atw 2018-12

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2018
11/12
573
Should Nuclear Energy
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Constrained World?
580 ı Energy Policy, Economy and Law
NIS Directive in the Energy Sector
587 ı Environment and Safety
Release-Category-Oriented Risk
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atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
2018: A “Quincuplex” for Nuclear Power
Dear reader, “Do good and talk about it.” Anyone who today follows protagonists of technical progress and technical
innovations – sometimes only supposedly, often for technology on four wheels or with rocket propulsion for space – sees
more than ever how important active “marketing” or “advertising” with a good portion of self-confidence and convincing
appearance are for business success.
A look at five such groundbreaking events of 2018 in the
nuclear energy sector should also convey such a sense of
optimism for our industry. But which five events? Test for
yourself and do some search in the news of the WWW ...
and, will you find what you are looking for? At least for
the German-speaking area it will be narrow here, the
English language already supplies more hits and who is
knowledgeable of the Chinese, finds the answers.
So let’s turn to Asia, certainly the most dynamically
developing region in the world today.
On 6 June 2018 the time had come. Taishan 1 was the
first EPR reactor in the world to achieve first criticality.
After VVER-1200 Novovoronezh II-1, with commissioning
in 2016, it is the second reactor type of Generation
III+ that went into operation. The EPR originates from
the earlier cooperation between Siemens/KWU and
Framamtome in the 1990s. It brings together the development,
construction and operating experience of the
pressurized water reactors of the French N4 series and the
three German KWU convoy plants. In addition to further
economic optimisation, e.g. through an extended fuel
cycle and an operating life of at least 60 years, additional
safety features are added, such as a core catcher for
controlling design-basis accidents and other safety
redundancies. The first two “First of a Kind” EPR projects,
Olkiluoto 3 in Finland and Flamanville 3, have been under
construction since 2005 and 2007, respectively. The
projects have been delayed several times for a different
reasons, including complex requirements for operational
facilities and safety defined in the approval procedure.
Construction of the Chinese Taishan plant with two blocks
under the designation CEPR (Chinese EPR) began in 2009.
While retaining the basic design and layout features,
specific Chinese customer requirements have been
implemented, resulting in an increased plant output of
1,750 MW gross. Taishan 2 is also expected to go into
operation in the foreseeable future. Other EPR projects
currently include Hinkley Point C-1 and C-2 in the UK –
where the subsoil is being prepared – and six blocks in
India.
A few days later, on 21 June 2018, the first AP1000
reactor, a further third generation III+ plant, became
critical for the first time in Sanmen, China. Construction of
the two AP1000 units erected at the Sanmen site began in
2009. The concept developed by Westinghouse Electric for a
nuclear power plant with a gross output of around
1,100 MW integrates revolutionary elements in several
respects. Thus, the AP1000 represents a new concept
not only in terms of building design. The modular design
and a passive safety concept for core and containment
emergency cooling are striking features of the pressurized
water reactor.
The AP1000 projects started in China in 2009/2010
then continued at a rapid pace: on August 8, 2018, the
Haiyang 1 unit reached first criticality, followed by the
Sanmen 2 and Haiyang 2 units on August 17 and September
29, 2018, respectively. Two further AP1000 units have
been under construction at the Vogtle site in the USA since
2013, and the two projects at the Summer site were
discontinued in 2017 due to the manufacturer’s Chapter 11
insolvency proceedings.
With these five nuclear power plants commissioned in
2018 and the Russian VVER-1200 projects – one plant
commissioned since 2016, Leningrad II-1 commissioned on
6 February 2018 and active construction projects in
Belarus, Turkey and Bangladesh as well as planning for
Finland, Hungary, Egypt and India - and these five nuclear
power plants commissioned in 2018, Generation III+
nuclear power plants are no longer a vision, they are reality
in a real world that needs a secure energy supply day and
night.
The projects in Asia, but also those of the Russian
company Rosatom, prove that nuclear power plants of this
development stage can also be built within the planned
budget and thus above all with a view to the “levelised cost
of electricity”. Consistent planning in agreement with all
parties involved and a reliable regulatory environment are
prerequisites for this.
These are promising signs for the future use of nuclear
energy worldwide, which, with a view to aspects such as
security of supply, affordable generation costs and
low-emission technology, is once again being increasingly
brought to the fore by governments and organizations –
including NGOs and environmental protection associations
– as an option for the future energy mix. Signs, the
law
These are promising signs for the future use of nuclear
energy worldwide, which, with a view to aspects such as
security of supply, affordable generation costs and
low-emission technology, is once again being increasingly
brought to the fore by governments and organisations –
including NGOs and environmental protection associations
– as an option for the future energy mix. These are
signs that have been set and that now need to be communicated
and fairly communicated - even if, beyond reality,
protagonists against nuclear energy are still trying to hide
them. The same goes for the fact that half a dozen nuclear
energy news items for 2018 will be filled to overflowing,
with 454 reactors in operation worldwide, more than ever
before in the history of the peaceful use of nuclear power!
Christopher Weßelmann
– Editor in Chief –
563
EDITORIAL
Editorial
2018: A “Quincuplex” for Nuclear Power

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
EDITORIAL 564
2018: Ein „Quincuplex“
für die Kernenergie
Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser, „Tue Gutes und rede darüber“. Wer heute Protagonisten technischen Fortschritts
und technischer Innovationen – manchmal auch nur vermeintlicher, oft für Technik auf vier Rädern oder mit Raketenantrieb
für den Weltraum – verfolgt, sieht mehr denn je, wie wichtig aktives „Marketing“ oder „Werbung“ mit einer
gehörigen Portion Selbstbewusstsein und überzeugendem Auftreten für betriebswirtschaftlichen Erfolg sind.
Ein Blick auf fünf solcher wegwei sender Ereignisse des
Jahres 2018 aus dem Kernenergiesektor sollte auch für
unsere Branche eine solche Aufbruchstimmung vermitteln.
Doch welche sind es? Testen Sie selbst und recherchieren
einmal in den Nachrichten des allvermittelnden
WWW ... und, werden Sie fündig? Zumindest für den
deutschen Sprachraum wird es hier eng, die englische
Sprache liefert schon mehr Treffer und wer des
Chinesischen kundig ist, findet die Antworten.
Wenden wir uns also Asien zu, der aktuell sicherlich
weiterhin dynamischsten sich entwickelnden Region
weltweit.
Am 6. Juni 2018 war es soweit. Taishan 1 erreichte als
erster EPR-Reaktor weltweit Erstkritikalität. Nach dem
WWER-1200 Nowoworonesch II-1, mit Inbetriebnahme in
2016, ist es der zweite Reaktortyp der Generation III+ der
in Betrieb gegangen ist. Der EPR entstammt der früheren
Zusammenarbeit von Siemens/KWU und Framamtome
aus den 1990er Jahren. Er führt die Entwicklungs-, Bauund
Betriebserfahrungen der Druckwasserreaktoren der
französischen N4-Baureihe und der drei deutschen KWU-
Konvoi-Anlagen zusammen. Neben einer weiteren Optimierung
der Ökonomie z.B. durch einen verlängerten
Brennstoffzyklus und eine auf minimal 60 Jahre ausgelegte
Betriebszeit kommen zusätzliche Sicherheitsmerkmale
hinzu, wie ein Core-Catcher für die Beherrschung
auslegungsüberschreitende Störfälle sowie
weitere Sicherheits-Redundanzen. Die ersten beiden –
„First of a Kind“ – EPR-Projekte Olkiluoto 3 in Finnland sowie
Flamanville 3 sind seit 2005 bzw. 2007 in Bau.
Verschiedenste Ursachen, so komplexe, im Genehmigungsverfahren
definierte, Anforderungen an betriebliche
Einrichtungen und die Sicherheit haben die Projekte
mehrfach verzögert. Baubeginn für die chinesische Anlage
Taishan mit zwei Blöcken unter der Bezeichnung CEPR
(Chinese EPR) war 2009. Unter Beibehaltung der grundlegenden
Auslegungs- und Designmerkmale sind spezifische
chinesische Kundenwünsche implementiert, so eine
erhöhte Leistung der Anlage von 1.750 MW brutto.
