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The Intelligence Review | volume 2 | issue 4 |

This volume is the product of a collaboration between the European Intelligence Academy (EIA) and the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB), a student-run initiative supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, South Carolina, United States. Four CIB analysts tackle some of the most pressing and timely questions confronting intelligence observers today. Topics in this volume include the possibility of a war with North Korea, and the rise of far-right militancy in the United States. The volume also includes an assessment of the impact of the Islamic State in the relations between Russia and the United States, and a discussion of Turkish politics and its effect on NATO's cohesion.

with President Trump.

with President Trump. The status of the meeting could change at any moment. If it does take place, then it will be the first meeting between a South Korean President and leader from the DPRK in over a decade. Astonishingly, this would also be the first official meeting with Kim Jong-un for both President Moon Jaein and President Trump. The two Koreas have even agreed to establish a communication hotline. This should be seen as a critical step in diplomacy between the two sides. Interestingly enough, the invitation came just days before President Trump declared new tough sanctions against the DPRK, in what appeared to be yet another attempt to limit the importation of oil and exportation of coal by the regime (Landler 2018). It is important to note that these sanctions have previously been ineffective at thwarting acts of provocation by the DPRK, as numerous nations, including China, have refused to comply with established regulations, and the DPRK has managed to evade them. It is also important to keep in mind that these sanctions negatively impact the Chinese economy as it receives most of its coal supply from the DPRK, and it does so for the most advantageous price on the market. It is therefore difficult for some UN member states to honor all sanctions resolutions, which is something that the DPRK has managed to exploit, despite growing penalties. Conclusion The US and the DPRK have remained at gridlock because the US is solemnly opposed to the DPRK having a nuclear capability. But the DPRK desires as many freedoms as any other state. Marshal Kim Jong-un finds it imperative to construct a capable defense against the potential threat that the US military poses by its significant presence in South Korea. So the fact remains that the North Koreans have the most to gain from gridlock, as it can continue to advance its defense program, while the UN continues to sanction and watch. The US, South Korea, China and Japan all do not want the DPRK to possess nuclear capabilities. However, anything less than that is a non-starter with the DPRK when it comes to diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless, the DPRK has expressed its willingness to suspend its nuclear program for the duration of the talks. Yet, as President Moon has stated, optimism at this early stage would be premature. It is worth remembering that Kim Jong-il established similar hopes with the UN during the 1990s and his father did so at earlier times. Historically, however, such openings did not lead to lasting change. If anything, the DPRK may use this as an opportunity to quietly hone its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, while avoiding mounting UN sanctions. Moreover, the feeling of optimism is very unlikely to be tenuous, as these talks will be held during the looming joint military drills that are jointly held every year between the US and South Korea. There is an absence of signs that would suggest that Washington or Seoul are willing to postpone these drills. 22

For decades, the two sides have dismissed each other’s demands and no major issue of disagreement has been resolved. So, a major cause for concern moving forward is that the overall strategy of the UN has remained unchanged despite the ineffectiveness its past efforts. That is especially critical to remember in the wake of a potentially historic meeting between the various sides. Undoubtedly, all countries involved face the very real risk of losing a plethora of resources by going to war. This applies primarily to South Korea and the DPRK, as both nations risk virtual annihilation. To prevent this, the White House should envision reality from Pyongyang’s perspective, and the world must hope that the DPRK would return the gesture by abiding by international law. Every participating country in this dispute essentially faces economic stress, heavy military casualties, political suicide and possible collapse in a nuclear conflict. The audacious public rhetoric by the DPRK seems to be purely propaganda, as it is way more advantageous for the pariah state to maintain the current status of gridlock. Additionally, none of the nations involved, including the DPRK, appear to be truly seeking war. I can therefore state with high confidence that it is highly unlikely that there will be a war involving North Korea in the foreseeable future. 23

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The Intelligence Review | vol. 1 | iss. 1 |