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The Intelligence Review | volume 2 | issue 4 |

This volume is the product of a collaboration between the European Intelligence Academy (EIA) and the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB), a student-run initiative supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, South Carolina, United States. Four CIB analysts tackle some of the most pressing and timely questions confronting intelligence observers today. Topics in this volume include the possibility of a war with North Korea, and the rise of far-right militancy in the United States. The volume also includes an assessment of the impact of the Islamic State in the relations between Russia and the United States, and a discussion of Turkish politics and its effect on NATO's cohesion.

This volume is the product of a collaboration between the European Intelligence Academy (EIA) and the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB), a student-run initiative supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, South Carolina, United States. Four CIB analysts tackle some of the most pressing and timely questions confronting intelligence observers today. Topics in this volume include the possibility of a war with North Korea, and the rise of far-right militancy in the United States. The volume also includes an assessment of the impact of the Islamic State in the relations between Russia and the United States, and a discussion of Turkish politics and its effect on NATO's cohesion.

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SPECIAL ISSUE: MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES<br />

FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION<br />

<strong>The</strong> likelihood of a war involving North Korea<br />

in the coming year<br />

Homegrown far-right extremism as a threat<br />

to the national security of the United States<br />

<strong>The</strong> Islamic State as a factor in relations<br />

between the United States and Russia<br />

<strong>The</strong> effect of Turkey’s political instability on<br />

the NATO alliance<br />

0<br />

EDITED BY JOSEPH FITSANAKIS AND MADISON NOWLIN


SPECIAL ISSUE: MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES<br />

FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION<br />

<strong>The</strong> likelihood of a war involving North Korea<br />

in the coming year<br />

Homegrown far-right extremism as a threat<br />

to the national security of the United States<br />

<strong>The</strong> Islamic State as a factor in relations<br />

between the United States and Russia<br />

<strong>The</strong> effect of Turkey’s political instability on<br />

the NATO alliance<br />

PUBLISHED BY THE<br />

EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY<br />

IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE<br />

CHANTICLEER INTELLIGENCE BRIEF<br />

EDITED BY<br />

JOSEPH FITSANAKIS AND MADISON NOWLIN<br />

COASTAL CAROLINA UNIVERSITY


European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy www.euintelligenceacademy.eu<br />

<strong>The</strong> European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy (EIA) was established in 2013 as an international<br />

network of intelligence studies scholars, specialists and students, who are dedicated to<br />

promoting research and scholarship across the European Union (EU), as well as between<br />

the EU and other parts of the world. One of the primary aims of the EIA network is to<br />

highlight the work of emerging graduate and undergraduate scholars in the intelligence<br />

studies field, while encouraging cooperation in research and scholarship between<br />

students of intelligence. <strong>The</strong> EIA is an initiative of the Research Institute for European<br />

and American Studies (RIEAS).<br />

Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief www.cibrief.org<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief (CIB) was established in 2015 as a student-run initiative<br />

supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University (CCU) in<br />

Conway, South Carolina, United States. It operates as an ancillary practicum for students<br />

in the National Security and <strong>Intelligence</strong> Studies program who wish to cultivate and refine<br />

their ability to gather, present, and analyze information in accordance with techniques used<br />

in the analytical profession. <strong>The</strong> goal of the CIB is to train aspiring intelligence professionals<br />

in the art of producing well-researched, impartial and factual analytical products.<br />

<strong>The</strong> European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy<br />

11 Kalavryton Street,<br />

Alimos, 17456, Athens, Greece<br />

Tel/Fax: +30-210-991-1214 (Europe)<br />

++1-423-742-1627 (United States)<br />

Email: rieasinfo@gmail.com<br />

ISBN-13: 978-1987629361<br />

ISBN-10: 1987629361<br />

Copyright © 2018 <strong>The</strong> European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy (EIA)<br />

All rights reserved, Published in North Charleston, SC, United States, in April 2018.<br />

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No parts of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any<br />

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to circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer of this <strong>volume</strong>.<br />

2


4


Table of Contents<br />

Foreword page 07<br />

Madison Nowlin<br />

Introduction: Major Security Challenges for the Trump Administration page 11<br />

Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis<br />

How Likely is a War Involving North Korea? page 17<br />

Matt Pologe<br />

Is Far-Right Extremism a Threat to the National Security of the United States? page 27<br />

Maeve Stewart<br />

<strong>The</strong> Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as a Factor in US-Russian Relations page 37<br />

Madison Nowlin<br />

<strong>The</strong> Effect of Turkey’s Political Instability on the NATO Alliance page 45<br />

Katelyn Montrief<br />

Biographical notes on contributors page 53<br />

5


6


Foreword<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is something to be said about the synergy one feels as they step into room<br />

300 at Coastal Carolina University’s Science Center at 6 o’clock on a Wednesday<br />

night. It crackles in the air, lights up the room, and gives everyone a sense of<br />

purpose. At that time every week, students of Coastal’s <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National<br />

Security Studies program gather and discuss world events. <strong>The</strong>y dig deep into a<br />

topic of their choice, literally bringing the most relevant news developments of<br />

the week to the table and explaining their significance. <strong>The</strong>se students do not<br />

receive class credit for this, and yet they continue to come back each week.<br />

Despite the deadlines, the pressure to perform well, and the additional stressors<br />

of life, students of the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief (CIB) refuse to let schooling<br />

interfere with their education.<br />

<strong>The</strong> most dedicated of the CIB’s students decide to sacrifice their social lives for<br />

an entire semester and register for the CIB class. You have in your hands the<br />

product of that sacrifice. This journal comprises the analytical works of some of<br />

those CIB students who took the plunge. <strong>The</strong>y agreed to be subject to countless<br />

late nights, weekly stage fright, and open criticism in front of their peers. Some<br />

even do it a second and third time. By reading this <strong>issue</strong> of <strong>The</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>Review</strong>,<br />

you will see firsthand that it is greater than the sum of its parts. <strong>The</strong> possibility of<br />

a war involving North Korea, right-wing extremism in the United States,<br />

American-Russian relations, and Turkey’s instability within the North Atlantic<br />

Treaty Organization, represent some of the most significant crises of our time.<br />

2017 turned out to be one of the most tumultuous years in America’s recent<br />

history. <strong>The</strong> election of President Donald Trump has changed the game in many<br />

ways when it comes to international politics. As part of their intelligence product,<br />

the analysts featured in this <strong>issue</strong> were tasked with evaluating the effects that the<br />

7


new Trump Administration has had on their topics. As you read this <strong>issue</strong>, you<br />

may begin to perceive the world in a different light. Whether you begin to develop<br />

a more or less pessimistic worldview, know that these analysts are only presenting<br />

the facts as they know them. I encourage you to continue building your knowledge<br />

of these evolving topics and acquire a better understanding of their complexities.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>Review</strong> can be a useful ally in this process.<br />

Madison Nowlin<br />

Chief Financial Officer and Head of Russia Desk, Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief<br />

8


9


10


Introduction: Major Security Challenges for<br />

the Trump Administration<br />

Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis<br />

Associate Professor, <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies, Coastal Carolina University<br />

Deputy Director, European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy<br />

Political scientists in Europe and the United States began employing the term<br />

superpower in the final months of World War II. During that time, there was a<br />

widespread feeling among experts that the global nature of the war against Nazism<br />

had prompted the leading allied nations of the day —the United States, the Soviet<br />

Union and the United Kingdom— to project worldwide dominance on an<br />

unprecedented scale. <strong>The</strong> use of the term became commonplace during the Cold<br />

War, as the United States and the Soviet Union exceeded the historical confines<br />

of the term great power. For nearly half a century, Washington and Moscow<br />

competed in efforts to spread their economic, military, political and cultural<br />

influence to the remotest regions of the Earth, and even into space. <strong>The</strong><br />

conclusion of that tumultuous period left the United States as the planet’s sole<br />

superpower.<br />

America’s victory in the Cold War was unquestionable and resounding. However,<br />

Washington has seen its global dominance challenged on numerous levels in the<br />

post-Cold War era —not least on September 11, 2001, when an attack on American<br />

soil by al-Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 people. That tragic event demonstrated the<br />

unpredictable nature of the post-Cold War period and triggered what became<br />

11


known as America’s “global war on terrorism”. Inevitably, the political rise of<br />

Donald J. Trump, America’s 45 th president, was shaped by the domestic and<br />

foreign-policy pressures that American society has been experiencing since the<br />

events of 9/11. During his presidential election campaign, candidate Trump<br />

struck a markedly assertive —belligerent, according to his critics— tone on<br />

matters of national security. He also proposed to narrow considerably the scope<br />

of America’s actions in defense of its national security, focusing solely on what<br />

he saw as essential priorities. Overall, however, the lack of clarity on national<br />

security policy that characterized Trump’s election campaign has persisted during<br />

his presidential tenure. <strong>The</strong> recent appointment of John Bolton to the post of<br />

National Security Advisor —the third during Trump’s 14 months in office— is<br />

perhaps indicative of his administration’s ambiguity in this crucial area of policy.<br />

Ambassador Bolton, a leading neo-conservative ideologue, is known for his<br />

military-interventionist views and his belief in so-called “democracy promotion”.<br />

That was a policy staple of the administration of US President George W. Bush,<br />

to which President Trump is —in theory— bitterly opposed.<br />

Thus, in the words of Marlon Brando in the 1963 film adaptation of <strong>The</strong> Ugly<br />

American, “the only thing that’s clear so far is that there’s no clarity at all”. That is<br />

concerning, given that clarity on national security is required by the pressing<br />

nature of ongoing national and global developments on many fronts. <strong>The</strong> present<br />

<strong>volume</strong>, a special edition of <strong>The</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>Review</strong>, with articles that are longer than<br />

usual, is an attempt to asses some of the most important national-security<br />

challenges facing the Trump administration. Given the immense breadth of<br />

national-security concerns for any American administration, our choice of topics<br />

in this compendium is inevitably selective. <strong>The</strong> selection of topics came from a<br />

hierarchical evaluation of current challenges faced by the United States, combined<br />

with the personal interests of the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief’s analysts during<br />

the concluding months of 2017, when the reports in this <strong>volume</strong> were authored.<br />

Our North Korea analyst, Matt Pologe, writes about one of the thorniest foreignpolicy<br />

<strong>issue</strong>s of the Trump administration, namely the United States’ stance on<br />

North Korea’s nuclear program. <strong>The</strong> rhetoric on all sides has always been heated<br />

in the decades-old conflict between North Korea and its rivals. But Pologe notes<br />

that, despite its heightened rhetoric, the Trump administration “remains broadly<br />

unwilling to engage in a war in the Korean Peninsula”. <strong>The</strong> same applies to China,<br />

Pyongyang’s political ally and largest trading partner. More importantly, says<br />

Pologe, the two Koreas are aware that they have nothing to gain and everything<br />

to lose from a destructive regional war. That does not mean that a war will not<br />

happen, he argues, but that it is highly unlikely. Ultimately, North Korea wants to<br />

be viewed by the outside world as a sovereign state with the “right to exercise as<br />

many freedoms as any other world power, including the United States”, says<br />

Pologe. That is something on which Pyongyang will not compromise, and will<br />

protect even at the expense of its nuclear program. Washington, therefore, must<br />

12


use that to achieve, not the complete elimination of North Korea’s nuclear<br />

program, which is highly unlikely, but rather “a cap in the production of nuclear<br />

materials” by North Korea, advises Pologe. “<strong>The</strong>re are no other realistic options”,<br />

he argues.<br />

Because of the global nature of its strength, the United States has become<br />

accustomed to viewing national-security challenges as coming from abroad. But<br />

that is not so, argues CIB analyst Maeve Stewart, who studies the contemporary<br />

rise of American far-right groups. Ideas that could today be classified as far-right<br />

have been parts of the American political landscape since the late 1700s. Indeed,<br />

students of American national security will recall that the largest domestic terrorist<br />

attack on American soil before 9/11 was carried out in 1995 by Timothy McVeigh,<br />

a white nationalist who blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in<br />

