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WWR Vol.2.005

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What We Are Reading - Volume 2.005<br />

• The Uphill Climb<br />

• FX Outlook<br />

• Revised Load-Carrying Norms for Trucks<br />

• Travel and Logistics: Data Drives the Race for Customers<br />

• Neta App<br />

• India’s Post Poverty Challenge<br />

• The little - known American Startup that Powers Jio Phones<br />

• The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

-Morgan Stanley<br />

-Kotak<br />

-Kotak<br />

-McKinsey<br />

-qz.com<br />

-asia.nikkei.com<br />

-qz.com<br />

-thereformerbroker.com


July 16, 2018 04:15 AM GMT<br />

India Equity Strategy Alpha Almanac<br />

The Uphill Climb<br />

Indian stocks are jostling weak emerging markets, rising rates,<br />

higher oil prices, an election year and relatively rich mid-cap<br />

valuations. The large-cap index has support from an improving<br />

growth cycle, strong macro stability and local appetite for<br />

equities.<br />

MORGAN STANLEY INDIA COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED+<br />

Ridham Desai<br />

EQUITY STRATEGIST<br />

Ridham.Desai@morganstanley.com<br />

Sheela Rathi<br />

EQUITY STRATEGIST<br />

Sheela.Rathi@morganstanley.com<br />

Exhibit 1: India's outperformance continues<br />

5%<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

+91 22 6118-2222<br />

+91 22 6118-2224<br />

MSCI India performance relative to MSCI EM<br />

- local currency<br />

What is in favor of Indian equities?<br />

Strong macro stability evident in a positive BoP and backed by a Central<br />

Bank that is committed to keeping real rates positive.<br />

-10%<br />

-15%<br />

-20%<br />

Jul-16<br />

MSCI India performance relative to MSCI<br />

EM - USD<br />

Sep-16<br />

Nov-16<br />

Jan-17<br />

Mar-17<br />

May-17<br />

Jul-17<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Sep-17<br />

Nov-17<br />

Jan-18<br />

Mar-18<br />

May-18<br />

Jul-18<br />

A bullish steepening of yield curve, which is at post-2010 highs – the yield<br />

curve correlates positively with stocks.<br />

A low and falling beta, which augurs well in a weak global equity market<br />

environment as we have seen over the past few weeks.<br />

Exhibit 2: Interday volatility falls to lows<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

3M change in 3M Rolling Interday<br />

Volatility<br />

India's growth is likely accelerating relative to EM. Our work shows that<br />

corporate confidence is at a multiyear high and profits are likely to mean<br />

revert from below trend.<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

Strong domestic flows, currently averaging around US$2-2.5 billion a<br />

month, which we believe are in a structural uptrend.<br />

Weaker FPI positioning, now at 2011 levels.<br />

What is against Indian equities?<br />

Likely rising crude oil prices, which could put pressure on growth.<br />

Upward pressure on inflation from food price hikes making sure that more<br />

rate hikes are coming.<br />

The election cycle, which brings its own set of uncertainties.<br />

Relatively rich mid-cap valuations (even after the recent drawdown).<br />

Equity valuations relative to bonds is at the top end of its range, indicating<br />

that the market is pricing in some part of the coming growth recovery.<br />

Rising equity supply.<br />

Portfolio strategy: We prefer large-caps over mid-caps. We like Banks (private<br />

corporate and retail), Discretionary Consumption, Industrials and Domestic<br />

Materials, while avoiding Healthcare, Staples, Utilities, Global Materials and<br />

Energy.<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research.<br />

Exhibit 3: Small and mic-cap price drawdown intense<br />

but valuations still rich<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

-30%<br />

-40%<br />

-50%<br />

-60%<br />

-70%<br />

-80%<br />

-15%<br />

-21%<br />

Sep-05<br />

Mar-06<br />

Sep-06<br />

Mar-07<br />

Sep-07<br />

Mar-08<br />

Sep-08<br />

Mar-09<br />

Sep-09<br />

Mar-10<br />

Sep-10<br />

Mar-11<br />

Sep-11<br />

Mar-12<br />

Sep-12<br />

Mar-13<br />

Sep-13<br />

Mar-14<br />

Sep-14<br />

Mar-15<br />

Sep-15<br />

Mar-16<br />

Sep-16<br />

Mar-17<br />

Sep-17<br />

Mar-18<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research.<br />

Morgan Stanley does and seeks to do business with<br />

companies covered in Morgan Stanley Research. As a<br />

result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a<br />

conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of<br />

Morgan Stanley Research. Investors should consider<br />

Morgan Stanley Research as only a single factor in making<br />

their investment decision.<br />

For analyst certification and other important disclosures,<br />

refer to the Disclosure Section, located at the end of this<br />

report.<br />

+= Analysts employed by non-U.S. affiliates are not registered with<br />

FINRA, may not be associated persons of the member and may not<br />

be subject to NASD/NYSE restrictions on communications with a<br />

subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by<br />

a research analyst account.<br />

-18%<br />

1


Summary of Our Views<br />

Risks and Catalysts (Exhibits 1-3, 17-22):<br />

The section in this report, "Known Unknowns", outlines the potential risks and catalysts<br />

for Indian equities in the coming months. We highlight some of the key ones below:<br />

Earnings growth: At current valuations – especially where equities trade vs. bonds<br />

– it is imperative that the growth cycle turns. The market is already anticipating<br />

some turn in the growth cycle and hence a feeble improvement will not help<br />

stocks.<br />

Rates: We need to bear in mind that the RBI now has an explicit mandate to keep<br />

inflation under the lid (unlike the past, when its mandate oscillated between<br />

growth and inflation). This means that the historical relationship between short<br />

rates and equities cannot be relied upon in the coming cycle. At the minimum, there<br />

is likely to be more volatility in stocks as the rate cycle inflects upward. We see a<br />

couple of more rate hikes this year with oil and food prices representing a risk to<br />

the upside for rates. Also note that the yield curve is undergoing bullish steepening,<br />

which correlates positively with equities. The fiscal slippage has been a key source<br />

of worry for the bond markets, but a large part of this is already in play in the bond<br />

market.<br />

Global equities: While global market performance remains a key to the absolute<br />

performance of Indian stocks in the near term, India's beta to the world has<br />

dropped to a 13-year low and possibly sets the stage for India's outperformance in<br />

a low-return world (Where has the India Story Vanished?).<br />

Oil prices: This remains a key risk to equities given its ability to cause pain to the<br />

fiscal deficit and, therefore, growth.<br />

Political cycle: As we approach the 2019 general elections, the market is likely to<br />

shift focus on likely outcomes as a key driver for performance (The World's Biggest<br />

Democratic Elections: How to Forecast Them & What to Do with Portfolios).<br />

Net demand-supply: Household demand for stocks remains strong, although<br />

supply is also rising. There is an active debate on the sustainability of domestic<br />

flows, and the monthly number will be widely tracked (India Equity Strategy:<br />

Dream Run: What Is the Risk to Domestic Equity Flows?).<br />

Macro and politics (Exhibits 23-28)<br />

We see strong growth in 2018 and 2019 driven by consumption, exports, government<br />

spending and a nascent recovery in private capex. We see a tighter monetary policy in<br />

2018 as well as the risk of a higher-than-budgeted fiscal deficit as we approach elections<br />

in 2019.<br />

The policy uncertainty index has been low, but the relative market performance has<br />

underperformed, i.e., diverged. The election calendar thickens in 2018/19, and hence<br />

2


Exhibit 4: Forecasts at a Glance<br />

F2017 F2018E F2019E F2020E<br />

G DP G rowth 5.7% 6.1% 6.3% 6.6%<br />

G DP G rowth (new) 7.1% 6.7% 7.5% 7.7%<br />

IIP G rowth 4.6% 4.4% 4.1% 4.4%<br />

Av erage CPI 4.5% 3.6% 4.5% 4.3%<br />

Repo Rate (year end) 6.25% 6.00% 6.75% 6.75%<br />

CAD% of G DP -0.7% -1.9% -2.2% -1.9%<br />

Sensex EPS 1420 1492 1837 2269<br />

Sensex PE 25.7 24.5 19.9 16.1<br />

EPS growth YoY -0.5% 5.0% 23.1% 23.5%<br />

Broad M arket Earnings G rowth 0.0% 3.0% 20.0% 22.0%<br />

Broad M arket PE 31.0 30.1 25.1 20.5<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research (E) estimates<br />

the market's perception of uncertainty will likely rise in 2018/19.<br />

Liquidity (Exhibits 29-34)<br />

Growth indicators are turning up.<br />

There are nascent signs of a capex cycle evident in order<br />

books. Our AlphaWise survey points to a recovery in private<br />

capex in the coming months (Corporate Confidence Is Back,<br />

Capex to Follow).<br />

The yield curve has steepened to a post-2010 high and it<br />

augurs well for stocks.<br />

India's macro stability remains strong, and is unlikely to be<br />

threatened by a rise in oil prices. However, rising oil prices can bring growth<br />

problems for India given the limited fiscal flexibility in an election year.<br />

The rupee has suffered some real and nominal depreciation over the past few<br />

weeks, which augurs well for reported earnings.<br />

Liquidity, or the force of the bid, has weakened in recent weeks.<br />

The pace of the rise in market multiple relative to earnings has fallen in recent<br />

weeks to slightly negative territory.<br />

Our global liquidity proxy is rising and should be tracked closely for a shift in global<br />

liquidity conditions.<br />

Share prices appear neutral relative to M2 growth.<br />

Financial conditions have eased at the margin.<br />

Short yields for India have fallen relative to the US. We feel that the historical<br />

relationship between relative rates and relative equity performance will be<br />

reinforced. Accordingly, India's relative performance should continue to improve.<br />

The yield curve has steepened, which correlates positively with equities.<br />

Corporate Fundamentals (Exhibits 35-46)<br />

In our base case, BSE Sensex earnings growth is pegged at 5%, 23% and 24% for F2018,<br />

F2019 and F2020, respectively.<br />

Our proprietary models point to robust earnings growth in the next three years.<br />

Profits could surprise significantly on the positive side given the low starting point<br />

of profit share in GDP, which is almost at 2002 levels.<br />

Balance sheet recession (which we define as return on capital being lower than the<br />

cost of debt) has also ended and may prompt a private capex recovery. Corporate<br />

balance sheets have delevered over the past two years, and free cash flows are<br />

sitting at all-time highs at over 10% to sales.<br />

3


Asset turn has hit a post-GFC high and ROE may have troughed for this cycle.<br />

The consensus has held its F2019 and F2020 Sensex numbers, generally speaking.<br />

We think earnings revisions breadth should turn positive in the coming weeks.<br />

Profits have trailed GDP since F2011 and are likely coming out of their deepest and<br />

longest recession in Indian history.<br />

Valuations (Exhibit 47-58)<br />

The absolute P/B is around average, but mid-cap valuations are still looking stretched<br />

despite the recent drawdown. Equities do not look compelling vs. long bonds. India's<br />

recent outperformance has lifted relative valuations above average. Our composite<br />

valuation indicator suggests low double-digit index returns in the coming 12 months.<br />

Valuations, on their own, unless at extreme points, rarely give a clue of where stocks are<br />

heading. We also do not think the narrow indices, such as the Sensex or the Nifty, are<br />

pricing in a multiyear growth cycle, implying meaningful upside potential to stocks over<br />

the next three to five years.<br />

For long-term investors, valuations are still in the comfort zone.<br />

Valuations relative to interest rates are not attractive, so we continue to argue for<br />

even or better performance for long bonds versus equities (unlike 2017).<br />

At this point of the cycle, given how depressed earnings are, P/E could be<br />

misleading and P/B offers a better valuation perspective, in our view.<br />

Shiller P/E and market cap to GDP for the broad market are both off highs after<br />

multiyear highs in January.<br />

Share of India's market cap in global market is below its share in global GDP.<br />

Sentiment (Exhibit 59-70)<br />

Overall sentiment appears to be in neutral territory post the rallies off lows made in<br />

March. Indian equities just about remain in a bull market with the 200DMA slightly<br />

above the 50DMA (golden cross).<br />

EM positioning in India is also at a multiyear low, and the level of trailing FPI<br />

inflows suggest a bounce in FPI demand for stocks. FPIs have also meaningfully<br />

trimmed exposure in mid-caps relative to large caps. Domestic equity assets to total<br />

assets is close to an all-time high.<br />

Net demand supply for equities is deteriorating due to likely higher supply even as<br />

household balance sheet rebalancing toward equities is unabated. We are expecting<br />

equity issuances of around US$45-50 billion in 2018 compared to US$28 billion in<br />

2017.<br />

4


Portfolio Strategy<br />

We continue to back growth at a reasonable price. The way to construct portfolios is to<br />

buy stocks of companies with the highest delta in return on capital. The market's<br />

character is most evident in the all-time low correlation of returns across stocks. This<br />

tells us that market participants are acutely idiosyncratic in their approach to stocks. A<br />

likely mean reversion in correlations warrants wider sector positions. We continue to<br />

prefer large caps over mid-caps given relative valuations.<br />

Recap of our biggest sector views:<br />

Consumer Discretionary (+500bp): Strong consumer loan growth and rising real<br />

incomes drives our view.<br />

Financials (+500bp): Credit costs are likely to decline, led by M&A activity and a<br />

recovery in economic growth. Recapitalization will also help the Corporate banks.<br />

Loan growth prospects are looking up as the economy gathers pace. The<br />

bankruptcy processes are gaining pace, in our view. Non-banks may face margin<br />

pressure as rates rise.<br />

Industrials (+400bp): Private capex is likely turning and public capex remains strong.<br />

Technology (+0bp): Business momentum is recovering and the sector has done well<br />

over the past few months contrary to market expectations.<br />

Consumer Staples (-600bp): Stocks look rich and profit growth may trail the market<br />

due to lower leverage to an economic recovery.<br />

Healthcare (-200bp): The sector remains challenged by regulatory burden.<br />

Utilities (-200bp): We prefer cyclical exposures.<br />

Energy (-300bp) and Materials (-100bp): Funding source for our overweights.<br />

Index Target: On our June 2019 target of 36,000, the BSE Sensex would trade at just<br />

under 16x one-year forward P/E, which below its historical average.<br />

Base case (50% probability) – BSE Sensex: 36,000: All outcomes are moderate.<br />

Growth accelerates slowly. We expect Sensex earnings growth of 5% YoY in F2018,<br />

23% YoY in F2019 and 24% YoY in F2020.<br />

Bull case (30% probability) – BSE Sensex: 44,000: Better-than-expected outcomes,<br />

most notably on policy and global factors. The market starts believing in a strong<br />

election result. Earnings growth accelerates to 29% in F2019 and 26% in F2020.<br />

Bear case (20% probability) – BSE Sensex: 26,500: Global conditions deteriorate and<br />

the market starts pricing in a poor election outcome. Sensex earnings grow 21% in<br />

F2019 and 22% in F2020.<br />

5


Exhibit 5: BSE Sensex Outlook: Risk-Reward for Jun-19<br />

44,000<br />

42,000<br />

40,000<br />

38,000<br />

36,000<br />

34,000<br />

32,000<br />

30,000<br />

28,000<br />

26,000<br />

24,000<br />

22,000<br />

Jun 19 Fwd probability-weighted<br />

outcome @ 36500<br />

44000(+20%)<br />

36000(-2%)<br />

Jun-14<br />

Jul-14<br />

Sep-14<br />

Oct-14<br />

Dec-14<br />

Feb-15<br />

Mar-15<br />

May-15<br />

Jul-15<br />

Aug-15<br />

Oct-15<br />

Dec-15<br />

Jan-16<br />

Mar-16<br />

May-16<br />

Jun-16<br />

Aug-16<br />

Sep-16<br />

Nov-16<br />

Jan-17<br />

Feb-17<br />

Apr-17<br />

Jun-17<br />

Jul-17<br />

Sep-17<br />

Nov-17<br />

Dec-17<br />

Feb-18<br />

Apr-18<br />

May-18<br />

Jul-18<br />

Aug-18<br />

Oct-18<br />

Dec-18<br />

Jan-19<br />

Mar-19<br />

May-19<br />

Jun-19<br />

Base Case<br />

(Jun 2019)<br />

Source: RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research (E) estimate<br />

Current Price<br />

(Jul 12, 2018)<br />

35600<br />

26500 (-27%)<br />

Historical<br />

Performance<br />

Exhibit 6: Sector Model Portfolio<br />

Perform ance relative to M SC I India<br />

Sector O W /U W (bps) (YT D ) (12M )<br />

M SC I India 0% 11%<br />

C onsumer D isc. 500 -7% -6%<br />

C onsumer Staples -600 11% 6%<br />

Energy -300 1% 12%<br />

Financials 500 1% -3%<br />

H ealthcare -200 -5% -18%<br />

Industrials 400 0% -3%<br />

Technology 0 15% 14%<br />

M aterials -100 -10% -5%<br />

Telecoms 0 -29% -17%<br />

U tilities -200 -11% -5%<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 7: Focus List<br />

