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Thinking with Pamela Virtuous Dialogue and the Philosophy of Religion. Pamela Sue Anderson is well known for her work on the feminist philosophy of religion; her 1997 book on that subject being one of the first in the discipline. In the last two years before her death, however, her work focused on the themes of vulnerability and love. Drawing on Anderson’s as-yet unpublished ‘Introduction’ to a volume of Michèle Le Doeuff’s philosophy (edited by Anderson and to which I contributed as translator), I will outline the ways in which her vision for the philosophy of religion – and her methodological ideals for philosophy in general – are encapsulated by a desire for virtuous dialogue of the kind her most recent work discusses. From her earliest work, Anderson was concerned to reject a model of the ‘empirical realist philosopher of religion’ that I’d like to call by the shorthand homo philosophicus. By this term, I mean to denote a negative exemplar, and thus it is important to clarify that I do not take it in the same sense in which it has recently been used by Quassim Cassam – that is, as a ‘model epistemic citizen who can discover what his beliefs and other attitudes are by establishing what they ought rationally to be’ (Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans¸ 2015). In the case of religion, determining what our beliefs and attitudes ‘ought rationally to be’ is, of course, much disputed. But Anderson’s work criticized homo philosophicus precisely for the confidence he placed in disembodied reason (or formal rationality) to answer our questions. On Anderson’s account, homo philosophicus – historically male, white, and privileged – claimed a god’s-eye view that failed to acknowledge the experiences of less privileged others, especially women and the marginalized. In doing so, Anderson argued, homo philosophicus endangered the philosophy of religion by downplaying the importance of ‘desire, need, ethical truth, and justice’; and assuming ‘the status quo of patriarchal beliefs’ (Anderson, A Feminist Philosophy of Religion (1997), 16). As such, one of the aims of her work – frequently reiterated in the decades that followed – was to transform ‘the focus and the conceptual scheme in contemporary philosophy of religion’ (Anderson, in Cornwell and McGhee, eds, Philosophers and Gods (2009), 167). In 2009, she argued that the required transformation involved not only concerning ourselves [that is, philosophers of religion] ‘with knowing […], but with thinking, acting, and making reflective judgements which would be creative, spiritually’ (adapted from ibid., 171). She appealed to philosophers of religion to examine and exhibit ‘spiritual virtues’, calling her readers to be ‘creative’ ‘for a world in need of love, trust, respect, and hope’ (ibid., 171). These virtues, she argued, should become characteristic of reflective subjects, shaping the way we imagine and interact with the world. This was needful, on Anderson’s view, because ‘[i]n a time when the world is increasingly aware of global diversity, the tradition of philosophy of religion seems disinclined (or, is it simply afraid?) to scrutinize its own practices not only for epistemic injustice, but more positively for the passion implicit in yearning for the virtuous life’ (ibid., 176). She followed Robert Solomon in claiming that the virtuous spiritual life should be understood in terms of the transformation of the self (see ibid., 173). This is significant because, on Anderson’s view, ‘the spiritual life directs reason’ towards a telos. In a world increasingly divided by difference, the telos towards which the spiritual life directs us is an exploration of ‘love’ as openness to others, the world and our natural being; ‘trust’ as a coming together of uncertainty and confidence; ‘respect’ as an active responsibility to join love and trust in attention to life; and ‘hope’ in past, present, and future (see ibid., 176). Anderson is no naïve optimist about the realization of these ends, however. In her recent work on vulnerability she wrote about the human tendency to shut itself off to the danger of being wounded – to the possibility of pain that can ensue from openness gone wrong. But even so, through the practice of virtuous dialogue, Anderson proposed that she had ‘found a transformative strategy for refining philosophy’s self-definition, in order that philosophy itself becomes far more inclusive, and not just ‘western’, not largely elite, and not largely for certain privileged men alone’ (Anderson, ‘Introduction’ to In Dialogue with Michèle Le Doeuff (forthcoming), 8). Instead of paradigms of discipleship – in which powerful masters instruct their disciples, inducting them into readymade worlds of thought – Anderson’s dialogical approach invites others – including marginalized others – to think with us for themselves. It is a condition of such a method that we are vulnerable 24