­Taishan 2 soll absehbar ebenfalls in Betrieb gehen. Weitere
EPR-Projekte sind derzeit Hinkley Point C-1 und C-2 in
Großbritannien – hier wird der Baugrund vorbereitet –
sowie sechs Blöcke in Indien.
Wenige Tage später, am 21. Juni 2018, wurde der erste
AP1000-Reaktor, eine weitere, die dritte Generation III+-
Anlagen, im chinesischen Sanmen erstmals kritisch.
Baubeginn für die zwei am Standort Sanmen errichteten
AP1000-Blöcke war 2009. Das von Westinghouse Electric
entwickelte Konzept für ein Kernkraftwerk mit einer
Leistung von um die 1.100 MW brutto integriert in
mehrerlei Hinsicht revolutionäre Elemente. Somit stellt
der AP1000 nicht nur vom Gebäudedesign her ein neues
Konzept dar. Markant für den Druckwasserreaktor sind
unter anderem die modulare Bauweise sowie ein passives
Sicherheitskonzept für die Kern- und Containmentnotkühlung.
Mit den in den Jahren 2009/2010 begonnenen AP1000-
Projekten in China ging es dann rasant weiter: Am 8. August
2018 erreichte der Block Haiyang 1 Erstkritikalität und am
17. August bzw. 29. September 2018 folgten die Blöcke
Sanmen 2 und Haiyang 2. Zwei weitere AP1000-Blöcke
sind am Standort Vogtle in den USA seit 2013 in Bau, die
beiden Vorhaben am Standort Summer wurden im Jahr
2017 aufgrund des „Chapter 11 Insolvenzverfahrens“ des
Herstellers eingestellt.
Mit diesen fünf in 2018 in Betrieb gegangenen Kernkraftwerken
sowie den russischen WWER-1200-Projekten
– eine Anlage seit 2016 in Betrieb, Leningrad II-1 wurde am
6. Februar 2018 in Betrieb genommen sowie aktiven Bauvorhaben
in Weißrussland, der Türkei und Bangladesch
sowie Planungen für Finnland, Ungarn, Ägypten und
Indien, sind Kernkraftwerke der Generation III+ keine
Vision mehr, sie sind Realität in einer realen Welt, die eine
sichere Energieversorgung Tag und Nacht braucht.
Die Projekte in Asien, aber auch die der russischen
Rosatom belegen, dass Kernkraftwerke dieser Entwicklungsstufe
auch im vorgesehenen Kostenrahmen und
damit vor allem mit Blick auf die „Levelised cost of
Electricity“, also die Gesamt-Stromgestehungskosten
errichtet werden können. Konsequente Planung im
Einvernehmen aller Beteiligten und ein verlässliches
regulatorisches Umfeld sind dafür mit Voraussetzungen.
Für die zukünftige Nutzung der Kernenergie weltweit,
die mit Blick auf Aspekte wie Versorgungssicherheit,
bezahlbare Erzeugungskosten und emissionsarme
Technologie wieder stärker von Regierungen und Organisationen
– auch NGOs und Umweltschutzverbänden – als
Option für den zukünftigen Energiemix in den Fokus
gerückt wird, sind dies vielversprechenden Zeichen.
Zeichen, die gesetzt sind und für die es jetzt gilt, sie zu
kommunizieren und fair kommuniziert zu werden – auch,
wenn jenseits der Realität Protagonisten gegen die Kernenergie
immer noch versuchen, dies auszublenden. So
auch die Tatsachen, quasi um das halbe Dutzend an
Kernenergienachrichten für 2018 voll zumachen, dass mit
454 Reaktoren so viele weltweit in Betrieb sind, wie nie
zuvor in der Geschichte der friedlichen Nutzung der
Kernenergie!
Christopher Weßelmann
– Chefredakteur –
Editorial
2018: A “Quincuplex” for Nuclear Power

Kommunikation und
Training für Kerntechnik
Suchen Sie die passende Weiter bildungs maßnahme im Bereich Kerntechnik?
Wählen Sie aus folgenden Themen: Dozent/in Termin/e Ort
3 Atom-, Vertrags- und Exportrecht
Ihr Weg durch Genehmigungs- und Aufsichtsverfahren RA Dr. Christian Raetzke 02.04.2019
22.10.2019
Das Recht der radioaktiven Abfälle RA Dr. Christian Raetzke 05.03.2019
17.09.2019
Atomrecht – Navigation im internationalen nuklearen Vertragsrecht Akos Frank LL. M. 03.04.2019 Berlin
Atomrecht – Was Sie wissen müssen
Export kerntechnischer Produkte und Dienstleistungen –
Chancen und Regularien
3 Kommunikation und Politik
RA Dr. Christian Raetzke
Akos Frank LL. M.
RA Kay Höft M. A.
RA Olaf Kreuzer
Dr. Ing. Wolfgang Steinwarz
Berlin
Berlin
04.06.2019 Berlin
12.06. - 13.06.2019 Berlin
Public Hearing Workshop –
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Schlüsselfaktor Interkulturelle Kompetenz –
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Dr. Nikolai A. Behr 05.11. - 06.11.2019 Berlin
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3 Rückbau und Strahlenschutz
In Kooperation mit dem TÜV SÜD Energietechnik GmbH Baden-Württemberg:
3 Nuclear English
Stilllegung und Rückbau in Recht und Praxis
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Folgen für Recht und Praxis
Dr. Matthias Bauerfeind
RA Dr. Christian Raetzke
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RA Dr. Christian Raetzke
29.01. - 30.01.2019
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Berlin
Veränderungsprozesse gestalten – Heraus forderungen
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Methoden und praktische Anwendung
Dr. Tanja-Vera Herking
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22.01. - 23.01.2019
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atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
566
Issue 11/12
November/December
CONTENTS
573
Should Nuclear Energy
Play a Role in a Carbon-
Constrained World?
| | Development of nuclear technology. Fuel element heads for heavy water reactor fuel elements. (Courtesy: NA-SA)
Editorial
2018: A “Quincuplex” for Nuclear Power 563
2018: Ein „Quincuplex“ für die Kernenergie 564
Abstracts | English 568
Abstracts | German 569
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
How Nuclear Industry Can Solve
‘ Fundamental Obstacle’ of High Capital Cost 570
DAtF Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .571
Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Should Nuclear Energy Play a Role
in a Carbon-Constrained World? 573
Jacopo Buongiorno, Michael Corradini, John Parsons and David Petti
Talks of an End to Germany’s
Nuclear Industry Premature 578
Roman Martinek
Development on NIS Directive in Different
EU Countries in the Energy Sector 580
Stefan Loubichi
573
Spotlight on Nuclear Law
Arbitrary-peaceful?
Consequences of the “Achmea” Decision
of the ECJ also for the ICSID Arbitration
of Vattenfall? 585
Schiedlich-friedlich? –
Folgen des „Achmea“-Urteils des EuGH
auch für das ICSID-Schiedsgerichtsverfahren
von Vattenfall? 585
| | Human Development Index versus per capita electricity consumption
Ulrike Feldmann
Contents

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
567
Environment and Safety
Release-Category-Oriented Risk
Importance Measure in the Frame of
Preventive Nuclear Safety Barriers 587
CONTENTS
Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul and Luca Ammirabilea
607
| | Classification of the different scenarios.
587
| | Relationship between the different Nuclear Safety Pillars.