Stocks<br />

Sector<br />

R ating<br />

Price as on<br />

Jul 12, 2018<br />

M C ap ($<br />

R el to M SC I India<br />

YT D Perf<br />

12m Perf<br />

Bajaj Auto C ons. D isc. O W 3,097 13.1 -8% 1% 11%<br />

M &M C ons. D isc. O W 916 15.9 21% 20% 19%<br />

M aruti C ons. D isc. O W 9,347 41.2 -5% 13% 23%<br />

Zee Entertainment C ons. D isc. O W 534 7.5 -9% -5% 21%<br />

Titan C ons. D isc. O W 808 10.5 -7% 38% 29%<br />

ITC Staples O W 277 49.4 4% -24% 13%<br />

R eliance Industries Energy O W 1,082 100.1 16% 30% 18%<br />

Bharat Financial Financials ++ 1,177 2.4 16% 39% 110%<br />

H D FC Bank Financials O W 2,166 82.3 14% 17% 24%<br />

IC IC I Bank Financials O W 272 25.6 -14% -16% 49%<br />

Indusind Bank Financials ++ 1,938 17.0 16% 11% 30%<br />

M & M Financial Financials O W 479 4.3 0% 19% 47%<br />

Shriram Transport Financials O W 1,213 4.0 -19% 6% 31%<br />

D r R eddy's H ealthcare O W 2,357 5.7 -3% -21% 48%<br />

Adani Ports Industrials O W 369 11.2 -10% -11% 12%<br />

H avells India Industrials O W 562 5.1 -1% 6% 23%<br />

Asian Paints M aterials O W 1,358 19.0 16% 8% 23%<br />

U ltratech C ement M aterials O W 3,947 15.8 -10% -15% 31%<br />

U PL M aterials O W 582 4.3 -25% -39% 15%<br />

Infosys Technology O W 1,294 41.1 24% 21% 2%<br />

bn)<br />

2Y Fw d EPS<br />

G row th<br />

Source: RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research; ++ Rating and price target for this company have been removed<br />

from consideration in this report because, under applicable law and/or Morgan Stanley policy, Morgan Stanley<br />

may be precluded from issuing such information with respect to this company at this time.<br />

Exhibit 8: Key Themes in Our Portfolio: We Prefer Growth Stocks and<br />

Wide Sector Positions<br />

Themes Implications Stocks<br />

M&A<br />

Banks, property, infrastructure,<br />

materials and telecoms<br />

JSW Steel<br />

Capex<br />

Companies that have done capex over<br />

the past 5 years<br />

Reliance Industries, JSW Steel<br />

Unloved and underowned<br />

stocks Valuations and momentum Asian Paints<br />

Rising ROCE<br />

Delta in ROCE probably more important<br />

than just the level<br />

Asian Paints, MMFS<br />

Earnings revisions<br />

Earnings momentum is a key share price<br />

driver<br />

Maruti Suzuki<br />

Growth at a reasonable<br />

price<br />

Source: Morgan Stanley Research.<br />

As a style growth is likely to lead<br />

performance in the coming months<br />

Bajaj Auto, HDFC Bank, UPL, Zee, ITC<br />

Exhibit 9: Style Performance: GARP in Form<br />

5000%<br />

4000%<br />

3000%<br />

2000%<br />

1000%<br />

0%<br />

Value Growth Quality Junk Momemtum<br />

Cumulative YoY trailing<br />

Exhibit 10: Correlation across Stocks<br />

65%<br />

55%<br />

45%<br />

35%<br />

25%<br />

Stock pickers' time,<br />

Apr-04<br />

1Y Rolling R-squared<br />

Explanatory Power of Market Effect<br />

Stock pickers' time, Jul-06<br />

Stock pickers' time, Jun-09<br />

Stock pickers' time, Feb-11<br />

-1000%<br />

-2000%<br />

-3000%<br />

15%<br />

5%<br />

2003<br />

Time for macro, Jul-05<br />

Time for macro, Aug-03<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

Time for macro, Jul-07<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

Time for macro, Sep-10<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Source: RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Source: RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Note: Prices as of July 12, 2018. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Results shown do not include transaction costs.<br />

6


Portfolio Strategy: Stock Screens<br />

Exhibit 11: Capex Screen<br />

Company MS Rating Stock prices (as<br />

on Jul 12, 2018)<br />

Cumulative Capex to<br />

Total Assets<br />

5 year relative<br />

performance<br />

Colgate-Palmolive Underweight 1,151 0.99 -2%<br />

IPCA Overweight 745 0.65 -10%<br />

Jindal Steel & Power Overweight 219 0.71 -12%<br />

Jubiliant Food Overweight 1,425 0.86 11%<br />

JSW Steel Equal-Weight 317 0.61 23%<br />

JK Lakshmi Underweight 348 0.51 18%<br />

ONGC Underweight 159 0.67 -15%<br />

Power Grid Overweight 183 0.71 -2%<br />

Reliance Industries Overweight 1,082 0.80 6%<br />

Shree Cement Overweight 17,123 0.51 16%<br />

Source: RIMES, Morgan Stanley Estimates, Morgan Stanley Research. Note: Cumulative Capex is sum of capex<br />

from F2013 to F2017. For important disclosures regarding companies that are the subject of this screen,<br />

please see the Morgan Stanley Research Disclosure Website at<br />

www.morganstanley.com/researchdisclosures.<br />

Exhibit 12: Highest 3M Earnings Revisions<br />

Company Name Sector Stock Rating Prices as on<br />

Jul 12, 2018<br />

3M Earnings<br />

Revisions<br />

(FY19E)<br />

Ashok Leyland Industrials Overweight 134 9.9%<br />

Coal India Energy Equal-Weight 265 6.5%<br />

Jubilant Food Consumer Disc. Overweight 1,425 16.8%<br />

JSW Steel Materials Equal-Weight 317 24.3%<br />

MindTree IT Overweight 1,077 7.8%<br />

MphasiS IT Overweight 1,167 7.3%<br />

Oil India Energy Underweight 210 6.6%<br />

SAIL Materials Underweight 75 14.1%<br />

Tech Mahindra IT Overweight 648 7.6%<br />

HDFC Standard Life Financials Equal-Weight 479 11.5%<br />

Source: RIMES, IBES Estimates, Morgan Stanley Research. For important disclosures regarding companies<br />

that are the subject of this screen, please see the Morgan Stanley Research Disclosure Website at<br />

www.morganstanley.com/researchdisclosures.<br />

Exhibit 13: Stocks with Best Two-year Forward Delta in ROCE from<br />

Our Coverage Universe – OW Rating<br />

Stock Price as on Jul 12, 2018 2Yr Change in ROCE ROA+Operating Earnings Yield<br />

(F19E)<br />

Asian Paints 1,121 6.1% 28%<br />

Dabur 338 12.2% 36%<br />

Dr. Reddy's 2,111 10.9% 18%<br />

Godrej Cons. 1,012 6.7% 24%<br />

Havells 504 5.5% 19%<br />

Infosys 1,109 10.0% 25%<br />

ITC 275 7.7% 53%<br />

Titan 784 5.5% 25%<br />

IPCA Labs 573 5.9% 26%<br />

MindTree 717 11.7% 22%<br />

MphasiS 833 7.6% 25%<br />

Gujarat Gas 858 13.7% 25%<br />

Source: RIMES, Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research. For important disclosures regarding companies<br />

that are the subject of this screen, please see the Morgan Stanley Research Disclosure Website at<br />

www.morganstanley.com/researchdisclosures.<br />

Exhibit 14: Growth at a Reasonable Pricing – OW Rating<br />

Stock<br />

Price as on Jul<br />

12, 2018<br />

Trailing 36M<br />

Beta<br />

EPS Growth (F18-<br />

20E)<br />

2Yr Change in ROCE<br />

Implied EPS<br />

growth (SD from<br />

avg)<br />

Asian Paints 1,121 0.78 18% 6.1% 0.6<br />

Dabur 338 0.73 8% 12.2% 0.0<br />

Dr. Reddy's 2,111 0.91 39% 10.9% -0.4<br />

Godrej Cons. 1,012 0.95 17% 6.7% 0.9<br />

Havells 504 0.85 22% 5.5% 1.1<br />

Infosys 1,109 0.63 7% 10.0% -1.1<br />

ITC 275 1.00 11% 7.7% -0.7<br />

Titan 784 0.76 39% 5.5% 0.9<br />

IPCA Labs 573 0.63 48% 5.9% -0.3<br />

MindTree 717 0.56 31% 11.7% 1.0<br />

MphasiS 833 0.78 20% 7.6% 0.0<br />

Gujarat Gas 858 0.52 61% 13.7% -0.4<br />

Source: RIMES, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research. For important disclosures regarding companies that<br />

are the subject of this screen, please see the Morgan Stanley Research Disclosure Website at<br />

www.morganstanley.com/researchdisclosures.<br />

Exhibit 15: Un-loved and Under-owned Stocks<br />

Company<br />

MS Rating<br />

Prices as on<br />

Jul 12, 2018<br />

3M/3Y Avg<br />

daily<br />

traded<br />

volume 12M Perf Beta<br />

3M<br />

Change in 200DMA Institution Sell-side<br />

12M Beta Deviation al Position Reco<br />

ACC Overweight 1,350 149% -21% 1.05 -0.15 -16% 42% 0.24<br />

Ambuja Cements Underweight 202 114% -23% 1.02 -0.18 -18% 57% 0.15<br />

Bank of India Underweight 85 141% -42% 2.17 -0.23 -37% 71% -0.69<br />

Colgate-Palmolive Underweight 1,151 122% 7% 0.38 -0.16 5% 53% 0.18<br />

Cummins India Underweight 656 130% -28% 0.86 -0.22 -19% 71% 0.38<br />

G.E. Shipping Co Underweight 276 39% -33% 0.86 0.04 -25% 72% 0.50<br />

Indraprastha Gas Overweight 262 87% 17% 0.43 -0.22 -11% 66% 0.53<br />

JK Lakshmi Cement Equal-Weight 348 67% -26% 0.68 -0.12 -14% 53% 0.48<br />

JSW Energy Overweight 68 32% 5% 1.30 0.25 -15% 36% -0.27<br />

Oil India Equal-Weight 210 99% 18% 0.36 -0.06 -9% 14% 0.50<br />

IDFC Bank Underweight 39 150% -39% 1.12 -0.15 -23% 42% 0.27<br />

Gujarat Gas Underweight 778 31% 2% 0.60 0.16 -8% 44% 0.43<br />

Dr Lal Underweight 897 47% 7% 0.63 -0.25 4% 55% 0.47<br />

Narayana Hrudyalaya Underweight 247 43% -19% -0.08 0.14 -12% 55% 0.78<br />

Future Consumer Equal-Weight 48 75% 28% 1.25 -0.32 -20% 37% 0.00<br />

Source: RIMES, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research. For important disclosures regarding companies that<br />

are the subject of this screen, please see the Morgan Stanley Research Disclosure Website at<br />

www.morganstanley.com/researchdisclosures.<br />

Exhibit 16: Over-loved and Over-owned Stocks<br />

Company<br />

MS Rating<br />

3M/3Y Avg<br />

Prices as on daily traded<br />

Jul 12, 2018 volume 12M Perf Beta<br />

3M Change<br />

in 12M Beta<br />

200DMA<br />

Deviation<br />

Institutional<br />

Position<br />

HCL Tech Overweight 1,006 132% 18% 0.61 0.09 9% 91% 0.55<br />

HDFC Bank Overweight 2,166 145% 29% 0.72 -0.08 13% 57% 0.87<br />

Cyient Overweight 742 217% 41% 0.43 0.16 16% 78% 0.83<br />

Just Dial Underweight 585 226% 57% 1.26 0.11 20% 68% -0.26<br />

Jubilant Food Overweight 1,425 131% 158% 1.06 -0.16 35% 83% 0.59<br />

Kotak Bank Overweight 1,390 100% 45% 0.83 0.09 24% 69% 0.68<br />

MphasiS Overweight 1,167 301% 94% 0.48 -0.01 36% 74% 0.44<br />

Oberoi Realty Overweight 476 130% 25% 1.08 0.04 -3% 93% 0.71<br />

Edelweiss Overweight 298 102% 57% 1.30 0.08 5% 48% 1.00<br />

SAIL Underweight 75 175% 20% 2.12 0.17 -5% 68% -0.20<br />

TCS Overweight 1,971 178% 62% 0.72 0.05 31% 85% 0.27<br />

Yes Bank Overweight 375 84% 24% 1.34 0.35 14% 84% 0.81<br />

Indiabulls Housing Underweight 1,144 759% 3% 1.33 -0.08 -7% 87% 0.63<br />

Future Retail Overweight 560 156% 43% 1.30 -0.03 2% 41% 0.90<br />

Sell-side<br />

Reco<br />

Source: RIMES, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research. For important disclosures regarding companies that<br />

are the subject of this screen, please see the Morgan Stanley Research Disclosure Website at<br />

www.morganstanley.com/researchdisclosures.<br />

7


The Known Unknowns<br />

Growth<br />

High frequency<br />

data<br />

Earnings season<br />

Earnings guidance<br />

GST collections<br />

Why is this important What the market could be pricing in What is our expectation<br />

Growth cycle is at an inflexion<br />

point in our view<br />

Earnings have persistently<br />

disappointed since 2010<br />

Will set the stage for earnings<br />

revisions breadth to turn positive<br />

GST revenues have been weak<br />

and caused fiscal concerns<br />

Mixed data with some signs of<br />

improvement<br />

Modest improvement in growth QoQ<br />

Neutral to positive guidance<br />

Likely stabilization of revenues at around<br />

the current levels of Rs900-1000 billion<br />

Better improvement than what may be priced in<br />

We are watching for margin improvement as operating<br />

leverage kicks in<br />

Positive guidance from tech, autos, other disc consumption,<br />

private sector banks and industrials<br />

Acceleration possibly to over Rs1 trillion<br />

Loan growth A lagging indicator of growth Modest increase led by retail loan growth Some acceleration in corporate loan growth consistent with<br />

our view on the growth cycle<br />

Order books A signal that capex is returning No major increase We think order books are likely to build visibly in the coming<br />

months<br />

Rates<br />

CPI<br />

Monetary policy<br />

Long bonds<br />

Politics & Policy<br />

Elections<br />

Fiscal spending<br />

Monsoons<br />

We expect the RBI to have limited<br />

tolerance to a rise in CPI<br />

Crucial to protect India's hard<br />

earned macro stability<br />

Recent change in government<br />

borrowing program and rumors<br />

about an increase in foreign limits<br />

has calmed the market<br />

The market believes that the<br />

state elections may provide<br />

insight into the general elections<br />

Higher spending creates inflation<br />

risk<br />

Rains affect market sentiment<br />

more than growth<br />

Range-bound CPI<br />

Market is expecting rate hikes though<br />

exact quantum is hard to judge<br />

Bond prices are likely to be the current<br />

range given that the growth cycle has hit<br />

an inflexion point. Thus the yield curve is<br />

at its highest level since 2010<br />

A difficult election for the BJP<br />

Market is expecting higher than budgeted<br />

deficit in a an election year<br />

Normal rains<br />

For the next three months, we expect core inflation to remain<br />

stable, food prices should continue to drive the headline CPI.<br />

Upside risk to inflation from the MSP hike could (assuming full<br />

pass-through) be about 66bp.<br />

We expect rate hikes at the August and October meetings,<br />

with the quantum of rate hikes totaling 75bp for this cycle.<br />

See: India Equity Strategy: Why and How Long Bond Yields<br />

Matter to Equities (22 Mar 2018)<br />

We think these elections will have limited bearing on general<br />

elections – if the BJP fares well, the market could react<br />

positively<br />

Our economist expects fiscal deficit of 3.4% in F2019, higher<br />

than the government's target of 3.3%, and vs. 3.5% in F2018<br />

Normal rains<br />

NCLT process Important for loan growth Some acceleration in the fruition of deals Similar to the market<br />

Source: Morgan Stanley Research<br />

8


Why is this important What the market could be pricing in What is our expectation<br />

