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Candidates and the Median Voter Model<br />

A wide range of persons choose to become candidates for public office. But these candidates<br />

seem to behave in similar patterns. Why do candidates who are often very different in political<br />

opinions, backgrounds, personalities, etc. seem to behave so much alike? The median voter<br />

model provides an explanation. The median voter model suggests that the median voter (the one<br />

in the middle) must be captured to achieve a majority vote. If two candidates are on opposite<br />

sides of an issue, or on the same side, the candidate closer to the median position will capture<br />

the median voter and the majority of the votes.<br />

Example 5: If Candidate Waffle realizes that Candidate Waver is positioned closer to the median<br />

voter, Candidate Waffle will want to move closer to the median position. If Candidate Waver<br />

realizes that Candidate Waffle is now positioned closer to the median voter, Candidate Waver will<br />

want to move closer to the median position.<br />

The median voter model predicts that a candidate will behave in certain predictable ways in his or<br />

her pursuit of the median voter:<br />

1. Aim for a middle-of-the-road position. A candidate who is too far from the middle-of-theroad<br />

will lose the median voter to his or her opponent. A candidate may stake out a fairly<br />

extreme position during the nomination process, in order to appeal to the most committed<br />

members of the candidate’s party. But after receiving the nomination, the candidate will want<br />

to move toward the median position.<br />

2. Label his or her opponents as extremists. At the same time that Candidate Waffle tries to<br />

move toward the middle, Candidate Waffle will try to portray Candidate Waver as on the<br />

fringe, and out of touch with the desires of the average voter.<br />

3. Adjust his or her positions in response to polls. Candidates will take polls to try to<br />

determine what the median voter wants. Candidates may have to change their positions on<br />

issues in order to get more in tune with the median voter.<br />

4. Speak in general rather than specific terms. To appeal to the median voter, candidates will<br />

speak in general terms in favor of goals that the median voter will support (e.g. a strong<br />

economy, efficient government, better education, crime reduction, etc.). Candidates will try to<br />

avoid revealing specific details about how they might plan to accomplish these popular goals<br />

(e.g. free trade agreements, closure of redundant military bases, tuition vouchers, construction<br />

of new prisons, etc.), to avoid offending voters who might disagree with the specifics.<br />

Policies favored by the median voter (who likely will be ill-informed on most issues) will not<br />

necessarily be the most economically efficient policies. The candidates’ pursuit of the median<br />

voter may result in government failure.<br />

Elected Officials<br />

Once a candidate is elected to public office, what will he or she do? An elected official may have<br />

a strong desire to support policies that will benefit the general public by increasing economic<br />

efficiency or by promoting long term economic growth. But will an elected official actually support<br />

such policies?<br />

Elected Officials and Short Run Focus<br />

Elected officials tend to have a strong desire to remain elected officials. Thus, an elected official<br />

will tend to focus on winning the next election. An elected official will naturally support policies<br />

that improve his or her chances of winning the next election, and will naturally oppose policies<br />

that harm his or her chances of winning the next election. Thus, an elected official will tend to<br />

support policies that yield benefits in the short run (before the next election) and impose costs in<br />

the long run (after the next election). This will be true even if the long run costs of the policies<br />

exceed the short run benefits. Likewise, an elected official will tend to oppose policies that impose<br />

costs in the short run and yield benefits in the long run. This will be true even if the long run<br />

benefits of the policies exceed the short run costs.<br />

FOR REVIEW ONLY - NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION<br />

28 - 3 Public Choice and Government Failure

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