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and
Handling of Improbable Developments 593
Position des Arbeitskreises
„Szenarienentwicklung“ zur Thematik:
Wahrscheinlich keitsklassen und Umgang mit
unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen 593
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz,
J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel,
G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath
Research and Innovation
Kurchatov Institute’s Critical Assemblies 607
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy
AMNT 2018
Key Topic
Enhanced Safety & Operation Excellence
Focus Session
“International Operational Experience” 610
Ludger Mohrbach
KTG Inside 613
News 616
Nuclear Today
Brexit and Trump Among Fresh Challenges
for Nuclear in Year Ahead 626
John Shepherd
Imprint 614
593
INFORUM: Seminar Programme 2019
Insert
| | Classification of the different scenarios.
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities:
An Interdisciplinary Task for Junior Staff 601
Der Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen:
Eine interdisziplinäre Aufgabe
für Nachwuchskräfte 601
David Anton, Manuel Reichardt, Thomas Hassel and Harald Budelmann
Contents

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
568
ABSTRACTS | ENGLISH
How Nuclear Industry can Solve
‘ Fundamental Obstacle’ of High Capital Cost
NucNet | Page 570
History shows that new nuclear generating capacity
can be deployed as quickly as coal and gas-fired
capacity, but the high capital cost of new nuclear
plants remains “a fundamental obstacle” which the
industry needs to tackle, a report by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) Energy Initiative
found. If the global nuclear industry achieved the
pace of plant construction and deployment seen in
France and the US in the 1970s and 1980s, the world’s
energy sector would be completely decarbonised by
2050, Jacopo Buongiorno, a co-director of the study
and an associate department head of the Department
of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, said
during a briefing on the report in Brussels.
Should Nuclear Energy Play a Role in a
Carbon-Constrained World?
Jacopo Buongiorno, Michael Corradini,
John Parsons and David Petti | Page 573
We summarize the findings of a new MIT study on
the future of nuclear energy. The context for the
study is the challenge of simultaneously expanding
energy access and economic opportunity to billions
of people while drastically reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases. We find that while decarbonization
of the electricity sector can be accomplished
employing an assortment of low-carbon technologies
in various combinations, nuclear has a uniquely
valuable role to play as a dispatchable low-carbon
technology. Excluding a dispatchable low-carbon
option like nuclear, as the German Energiewende
does, significantly increases the cost and difficulty of
achieving decarbonization targets. We also find that
the high cost of new nuclear plants limits nuclear’s
role in a balanced portfolio. Reducing this cost can
significantly reduce the total cost of decarbonization.
Our study identified the factors driving up cost,
and we identify promising approaches to achieving
cost reductions. Finally, we identify needed government
policies. These include decarbonization strategies
that recognize the contribution of all lowcarbon
energy technologies and treat them equally
in the electricity market. These also include policies
to accommodate and support development and
demonstration of advanced reactor designs.
Talks of an End to Germany’s Nuclear
Industry Premature
Roman Martinek | Page 578
There now remains hardly anyone in Germany who
has not yet dropped in the last few years a single line
about how the country is valiantly closing one by
one its nuclear power plants. It was difficult to
expect anything else, though, if one keeps in mind
that the accelerated phase-out of nuclear energy
announced by the German political establishment
in 2011 became perhaps the most resonant energy
policy decision in the country’s recent history.
At the same time, it is often overlooked that the
“Atomausstieg” (the name given to Germany’s
denuclearization) is a like a hat that has a false
bottom to it: the issue of disconnection from the
grid lying on the surface of public discourse, while
behind it (or ‘under’ it, if you will) lies a number of
deeper and more far-reaching questions.
Development on NIS Directive in Different
EU Countries in the Energy Sector
Stefan Loubichi | Page 580
The magnitude, frequency and impact of security incidents
are increasing, and represent a major threat
to the functioning of network and information
systems. These systems may also become a target for
deliberate harmful actions intended to damage or
interrupt the operation of the systems. Such incidents
can impede the pursuit of economic activities,
generate substantial financial losses, undermine user
confidence and cause major damage to the economy
of the Union. The answer of the European Union to
this challenge was the NIS Directive.
Arbitrary-peaceful? Consequences of the
“Achmea” Decision of the ECJ also for the
ICSID Arbitration of Vattenfall?
Ulrike Feldmann | Page 585
On 6 March 2018, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ, Grand Chamber) issued a serious and controversial
ruling on the compatibility of investment
protection clauses with Union law (C-284/16 –
“ Achmea”). Various parties have raised the question
of whether the ruling also applies to agreements
such as the Energy Charter, to which the EU itself is
a contracting party. The Energy Charter is the basis
of the Swedish Vattenfall AB and other plaintiffs’
proceedings before the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which
belongs to the World Bank in Washington D.C..
ICSID was established in 1965 by the ICSID
Convention, to which 153 states belong.
Release-Category-Oriented Risk Importance
Measure in the Frame of Preventive Nuclear
Safety Barriers
Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul and
Luca Ammirabile | Page 587
After the Fukushima accident, the interest on the
field of severe accidents has largely increased, both
on the management aspects – to improve the
prevention of severe accident progression and
mitigate their consequences –, but also in sponsoring
research activities focused on reducing the
uncertainty still present on physical and chemical
phenomena and processes taking place during a
postulated severe accident. One of the most relevant
and comprehensive approaches to look into the field
of severe accidents consists of the Level 2 Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA). In order to reveal the
relative probabilistic weight each system, structure
or component contributes with to the integrated
core damage frequency, several consolidated risk
measures are available for application, among
which Risk Reduction Worth or Fussell-Vesely.
This paper discusses the nature of the different
approaches underlying the existing nuclear safety
barriers and introduces an innovative severeaccident
risk importance measure. This innovative
risk measure takes into account the entire spectrum
of accidents leading to radioactive releases rather
than only focusing at large and early releases. By
applying this tool, the importance is shifted from a
consequence-oriented to a frequency-oriented tool
where the contribution of the different elements of
the plant will be ranked according to their impact
on the total radioactive release frequency.
Position of the Working Group
“Scenario Development” on the Topic:
Probability Classes and Handling
of Improbable Developments
J. Orzechowski, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wollrath,
A. Lommerzheim, S. Mrugalla, Th. Beuth, G. Bracke,
K.-M. Mayer, J. Mönig, A. Rübel, J. Wolf, V. Metz,
S. Chaudry, E. Plischke and K.-J. Röhlig | Page 594
The safety requirements demand the consideration
of different probabilities of occurrence in the
analysis of future evolutions of a disposal system
and disposal site. Furthermore, the Commission
which was established according to the Repository
Site Selection Act requires, as stated in the final
report , the review of the classification in the
probability classes “probable”, “less probable” and
“improbable” evolutions as well as of the distinction
between “probable” and “less probable” evolutions.
In the past, probable and less probable scenarios
were derived during research projects related to the
scenario development. Furthermore, evolutions on
the basis of human intrusion into a disposal system
were examined as well. However, improbable
evolutions have not been considered so far. The
Working Group “Scenario Development” (AKS)
dealt with the classification into probability
classes and with the derivation and treatment
of improbable scenarios. The position was
elaborated by the AKS.
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities:
An Interdisciplinary Task for Junior Staff
David Anton, Manuel Reichardt, Thomas Hassel and
Harald Budelmann | Page 602
Some challenges and boundary conditions are
outlined which accompany the dismantling of
nuclear facilities. Compared to the dismantling of
conventional facilities, the work in nuclear facilities
is considerably impeded by the radiological load.
The decommissioning concept has to be individually
developed or adapted for each nuclear installation
taking into account the various boundary conditions.
The versatility of the challenges in connection
with the dismantling of nuclear facilities and
the interim or final disposal of radioactive waste
underlines the necessity of an interdisciplinary
approach.
Kurchatov Institute’s Critical Assemblies
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy | Page 607
Since its establishment, the Kurchatov Institute of
Atomic Energy (now National Research Centre
“ Kurchatov Institute”) was always involved in R&D
on nuclear reactors for various applications. This
activity required dedicated critical facilities (whose
number, design and purpose naturally varied with
time). This paper reviews the status of the Kurchatov
Institute’s experimental park that includes more
than ten critical assemblies intended for R&D
for power (VVER, RBMK, HTGR), ship and space
reactors.