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring several hundred more.<br />

Other far-right believers have been behind high-profile terrorist incidents, such<br />

as Eric Rudolph, a Christian Identity believer and anti-gay propagandist who planted<br />

a bomb at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, during the 1996<br />

Summer Olympic Games. <strong>The</strong>se kinds of incidents could happen again, argues<br />

Stewart, if the United States government does not take comprehensive action<br />

against far-right groups. Counter-terrorist attention should focus on far-right<br />

groups that are motivated by race, because they “have shown more discipline and<br />

organization than the rest, indicating that they are moving faster towards<br />

becoming a US national security threat”, according to Stewart. She notes that a<br />

plethora of far-right groups are working in closer cooperation, having been<br />

emboldened by the election of President Trump, whom they perceive as a tacit<br />

supporter. <strong>The</strong> president, therefore, should go out of his way to explicitly and<br />

repeatedly denounce his supporters from the far-right. That act alone would help<br />

significantly to deflate the national-security threat from the extreme right, says Stewart.<br />

America’s relations with the Soviet Union and Russia have been a central pillar of<br />

Washington’s national-security policy for decades. <strong>The</strong> current juncture is no<br />

exception. But bilateral relations between the two rival states have been furthercomplicated<br />

by the ongoing military standoff in Syria, argues Maddison Nowlin,<br />

a longtime CIB analyst and executive officer. A major aspect of the Syrian Civil<br />

War is the rise of militant Sunni Islam, which has prompted the growth of numerous<br />

armed groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Nowlin points<br />

out that, while further complicating American-Russian relations, the rise of ISIS<br />

—a group that has attacked both Russian and American targets— has helped<br />

facilitate a limited dialogue about security between Washington and Moscow. <strong>The</strong><br />

United States became militarily involved in Syria as part of its longstanding<br />

support for the so-called “Arab Spring”, a combination of peaceful and violent<br />

protest movements that have pressed for political changes in the Arab World<br />

since 2010. Russia, on the other hand, entered the Syrian Civil War in an effort to<br />

prevent a repetition of the political chaos that engulfed Libya following the removal<br />

13


from power of Colonel Muammar al-Gadhafi. <strong>The</strong> simultaneous presence of<br />

Russian and American military and intelligence personnel in Syria is worrisome<br />

for many observers. Nowlin agrees, but points out that the two countries have<br />

repeatedly demonstrated that they are “capable of striking partial agreements over<br />

Syria, to the benefit of both the region and the world”. Ultimately, she points out,<br />

both Moscow and Washington are aware that, as ISIS loses power in the region,<br />

“the need for a political resolution in Syria becomes more prevalent”. Russia has<br />

repeatedly indicated that Syria’s embattled President, Bashar al-Assad, should play<br />

a prominent role in a future political solution. It is also clear, says Nowlin, that<br />

“while the United States has articulated its intent to remove Assad from power,<br />

that is no longer [its] primary goal [...] in Syria”. This could form the basis of a<br />

mutually agreed path toward stability in the country, argues Nowlin. Alternatively,<br />

tensions between the United States and Russia could continue to rise toward Cold<br />

War levels, something that could “turn Syria into one of history’s longest proxy<br />

wars between the two powers”, she concludes.<br />

<strong>The</strong> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a central parameter<br />

of America’s national security strategy in the postwar era. However, recent years<br />

have witnessed a severe deterioration in relations between NATO’s two largest<br />

military powers, the United States and Turkey. In September of 2017, following<br />

a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President Trump<br />

said that the relationship between the two nations was better than it had ever<br />

been. However, as CIB analyst and executive officer Katelyn Montrief argues, the<br />

American president’s statement appears to contradict the facts. <strong>The</strong>re has never<br />

been complete agreement on policy between Washington and Ankara, even<br />

—especially, some would say— during the Cold War. However, Montrief notes<br />

that recent years have seen an unprecedented deterioration in relations between<br />

Turkey and the United States, which has inevitably spread confusion and ambiguity<br />

within NATO circles. <strong>The</strong>re are several factors that contribute to the worsening<br />

of bilateral relations between Washington and Ankara, says Montrief. One is<br />

America’s stance toward the Kurds, which constitute a sizeable minority within<br />

Turkey, Iraq, and other nations in the Middle East. Turkey sees the Kurds’<br />

secessionist aspirations as direct threats to its territorial integrity. But the United<br />

States has worked closely with the Kurds for years, most recently in Syria against<br />

ISIS. That close relationship continues to incense Ankara and contributes<br />

significantly to its thorny relations with Washington. Relations between Turkey<br />

and the United States took a rapid turn for the worse in July 2016, when a group<br />

of Turkish military officers carried out a failed coup against President Erdogan.<br />

He has since accused Washington of involvement in the coup, and has asked for<br />

the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, an American-based former Islamic preacher and<br />

politician, who leads the so-called Gülen movement. Washington rejects Ankara’s<br />

assertions and continues to provide political protection for Gülen. In late 2017,<br />

former national security advisor Michael Flynn was charged with making false<br />

14


statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation about a series of conversations<br />

he had with Russia's ambassador. He was also accused of having been offered $15<br />

million to help Turkish officials forcibly —and presumably illegally— remove<br />

Gülen from the US. This latest claim shows that “extraditing Gülen to Turkey<br />

remains one of Ankara’s major objectives, and that the Erdogan administration<br />

has taken extreme measures —including attempts to bribe US officials— in<br />

attempts to do so”, says Montrief. Because of all these reasons, the decline in<br />

Turkish-American relations will continue, she adds. Much will depend on whether<br />

Turkey’s domestic political instability will be prolonged. <strong>The</strong> latter “will continue<br />

to have a negative effect on NATO, which is in turn likely to lead to future<br />

diplomatic disagreements between Turkey and its NATO allies”, Montrief warns.<br />

This compendium focuses on an admittedly small sample of potential nationalsecurity<br />

challenges for the Trump administration. It also showcases an equally<br />

small sample of the CIB’s extensive output. It is presented in the hope that readers<br />

will benefit from the precision, astuteness and analytical clarity of these very timely<br />

reports, which have been produced by a very talented team of young analysts.<br />

15


16


How Likely is a War Involving North Korea?<br />

Matt Pologe<br />

<strong>The</strong> question of whether the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)<br />

could become involved in a war could be partly answered by assessing the<br />

DPRK’s national history. <strong>The</strong> very roots of this hermit kingdom were forged<br />

through war, and the citizens of the DPRK have been acclimated to that<br />

background (Armstrong 2017). Since the fighting concluded in 1953, the DPRK<br />

and the United States (US) have been at a standstill with regards to the DPRK’s<br />

status and armaments program. <strong>The</strong> current US position is that the DPRK must<br />

not expand its ballistic missile program. Washington also wants to prevent the<br />

DPRK from establishing a nuclear program, and to compel Pyongyang to join the<br />

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of the International Atomic Energy Association<br />

(IAEA) (Davenport 2018; Shepherd 2017). However, the DPRK insists that it is<br />

within its right to exercise as many freedoms as any other world power, including<br />

the US, and has withdrawn its membership to the NPT (Davenport 2018;<br />

Manchester 2017). If the current pattern of military expansion continues to<br />

increase, then the DPRK may become so powerful that it might nullify the<br />

capability of United Nations (UN) to impose effective sanctions. If the threat of<br />

war becomes too great, then the US and the UN may have to enter into<br />

negotiations, or the situation could feasibly end in conflict. Notably, after decades<br />

of growth and evasion from sanctions, the DPRK could have a level of military<br />

strength that would allow it to force the US to alter its policy on the hermit<br />

country’s nuclear program at the bargaining table (Davenport 2017; When 2003).<br />

17


<strong>The</strong> Emergence of North Korea<br />

Since 1950, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, known commonly as RoK or<br />

South Korea, have remained in a constant state of war. More powerful countries,<br />

like the US and China, have encouraged regional conflict in the past (Armstrong<br />

2017). Japan, a valuable US ally in the region, is another major component in this<br />

topic, as it has been targeted by the DPRK through acts of provocation ever since<br />

the conclusion of World War II (Armstrong 2017). <strong>The</strong> Japanese Empire reigned<br />

over the Korean peninsula from 1910 until the end of World War II. <strong>The</strong> record<br />

of the occupation was devastating for the Korean people (Armstrong 2017). What<br />

had begun as an ostentatious display of imperialism, eventually wavered under the<br />

weight of Korean armed defiance in 1931 (Blomquist and Wertz 2015).<br />

<strong>The</strong> Korean resistance formed the Provisional Government of the Republic of<br />

Korea, which declared war on Japan in 1941 (Armstrong 2017). Japan became<br />

increasingly preoccupied with the World War II in the Pacific Ocean, and that<br />

lack of focus allowed the Korean resistance movement to form an independent<br />

identity. Meanwhile, many Koreans were still fighting in the Japanese military or<br />

working as civilian laborers, which made them supporters of the colonial regime<br />

in the eyes of some. That tension brought about a new era of conflict and war<br />

after 1945 (Blomquist and Wertz 2015). After the Japanese Empire surrendered<br />

to the allied forces in 1945, a power vacuum emerged in the Korean Peninsula.<br />

<strong>The</strong> region became a proxy arena for an ideological battle between the US-led<br />

UN against communist states like China and the Soviet Union.<br />

At that time, members of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) and the<br />

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began to split and form opposing factions, each<br />

of them attempting to establish an organized government (Blomquist, Wertz<br />

2015). Supported by the US, the majority of the NRA formed modern South<br />

Korea, while factions of the NRA and the Soviet-backed PLA pledged loyalty to<br />

Kim Il-sung, future founder of the DPRK (Blomquist and Wertz 2015). In 1950,<br />

the DPRK, supported by the Soviet Union and China, invaded South Korea, and<br />

the United States rushed to its defense. In 1951, the US and South Korea signed<br />

a defense treaty and the American General Douglas MacArthur led a<br />

multinational UN force in pushing Kim Il-sung’s troops almost to the Chinese<br />

border. Much to MacArthur’s surprise, however, Chinese forces successfully<br />

assisted the DPRK in countering the UN assault, in an effort to prevent US<br />

domination of the region (Whalen 2003). For China, the presence of a USsupported<br />

military power so close to its territory was —and has remained—<br />

unacceptable. It was the reason that prompted China to intervene in the ensuing<br />

Korean War and assist the DPRK militarily and economically.<br />

18


<strong>The</strong> Korean War ended in armistice in 1953, after the DPRK accepted an offer<br />

to control a number of islands off the coast of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).<br />

That led to a ceasefire, but did not technically end the war (Armstrong 2017). <strong>The</strong><br />

DPRK and China signed the so-called Sino-Korean Treaty in 1961, with the<br />

Chinese vowing to defend the DPRK in the event of a war (Armstrong 2017).<br />

Following the conclusion of the Korean War, Kim Il-sung managed to gain an<br />

almost divine status among his people, by spearheading the creation of a quasireligion<br />

called Juche, which hails him as a god. According to the DPRK’s state<br />

ideology, Kim will be forever known as the Eternal President of North Korea,<br />

and the country’s citizens are fervent supporters of that notion. <strong>The</strong> people of the<br />

DPRK are asked to display their love to Kim with an annual celebration and<br />

military display (Armstrong 2017).<br />

North Korea’s Nuclear Era<br />

Kim Il-sung managed to establish the state and significantly expand his nation’s<br />

weapons program. But his son and successor, Kim Jong-il, had even more success<br />

at expanding the DPRK’s military capability, despite the presence of economic<br />

sanctions imposed by the UN and the US. After the collapse of the Soviet Union<br />

in 1991, the DPRK faced a potentially catastrophic loss of support from what was<br />

its strongest ally and defense-trading partner. That was Kim Jong-il’s first real test.<br />

