</strong>fully from<br />

the senior leaders under fire, the religious climate of many<br />

subunits of the armed <strong>force</strong>s would be very different — and<br />

better — <strong>to</strong>day.<br />

Consider, for example, how the following situations might have<br />

been different had the Oath of Equal Character been involved:<br />

å In 2004, fliers promoting Mel Gibson’s “The Passion of the<br />

Christ” were placed on tables at the Air Force Academy’s dining<br />

facility during the manda<strong>to</strong>ry lunch formation.<br />

å PowerPoint slides were shown at manda<strong>to</strong>ry briefings<br />

routinely promoting organizationally endorsed Bible studies<br />

or “Thoughts for the Day” from the Christian New Testament,<br />

even in the presence of allied international officers who do not<br />

share these beliefs.<br />

Those who believe<br />

that those who<br />

don’t share their<br />

religious beliefs are<br />

less likely <strong>to</strong> have<br />

good character<br />

should leave the<br />

military and seek<br />

another career.<br />

å What if, instead of asserting the “right <strong>to</strong> evangelize the<br />

unchurched” — as the Air Force chaplaincy did in a July 12,<br />

2005, New York Times article — the Air Force chaplaincy had<br />

publicly endorsed the Oath of Equal Character?<br />

It is imperative for leaders <strong>to</strong> prescriptively consider their own<br />

actions and estimate their effect on those that they intend <strong>to</strong><br />

influence in a proper manner. Leaders who attempt <strong>to</strong> increase<br />

their influence over subordinates by promoting their religiosity<br />

risk destroying trust within the rank and file over whom they preside<br />

and, <strong>more</strong> disturbingly, risk abdicating their Oath of<br />

Allegiance. Even if being a good leader is<br />

independent of being a good follower, it is of<br />

paramount importance for leaders <strong>to</strong> continually<br />

get inside the hearts and minds of<br />

their subordinates, shed their biases and<br />

perspectives, and instead genuinely attempt<br />

<strong>to</strong> see the world through the eyes of those<br />

who yearn <strong>to</strong> be dependent upon them for<br />

the wisdom, guidance and support <strong>to</strong> do<br />

what is required <strong>to</strong> remain the most <strong>effective</strong><br />

fighting <strong>force</strong> in defense of our nation’s<br />

freedom. As leaders foster dependencies<br />

among their followers, it also is paramount<br />

that such power not be abused.<br />

Our armed <strong>force</strong>s have grappled with<br />

racial and gender discrimination over the<br />

decades and continue <strong>to</strong> strive <strong>to</strong> provide<br />

every military member the equal opportunity<br />

<strong>to</strong> succeed. But in the face of different belief systems, we<br />

must recognize the need <strong>to</strong> maintain the plurality of belief systems<br />

within our organizations and refrain from taking any<br />

actions that might adversely influence followers <strong>to</strong> believe differently<br />

than they may otherwise and independently choose.<br />

The only permissible discrimination in the armed <strong>force</strong>s is<br />

in the ability <strong>to</strong> do a job. There can be no other. Beliefs remain<br />

a right and a privilege, and freedom of conscience is among<br />

the oldest and most precious freedoms enshrined in the his<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

of America’s founding. But as members of the armed <strong>force</strong>s,<br />

we have all taken an Oath of Allegiance <strong>to</strong> the Constitution of<br />

the United States. Those who believe that those who don’t<br />

share their religious beliefs are less likely <strong>to</strong> have good character<br />

should leave the military and seek another career.<br />

Exercising referent power over followers by using one’s faith<br />

tradition in the capacity of a governmental official is subversive<br />

<strong>to</strong> our constitutional values AFJ<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_044_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:46 AM Page 44<br />

AFRICA continued from Page 29 TAIWAN continued from Page 35<br />

graphic study of economic regulation in<br />

Chad, author Janet Roitman discovers<br />

that the military-commercial nexus does<br />

not undermine the nation-state, but<br />

rather exists alongside state fiscal authority<br />

and control. Sometimes, the relationship<br />

is antagonistic, but at other times, it<br />

is one of complicity. Illicit trade and rent<br />

seekers in the informal economy provide<br />

the government with secondary and tertiary<br />

income and wealth redistribution.<br />

Policymakers and military planners need<br />

<strong>to</strong> abandon simplistic rhe<strong>to</strong>ric <strong>to</strong> gain a<br />

