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1130b Nicomachean Ethics assistance through stinginess). But when someone is greedy, his action is often not in accordance with any of these forms of wickedness, still less all of them; but, since we blame him, it is in accordance with some form of wickedness, namely, injustice. There is, then, another kind of injustice, which is part of injustice as a whole, and what is unjust can here be seen as part of the whole of what is unjust in the sense of being contrary to law. Again, someone who commits adultery for gain and makes money out of it would seem unjust, but not intemperate, while another who does so through appetite, though it costs him and he loses money for it, would seem to be intemperate rather than greedy. Obviously, this is because the ®rst acts for gain. Again, all other unjust acts are always attributed to some form of wickedness, such as adultery to intemperance, desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, physical assault to anger. But if the person gains by what he does, it is attributed to no other form of wickedness than injustice. Clearly, then, besides universal justice, there is another form of injustice ± particular injustice; it has the same name, because its de®nition falls under the same genus, both being effective in relation to somebody else. But, whereas the one is concerned with honour or money or security ± or that which includes all of these, if we had a name for it ± and is motivated by the pleasure that results from gain, the other is concerned with all the things with which the good person is concerned. Clearly, then, there are several kinds of justice, and there is one that is distinct from virtue as a whole; we must ascertain what it is and what sort of thing it is. What is unjust has been divided into what is unlawful and what is unfair, and what is just into what is lawful and what is fair. Injustice in the sense above corresponds to what is unlawful. But what is unfair is not the same as what is unlawful, but differs as part from whole (since everything that is unlawful is unfair, while not everything that is unfair is unlawful); and so what is unjust, and injustice in the sense of unfairness, are not the same as what is unjust and injustice in the other sense, but differ as parts from wholes. For this injustice is a part of injustice as a whole, and similarly particular justice a part of justice as a whole. So we must discuss justice and injustice in the particular sense, 84

Book V and similarly what is just and unjust. Let us therefore put aside the justice and injustice that correspond to virtue as a whole, the one being the exercise of virtue as a whole in relation to another, the other of vice. It is obvious, too, how we should distinguish what is just and what is unjust in accordance with these types of justice and injustice, since most acts required by law, we might say, are enjoined from the point of view of virtue as a whole. For law requires us to live in accordance with each single virtue and forbids us to live in accordance with each form of wickedness. And the things that tend to produce virtue as a whole are the actions required by law that are laid down for education in good citizenship. But any decision must be delayed as to whether the education of the individual as such, on the basis of which he is a good person without quali®cation, is a branch of political science or of some other science; for, presumably, being a good person is not in every case the same as being a good citizen. One type of particular justice, and of what is just in that same sense, is that found in distributions of honour or money or the other things that have to be shared among members of the political community (since here one person can have a share equal or unequal to another's). Another type is that which plays a recti®catory role in transactions. This type divides into two, since some transactions are voluntary, others involuntary. The voluntary transactions are things like selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, and letting (they are called voluntary because the ®rst principle in these transactions is voluntary). The involuntary ones are either secret ± such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticing away slaves, treacherous murder, and false witness ± or involve force, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery, maiming, slander, and insult. 1131a Chapter 3 Since the unjust person is unfair, or unequal, and what is unjust is unfair, or unequal, it is clear that there is a mean in respect of what is unfair, namely, what is fair, or equal. In any kind of action in which there is a more and a less, there is also an equal. So if what is unjust is unequal, what is just must be equal ± something that everyone thinks, even without argument. Since what is equal is a mean, the just will be some sort of mean. 85

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