He had to find a way to maintain the country’s weapons program, but was no<br />

longer able to do it as drastically as his father (Davenport 2017). In 1992, the<br />

DPRK signed the NPT and submitted relevant information to the IAEA<br />

(Davenport 2017). Kim Jong-il was then able to circumvent the rules of the treaty<br />

by pretending to be cooperative, while at the same time growing the nuclear<br />

program and avoiding major conflict. <strong>The</strong> UN imposed new sanctions against the<br />

regime after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, but was not prepared to send troops<br />

to the peninsula as it did in 1950 (Davenport 2017). However, over time US<br />

military presence in the region has significantly increased. Yet Washington<br />

remains broadly unwilling to engage in a new war in the Korean Peninsula, despite<br />

proclamations to the contrary.<br />

After North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, China had to publicly support<br />

sanctions against the DPRK to maintain positive relations with the UN. But<br />

Beijing has not been completely upfront about honoring all of the stipulations of<br />

these sanctions (Davenport 2017; Armstrong 2017; Shim 2017). China is North<br />

Korea’s largest trading partner, neighbor and military ally. It is therefore difficult<br />

for either side to behave aggressively against the other (Armstrong 2017). Today,<br />

the DPRK’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un continues the trend of public defiance<br />

and verbal hostility. <strong>The</strong> Kim dynasty has always ruled through a mixture of fear<br />

and respect that North Koreans often compare to the sun: if you get too close to<br />

it, you burn; if you get too far away, you freeze. That is how the ruling family has<br />

successfully maintained communal loyalty to the regime. <strong>The</strong> people do not only<br />

19


feel reliant on their leader, but also revere him. So they heavily support having an<br />

advanced military program, and applaud public rhetoric against the US. For the<br />

most part, the citizens of the DPRK view having a national nuclear arms program<br />

as crucial for their defense against Western power.<br />

In terms of national security, the DPRK has everything to gain by finding ways<br />

around sanctions and expanding its nuclear and missile programs. But it truly has<br />

everything to lose by engaging in full-scale conflict. Any conflict that would bring<br />

the UN against the DPRK would almost certainly involve the US, South Korea,<br />

Japan, Russia, and China, which could have long-term global implications. <strong>The</strong>se<br />

parties understand the notion that any war involving the DPRK could have<br />

potentially devastating consequences, as nuclear or chemical weapons could be<br />

utilized. In order to properly handle the DPRK threat, the US must find a way to<br />

agree on a cap in the production of nuclear materials, because there are no other<br />

realistic options. Rhetoric and propaganda from both the US and North Korean<br />

sides have always been heated, but the key to solving the differences between the two<br />

countries will be through patience and diplomacy, which comes with communication.<br />

<strong>The</strong> DPRK and the Trump Presidency<br />

<strong>The</strong> most realistic hope for a resolution resides in the will of US President Donald<br />

Trump and his foreign policy advisors. But the Trump team must remain<br />

conscious of what the DPRK desires. When President Trump was campaigning<br />

for the 2016 election, Kim Jong-un displayed hints of admiration for the realestate<br />

mogul. But that feeling soon faded after the DPRK conducted a nuclear<br />

test in early September 2016 (Thiessien 2016; UNSC 2016). As President Trump<br />

began melding his foreign policy, he made clear that he intended to deal with the<br />

DPRK diplomatically. By early January, 2017, Kim Jong-un and President-Elect<br />

Trump had exchanged public insults, leading many to believe that a DPRK<br />

provocation would be imminent (Manchester 2017). <strong>The</strong> day before Trump’s<br />

inauguration, the US <strong>Intelligence</strong> Community acknowledged activity in a missile<br />

factory outside of Pyongyang, which renewed concerns that Kim Jong-un<br />

intended to launch a missile during the inauguration. While such an event never<br />

materialized, the DPRK did launch a missile on February 11, as President Trump<br />

was meeting with Japanese President Shinzo Abe at his golf club in Mar-a-Lago,<br />

Florida (McKirdy 2017).<br />

Three days after that meeting in Florida, Kim Jong-un’s exiled half-brother, Kim<br />

Jong-nam, was assassinated with the use of VX nerve agent, a chemical banned<br />

by the UN, while waiting to board a flight at the Kuala Lumpur International<br />

Airport, Malaysia (Manchester 2017). Immediately after his murder, South<br />

Korean and Malaysian authorities accused the DPRK of orchestrating the<br />

assassination and began searching for the North Koreans responsible. Kim Jongnam<br />

had been outspoken against the regime, and was exiled by his father in 2001.<br />

20


Two women, carrying Vietnamese and Indonesian passports, were arrested based<br />

on CCTV footage of the attack on Kim Jong-nam. Both have insisted that they<br />

are not North Korean agents (Anonymous 2017). Following Kim’s dramatic<br />

assassination, China announced that it would suspend all oil imports from the<br />

DPRK, effectively halting purchases of one of the DPRK’s largest export. After an<br />

extensive investigation, the US concluded that the DPRK did order the assassination<br />

of Kim Jong-nam and has stated its intent to impose even more sanctions<br />

(Anonymous 2018).<br />

On March 6, 2017, North Korea fired four ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan,<br />

with a fifth missile failing to launch. <strong>The</strong>se launchings occurred just before the<br />

military drill held jointly by the United States and South Korea, in which Japan had<br />

also been invited to join. Eight days later, North Korea tested an improved rocket<br />

engine, which demonstrated its intent to improve its ballistic missile program and<br />

showed that it was succeeding in that effort (McKirdy 2017). On April 6, the<br />

DPRK launched another ballistic missile before another high-level meeting, this<br />

time between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping<br />

(McKirdy 2017). During the meeting, President Trump ordered a missile strike<br />

on Syria in a possible show of force towards the DPRK. Shortly after, President<br />

Trump ordered the Mother of All Bombs (MOAB) to be dropped on ISIS in<br />

Afghanistan. In late April, the US carrier Carl Vinson arrived in the Sea of Japan,<br />

which raised alarms about a possible military engagement in Korea. However,<br />

President Trump maintained that he would meet with Kim Jong-un under the<br />

right circumstances (Manchester 2017).<br />

Rockets and Olympic Diplomacy<br />

In early May, South Korea elected liberal Moon Jae-in as its new president. Moon<br />

won on a promise that he would try to reunify the two Koreas. But the DPRK<br />

seemed intent on testing his patience. Just a few days after his inauguration, North<br />

Korea launched another missile and the UN responded with more sanctions<br />

(McKirdy 2017). On July 4, the DPRK claimed to have tested its first successful<br />

ICBM followed by another successful test on July 28. <strong>The</strong> UN responded with<br />

more sanctions, but did not address the DPRK’s increased rocket propulsion<br />

capabilities, as demonstrated in the missile tests. It appeared that the new missiles,<br />

with increased rocket size and operation, were capable of striking the US<br />

mainland. <strong>The</strong> DPRK could successfully affix a miniaturized nuclear warhead on<br />

a missile and thus carry out a nuclear strike on the United States. Towards the end<br />

of November, the DPRK launched an even more advanced ICBM, this time<br />

stating that it had the capability of reaching US lawmakers in Washington, DC.<br />

Following the conclusion of the 2018 winter Olympics in South Korea, the DPRK<br />

delegation invited South Korea’s President Moon to Pyongyang for a summit.<br />

Now President Moon and Supreme Leader Kim are set to meet in April, along<br />

21


with President Trump. <strong>The</strong> status of the meeting could change at any moment. If<br />

it does take place, then it will be the first meeting between a South Korean<br />

President and leader from the DPRK in over a decade. Astonishingly, this would<br />

also be the first official meeting with Kim Jong-un for both President Moon Jaein<br />

and President Trump. <strong>The</strong> two Koreas have even agreed to establish a<br />

communication hotline. This should be seen as a critical step in diplomacy<br />

between the two sides. Interestingly enough, the invitation came just days before<br />

President Trump declared new tough sanctions against the DPRK, in what<br />

appeared to be yet another attempt to limit the importation of oil and exportation<br />

of coal by the regime (Landler 2018). It is important to note that these sanctions<br />

have previously been ineffective at thwarting acts of provocation by the DPRK,<br />

as numerous nations, including China, have refused to comply with established<br />

regulations, and the DPRK has managed to evade them. It is also important to<br />

keep in mind that these sanctions negatively impact the Chinese economy as it<br />

receives most of its coal supply from the DPRK, and it does so for the most<br />

advantageous price on the market. It is therefore difficult for some UN member<br />

states to honor all sanctions resolutions, which is something that the DPRK has<br />

managed to exploit, despite growing penalties.<br />

Conclusion<br />

<strong>The</strong> US and the DPRK have remained at gridlock because the US is solemnly<br />

opposed to the DPRK having a nuclear capability. But the DPRK desires as many<br />

freedoms as any other state. Marshal Kim Jong-un finds it imperative to construct<br />

a capable defense against the potential threat that the US military poses by its<br />

significant presence in South Korea. So the fact remains that the North Koreans<br />

have the most to gain from gridlock, as it can continue to advance its defense<br />

program, while the UN continues to sanction and watch. <strong>The</strong> US, South Korea,<br />

China and Japan all do not want the DPRK to possess nuclear capabilities.<br />

However, anything less than that is a non-starter with the DPRK when it comes<br />

to diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless, the DPRK has expressed its willingness<br />

to suspend its nuclear program for the duration of the talks. Yet, as President<br />

Moon has stated, optimism at this early stage would be premature. It is worth<br />

remembering that Kim Jong-il established similar hopes with the UN during the<br />

1990s and his father did so at earlier times. Historically, however, such openings<br />

did not lead to lasting change. If anything, the DPRK may use this as an<br />

opportunity to quietly hone its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, while<br />

avoiding mounting UN sanctions. Moreover, the feeling of optimism is very<br />

unlikely to be tenuous, as these talks will be held during the looming joint military<br />

drills that are jointly held every year between the US and South Korea. <strong>The</strong>re is<br />

an absence of signs that would suggest that Washington or Seoul are willing to<br />

postpone these drills.<br />

22


For decades, the two sides have dismissed each other’s demands and no major<br />

<strong>issue</strong> of disagreement has been resolved. So, a major cause for concern moving<br />

forward is that the overall strategy of the UN has remained unchanged despite<br />

the ineffectiveness its past efforts. That is especially critical to remember in the<br />

wake of a potentially historic meeting between the various sides. Undoubtedly, all<br />

countries involved face the very real risk of losing a plethora of resources by going<br />

to war. This applies primarily to South Korea and the DPRK, as both nations risk<br />

virtual annihilation. To prevent this, the White House should envision reality from<br />

Pyongyang’s perspective, and the world must hope that the DPRK would return<br />

the gesture by abiding by international law. Every participating country in this<br />

dispute essentially faces economic stress, heavy military casualties, political suicide<br />

and possible collapse in a nuclear conflict. <strong>The</strong> audacious public rhetoric by the<br />

DPRK seems to be purely propaganda, as it is way more advantageous for the<br />

pariah state to maintain the current status of gridlock. Additionally, none of the<br />

nations involved, including the DPRK, appear to be truly seeking war. I can<br />

therefore state with high confidence that it is highly unlikely that there will be a<br />

war involving North Korea in the foreseeable future.<br />

23


References Cited<br />

Anonymous (2017) “Kim Jong Nam Assassination: CCTV Shows Accused’s Alleged<br />

‘Practice Run’ Before Mysterious Killing”, SBS, 11 October accessed on 29 November 2017.<br />

Anonymous (2018) “State Dept Sanctions DPRK for Using Agent VX to Kill Kim Jong-un’s<br />