better assessment of the economic<br />

dynamics on the ground, especially in<br />

understanding the reproduction of systems<br />

of licit and illicit trade. A sophisticated<br />

understanding of politics, culture<br />

and economics can arise from a sincere<br />

engagement with African militaries.<br />

Additionally, militaries in Africa<br />

should not be trained <strong>to</strong> view the outbreak<br />

of civil war and conflict as somehow<br />

alien and exogenous <strong>to</strong> an otherwise<br />

peaceful status quo. Social<br />

processes always consist of violent currents<br />

and volatility. By simplifying the<br />

message and pushing the same old<br />

rhe<strong>to</strong>ric of transparency, regulation and<br />

market discipline, Africans will continue<br />

<strong>to</strong> view Western countries as hypocritical<br />

and untrustworthy.<br />

Lastly, we need <strong>to</strong> start thinking <strong>more</strong><br />

creatively — and less land-centrically. To<br />

this effect, Western countries can make a<br />

positive contribution <strong>to</strong>wardimproving<br />

maritime security. Even though most<br />

countries in the Gulf of Guinea have<br />

small navies, if any, there is a need <strong>to</strong><br />

help African coastal countries take full<br />

s<strong>to</strong>ck of their maritime assets. Increased<br />

maritime domain awareness will allow<br />

African countries <strong>to</strong> manage and control<br />

the channeling and distribution of<br />

resources <strong>to</strong>wardpro-growth policies<br />

and strategies. A greater network of<br />

African countries involved in shoring up<br />

criminal activity, human trafficking,<br />

piracy and the exploitation of valuable<br />

economic resources will help <strong>to</strong> invigorate<br />

the need for identifying key gaps in<br />

governance structures. By investing in<br />

maritime security development, African<br />

navies working alongside their Western<br />

military counterparts can contribute <strong>to</strong><br />

economic development.<br />

Employing the military for political<br />

and economic interventions is difficult,<br />

and rather tendentious, especially given<br />

our recent experience post-9/11. If anything,<br />

African military <strong>force</strong>s in the<br />

future, whether they are organized and<br />

owned by respective countries or under<br />

the aegis of the African Union in the<br />

form of an African Standby Force, should<br />

embody institutional-governing checks<br />

and balances <strong>to</strong> stave off the spread of<br />

corruption. African military <strong>force</strong>s<br />

should focus on responding <strong>to</strong> humanitarian<br />

and natural crises rather than conventional<br />

warfare, even though violent<br />

conflicts do occur during complex crises.<br />

Far from just pouring <strong>more</strong> money in<strong>to</strong><br />

Africa and expecting institutional change<br />

as the result of military-<strong>to</strong>-military<br />

engagements, Africa would do much<br />

better <strong>to</strong> realize and come <strong>to</strong> terms with<br />

its own needs and self-assessments.<br />

Working partnerships can help Africans<br />

capitalize and groom the required s<strong>to</strong>ck<br />

of assets, but the key issue is not determining<br />

externally what the right model<br />

should be for Africa. Harnessing time<br />

in<strong>to</strong> the equation will allow the participa<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

process <strong>to</strong> unfold, ensuring that<br />

Africans are ultimately the empowered<br />

stakeholders. Extrapolating from static<br />

state models will not hold water, especially<br />

when African countries are in a<br />

position <strong>to</strong> move substantially and<br />

dynamically along the growth curve.<br />

There has <strong>to</strong> be a dialectic process<br />

among and between institutions and<br />

nations involving resource identification<br />

and (re)distribution during dynamic<br />

periods of growth and change.<br />

Further<strong>more</strong>, economic growth does<br />

not have <strong>to</strong> be violent; development is<br />

not a de fac<strong>to</strong> promethean process<br />

involving the inevitable cycle of human<br />

bloodshed. Rather than treating Africa<br />

as just another battlefield tilled over<br />

again for resource hoarding and hegemonic<br />

chest-beating, a <strong>more</strong> enlightened<br />

approach suggests that instead of<br />

polarizing and dividing the world in<br />

antagonizing competition, Africa can be<br />

the road <strong>to</strong> Damascus for realizing a<br />

<strong>more</strong> civilized geopolitics based on<br />

equality. By enabling Africa <strong>to</strong> help<br />

itself, we may usher in a new political<br />

paradigm for the world based on<br />

human rights, civilized economic<br />

growth and true development. AFJ<br />

of maneuver for the units participating<br />

in the final joint armor and infantry<br />

assault exercise were strictly proscribed<br />

in advance and diverged <strong>to</strong>ward individual<br />

target ranges rather than a single<br />

objective. As a consequence, the participating<br />

units did not demonstrate the<br />

ability <strong>to</strong> provide covering fire while<br />

moving forward in alternating lanes of<br />

advance. The commanding officer of<br />

the drill explained afterwards that he<br />

had ordered the troops and tanks “not<br />

<strong>to</strong> proceed at <strong>to</strong>p speed, because it is<br />

extremely muddy and slippery because<br />

of the rain,” but the exercise still raised<br />

questions about the progress of training<br />

Taiwan’s troops for complex, joint operations<br />

in the future.<br />

Reflecting the unpopularity of the<br />

conscription system, KMT presidential<br />

candidate Ma Ying-jeou promised in a<br />

September 2007 speech that he will<br />

move Taiwan <strong>to</strong> a wholly all-volunteer<br />

<strong>force</strong> within three <strong>to</strong> four years if he is<br />