49 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology
(AMNT 2018) Key Topic | Enhanced Safety &
Operation Excellence
Ludger Mohrbach | Page 610
The report summarises the presentations of the Focus
Session “International Operational Experience” Key
Topic “Enhanced Safety & Operation Excellence”
presented at the AMNT 2018, Berlin, 29 to 30 May
2018.
Brexit and Trump Among Fresh Challenges
for Nuclear in Year Ahead
John Shepherd | Page 626
As 2018 draws to a close, there have been several
developments that will mean the new year dawning
with fresh uncertainties on the horizon for the
global nuclear energy industry: Brexit and
announcement of the Trump administration for a
new policy framework for curtailing civil nuclear
commerce with China are two of them.
Abstracts | English

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Wie kann die Nuklearindustrie mit
der Herausforderung hoher Kapitalkosten
umgehen?
NucNet | Seite 570
Die Geschichte zeigt, dass neue Kernkraftwerke
schnell hinzu gebaut werden können, aber die
hohen Investitionskosten für neue Kernkraftwerke
„eine grundlegende Herausforderung“ sind, mit
dem die Industrie konfrontiert wird. Ein Bericht der
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Energy Initiative kommt fasst dies zusammen.
Wenn die Nuklearindustrie das Tempo des Anlagenbaus
und der Inbetriebnahme in Frankreich und
den USA in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren erreichen
würde, könnte der weltweite Energiesektor bis
2050 vollständig dekarbonisiert sein, sagte Jacopo
Buongiorno, Co-Direktor der Studie und stellvertretender
Abteilungsleiter des Department of
Nuclear Science and Engineering am MIT, während
eines Briefings über den Bericht in Brüssel.
Sollte die Kernenergie eine Rolle bei der
weltweiten Dekarbonisierung spielen?
Jacopo Buongiorno, Michael Corradini,
John Parsons und David Petti | Seite 573
Zusammengefasst sind die Ergebnisse einer neuen
MIT-Studie zur Zukunft der Kernenergie. Der
Kontext für die Studie ist die Herausforderung, den
Zugang zu Energie und die wirtschaftlichen
Möglichkeiten für Milliarden von Menschen zu
erweitern und gleichzeitig die Emissionen von
Treibhausgasen drastisch zu reduzieren. Die Dekarbonisierung
des Elektrizitätssektors kann zwar
durch den Einsatz einer Reihe von kohlenstoffarmen
Technologien in verschiedenen Kombinationen
erreicht werden, Kernkraft ist jedoch die
einzig ausreichend verfügbare kohlenstoffarme
Technologie. Der Ausschluss einer leistungsfähigen
kohlenstoffarmen Option wie der Kernenergie, wie
es bei der deutschen Energiewende der Fall ist, ist
mit erheblichen Herausforderungen verbunden.
Hohe Kapitalkosten für neue Kernkraftwerke
schränken allerdings auch die Investitionsbereitschaft
ein. Die Reduzierung dieser Kosten kann die
Gesamtkosten der Dekarbonisierung erheblich
reduzieren. Abschließend werden Regierungspolitiken
analysiert. Dazu gehören auch Dekarbonisierungsstrategien,
die den Beitrag aller kohlenstoffarmen
Energietechnologien gleich behandeln,
auch den der Kernenergie.
Kein weitere Diskurs zur
deutschen Nukleartechnik
Roman Martinek | Seite 578
In Deutschland gibt es heute kaum noch jemanden,
der in den letzten Jahren darüber schreibt, wie das
Land seine Kernkraftwerke nacheinander stilllegt.
Es war kaum etwas anderes zu erwarten, denn der
von der deutschen Politik im Jahr 2011 beschlossene
beschleunigte Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie wurde
medial zustimmend begleitet und ist sicherlich eine
bedeutende energiepolitische Entscheidung in der
jüngeren Geschichte des Landes. Es muss dennoch
mit allen Fragen und Herausforderungen des „Atomausstiegs“,
auch öffentlich, umgegangen werden.
Die Anwendung der NIS Direktive im
Energiesektor in einigen EU-Staaten
Stefan Loubichi | Seite 580
Die so genannte NIS RICHTLINIE (EU) 2016/1148
war der erste wichtige Schritt in Richtung der
Implementierun eines gemeinsamen Standards der
Informationssicherheit für die gesamte EU. Die
Richtlinie wird in allen EU Ländern unterschiedlich
umgesetzt. Das nächste Problem besteht darin, dass
die Umsetzung in den einzelnen Ländern auch sehr
unterschiedlich ist. Zusammenhänge und Details
dazu werden vorgestellt.
Schiedlich-friedlich? – Folgen des
„Achmea“-Urteils des EuGH auch für
das ICSID-Schiedsgerichtsverfahren
von Vattenfall?
Ulrike Feldmann | Seite 585
Am 6. März 2018 hat der Europäische Gerichtshof
(EuGH, Große Kammer) ein folgenschweres
und umstrittenes Urteil zur Vereinbarkeit von
Inves titionsschutzklauseln mit Unionsrecht gefällt
(Rechtssache C-284/16 - „Achmea“). Es wird von
verschiedenen Seiten die Frage aufgeworfen
worden, ob das Urteil auch für Abkommen wie z.B.
die Energiecharta gilt, bei denen die EU selber
Vertragspartei ist. Die Energiecharta ist Grundlage
des Verfahrens der schwedischen Vattenfall AB und
weiterer Kläger vor dem Internationalen Zentrum
zur Beilegung von Investitionsstreitigkeiten/International
Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), das zur Weltbank in Washington
D.C. gehört. Das ICSID wurde 1965 durch die
ICSID-Konvention gegründet, der 153 Staaten
angehören.
Freisetzungskategorie-orientierte
Risikobetrachtung zur Beurteilung
vorsorglicher Sicherheitsbarrieren
Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul und
Luca Ammirabile | Seite 587
Nach dem Unfall von Fukushima hat das Interesse
an Analysen zu schweren Unfällen stark zugenommen,
sowohl hinsichtlich administrativer Maßnahmen
– zur Verbesserung der Prävention und
Minimierung schwerer Unfallfolgen – als auch bei
der Förderung von Forschungsaktivitäten, die sich
auf noch bestehende Unsicherheiten zu physikalischen
und chemischen Phänomene und Prozesse
konzentrieren, die während eines postulierten
schweren Unfalls eine Rolle spielen können. Ein
relevante und umfassender Ansatz zur Untersuchung
schwerer Unfälle ist das Level 2 Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA). Um die relative wahrscheinlichkeitsbezogene
Gewichtung zu ermitteln,
die jedes System, jede Struktur oder Komponente
zur Kernschadenshäufigkeit beiträgt, stehen
mehrere Risikomaßstäbe zur Disposition. Die verschiedenen
Ansätze dafür werden diskutiert und
ein innovatives Maß für die jeweilige Bedeutung des
Beitrags zum Schwerstörfallrisiko wird eingeführt.
Diese Verfahren berücksichtigt das gesamte
Spektrum von Unfällen, die zu radioaktiven Freisetzungen
führen. Durch die Anwendung des Tools
kann der Beitrag zum Risiko der verschiedenen
Komponenten einer Anlage ermittelt werden.
Position des Arbeitskreises „Szenarienentwicklung“
zur Thematik: Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
und Umgang mit
unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
J. Orzechowski, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wollrath,
A. Lommerzheim, S. Mrugalla, Th. Beuth, G. Bracke,
K.-M. Mayer, J. Mönig, A. Rübel, J. Wolf, V. Metz,
S. Chaudry, E. Plischke und K.-J. Röhlig | Seite 594
Die Sicherheitsanforderungen verlangen bei der
Analyse von zukünftigen Entwicklungen eines Endlagers
und Endlagerstandortes die Unter scheidung
hinsichtlich der Wahrscheinlichkeit ihres Eintretens.