Half Brother”, Sputnik, 07 March <br />

accessed on 07 March 2018.<br />

Armstrong, C. (2017) “Korean History and Political Geography”, Asia Society, 03 December<br />

accessed on 03<br />

December 2017.<br />

Blomquist, R., and Wertz, D. (2015) “An Overview of North Korea- Japan Relations”,<br />

NCNK, 1 October <br />

accessed on 03 December 2017.<br />

Davenport, K. (2017) “Chronology of US-North Korea Nuclear and Missile<br />

Diplomacy”, Arms Control Association, 1 November accessed on 3 December 2017.<br />

Landler, M. (2018) “Trump Announces Harsh New Sanctions Against North Korea”,<br />

<strong>The</strong> New York Times, 23 February <br />

accessed on 2 March 2018.<br />

Manchester, J. (2017) “Trump and North Korea: A Timeline on Escalating Tensions”,<br />

<strong>The</strong> Hill, 3 September <br />

accessed on 30 November 2017.<br />

McKirdy, E. (2017)”North Korea Timeline : From Trump’s Inauguration to Now”,<br />

CNN, 31 July accessed on 29 November 2017.<br />

United Nations Security Council (2016)” UNSC Strengthens Sanctions on the DPRK,<br />

Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2321” United Nations Security Council, New York,<br />

NY, United States, 27 November <br />

accessed on 29 November 2017.<br />

Shepherd, C. (2017)” US Can Talk to North Korea if it Stops Missile Tests: Tillerson”<br />

Reuters, 06 August accessed on 03<br />

December 2017.<br />

Whalen, K. (2017) “A Short History United States-North Korea Timeline”, PBS Frontline,<br />

10 January <br />

accessed on 3 December 2017.<br />

24


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26


Is Homegrown Far-Right Extremism in the<br />

United States a National Security Threat?<br />

Maeve Stewart<br />

Evidence of the presence of ideologies in the United States that could today be<br />

classified as far-right dates as far back as the late 1700s. However, this report<br />

focuses on far-right threats to US national security in the period after the attacks<br />

of September 11, 2001. <strong>The</strong>re are several definitions of national security, but for<br />

the purposes of this report, national security refers to wholescale efforts to<br />

preserve and sustain the nation-state from foreign and domestic threats through<br />

political negotiation, force or threat of force. In this case, the threat is homegrown<br />

and the groups that represent that threat consist of US citizens who carry out<br />

attacks on US soil. <strong>The</strong> term far-right can be defined as a broad collection of<br />

political views held by conservatives who maintain extreme nationalist or nativist<br />

ideologies, as well as authoritarian tendencies. Today there are several types of<br />

groups that can be classified as far-right, such as anti-government militias, anti-<br />

Muslim groups, anti-LGBTQ, anti-immigrant groups, and groups that are motivated<br />

by race and nationality, including the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and various neo-Nazi<br />

factions. Overall, the far-right in America is becoming an increasingly prominent<br />

political force. However, the groups that are motivated by race have shown more<br />

discipline and organization than the rest, indicating that they are moving faster<br />

towards becoming a US national security threat.<br />

27


Ideology and Main Actors<br />

Throughout history, the various ideologies of far-right groups have shifted; old<br />

groups have disappeared and have been replaced by new formations led by<br />

younger members. It can be easy to overlook ideological differences between<br />

these factions, but these are important in order to form an accurate picture of the<br />

far-right ecosystem. White supremacists believe that white people are superior,<br />

therefore white people should be dominant over all other races. White nationalists<br />

seek to develop and maintain a separate white national identity, but are not<br />

necessarily racial supremacists. Neo-Nazis are the post-World War II groups that<br />

aim to construct contemporary interpretations of German national socialism,<br />

modeled after the German far-right that emerged in the 1920s and persisted until<br />

the 1940s. Neo-confederates promote a revisionist history of the southern<br />

Confederate States of America and view the south’s stance in the American Civil<br />

War in a positive light. Christian identity groups believe that only the European<br />

peoples and people of kindred blood are the descendants of the Biblical figures,<br />

Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, hence the descendants of the ancient Israelites, and<br />

only they can reach paradise. Finally, racist skinheads are the youth-oriented,<br />

violent element of the white supremacist movement.<br />

<strong>The</strong> contemporary far-right movement is influenced by several important actors,<br />

including individuals, organizations and groups. David Duke “is [today] the most<br />

recognizable figure of the American radical right, a neo-Nazi, longtime Klan<br />

leader and now international spokesman for Holocaust denial” (SPLC n.d.). An<br />

emerging far-right figure is Richard Spencer, a white supremacist and president<br />

of the National Policy Institute, which operates as a lobbying group for white<br />

supremacists. He is an avid organizer with many followers, who has called for a<br />

“peaceful ethnic cleansing” and sees himself as a spokesman for the “dispossessed<br />

white race” (SPLC n.d.). In 2008, Spencer coined the term “alt-right”, meaning<br />

those whose ideologies are centered on “white identity” and feel they are under<br />

attack by “political correctness” and “social justice” (SPLC n.d.). <strong>The</strong> term altright<br />

loosely defines groups with far-right ideologies that reject mainstream<br />

conservatism and favor a white-nationalist ideology.<br />

<strong>The</strong> main organization that has shaped this movement is Stormfront, a website<br />

for white supremacists with over 300,000 registered users. It is used for all types<br />

of communication and it has users that are said to be linked to over 100 violent<br />

criminal acts, committed with far-right motives, all over the world (SPLC n.d.).<br />

<strong>The</strong> Southern Poverty Law Center refers to Stormfront as the “murder capital of<br />

the internet”. Another individual that has just recently stepped into the spotlight<br />

is Jared Taylor, a white nationalist who is the founder and editor of the white<br />

supremacist magazine American Renaissance. Taylor recently authored an article<br />

containing several, templates of racially motivated posters. <strong>The</strong>se posters have<br />

been popping up on college campuses all over the US. Groups and leaders such<br />

as the National Socialist Movement (NSM), led by Jeff Schoep, Identity Evropa,<br />

28


led by Patrick Casey, the KKK, neo-Nazis, and Michael Hill, founder of the League<br />

of the South, can be considered the most active within the racially motivated farright<br />

in America.<br />

Recent Historical Development<br />

During the 1980s, 75 far-right extremists were prosecuted in the US for acts of<br />

terrorism (Smith 1994:33). In 1983, Gordon Kahl, a member of the Posse<br />

Comitatus, an anti-government and anti-Semitic group, killed two federal<br />

marshals. Later that year, a white nationalist group known as <strong>The</strong> Order robbed<br />

banks, stores and armored cars, bombed a theater and a synagogue and murdered<br />

Alan Berg, a liberal radio talk-show host. <strong>The</strong> most notable far-right attacks<br />

before 9/11, in terms of their scale and the attention they received, were the<br />

bombings of the Oklahoma federal building in 1995 and the Centennial Olympic<br />

Park in 1996. <strong>The</strong> Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) disseminated detailed<br />

reports regarding these attacks. In April of 1995, Timothy McVeigh, a former<br />

soldier, blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,<br />

Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring several hundred more. McVeigh<br />

claimed that his action was a retaliation for the Ruby Ridge and Waco sieges (FBI<br />

n.d.), which are prominent in far-right activist circles and have come to symbolize<br />

the perceived intent of the state to disarm citizens. In July of 1996, during the<br />

summer Olympic Games, Eric Rudolph, a Christian Identity believer and anti-gay<br />

propagandist, bombed the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, killing<br />

two and injuring over 100 others. Rudolph then went on to bomb two more<br />

locations in Georgia and Alabama (FBI n.d.). After 9/11, there have been over<br />

30 attacks committed on American soi by people motivated by far-right<br />

ideologies. One of the most infamous is the shooting at the Emanuel African<br />

Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, perpetrated by a<br />

white supremacist, Dylann Roof, on June 17, 2015. Roof killed nine people in hopes<br />

of starting a race war (FBI n.d.).<br />

Present Status of the American Far Right<br />

Despite its long history, domestic non-Islamic extremism is often overlooked as<br />

a threat to US national security. Recent developments indicate that the American<br />

far-right is becoming a national security threat, possibly even greater than Islamist<br />

extremists.<br />

Since the November 2016 election of President Donald Trump, American farright<br />

groups have, seemingly, become emboldened through public protests and<br />

rallies, and through aggressive recruitment tactics. It is too early in Trump’s<br />

presidency to determine with certainty where he stands, regarding his level of<br />

support, on the <strong>issue</strong>s involving the far-right. Earlier this year, a report on CNN<br />

disclosed President Trump’s alleged racial comments to lawmakers. <strong>The</strong> president<br />

reportedly said, “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come<br />

29


here?”, referring to developing countries such as Haiti and countries in Africa.<br />

President Trump then reportedly went on to say, “Why do we need more Haitians?<br />

Take them out” (Phillip and Watkins 2018). It is comments such as these that<br />

arguably give the American far-right the perception that the President of the<br />

United States supports elements of their ideologies.<br />

In the past year, there have been three attacks in the US, perpetrated by supporters<br />

of the far-right, resulting in casualties. <strong>The</strong> first was the death of Timothy Coughman,<br />

who was stabbed with a sword by James Jackson in March 2017. Police later<br />

confirmed that Jackson traveled from Maryland to New York with the intent of<br />

killing black men in order to stop interracial relationships between white women<br />

and black men (Southall 2017). <strong>The</strong> second attack occurred in May 2017. Jeremy<br />

Christian stabbed and killed two people and injured two more, when he was<br />

confronted for uttering racial slurs aimed at two teenage girls (Becker and Parker<br />

2017). <strong>The</strong> third violent incident occurred in August 2017. James Fields allegedly<br />

drove his car into a group of counter-protestors at the Unite the Right rally in<br />

Charlottesville, Virginia, which was organized by far-right groups, killing one and<br />

injuring nineteen others (Heim 2017).<br />

In addition to these violent events, there have been several non-violent events. In<br />

early October 2017, Spencer led another march in Charlottesville that only lasted<br />

about 20 minutes due to a large counter-protest that was held in the same area<br />

(Chaitin 2017). <strong>The</strong> White Lives Matter rally occurred later that month in<br />

Tennessee, but was also cut short. One violent incident was reported after the<br />

event, at a pub, where several White Lives Matter protestors harassed a white<br />

woman for sitting with a black man that ended in a physical altercation between<br />

a protestor and the woman (Liebelson 2017). According to Ian Allen, editor at<br />

IntelNews, far-right activist Taylor Wilson attempted to derail a passenger train in<br />

Nebraska on October 22, 2017. <strong>The</strong> FBI reported that Wilson entered the engine<br />

room and activated the emergency brakes, bringing the train to a complete halt.<br />

No one was reported injured or killed. Allen also refers to an FBI indictment that<br />

states: “Wilson traveled to Charlottesville, Virginia, in August of last year to attend<br />

the ‘Unite the Right’ rally, which was organized by various white supremacist,<br />

white nationalist, neo-Nazi and militia groups.” <strong>The</strong>re have also been reports of<br />

Wilson being a member of the NSM (Allen 2018).<br />

Information was recently uncovered by the investigative website ProPublica<br />

regarding today’s far-right groups and their organizational capabilities. According<br />

to the website, far-right groups are sharing information and documents via online<br />

chatrooms about manufacturing and using bombs, grenades, mines and other<br />

explosive devices. <strong>The</strong>se documents contain information ranging from instructions<br />

on how to detonate dynamite, to US military-<strong>issue</strong> manuals for making<br />

improvised explosives and booby traps (Thompson and Winston 2017).<br />

30


More recently, far-right posters have appeared on college campuses in what<br />

appears to be a new recruitment technique. More specifically, Clemson University,<br />

in Clemson, South Carolina, has seen alt-right-themed posters attempting to<br />

appeal to white people who feel they are being oppressed (Silvarole 2017).<br />

Emerson College, in Boston, Massachusetts, has seen fliers sponsored by<br />

Vanguard America, proclaiming: “Take Your Country Back!” (Anon. 2016). <strong>The</strong><br />