elected, but this is a challenge that the<br />

DPP government has pursued for years<br />

with only partial success. Moving from<br />

conscription <strong>to</strong> an AVF is a tremendous<br />

challenge, and the country will very<br />

likely maintain some form of conscript<br />

system <strong>to</strong> man its reserves even after<br />

the transition is complete. But the task<br />

for Taipei is clear — it must develop a<br />

sufficiently robust personnel structure<br />

<strong>to</strong> operate the ever <strong>more</strong> sophisticated<br />

weapon systems that it seeks <strong>to</strong> deploy.<br />


Taiwan’s 2007 Han Kuang exercises were<br />

a test of the military strategy of taking<br />

Taiwan’s defense offshore and fighting<br />

jointly. The exercises demonstrated that<br />

such a strategy is within Taiwan’s grasp<br />

but also served as a reminder that<br />

Taiwan’s military is yet undergoing a<br />

wrenching transformation as it adapts<br />

<strong>to</strong> greater civilian control and a <strong>more</strong><br />

professionalized <strong>force</strong>, carries out major<br />

arms purchases, and maintains an<br />

increasingly antiquated arsenal. This<br />

effort will require years before it is completed<br />

<strong>to</strong> the satisfaction of policymakers<br />

in either Taipei or Washing<strong>to</strong>n, be<br />

they DPP or KMT, Republican or<br />

Democrat.<br />

The U.S. has played a positive, bipartisan<br />

role in this effort. The decision <strong>to</strong><br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_044_00 (READ ONLY) 12/11/2007 6:46 AM Page 45<br />

support major upgrades <strong>to</strong> Taiwan’s<br />

C4ISR system dates back <strong>to</strong> the latter<br />

years of the administration of President<br />

Clin<strong>to</strong>n, and the American interest in<br />

Taiwan’s possessing a credible selfdefense<br />

will long outlast the final years<br />

of the Bush administration.<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n can take concrete <strong>steps</strong> in<br />

guaranteeing that this interest continues<br />

<strong>to</strong> be realized.<br />

As Taiwan continues <strong>to</strong> improve and<br />

test its C4ISR capabilities, its potential<br />

<strong>to</strong> serve as an ad hoc coalition partner<br />

in the event of either a cross-Strait crisis<br />

or a humanitarian disaster in the region<br />

will grow significantly. Under the Po<br />

Sheng program, Taiwan has procured a<br />

set of capabilities that can plug directly<br />

in<strong>to</strong> the U.S. C4ISR system in the western<br />

Pacific, both providing and receiving<br />

critical data when the two sides<br />

work <strong>to</strong>gether. If the U.S. is <strong>to</strong> bolster<br />

this latent ability, it must enhance the<br />

level of dialogue between the two sides.<br />

One example would be <strong>to</strong> lift the nearly<br />

30-year ban on visits <strong>to</strong> Taiwan by serving<br />

U.S. flag and general officers, so the<br />

managers of American command-andcontrol<br />

systems could visit their colleagues<br />

at Taiwan’s JOCC and field<br />

headquarters.<br />

The U.S. should also support Taiwan’s<br />

continued acquisition of weapons systems<br />

for its defense. Although Taiwan’s<br />

defense spending as a share of GDP<br />

remains at a relatively low 2.7 percent,<br />

both the DPP and KMT candidates in<br />

March’s presidential election have indicated<br />

that they plan <strong>to</strong> increase it past 3<br />

percent. As Taiwan seeks <strong>to</strong> shoulder a<br />

larger share of the defense burden,<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n should also play a <strong>more</strong><br />

productive role.<br />

The recent experience with Taiwan’s<br />

request <strong>to</strong> purchase F-16s is a clear<br />

example of how not <strong>to</strong> handle this relationship.<br />

Taipei’s regular arms purchases<br />

should be handled as a matter of<br />

course in U.S. security assistance and<br />

sales programs, not as an instrument<br />

for punishing or rewarding Taipei’s<br />

behavior on tangential matters.<br />

Likewise, the CPX seems <strong>to</strong> have<br />

demonstrated a useful role for a<br />

Taiwanese land-attack cruise missile.<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n may not prefer that Taiwan<br />

develop that particular capability, but it<br />

is not obvious why Taipei should be<br />

expected <strong>to</strong> foreswear options for striking<br />

military facilities on the mainland<br />

while it lives under the shadow of<br />

Beijing’s growing missiles <strong>force</strong>.<br />

Finally, the Han Kuang exercises serve<br />

as a reminder that although Taiwan<br />

aims <strong>to</strong> defend itself through the initial<br />

stages of a conflict with the People’s<br />

Republic of China, its military would<br />

suffer tremendous attrition during such<br />

a conflict. The U.S. must be prepared <strong>to</strong><br />

accept a leading role in the defense of<br />

Taiwan, including providing a major<br />

naval and tactical air presence in<br />

defense, even in the face of advanced<br />

Chinese submarine and SAM capabilities.<br />

Surviving Taiwanese <strong>force</strong>s would<br />

also require significant logistical support<br />

after the opening weeks of a conflict.<br />

While no one seeks a war in the Taiwan<br />

Strait, such a scenario is yet a plausible<br />

outcome and one that demands<br />

Washing<strong>to</strong>n remain prepared. AFJ<br />



TheMECOLightweight WaterPurifier –the LWP–can be set<br />

up and operated byone soldier in 45 minutes or less. Itprovides<br />

safe potablewater<strong>to</strong>early entry, highly mobile <strong>force</strong>s<br />

throughoutthe spectrumofconflict in peaceand war,<br />

andwill providequalitywatersupport<strong>to</strong> remote units<br />

anddetachments wheredistribution of bulk water<br />

is notfeasible or practical. It’s extremelysimple<br />

<strong>to</strong> operate with virtually hands-free functionality.<br />

Yet the advanced process controls allow the<br />

opera<strong>to</strong>r <strong>to</strong> treat ANY WATER–ANYWHERE<br />

withoutspecial chemicals, trainingorequipment<br />

modifications.<br />

The MECO LWP is presently deployed atseveral Forward<br />

Operating Bases incentral Baghdad, Iraq and Afghanistan<br />

–fighting thewar on terror.<br />

For <strong>more</strong> information visit www.mecomilitary.com or call 1(866) 363-0813.<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_046_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:45 AM Page 46<br />

