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Nicomachean Ethics much as the household is antecedent to the city, and more necessary, and reproduction is more widely shared with animals. With other animals, the community extends only to this point, but human beings live together not only for reproductive purposes but also to supply what they need for life. For from the start their characteristic activities are divided, those of the man being different from those of the woman. They supply one another's needs, therefore, by putting their own talents into the common pool. These reasons explain why this friendship seems to include both utility and pleasure. But it may also be friendship for virtue, if they are good, since each has his or her own virtue, and can ®nd enjoyment in this. Children seem to be another bond, which is why childless people separate more quickly: children are a good which is common to both, and what is common holds things together. How a man should live in relation to his wife, and in general how one friend should live in relation to another, appears to be the same question as how they can live justly. For the demands of justice on a friend towards a friend are not the same as those towards a stranger, nor those on a companion the same as those towards a fellow-student. 1162b Chapter 13 There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the beginning. And in each case some are friends on the basis of equality, others in accordance with superiority, because not only can equally good people become friends, but also a better and a worse; and similarly in friendships for pleasure and utility, since the bene®ts conferred by each can be equal or different. Equals, then, must create equality in loving and other things, in accordance with their equality, while unequals must give in return what is proportionate to the relation of superiority. Complaints and recriminations arise only, or at least mostly, in friendship for utility. And this is not surprising, since those who are friends for virtue are eager to bene®t each other (this being characteristic of virtue and friendship), and there are no complaints or disagreements between people competing with each other in this way. For no one objects to another's loving and bene®ting him; if he has good taste, he will respond by bene®ting the other. And if the superior gets what he is aiming at, he will not complain against his friend, since each desires what is good. 160

Book VIII Nor are complaints generally found in friendships for pleasure, since both at the same time get what they desire, if they enjoy spending time together; and one would look ridiculous if one were to complain that one's friend is not entertaining, when it is open to one not to spend one's days with him. But friendship for utility is the sort to cause complaint. For they are using each other for their own advantage, and so always require more, thinking that they have less than they ought, and they complain because they are not getting as much as they require and deserve. And benefactors cannot supply as much as the recipients require. Just as there are two kinds of justice, one unwritten and the other prescribed by law, so there seem to be two kinds of friendship based on utility, one related to character, the other to law. Complaints arise especially when people dissolve relationships in a spirit different from that in which they entered into them. The type related to law is that on ®xed terms. The purely commercial kind involves hand-to-hand exchange, while the more generous kind allows for time to pay, but is based on an agreement of the terms of exchange. In the more generous kind, while the obligation is clear and indisputable, the credit granted contains an element of friendship. This is why some cities do not allow legal actions in these cases, but think that people who have made a contract on trust ought to be content with the outcome. The type related to character is not on ®xed terms, but the gift or whatever is offered as to a friend. One nevertheless expects to get back as much or more, on the assumption that one has made not a gift but a loan. And if a person's situation when the relation is dissolved differs from that when he entered into it, he will complain. This happens because all or most people, though they wish for what is noble, rationally choose what will advantage them; and while it is noble to confer a bene®t on another without any reciprocation in mind, it is receiving bene®ts that advantages one. So we ought, if we can, to pay back the equivalent of what we have received, if our friend was acting voluntarily. (We should not make another our friend if he is acting involuntarily, but accept that we were mistaken at the beginning and that we received a bene®t from a person from whom we should not have received it; since it was not from a friend nor from someone who did it for its own sake, we must dissolve 161 1163a

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