Views
5 days ago

[Aristotle,_Roger_Crisp]_Nicomachean_Ethics_(Cambr(BookFi)

1118b

1118b Nicomachean Ethics but people do not really enjoy these sorts of thing ± at least, intemperate people do not ± but rather the grati®cation itself, which arises entirely through touch in the cases of food, drink and what people call the sexual pleasures. This is why a certain gourmet prayed that his throat might become longer than a crane's, demonstrating that it was the touching which gave him pleasure. So the sense to which intemperance is related is the most widely shared, and seems justly subject to criticism, because it is something we have not in so far as we are human, but in so far as we are animals. To enjoy such things, then, and to love them most of all is brutish. The most genteel of the pleasures of touch ± such as those produced in the gymnasium through massage and heat ± are indeed exceptions here, since the sense of touch characteristic of the intemperate person is to do not with the body as a whole, but certain parts of it. Chapter 11 Some appetites are thought to be common, others peculiar to particular individuals. That for sustenance, for example, is natural, since everyone who needs it has an appetite for food or drink, or sometimes both; and that for sex, when one is, as Homer puts it, young and blooming. 26 But not everyone has an appetite for this or that kind of sustenance or sex, nor the same kinds; so it seems to be a matter of personal taste. Nevertheless, there is also something natural in it, because one thing will please one kind of person, another another, and some things are more pleasant to everyone than certain others. In the case of the natural appetites, the number of people who miss the mark is low, and they do so in only one direction, that of excess. To eat whatever is at hand or to drink until one is full to bursting is to exceed the amount that accords with nature, since natural appetite is the replenishment of what one lacks. This is why these people are called `belly-crazy', since they ®ll their bellies beyond what is right; it is utterly slavish people who become like this. In the case of the pleasures peculiar to particular individuals, however, many people miss the mark, and in many ways: people are called lovers of such and such because they enjoy the wrong things, 26 Homer, Iliad xxiv.130f. 56

Book III enjoy things more than most people do, or enjoy things in the wrong way. And intemperate people go to excess in all these ways; for they enjoy certain things they should not (because those things are detestable), and if they enjoy the sort of things that it is right to enjoy, they enjoy them more than is right or more than most people enjoy them. Clearly, then, excess with regard to pleasures is intemperance and to be blamed. With regard to pains, however, one is not called temperate, as one is called courageous, for enduring them, nor intemperate for not doing so. Rather, the intemperate person is so called for being more pained than he ought to be when he fails to get pleasant things (even his pain being caused by pleasure), while the temperate is described as such because he is not pained at the absence of what is pleasant, or at abstaining from it. The intemperate person, then, has an appetite for all pleasant things, or the most pleasant, and is led by his appetite to choose them at the cost of everything else. So he is pained both when he fails to get them and when he has an appetite for them, because appetite involves pain; but experiencing pain on account of pleasure seems absurd. People who are de®cient in relation to pleasures and enjoy them less than they ought are not generally found, since such insensibility is not a human characteristic. Even the other animals make discriminations between different kinds of food, and enjoy some but not others; and if there is anyone who ®nds nothing pleasant and is indifferent about everything, he must be far from being human. And because he is found so rarely, this sort of person has not been given a name. The temperate person occupies a mean position with regard to pleasures. For he does not enjoy the things that the intemperate enjoys most ± rather he actually dislikes them ± nor, in general, pleasures it would be wrong to enjoy; nor does he enjoy any pleasure to excess; nor does he feel pain or appetite at the absence of pleasures, except perhaps in moderation, and not more than is right, at the wrong time, and so on. But things that are pleasant and conducive to health or vigour he desires in a moderate way, as is right, and other pleasant things as well, as long as they are not incompatible with health or vigour, contrary to what is noble, or beyond his means. For the person who fails to abide by these limitations enjoys such pleasures more than they deserve; the temperate person is not like this, but enjoys them as correct reason prescribes. 57 1119a

Routledge History of Philosophy Volume II : Aristotle to Augustine
Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com
Coolhunting with Aristotle Welcome to the hunt - Planning Above ...
Roots of Psychology Aristotle and Descartes
A study of ethical principles Seth James 1860-1924.pdf
Feminism in Greek literature from Homer to Aristotle
A study of ethical principles - Seth, James, 1860-1924(E4).pdf
Is There Anything Like a Moral Character &Virtue? Gdańsk, 10–11 ...
Buddhist Ethics: A Very Short Introduction
Virtuous_Character_for_the_Practice_of_Law
JNK Mugambi - Africa Information Ethics Portal
The Stoic Creed - College of Stoic Philosophers
슬라이드 1 - 국제통상
Acer Group Standards of Business Conduct
to read the entire article - Kansas Society of CPAs & Educational ...