FORCE MODERNIZATION continued from Page 21<br />

which would use state-of-the-art components<br />

<strong>to</strong> construct an airfield capable<br />

of handling C-17 transports within 12<br />

hours of arrival. Once completed, an<br />

aerial beachhead would be established<br />

and expanded <strong>to</strong> serve as a rapidly<br />

emplaced aerial point for <strong>force</strong>d-entry<br />

operations.<br />

Just as we need <strong>to</strong> bolster our ability<br />

<strong>to</strong> transport maneuver <strong>force</strong>s via C-17,<br />

we likewise need <strong>to</strong> modernize and<br />

increase our capacity <strong>to</strong> move heavy<br />

<strong>force</strong>s rapidly via fast sealift. To increase<br />

the deterrent our military poses <strong>to</strong> any<br />

nation considering military action<br />

against the U.S., we need <strong>to</strong> continue<br />

the development of capable, fast sea<br />

transport and invest in the development<br />

of sea basing for power projection of<br />

land <strong>force</strong>s. Although air transport can<br />

rapidly emplace <strong>force</strong>s, it would take an<br />

inordinate number of sorties <strong>to</strong> move<br />

heavy <strong>force</strong>s in<strong>to</strong> an area when that was<br />

required. Sealift — fast sealift — would<br />

give the U.S. the ability <strong>to</strong> insert <strong>force</strong>s<br />