Patriot Front website is displayed on the flyers at the University of Utah in Salt<br />

Lake City, Utah, bearing the words: “Stop the rapes. Stop the crime. Stop the<br />

murder. Stop the blacks”, along with crime statistics (Anderson 2017). Coastal<br />

Carolina University, in Conway, South Carolina, has also seen white supremacy<br />

flyers on its campus. Early flyers displayed the message “It’s okay to be white”<br />

(Boschult and Broyles 2017). However, later versions, created by Jared Taylor,<br />

state: “Men of the West, don’t give in to hate. Love your people. Love your culture.<br />

Love your heritage. Embrace white identity today!”. One recent flyer found on<br />

Coastal’s Campus, which has reportedly been seen on several other campuses, states,<br />

“Make America White Again”; this is clearly an alteration of one of President<br />

Trump’s campaign slogans, “Make America Great Again”.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se are only a few examples of flyers that are popping up on college campuses<br />

across the country. Since March of 2016, the SPLC has tracked over 300 racist<br />

fliers on over 200 different college campuses in the US (Hatewatch). <strong>The</strong>re are<br />

also reports of college campus computer systems getting hacked —specifically<br />

libraries— in order for far-right activists to print their fliers remotely without<br />

getting caught (Markovich 2016). Hackers are finding a way into university<br />

computer systems and connecting to their printing software in order to print their<br />

racist propaganda from the comfort of their own homes. <strong>The</strong> goal behind these<br />

actions appears to be to instill the perception of a large presence of the far-right<br />

on campuses. Fear comes into play when students and faculty try to silently figure<br />

out who the anonymous supporters of these groups may be.<br />

Analytical Projections<br />

Members of the American far-right consistently interpret the views of the Trump<br />

administration as tacit support for their beliefs, which in turn fuels their actions.<br />

<strong>The</strong> leaders of these groups can no longer be dismissed as “racist rednecks”. <strong>The</strong>y<br />

are well educated and understand how to encourage —and sometimes<br />

manipulate— their followers into carrying out violent acts in the name of their<br />

ideologies. Additionally, it was not until the first Unite the Right rally in<br />

Charlottesville that the US saw large-scale collaboration between far-right groups<br />

post 9/11. After seeing the second Tennessee rally canceled due to the small<br />

turnout and overwhelming amount of counter-protesters, far-right leaders made<br />

recruitment adjustments by targeting college students via racist propaganda. Now<br />

that there are open lines of communication and cooperation between the various<br />

groups, the far-right aims to build upon that by recruiting new members in hopes<br />

that there will be more joint events in the future.<br />

31


<strong>The</strong> far-right have come to the realization that the future of the US is in the hands<br />

of the younger generations. By spreading their ideologies, they are hoping to<br />

recruit more young members. Targeting college campuses is, therefore, seen as an<br />

ideal recruitment tactic, whether it is activists posting the flyers themselves,<br />

getting a student or faculty member to do it, or by hacking into school computer<br />

systems to print them out. This development is extremely important because<br />

students now have a platform to launch their own rallies from. <strong>The</strong> use of the<br />

Internet makes spreading propaganda that much easier; it can be seen and shared<br />

by people not only all over the United States, but all over the world as well. This,<br />

plus the decentralization of the movement, should be considered dangerous. In<br />

the past, government security agencies were able to pinpoint a certain area where<br />

these groups operated. For instance, the KKK was known to mainly operate in<br />

rural areas of the South and Midwest. However, these small group-like cells are<br />

appearing all over the country, and sometimes all it takes is the click of a button<br />

to make their presence known. <strong>The</strong> majority of these groups will not be publicly<br />

visible until they organize a high-profile event such as the Charlottesville rally.<br />

It is entirely possible that these newly established far-right college groups will<br />

collaborate with groups on other campuses across the US to organize an event<br />

with some form of meaningful structure. This event could show up as a series of<br />

rallies taking place in succession, one on a new campus every day, or several<br />

distinct rallies held on different campuses on the same day. It is also possible that<br />

a large rally could be organized in the US, such as the recent one in Poland, which,<br />

according to a Washington Post article, was attended by an estimated 60,000 farright<br />

supporters from dozens of countries, including Italy and Britain (Selk 2017).<br />

Ideally, for the American far-right, supporters will come to attend such an event<br />

from all over the world, which will, by definition, elevate the threat to US national<br />

security. Concerns over the collaboration between homegrown far-right groups<br />

in the United States and similar groups abroad are not alarmist. One can argue<br />

that it is currently happening, as there were reports from the Charlottesville rally<br />

that far-right supporters from Canada were in attendance (Marquis 2017).<br />

Ultimately, the more public support the far-right gains, even if it is perceived<br />

support via hacked computers to create visual propaganda, the more violence will<br />

occur. It can be stated with high confidence that the American far-right is a<br />

national security threat. This is primarily due to two things: first, the fact that farright<br />

groups have recently acquired the information necessary to build and<br />

detonate large-scale IEDs; second, the fact that they are sharing that information<br />

with other far-right actors online. Broadly speaking, there is substantial and<br />

deepening collaboration and support among these groups. Additionally, the farright<br />

feel more emboldened. It can be stated with moderate confidence that there<br />

will be a large-scale attack on US soil, perpetrated by the far-right, within 2018.<br />

32


Implications for the Trump Administration<br />

President Trump, along with senior members of his administration, have a<br />

perceived controversy surrounding them when it comes to the far-right. <strong>The</strong><br />

president has been accused by the Southern Poverty Law Center and <strong>The</strong> New<br />

York Times of being a sympathizer and supporter of the far-right, and even of<br />

being a white supremacist himself (SPLC n.d. and Blow 2017). During his<br />

presidency, there have been several attacks on US soil by far-right actors.<br />

According to his critics, his comments regarding those attacks have not clarified<br />

his position on the matter. Since his 2016 campaign launch, President Trump has<br />

used the slogan “Make America Great Again”. However, some far-right<br />

supporters have interpreted that slogan to mean “Make America White Again”,<br />

and have been chanting this at far-right rallies throughout the past year. Far-right<br />

groups are becoming more emboldened through their actions, because they feel<br />

that they have the support of the president; they believe that he is a tacit<br />

sympathizer and supporter of their ideologies because he has not given them clear<br />

reasons to think otherwise. Given the current state of affairs regarding the<br />

homegrown far-right in America, the Trump administration should take the steps<br />

necessary to make clear its position on the far-right and denounce President<br />

Trump’s right-wing supporters. It is logical to assume that if President Trump<br />

denounces his far-right supporters, the national security threat from the far-right<br />

will deflate.<br />

33


References Cited<br />

Allen, I. (2018) “Man Who Attended Charlottesville Far-Right Rally Tried to Derail<br />

Passenger Train”, IntelNews, 01 January .<br />

Anderson, E. (2017) “Racist Posters Found on U Campus”, <strong>The</strong> Daily Utah Chronicle, 12<br />

August .<br />

Anon. (2014) “White Homicide Worldwide”, Southern Poverty Law Center, 3 December<br />

.<br />

Anon. (2016) “Posters For White Supremacist Group Found On Emerson College<br />

Campus”, CBS Boston, 07 December .<br />

Anon. (2018) “<strong>The</strong> Year in Hate: Trump Buoyed White Supremacists in 2017, Sparking<br />

Backlash Among Black Nationalist Groups”, Southern Poverty Law Center, 21 February<br />

.<br />

Anon. (n.d.) “Alt-Right”, Southern Poverty Law Center, .<br />

Anon. (n.d.) “David Duke”, Southern Poverty Law Center, .<br />

Anon. (n.d.) “National Security Law and Legal Definition”, US Legal, .<br />

Anon. (n.d.) “Richard Bertrand Spencer”, Southern Poverty Law Center, .<br />

Becker, S. and Park, M. (2017) “Portland Train Suspect: ‘I Hope Everyone I Stabbed<br />

Died’”, CNN, 3 December .<br />

Blow, C. (2017) “Is Trump a White Supremacist?”, <strong>The</strong> New York Times, 18 September<br />

.<br />

Boschult, C., and Broyles, M. (2017) “‘IT’S OKAY TO BE WHITE’ Flyers at CCU<br />

Spark Investigation”, Myrtle Beach Online, 09 November .<br />

Chaitin, D. (2017) “White Nationalists Return to Charlottesville for Brief Torch-Lit<br />

Rally”, <strong>The</strong> Washington Examiner, 07 October .<br />

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015) “Active Shooter Incidents in the United States<br />

in 2014 and 2015”, United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC,<br />

United States .<br />

Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.) “Oklahoma City Bombing”, United States<br />

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., United States .<br />

Federal Bureau of Investigation “Erid Rudolph”, United States Federal Bureau of<br />

Investigation, Washington, D.C., United States .<br />

Hatewatch Staff (2017) “White Nationalist Fliering on American College Campuses”,<br />

Southern Poverty Law Center, 17 October .<br />

34


Heim, J. (2017) “Recruiting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death”, <strong>The</strong> Washington<br />

Post, 14 August .<br />

Liebelson, D. (2017) “A Black Man and a White Woman Sat Down at a Pub. <strong>The</strong>n the<br />

White Supremacists Showed Up.”, HuffPost, 31 October .<br />

Markovich, A. (2016) “Hacker Says He Printed Anti-Semitic and Racist Fliers at Colleges<br />

Across US”, <strong>The</strong> New York Times, 29 March .<br />

Marquis, M. “At Least Two Quebecers Who Attended White Supremacist Rally in<br />

Charlottesville Identified”, <strong>The</strong> Globe and Mail, 17 August .<br />

Phillip, A., and Watkins, E. (2018) “Trump Decries Immigrants from ‘Shithole<br />

Countries’ Coming to the US”, CNN, 11 January .<br />

Selk, A. (2017) “Poland Defends Massive Far-Right Protest that Called for a ‘White<br />

Europe’”, <strong>The</strong> Washington Post, 12 November .<br />

Silvarole, G. (2017) “Clemson Officials Respond to Alt-Right Flyers in Internal Email”,<br />

<strong>The</strong> Independent Mail, 03 November .<br />

Smith, B.L. (1994) Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams, State University of<br />

New York Press, Albany, NY.<br />

Southall, A. (2017) “White Suspect in Black Man’s Killing is Indicted on Terror<br />

Charges”, <strong>The</strong> New York Times, 27 March .<br />

Thompson A.C., and Winston, A. (2017) “White Supremacists Share Bomb-Making<br />

Materials in Online Chats”, ProPublica, 02 November .<br />

35


36


<strong>The</strong> Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as a<br />

Factor in US-Russian Relations<br />

Madison Nowlin<br />

Relations between the United States and Russia have been tense for decades.<br />

However, the rise of Sunni armed extremist groups in the Middle East in our<br />

century, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has further complicated<br />

the relationship between the two countries. <strong>The</strong> ongoing instability in Syria has<br />

attracted the attention and intervention of both Moscow and Washington. <strong>The</strong>y<br />

share common goals in Syria, such as defeating ISIS and increasing regional<br />

stability, but they often disagree on the methods to do so. Notably, Russia<br />

militarily and financially supports the government of Syrian President Bashar al-<br />

Assad, while the US supports Syrian rebel groups opposed to Assad’s rule, like<br />

the Free Syrian Army. Russia considers Assad to be a source of stability for Syria<br />

and sees the US as a source of instability. This stark difference in policy has caused<br />

a rise in tensions between the US and Russia. At the same time, the US and Russia<br />

have been forced to cooperate in areas where a combined effort has been<br />

necessary to achieve commonly desired goals. An example of this was seen in the<br />

joint US-Russian condemnation of Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria.<br />

Achieving the US and Russia’s goals in Syria could lead to increased regional<br />

stability and a decrease in the ISIS’s global presence. <strong>The</strong>refore, based on recent<br />

evidence, it can be stated with high confidence that ISIS has further complicated<br />