Market<br />

Domestic<br />

flows<br />

Domestic flows have been a reliable<br />

source of equity demand over the past<br />

three years<br />

Some challenge to the run rate of US$2.5<br />

to US$3 billion due to market volatility<br />

See: India Equity Strategy: Dream Run: What Is the Risk to<br />

Domestic Equity Flows? (19 Mar 2018)<br />

Corporate<br />

activity<br />

Higher supply will drag down share<br />

prices, while M&A is an offset<br />

Some increase in supply and M&A<br />

We also expect net demand-supply to deteriorate in 2018 as<br />

companies raise growth capital<br />

Global<br />

Fed rates Determines risk appetite for EM One more hike this year Our US economist expects the Fed to raise once more this<br />

year<br />

EM<br />

performance<br />

Oil prices<br />

India remains highly correlated to<br />

global equities<br />

Given the fiscal constraints, higher oil<br />

could hurt growth<br />

NA<br />

Oil to have a negative impact on the fiscal<br />

deficit and growth<br />

India's beta has fallen to a 13-year low and thus India is<br />

outperforming global equities<br />

Key risk to equities given its ability to cause pain to the fiscal<br />

deficit and, therefore, growth. Our oil analyst expects crude to<br />

be US$85/bbl for 2H18.<br />

Source: Morgan Stanley Research<br />

9


Risks/Catalysts<br />

Exhibit 17: Growth cycle turning? YoY Sensex Revenue and Earnings<br />

Growth<br />

25%<br />

20%<br />

15%<br />

10%<br />

5%<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

-10%<br />

-15%<br />

-20%<br />

BSE Sensex Revenue growth - RS<br />

BSE Sensex Profit growth<br />

Q1F12<br />

Q2F12<br />

Q3F12<br />

Q4F12<br />

Q1F13<br />

Q2F13<br />

Q3F13<br />

Q4F13<br />

Q1F14<br />

Q2F14<br />

Q3F14<br />

Q4F14<br />

Q1F15<br />

Q2F15<br />

Q3F15<br />

Q4F15<br />

Q1F16<br />

Q2F16<br />

Q3F16<br />

Q4F16<br />

Q1F17<br />

Q2F17<br />

Q3F17<br />

Q4F17<br />

Q1F18<br />

Q2F18<br />

Q3F18<br />

Q4F18<br />

Q1F19E<br />

Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

25%<br />

20%<br />

15%<br />

10%<br />

5%<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

-10%<br />

Exhibit 18: Market anticipating some recovery in growth: Earnings<br />

growth implied by EY Gap<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

-80%<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

12M fwd Earnings growth implied by EY gap<br />

model<br />

Trailing Earnings growth pushed back one year<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Source: Bloomberg, RIMES, MSCI,, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 19: Sensex at the top end in gold terms: Sensex in Gold Ounces<br />

(log scale)<br />

729<br />

Sensex in gold ounces (log scale)<br />

Exhibit 20: Oil Could still play spoilsport: Brent Prices and Stocks<br />

80%<br />

Brent YoY Change MSCI India Rel to EM YoY Returns (on reverse scale)<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-20%<br />

-10%<br />

0%<br />

10%<br />

20%<br />

270<br />

-40%<br />

30%<br />

-60%<br />

Dec-13<br />

40%<br />

100<br />

1983<br />

1985<br />

1987<br />

1989<br />

1991<br />

1993<br />

1995<br />

1997<br />

1999<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

Jun-14<br />

Dec-14<br />

Jun-15<br />

Dec-15<br />

Jun-16<br />

Dec-16<br />

2017<br />

Jun-17<br />

Dec-17<br />

Jun-18<br />

Source: Bloomberg, RIMES, MSCI,, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Source: RIMES, Bloomberg, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research,<br />

10


Exhibit 21: India's Growth and Performance Relative to EM: Growth<br />

Key to India's Outperformance<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

-30%<br />

-40%<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

3-year fwd India EPS growth<br />

relative to EM<br />

3-year fwd India returns<br />

relative to EM - RS<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

Exhibit 22: India's beta composition to EM: The Fall in Relative<br />

Volatility<br />

90%<br />

80%<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

3-year rolling return correlations MSCI India vs. MSCI EM (LS)<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

Source: RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

3-year rolling relative volatility MSCI India vs. MSCI EM<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

1.90<br />

1.80<br />

1.70<br />

1.60<br />

1.50<br />

1.40<br />

1.30<br />

1.20<br />

1.10<br />

1.00<br />

0.90<br />

11


Politics and Macro<br />

Exhibit 23: India's Policy Uncertainty Index<br />

300<br />

India's economic policy uncertainty index<br />

LTA of Policy Uncertainty Index<br />

MSCI India vs. EM: 12M relative performance - RS (on reverse scale)<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

Jan-03<br />

Sep-03<br />

May-04<br />

Jan-05<br />

Sep-05<br />

May-06<br />

Jan-07<br />

Sep-07<br />

May-08<br />

Jan-09<br />

Sep-09<br />

May-10<br />

Jan-11<br />

Sep-11<br />

May-12<br />

Jan-13<br />

Sep-13<br />

May-14<br />

Jan-15<br />

Sep-15<br />

May-16<br />

Source: Economic policy uncertainty Index, RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Jan-17<br />

Sep-17<br />

May-18<br />

-30%<br />

-20%<br />

-10%<br />

0%<br />

10%<br />

20%<br />

30%<br />

40%<br />

Exhibit 24: REER Movement<br />

124<br />

120<br />

116<br />

112<br />

108<br />

104<br />

100<br />

96<br />

Mean + st dev<br />

10 Year<br />

Average<br />

RBI REER Trade Weighted 36 Currencies, LS<br />

Mean - st dev<br />

MSe for Jun-18, 5.4% above 10Y<br />

mean<br />

2006<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2007<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2009<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2012<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2014<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2017<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Source: CEIC, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 25: Order Book<br />

60% Order Book, Quarterly<br />

Order Inflows, Trailing 4-quarter sum, RS<br />

40%<br />

YoY%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

Exhibit 26: Consolidated Fiscal Deficit<br />

10%<br />

Consolidated Fiscal Deficit % of GDP<br />

9%<br />

8%<br />

7%<br />

6%<br />

5%<br />

-40%<br />

Dec-08<br />

Jun-10<br />

Dec-11<br />

Jun-13<br />

Dec-14<br />

Jun-16<br />

Dec-17<br />

4%<br />

F1982<br />

F1984<br />

F1986<br />

F1988<br />

F1990<br />

F1992<br />

F1994<br />

F1996<br />

F1998<br />

F2000<br />

F2002<br />

F2004<br />

F2006<br />

F2008<br />

F2010<br />

F2012<br />

F2014<br />

F2016<br />

F2018…<br />

F2020E<br />

Source: Company data, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Source: CSO, Morgan Stanley Research , Morgan Stanley estimates<br />

Exhibit 27: India's External Balance Sheet<br />

Exhibit 28: Supply Shock in Oil Is Bad for Indian Stocks<br />

9%<br />

7%<br />

5%<br />

3%<br />

1%<br />

-1%<br />

Capital Account Balance<br />

Overall BoP<br />

Current Account Balance<br />

195%<br />

165%<br />

135%<br />

105%<br />

75%<br />

45%<br />

15%<br />

Brent YoY Change<br />

MSCI India Rel to EM YoY Returns<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

-3%<br />

4-quarter trailing sum, as % of GDP<br />

-15%<br />

-30%<br />

-5%<br />

-45%<br />

-40%<br />

Mar-97<br />

Mar-98<br />

Mar-99<br />

Mar-00<br />

Mar-01<br />

Mar-02<br />

Mar-03<br />

Mar-04<br />

Mar-05<br />

Mar-06<br />

Mar-07<br />

Mar-08<br />

Mar-09<br />

Mar-10<br />

Mar-11<br />

Mar-12<br />

Mar-13<br />

Mar-14<br />

Mar-15<br />

Mar-16<br />

Mar-17<br />

Mar-18<br />

-75%<br />

1993<br />

1995<br />

1997<br />

1999<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

-50%<br />

Source: RBI, CEIC, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

12


Liquidity<br />

Exhibit 29: P/E Multiple Relative to Earnings Growth – A Measure of<br />

the Force of the Bid Over the Offer or Liquidity<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

-30%<br />

-40%<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

Trailing 3 year CAGR Trailing 5 year CAGR Average<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

Source: RIMES, Bloomberg, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research,<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

Index change minus<br />

EPS growth for MSCI<br />

India<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Exhibit 30: Global Liquidity Proxy: US Treasury Yield Minus India's<br />

Earnings Yield<br />

120%<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

-80%<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

Sensex YoY<br />

US 10Y Yield- MSCI India earnings yield (RS)<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

Source: RIMES, Bloomberg, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

4.0%<br />

2.0%<br />

0.0%<br />

-2.0%<br />

-4.0%<br />

-6.0%<br />

-8.0%<br />

Exhibit 31: Financial Conditions Index vs. Share Prices: Measure of<br />

System Liquidity<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

6M Sensex change - LS<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

Source: Bloomberg, RBI, CEIC, RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2014<br />

FCI<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

2.00<br />

1.50<br />

1.00<br />

0.50<br />

-<br />

(0.50)<br />

(1.00)<br />

(1.50)<br />

(2.00)<br />

(2.50)<br />

Exhibit 32: M2 Supply Growth Relative to Share Prices<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

-80%<br />

YoY Sensex change minus YoY M2 supply<br />

growth<br />

1994<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2018<br />

Source: RBI, RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 33: Fed Rate<br />

Exhibit 34: Yield Curve vs. Sensex Returns<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

-30%<br />

-40%<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

MSCI India vs. EM: 12M relative performance - LS<br />

Rate Gap (Repo rate - Fed rates) - Inverted RS<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2010<br />

Source: Bloomberg, RBI, MSCI, RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

0%<br />

1%<br />

2%<br />

3%<br />

4%<br />

5%<br />

6%<br />

7%<br />

8%<br />

5.0%<br />

4.0%<br />

3.0%<br />

2.0%<br />

1.0%<br />

0.0%<br />

-1.0%<br />

-2.0%<br />

-3.0%<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

Source: BSE, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

Yield Curve pushed fwd 2M<br />

Sensex 12M trailing Returns -<br />

RS<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

120%<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

-80%<br />

13


Corporate Fundamentals<br />

Exhibit 35: Macro Earnings Model Based on Kalecki Equation<br />

80%<br />

70%<br />

Corporate Profit Growth Based on the Macro model<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

Actual Broad Market Profit Growth<br />

-20%<br />

F1994<br />

F1996<br />

F1998<br />

F2000<br />

F2002<br />

F2004<br />

F2006<br />

F2008<br />

F2010<br />

F2012<br />

Source: CEIC, Capitaline, Morgan Stanley Research (E) estimates<br />

F2014<br />

F2016<br />

F2018E<br />

F2020E<br />

F2023e<br />

F2025e<br />

F2026e<br />

Exhibit 36: Proprietary Macro Earnings Model Based on IIP/Inflation<br />

Differentials<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

2004<br />

Broad market Earnings Growth (ex Oil PSU)-RS<br />

Earnings Growth Leading Indicator (Real IIP growth) * (1+ex<br />

food CPI -WPI) as 3MMA-LS<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

E<br />

2017<br />

E<br />

2018<br />

E<br />

2019<br />

Source: CEIC, Capitaline, Morgan Stanley Research (E) estimates<br />

Exhibit 37: YoY Revenue and Profit Growth for Broad Market<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

-30%<br />

-40%<br />

Mar-05<br />

Mar-06<br />

Mar-07<br />

Mar-08<br />

Mar-09<br />

Broad market earnings growth (ex-oil PSU)<br />

Broad market revenue<br />

growth (ex Oil PSU) - RS<br />

Mar-10<br />

Source: Capitaline, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Mar-11<br />

Mar-12<br />

Mar-13<br />

Mar-14<br />

Mar-15<br />

Mar-16<br />

Mar-17<br />

Mar-18<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

-30%<br />

-40%<br />

-50%<br />

Exhibit 38: India vs. US: Corporate Profits to GDP<br />

12%<br />

10%<br />

8%<br />

6%<br />

4%<br />

2%<br />

0%<br />

India<br />

Corporate Profits to GDP<br />

US<br />

F1992<br />

F1993<br />

F1994<br />

F1995<br />

F1996<br />

F1997<br />

F1998<br />

F1999<br />

F2000<br />

F2001<br />

F2002<br />

F2003<br />

F2004<br />

F2005<br />

F2006<br />

F2007<br />

F2008<br />

F2009<br />

F2010<br />

F2011<br />

F2012<br />

F2013<br />

F2014<br />

F2015<br />

F2016<br />

F2017E<br />

Source: CMIE, Morgan Stanley Research (e) estimates<br />

Exhibit 39: Earnings Drawdown or Indicator of Earnings Recession<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

-10%<br />

-15%<br />

-20%<br />

-25%<br />

MSCI India EPS drawdown from peak<br />

1994<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 40: Corporate Confidence Improves to the Highest Level since<br />

F2013<br />

Confidence on Business Growth<br />

FY13<br />

FY14E<br />

FY15<br />

FY16E<br />

FY18<br />

FY19E<br />

32%<br />

38%<br />

49%<br />

47%<br />

Source: AlphaWise, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

77%<br />

88%<br />

61%<br />

54%<br />

44%<br />

45%<br />

20%<br />

7%<br />

6%<br />

7%<br />

8%<br />

3%<br />

10% 2%<br />

Improved y-o-y No change y-o-y Worsened y-o-y<br />

14


Corporate Fundamentals<br />

Exhibit 41: Morgan Stanley Top-down Sensex EPS Estimates<br />

BSE Sensex EPS F17 F18e F19e F20e<br />

MS Top Down Estimates<br />

Bear Case 1,366 1,387 1,683 2,057<br />

EPS Growth 2% 21% 22%<br />

Base Case 1,366 1,435 1,766 2,182<br />

EPS Growth -0.5% 5% 23% 24%<br />

Bull Case 1,366 1,496 1,925 2,427<br />

EPS Growth 10% 29% 26%<br />

Consensus EPS Estimates 1,366 1,536 1,919 2,255<br />

EPS Growth 12% 25% 18%<br />

MS Analyst Estimates<br />

EPS 1,366 1,462 1,892 2,403<br />

EPS Growth -0.5% 7% 29% 27%<br />

Broad Market<br />

MS Top Down Estimates<br />

EPS Growth 0% 3% 20% 22%<br />

Exhibit 42: India's ROE and Asset Turnover Trend<br />

24% India<br />

Asset Turn Trend - RS<br />

22%<br />

20%<br />

18%<br />

ROE Trend -LS<br />

16%<br />

14%<br />

12%<br />

10%<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

Source: Worldscope, RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

110.0%<br />

100.0%<br />

90.0%<br />

80.0%<br />

70.0%<br />

60.0%<br />

50.0%<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, IBES, Morgan Stanley Research. e= Morgan Stanley estimates except for Consensus<br />

estimates, which are IBES estimates<br />

Exhibit 43: Free Cash Flow for Corporate India<br />

Exhibit 44: BSE Sensex Consensus EPS Growth Trend<br />

15%<br />

10%<br />

FCF to Sales<br />

30%<br />

28%<br />

26%<br />

24%<br />

BSE Sensex consensus EPS growth trend<br />

F2019E EPS -<br />

1922<br />

5%<br />

22%<br />

20%<br />

F18 to F20 EPS<br />

CAGR<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

-10%<br />

-15%<br />

FY02<br />

FY03<br />

FY04<br />

FY05<br />

FY06<br />

FY07<br />

FY08<br />

FY09<br />

FY10<br />

FY11<br />

FY12<br />

FY13<br />

BSE 500<br />

Ex Financials<br />

Series3<br />

FY14<br />

FY15<br />

FY16<br />

FY17<br />

18%<br />

16%<br />

14%<br />

12%<br />

10%<br />

8%<br />

F2020E EPS -<br />

2268<br />

F2018E EPS -<br />

1539<br />

7-Jul-16<br />

29-Jul-16<br />

19-Aug-16<br />

8-Sep-16<br />

30-Sep-16<br />

21-Oct-16<br />

11-Nov-16<br />

30-Nov-16<br />

21-Dec-16<br />

13-Jan-17<br />

7-Feb-17<br />

28-Feb-17<br />

21-Mar-17<br />

11-Apr-17<br />

2-May-17<br />

23-May-17<br />

14-Jun-17<br />

5-Jul-17<br />

26-Jul-17<br />

16-Aug-17<br />

6-Sep-17<br />

27-Sep-17<br />

18-Oct-17<br />

8-Nov-17<br />

29-Nov-17<br />

20-Dec-17<br />

10-Jan-18<br />

31-Jan-18<br />

21-Feb-18<br />

14-Mar-18<br />

4-Apr-18<br />

25-Apr-18<br />

16-May-18<br />

6-Jun-18<br />

27-Jun-18<br />

Source: Company Data, Capitaline, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Source: Company Data, Capitaline, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 45: Earnings Estimate Revisions Breadth<br />