in<strong>to</strong> an emergency immediately if needed,<br />

but then rapidly deploy <strong>force</strong>s heavy<br />

enough <strong>to</strong> engage anything the enemy<br />

could throw out, and sustain those<br />

<strong>force</strong>s over the long term. Associated<br />

with this capability is the concept of “sea<br />

basing.” The concept is still not mature,<br />

but the idea holds great potential. If the<br />

Navy can figure a way <strong>to</strong> safeguard a<br />

floating base so that it is not overly vulnerable<br />

<strong>to</strong> anti-shipping weapons, this<br />

capability could add significantly <strong>to</strong><br />

America’s power projection capability.<br />


His<strong>to</strong>rically speaking, nothing gives an<br />

army the chance <strong>to</strong> dominate on the<br />

ground like an air <strong>force</strong> that dominates<br />

the skies. It is said that the arm of decision<br />

is the ground <strong>force</strong>, but his<strong>to</strong>ry has<br />

provided strong evidence that the nation<br />

that owns the skies owns the ground.<br />

Certainly, air power alone cannot win<br />

major wars, but without it, ground<br />

<strong>force</strong>s become extremely vulnerable. In<br />

the future, we may well succeed in producing<br />

the most powerful land <strong>force</strong> in<br />

the world. But for that <strong>force</strong> <strong>to</strong> win the<br />

nation’s wars at the lowest possible cost,<br />

it is imperative that we own the skies.<br />

Whether it’s the F-22, the F-35 Joint<br />

Strike Fighter or some other airframe,<br />

the U.S. must invest <strong>to</strong> ensure the Air<br />

Force continues <strong>to</strong> dominate the skies.<br />

Without question, as technology has<br />

advanced and proliferated over the past<br />

three or four decades, ballistic and<br />

guided missiles have become the<br />

weapon of choice for militaries across<br />

the world. Our defense against them<br />

must likewise increase.<br />

China, Russia, India and Pakistan, of<br />

course, have highly advanced arsenals<br />

of tactical and theater missiles. But<br />

there are scores of other nations — such<br />

as Iran and North Korea — that have a<br />

growing and sophisticated capability in<br />

this area. If we do not invest in a robust<br />

capability <strong>to</strong> defend against this rapidly<br />

advancing threat, whatever <strong>force</strong> we put<br />

in the field will be increasingly vulnerable.<br />

It is critical that we build a robust<br />

and credible missile defense, both at the<br />

tactical and theater levels.<br />

Force modernization is not all about<br />

platforms, softwareand high technology.<br />

A modernization program also must<br />

include a training development program.<br />

If we advance the way we fight by<br />

adding new capabilities, we must concurrently<br />

train our troops how best <strong>to</strong><br />

apply them. As we develop new fighting<br />

doctrine and equip the <strong>force</strong> with the<br />

latest technology, we must never fail <strong>to</strong><br />

understand that war is a brutish,<br />

bloody, chaotic and unpredictable<br />

affair. It is important, therefore, that as<br />

we design training plans <strong>to</strong> support new<br />

concepts it be done with the understanding<br />

that the essential principles of<br />

war are not negated by modernization.<br />

Today, our Army is sharply focused<br />

on the counterinsurgency fight, which is<br />

appropriate. But the requirement <strong>to</strong><br />

succeed in the present fight must not<br />

detract from the need <strong>to</strong> prepare for<br />

<strong>to</strong>ugher fights in the future. Bluntly put,<br />

the counterinsurgency fight does not<br />

represent an existential threat <strong>to</strong> the<br />

U.S. It may cause problems, it may<br />

result in a loss of prestige, but the U.S.<br />

isn’t going <strong>to</strong> collapse, even if we overtly<br />

lost in Iraq; get preparation for the conventional<br />

fight wrong, however, and we<br />

run the risk of being unprepared for an<br />

enemy that has the ability <strong>to</strong> inflict catastrophic<br />

damage both <strong>to</strong> our armed<br />

<strong>force</strong>s and the American way of life.<br />

Getting transformation right and effec-<br />

tive combat-focused training are<br />

absolute requirements <strong>to</strong> prevent that<br />

from happening.<br />

We must tailor our future training<br />

programs <strong>to</strong> counter the capabilities<br />

inherent in the countries with the most<br />

potent military capabilities. We must,<br />

therefore, resist the temptation <strong>to</strong> conduct<br />

command-post exercises, simulations<br />

and field-training exercises that<br />

are so scripted and controlled that<br />

everything always works, communications<br />

are always up, and significant time<br />

is always given for preparation,<br />

rehearsals, etc. More problematic, however,<br />

is our tendency <strong>to</strong> portray an<br />

enemy <strong>force</strong> that is docile, unimaginativeand<br />

poorly equipped.<br />

I have participated in numerous division-level<br />

Warfighter exercises and<br />

corps command-post exercises, and<br />

countless numbers of simulation exercises<br />

at the battalion level and below. In<br />

virtually every one of these, the enemy<br />

<strong>force</strong> is equipped with significantly<br />

weaker <strong>force</strong>s than those of the friendly<br />

unit. Particularly at the division level,<br />

rehearsals and practice exercises are<br />

done months in advance of the Warfighter,<br />

and often as much as two weeks<br />

before the exercise, headquarters and<br />

signal troops will establish the division<br />

main command post <strong>to</strong> ensure that<br />

every phone line, every satellite communications<br />

device and every radio is<br />

up and running. I recall the commanding<br />

general exploding during one<br />

exercise because one of his telephones<br />

went down. I wondered what this officer<br />

would have done in combat when half<br />

his assets were down as a result of a<br />

combination of terrain masking, atmospheric<br />

conditions and enemy action.<br />

While we spend enormous amounts<br />

of money developing and fielding awesome<br />

technology, we must not fall prey<br />

<strong>to</strong> the belief that such equipment<br />

always will provide us combat overmatch<br />

against all opponents. Presently,<br />

we depict exactly this in the vast majority<br />

of our training exercises and simulations.<br />

To give our future <strong>force</strong>s the best<br />

chance of success when we face a <strong>to</strong>ugh<br />

opponent, we must reverse this trend.<br />

To summarize, the following nine<br />

changes and additions should be made<br />

<strong>to</strong> the Defense Department<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_046_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:45 AM Page 47<br />

