Adolf Hitler's Table Talk-1941-1944

534 LEGISLATURE AND

534 LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE point—namely, that there is nothing more harmful to the organisation of a State than over-centralisation and limitation of local power. The lawyers among us hanker constantly for such limitation. But, as Bismarck rightly pointed out in 1871, it was centralisation that had brought about the downfall of France; the petty Départements, being vested with no powers at all, were robbed of all initiative and sat dumbly awaiting instructions from Paris. I can sum up my own views by saying that one should give to local authority the widest possible powers of self-government, but should at the same time ensure strict obedience to orders from above. Wherever superior authority intervenes, its orders must be regarded as final. Side by side with the integrated legislative body must stand the executive, as the firmly established instrument of the national will; and this executive, with the Wehrmacht at its head, then the police, the labour organisation, the youth education, etc., must be in the control of one single man. Together, these two—legislative body and executive—form the cement that binds the State into a single corporate entity. The State which succeeds in achieving this has nothing to fear. The greatest danger occurs when the executive possesses at the same time supreme legislative powers—or aspires to them. This leads inevitably to those rivalries between component units of the Wehrmacht, between provinces and so on, which in the past have caused the downfall of a number of most healthy States. As regards the Head of the State, should anything happen to me, it would be as unsound to elect my successor by public vote as it would for, say, the Pope to be elected by suffrage among the faithful, or the Doge of Venice by the vote of the whole population of the city. If the mass of the people were invited to take part in such a vote, the whole thing would degenerate into a propaganda battle, and the propaganda for or against any candidate would tear the people asunder. If the choice is left to a small body—a senate, for instance— and marked differences of opinion should arise in it, I don't think it would matter very much, provided that no hint of these differences was allowed to become public. But once the votes

ELECTION OF EMPERORS—PARTY OFFICIALS 535 have been cast, then he who receives the majority becomes automatically and forthwith the supreme head of the state. If it is further arranged that the oath of allegiance to the new Head can be administered to the Wehrmacht, the Party and all the appropriate officials within three hours of the result of the election, then maintenance of public law and order can be regarded as assured. I have no illusions, however, that an absolutely outstanding personality will always emerge by this method of selection. But it does at least ensure that the man chosen will be one so much above the average that, as long as the machinery of government is in good order, the State will not be endangered in any way. The old German method of electing the Emperor was an ideal way of forming a government. It unfortunately broke down, however, because the princely electors were themselves hereditary princes in their own right. As Germany had for centuries been the incarnation of the western world, without ever being seriously menaced from outside, these hereditary sovereigns, preoccupied primarily with the domestic affairs of their own States, considered that they could afford to have the luxury of a weak Emperor—and consequently, a minimum of interference from the centre in their own affairs. It must therefore be an absolute and fundamental principle of National Socialism that office in neither Gau, State nor Party is hereditary Each Gauleiter, I consider, should have a deputy. The danger that the latter might intrigue against his chief is precluded by the Party rule that no deputy may succeed his chief as Gauleiter in the Gau in which he has officiated as deputy. In this way we National Socialists guard ourselves against a stab in the back. A Deputy Gauleiter can, of course, aspire to promotion as Gauleiter of a different province, always provided • that he has never intrigued to bring about the downfall of his own Chief. The criterion for judging the qualities of a Deputy Gauleiter is the degree of prosperity in the Gau ; for when all is going well in the Gau, it is not due solely to the work and the personality of the Gauleiter, but to those of his Deputy as well, who also has definite tasks of his own. As a sure safeguard against a Gau's ever becoming a hereditary