10%<br />

5%<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

-10%<br />

-15%<br />

Sep-01<br />

Sep-02<br />

Reflexivity in corporate earnings<br />

outlook and share price<br />

Sep-03<br />

Sep-04<br />

Sep-05<br />

Sep-06<br />

Analyst Revisions 3MA -LS<br />

Sep-07<br />

Sep-08<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Sep-09<br />

Sep-10<br />

Sep-11<br />

Sep-12<br />

MSCI India (yoy, RS)<br />

Sep-13<br />

Sep-14<br />

Sep-15<br />

Sep-16<br />

Sep-17<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

Exhibit 46: GDP Growth vs. Earnings Growth<br />

Cumulative GDP Growth<br />

on a log scale<br />

1000<br />

Cumulative EPS Growth (MSCI India)<br />

100<br />

FY1994<br />

FY1995<br />

FY1996<br />

FY1997<br />

FY1998<br />

FY1999<br />

FY2000<br />

FY2001<br />

FY2002<br />

FY2003<br />

FY2004<br />

FY2005<br />

FY2006<br />

FY2007<br />

FY2008<br />

FY2009<br />

FY2010<br />

FY2011<br />

FY2012<br />

FY2013<br />

FY2014<br />

FY2015<br />

FY2016<br />

FY2017<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, CEIC, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

15


Valuations<br />

Exhibit 47: Average Predicted Performance by All Valuation Tools<br />

175%<br />

12M Fwd. Performance Predicted 12M Fwd. Performance<br />

125%<br />

75%<br />

25%<br />

-25%<br />

Exhibit 48: Absolute P/B<br />

7<br />

6<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

PB<br />

LTA<br />

+1 Stdev<br />

-1 Stdev<br />

MSCI India<br />

-75%<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

1<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 49: Share of India in World Market Cap & GDP<br />

3.5%<br />

3.0%<br />

2.5%<br />

2.0%<br />

1.5%<br />

1.0%<br />

0.5%<br />

0.0%<br />

Share of India (in World<br />

Market Cap)<br />

Share of India (in World<br />

GDP) - RS<br />

3.3%<br />

3.1%<br />

2.9%<br />

2.7%<br />

2.5%<br />

2.3%<br />

2.1%<br />

1.9%<br />

1.7%<br />

1.5%<br />

Exhibit 50: MSCI India P/B Relative to MSCI EM<br />

2.4<br />

2.2<br />

2.0<br />

1.8<br />

1.6<br />

1.4<br />

1.2<br />

PB<br />

LTA<br />

+1 Stdev<br />

-1 Stdev<br />

MSCI India (relative to EM)<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

Source: IMF, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017E<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Exhibit 51: Cyclically Adjusted P/E<br />

30x<br />

India Shiller PE<br />

28x<br />

26x<br />

24x<br />

22x<br />

20x<br />

18x<br />

16x<br />

14x<br />

12x<br />

10x<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2016<br />

in USD<br />

in INR<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Exhibit 52: Market Cap to GDP<br />

100%<br />

90%<br />

80%<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

Source: Capitaline, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

Market Cap to GDP ex Sensex<br />

Sensex market cap to GDP<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

16


Valuations<br />

Exhibit 53: Equity vs. Bond Multiple<br />

2.5<br />

2.4<br />

2.3<br />

2.2<br />

2.1<br />

2.0<br />

1.9<br />

1.8<br />

1.7<br />

1.6<br />

1.5<br />

1.4<br />

1.3<br />

1.2<br />

1.1<br />

1.0<br />

0.9<br />

0.8<br />

0.7<br />

0.6<br />

0.5<br />

0.4<br />

0.3<br />

0.2<br />

0.1<br />

0.0<br />

1994<br />

Equity multiple (using 12M fwd PE) over bond multiple (using 10-year bond yields)<br />

Feb-00<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

Mar-03<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI,, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Jan-08<br />

2007<br />

Dec-08<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

Oct-10<br />

Sep-11<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

Jun-14 Jul-15<br />

Jun-13<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

Nov-16<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

Exhibit 54: Small Cap Price to Book<br />

4.9<br />

4.4<br />

3.9<br />

3.4<br />

2.9<br />

2.4<br />

1.9<br />

1.4<br />

0.9<br />

0.4<br />

MSCI India Small Cap PB (LS)<br />

MSCI India Small Cap PB<br />

relative to MSCI India (RS)<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

1.0<br />

0.9<br />

0.8<br />

0.7<br />

0.6<br />

0.5<br />

0.4<br />

0.3<br />

Exhibit 55: P/B Forecasting 10-year CAGR of 13.0% in Returns<br />

25.0%<br />

20.0%<br />

15.0%<br />

Annual 10-year fwd<br />

MSCI India returns<br />

Current P/B of 3.2 implies a<br />

10-year annual return of 13.0%<br />

Exhibit 56: Value Assigned to Future Growth<br />

90% Value assigned to future growth for MSCI India Index<br />

80%<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

10.0%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

10-year<br />

average<br />

5 Year trailing average<br />

5.0%<br />

R² = 0.7927<br />

MSCI India Trailing P/B<br />

y = -0.0351x + 0.2436<br />

0.0%<br />

1 2 3 4 5 6 7<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

1994<br />

1996<br />

1998<br />

2000<br />

2002<br />

2004<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2006<br />

2008<br />

2010<br />

2012<br />

2014<br />

2016<br />

Exhibit 57: MSCI India P/E Relative to MSCI US<br />

2.0<br />

MSCI India PE relative to<br />

1.8 MSCI US<br />

1.6<br />

1.4<br />

1.2<br />

1.0<br />

0.8<br />

0.6<br />

0.4<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

Source: Bloomberg, RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Exhibit 58: Valuation Summary<br />

Current Average z-score %ile of current<br />

reading<br />

MSCI India<br />

Trailing PE 23.2 18.1 1.1 91%<br />

12M Fwd PE 18.0 14.4 1.2 92%<br />

Trailing PB 3.2 3.1 0.1 67%<br />

Dividend Yield 1.4% 1.4% -0.2 45%<br />

VAFG 64% 54% 0.8 86%<br />

Modified EY Gap -2.2% -1.6% -0.3 41%<br />

EY Gap -3.6% -1.8% -1.0 30%<br />

MSCI India Relative to EM<br />

Trailing PE 1.7 1.2 1.6 96%<br />

12M Fwd PE 1.6 1.2 1.4 99%<br />

Trailing PB 1.9 1.7 0.9 81%<br />

Dividend Yield 0.5 0.6 -0.4 51%<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

17


Sentiment<br />

Exhibit 59: Sentiment Indicator<br />

Exhibit 60: Market Breadth<br />

2.0<br />

1.5<br />

1.0<br />

0.5<br />

Composite Sentiment Indicator (CSI)<br />

Jan-04<br />

Jun-99<br />

Nov-06<br />

Jan-08<br />

Oct-09<br />

Nov-10<br />

Overbought<br />

SELL ZONE<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

% stocks above 200 DMA<br />

Sell Zone<br />

0.0<br />

40%<br />

-0.5<br />

-1.0<br />

-1.5<br />

-2.0<br />

1998<br />

May-03<br />

May-00<br />

Dec-98<br />

Sep-01<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

Apr-07<br />

Aug-06<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

Oct-08<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

Sep 13<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

Dec 16<br />

Feb 16<br />

2016<br />

BUY ZONE<br />

Oversold<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

Source: RIMES, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

Buy Zone<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

Source: RIMES, Bloomberg, ASA, BSE, CDSL, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 61: GAP between 200 DMA and 50 DMA<br />

Exhibit 62: Realized Interday Volatility<br />

25%<br />

20%<br />

15%<br />

10%<br />

5%<br />

0%<br />

-5%<br />

3.5%<br />

3.0%<br />

2.5%<br />

2.0%<br />

1 Yr Rolling Interday Volatility<br />

-10%<br />

-15%<br />

-20%<br />

Gap between 200 DMA and 50 DMA as % of Nifty<br />

1.5%<br />

1.0%<br />

-25%<br />

1991<br />

1992<br />

1993<br />

1994<br />

1995<br />

1996<br />

1997<br />

1998<br />

1999<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

Source: NSE, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

0.5%<br />

1991<br />

1993<br />

1995<br />

1997<br />

1999<br />

2001<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

Exhibit 63: Equity Capital Raising vs. Valuations<br />

40<br />

12M Rolling Equity Issuances/GDP (RS)<br />

35 MSCI India PE (LS) - Pushed fwd 2 months<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

1994<br />

1996<br />

1998<br />

2000<br />

2002<br />

2004<br />

2006<br />

2008<br />

2010<br />

2012<br />

2014<br />

2016<br />

4.5%<br />

4.0%<br />

3.5%<br />

3.0%<br />

2.5%<br />

2.0%<br />

1.5%<br />

1.0%<br />

0.5%<br />

0.0%<br />

Exhibit 64: Net Equity Demand-supply Likely to Decline in 2018<br />

15.0<br />

10.0 Equity demand supply gap (US$ bn)<br />

5.0<br />

0.0<br />

-5.0<br />

-10.0<br />

-15.0<br />

-20.0<br />

-25.0<br />

-30.0<br />

-35.0<br />

-40.0<br />

2000<br />

2001<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018 E<br />

Source: Capitaline, CMIE, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Source: Capitaline, CMIE, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

18


Sentiment<br />

Exhibit 65: Domestic Equity: Flows to Stock<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

-10%<br />

-20%<br />

12-month trailing equity flows to equity mutual fund assets<br />

Sep-00<br />

May-01<br />

Jan-02<br />

Sep-02<br />

May-03<br />

Jan-04<br />

Sep-04<br />

May-05<br />

Jan-06<br />

Sep-06<br />

May-07<br />

Jan-08<br />

Sep-08<br />

May-09<br />

Jan-10<br />

Sep-10<br />

May-11<br />

Jan-12<br />

Sep-12<br />

May-13<br />

Jan-14<br />

Sep-14<br />

May-15<br />

Jan-16<br />

Sep-16<br />

May-17<br />

Jan-18<br />

Source: AMFI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 66: Margin of Safety for Equity Mutual Fund Investors has<br />

waned<br />

2500<br />

Cumulative 12M flows in<br />

200%<br />

equity mfs (Rs bn)<br />

175%<br />

2000<br />

Margin of safety - RS<br />

150%<br />

1500<br />

125%<br />

100%<br />

1000<br />

75%<br />

50%<br />

500<br />

25%<br />

0<br />

0%<br />

-25%<br />

-500<br />

-50%<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

Source: AMFI, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

Exhibit 67: Aggregate Institutional Flows<br />

18000<br />

13000<br />

3M Rolling Total<br />

Flows (US$ mn)<br />

3M Rolling FII Flows<br />

(US$ mn)<br />

Exhibit 68: Sector FPI Flows<br />

8000<br />

3000<br />

-2000<br />

-7000<br />

3M Rolling DII Flows<br />

(US$ mn)<br />

-12000<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

Source: SEBI, CDSL, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

2018<br />

Source: CDSL, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 69: India Ownership in EM Portfolios<br />

Exhibit 70: Ownership Status (Quarter Ended Mar-18)<br />

Overall Institutional<br />

sector positions<br />

Total Institutional<br />

FPIs DFIs DMFs Total Inst.<br />

YoY ^ in Tot<br />

MSCI Weight Position over MSCI QoQ Change<br />

Inst. Position<br />

weight<br />

Cons Disc 10% 10% 9% 10% 12.2% -2.3% 0.1% -0.2%<br />

Cons Staples 7% 16% 12% 9% 9.7% -0.3% -0.1% -1.3%<br />

Energy 9% 17% 7% 10% 13.1% -2.9% -0.8% -1.4%<br />

Financials 41% 18% 35% 36% 23.7% 12.0% -0.5% 0.8%<br />

Healthcare 2% 3% 4% 3% 5.4% -2.7% 0.3% 1.5%<br />

Industrials 4% 9% 8% 6% 6.0% -0.4% 0.0% 0.1%<br />

Materials 7% 8% 7% 7% 9.4% -2.4% 0.0% 0.0%<br />

Technology 14% 11% 10% 13% 15.6% -2.9% 0.7% 0.5%<br />

Telecoms 3% 2% 3% 3% 2.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%<br />

Utilities 3% 6% 6% 4% 2.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0%<br />

Source: BSE, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Source: EPFR, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

19


Sectors<br />

Exhibit 71: Sector Fundamentals<br />

MSCI Sectors F18 ROE 1Y Fwd<br />

Change in<br />

ROE<br />

ROE as SD<br />

from Avg<br />

F17 Net D/E<br />

F17 FCF/<br />

Sales<br />

Trailing 5Y<br />

CAGR in<br />

EPS<br />

Consumer Disc. 17.8% 3.7% (0.1) 29% 5.4% 2.4%<br />

Consumer Staples 28.9% 2.4% (1.1) -22% 14.3% 0.2%<br />

Energy 15.7% 1.2% (0.7) 34% 3.3% 3.9%<br />

Financials 10.9% 6.2% (1.6) 241% 6.7% -1.0%<br />

Health Care 12.2% 2.0% (1.7) 35% 9.5% 1.7%<br />

Industrials 14.1% 1.4% 0.0 65% 7.6% 2.2%<br />

Technology 24.6% -0.8% 0.0 59% 6.1% 1.9%<br />

Materials 13.1% 2.6% (0.6) -47% 19.0% 1.4%<br />

Telecoms -0.8% -1.1% (1.4) 137% 4.6% -5.2%<br />

Utilities 12.9% 1.4% (0.3) 98% 13.2% 0.9%<br />

F18 EPS<br />

growth<br />

14.8%<br />

10.9%<br />

12.7%<br />

2.0%<br />

-27.1%<br />

25.8%<br />

2.8%<br />

40.0%<br />

NM<br />

15.5%<br />

1M Revision<br />

in F18 EPS<br />

growth<br />

6M Revision in<br />

F18 EPS<br />

growth<br />

0.0% -2.9%<br />

0.0% 0.1%<br />

0.0% 5.1%<br />

0.0% -16.1%<br />

0.0% -7.2%<br />

0.0% 7.5%<br />

0.0% 1.6%<br />

0.0% -0.3%<br />

0.0% -32.8%<br />

0.0% -2.6%<br />

F19 EPS<br />

growth<br />

18.2%<br />

17.1%<br />

18.1%<br />

47.1%<br />

21.5%<br />

16.0%<br />

10.2%<br />

28.6%<br />

NM<br />

15.1%<br />

1M Revision in<br />

F19 EPS<br />

growth<br />

6M Revision in<br />

F19 EPS<br />

growth<br />

-0.7% -9.3%<br />

0.0% 1.0%<br />

-0.1% 3.3%<br />

-3.0% 15.0%<br />

0.1% -7.6%<br />

-0.5% -3.6%<br />

2.8% 1.9%<br />

-0.3% -0.3%<br />

NM<br />

NM<br />

-0.7% -2.8%<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 72: Sector Valuations<br />

MSCI Sectors Trailing PE PE as SD<br />

from Avg<br />

Trailing PB PB as SD from<br />

Avg<br />

Div Yield<br />

Div Yield as<br />

SD from<br />

Avg<br />

Long Term<br />

Implied EPS<br />

Growth<br />

Long Term<br />

Implied Div<br />

Growth<br />

Value Assigned<br />

to Future<br />

Growth<br />

Consumer Disc. 23.3 1.0 4.6 0.8 0.8% (1.3) 9.4% 18.9% 63.7%<br />

Consumer Staples 52.7 2.1 15.8 1.4 1.1% (1.0) 21.3% 14.9% 82.0%<br />

Energy 13.3 0.2 2.0 (0.3) 1.8% (0.2) -0.8% 9.5% 43.2%<br />

Financials 27.1 1.3 2.9 0.6 1.1% (0.8) -9.0% 15.2% 70.3%<br />

Health Care 31.8 0.3 3.4 (1.4) 0.7% (0.5) 10.6% 21.0% 76.6%<br />

Industrials 27.2 0.8 4.3 0.5 1.0% (0.7) 8.6% 16.5% 70.9%<br />

Technology 20.1 (0.4) 4.8 (0.3) 1.8% 1.1 5.4% 9.7% 52.4%<br />

Materials 22.1 0.6 2.4 0.3 1.7% (0.1) 9.8% 10.6% 65.6%<br />

Telecoms 143.8 3.9 1.7 (0.3) 1.3% (0.2) NM 13.3% 94.2%<br />

Utilities 13.8 0.2 1.7 (0.0) 2.8% 0.7 12.0% 5.0% 35.7%<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