modernization program:<br />

1. Improve the ar<strong>more</strong>d protection of<br />

our ar<strong>more</strong>d fighting platforms.<br />

2. Increase the ability of reconnaissance<br />

<strong>force</strong>s <strong>to</strong> fight for information in a<br />

degraded mode.<br />

3. Implement a counter-UAV and<br />

space-defense program.<br />

4. Return air defense <strong>to</strong> the tactical<br />

formation in recognition of improving<br />

threat capabilities.<br />

5. Expand our air transport fleet <strong>to</strong><br />

enable rapid strategic and operational<br />

movement and maneuver.<br />

6. Improve the ability of land <strong>force</strong>s <strong>to</strong><br />

engage in operations worldwide via fast<br />

sealift and sea basing.<br />

7. Field significant numbers of<br />

advanced fighter aircraft <strong>to</strong> ensure air<br />

superiority.<br />

8. Strengthen missile defense.<br />

9. Place an increased emphasis on<br />

training the <strong>force</strong> in light of emerging<br />

capabilities with a focus on the realities<br />

of ground combat.<br />

If substantive changes are not made<br />

in the way the Defense Department<br />

transforms the Army, based on the correlation<br />

of <strong>force</strong>s and overall analysis of<br />

the preceding sections of this study, the<br />

U.S. faces the very real possibility that if<br />

it takes on a determined, well-equipped<br />

and well-trained foe, we could suffer<br />

our first major defeat since the Chinese<br />

hordes came pouring across the Yalu<br />

River in North Korea on Thanksgiving<br />

Day 1950.<br />

Too often, we exaggerate what technology<br />

can do for us and underestimate<br />

what the enemy can do. Of our own<br />

volition, we have reduced the combat<br />

power of current organizations in the<br />

hope that technology will give us an<br />

advantage in the future; in the belief<br />

that our air- and space-based intelligence<br />

platforms will always give us critical<br />

information about the enemy, we<br />

have dissolved the most powerful<br />

reconnaissance formation in our<br />

nation’s his<strong>to</strong>ry and replaced it with an<br />

organization that has no ground reconnaissance<br />

capability; we are replacing<br />

what has been proven in combat as the<br />

world’s best main battle tank with a<br />

“As marketing weapons,<br />

reprints rank exceptionally<br />

high asadown-right value.”<br />

--Jay Conrad Levinson, Guerilla Marketing Weapons<br />

Their uses are endless ...<br />

•Trade Show Handouts<br />

•Direct Mail Campaigns<br />

•Sales Force Material<br />

•News Releases<br />

•Education &Training Handouts<br />

•Media &Press Kit Enclosures<br />

•Inves<strong>to</strong>r &S<strong>to</strong>ckholder Information<br />

•Valuable Website Materials<br />

Your best sales <strong>to</strong>ol<br />

is only aphone call away<br />

1.888.750.8099<br />

lightly ar<strong>more</strong>d vehicle that cannot survive<br />

direct-fire engagements with<br />

enemy tanks and which depends on an<br />

uninterrupted flow of information for<br />

its survival; despite numerous, highlevel<br />

Defense Department and governmental<br />

studies explicitly quantifying<br />

China’s military modernization and the<br />

specific threats it poses <strong>to</strong> future<br />

American <strong>force</strong>s, no changes <strong>to</strong> formations<br />

or fighting doctrine have occurred;<br />

and almost exclusively, we prepare our<br />

<strong>force</strong>s <strong>to</strong> face a docile, weak and<br />

unimaginative enemy in future combat,<br />

despite the potentially hostile <strong>force</strong>s in<br />

the world <strong>to</strong>day with demonstrated<br />

capabilities well above those we depict.<br />

Although we are heading in the<br />

wrong direction, the future has not yet<br />

been irreversibly determined.<br />

There is still time <strong>to</strong> make course corrections.<br />

But if we hold on <strong>to</strong> current<br />

plans despite the presence of so much<br />

evidence that demands change, the<br />

future battlefield could become an<br />

American tragedy.<br />

The time for action is now. AFJ<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_048_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:33 AM Page 48<br />


In a bit of a State<br />

Sympathy runs dry for Rice’s fiasco-laden agency<br />


W<br />

ith any luck, fall 2007 will one day be regarded as the<br />

nadir of the State Department’s fortunes. During<br />

September hearings, Ambassador <strong>to</strong> Iraq Ryan<br />

Crocker said progress there was based on a grass-roots rejection<br />

of al-Qaida, not a State-brokered compromise among Iraq’s fractured<br />

political leadership. Less than a week later, Blackwater USA<br />

security contrac<strong>to</strong>rs escorting State officials <strong>to</strong> the Baghdad<br />

Green Zone caused at least 17 Iraqi fatalities in a<br />

controversial firefight. Finally, when a handful of<br />

foreign service officers (FSOs) decried compulsory<br />

service in Iraq as a “potential death sentence”<br />

at a November <strong>to</strong>wn hall meeting, the<br />

department’s eviscerated morale was revealed<br />

for the whole world <strong>to</strong> see.<br />

The <strong>to</strong>wn hall kerfuffle has initiated a<br />

friendly-fire barrage from milbloggers, most of<br />

whom are unsympathetic <strong>to</strong> the State<br />

Department’s plight. “Abu Muqawama”<br />

in<strong>to</strong>nes that “State has brought this one on<br />

themselves” by publicly complaining when<br />

soldiers — and many FSOs — are serving quietly<br />

and <strong>effective</strong>ly in Iraq and Afghanistan.<br />

“Subsunk” at Blackfive pipes in that although both FSOs and<br />

military service members take an oath <strong>to</strong> obey the<br />

Constitution and serve the country, “it just appears that some<br />

folks place <strong>more</strong> weight on their oaths than others.”<br />

A few bloggers have been <strong>more</strong> empathetic. “Akinoluna,” a<br />

female Marine supply sergeant who has daily contact with<br />

American diplomats while serving at a U.S. Embassy, observes<br />

that “State Department employees spend most of their careers<br />

overseas and many of those years [are] at ... hardship posts. ... I<br />

can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard military people complaining<br />

about being outside of the United States, but I’ve never<br />

heard a foreign service officer say that. Usually they are complaining<br />

about being <strong>force</strong>d back <strong>to</strong> D.C. for a couple years.”<br />

Raising the level of debate, Matt Armstrong at<br />

MountainRunner lays the blame for the fiascoes on the failure<br />

of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s agenda of “transformational<br />

diplomacy”: “Rice has not prepared her department<br />

for the mission she’s suddenly demanded. We’re now four<br />

years in<strong>to</strong> Iraq, six years in<strong>to</strong> Afghanistan, and her department<br />

still hasn’t mobilized ... for war <strong>to</strong> the extent that even a few<br />

months ago Crocker had <strong>to</strong> go public with staffing problems.<br />