Darüber hinaus forderte die nach dem Standortauswahlgesetz
in 2013 eingesetzte Endlagerkommission
in ihrem Abschlussbericht die Überprüfung
der Einteilung in die Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
„wahrscheinliche“, „we niger wahrscheinliche“ und
„unwahrschein liche“ Entwicklungen und der
Trennung in „wahrscheinliche“ und „weniger wahrscheinliche“
Entwicklungen.
Der Arbeitskreis „Szenarienentwicklung“ (AKS) hat
sich mit der Einteilung von Entwicklungen in
Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen, der Ableitung von
unwahrscheinlichen Szenarien sowie mit deren
Behandlung auseinandergesetzt und die vorgestellte
Position formuliert.
Der Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen:
Eine interdisziplinäre Aufgabe
für Nachwuchskräfte
David Anton, Manuel Reichardt,
Thomas Hassel und Harald Budelmann | Seite 602
Einige Herausforderungen und Randbedingungen
werden skizziert, die mit dem Rückbau kerntechnischer
Anlagen einhergehen. Im Vergleich zum
Rückbau konventioneller Anlagen werden die
Arbeiten in kerntechnischen Anlagen durch die
radiologische Belastung erschwert. Das Rückbaukonzept
muss unter Berücksichtigung der vielfältigen
Randbedingungen für jede kerntechnische
Anlage individuell erarbeitet bzw. angepasst
werden. Die Vielseitigkeit der Herausforderungen
im Zusammenhang mit dem Rückbau kerntechnischer
Anlagen und der Zwischen- bzw. Endlagerung
der radioaktiven Abfälle unterstreicht
die Notwendigkeit einer interdisziplinären Herangehensweise.
Kritische Anordnungen des
Kurchatov Instituts
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy | Seite 607
Seit seiner Gründung ist das Kurchatov Institute of
Atomic Energy (heute National Research Centre
„Kurchatov Institute“) an der Erforschung und Entwicklung
von Kernreaktoren für verschiedene
Anwendungen beteiligt. Dies erforderte auch
Planung, Bau und Betrieb von speziellen Kritischen
Anordnungen. Dieses Papier gibt einen Überblick
über den Status des Einrichtungen des Kurchatov
Institute mit mehr als zehn Kritischen Anordnungen,
die für die Forschung und Entwicklung von
Leistungs- (VVER, RBMK, HTGR), Schiffs- und
Weltraumreaktoren vorgesehen sind.
49 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology
(AMNT 2018) Key Topic | Enhanced Safety &
Operation Excellence
Ludger Mohrbach | Seite 610
Der Bericht fasst die Vorträge der Focus Session
„International Operational Experience” des Key
Topic „Enhanced Safety & Operation Excellence“
zusammen, die auf der 49. Jahrestagung Kerntechnik
(AMNT 2018) präsentiert wurden.
Brexit und die Trump-Administration:
Neue Herausforderungen für die
Kernenergie im kommenden Jahr
John Shepherd | Seite 626
Zum Ende des Jahres 2018 gab es mehrere Entwicklungen,
die möglicherweise dazu führen
werden, dass das neue Jahr mit neuen Unsicherheiten
im Kontext der globalen Kernenergieentwicklung
beginnt. Es sind dies der Brexit mit
seinen Unsicherheiten und die Ankündigung der
Trump-Administration für einen neuen politischen
Rahmen zur Beschränkung des Handels mit
Kernenergietechnologie mit China.
569
ABSTRACTS | GERMAN
Abstracts | German

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
570
INSIDE NUCLEAR WITH NUCNET
How Nuclear Industry Can Solve
‘ Fundamental Obstacle’
of High Capital Cost
History shows that new nuclear generating capacity can be deployed as quickly as coal and gas-fired capacity, but the
high capital cost of new nuclear plants remains “a fundamental obstacle” which the industry needs to tackle, a report
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative found.
If the global nuclear industry achieved the pace
of plant construction and deployment seen in
France and the US in the 1970s and 1980s, the
world’s energy sector would be completely
decarbonised by 2050, Jacopo Buongiorno, a
co-director of the study and an associate
department head of the Department of Nuclear Science and
Engineering at MIT, said during a briefing on the report in
Brussels.
“It is feasible based on historical data, but the important
question is can we build nuclear capacity the same way
today?” Mr Buongiorno told the briefing, organised by
European industry group Foratom.
“Such deployment requires an industry which has
sufficient manufacturing capability and resources and also
a regulatory framework in place to support it.”
According to MIT, about 75 % of the capital cost of
nuclear projects under construction, including two
AP1000s at Vogtle in the US, EPRs at Flamanville in France
and Olkiluoto in Finland, and four South Korean APR1400s
at Barakah in the United Arab Emirates, is down to civil
work, site preparation, installation and indirect costs like
engineering oversight and ownership costs.
“Only 20-25% of the total cost goes to actual nuclear
equipment, meaning that there are many issues not related
to technology which affect the bill,” Mr Buongiorno said.
“The solution to high cost will not come from a new,
innovative reactor design, but rather from shrewd
management practices,” he said.
To tackle the cost burden, the MIT report calls on the
nuclear industry to start using “proven project and contract
management practices” and to shift away from construction
of cumbersome, highly site-dependent plants to the
“serial manufacturing of standardised plants”.
“The use of cross-cutting technologies, including
modular construction in factories and shipyards,
advanced concrete solutions (e.g. steel-plate composites,
high-strength reinforcement steel, ultra-high-performance
concrete), seismic isolation technology, and advanced
plant layouts (e.g., embedment, offshore siting),
could have positive impacts on the cost and schedule
of new nuclear power plant construction”, the report
said.
The report, ‘The Future of Nuclear Energy in a Carbon-
Constrained World’, analyses the reasons for the current
global stall in nuclear energy – which accounts for only 5%
of global primary energy production – and outlines
measures that could be taken to arrest and reverse that
trend.
It concludes that nuclear energy could take its place as
a major low-carbon energy source, but issues of cost and
policy need to be addressed. New nuclear plants have
become costlier in recent decades, while other generation
technologies have become cheaper, the report said.
“This disturbing trend undermines nuclear energy’s
potential contribution and increases the cost of achieving
deep decarbonisation”, the report said.
The report found that the overnight cost for nuclear
new-build projects in Europe and the US are higher than
those for projects in South Korea or the UAE.
Overnight cost is the capital cost including engineering,
procurement and construction (EPC) costs, and owners'
costs, but excluding financial charges or interest accrued
during construction.
The overnight cost of the Olkiluoto and Flamanville
projects, and the estimated overnight cost for the EPR
project at Hinkley Point C in the UK, fall between about
$7,200 and $8,200 per kW, based on 2017 figures, the
report said.
The overnight cost for the two AP1000s under construction
at Vogtle has exceeded $8,500 per kW, while that for
two suspended VC Summer AP1000s, also in the US, is
about $6,300 per kW.
In comparison, the report said, the overnight cost for
South Korea’s APR1400 under construction at Barakah in
the UAE is $4,000 per kW. Other APR1400 projects in
South Korea have cost even less – about $3,000 per kW.
China can be even cheaper. According to the report,
China has been building nuclear units at an overnight cost
ranging between about $2,500 and $5,000 per kW.
The report said that for nuclear power to compete with
natural gas-fired energy in the absence of a carbon price,
overnight costs would have to be between $2,000 and
$4,000 per kW.
The report noted that in addition to cost-cutting efforts
and developments, action by policy makers is needed to
support the growth of nuclear energy.
John Parsons, study co-chair and senior lecturer at MIT’s
Sloan School of Management, said “the role of government
will be critical if we are to take advantage of the economic
opportunity and low-carbon potential that nuclear has to
offer”.
He said government officials must create new
decarbonisation policies that put all low-carbon energy
tech nologies on an equal footing, while also exploring
options that spur private investment in nuclear advancement.