US Russian relations while simultaneously forcing dialogue and cooperation.<br />

37


Key Actors<br />

Several state and non-state actors have the capability to influence events in Syria.<br />

When Russian President Vladimir Putin complied with President Assad’s request<br />

for assistance in 2015, he helped protect the Assad regime from the many factions<br />

attempting to remove it. In turn, Russia was placed in a prime position to<br />

influence the rebuilding of Syria after the Civil War. As extensions of Russia and<br />

the US, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and —until his removal in March 2018—<br />

Secretary of Defense Rex Tillerson also have had substantial power in influencing<br />

how the two countries have interacted in Syria. For example, after the Asia-Pacific<br />

Cooperation Summit in 2017, Tillerson and Lavrov produced a joint statement<br />

on Syria on behalf of Presidents Trump and Putin. Neither president had a hand<br />

in drafting the statement (Erickson and Vitkovskaya 2017). This displays the<br />

considerable power both ministers have in engaging in public rhetoric. In<br />

addition, the estimated 1,000 Syrian rebel groups fighting against the Syrian<br />

government —many of them US or Saudi-backed— can sway efforts to maintain<br />

the Assad regime (Anon. 2013). Groups such as the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic<br />

Front, and the Syrian Democratic Forces —a coalition of mostly Kurdish, along<br />

with some Christian and Sunni Arab fighters— all fight to remove President<br />

Assad from power (Finnegan 2017). Lastly, Sunni armed extremist groups, such<br />

as ISIS and, to some degree, Tahrir al-Sham (an offshoot of al-Qaeda), can —and<br />

have— drastically reshaped the political landscape of the Middle East. Each actor<br />

mentioned above has a degree of influence over US-Russian relations in Syria.<br />

Discussion of Recent Developments<br />

<strong>The</strong> dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991,<br />

brought not only the end of the Cold War, but the beginning of a new relationship<br />

between the US and the Russian Federation. Progress in this relationship was<br />

made rapidly, with the first joint space shuttle mission in 1994 and the ratification<br />

of the START II treaty in 1996 (US Department of State 2017). Since the mid-<br />

1990s, however, periods of optimism and progress have been followed by mutual<br />

criticism, tension, and pessimism. A total of four relationship ‘resets’ have been<br />

attempted by different US presidents (not mentioning attempts by Russian<br />

leaders), each failing to stop the overall trend toward deterioration. For example,<br />

Bill Clinton began his presidency as “the US government’s principal Russia hand”<br />

(US Department of State 2017), a statement implying he had an advantage in<br />

negotiating with Russia. By the end of 1995, the US disapproval of the conflict in<br />

Chechnya and the Russian disapproval of US involvement in Bosnia had reversed<br />

any forward progress. In addition, in early 2002 the US announced that it would<br />

be withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to help protect<br />

NATO allies from Iranian missile attack (Rohde and Mohammed 2014). President<br />

Putin denounced the move as undermining nonproliferation efforts. Again, in<br />

Libya, Russia disapproved of the US removing Muammar al-Gaddafi from power.<br />

38


Furthermore, when Russia annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in March of<br />

2014, the US placed the first of many harsh sanctions on Russia in an attempt for a<br />

peaceful resolution. By the end of that year, US-Russian relations had deteriorated<br />

to levels last seen during the presidency of Mikhail Gorbachev (Stent 2014).<br />

In October of 1980, Syria and the USSR signed the 20-year Treaty of Friendship and<br />

Cooperation. <strong>The</strong> treaty automatically renews every five years, unless terminated<br />

by either party, and stipulates coordinating responses in the event of a crisis<br />

(Vicente-Caro 2017). <strong>The</strong> treaty also guarantees Russia’s use of the Port of Tartus<br />

—the only Russian military outpost left in the Mediterranean. When Syrian<br />

president Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad took power and<br />

maintained his country’s close relationship with the Russian Federation. Between<br />

2009 and 2013, Russia invested close to $20 million in Syria through weapons,<br />

military training, and other supplies that eventually aided the government in the<br />

Syrian Civil War (Dugulin 2015). On September 16, 2015, President Assad <strong>issue</strong>d<br />

a formal request for military assistance in fighting ISIS, and Russian President<br />

Vladimir Putin complied. On September 30, 2015, Russia began airstrikes on<br />

targets throughout Syria and officially became involved in the Syrian conflict<br />

(Dugulin 2015).<br />

In August 2011, US president Barack Obama froze Syrian assets in the US<br />

government and called for President Assad to resign. He also warned Assad that<br />

the use of chemical weapons would force the US to intervene on behalf of the<br />

Syrian people. In August 2013, a sarin gas attack befell civilians in the rebel-held<br />

areas of Syria’s capital while they were sleeping. Two months later, Syria signed<br />

the Chemical Weapons Convention amid international pressure from the UN<br />

Security Council. That year, ISIS was believed to be responsible for multiple mustard<br />

gas attacks. Yet, it was not until September 2014 that the US began airstrikes in<br />

Syria on ISIS targets. According to the UN, the Syrian government was responsible<br />

for three known chemical attacks on civilians between 2013 and 2016. After taking<br />

office, US president Donald Trump, blamed the Obama administration for Assad’s<br />

“heinous” acts, citing former President Obama’s “weakness and irresolution”<br />

(Anonymous 2018).<br />

Recent confrontations between the Trump administration and Russia began early<br />

in 2017. On April 7, 2017, the US launched 58 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the<br />

Shayrat Airbase in Syria. <strong>The</strong> base had been identified as the source of a chemical<br />

weapons attack that had occurred earlier in the week and killed over 80 people.<br />

Both Russian and Syrian forces were stationed at the base; however Russian<br />

authorities were notified of the strike in advance. Despite the Pentagon stating<br />

that the targets were strictly logistical, six Syrians were killed and several others<br />

were injured. In addition, six Syrian airplanes that were being repaired at the<br />

targeted airbase were destroyed, in contrast with the runways, which were left<br />

undamaged. After the strike, Russia vowed to boost Syrian air defenses in order<br />

39


to deter any future attacks (Graham-Harrison 2017). <strong>The</strong> strike had many analysts<br />

concerned about the future of US-Russian relations in Syria, hoping that the<br />

attack would not set a dangerous precedent for the region.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first face-to-face meeting between President Trump and President Putin took<br />

place on July 7, 2017, during the G-20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany. <strong>The</strong> topics<br />

discussed included Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 election, as well as<br />

Ukraine, and Syria. It was reported that President Trump accepted Russia’s strong<br />

denials of accusations that it meddled in the US elections, and President Putin<br />

called for an end to sanctions imposed in response to the Ukraine Crisis. On the<br />

topic of Syria, the two leaders agreed on a ceasefire in the southwest regions of<br />

Deraa, Quneitra, and Suweida (Anon. 2017a). Ramzy Ramzy, the United Nations<br />

deputy special envoy to Syria, called that move a “positive development”, and said<br />

he hoped it would extend to other parts of Syria (Anon. 2017c). <strong>The</strong> meeting<br />

between the two presidents showed that the US and Russia were capable of striking<br />

partial agreements over Syria, to the benefit of both the region and the world.<br />

<strong>The</strong> two men did not meet again the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation Summit,<br />

which was held in Vietnam on November 10 and 11. During that summit, a<br />

formal meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin was attempted, but failed<br />

due to “scheduling conflicts on both sides” (Merica 2017). Despite this, the two<br />

leaders were able to speak briefly during a photo-op on Friday and before a<br />

plenary session on Saturday. After the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei<br />

Lavrov and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson prepared a joint statement calling<br />

for a political solution in Syria and insuring further cooperation on fighting ISIS.<br />

<strong>The</strong> two leaders also acknowledged that the only solution to the conflict in Syria<br />

was through the Geneva process, and affirmed their commitment to Syria’s<br />

sovereignty (US Department of State 2017). <strong>The</strong> joint statement was very specific<br />

about how to move forward in Syria: “<strong>The</strong> two Presidents affirmed that these<br />

steps must include [...] constitutional reform and free and fair elections under UN<br />

supervision, held to the highest international standards of transparency, with all<br />

Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate” (US Department<br />

of State 2017). This statement seems to contradict Russia’s wholehearted support<br />

for President Assad’s regime in Syria. Furthermore, it should be noted that, while<br />

the US has articulated its intent to remove Assad from power, that is no longer<br />

the primary goal of the US in Syria (Nichols 2017).<br />

Taking a step back from the Middle East, it must be acknowledged that some of<br />

the most recent developments pertaining to US-Russian relations have revolved<br />

around Russia’s alleged meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election. Not long<br />

after the interference was uncovered, former US President Barack Obama closed<br />

two diplomatic facilities in the US, in addition to ordering new sanctions on<br />

Russian intelligence agencies. In response, President Putin expelled 755 employees<br />

—most of them Russian citizens— working at American diplomatic facilities in<br />

40


Russia. On August 21, 2017, the US embassy in Moscow stopped issuing travel visas<br />

to Russians (Erickson and Vitkovskaya 2017). <strong>The</strong> two countries also engaged in<br />

tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions in March of 2018, following the alleged poisoning<br />

of Sergei Skripal, a Russian former spy living in Britain, allegedly on orders of the<br />

Kremlin. Although the Skripal incident and the controversy surrounding the 2016<br />

election are important to US-Russian relations, they are unlikely to have a major<br />

impact on how the two countries interact in Syria.<br />

Currently, the public facade of the relationship between Presidents Trump and<br />

Putin is one of friendliness and agreeance; however this relationship has yet to be<br />

reflected in policy. Sanctions tied to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014<br />

have not been lifted, and despite the promise of free elections in Syria, Russia has<br />

repeatedly demonstrated its support for the Assad regime to remain in place.<br />

Russia announced on November 30, 2017, that it had begun preparations to<br />

downsize its military presence in Syria due to significant progress in defeating ISIS<br />

(Anon. 2017b).<br />

Future Trajectories<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are multiple possible scenarios that could conclude the conflict in Syria<br />

after the defeat of ISIS; however, two of these are the most likely. <strong>The</strong> first<br />

scenario is that a free election is held “with all Syrians eligible to participate”, as<br />

outlined in the joint US-Russian statement discussed earlier (US Department of<br />

State 2017). This scenario would follow the Geneva process pursuant to UNSCR<br />

2254, which calls for constitutional reform in addition to elections under UN<br />

supervision. If free elections are indeed held, rebel opposition groups currently<br />

fighting in Syria would be eligible to run for office. It can be assumed that President<br />

Assad, Syria’s current leader, would also run in the election. Based on the current<br />

political landscape in Syria —and assuming the absence of US or Russian<br />

influence— it can be stated with a moderate degree of confidence that the result<br />

of the election would keep Assad in power. Syrian rebel groups are numerous and<br />

hold considerable territory, but refuse to consolidate due to differences in ideology.<br />

Instead of stockpiling their votes behind one opposition candidate, they would<br />

spread their votes among multiple candidates, thus preventing any of them from<br />

gaining a majority victory.<br />

This analysis was based on the assumption that the US and Russia would not<br />

interfere with the election at all. This assumption is naive in the sense that both<br />

powers have made it perfectly clear who they want to have a strong say in Syria.<br />

It is likely that if free elections are held, the US and Russia would attempt to sway<br />

the vote, with the US supporting the opposition and Russia supporting the Assad<br />

regime. <strong>The</strong> results of such an election could affect US-Russian relations for<br />

decades, depending on which faction “wins”.<br />

41


<strong>The</strong> second scenario is that free elections are not held and the Assad regime<br />

remains in power with the help of Russia. In this scenario, it is likely that the US<br />

would continue to “secretly” support opposition groups, providing financial and<br />

possibly even military aid. Essentially, this scenario cannot be classified as a<br />