State/DynCorp have messed up policing. State permitted<br />

(some, like me, might say encouraged) their security escorts <strong>to</strong><br />



http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com<br />


http://www.blackfive.net<br />


http:// akinoluna.blogspot.com<br />


http://mountainrunner.us<br />


http://blogs.state.gov<br />

take an overly aggressive posture because of screwed up priorities.<br />

And State hasn’t intervened when American reconstruction<br />

contrac<strong>to</strong>rs screw the Iraqi government.”<br />

The tempest in the milblogosphere has been matched by<br />

intensive navel-gazing on the part of diplomat bloggers. The<br />

State Department’s official blog site, DipNote, has been a hub<br />

of contention on the matter, for although the postings generally<br />

represent official policy, the comment sections<br />

have provided FSOs a forum where they can<br />

vent and present all sides of the issue.<br />

One of the most controversial DipNote postings<br />

has been an open letter from John Matel,<br />

a long-serving FSO who is leading a provincial<br />

reconstruction team (PRT) in Iraq. Advising his<br />

“vexed and overwrought colleagues” <strong>to</strong> “take a<br />

deep breath and calm down,” he reminds FSOs<br />

that although he would just as well not have <strong>to</strong><br />

babysit anyone who does not want <strong>to</strong> join his<br />

PRT, he suggests that his colleagues who are<br />

not willing <strong>to</strong> serve at the president’s discretion<br />

might best “consider the type of job that does<br />

not require worldwide availability.”<br />

Matel’s posting set off a chain of comments that ranged from<br />

denunciations of the “cowardice” of FSOs by one retired Army<br />

officer <strong>to</strong> accusations that Matel would have made a model fascist<br />

s<strong>to</strong>oge. One of the most thoughtful observations was contributed<br />

by an FSO in Portugal, who criticizes the absence of<br />

proper training for FSOs, even after six years of war: “At the end<br />

of the day, taking FSOs with no Arabic language skills, no Middle<br />

Eastern experience, no job-specific skills (repairing electrical<br />

grids? water systems?), and especially no security training, and<br />

sending them <strong>to</strong> Iraq is foolish. Hundreds of FSOs are in Arabic<br />

training right now; job-specific training is lagging but underway.<br />

These people will probably do good work in Iraq when ready.<br />

Many of those being sent now, however, are just <strong>to</strong>tems, sent for<br />

no other reason than <strong>to</strong> show that they are there.”<br />

In late November, Defense Secretary Robert Gates joined the<br />

fray when he challenged U.S. civilian agencies <strong>to</strong> undertake a<br />

greater share of the burden for post-conflict stabilization and<br />

reconstruction. Generously deflecting blame from his colleague<br />

Rice <strong>to</strong>ward a decade of dystrophy, as the post-Cold War “peace<br />

dividend” was largely paid by the State Department, the U.S.<br />

Agency for International Development and the former U.S.<br />

Information Agency, he called for developing such civilian<br />

capacity as a sufficiently funded State Department and a readi-<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_048_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:33 AM Page 49<br />

ly deployable corps of civilians who can fill the technical jobs<br />

required <strong>to</strong> accomplish reconstruction operations.<br />

Gates frames the problem perfectly. Just as many of the<br />

technical skills required for stabilization and reconstruction<br />

are not inculcated through military training, nor will they ever<br />

be native <strong>to</strong> even the best-trained diplomat. This is why the<br />

reserves and National Guard have been in such high demand<br />

in Iraq and Afghanistan, for they deliver civilian expertise in<br />

such fields as policing and civil engineering that neither the<br />

full-time soldier nor the statesman can be expected <strong>to</strong> master.<br />

But even with the development of such a civilian capability,<br />

which the State Department’s coordina<strong>to</strong>r for reconstruction<br />

and stabilization hopes <strong>to</strong> develop in<strong>to</strong> a several-thousandstrong<br />

deployable corps of civilian experts, State will still require<br />

a cultural shift <strong>to</strong> manage such missions. This is one point on<br />

Subscribe<br />

Today!<br />

Save 37%<br />

Off The $7.95 Cover Price<br />

12 Issues Only $60!<br />

Go <strong>to</strong>:<br />

www.armed<strong>force</strong>sjournal.com<br />

or call 1.800.368.5718 and reference code #H79VA<br />

which the debate on DipNote and other professional sources<br />

diverge: What makes the best foreign service officer? The master<br />

of memo writing and diplomatic communication? Or the manager<br />

who can oversee a range of reconstruction projects and<br />

extract performance from the civilians and soldiers under his<br />

watch? Both skill sets may be necessary, but the department<br />

does not have a tradition of training and promoting the latter.<br />

The crisis in Foggy Bot<strong>to</strong>m, as well as Gates’ call for reform,<br />

has opened a window for reforming the State Department in<br />

preparation for what will likely remain a “Long War” against<br />

Islamist extremism. If this opportunity is embraced, then State<br />

has an opportunity <strong>to</strong> reverse its slide in<strong>to</strong> interagency irrelevancy.<br />

If this opportunity is missed, State appears poised <strong>to</strong><br />

continue disappointing its military counterparts and <strong>to</strong> fail <strong>to</strong><br />

effect American foreign policy. AFJ<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_050_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 6:45 AM Page 50<br />