The study laid out detailed options for government
support of nuclear. For example, the authors recommend
that policymakers should avoid premature closures of
existing plants, which undermine efforts to reduce
emissions and increase the cost of achieving emission
reduction targets.
One way to avoid these closures is the implementation
of zero-emissions credits – payments made to electricity
producers where electricity is generated without greenhouse
gas emissions – which are in place in New York,
Illinois, and New Jersey.
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
How Nuclear Industry Can Solve ‘ Fundamental Obstacle’ of High Capital Cost ı November/December

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Another proposal is that governments support
development and demonstration of new nuclear technologies
through four funding “levers”: funding to share
regulatory licensing costs; funding to share research and
development costs; funding for the achievement of specific
technical milestones; and funding for production credits to
reward successful demonstration of new designs.
Unless nuclear energy is incorporated into the global
mix of low-carbon energy technologies with the help of
new government policies, the challenge of climate change
will be much more difficult and costly to solve, the report
concluded.
According to MIT, over 80 % of the energy used in the
world comes from fossil fuels and despite all the talk about
switching to alternative energy sources, CO 2 emissions are
on the rise.
“The magnitude of the challenge we are facing in
decarbonising the world’s energy supply is enormous”,
Mr Buongiorno said.
“This means we must have as many energy options on
the table as possible because we cannot succeed using just
one technology type.”
The report is online:
http://bit.ly/2x3yvNt
DATF EDITORIAL NOTES
571
Notes
Public Opinion About
the Loss of Competence
Only limited concern about loss of competence: Asked about their
possible concern with regard to the loss of knowledge on the safety
of nuclear power plants in Germany after nuclear phase-out and in
view of future German capabilities to rate the safety level of foreign
NPPs, a relative majority is not concerned. The relatively high
percentage of persons that cannot decide for either position shows
that their opinion on the issue is not stable. This is often the case
with issues the citizens have not or only hardly dealt with and thus
do not consider it possible to judge on the issue.
East-Germans are more concerned than West-Germans, men
more than women. This might be due to differences in the basic
opinion on nuclear power. The surveys of past decades showed
repeatedly that East-Germans and men are more open to nuclear
than West-Germans and men respectively.
Question: Some time ago, Germany decided to phase out nuclear
energy entirely until 2022. We have two persons talking about this
topic. Who of the two says what comes close to what is your opinion?
Person one: “I’m concerned, that Germany will lose precious
knowledge and experience regarding to the operation of nuclear
power plants. Then, Germany will not be able anymore to rate the
safety standards of foreign nuclear power plants.”
Person two: “I do think differently. When there will be no more use
of nuclear power plants in Germany, we don’t need experience in
operation of nuclear power plants. The safety standards can well be
rated by local experts. Therefore, I am not concerned.”
Not concerned
Concerned
Undecided, no opinion
25 %
36 %
39 %
Public Opinion About Euratom
A large majority thinks Euratom Treaty is reasonable: There is a
broad consensus in the population that European safety cooperation
in the area of nuclear energy is important. Accordingly, 72 per cent
think that the Euratom Treaty makes sense. Only 9 per cent have the
opposing opinion, that it would be better if every European country
would deal with the issue on its own.
Question: The Euratom Treaty has established a safety cooperation
in the field of nuclear energy on the European level for more than
60 years. Do you consider this kind of cooperation to be reasonable,
or should the respective countries regulate this on their own?
19 %
Undecided,
no opinion
72 %
Reasonable
9 %
On their own
Are you interested in more information
on Euratom? DAtF published a new
booklet about Euratom (in German).
Please check www.kernenergie.de.
Results of a public
opinion survey
carried out in
October 2018 by
Institut für
Demoskopie
Allensbach
commissioned by
DAtF. The survey is
based on a total of
1.236 Face-to-Face-
Interviews with a
representative
cross section of
the population
from age 16. The
interviews were
conducted between
11 and 27 October
2018.
For further details
please contact:
Nicolas Wendler
DAtF
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin
Germany
E-mail: presse@
kernenergie.de
www.kernenergie.de
DAtF Notes

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Calendar
572
CALENDAR
2018
03.12.-14.12.2018
United Nations, Conference of the Parties –
COP24. Katowice, Poland, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change –
UNFCCC, www.cop24.katowice.eu
03.12.-04.12.2018
IGD-TP Exchange Forum 8 – Radioactive Waste
Management (EURAD). Berlin, Germany, German
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
(BMWi), igdtp.eu/event/igd-tp-exchange-forum-8/
06.12.2018
Nuclear 2018. London, United Kingdom, Nuclear
Industry Association (NIA), www.niauk.org
10.12.-12.12.2018
Toronto Global Forum: Navigating a World in
Disruption. Toronto, Canada, forum-americas.org
10.12.-11.12.2018
Symposium zum neuen deutschen Strahlenschutzrecht.
Aschaffenburg, Germany,
Fachverband für Strahlenschutz e. V., fs-ev.org
2019
07.01.-08.01.2019
ICNPPS 2019 – 21 st International Conference
Nuclear Power Plant Systems. Tokyo, Japan,
World Academy of Science, Engineering and
Technology, waset.org
15.01.2019
Nuclear Fuel Supply Forum. Washington DC, USA,
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), www.nei.org
21.01.-22.01.2019
Uranium Science. Bristol, Unitd Kingdom, University
of Bristol, Royal Academy of Engineering, IAC,
uranium-science.tumblr.com
28.01.-29.01.2019
5 th Central & Eastern Europe Nuclear Industry
Congress 2019. Prague, Czech Republic,
www.szwgroup.com
05.02.-07.02.2019
Nordic Nuclear Forum. Helsinki, Finland, FinNuclear,
www.finnuclear.fi, nordicnuclearforum.fi
20.02.-22.02.2019
ips – International Power Summit 2019.
Berlin, Germany, bit.ly/2kQk2LU
12.02.-14.02.2019
The annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit.
Arlington, VA, USA, Access Intelligence,
www.deterrencesummit.com
20.02.-21.02.2019
Nuclear Decommissioning & Waste Management
Summit 2019. London, United Kingdom, ACI,
www.wplgroup.com/aci/event/nucleardecommissioning-waste-management-summit/
25.02.-26.02.2019
Symposium Anlagensicherung. Hamburg,
Germany, TÜV NORD Akademie, www.tuev-nord.de
03.03.-07.03.2019
WM Symposia – WM2019. Phoenix, AZ, USA.
www.wmsym.org
05.03.-06.03.2019
VI. International Power Plants Summit.
Istanbul, Turkey, INPPS Fair,
www.nuclearpowerplantssummit.com
10.03.-15.03.2019
83. Annual Meeting of DPG and DPG Spring
Meeting of the Atomic, Molecular, Plasma Physics
and Quantum Optics Section (SAMOP),
incl. Working Group on Energy. Rostock, Germany,
Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft e.V.,
www.dpg-physik.de
10.03.-14.03.2019
The 9 th International Symposium On
Supercritical- Water-Cooled Reactors (ISSCWR-9).
Vancouver Marriott Hotel, Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada, Canadian Nuclear Society (CNS),
www.cns-snc.ca
11.03.-13.03.2019
18 th Workshop of the European ALARA Network:
ALARA in Decommissioning and Site Remediation.
Marcoule, France, European ALARA Network
www.eu-alara.net
11.03.-12.03.2019
Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference.
Washington D.C., U.S.A., Carnegie Endownment for
International Peace, carnegieendowment.org
11.03.-15.03.2019
RaPBA-training course. Jülich, Germany,
Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, www.fz-juelich.de
24.03.-28.03.2019
RRFM 2019 – 2019 the European Research
Reactor Conference. Jordan, IGORR,
the Inter national Group Operating Research
Reactors and European Nuclear Society (ENS),
www.euronuclear.org
25.03.-27.03.2019
Cyber Security Implementation Workshop.