“resolution”, because it would constitute a continuation of the Civil War minus<br />

ISIS. This scenario would increase tensions between the US and Russia to Cold<br />

War levels and turn Syria into one of history’s longest proxy wars between the<br />

two powers. Based on the level of UN involvement in Syria, there is a low level<br />

of confidence that this scenario will occur.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Trump Administration, or more accurately, former US Secretary of State Rex<br />

Tillerson, has publicly articulated his intent to remove Assad from power.<br />

Evidence of this could be seen when WikiLeaks documents revealed that the US<br />

State Department had financially supported Syrian opposition groups (Whitlock<br />

2011). Tillerson’s successor, Mike Pompeo, is in agreement with that line of<br />

policy. Based on the recent history of US foreign policy, a continuation of this<br />

stance makes sense for the Trump administration. Additionally, an opposition<br />

leader in the Syrian government would be sympathetic towards the US, thus<br />

gaining Washington another ally in the region. With ISIS becoming less powerful<br />

every week, the need for a political resolution in Syria becomes more prevalent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> US should begin to adamantly talk about free elections in Syria, in an effort<br />

to create the atmosphere needed for them to occur. Ideally, multilateral resolution<br />

talks between the UN, the US, Russia, and Syria should have already begun to<br />

increase the chances of a peaceful and favorable solution to the Syrian Civil War.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Despite the façade of cooperation and agreeance, the relationship between the<br />

US and Russia has not improved in recent weeks. With the US supporting the<br />

opposition and Russia supporting the Assad regime in Syria, the common enemy<br />

found in ISIS is not enough to maintain good relations. As the Cruise missile<br />

strike on the Syrian airbase proved, this disagreement can be highly detrimental<br />

to US-Russian interactions in Syria. However, the G-20 summit in Germany and<br />

the Vietnam Summit have shown that ISIS has also forced dialogue and<br />

cooperation between Washington and Moscow. A political resolution to the<br />

Syrian Conflict is necessary, and the Trump Administration should begin pushing<br />

for free elections. <strong>The</strong>refore, based on evidence in this analysis, it can be stated<br />

with high confidence that Sunni armed extremism has complicated US-Russian<br />

relations, while simultaneously forcing dialogue.<br />

42


References Cited<br />

Anonymous (2013) “Guide to the Syrian Rebels” BBC, 13 December.<br />

Anonymous (2017a) “G-20: Trump and Putin Hold First Face-to-Face Talks”, BBC, 7<br />

July.<br />

Anonymous (2017b) “Russia Preparing to Withdraw Military Contingent from Syriasecurity<br />

chief”, Russia Today, 30 November.<br />

Anonymous (2017c) “US and Russia Agree New Ceasefire Deal”, Al Jazeera, 8 July.<br />

Anonymous (2018) “Syria: Timeline of the Civil War and US Response” ABC Australia,<br />

22 February.<br />

Dugulin, R. (2016) “<strong>The</strong> Emerging Islamic State Threat in the North Caucasus”.<br />

International Policy Digest, 04 April.<br />

Erickson, A. and Vitkovskaya, J. (2017) “How the Diplomatic Fight Between Russia<br />

and US Unfolded”, <strong>The</strong> Washington Post, 5 September.<br />

Finnegan, C. (2017) “A Look at the Factions Battling in Syria’s Civil War”, ABC News,<br />

11 April.<br />

Graham-Harrison, E. (2017) “A Visual Guide to the US Missile Strikes on a Syrian<br />

Airbase”, <strong>The</strong> Guardian, 7 April.<br />

Merica, D. (2017) “Trump, Putin Shake Hands, Chat Multiple Times at Asia-Pacific<br />

Summit”, CNN, 11 November.<br />

Nichols, M. (2017) “US Priority on Syria no Longer Focused on ‘Getting Assad Out’:<br />

Haley”, Reuters, 30 March.<br />

Stent, A. (2014) <strong>The</strong> Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century,<br />

Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.<br />

Rohde, D. and Mohammed, A. (2014) “Special Report: How the US made its Putin<br />

problem worse”, Reuters, 18 April.<br />

US Department of State (2017) “Joint Statement by the President of the United States<br />

and the President of the Russian Federation”, Washington, DC, United States.<br />

Vincent-Caro, C. J. (2017) “Moscow’s Historical Relationship with Damascus: Why it<br />

Matters Now”, <strong>The</strong> Huffington Post (no date provided).<br />

Whitlock, C. (2011) “US Secretly Backed Syrian Opposition Groups, Cables Released<br />

by WikiLeaks Show”, <strong>The</strong> Washington Post, 17 April.<br />

43


44


<strong>The</strong> Effect of Turkey’s Political Instability<br />

on the NATO Alliance<br />

Katelyn Montrief<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States and Turkey are the two largest military powers in the North<br />

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a US-led military alliance formed in 1949<br />

by 12 Western countries to provide security in Europe against the Soviet Union<br />

and to prevent the spread of communism. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, a<br />

development that strengthened relations between the predominantly Muslim<br />

country and other NATO members. Turkey is often seen as bridging the gap<br />

between the Western-oriented NATO and the Muslim World as a whole. This is<br />

crucial for NATO, which wants to project an image of itself as more than just an<br />

alliance of predominately Christian nations. Turkey’s entry into NATO also<br />

shaped drastically the relationship between the US and Turkey. <strong>The</strong> two countries<br />

remained allies through the decades, even though they did not always agree on a<br />

host of regional and even global <strong>issue</strong>s. For example, Washington and Ankara<br />

differed on their approach to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Today, the US and<br />

Turkey share an overall goal of defeating terrorism and promoting stability and<br />

security. However, Turkey’s deepening political uncertainty is leading to potential<br />

conflicts between it and its NATO allies. <strong>The</strong> current tensions between Turkey<br />

and the US, as well as between Turkey and other countries in NATO, can be<br />

traced back to the time of the Cold War. <strong>The</strong>y continue to exist today for a variety<br />

of reasons.<br />

45


Key Figures and Groups<br />

Several individuals and groups play key roles in the current state of tension<br />

between Turkey and its NATO allies. Primary among them is Recep Tayyip<br />

Erdogan, who served as Turkey’s prime minister from 2003 to 2014, when he was<br />

elected president, a post that he continues to occupy to this day. Under Erdogan’s<br />

leadership, Turkey has witnessed substantial economic growth. However, his<br />

heavy-handed approach to political dissent shaped his reputation as a leader<br />

known for harshly punishing those who oppose him. In answering his critics,<br />

Erdogan recently stated that “an all-powerful presidency is a guarantee that the<br />

political instability used to plague Turkey will not return” (BBC 2017). President<br />

Erdogan is also the leader of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP),<br />

which is based on the ideology of religious conservatism. <strong>The</strong> former leader of<br />

the AKP is Binali Yildirim, who is now the current Prime Minister of Turkey.<br />

Another individual who plays an important role in Turkey-NATO relations is Jens<br />

Stoltenberg, who has been the Security General of NATO since 2014. Stoltenberg,<br />

a career politician, served as Norway’s prime minister for 13 years before leading<br />

NATO. Another key individual that directly affects this topic is Fethullah Gülen,<br />

a former Islamic preacher and politician who leads the so-called Gülen movement.<br />

His movement promotes his beliefs in secular education, religious tolerance, and<br />

advancement in social networking (Gülen 2017). Gülen has been residing in the US<br />

since 1999 and currently lives in Pennsylvania. Alongside the Gülen movement, a<br />

group that has a major impact on this topic is the Kurds. <strong>The</strong> Kurds make up the<br />

fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, but do not have a permanent state.<br />

Organized groups of Kurdish fighters have been in a state of war with Turkish<br />

authorities for generations and oppose the authority of the Turkish government.<br />

<strong>The</strong> clashes —both rhetorical and armed— between these two sides continue to<br />

increase tensions in Turkey’s far-eastern Anatolia region, where Islamist groups<br />

are also active. According to Al Jazeera, more than 500 have been killed since<br />

2015 in attacks carried out by Islamist and Kurdish forces against Turkish<br />

government targets.<br />

Finally, in January of 2017, Donald J. Trump was sworn in as the 45 th president<br />

of the US. This event affected Turkey politically because its government has had<br />

to negotiate over a variety of <strong>issue</strong>s with a new administration that holds radically<br />

different views on foreign policy and from the administration of former President<br />

Barrack Obama. However, whether the Trump administration’s different views<br />

will translate into radically different actions remains to be seen.<br />

<strong>The</strong> 2016 Military Coup<br />

An important recent event that has affected the relations between the US and<br />

Turkey was the failed coup attempt that took place in Turkey on July 15, 2016.<br />

<strong>The</strong> attempted coup was carried out by Turkish military officers in an effort to<br />

46


emove President Erdogan from power. At least 249 people died during the coup<br />

and over 2,000 more were injured (BBC 2017). Turkish authorities later described<br />

the coup as a complete intelligence failure for the government (BBC 2017), which<br />

indicates the lack of information that Turkish security agencies had about the<br />

impending action of the military officers. President Erdogan released a statement<br />

after the failed coup attempt, stating that he had only found out about the coup<br />

attempt a couple hours prior from his brother-in-law (BBC 2017), not from<br />

intelligence officials.<br />

Soon afterwards, however, Turkish government officials identified Gülen as the<br />

individual they believe was behind the attempted coup. <strong>The</strong> Turkish government<br />

<strong>issue</strong>d an arrest warrant for Gülen on July 19, 2016, just days after the failed coup<br />

attempt. <strong>The</strong> Turkish government was not able to take Gülen into custody<br />

because he lives in Pennsylvania, reportedly under US protection. <strong>The</strong> Turkish<br />

government’s efforts to extradite Gülen to Turkey have so far been unsuccessful.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Turks want to take him into custody in order to have him stand trial for the<br />

failed coup attempt. However, the US claims that there is no strong enough<br />

evidence to extradite Gülen to Turkey. Over 50,000 individuals who, according<br />

to the Turkish government, were involved in the coup, have been arrested and<br />

are awaiting trial. Additionally, another 150,000 have been fired or suspended<br />

from their government or private-sector positions in Turkey (Al Jazeera 2017).<br />

Rising Tensions<br />

Before the failed coup attempt, relations between the US and Turkey were already<br />

tense due to disagreements regarding the Syrian Civil War. <strong>The</strong> two countries have<br />

never seen eye to eye on how to proceed in the Syrian Civil War. Turkey’s<br />

government argues that the Syrian Kurdish Forces (YPG) and the Democratic<br />

Unity Party (PYD), which are the dominant armed forces the in Syrian Kurdish<br />

region, are affiliates of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). <strong>The</strong> PKK is a paramilitary<br />

group based in Iraq and Turkey that seeks to create a separate homeland for the<br />

Kurds through political agitation and armed struggle. It is designated as a terrorist<br />

group by Turkey, the US and others. <strong>The</strong> Turkish government sees the YPG and<br />

the PYD as essentially branches of the PKK (BBC News 2017). <strong>The</strong> US does not<br />

support the PYD or the PKK, which it sees as terrorist organizations. However,<br />

it has consistently offered support to the YPG in the Syrian Civil War, prompting<br />

Turkey to accuse Washington that it is backing terrorists in the Syrian Civil War.<br />

In addition to causing friction in Turkey-US relations, this disagreement has also<br />

caused rising tensions between Turkey and other NATO nations.<br />

In April of 2017, a Turkish referendum gave President Erdogan a 51.4% victory<br />

that allowed him to run for two more election cycles, and to possibly remain the<br />

head of state until 2029 (Shaheen 2017). President Erdogan can also return to the<br />

leadership of the AKP, which holds the majority of members in the Turkish<br />

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parliament (BBC 2017). <strong>The</strong> referendum also passed 18 new amendments that<br />

were added to the Turkish constitution. <strong>The</strong>se amendments primarily deal with<br />

the powers of the executive and legislative branches in the Turkish government.<br />