Exhibit 73: Sector Market Dynamics<br />

MSCI Sectors Abs 3M perf Abs 12M<br />

perf<br />

Abs YTD<br />

perf<br />

5 Year CAGR<br />

Perf<br />

200DMA<br />

Deviation<br />

12M Beta<br />

3M Change in<br />

12M Beta<br />

Institutional<br />

Ownership<br />

Sell Side Reco<br />

3M change in<br />

Sell Side Reco<br />

Consumer Disc. -5% 2% -10% 11% -2% 0.9 92% 67% 56% 2%<br />

Consumer Staples 13% 15% 16% 12% 14% 0.6 65% 54% 46% 7%<br />

Energy 7% 21% 3% 11% 2% 1.2 122% 61% 63% 16%<br />

Financials 3% 9% 4% 13% 2% 1.1 105% 76% 59% 9%<br />

Health Care 7% -9% -4% 3% 2% 1.3 127% 66% 45% 4%<br />

Industrials -6% 3% -4% 13% -4% 1.1 110% 63% 59% 16%<br />

Technology 12% 34% 22% 14% 18% 0.6 63% 75% 33% 13%<br />

Materials -7% -4% -14% 13% -9% 1.2 120% 62% 62% 13%<br />

Telecoms -9% -19% -32% -6% -19% 1.0 96% 90% 32% 22%<br />

Utilities -7% 1% -14% 4% -8% 0.8 80% 70% 37% 9%<br />

Source: RIMES, MSCI, Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley Research<br />

20


Sectors<br />

Dark blue Line – Weight in the average Institutional portfolio (domestic + foreign) using our sample of 75 companies – LS<br />

Light red line – Relative Position to MSCI Sector weight (above/below benchmark in bp) – RS<br />

Exhibit 74: Total Institutional Sector Positions – Absolute and Relative over Time<br />

Consumer Disc. Consumer Staples Energy Financials Healthcare<br />

12%<br />

600 36%<br />

1,100 25%<br />

300 40%<br />

1,600 12%<br />

32%<br />

400<br />

900<br />

200<br />

1,400<br />

36%<br />

10%<br />

28%<br />

20%<br />

100<br />

1,200 10%<br />

700<br />

200<br />

0 32%<br />

1,000<br />

24%<br />

8%<br />

500 15%<br />

(100)<br />

0 20%<br />

28%<br />

800 8%<br />

300<br />

(200)<br />

600<br />

6%<br />

(200) 16%<br />

10%<br />

(300) 24%<br />

400 6%<br />

100<br />

12%<br />

(400)<br />

(400)<br />

20%<br />

200<br />

(100)<br />

4%<br />

8%<br />

5%<br />

(500)<br />

0 4%<br />

16%<br />

(600) 4%<br />

(300)<br />

(600)<br />

(200)<br />

2%<br />

(800) 0%<br />

(500)<br />

0%<br />

(700) 12%<br />

(400) 2%<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

Industrials Materials Technology Telecoms Utilities<br />

18%<br />

15%<br />

12%<br />

9%<br />

6%<br />

3%<br />

0%<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

(100)<br />

(200)<br />

(300)<br />

(400)<br />

14%<br />

12%<br />

10%<br />

8%<br />

6%<br />

4%<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

1,000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

(200)<br />

(400)<br />

(600)<br />

(800)<br />

(1,000)<br />

(1,200)<br />

19%<br />

17%<br />

15%<br />

13%<br />

11%<br />

9%<br />

7%<br />

5%<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

(200)<br />

(400)<br />

(600)<br />

(800)<br />

(1,000)<br />

(1,200)<br />

12%<br />

11%<br />

10%<br />

9%<br />

8%<br />

7%<br />

6%<br />

5%<br />

4%<br />

3%<br />

2%<br />

1%<br />

0%<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

(100)<br />

(200)<br />

(300)<br />

(400)<br />

8%<br />

7%<br />

6%<br />

5%<br />

4%<br />

3%<br />

2%<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

2013<br />

2015<br />

2017<br />

100<br />

0<br />

(100)<br />

(200)<br />

(300)<br />

(400)<br />

(500)<br />

(600)<br />

(700)<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

(50)<br />

(100)<br />

(150)<br />

Source: MSCI, Morgan Stanley Research. Historical weights are adjusted for Reliance Ind and Tata Motors, which were earlier classified in Materials and Consumer Disc and later as Energy and<br />

Industrials, respectively. Since Sept, MSCI reclassified Tata Motors to Consumer Discretionary from Industrials.<br />

21


Economy<br />

FX<br />

INDIA<br />

JULY 11, 2018<br />

UPDATE<br />

BSE-30: 36,240<br />

FX outlook: volatility abound. Fragile global risk sentiments and increasing domestic<br />

vulnerabilities have continued to weigh on INR in CY2018 after a stellar performance in<br />

CY2017. The unrelenting capital outflow from EMs is a reflection of the increasing<br />

global risks as DM monetary policies normalize and trade war threatens to derail the<br />

global economic recovery. Adverse global backdrop, deteriorating domestic macro<br />

scenario and domestic political uncertainty could continue to keep the INR under<br />

pressure. We expect USD-INR to range 67.5-71.0 for the rest of FY2019.<br />

Unabated global risks to keep the strength in USD intact<br />

We noted in our April 20 report (FX outlook: more unknowns than knowns) factors such as (1)<br />

trade wars translating into currency wars, (2) escalating geopolitical tensions, (3) secular<br />

uptrend in Brent and (4) faster G4 policy normalization to define the volatility in the FX space.<br />

Most of these adverse risks have transpired in 1QFY19, prompting us to revisit our forecasts.<br />

Trade tensions seem to be posing headwinds to global growth as reflected in the flattening<br />

yield curve (Exhibit 1). Another source of volatility has been policy dissonance across global<br />

central banks with the Fed signaling faster policy normalization while ECB postponing its rate<br />

hike decision to mid-2019. We pencil in another 50 bps of rate hike by the Fed in CY2018 and<br />

75 bps in CY2019. The divergence in global monetary policy along with geopolitical risks should<br />

continue to provide a case for a secular USD strength in the medium term. The spillover from<br />

these uncertainties has led to the worst quarter for the EM currencies since CY2015. Such<br />

swings in EM currencies have prompted several central banks to use interest rate hike as a<br />

defense mechanism (Exhibit 2).<br />

INR weakness a function of adverse global and domestic risks<br />

QUICK NUMBERS<br />

We estimate FY2019<br />

CAD/GDP at 2.8%<br />

with crude price<br />

assumption of<br />

US$72.5/bbl<br />

We estimate overall<br />

BOP in FY2019 at<br />

US$(-)32.7 bn<br />

USD-INR likely to be<br />

in 67.5-71.0 range<br />

for rest of FY2019<br />

In an already weakening domestic macro scenario, secular increase in crude prices (up around<br />

18% in CYTD18) has increased the risks to India’s twin deficit and inflation. We model CAD/GDP<br />

to deteriorate to 2.8% in FY2019 from 1.9% in FY2018 with overall balance at US$(-)32.7 bn<br />

against US$43.6 bn in FY2018 (Exhibit 3). Consequently, INR has been one of the worst Asian<br />

currencies in CY2018 even as there has been a steady FPI outflows from EMs in 1QFY19 (Exhibit<br />

4). The recent correction in the INR is reflecting in the sharp correction in the REER after a<br />

prolonged period of significant overvaluation (Exhibit 5). Based on the REER, the INR has shifted<br />

into a marginally overvalued zone—probably signaling some stability in the near term.<br />

INR to remain under pressure with some breather likely in the near term<br />

We had noted in our April FX report if global and domestic risks play out, the INR could<br />

overshoot the previous historical lows of 68.89 against the USD. With most of the risks<br />

transpiring, the INR has touched new lows. We note that on an annual basis the INR has<br />

outperformed the 12-month forward premia in most of the years (Exhibit 6). Given the<br />

worsening global and domestic political and economic climate, we believe that this year will be<br />

different with INR depreciating more than what the forward premia indicated at the start of<br />

FY2019 (67.75 for March 2019). We expect the INR at around 69-70 against the USD by end-<br />

FY2019. While in the near term we see some scope for temporary retracement in USD-INR as<br />

the incremental domestic risks remain contained (FPI outflows have abated in the recent days),<br />

we maintain our depreciation bias through 2HFY19 as political risks and broad-based USD<br />

strength continue to weigh on sentiments. Overall, with several global risks starting to play out,<br />

we shift our USD-INR range to 67.5-71.0 for the rest of FY2019 (Exhibit 7).<br />

Upasna Bhardwaj<br />

upasna.bhardwaj@kotak.com<br />

Mumbai: +91-22-6166-0531<br />

Suvodeep Rakshit<br />

suvodeep.rakshit@kotak.com<br />

Mumbai: +91-22-4336-0898<br />

Kotak Economic Research<br />

kotak.research@kotak.com<br />

Mumbai: +91-22-4336-0000<br />

For Private Circulation Only.


Argentina<br />

Turkey<br />

Indonesia<br />

US<br />

Mexico<br />

Canada<br />

Malaysia<br />

India<br />

Russia<br />

S. Africa<br />

Brazil<br />

China<br />

India<br />

Economy<br />

Exhibit 1: Yield curve has flattened across DMs<br />

Change in 10-year-2-year spread over the period, December calendar year-ends (bps)<br />

10<br />

CY2017<br />

CYTD18<br />

0<br />

(10)<br />

US UK Germany France Japan<br />

(20)<br />

(30)<br />

(40)<br />

(50)<br />

(60)<br />

(70)<br />

(80)<br />

Notes:<br />

(a) Negative indicates flattening od yield curve over specified period.<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Economics Research<br />

Exhibit 2: Central banks have been using interest rates to support their currencies<br />

Central bank policy action in CYTD18<br />

1,200<br />

1,000<br />

1,125<br />

975<br />

Change in policy rate (CYTD, bps)<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

100<br />

50 50 25 25 25 (25) (25) (50) (50)<br />

(200)<br />

Notes:<br />

(a) China’s reserve requirement ratio is used.<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Economics Research<br />

2 KOTAK ECONOMIC RESEARCH


Economy<br />

India<br />

Exhibit 3: Deteriorating CAD/BOP will weigh on the INR in FY2019<br />

India's balance of payments, March fiscal year-ends, 2014-19E (US$ bn)<br />

2019E<br />

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Oil@67.5/bbl Oil@72.5/bbl Oil@80/bbl<br />

Current account (32.4) (26.8) (22.2) (15.3) (48.7) (67.2) (74.7) (85.9)<br />

GDP 1,858 2,038 2,103 2,270 2,602 2,714 2,714 2,714<br />

CAD/GDP (%) (1.7) (1.3) (1.1) (0.7) (1.9) (2.5) (2.8) (3.2)<br />

Trade balance (147.6) (144.9) (130.1) (112.4) (160.0) (182.9) (190.4) (201.6)<br />

Trade balance/GDP (%) (7.9) (7.1) (6.2) (4.9) (6.2) (6.7) (7.0) (7.4)<br />

- Exports 319 317 266 280 309 331 334 337<br />

- oil exports 63 57 31 32 39 41 43 47<br />

- non-oil exports 255 260 236 249 270 290 290 290<br />

- Imports 466 461 396 393 469 514 524 539<br />

- oil imports 165 138 83 87 109 132 142 157<br />

- non-oil imports 301 323 313 306 360 382 382 382<br />

- gold imports 29 34 32 28 34 33 33 33<br />

Invisibles (net) 115 118 108 97 111 116 116 116<br />

- Services 73 77 70 67 78 80 80 80<br />

- softw are 67 70 71 70 72 74 74 74<br />

- non-softw are 6.0 6.2 (1.8) (2.6) 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5<br />

- Transfers 65 66 63 56 62 66 66 66<br />

- Income (net) (23) (24) (24) (26) (29) (30) (30) (30)<br />

Capital account 48.8 89.3 41.1 36.5 91.4 42.0 42.0 42.0<br />

Percentage of GDP 2.6 4.4 2.0 1.6 3.5 1.5 1.5 1.5<br />

Foreign investment 26 73 32 43 52 20 20 20<br />

- FDI 22 31 36 36 30 30 30 30<br />

- FPI 5 42 (4) 8 22 (10) (10) (10)<br />

- Equities 14 15 (4) 9 2 (2) (2) (2)<br />

- Debt (8) 26 (0) (1) 21 (8) (8) (8)<br />

Banking capital 25 12 11 (17) 16 12 12 12<br />

- NRI deposits 39 14 16 (12) 10 9 9 9<br />

Short-term credit (5.0) (0.1) (1.6) 6.5 13.9 6.0 6.0 6.0<br />

ECBs 11.8 1.6 (4.5) (6.1) (0.2) 2.0 2.0 2.0<br />

External assistance 1.0 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.0<br />

Other capital account items (10.8) 1.1 3.3 7.6 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />

E&O (0.9) (1.1) (1.1) 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0<br />

Overall balance 15.6 61.4 17.9 21.6 43.6 (25.2) (32.7) (43.9)<br />

Memo items<br />

Average USD/INR 60.5 61.2 65.4 67.2 64.5 68.7 68.7 68.7<br />

Average Brent (US$/bbl) 107.6 86.5 47.5 49.0 57.6 67.5 72.5 80.0<br />

Source: CEIC, Bloomberg, Kotak Economics Research estimates<br />

KOTAK ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3


Jun-05<br />

Dec-05<br />

Jun-06<br />

Dec-06<br />

Jun-07<br />

Dec-07<br />

Jun-08<br />

Dec-08<br />

Jun-09<br />

Dec-09<br />

Jun-10<br />

Dec-10<br />

Jun-11<br />

Dec-11<br />

Jun-12<br />

Dec-12<br />

Jun-13<br />

Dec-13<br />

Jun-14<br />

Dec-14<br />

Jun-15<br />

Dec-15<br />

Jun-16<br />

Dec-16<br />

Jun-17<br />

Dec-17<br />

Jun-18<br />

India<br />

Economy<br />

Exhibit 4: EMs have seen outflows over the past few months, especially debt outflows<br />

Debt and equity inflows into emerging markets, calendar year-ends, 2015-18 (US$ bn)<br />

80<br />

60<br />

Debt flows Equity flows Total flows<br />

40<br />

20<br />

0<br />

(20)<br />

(40)<br />

Jun-15<br />

Aug-15<br />

Oct-15<br />

Dec-15<br />

Feb-16<br />

Apr-16<br />

Jun-16<br />

Aug-16<br />

Oct-16<br />

Dec-16<br />

Feb-17<br />

Apr-17<br />

Jun-17<br />

Aug-17<br />

Oct-17<br />

Dec-17<br />

Feb-18<br />

Apr-18<br />

Jun-18<br />

Notes:<br />

(a) Countries included: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico,<br />

Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine.<br />

Source: IIF estimates, Kotak Economics Research<br />

Exhibit 5: INR REER has come off its peak over the past few months<br />

Trend in REER (36-country trade-weighted, 2004-05=100)<br />

125<br />

120<br />

115<br />

36 country REER Long term average<br />

+1 std dev.<br />

+2 std dev.<br />

110<br />

105<br />

100<br />

95<br />

-1 std dev.<br />

-2 std dev.<br />

90<br />

Source: CEIC, Kotak Economics Research<br />

4 KOTAK ECONOMIC RESEARCH


Economy<br />

India<br />

Exhibit 6: INR has been one of the worst performing currencies in Asia in CYTD18<br />

Change in Asian currencies against USD in CYTD18 (%)<br />

5<br />

Change in EM currencies against USD (%, CYTD18)<br />

0<br />

(5)<br />

(10)<br />

(15)<br />

Mexico<br />

Malaysia<br />

Hong Kong<br />

Singapore<br />

China<br />

Thailand<br />

Taiwan<br />

Korea<br />

Indonesia<br />

Philippines<br />

India<br />

South Africa<br />

Russia<br />

Brazil<br />

Turkey<br />

Argentina<br />

(20)<br />

(25)<br />

(30)<br />

(35)<br />

(40)<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Economics Research<br />

Exhibit 7: INR likely to range 65.0-71.0 in FY2019<br />

Trend and estimates of INR and major currencies against USD, March fiscal year-ends (X)<br />

