1107b 1108a Nicomachean Ethics because actions are to do with particulars, and what we say should accord with particulars. We may take them from our diagram. In fear and con®dence, courage is the mean. Of those who exceed it, the person who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many cases lack names), while the one who exceeds in con®dence is rash. He who exceeds in being afraid and is de®cient in con®dence is a coward. With respect to pleasures and pains ± not all of them, and less so with pains ± the mean is temperance, the excess intemperance. People de®cient with regard to pleasures are not very common, and so do not even have a name; let us call them insensible. In giving and taking money, the mean is generosity, while the excess and de®ciency are wastefulness and stinginess. People with these qualities are excessive and de®cient in contrary ways to one another. The wasteful person exceeds in giving away and falls short in taking, while the stingy person exceeds in taking and falls short in giving away. (At present, we can be content with giving a rough and summary account of these things; a more detailed classi®cation will come later.) There are other dispositions connected with money. One mean is magni®cence, for the magni®cent person, in so far as he deals with large amounts, differs from the generous one, who deals with small. The excess is tastelessness and vulgarity, the de®ciency niggardliness, and they differ from the states opposed to generosity; how they differ will be stated below. In honour and dishonour, the mean is greatness of soul, while the excess is referred to as a kind of vanity, the de®ciency smallness of soul. And just as we said generosity is related to magni®cence, differing from it by being concerned with small amounts, so there is a virtue having to do with small honours that corresponds in the same way to greatness of soul, which is to do with great ones. For one can desire small honours in the right way, and in excessive and de®cient ways as well. The person who exceeds in his desires is described as a lover of honour, the person who is de®cient as not caring about it, while the one in between has no name. Their dispositions are nameless as well, except that of the lover of honour, which is called love of honour. This is why those at the extremes lay claim to the middle ground. We ourselves sometimes refer to the person in the middle as a lover of honour, sometimes as one who does not care about it; and sometimes we praise the person who loves 32
Book II honour, sometimes the one who does not care about it. The reason for our doing this will be stated below. For now, let us discuss the remaining virtues and vices in the way laid down. In anger too there is an excess, a de®ciency, and a mean. They are virtually nameless, but since we call the person in between the extremes even-tempered, let us call the mean even temper. Of those at the extremes, let the one who is excessive be quick-tempered, and the vice quick temper, while he who is de®cient is, as it were, slow-tempered, and his de®ciency slow temper. There are three other means, having something in common, but also different. For they are all to do with our association with one another in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned with the truth to be found in them, while the other two are respectively concerned with what is pleasant in amusement and in life as a whole. We should talk about these things as well, then, so that we can better see that in all things the mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither praiseworthy nor correct, but blameworthy. Most of them again have no names, but, for the sake of clarity and intelligibility, we must try, as in the other cases, to produce names ourselves. With respect to truth, then, let us call the intermediate person truthful and the mean truthfulness; pretence that exaggerates is boastfulness and the person who has this characteristic is a boaster, while that which understates is self-depreciation and the person who has this is self-deprecating. In connection with what is pleasant in amusement, let us call the intermediate person witty, and the disposition wit; the excess clownishness, and the person with that characteristic a clown; and the person who falls short a sort of boor and his state boorishness. With respect to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that found in life in general, let us call the person who is pleasant in the right way friendly and the mean friendliness, while he who goes to excess will be obsequious if there is no reason for it, and a ¯atterer if he is out for his own ends; someone who falls short and is unpleasant all the time will be a quarrelsome and peevish sort of person. There are also means in the feelings and in connection with the feelings. Shame, for example, is not a virtue, but praise is also bestowed on the person inclined to feel it. Even in these cases one person is said to be intermediate, and another ± the shy person who feels shame at everything ± excessive; he who is de®cient or is ashamed of nothing at 33
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CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF P
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF
Acknowledgements Several friends an
Introduction publication, consistin
Introduction Aristotle does not him
Introduction own makes life worthy
Introduction that `happiness' is no
Introduction merely to hurl a book
Introduction basis of their shared
Introduction category: the non-volu
Introduction instantiation of all t
Book V Justice in this sense, then,
Book V and similarly what is just a
Book V part. But this proportion is
Book V party with more, and add to
Book V from the fact that whenever
Book V namely, honour and privilege
Book V one of the people present, a
Book V involuntary, as acting unjus
Book V that justice is an easy matt
Book V the equitable person is. He
Book VI Chapter 1 Since we have alr
Book VI practical. Such thought gov
Book VI and its contrary, lack of s
Book VI some people we think are wi
Book VI science, the latter being s
Book VI must ®rst inquire into the
Book VI the last. The intellect rel
Book VI Practical wisdom is not the
Book VII Chapter 1 Next we must mak
Book VII on the supposition that he
Book VII the same or different? Sim
Book VII The explanation of how the
Book VII children or parents; for t
Book VII with the same things as in
Book VII to those that most people
Book VII thus like a disease such a
Book VII who does something for the
Book VII happiness involves pleasur
Book VII The fact that no pleasure
Book VII states and processes, ther
Book VIII Chapter 1 After this, the
Book VIII Chapter 2 Perhaps the mat
Book VIII another's company, since
Book VIII true friendship that they
Book VIII since one ®nds more of a
Book VIII goods, though presumably
Book VIII differs as well, and the
Book VIII superior. Sometimes, howe
Book VIII or to a lesser degree. Pa
Book VIII Nor are complaints genera
Book VIII thinking it is characteri
Book IX wished, then that would hav
Book IX when he lent to you as some
Book IX Chapter 4 The origin of rel
Book IX Chapter 5 Goodwill seems to
Book IX Chapter 7 Benefactors seem
Book IX all to a person's relation
Book IX being self-suf®cient, need
Book IX or think); and if perceivin
Book IX But it is nobler in good fo
Book X Chapter 1 After this our nex
Book X choice with the addition of
Book X Against those who bring up d
Book X be so described, but only wh
Book X This is even more evident fr
Book X Chapter 6 Now that we have d
Book X and its objects are the high
Book X practical wisdom, since the
Book X done what he regarded as the
Book X heed necessity rather than a
Book X cians? For we did think that
Glossary Many of the English words
Glossary kalos noble. Alternative t
Index activity, 206 distinct from c
Index between master and slave, 158
Index Scythians, 42, 132 self-love,
Malebranche The Search after Truth
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