Boston MA, USA, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),
www.nei.org
01.04.-03.04.2019
CIENPI – 13 th China International Exhibition on
Nuclear Power Industry. Beijing, China,
Coastal International, www.coastal.com.hk
09.04.-11.04.2019
World Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2019. Shanghai, China,
World Nuclear Association (WNA),
www.world-nuclear.org
07.05.-08.05.2019
50 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology
AMNT 2019 | 50. Jahrestagung Kerntechnik.
Berlin, Germany, DAtF and KTG,
www.nucleartech-meeting.com – Register Now!
15.05.-17.05.2019
1 st International Conference of Materials,
Chemistry and Fitness-For-Service Solutions
for Nuclear Systems. Toronto, Canada, Canadian
Nuclear Society (CNS), www.cns-snc.ca
16.05.-17.05.2019
Emergency Power Systems at Nuclear Power
Plants. Munich, Germany, TÜV SÜD,
www.tuev-sued.de/eps-symposium
24.05.-29.05.2019
International Topical Workshop on Fukushima
Decommissioning Research – FDR2019.
Fukushima, Japan, The University of Tokyo,
fdr2019.org
03.06.-05.06.2019
Nuclear Energy Assembly. Washington DC, USA,
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), www.nei.org
04.06.-07.06.2019
FISA 2019 and EURADWASTE ‘19. 9 th European
Commission Conferences on Euratom Research
and Training in Safety of Reactor Systems and
Radioactive Waste Management. Pitesti, Romania,
www.nucleu2020.eu
24.06.-26.06.2019
2019 International Conference on the Management
of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors.
Vienna, Austria, International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), www.iaea.org
23.06.-27.06.2019
World Nuclear University Summer Institute.
Romania and Switzerland, World Nuclear University,
www.world-nuclear-university.org
21.07.-24.07.2019
14 th International Conference on CANDU Fuel.
Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, Canadian Nuclear
Society (CNS), www.cns-snc.ca
28.07.-29.07.2019
Radiation Protection Forum. Memphis TN, USA,
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), www.nei.org
04.08.-09.08.2019
PATRAM 2019 – Packaging and Transportation
of Radioactive Materials Symposium.
New Orleans, LA, USA. www.patram.org
21.08.-30.08.2019
Frédéric Joliot/Otto Hahn (FJOH) Summer School
FJOH-2019 – Innovative Reactors: Matching the
Design to Future Deployment and Energy Needs.
Karlsruhe, Germany, Nuclear Energy Division
of Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux
énergies alternatives (CEA) and Karlsruher Institut
für Technologie (KIT), www.fjohss.eu
04.09.-06.09.2019
World Nuclear Association Symposium 2019.
London, UK, World Nuclear Association (WNA),
www.wna-symposium.org
04.09.-05.09.2019
VGB Congerss 2019 – Innovation in Power
Generation. Salzburg, Austria, VGB PowerTech e.V.,
www.vgb.org
08.09.-11.09.2019
4 th Nuclear Waste Management,
Decommissioning and Environmental Restoration
(NWMDER). Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Nuclear
Society (CNS), www.cns-snc.ca
09.09.-12.09.2019
24 th World Energy Congress. Abu Dhabi, UAE,
www.wec24.org
09.09.-12.09.2019
Jahrestagung 2019 – Fachverband für
Strahlenschutz | Strahlenschutz und Medizin.
Würzburg, Germany, www.fs-ev.org
22.10.-25.10.2019
SWINTH-2019 Specialists Workshop on Advanced
Instrumentation and Measurement Techniques
for Experiments Related to Nuclear Reactor
Thermal Hydraulics and Severe Accidents.
Livorno, Italy, www.nineeng.org/swinth2019/
23.10.-24.10.2019
Chemistry in Power Plants. Würzburg, Germany,
VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org
27.10.-30.10.2019
FSEP CNS International Meeting on Fire Safety
and Emergency Preparedness for the Nuclear
Industry. Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Nuclear Society
(CNS), www.cns-snc.ca
Calendar

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Should Nuclear Energy Play a Role
in a Carbon-Constrained World?
Jacopo Buongiorno, Michael Corradini, John Parsons and David Petti
The Big Picture Access to electricity plays a vital role in improving standards of living, education, and health. This
relationship is illustrated by Figure 1, which locates various countries according to their score on the Human
Development Index, a well-known metric of economic and social development, and per capita electricity use. As
countries develop, electricity use tends to rise; according to current forecasts, electricity consumption in developing
non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries is expected to grow 60 % by 2040,
whereas worldwide use is expected to grow 45 % in the same timeframe (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2017).
| | Fig. 1.
Human Development Index versus per capita electricity consumption for
different countries (United Nations Development Programme, 2017)
Expanding access to energy while at the same time drastically
reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases that cause
global warming and climate change is among the central
challenges confronting humankind in the 21 st century. This
study focuses on the electric power sector, which has been
identified as an early target for deep decarbonization. In
the foreseeable future, electricity will continue to come
primarily from a mix of fossil fuels, hydro power, variable
renewables such as solar and wind, and nuclear energy
(U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2017). At present nuclear
energy supplies about 11 % of the world’s electricity and
constitutes a major fraction of all low-carbon electricity
generation in the United States, Europe, and globally
(Figure 2). Nuclear energy’s future role, however, is highly
uncertain for several reasons: chiefly, escalating costs and,
to a lesser extent, the per sistence of historical challenges
such as spent fuel disposal and concerns about nuclear
plant safety and nuclear weapons proliferation.
| | Fig. 2.
Share of carbon-free electricity sources in several major economies and
worldwide (International Energy Agency, 2017)
The Nuclear Energy Landscape
Since MIT published its first Future of Nuclear Power study
[Deutch, et al., 2003], the context for nuclear energy in the
United States and globally has changed dramatically.
Throughout most of the 2000s, the U.S. fleet of nuclear
power plants was highly profitable: their capital costs had
been largely amortized over previous decades and their
production costs were low compared to the relatively high
cost of fossil and renewable alternatives. As utilities sought
to maximize the value of their nuclear assets, they
embarked on a flurry of market-driven nuclear power plant
purchases, power uprates, and license extensions. The
situation changed quickly after 2007, as large quantities of
inexpensive shale natural gas became available in the
United States and the Great Recession depressed electricity
demand and prices. Since then, nuclear power plants in
the United States have become steadily less profitable and
the industry has witnessed a wave of plant closures. Two
recent examples include the Kewaunee plant in Wisconsin,
which shut down in 2013 [Dotson, 2014], and the Fort
Calhoun plant in Nebraska, which shut down in 2016
[ Larson, A., 2016]. Both plants shut down because they
could not compete with cheaper generation options.
Similarly, falling natural gas prices in Europe and Asia
have put more economic pressure on nuclear power in
those regions also.
While the U.S. nuclear industry remains exceptionally
proficient at operating the existing fleet of power plants, its
handling of complex nuclear construction projects has
been abysmal, as exemplified by the mismanagement of
component-replacement projects at the San Onofre
[Mufson, 2013] and Crystal River [Penn, 2013] plants,
which led to the premature closure of both plants in 2013.
Other projects, including the troubled Vogtle [Proctor, D.,
2017] and V. C. Summer [Downey, 2017] expansion
projects, have experienced soaring costs and lengthy
schedule delays. In the case of Vogtle and V.C. Summer,
costs doubled and construction time increased by more
than three years, causing the reactor supplier Westinghouse
[Cardwell & Soble, 2017] to declare bankruptcy
(Westinghouse only began emerging from Chapter 11 protection
in 2018) [Hals & DiNapoli, 2018]. The V. C. Summer
project was ultimately abandoned in 2017 [Plumer, 2017].