Average Rate<br />

2017 2018 2019E 1QFY18 2QFY18 3QFY18 4QFY18 1QFY19 2QFY19E 3QFY19E 4QFY19E<br />

USD/INR 67.07 64.47 68.73 64.50 64.30 64.72 64.34 66.92 68.75 69.75 69.50<br />

EUR/USD 1.09 1.17 1.16 1.10 1.17 1.18 1.23 1.19 1.18 1.15 1.13<br />

GBP/USD 1.31 1.32 1.33 1.28 1.31 1.30 1.39 1.36 1.34 1.31 1.29<br />

USD/JPY 108.5 110.8 110.5 111.1 111.0 112.9 108.4 109.1 110.0 111.0 112.0<br />

Depreciation (-)/appreciation (+) against USD (%)<br />

INR (2.4) 4.0 (6.2) 3.8 0.3 (0.6) 0.6 (3.8) (2.7) (1.4) 0.4<br />

EUR (0.9) 6.9 (0.7) 3.2 6.8 0.2 4.4 (3.0) (1.4) (2.1) (1.7)<br />

GBP (13.5) 1.0 0.4 3.3 2.2 (0.6) 7.0 (2.2) (1.5) (2.2) (1.5)<br />

JPY 10.6 (2.1) 0.3 2.2 0.1 (1.7) 4.1 (0.6) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9)<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Economics Research estimates<br />

KOTAK ECONOMIC RESEARCH 5


Automobiles<br />

India<br />

NEUTRAL<br />

JULY 17, 2018<br />

UPDATE<br />

BSE-30: 36,520<br />

Understanding the impact of revised load-carrying norms for trucks. As per a<br />

notification issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, (1) load-bearing<br />

capacity of trucks in India will increase by 10-25% depending on the number of axle<br />

and tires in the vehicle and (2) there will be stricter implementation of overloading ban<br />

(tolerance level of only 5%). The notification does not clearly state whether these norms<br />

apply only to trucks registered post this notification or the norms are applicable to the<br />

entire population of trucks, which is critical to assess the impact on the CV industry.<br />

Prima facie, we believe that new norms could be neutral to positive for new truck sales.<br />

Ministry of Road Transport issues notification to revise load-bearing capacity of trucks in India<br />

In a July 16, 2018 notification, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways in India has revised<br />

the maximum safe axle weight of each axle type for transport vehicles in India. As per the<br />

notification, single axle with four tires can carry load of up to 11.5-12.5 tons as compared to<br />

10.2 tons earlier while a tandem axle (two axles) for rigid vehicles and trailers can carry load of<br />

21-22 tons as compared to 19 tons as per earlier norms. We note that post the revised norms,<br />

load-carrying capacity of trucks in India will become higher than that of the US or Europe. For<br />

example—as per the norms in the US, a tandem axle can carry load of 15-19 tons. Other key<br />

details from the notification include: (1) gross vehicle weight shall not exceed total permissible<br />

safe axle weight and in no case exceed 49 tons for rigid vehicles and 55 tons in case of truck<br />

trailers and (2) stricter compliance of the notified loading norms with a tolerance level of only<br />

up to 5%.<br />

As per our calculations, post the revised norms, load-bearing capacity of trucks in India will<br />

increase by 10-25% depending on the number of axle and tires in the vehicle (refer to Exhibit 1<br />

for details); on an average, load-carrying capacity will go up by 15-17%.<br />

More clarification required to assess the impact on CV industry; prima facie positive for OEMs<br />

The notification does not clearly state whether these revised norms apply only to trucks<br />

registered post this notification or the norms are applicable to the entire population of trucks.<br />

Secondly, the impact on the domestic CV industry would also depend on the actual<br />

implementation of stricter overloading ban as stated in the notification.<br />

We assess the implication on CV OEMs and ancillaries based on the following two scenarios:<br />

If the norms are applicable only to new trucks, then it will have a positive impact on new<br />

truck demand (economics of owning a new truck will get better) and re-sale prices of old<br />

trucks may get impacted.<br />

If the norms are applicable to the entire population of trucks, then overall rated freightcarrying<br />

capacity of the industry will go up by 15-17%. As per our checks, 20-25%<br />

overloading on trucks is quite prevalent in the industry. Therefore, if the applicability of new<br />

load-carrying norms is coupled with stricter implementation of overloading ban, then it will<br />

still have a neutral to positive impact on new truck sales.<br />

Potential positive impact on Ashok Leyland, Apollo Tyres, Wabco, Tata Motors and Bharat Forge<br />

As highlighted above, the revised load-carrying norms can have neutral to positive impact on<br />

the MHCV industry volumes if there is a stricter implementation of overloading ban by the<br />

government. Key stocks within our coverage that can benefit from strong MHCV industry<br />

volume growth are Ashok Leyland, Apollo Tyres, Wabco, Tata Motors and Bharat Forge.<br />

Hitesh Goel<br />

hitesh.goel@kotak.com<br />

Mumbai: +91-22-4336-0878<br />

Nishit Jalan<br />

nishit.jalan@kotak.com<br />

Mumbai: +91-22-4336-0877<br />

Kotak Institutional Equities Research<br />

kotak.research@kotak.com<br />

Mumbai: +91-22-4336-0000<br />

For Private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES’ RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES, REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.


India<br />

Automobiles<br />

Exhibit 1: As per recent government notification, load-bearing capacity of trucks can increase by 10-25% in India<br />

Details on change in maximum safe axle load for trucks by Ministry of Road Transport in India (tons)<br />

Maximum safe axle weight (tons)<br />

Axle type Now Earlier % increase<br />

Single axle<br />

Single axle with single tire 3.0<br />

Single axle with two tires 7.5 6.0 25.0<br />

Single axle with four tires 11.5-12.5 10.2 12-22<br />

Tandem axles (two axles) (where the distance between two axles is less than 1.8 mtr)<br />

Tandem axle for rigid vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 21-22 19.0 10-16<br />

Tandem axle for puller tractors for hydraulic and pneumatic trailers 28.5 25.0 14.0<br />

Tri–axles (three axles) (where the distance between outer axles is less than 3 mtr)<br />

Tri-axle for rigid vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 27-28 24.0 12-17<br />

Axle row (two axles with four tires each) in modular hydraulic trailers (9 ton load shall be permissible for single axle) 18.0<br />

Source: Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Kotak Institutional Equities<br />

2 KOTAK INSTITUTIONAL EQUITIES RESEARCH


and logistics: Data drives the<br />

Travel<br />

for customers<br />

race<br />

7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

<br />

Travel, Transport & Logistics<br />

Report<br />

July 2018<br />

By Florian Bauer, Alex Dichter, and Maximilian Rothkopf<br />

We analyzed data from 15 European countries to better understand<br />

emerging travel industry technology and customer needs in the<br />

travel and logistics sectors. What can companies in this space do to<br />

respond to shifts and sharpen their digitization strategies?<br />

N<br />

o industry is immune to the changes brought about by digitization, although<br />

some are responding to the pressure more quickly than others. On the face of it,<br />

travel and logistics exemplify the extremes. There is hardly a consumer in Europe who<br />

does not take to the internet when thinking about booking accommodation or flights or<br />

looking at train timetables for an upcoming trip. Yet few businesses search online for<br />

information about air and ocean cargo. The balance of industry-related searches brings<br />

home the point: in 2017, for every 80 travel-related queries, there was one logisticsrelated<br />

query, according to our research.<br />

These statistics, however, shouldn’t suggest that travel is completely digitally mature or<br />

that logistics is totally in the stone age. The same research reveals significant variation at<br />

the subsector level when it comes to customers’ online behavior and companies’ response<br />

within the two industries (Exhibit 1).<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 1/10


7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

Exhibit 1<br />

And these are just some of the findings from work undertaken by McKinsey in<br />

collaboration with Google and the Kühne Logistics University in Germany, based on data<br />

[ 1 ]<br />

from 15 European markets, as well as extensive interviews with experts on technology,<br />

travel, and logistics. This article presents highlights from the full report describing our<br />

research, Travel and logistics: data drives the race for customers.<br />

Digital trends in travel and logistics<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 2/10


7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

The research also points to important trends that indicate how companies in both<br />

industries should be preparing for a digital future. For example:<br />

Where business-to-consumer (B2C) sectors have led, business-to-business<br />

(B2B) sectors are being forced to follow. In the logistics industry, ocean<br />

carriers and freight forwarders are among the subsectors feeling<br />

pressure from customers to move online. The number of Google<br />

searches for terms related to these subsectors grew on average by 8 and<br />

14 percent a year respectively between 2014 and 2017, outpacing growth<br />

in accommodation, which, across the two industries, is the subsector<br />

with the highest search volumes.<br />

The power of mobile is rising. While online searches in travel and<br />

logistics are increasing, so too is the proportion of those searches<br />

conducted on a smartphone (Exhibit 2). In 2017, they accounted for<br />

around 43 percent of all travel-related requests and 23 percent of<br />

logistics-related searches. Tablets and desktops combined shared the<br />

remainder. The trend suggests the importance of adopting a “mobile<br />

first” mind-set, prioritizing quick and easy mobile interactions. Yet rare<br />

is the company—even in the most digitally mature B2C sectors—whose<br />

mobile channels outperform the desktop.<br />

Most logistics companies provide limited online services. Only 6 percent<br />

of the largest ocean carriers and freight forwarders have end-to-end<br />

online booking capabilities. Some 38 percent of the former and 5 percent<br />

of the latter do not even offer online quotes, while most of those that do<br />

merely log an online request for a quote, which has to be followed up by<br />

email or a phone call, often a day or more later. By contrast, several<br />

attackers offer a full suite of online services.<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 3/10


7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

In travel, there are as many as 100 pre-booking online touchpoints. No<br />

wonder it is so hard to win customers’ attention. When researching travel<br />

online, the average customer shifts more than 50 times across channels<br />

—desktops, tablets, and mobile devices—chalking up roughly 100 prebooking<br />

touchpoints.<br />

[ 2 ]<br />

That adds up to way too many chances of losing<br />

potential customers if different information is given in different<br />

channels, customers are forced to reenter the same data time and again,<br />

and the sales agent has no record of the information given online. In<br />

addition, the majority of touchpoints are not “owned” by the travel<br />

company. Our research showed airlines owned fewer than 20 percent of<br />

all preflight digital touchpoints. That means companies have to be smart<br />

in knowing which of the various search engines, review sites, blogs, and<br />

so on are relevant to their potential customers in order to focus<br />

advertising budgets effectively.<br />

Slow page loads are a sure way to lose customers. Analysis of the websites<br />

of 33 large ocean carriers showed that more than half took 13 seconds or<br />

more to load on a typical mobile device, while 20 percent took more than<br />

20 seconds. Airlines tend to have even slower websites. Half of the<br />

analyzed 50 websites took more than 18 seconds to load—wait times of<br />

more than 30 seconds were not uncommon. In comparison, the front<br />

pages of leading e-commerce companies typically load in less than ten<br />

seconds (sometimes way less) on a 3G network. Bounce rates, the share<br />

of users who do not explore a website beyond the first page, are strongly<br />

related to load times. On average, load times for users who bounce are 50<br />

percent slower compared to load times for users who continue to engage<br />

with a website.<br />

[ 3 ]<br />

This is an unnecessary loss of potential business<br />

considering the ease with which load times can be improved.<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 4/10


enchmark and a guide to where future value lies<br />

A<br />

customers<br />

for<br />

7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

Exhibit 2<br />

All this matters because of the potential threat digitization poses to incumbents unless<br />

they take steps to fully harness its potential. The transparency the internet brings puts<br />

downward pressure on margins at the same time as attackers—often new, technologysavvy<br />

companies that adapt innovations with speed—are raising the bar on what<br />

consumers expect, while reducing the cost to serve those customers and accelerating the<br />

pace of digitization.<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 5/10


7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

Against this backdrop, the research and analysis set out in our full report offers two tools<br />

for companies in the travel and logistics industries that are committed to digital success:<br />

Benchmarking digital maturity. First, the report provides a benchmark of the digital<br />

maturity of the subsector in which each company operates. It does so by looking at six<br />

measures. Three gauge customers’ demand for online interactions and services: (1) the<br />

number of searches made through Google’s search engine, (2) the share of those searches<br />

made on smartphones, and (3) online bookings. Another three gauge companies’ online<br />

marketing response to customer behavior, judged by the intensity of their online<br />

advertising: (4) advertisement coverage (how often a search is accompanied by an<br />

advertisement), (5) advertisement depth, and (6) “cost per click.” The last two are<br />

measures of the level of competition for online advertising “real estate.”<br />

Creating and securing digital value. Second, the full report lists the specific actions that<br />

companies can take in both the short and medium terms to ward off competition and<br />

create value from digitization. We do this by examining passenger air travel as an example<br />

of a B2C business and ocean cargo and freight forwarding as examples of B2B businesses.<br />

To begin with, companies need to act quickly to improve customers’ online experience.<br />

For air-travel companies, ocean carriers, and freight forwarders alike, that might mean<br />

cutting the time it takes for a web page to load on to a mobile device, becoming more<br />

savvy about how to attract customers to their sites, or learning where they might lose<br />

customers on their online journeys and fixing the problem. Relevant information, such as<br />

the pitch of an airline seat, might be lacking, or there might be too many clicks required<br />

(some 30 percent of smartphone users will switch to another app if it fails to meet their<br />

[ 5 ]<br />

needs immediately). For ocean carriers and freight forwarders, upgrading websites to<br />

enable customers to book directly online or improving self-service offerings could be in<br />

order.<br />

Of course, the structure and competitive dynamics of each subsector differ. Nevertheless,<br />

the two-part approach we outline here is applicable to all companies, be they B2B or B2C.<br />

At the same time, companies need to look further ahead and understand and embrace the<br />

key technology-driven trends that will transform customers’ experience (Exhibit 3).<br />

We take a close look at 11 emerging technologies and suggest areas where they will have<br />

the most impact.<br />

[ 4 ]<br />

[ 6 ]<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 6/10


7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 8/10


7/16/2018 Digitization in logistics and travel industry technology | McKinsey & Company<br />

In air travel, for example, products will become more personalized and offerings<br />

increasingly transparent. Virtual reality and augmented reality, among other<br />

technologies, will drive this change. There will be greater use of digital “travel assistants,”<br />

capable of making and personalizing suggestions by applying machine-learning<br />

technologies. And air-travel companies will be able (and expected) to engage<br />

continuously with customers.<br />

In ocean cargo and freight forwarding, technology will usher in smarter pricing and more<br />

tailored solutions, more collaboration along the value chain, and more data-driven<br />

products and services. For example, advanced analytics and the Internet of Things (IoT)<br />

could deliver end-to-end shipment visibility—perhaps to pharmaceutical companies<br />

whose temperature-sensitive products need constant monitoring—if containers,<br />

systems, and fleets were modified. And with better links to terminals and truckers, ocean<br />

carriers could, for a price, prioritize the loading and unloading of customers’ containers.<br />

Customers are increasingly turning to the internet (particularly via mobile devices) for<br />

their travel and logistics needs. It is critical that both B2B and B2C players in these<br />

industries are able to accommodate customers’ growing preference for digital. A<br />

successful digitization strategy will depend upon a deep understanding of emerging<br />

technologies, the ways they could transform customer interactions, the pace at which<br />

they might be adopted, and how these factors might change industry structures and cause<br />

shifts in revenues and profit pools.<br />

Download Travel and logistics: Data drives the race for customer, the full report on which<br />

this article is based (PDF–1.1MB).<br />

1. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the<br />

Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.<br />

2. Google/Ipsos Connect, April 2016–17.<br />

3. Google, July 2016.<br />

4. All six measures are based on data from Google’s search engine.<br />

5. “Consumer in the Micro-Moment,” Wave 3, Google/Ipsos, US, 2015.<br />

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/Travel-and-logistics-Data-drives-the-race-for-customers?cid=other-eml… 9/10


7/20/2018 Ahead of 2019 elections, Neta app brings US-style approval ratings to India — Quartz<br />

GO VOTE!<br />

This startup is letting Indians rate<br />

and question their politicians, US<br />

style<br />

Sushma U N July 11, 2018 Quartz India<br />

Watching you. (AP Photo/Tsering Topgyal)<br />

A six-month-old New Delhi startup is looking to add a new element to the electoral<br />

process in the world’s largest democracy: rating politicians.<br />

Inspired by the US’s approval rating system, 27-year-old serial entrepreneur and Wharton<br />

graduate Pratham Mittal has launched a mobile app called Neta, which is attempting to<br />

get Indian voters to monitor their elected representatives and hold them accountable.<br />

In the US, approval ratings are used to gauge public support for the president.<br />

https://qz.com/1321579/ahead-of-2019-elections-neta-app-brings-us-style-approval-ratings-to-india/ 1/9


7/20/2018 Ahead of 2019 elections, Neta app brings US-style approval ratings to India — Quartz<br />

“We realised from our experience in the US that these polls make a lot of difference both<br />

in terms of forming a public opinion and keeping leaders accountable,” said Mittal, whose<br />

company, Shanthi Foundation, owns Neta. “In India, there is hardly any (transparent)<br />

data around approval ratings or popularity. We saw a clear void in the Indian market and<br />

that’s what we want to fulll,” he told Quartz.<br />

The app was piloted during the February bypolls in Rajasthan’s Ajmer and Alwar<br />

constituencies. It was also deployed in Karnataka ahead of the assembly elections in May.<br />

