1166b Nicomachean Ethics relation to himself, and he stands in the same relation to his friend as to himself (his friend being another self ), friendship too seems to be one of these characteristics, and those who have them to be friends. Whether there is friendship towards oneself or not is a question we can put to one side for the present. From what we have said, however, and because the extreme of friendship is close to friendship of oneself, there would seem to be friendship in so far as someone is regarded as a plural entity. It appears, however, that the characteristics we have mentioned belong even to the masses, bad as they are. Should we say, then, that they share in them only in so far as they are content with themselves and suppose themselves to be good? For no one who is altogether bad and wicked has them, or even appears to. Indeed, even bad people scarcely have them, since they are in internal con¯ict, and have an appetite for one thing but wish for another; they are like incontinent people, since they choose harmful pleasures in preference to what seems good to them. There are others whose cowardice or laziness makes them shrink from doing what they believe to be best for themselves. And those who have committed many dreadful crimes and are despised for their wickedness run away from their lives and destroy themselves. And wicked people seek others with whom to spend their days, and they avoid themselves. For when they are by themselves they remember many disturbing actions and foresee others like them, whereas when they are with others they forget. Because they have no qualities worthy of love, they feel no relation of friendship to themselves. Nor, therefore, do people like this share their joys and griefs with themselves. For their soul is in a state of civil strife, and one element in it, because of its wickedness, grieves in abstaining from certain things, while the other element is pleased; the one draws them this way, the other that, as if tearing them apart. If a person cannot be pained and pleased at the same time, nevertheless after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he wishes these things had not become pleasant for him; for bad people are full of regret. The bad person, then, appears not to be disposed in a friendly way even to himself, because he has nothing worthy of love. If to be like this is the height of wretchedness, we ought to avoid wickedness with all our might and try to be good; for this is how one can have a relation of friendship with oneself, and become a friend to another. 170
Book IX Chapter 5 Goodwill seems to be a characteristic of friendship, but still it is not friendship. For it can arise even towards people we do not know, and without their being aware of it, but friendship cannot. We have said this already. Nor is it even affection, since it does not involve either intensity of feeling or desire, both of which accompany affection. And affection involves intimacy, while goodwill can spring up suddenly, as it does towards competitors at the games. For people develop goodwill towards them and share in their wishes, but would not cooperate with them in any action: as we said, their goodwill comes into existence suddenly and their fondness is shallow. Goodwill, then, seems to be the ®rst principle of friendship, as pleasure through sight is ®rst principle of love. For no one loves another if he has not been pleased beforehand by his appearance. But ®nding enjoyment in the form of the other does not mean that one loves him; this happens only when one longs for him in his absence and wants him to be there. So too, though people cannot be friends if they have not already developed goodwill for each other, those who have goodwill are nevertheless not friends; they merely wish what is good on those towards whom they have goodwill, and would not cooperate with them in any action or go to any trouble on their behalf. By extending the scope of the word, then, one might describe goodwill as latent friendship, which becomes friendship as intimacy develops over time. It does not, however, become friendship for utility or pleasure, since goodwill does not arise for these reasons. For the recipient of a bene®t does what is just in returning goodwill for what he has received, but someone who wishes for another's well-being in the hope of some advantage through him seems to have goodwill not to the other person, but rather to himself. In the same way, a person is not a friend to another if he looks after him with some reward in mind. Generally speaking, however, goodwill develops because of some virtue and excellence, when one person appears noble or courageous or some such thing to another, as we suggested happens in the case of competitors at the games. 1167a 171
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Acknowledgements Several friends an
Introduction publication, consistin
Introduction Aristotle does not him
Introduction own makes life worthy
Introduction that `happiness' is no
Introduction merely to hurl a book
Introduction basis of their shared
Introduction category: the non-volu
Introduction instantiation of all t
Introduction Practical wisdom Havin
Introduction virtuous person's acti
edge about corned beef merely by po
Introduction the amicable relations
Introduction can have genuine frien
Introduction Why should we think th
Chronology All dates are BCE 384 Ar
Further reading Aristotle's Greek i
Further reading Clarendon Press, 19
Note on the text 1134a17±23: inser
Book I Chapter 1 Every skill and ev
Book I demonstrate the truth sketch
Book I rationally choosing a life
Book I about every good, and that t
Book I tion, since we always choose
Book I ways: the carpenter in so fa
Book I Noblest is that which is the
Book I life into his old age and di
Book I contrary to what people thin
Book I indeed, in that political sc
Book II Chapter 1 Virtue, then, is
Book II start, the accounts we dema
Book II choice, because what is nob
Book II feelings (the person who is
Book II For good people are just go
Book II honour, sometimes the one w
Book II osity. The greatest dissimi
Book III Chapter 1 Since virtue is
Book III pleasant or noble do so wi
Book III closely tied to virtue, an
Book III do; this is what remains.
Book III the individual it is the a
Book III the start it was open to t
Book III money in good heart. Nor i
Book III of a coward; for it is sof
Book III and to be courage if it is
Book III A distinction should be dr
Book III enjoy things more than mos
Book III harmony with reason; for t
Book IV giving, while taking and ke
Book IV he can be cheated, since he
Book IV Both, then, because they wi
Book IV weddings and suchlike; and
Book IV goes to excess in relation
Book IV towards people at the middl
Book IV nameless, it seems as if th
Book IV serious, and very much so i
Book IV while the dissemblers are b
Book IV make himself. He will not,
Book V Chapter 1 We must consider j
Book V Justice in this sense, then,
Book V and similarly what is just a
Book V part. But this proportion is
Book V party with more, and add to
Book V from the fact that whenever
Book V namely, honour and privilege
Book V one of the people present, a
Book V involuntary, as acting unjus
Book V that justice is an easy matt
Book V the equitable person is. He
Book VI Chapter 1 Since we have alr
Book VI practical. Such thought gov
Book VI and its contrary, lack of s
Book VI some people we think are wi
Book VI science, the latter being s
Book VI must ®rst inquire into the
Book VI the last. The intellect rel
Book VI Practical wisdom is not the
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