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[Aristotle,_Roger_Crisp]_Nicomachean_Ethics_(Cambr(BookFi)

Nicomachean Ethics Induction leads to the ®rst principle, that is, the universal, while deductive inference proceeds from universals. Therefore there are ®rst principles from which deductive inference proceeds and which are not reached by deductive inference; so they are reached by induction. Scienti®c knowledge, then, is a state by which we demonstrate, and has all the other distinguishing characteristics we add in the Analytics. For it is when a person believes in a certain way and understands the ®rst principles that he has scienti®c knowledge: if he fails to understand the ®rst principles better than the conclusion, he will have scienti®c knowledge only in an incidental way. Let this, then, be our de®nition of scienti®c knowledge. 1140a Chapter 4 Included within the class of what can be otherwise are what is produced and what is done. Production and action are different (we can rely here also on our popular accounts). So the practical state involving reason is different from the productive state involving reason. Neither, therefore, is included in the other, since action is not production, nor production action. Since building is one of the skills, and is essentially a productive state involving reason, and since there is neither any skill that is not a productive state involving reason, nor any such state that is not a skill, skill is the same as a productive state involving true reason. Every skill is to do with coming into being, and the exercise of the skill lies in considering how something that is capable of either being or not being, and the ®rst principle of which is in the producer and not the product, may come into being; for skill is not concerned with things that are or come into being by necessity, or with things that are by nature (since they have their ®rst principle within themselves). Since production and action are different, skill must be a matter of production, not action. There is a sense in which fortune and skill are concerned with the same things, as Agathon says: `Skill loved fortune, and fortune skill.' 39 Skill, then, as we have said, is a productive state involving true reason; 39 Agathon, fr. 6 Snell. 106

Book VI and its contrary, lack of skill, is a productive state involving false reason. Both are concerned with what can be otherwise. Chapter 5 We may grasp what practical wisdom is by considering the sort of people we describe as practically wise. It seems to be characteristic of the practically wise person to be able to deliberate nobly about what is good and bene®cial for himself, not in particular respects, such as what conduces to health or strength, but about what conduces to living well as a whole. An indication of this is the fact that we call people practically wise in some particular respect whenever they calculate well to promote some good end that lies outside the ambit of a skill; so, where living well as a whole is concerned, the person capable of deliberation will also be practically wise. No one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise, or about things he cannot do. So, if scienti®c knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of anything whose ®rst principles can be otherwise (since every such thing might be otherwise), and if one cannot deliberate about what is necessary, then practical wisdom cannot be scienti®c knowledge. Nor can it be skill. It is not scienti®c knowledge because what is done can be otherwise; and it is not skill because action and production are generically different. It remains therefore that it is a true and practical state involving reason, concerned with what is good and bad for a human being. For while production has an end distinct from itself, this could not be so with action, since the end here is acting well itself. This is why we think Pericles and people like him are practically wise, because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for people in general; and we consider household managers and politicians to be like this. This is also how temperance (soÅphrosuneÅ) got its name, because it preserves (soÅzein) practical wisdom (phroneÅsis). It preserves the kind of supposition we have described; it is not every supposition that is ruined and distorted by what is pleasant or painful ± not, for example, the supposition that a triangle does or does not have not two right angles ± but rather those about what is done. For the ®rst principle of what is done consists in the goal it seeks. But if a person has been ruined by 107 1140b

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