Now, Neta is set to go national for the 2019 general elections.<br />

Mittal’s venture is bootstrapped and doesn’t make money. Its revenue model is yet<br />

undecided, though Mittal said the app would be netuned as the brand and concept gain<br />

credibility.<br />

For now, the company intends to analyse the data it collects and nd ways to put it to use.<br />

“One of the byproducts we get from the app is very interesting data on how people are<br />

voting,” Mittal said. “Today I can tell you that this area in the country is swinging towards<br />

this, and who is voting for who.”<br />

As of now, Neta has over 2.5 million users in Rajasthan and Karnataka.<br />

Leading the polls<br />

Mittal’s not new to the polling business.<br />

In 2012, while still an MBA student at the Wharton School at the University of<br />

Pennsylvania, he launched Outgrow, a company that supports online polls or quizzes run<br />

by websites. Outgrow is used by over 4,000 publications, according to Mittal.<br />

Last year, he decided to return to India and use his expertise here.<br />

Neta lists all candidates in a constituency and lets users rank them. It also potentially<br />

allows communication between voters and politicians directly, besides providing a<br />

platform for feedback and suggestions. It avoids vote duplication by insisting on a onetime<br />

password every time a vote is registered, Mittal said.<br />

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7/20/2018 Ahead of 2019 elections, Neta app brings US-style approval ratings to India — Quartz<br />

In Mittal’s telling, despite being very new, there’s an increasing awareness about the app<br />

in the political system. “Recently, I was travelling on the same train as a group of MLAs. I<br />

began talking to one of them about the app,” he recalled. “Initially, he didn’t take me<br />

seriously because he hadn’t heard of the app. I asked him to name (his) constituency.<br />

(Then) I showed him…(that he was) number three (in the app’s ranking). He got so<br />

agitated; he called up his team and made me explain how to increase rankings.”<br />

Gearing up for 2019<br />

Neta mainly targets rural and semi-urban areas, which have a rapidly growing internet<br />

user base. Currently, the services of the app are only available in Rajasthan and<br />

Karnataka, Mittal said. Soon voters in Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, the other states<br />

going to polls later this year, too, will be able to use it. The company estimates that these<br />

three states alone will draw around 10 million votes on its app.<br />

By the 2019 general elections, it expects to have around 100 million votes.<br />

“I want people to be a little more educated about who they are voting for, and post-2019<br />

elections (ensure) that politicians actually do care about their rating on the app,” Mittal<br />

said.<br />

He has brought in a team that includes CEO Robin Sharma, the co-founder of the political<br />

advocacy group, Indian Political Action Committee (I-PAC), which ran Narendra Modi’s<br />

campaign in 2014.<br />

However, Mittal must watch out for the risks, industry experts said.<br />

“Social media is under great scrutiny globally due to its role in elections,” said Satish<br />

Meena, a Delhi-based analyst with Forrester Research. “The scale of operations on social<br />

media can be very big and the implications are very difcult to answer.”<br />

Nevertheless, analysts expect the app to secure a place in Indian politics, given that<br />

politicians are now increasingly becoming tech- and social media-savvy.<br />

“In 2014, there was one party, BJP, which used social media more effectively than other<br />

parties. Now almost all parties are investing in social media,” Meena said.<br />

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7/20/2018 India's post-poverty challenge - Nikkei Asian Review<br />

OPINION<br />

India's post-poverty challenge<br />

The poor now mostly have enough food, but need better clinics, schools and administrators<br />

James Crabtree<br />

July 04, 2018 07:00 JST<br />

Signs of modern prosperity are common even in parts of India known to be among the poorest, such as the state of Uttar Pradesh. (Hindustan<br />

Times/Getty Images)<br />

It is not often you see a chart that changes the way you look at Asia. The chart in question, which<br />

circulated online this week, shows India's unexpected recent progress curbing extreme poverty.<br />

More importantly, it explains something important about India's changing development challenge, as<br />

it moves quickly to become a middle-income nation, rather than a poor one.<br />

Drawing on new data from the World Bank, the chart in question, published earlier this month<br />

by researchers at the Brookings Institution, shows the number of Indians living in poverty falling<br />

rapidly -- from 125 million in 2016 to around 75 million today, to 20 million in 2022, and then<br />

dropping to near zero not long after.<br />

Here is the chart:<br />

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7/20/2018 India's post-poverty challenge - Nikkei Asian Review<br />

This is remarkable for a number of reasons.<br />

First, it suggests India's success eliminating poverty has been even greater than many believed.<br />

Center-right thinkers like economist Jagdish Bhagwati have long extolled India's poverty reduction<br />

record in the era since its economic reforms began in 1991. Yet India's record now looks even better<br />

than Bhagwati suggested.<br />

As recently as 2016 the World Bank cited data showing that 270 million Indians still lived in poverty,<br />

meaning those living on less than $1.90 a day, a number agreed in 2015 as the minimum most people<br />

in poor countries would need for basic food, clothing, and shelter.<br />

This shift is partly explained by methodological changes to the way poverty is measured. Even so,<br />

moving from 270 million to 75 million in less than a decade is impressive.<br />

Second, the same Brookings data show that Nigeria has now overtaken India as home to the largest<br />

number of the world's extreme poor. As the chart illustrates, it will not be long before Congo pushes<br />

India into third spot.<br />

All of this suggests that extreme poverty will soon be a largely African problem, with only small<br />

patches remaining around south and southeast Asia.<br />

A mix of factors explain this remarkable shift. Some credit should go to India's previous Congress<br />

government, which introduced various state programs designed to help the very poorest.<br />

Many of these have been pilloried for their inefficiency, notably the massive National Rural<br />

Employment Guarantee (NREGA) scheme, which gives basic menial jobs to anyone who wants one.<br />

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7/20/2018 India's post-poverty challenge - Nikkei Asian Review<br />

NREGA is expensive and wasteful: India's latest budget allowed 480 billion rupees ($7 billion) to the<br />

program in the fiscal year ending in March 2018. But latest evidence suggested it also provided<br />

employment to 51 million households in 2016, which surely helped reduce extreme poverty for many<br />

near the bread line.<br />

Just as important as government intervention, however, is the trickle-down effect from India's<br />

decades of recent rapid economic growth. Average income per head in purchasing power parity terms<br />

has risen from $1,140 in 1991 to $6,490 in 2017, according to the World Bank, putting India firmly in<br />

the ranks of middle-income states.<br />

Some caution is needed here. Many of those who have officially "escaped" poverty still live precarious<br />

and grim lives dogged by ignorance and disease. This is a group for whom slipping backward into<br />

absolute poverty often remains a major risk too.<br />

In a deeper sense, India's progress raises a conundrum, because its impressive record of absolute<br />

poverty reduction looks rather less impressive when measured by fuller measures of human<br />

development. Progress on issues such as maternal health or child mortality has typically been better<br />

in less successful countries like Bangladesh or Nepal, a point made by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen.<br />

Just as importantly, Indian inequality has rocketed over the last two decades, a point I make in my<br />

book "The Billionaire Raj," which is released this week. India's top 10% of earners now take 55% of<br />

national income each year, up from 32% in 1980. The bottom 50% have seen their share decline from<br />

23% to 15%, with the very poorest doing worst of all.<br />

India's poorest have benefited from the country's new economic model, but nothing like as much as<br />

the rich -- a trend which is likely to store up problems for the future, given that countries which start<br />

out their development with yawning inequality find it much harder to correct it later.<br />

Still, absolute poverty reduction is genuinely worth celebrating. Many African nations can only<br />

dream of making rapid Indian-style progress.<br />

Striking data such as these also underlines the extent to which our perceptions of India also now<br />

needs to change. In truth, large swathes of India already share more in common with the middleincome<br />

nations of Southeast Asia than they do with sub-Saharan Africa.<br />

Official data say a third of Indians now live in cities although other estimates put the figure much<br />

higher. You can still see patches of grinding destitution if you go to fast-growing places such as<br />

Chennai or Hyderabad or Panjim (in Goa), but mostly you will see prosperous urban centers.<br />

Even in the grimmest rural regions, the poverty-stricken India of old is fading away. Back in 2017 I<br />

took a trip to Uttar Pradesh, a giant but underdeveloped Indian state with a population of more than<br />

200 million. The state remains one of India's most problematic regions, and especially so in the city<br />

of Gorakhpur, which remains a byword for criminality, disease and economic backwardness.<br />

During the visit I spent a few days driving around this area, bouncing along potholed roads and<br />

visiting small villages. It would be fair to say that Gorakhpur remains a pretty miserable place to live.<br />

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7/20/2018 India's post-poverty challenge - Nikkei Asian Review<br />

Yet even here there were fewer signs of the dire problems of hunger and abject hardship that defined<br />

people's perceptions of India perhaps as recently as a decade ago. Young people generally went to<br />

school and found a basic job. They had mobile phones and modern clothes and lived in brick homes,<br />

not mud-walled huts.<br />

At the same time, however, they often lacked reliable water and electricity supplies, while their<br />

streets had no sewerage or rubbish collection, and their politicians were comically corrupt, for<br />

instance taking government funds designated to build indoor toilets for the poor, and using it to<br />

build fancy houses for themselves.<br />

Many residents suffered from preventable ill-health problems too -- Japanese encephalitis is<br />

rampant in the area -- because medical care was haphazard. Although almost everyone went to<br />

school, the education they received often was barely worth having.<br />

"Indians are living behind their means" was how the Indian author and journalist Shekhar Gupta put<br />

it to me during that trip. "There was an old poverty where you did not have enough to eat. The new<br />

poverty is getting some development but not all, because municipal administration is weak."<br />

As with many middle-income countries, India's fight against poverty needs now to focus less on the<br />

alleviation of extreme hardship. That battle is close to being won in large parts of the country.<br />

Instead, it needs to begin a new fight to build basic state capacity, providing decent government<br />

services and inexpensive forms of social security with can help its people build better lives.<br />

Here, the contrast with the successful emerging economies of East Asia is again clear. Most of these<br />

managed first to produce dramatic reductions in poverty, but then also developed a more inclusive<br />

model of growth shepherded by a more competent state machine, which, crucially, emphasized<br />

universal education and healthcare. That is now India's challenge too.<br />

James Crabtree is an associate professor in practice at the Lee Kuan Yew School of<br />

Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is the author of "The<br />

Billionaire Raj."<br />

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7/20/2018 KaiOS, which powers Reliance Jio phones, is challenging Google's Android in India — Quartz<br />

India<br />

SUCCESS CALLING<br />

The little-known American startup that<br />

powers Jio phones<br />

Ananya Bhattacharya July 11, 2018 Quartz India<br />

A fistful of possibilities. (KaiOS)<br />

A two-year-old feature phone operating system (OS) is challenging the supremacy of Google’s Android in<br />

India.<br />

KaiOS, owned by San Diego-based startup KaiOS Technologies, has gained a 15% market share in India<br />

over the last one year, according to May 2018 data by market intelligence rm DeviceAtlas. Its popularity<br />

stems from the massive success of Reliance’s Jio phones, which run on KaiOS.<br />

The OS has not only dented Android’s market share but also clawed into the Apple iOS user base.<br />

Market share of mobile operating systems in India<br />

2017 Q1 2018<br />

Android<br />

83%<br />

71.6%<br />

KaiOS<br />

0<br />

15<br />

iOS<br />

11<br />

9.6<br />

<br />

Data: DeviceAtlas<br />

Share<br />

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7/20/2018 KaiOS, which powers Reliance Jio phones, is challenging Google's Android in India — Quartz<br />

KaiOS will now also provide the OS for the soon-to-be-launched JioPhone 2, unveiled on July 05.<br />

“The potential of KaiOS is huge when it comes to achieving low-cost, connected feature phones,” said<br />

Rushabh Doshi, an analyst at Singapore-based market research rm Canalys. “It’s not a feature phone and<br />

it’s not a smartphone. It’s a totally different product by itself.”<br />

Reafrming its faith in the US rm, the Reliance group’s retail arm bought a 16% stake in KaiOS<br />

Technologies for $7 million in March. In fact, even Google invested $22 million in the company last<br />

month.<br />

A smart dumb phone<br />

KaiOS provides an almost smartphone-level functionality on a feature phone.<br />

It is the world’s only feature phone OS with apps like Google Maps and Google Assistant. For JioPhone 2,<br />

the OS has also integrated some of India’s favourite apps like WhatsApp, Youtube, and Facebook.<br />

“Until now you usually needed a smartphone to make use of these apps, putting them out of reach for<br />

many people,” Sebastien Codeville, the 44-year-old CEO of KaiOS Technologies, said in an interview with<br />

Quartz. “Bringing these apps to the JioPhone changes this and creates equal digital opportunities for<br />

everyone.”<br />

Worldwide, KaiOS works with various telcos like AT&T and Sprint, as well as handset makers like HMD<br />

Global, the maker of Nokia phones. However, its association with Reliance is the most lucrative. During<br />

the six months ending March 2018, Reliance Jio sold 25 million phones, which is over half of the 40<br />

million KaiOS phones sold worldwide.<br />

“KaiOS’ success in India is 100% owing to the success of Jio and JioPhone. It’s also available in Nokia<br />

feature phones but we don’t see those ying off the shelves. Jio has a better go-to-market strategy and<br />

better value proposition,” said Doshi of Canalys.<br />

In 2017, KaiOS set up a tech facility in Bengaluru with a team of nearly 30 engineers servicing Jio.<br />

Although the rm did not disclose its specic plans for India, Codeville said the company will use the<br />

recent funding from Google to accelerate the global deployment of KaiOS, grow local developer<br />

ecosystems, and expand into new product categories like wearables.<br />

“India is one of the fastest growing and largest economies globally and acts as a role model for other<br />

emerging markets,” Codeville said. “…if you can create a successful operating system and business model<br />

for the next generation of feature phones in India, then you have a blueprint and business case to<br />

replicate.”<br />

SEEING IS BELIEVING<br />

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7/20/2018 The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

Home About Invest with Josh Josh in the News! Public Speaking Books Mix Tape Contact<br />

The Nine Essential Conditions to<br />

Commit Massive Fraud<br />

Posted July 9, 2018 by Joshua M Brown<br />

On October 28th, the day before Black Tuesday, the crescendo moment of the Crash<br />

of 1929, Time Magazine had a financier on its cover. At that time, virtually everyone in<br />

the international community had known his name all too well, although investors today<br />

probably wouldn’t recognize it. He was a confidant of kings and princes, dictators and<br />

captains of industry, a noted companion to the international movie star Greta Garbo<br />

and the close personal friend of President Herbert Hoover.<br />

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7/20/2018 The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

Little did anyone suspect that he was also destined to be be revealed as the biggest<br />

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fraud in the history of Wall Street.<br />

The more you read about financial history (and the more of it you live through), the<br />

more you start picking up on repeating patterns. This is not because the markets never<br />

change. They absolutely do. But people…people don’t change.<br />

The dueling twin instincts of fear and greed are as old as the species itself and<br />

perhaps even older. We possess these instincts because they’re the reason we’ve<br />

made it as far as we have from an evolutionary standpoint. The woman who didn’t run<br />

from a sabretooth tiger with the rest of her clan did not pass on her genes. The man<br />

who never attempted to rise above the circumstances into which he was born through<br />

the pursuit of more resources probably wasn’t the most popular mate in the available<br />

gene pool.<br />

So we’ve got these two inalienable parts of our personalities and biochemical makeup.<br />

They make us do things. We have some self-control, but not fully. As William aka the<br />