For example, one amendment that was added through the referendum was the<br />

abolition of the post of prime minister. Now President Erdogan can appoint the<br />

cabinet himself and oversees a number of vice presidents that are under his<br />

command. Additionally, the Turkish parliament no longer oversees the ministers,<br />

as its power to initiate a motion of no confidence against them has been be removed<br />

(Shaheen 2017).<br />

On October 9, 2017, the US embassy in Ankara, Turkey, suspended all nonimmigrant<br />

visa services, reportedly in order to reassess Turkey’s commitment to<br />

the security of the embassy’s staff (BBC 2017). <strong>The</strong> US government decided to<br />

minimize the number of visitors to its embassy and consulates in Turkey, until<br />

the personnel working there stopped facing what the embassy said were security<br />

threats. Only individuals who were permanently moving to the US were able to<br />

apply for visas. In response, Turkey suspended all visa services for US citizens at<br />

their diplomatic and consular missions (BBC 2017). President Erdogan and<br />

President Trump had met in September, shortly before the visa suspension<br />

occurred. During that meeting, President Trump stated that the relationship<br />

between the two nations was better than it had ever been (<strong>The</strong> White House<br />

2017). However, as will be shown here, this statement appears to contradict the<br />

facts, as the latter do not support it.<br />

On November 7 2017, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim met at the White<br />

House with US Vice President Mike Pence, to discuss the ongoing diplomatic<br />

dispute between Washington and Ankara. Following the closed-door meeting,<br />

“Prime Minister Yildirim stated that [it] was a positive step for both nations” (<strong>The</strong><br />

White House 2017). <strong>The</strong> Turkish official also took a large legal team with him on<br />

his visit, in what appeared to be an unofficial attempt to strengthen the case to<br />

extradite Gülen to Turkey —something that did not ultimately materialize.<br />

Interestingly, President Trump was on a tour of Asia when Prime Minister<br />

Yildirim came to the US to meet with Vice President Pence to discuss diplomatic<br />

disagreements between Washington and Ankara.<br />

Another recent event that negatively affected Turkey’s relations with NATO was<br />

a dispute over a NATO military exercise in Norway in November of 2017. During<br />

this routine exercise, President Erdogan was reportedly depicted as NATO’s<br />

enemy during a simulation (Fraser 2017). NATO Secretary-General Jens<br />

Stoltenberg immediately <strong>issue</strong>d an apology for the offense, stating that the<br />

incident was the result of an external contractor that was hired for the exercise,<br />

and that it did not reflect the views of NATO. Stoltenberg added that “Turkey is<br />

a valued NATO ally, which makes important contributions to allied security” (<strong>The</strong><br />

Guardian 2017). A report by Politico said that the contractor involved was a<br />

48


Norwegian of Turkish origin, who was predictably accused by Turkey of being a<br />

supporter of Gülen.<br />

On December 1 2017, Turkey’s chief prosecutor <strong>issue</strong>d an arrest warrant for former<br />

Central <strong>Intelligence</strong> Agency officer Graham Fuller, former vice-chairman of the<br />

US National <strong>Intelligence</strong> Council. <strong>The</strong> warrant alleges that Mr. Fuller has links to<br />

Gülen and the failed 2016 coup attempt. But Fuller and the United States government<br />

have dismissed these allegations (Stockholm Center for Freedom 2017).<br />

On December 1, 2017, former national security advisor Michael Flynn turned<br />

himself in to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which charged him with lying<br />

about having had unauthorized discussions with Russian officials in December of<br />

2016. In addition to his links with Russian officials, Flynn was also accused of<br />

having been offered $15 million to help Turkish officials forcibly remove Gülen<br />

from the US and extradite him to Turkey (BBC 2017). <strong>The</strong> Turkish government<br />

did not discuss these allegations. If the accusations about Flynn are accurate, they<br />

show that extraditing Gülen to Turkey remains one of Ankara’s major objectives,<br />

and that the Erdogan administration has taken extreme measures —including<br />

attempts to bribe US officials— in attempts to do so.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Rising tensions between the US and Turkey are extremely significant within the<br />

context of NATO. In the past few months, major events have occurred between<br />

the two countries, which have affected American and Turkish embassies and<br />

consulates, NATO training exercises, as well as regular travel between Turkey and<br />

the US. <strong>The</strong>y have prompted numerous statements <strong>issue</strong>d by senior US, Turkish<br />

and NATO officials, as well as lengthy reports from multiple news sources. Visa<br />

services between the US and Turkey have yet to be normalized, though they have<br />

been modified on several occasions. It is likely, therefore, that visa services will<br />

resume in the near future. It is less probably, but not impossible, that the visa<br />

services <strong>issue</strong> will become an ongoing dispute and will not be completely restored<br />

until the US and Turkey come to an agreement on how to resolve the case of Gülen.<br />

President Trump’s administration has been engaged in negotiations with Turkish<br />

government officials on multiple <strong>issue</strong>s that affect diplomatic relations between<br />

the two nations, including the failed 2016 coup attempt and the more recent visa<br />

service suspension. <strong>The</strong> Trump administration’s current position is that the US<br />

government has been making multiple attempts to normalize relations between<br />

the two nations. President Trump and Vice President Pence, along with other US<br />

officials, have personally met with Turkish officials for that reason. If the current<br />

trend continues, bilateral relations are likely to grow stronger in the future.<br />

However, the major diplomatic <strong>issue</strong> between the US and Turkey continues to be<br />

the extradition of Gülen. <strong>The</strong> US has stated on multiple occasions that it has not<br />

49


een shown enough incriminating evidence to extradite Gülen. Turkey has also<br />

made it clear that it does not plan on giving up its goal of arresting Gülen. <strong>The</strong>re<br />

is no evidence that the US will change its position on this matter either.<br />

Given the current state of US-Turkish relations, it can be stated with high confidence<br />

that Turkey’s political instability will continue to have a negative effect on NATO,<br />

which is in turn likely to lead to future diplomatic disagreements between Turkey<br />

and its NATO allies.<br />

50


References Cited<br />

Al Jazeera (2017) “Turkey’s Failed Coup Attempt: All You Need to Know”, Al Jazeera,<br />

15 July accessed on December 1, 2017.<br />

BBC (2015) “Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand”, BBC, 30 October, accessed on October 21, 2017.<br />

BBC (2017) “Ex-Trump Aide Mike Flynn ‘Offered $15m by Turkey for Gülen’”, BBC,<br />

11 November Accessed on November<br />

27, 2017.<br />

BBC (2017) “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Pugnacious President”, BBC, 17 April<br />

accessed on October 17, 2017.<br />

BBC (2017) “Turkey and US Scale Back Visa Services Amid Diplomatic Row”, BBC, 09<br />

October accessed on October 19,<br />

2017.<br />

BBC (2017) “Turkey Seeks Arrest of ex-CIA Officer Fuller Over Coup Plot”, BBC, 01<br />

December accessed on December<br />

01, 2017.<br />

Fraser, S. (2017) “NATO Apologizes After Turkey’s President Shown as Enemy During<br />

Drill”, Defense News, 17 November accessed on<br />

February 27 2018.<br />

Guardian (2017) “NATO Apologizes to Turkey after Erdogan and Ataturk Appear on<br />

‘Enemy Chart’”, <strong>The</strong> Guardian, 18 November accessed on March 17,<br />

2018.<br />

Gulen, F. (n.d.) “Love and Obedience”, Fethullah Gülen’s Official Web Site accessed March 17, 2018.<br />

Politico (2017) “Turkish Tensions Undermine its Role in NATO”, Politico, 30 June,<br />

accessed on<br />

October 19, 2017.<br />

Shaheen, K. (2017) “Turkish Referendum: All You Need to Know”, <strong>The</strong> Guardian, April 10<br />

,<br />

accessed on March 17, 2018.<br />

Stockholm Center for Freedom (2017) “Graham Fuller Rejects Turkey’s Claims of<br />

Involvement in Coup Plot”, Stockholm Center for Freedom, 04 December


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Biographical Notes on Contributors<br />

KATELYN MONTRIEF, from Fredericksburg, Virginia, is a junior majoring in <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />

and National Security Studies with a minor in Political Science and a certificate in<br />

Sustainability at Coastal Carolina University. In May 2017, Katelyn was elected to<br />

serve as the Recruitment Officer for the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief, where she has<br />

also headed the Middle East and Americas Desks. She was later elected to serve as<br />

the organization’s Chief Operations Officer. Katelyn’s research interests are focused<br />

primarily on Turkish politics and Turkey’s relations with the United States. She is also<br />

an intern for the United Nations Youth Corps in Georgetown, South Carolina.<br />

MADISON NOWLIN, from Concord, North Carolina, is a senior <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National<br />

Security Studies major and Global Studies minor at Coastal Carolina University. In 2018<br />

she will be attending Magdalene College’s International Security and <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />

summer program at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom, in addition to<br />

studying Russian language at Narxoz University in Almaty, Kazakhstan. As president<br />

of the National Security Club, Madison helped organize and host the 1 st Annual<br />

<strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Conference at Coastal Carolina University in 2017.<br />

She is also a founding member of Women in <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security. Madison<br />

has previously won the Best <strong>Intelligence</strong> Essay Award and the <strong>Intelligence</strong> Analysis<br />

Award for the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief, and was named Undergraduate Student<br />

of the Year for Coastal Carolina University’s Edwards College of Humanities and Fine<br />

Arts for the 2017-2018 academic year. In April 2018, Madison received the <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />

Student of the Year award from the <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies program<br />

at Coastal Carolina University.<br />

MATT POLOGE, from Glen Rock, New Jersey, is a senior majoring in <strong>Intelligence</strong> and<br />

National Security Studies with a minor in Sociology at Coastal Carolina University.<br />

Matt began studying North Korea during his freshman year of high school, after<br />

interviewing his grandfather for a school research project. During his time at Coastal,<br />

he joined the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief to hone his analytical capabilities, and was<br />

awarded the CIB’s <strong>Intelligence</strong> Advancement Award for the spring 2017 semester.<br />

After continuing to pursue his work on the Korean Peninsula and Asian relations<br />

more broadly, Matt became the recipient of the CIB’s Best <strong>Intelligence</strong> Essay Award<br />

for the fall of 2017.<br />

MAEVE STEWART, from Stockton, New Jersey, is a senior at Coastal Carolina University<br />

majoring in <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies. In the summer of 2016, she<br />

completed an internship at the Regional Operations <strong>Intelligence</strong> Center of the New<br />

Jersey State Police, where she worked under a senior analyst in one of their criminal<br />

divisions. Since the fall of 2017, Maeve has focused her analytical research on<br />

domestic far-right extremist threats to US national security. In the spring of 2018, she<br />

53


presented her findings at the 2 nd Annual <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Conference<br />

at Coastal Carolina University, which she also helped host as a member of the student<br />

led initiative, Women in <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security. Maeve has also been a<br />

member and analyst of the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief for two years.<br />

JOSEPH FITSANAKIS, PhD, is Associate Professor of Politics in the <strong>Intelligence</strong> and<br />

National Security Studies program at Coastal Carolina University, where he teaches<br />

courses on intelligence operations, intelligence communications, national security,<br />

intelligence analysis, and intelligence in the Cold War, among other subjects. Before<br />

joining Coastal, Dr. Fitsanakis founded the Security and <strong>Intelligence</strong> Studies program<br />

at King University, where he also directed the King Institute for Security and <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />

Studies. He has written extensively on subjects such as international espionage, intelligence<br />

tradecraft, counterintelligence, wiretapping, cyber-espionage, transnational crime and<br />

intelligence reform. He is a frequent media commentator, syndicated columnist, and<br />

senior editor at intelNews.org, an ACI-indexed scholarly blog that is cataloged through<br />

the United States Library of Congress.<br />

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