Nuking it out MRAP rethink Health check<br />


for losing the propaganda<br />

battle over the<br />

Iran nukes fiasco. It’s<br />

bad enough that the<br />

U.S. again is being served humble pie<br />

over weapons-of-mass-destruction allegations.<br />

But this time around, it would<br />

have been wise for the White House <strong>to</strong><br />

have eaten the pie, however unappetizing.<br />

Instead, just two days after the intelligence<br />

report said Iran halted its nuclear<br />

weapons program four years ago, Bush<br />

<strong>to</strong>ld Tehran <strong>to</strong> “come clean” about its<br />

nuclear activities. No one believes that<br />

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad<br />

is up <strong>to</strong> anything good. But the<br />

U.S. handed a public relations gem <strong>to</strong> a<br />

tyrant who will use it for all it’s worth.<br />

Rather than continue the saber-rattling<br />

rhe<strong>to</strong>ric from such a poor position, Bush<br />

and his key advisers need <strong>to</strong> s<strong>to</strong>p,<br />

regroup and work out a plan that outsmarts<br />

a dangerous but containable<br />

threat.<br />

TO GEN. JAMES T.<br />

CONWAY, for having<br />

the courage <strong>to</strong> do a<br />

sharp about-face and<br />

cut the Marine Corps’<br />

request for bomb-resistant vehicles<br />

from 3,700 <strong>to</strong> 2,300.<br />

The original plan was for every<br />

Marine outside the wire in Iraq <strong>to</strong> travel<br />

in a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected<br />

(MRAP) vehicle. Lawmakers, <strong>to</strong> their<br />

credit, quickly stepped up <strong>to</strong> the plate<br />

and pushed hard <strong>to</strong> get billions of dollars<br />

of funding for the MRAP program.<br />

Which made it an even <strong>to</strong>ugher call<br />

for the Corps’ commandant <strong>to</strong> admit<br />

this probably is not a good use of taxpayers’<br />

money. But Conway’s decision<br />

was based on changing conditions and<br />

the recognition that the less-than-agile<br />

MRAP vehicles would risk the Corps’<br />

ability <strong>to</strong> execute its core expeditionary<br />

mission.<br />

FORUM PICK From our online discussion boards<br />

“ One of the major fac<strong>to</strong>rs responsible for the near-debacle in<br />

Iraq is the <strong>to</strong>tal failure of law and order due <strong>to</strong> the complete<br />

absence of both the Army and the police from carrying out<br />

internal security duties in terrain that they knew inside out.<br />

What is happening now was both predictable and<br />

avoidable. So, must we allow <strong>to</strong> go unanswered questions<br />

as <strong>to</strong> why the intellectual horsepower in and available <strong>to</strong><br />

Congress, the White House, the State Department, the<br />

Pentagon and Central Command failed <strong>to</strong> realize that it<br />

would not be necessary or helpful <strong>to</strong> disband both the Iraqi<br />

Army and police after Saddam was taken out?”<br />

Post your thoughts and continue the debate at http://www.armed<strong>force</strong>s<br />

journal.com/forums.<br />


TO THE ARMY, for its<br />

handling of the case of<br />

Lt. Elizabeth Whiteside,<br />

the reservist who led a<br />

unit of medics in Iraq<br />

and then suffered a<br />

mental breakdown, possibly triggered<br />

by the stresses of war, during which she<br />

waved a gun at a psychiatric nurse on<br />

her unit, fired in<strong>to</strong> the ceiling, then shut<br />

herself in a room and shot herself in the<br />

s<strong>to</strong>mach.<br />

Whiteside, whose s<strong>to</strong>ry was detailed<br />

in The Washing<strong>to</strong>n Post, was taken <strong>to</strong><br />

Walter Reed Army Medical Center,<br />

where she was diagnosed with severe<br />

mental disorder. Yet the Army offered<br />

her only the chance <strong>to</strong> resign under a<br />

status that would have left her without<br />

the veterans’ medical benefits she will<br />

need as the result of her severe<br />

injuries. The Army also filed criminal<br />

charges against her for endangering<br />

the life of another soldier and for<br />

attempting suicide.<br />

In December, the investigating officer<br />

conducting a preliminary hearing recommended<br />

that the charges be dismissed,<br />

saying it was the only moral<br />

course.Army leaders from <strong>to</strong>p <strong>to</strong> bot<strong>to</strong>m<br />

must all recognize the critical<br />

importance of protecting — and, where<br />

necessary, healing — the mental health<br />

of its war-stressed soldiers.<br />


0107_AFJ_DOM_00_051_00 (READ ONLY) 12/12/2007 9:48 AM Page 51

0107_AFJ_DOM_00_052_01 (READ ONLY) 12/21/2007 10:46 AM Page 52<br />

General Tactical Vehicles<br />

The JLTV Team sm<br />

If the JLTV was just another truck,<br />

anyone could build it.<br />

The JLTV is <strong>more</strong> than amilitary truck—it’s arevolutionary combat tactical system.<br />

Only the team with aproven track record in design, development, systemsintegration,<br />

and production of both combat and tactical vehicles will make the JLTV asuccess.<br />

General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General have combined these core<br />

competencies and joined <strong>force</strong>s as General Tactical Vehicles.<br />

General Tactical Vehicles ...Strength of The JLTV Team.<br />


Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!