Man in Black from Westworld asks rhetorically this season, “What is a person but a<br />

collection of choices? Where do those choices come from? Do I have a choice? Were<br />

any of these choices ever truly mine to begin with?”<br />

The greed side of this equation is worth discussing today because we’re in what could<br />

be the tenth straight year of positive gains for the US stock market and a lot of what’s<br />

happening now will look horrendously foolish when the cycle turns. There will be all<br />

sorts of revelations to come when the proverbial tide goes out (and, as Warren Buffett<br />

says, we find out who has been swimming naked).<br />

Not all of the investment losses to come will be a result of fraud or cheating; good<br />

assets decline in value too. But undoubtedly, the most memorable debacles will involve<br />

fraud and cheating, to go along with the customary lack of attention being paid to<br />

details and the general sense of risk-free delusion. Almost everyone saw losses during<br />

the post-tech bubble period of the early 2000’s, but Worldcom and Enron are the<br />

touchstone moments we recall with the most ease. There were plenty of losses to go<br />

around in the wake of the financial crisis, but the reckless confidence games being<br />

played by Lehman Brothers and Bernie Madoff stand head and shoulders above the<br />

rest of the disaster in our collective consciousness.<br />

When it comes to the massive frauds – the kind that wipe out tens of billions of dollars<br />

and result in career-ending, corporation-killing infernos, there are some necessary<br />

conditions that seem to appear with great regularity accompanying them. These are<br />

the conditions that allow the seed of a fraud to take root and germinate, they provide<br />

the fertile ground and atmosphere letting the sprout become something larger, thornier<br />

and more interconnected with the flora around it.<br />

Ivar Krueger aka The Match King was one of the most notorious purveyors of<br />

investment fraud who ever lived. His story is relatively unknown in modern times<br />

despite the fact that the global scale of what he did was ten times more intricate and<br />

ultimately destructive than anything Madoff attempted. When you read about the<br />

details of the Krueger saga, you realize that everything that’s happened since (and will<br />

happen hence) is merely an echo of an old story.<br />

Using his tale as a backdrop, we can look at the conditions that allowed him to thrive<br />

and rope in almost the entirety of the investing public.<br />

One: It begins with an enigmatic figure with an aura of success and brilliance<br />

Ivar Kreuger is obsessed with the cultivation of his image from the very beginning.<br />

Almost everything he does in the public eye from his first arrival in America is<br />

calculated and carried out deliberately. He projects a supernatural air of confidence<br />

about himself and many of the affectations he adopts in both business meetings as<br />

well as in social settings end up making the newspapers. He finesses a conversation<br />

with one group so as to ensure a future meeting with a second group, and so on. The<br />

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7/20/2018 The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

manipulation of people’s feelings about the person eventually allow for even greater<br />

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manipulation down the road.<br />

Two: The markets are booming<br />

When people are making a lot of money and haven’t recently taken significant losses,<br />

lots of details are overlooked and difficult questions go unasked and unanswered.<br />

Oversight is seen as a trifling interference and people lose patience with long, drawn<br />

out due diligence. The money burns a hole in their pockets – every delay in putting it to<br />

work feels like a costly waste of time, a mere formality at best and an intolerable<br />

impediment to opportunity at worst. Besides, if you don’t buy in, someone else will take<br />

your spot.<br />

Frank Partnoy, the author of The Match King, describes the environment into which<br />

Ivar hatches his scheme…<br />

The hottest two emerging industries were cars and radio. Annual car<br />

sales had doubled from two years earlier, and there were now more than<br />

15 million cars on the road. Manufacturers introduced faster, safer,<br />

cheaper models every year, and the only asset people wanted more than<br />

cars were securities issued by car companies. Anyone who bought<br />

shares of General Motors or Fisher Body or Yellow Cab expected to<br />

double or triple their money after just a few years.<br />

Shareholders of Radio Corporation of America, known as RCA, did even<br />

better…<br />

As recently as 1920, only 5,000 families had owned in-home radio sets,<br />

and RCA’s share price was around a dollar then. Then, WBAY, a<br />

pioneering New York radio station, sold the first-ever radio spot, a pitch<br />

for apartments in Jackson Heights – and the world changed overnight.<br />

Radio stations popped up in every major city, and radio sales soared, to<br />

$60 million in 1922. RCA’s share price flew even higher than its sales.<br />

Anyone who held RCA shares during the 1920’s earned an average<br />

annual return of 60 percent. All of that gain was from share price<br />

appreciation, not any periodic payments from the company. RCA did not<br />

even pay a dividend.<br />

If this sounds familiar, it’s because the market is currently engaged in exactly this<br />

debate over the Netflixes, the Amazons and the Teslas of the world as we speak. It’s<br />

almost identical…<br />

A few naysayers argued that shares of General Motors and RCA were<br />

overvalued, because actual profits were slim. Shares represented a claim<br />

to future dividend payments, so share prices should reflect the value of<br />

expected future dividends. The pessimists noted that RCA didn’t pay a<br />

dividend, and claimed it never would, because it didn’t make any money.<br />

Their point was simple: no profits, no dividend, no value…<br />

Here’s the kill shot (bold is mine):<br />

But these shares were a bet on tomorrow, not today. If people thought the<br />

share price of General Motors would rise in the future, no one could prove<br />

them wrong now. And even though RCA didn’t pay a dividend or earn<br />

much actual profit, the people who bet on the company were<br />

winners, year after year. RCA’s share price rose because investors<br />

believed RCA eventually would make money and pay dividends. The<br />

skeptics who bet against RCA were stepping in front of a speeding<br />

train.<br />

This is how hundreds of internet and telecom startups with large cash-burns were<br />

taken public in the late 1990’s. It’s how billions of dollars for housing projects and<br />

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7/20/2018 The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

lending scams were financed in the mid-2000’s.<br />

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You can sell anything to investors in this environment, and it’s exactly the sort of<br />

condition necessary for a massive fraud to flourish.<br />

Three: Many massive frauds start out as legitimate businesses<br />

Once upon a time, before the world was completely electrified, matches were among<br />

the most important consumer staples in the world, second only to perhaps food,<br />

clothing and shelter. You couldn’t do anything without a box of matches. The trouble<br />

was that matches were highly combustible, making their storage and transport a major<br />

challenge. This was the case until the Swedes invented something called the safety<br />

match, which could only be ignited by a deliberate strike against the side of the box. An<br />

industry of global necessity was born.<br />

In the early 1920’s, European countries were starving for cash as they rebuilt<br />

themselves. They were already massively indebted and had strained the resources of<br />

their own central banks and private lenders. Ivar Kreuger emerges into this<br />

environment with an answer to their troubles, in the form of a simple business<br />

proposition. Kreuger’s match manufacturing capabilities are real. His business interests<br />

are legitimate. This legitimacy is what gets him in the door to make his pitch.<br />

Enron was once a legitimate business – an electric utility. Worldcom was a telephone<br />

company. Madoff Securities began as a broker-dealer. When things begin to go wrong,<br />

the principals cannot admit it to the shareholders and the community that sees them as<br />

geniuses. So they hide losses, which leads to an escalating series of more and more<br />

illegitimate business behind the scenes.<br />

Four: Massive frauds frequently involve an innovative approach to an old<br />

industry<br />

Ivar’s got a brand new way to help sovereign nations fund themselves, retire old debts<br />

and raise new capital away from traditional bank loans or new taxes. It’s a loan for<br />

monopoly scheme involving his company, Swedish Match. In many countries around<br />

the world, the match making industry is either nationalized and run by the government<br />

or fragmented and run by various mom & pop enterprises. Ivar convinces the<br />

governments of Europe, Latin America and the Middle East to allow him to make<br />

enormous loans to them at competitive interest rates in exchange for Swedish Match<br />

being granted a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of matches within their borders.<br />

This means that all domestic means of production are turned over to his company and<br />

all foreign imports of matches are punished with tariffs and levies until they stop<br />

coming.<br />

Germany, among the more desperate countries given the terms imposed upon it by the<br />

Versailles Treaty after the war, is among the first to say yes. France follows, as do<br />

Turkey and Poland. Ivar has reinvented sovereign lending, treading upon the territory<br />

previously controlled almost exclusively by investment banks like J.P. Morgan. At first,<br />

the incumbent competitors are shocked by Ivar Kreuger’s ability to lend tens of millions<br />

of dollars at rates as low as five and six percent to these governments.<br />

In the 1700’s, the South Sea bubble was financed through a similar conceit – England<br />

converted her debts from fighting endless wars throughout Europe into an equity. That<br />

equity, the South Seas joint-stock company, was granted a monopoly on trade with the<br />

colonies of the Western Hemisphere. The Dutch East India Company had become the<br />

world’s first publicly traded “corporation” a century earlier with an almost identical pitch.<br />

Trade monopolies gave way to industrial monopolies in the 20th century and Ivar<br />

Kreuger was building the ultimate version of one.<br />

Five: Fraud is enabled by the greed of people who desperately want to believe<br />

Kreuger’s match factory, of course, does not have tens of millions of dollars to secure<br />

these monopolies, which requires the use of outside capital in huge amounts.<br />

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7/20/2018 The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

Specifically, it requires the sort of daring and adventurous capital from investors that<br />

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only really exists in one place: America. Ivar begins his charm offensive with a dashing<br />

display of sophistication and worldliness, first on a transatlantic voyage and then in<br />

front of an audience of willing suckers at the nation’s second most prosperous<br />

investment bank, Lee Higginson & Co. Lee Higg, based in Boston but with a growing<br />

presence in New York City, is perennially playing second fiddle to J.P. Morgan but is far<br />

ahead of it’s competitors at Lehman or Goldman Sachs. The New York office is<br />

desperate to make a splash at the outset of the roaring 20’s and Ivar’s scheme<br />

presents them with the perfect opportunity at the perfectly opportune moment.<br />

Madoff’s hard-to-get act made allocators to his fund feel fortunate just to have the<br />

chance to invest and that to even question his consistent returns would possibly cut off<br />

their access to his genius. Elizabeth Holmes had the unabashed support of Silicon<br />

Valley and most of the media as so many wanted to believe that the heir to Steve Jobs<br />

was a confident young lady who was on her way to changing the world.<br />

Six: The financing of these schemes requires innovation as well<br />

The investment bank agrees to create a series of different securities to fund the loans<br />

being made by Swedish Match (now International Match) and its expansion plans. The<br />

format of these securities – ranging from a gold-backed debenture to a mixture of<br />

tracking stocks and preferred equity instruments – are all innovations in and of<br />

themselves. Ivar Krueger and his partners at Lee Higg continue to create brand new<br />

instruments as investor demand for the combination of large dividends and unheard of<br />

growth opportunities skyrockets. The louder the ducks are quacking, the larger the<br />

quantities of securities the brokers can sell them. The more the earlier investors earn in<br />

yields, the more outrageous the terms that future investors will agree to. Eventually<br />

clients of almost every major brokerage house will start flooding International Match<br />

with capital. The press plays its role, anointing Ivar as an unparalleled genius. The Wall<br />

Street Journal and New York Times breathlessly report on his every move and on<br />

rumors of the various international deals he is said to be working on. Time Magazine<br />

would eventually put him on the cover.<br />

The funding of real estate and mortgage loans in the aught’s decade was highly<br />

dependent on new and increasingly obtuse methods of packaging and repackaging<br />

debt in the form of wilder and less understandable securities. Anytime the terms<br />

“innovative” and “lending” are used in the same breath, something bad is usually about<br />

to happen.<br />

Seven: Fraud always has unwitting accomplices and useful idiots<br />

Now that Ivar Kreuger has an investor base and listings for his various securities on<br />

legitimate exchanges like the NYSE and the Curb (Amex), his businesses must report<br />

numbers to them. His Swedish auditors issue reports and Ivar massages the numbers<br />

before passing them along to his US auditors. Kreuger makes frequent use of the time<br />

delays in getting information from around the world in order to cook his books. He uses<br />

discrepancies between terminology and the vagaries of international accounting rules<br />

to his advantage. He takes “lost in translation” to a whole new level in his dealings with<br />

the firm’s US auditors. He turns his business relationships into friendships so as to<br />

ensure that even the most basic questions are never asked or can be dismissed<br />

casually during weddings and cocktail parties.<br />

As Kreuger creates an endless series of subsidiaries and subsidiaries of hit<br />

companies, the truth becomes impossible to determine. No stakeholder is possession<br />

of all the information to understand the entity so they content themselves with<br />

understanding the pieces that have been explained to them. Enron had so many offbalance<br />

sheet subsidiaries and debts that even the CFO who’d created them lost track.<br />

Madoff had a floor in the building that most employees had not even known about<br />

where fake account statements were coming off the printing press night and day.<br />

Eight: The point of no return<br />

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7/20/2018 The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

Not all hucksters go about their hucksterism deliberately. In many cases, the crossing<br />

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of the line takes place incrementally, in stages. The point of no return is reached<br />

toward the end, frequently without the person carrying it out even being aware of the<br />

exact moment it occurs. Ivar’s promises of up to 24% income distributions to<br />

shareholders and the constant shuffling around of assets from one jurisdiction to<br />

another represents one of the most audacious “spinning plates” routines the world has<br />

ever seen. Every time a deal falls through or a payment is missed, he announces an<br />

even bolder and more lucrative potential deal to take its place. Ivar begins to publicly<br />

mention a gold mine in Sweden with supposedly massive deposits of precious metals<br />

in response to bankers and investors questioning his ability to make good on<br />

International Match’s commitments. By constantly hinting at new securities to be<br />

offered or new loan agreements to be signed in new locales, Kreuger keeps the plates<br />

spinning for years and years before anyone loses confidence in him.<br />

But in the wake of the crash, investor appetites for new and exotic deals vanish<br />

virtually overnight. People start demanding their money or, at least, some actual<br />

answers to their questions. Rather than admitting to having bit off more than he could<br />

chew, the entrepreneur crosses the line from fudging numbers to outright forgery of<br />

documents and theft of investor assets. He begins pledging the same assets twice to<br />

obtain loans from multiple banks, ordering the printing of fake Italian sovereign bonds<br />

and copying the signatures of various finance ministers.<br />

Nine: The unraveling is always the same<br />

The perpetrator of the fraud, as the curtain begins to come down, grows increasingly<br />

desperate. The tactics become increasingly erratic and inexplicable. Deals that appear<br />

to have no economic purpose are announced. Hail Mary style passes are thrown.<br />

Investors are asked to believe in more outlandish projections and are made even<br />

bigger promises just as the old promises fail to play out.<br />

And then the con artist goes on the offensive, against both the media as well as a<br />

supposed conspiracy of short-sellers who are unfairly targeting the company. This<br />

takes place near the very end. Think of Theranos employees creating a video game<br />

where they could shoot at the Wall Street Journal reporter who first unearthed the truth<br />

about their company. Think of threats of litigation, the incitement of loyal fans to rush to<br />

a company’s defense and other forms of intimidation used when it becomes clear that<br />

the time is almost up.<br />

Here’s how Ivar Kreuger explained what was happening as his company’s securities<br />

began declining in value…<br />

The decline weighed on Ivar. He complained to Durant that he and his<br />

companies “have been the subject of a deceitful press campaign from…<br />

some twenty black-mailing papers who continually attack our securities.”<br />

Ivar became increasingly paranoid about short-sellers, and he personally<br />

bought large volumes of his companies’ securities, in an effort to prop up<br />

the price. As the short selling of Ivar’s companies increased during late<br />

1931, he became increasingly frustrated and ultimately published the<br />

following statement: “This situation has been utilized by an internationally<br />

organized short selling syndicate, which has not hesitated to spread<br />

unfounded rumours about the group.”<br />

In reality, what was actually happening was that the once-buoyant economy and stock<br />

market euphoria had been replaced with a post-crash environment of skepticism. The<br />

priority had become preservation of capital rather than the pursuit of lavish dividends<br />

and grand schemes. Simultaneously, banks were losing faith in the Match King’s ability<br />

to finance and pay for all of the elaborate promises he’d made and the immense<br />

obligations he’d assumed in the boom times.<br />

The Match King is an important book to read because of how amazingly similar the rise<br />

and fall of his fraudulent enterprise had been to all the frauds that have come after it –<br />

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7/20/2018 The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud<br />

and the frauds still to be revealed. People don’t change and so the enterprises built by<br />

Home About Invest with Josh Josh in the News! Public Speaking Books Mix Tape Contact<br />

people to deceive and to be deceived by do not substantially change either. There is<br />

always the enigmatic leader, the battles with the press and invisible “short seller”<br />

cabals, the use of unsuspecting third parties who convey legitimacy, the convoluted<br />

corporate structure and accounting liberalism, the replacement of dashed promises<br />

with even greater promises of what’s to come in the future…<br />

As speculator Jesse Livermore said, a hundred years ago, “There is nothing new in<br />

Wall Street. There can’t be because speculation is as old as the hills. Whatever<br />

happens in the stock market today has happened before and will happen again.”<br />

***<br />

The Match King is the second book on my summer reading list. The next book in the<br />

series is here.<br />

Full Disclosure: Nothing on this site should ever be considered to be advice, research or an invitation to buy<br />

or sell any securities, please see my Terms & Conditions page for a full disclaimer.<br />

Now go talk about it.<br />

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The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive Fraud – Financial Solutions<br />

commented on Jul 09<br />

[…] On October 28th, the day before Black Tuesday, the crescendo<br />

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captains of industry, a noted companion to the international movie star<br />

Gre… Source: http://thereformedbroker.com/2018/07/09/the-nineessential-conditions-to-commit-massive-fraud/<br />

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[…] Joshua Brown: The Nine Essential Conditions to Commit Massive<br />

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