to these others – that we open ourselves up to them, and to the possibility of being – in some respect – challenged or even ‘undone’ by our encounter. Because the social self is dialogical, and unfolds in a context and with interlocutors that are not always of its choosing, the prospect of dialogue can fill us with fear. As Charles Taylor has written, ‘we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us’ (Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994), 32-33). So, alongside this call for dialogue Anderson’s recent work also called for ‘a new philosophical imaginary – which would transform the myths we live by’ (Anderson, ‘Love and Vulnerability’ (unpub.)). In particular, she wished to transform ‘a patriarchal myth which projects on to “vulnerability” only negative affects’, arguing that love and vulnerability needed to be liberated ‘from the excessive fear and violence which has been conveyed mythically by our (western) philosophical imaginary’. As Anderson reconceived it, vulnerability was a ‘capability’ that enhanced life, enabling us to be open to receive from others in love. As such, it has redemptive potential for the discipline of philosophy – and for the dialogues in which each of us participate. Dr Kate Kirkpatrick, FRSA, read Philosophy and Theology (2002) at Regent’s Park College, Oxford. Speaker Vulnerability and Feminist Collectivity in Philosophy. I never quite crossed paths with Pamela Sue Anderson. She returned to Oxford in 2001, the year after I finished my undergraduate studies. In February 2017, we were both invited to speak at a British Academy conference in Durham on 'Vulnerability and The Politics of Care'. Anderson’s paper was read by a friend, just weeks before her death. All of us spoke about vulnerability, but Anderson’s contribution stood out in that she addressed our own vulnerability as speakers. She began by recounting an occasion, earlier in her career, when her audience was unable to receive her as an expert on feminist philosophy. The story stayed with many of us because it reflected the painful, hidden histories of speakers who do not conform to preconceptions of how a ‘knower’ ought to look, be or think. These stories, if they are told at all, are normally the topic of hushed and anxious conversations, where the speaker’s close friends and colleagues express outrage and reassurance. Anderson, however, put her vulnerability on display. Her story was about a talk (also at Durham) on feminist philosophy. Before she arrived, the posters announcing the event had been defaced with the image of another Pamela Anderson: the Playboy model and actress who rose to fame in the 1990s. Anderson’s talk was particularly well attended – mostly by male students and philosophers drawn to it by interest in the other Pamela. From the outset, Anderson was not quite believed to be a philosopher because of her name. However, she was also accused by a prominent male philosopher of ‘disappointing’ her audience because the content of her epistemology was deemed to lack the ‘particularity, concreteness and relationality required for women, and so, for “feminism”’. How do we respond when an audience is unable to recognise us as a 'knower'? Sometimes, we are silenced because the audience refuses to listen. Sometimes, we pre-emptively silence ourselves, smothering our own voices because we risk too much by expressing those ideas, to that audience, at that time (see Dotson, ‘Tracking Epistemic Violence’, Hypatia, 26.2 (2011), 236-57). Sometimes, we soldier on, knowing that the audience will find it hard to hear us. We hope that if we appear invulnerable, we might be taken seriously. At the time, trying to appear invulnerable was Anderson’s reaction to being silenced. 'How do we respond when an audience is unable to recognise us as a 'knower'? Sometimes, we are silenced because the audience refuses to listen. Sometimes, we pre-emptively silence ourselves'. I didn’t make it to hear Anderson’s paper in February, exhausted by my own performance as an invulnerable speaker and needing to recover some energy before collecting my young daughter, but afterwards my colleague and collaborator, Doerthe Rosenow, insisted that I read the text: 'You would have loved it. It resonated so much with everything we’ve talked about.' About the incident in Durham, Anderson said that she came to wonder what she might have done differently. She realised that nothing she could have done on her own could have made her a trustworthy 'knower' to that particular audience. Women’s attempts to be recognised 25
Page 1 and 2: T H E M A G A Z I N E O F R E G E N
Page 3 and 4: Foreword Dr Robert Ellis Principal
Page 6 and 7: MCR REPORT Allison D'Ambrosia (MTh
Page 8 and 9: Dissenting Spirit A History of Rege
Page 10 and 11: Jubilee Development Review As 2017
Page 12 and 13: Evie Ioannidi (English, 2012) Omnia
Page 14 and 15: THE HEART OF THINGS: MY JOURNEY TO
Page 16 and 17: A PIONEERING SPIRIT Regent's, Women
Page 18 and 19: J U B I L E E P E I studied at Rege
Page 20 and 21: J U B I L E E P E Apart from a caut
Page 22 and 23: VULNERBILITY & A LIVABLE LIFE Remem
Page 24 and 25: Pamela once said, in a sermon preac
Page 28 and 29: are unlikely to succeed by trying t
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