New nuclear plant construction projects by French
reactor suppliers Areva and EDF at Olkiluoto (Finland)
[Rosendahl & Forsell, 2017], Flamanville (France) [Reuters,
2018], and Hinkley Point C (United Kingdom) [BBC News,
2017], have suffered similarly severe cost escalation and
delays. Clearly, the goal of deploying new nuclear power
plants at an overnight capital cost of less than $2,000 per
electric kilowatt, as claimed by the North American and
573
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 574
European nuclear industries in the 2000s [Winters,
Corletti, & Thompson, 2001] (The Economics of Nuclear
Power, 2008), turned out to be completely unrealistic.
New nuclear plant construction (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2017) has con tinued at a steady rate in
countries like South Korea, China, and Russia; construction
has also recently started in the Middle East. Many
of these projects have been completed more or less on
time, and likely at significantly lower cost than comparable
projects in the West, although it is often challenging to
independently validate the cost figures published in these
countries.
In 2011, the combined effects of a massive earthquake
and tsunami triggered an accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan and led to an unfortunate
decision by Japanese authorities to force the evacuation
of nearly 200,000 people from the region surrounding
the site. This event renewed public concerns about the
safety of nuclear installations. Although the radiological
consequences of the accident have been minimal (United
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation, 2017), by 2012 the entire nuclear fleet in Japan
was tempo rarily shut down, and only a handful of nuclear
plants are currently back online in that country. In the
wake of Fukushima, five countries (Germany, Switzerland,
Belgium, Taiwan, and South Korea) (World Nuclear
Association, 2017) announced their intention to ultimately
phase out nuclear energy, though to date only Germany
has taken immediate action toward actually implementing
this policy.
Against this bleak backdrop, some opportunities have
nonetheless emerged for the nuclear energy industry.
Heightened awareness of the social, economic, and
environmental risks of climate change and air pollution
has provided a powerful argument for maintaining and
potentially increasing nuclear energy’s share of the global
energy mix [Hansen, Emanuel, Caldeira, & Wigley, 2015].
Private investors appear interested in developing and
deploying advanced reactor technologies [Brinton, 2015],
defined here as light- water-cooled small modular reactors
(SMRs) and non-water-cooled reactors (Generation-IV
systems), even as the readiness of these technologies
has significantly increased in the past 15 years [ANL-INL-
ORNL, 2016] (Generation-IV International Forum, 2014).
Finally, there seems to be bipartisan support in the
U.S. Congress for renewed American leadership in commercializing
new nuclear technology [115 th U.S. Congress,
2017-2018].
The New MIT Study
In light of the important changes that have occurred in the
past 15 years, coupled with the existential challenges that
now confront the nuclear industry, we concluded that
it was time to conduct a new interdisciplinary study
analyzing the future prospects of nuclear energy in the
U.S. and internationally. The objective of this paper is to
summarize the key findings of the study. The reader is
encouraged to examine the full study report [Buongiorno
& al., 2018] for a detailed discussion and justification of
the findings.
We have examined the challenge of drastically reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector,
which has been widely identified as an early candidate for
deep decarbonization. In most regions, serving projected
electricity demand in 2050 while simultaneously reducing
emissions will require a mix of electrical generation assets
| | Fig. 3.
(Left) average system cost of electricity (in $/MWh e ) and (right) nuclear installed capacity (% of peak demand) in the New England region of the United States and
the Tianjin-Beijing-Tangshan (T-B-T) region of China for different carbon constraints (gCO 2 /kWh e ) and three scenarios of various available technologies in 2050:
(a) no nuclear allowed, (b) nuclear is allowed at nominal overnight capital cost ($5,500 per kW e for New England and $2,800 per kW e for T-B-T), and (c) nuclear is
allowed with improved overnight capital cost ($4,100 per kWe for New England and $2,100 per kW e for T-B-T). Simulations were performed with an MIT system
optimization tool called GenX. For a given power market the required inputs include hourly electricity demand, hourly weather patterns, economic costs (capital,
operations, and fuel) for all power plants (nuclear, wind and solar with battery storage, fossil with and without carbon capture and storage), and their ramp-up
rates. The GenX simulations were used to identify the electrical system generation mix that minimizes average system electricity costs in each of these markets.
The cost escalation seen in the no-nuclear scenarios with aggressive carbon constraints is mostly due to the additional build-out and cost of energy storage, which
becomes necessary in scenarios that rely exclusively on variable renewable energy technologies. The current world-average carbon intensity of the power sector is
about 500 grams of CO 2 equivalent per kilowatt hour (g/kWh e ); according to climate change stabilization scenarios developed by the International Energy Agency
in 2017, the power-sector carbon intensity targets to limit global average warming to 2°C range from 10 to 25 g/kWh e by 2050 and less than 2 g/kWh e by 2060.
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atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
that is different from the current system. While a variety of
low- or zero-carbon technologies can be employed in
various combinations, our analysis shows the potential
contribution nuclear can make as a dispatchable lowcarbon
technology. Without that contribution, the cost of
achieving deep decarbonization targets increases significantly
(see Figure 3, left column). The least-cost portfolios
include an important share for nuclear, the magnitude of
which significantly grows as the cost of nuclear drops
( Figure 3, right column).
In all the scenarios we analyzed, a certain flexibility
in operations is required from the dispatchable power
generators, because of the presence of variable renew ables
on the grid. Nuclear plants were traditionally designed for
baseload operation, but, as has been recently demonstrated
in Europe and the United States [Jenkins & al., 2018],
nuclear plants can adapt to provide load-following generation
and many advanced reactor concepts are being
designed for that capability as well.
A key consideration is whether the deployment of
low-carbon energy technologies like renewables or nuclear
can be accomplished in the timeframe needed to substantially
displace fossil fuels by 2050. Rapid deployment by
that date is critical to achieve current international climate
mitigation goals. In many countries, solar and wind have
achieved notable levels of penetration in electricity generation
markets over the last decade, and this trend is expected
to continue. However, our analysis indicates that, historically,
large-scale increases in low-carbon generation
have occurred most rapidly in connection with additions of
nuclear power (Figure 4).
Nuclear energy does provide other benefits in addition
to its low-carbon attribute. For example, it reduces air
pollution associated with electricity production; it contributes
to fuel diversification and grid stability, has low
land requirements, and creates well-paid jobs. These
benefits are important in certain contexts; for example,
nuclear energy may be attractive in regions that do not
have enough land or suitable weather patterns for largescale
deployment of renewables, or in countries that are
seeking to reduce coal use to improve air quality, or that
are concerned about the security and reliability of their
energy supply. However, we believe that the primary,
generally applicable attribute of nuclear energy that may
justify its future growth on a global scale is its low-carbon
nature. As such, special consideration should be given to
preserving the existing nuclear power plant fleet in the
U.S. and internationally, as it constitutes a bridge to the
future in terms of emission avoidance (as recognized in
recent legislation adopted by the U.S. states of New York
[Larson, A., 2016], Illinois [Anderson, 2016], and New
Jersey [Sethuraman, 2018]), and expertise essential for
the operation of the future nuclear systems.
Despite the promise highlighted by our analyses, the
prospects for the expansion of nuclear energy remain
decidedly dim in many parts of the world. The fundamental
problem is cost. Other generation technologies
have become cheaper in recent decades, while new nuclear
plants have only become costlier. This disturbing trend
undermines nuclear energy’s potential contribution and
increases the cost of achieving deep decarbonization. In
the MIT study, we have examined what is needed to arrest
and reverse that trend.
We have surveyed recent light water reactor (LWR)
construction projects around the world and examined
recent advances in crosscutting technologies that can be
applied to nuclear plant construction for a wide range of
| | Fig. 4.
Electricity growth (kWh per year per capita) based on actual data for added power capacity in various
countries. Assumes 90 % capacity factor for dispatchable energy sources (nuclear, natural gas, coal) and
the following capacity factors for wind/solar: Germany 19 %/9 %; Spain 25 %/33 %; Denmark 26 %/7 %
(based on historical record for best 10-year period).
advanced nuclear plant concepts and designs under
development. To address cost concerns, we recommend:
(1) An increased focus on using proven project/construction
management practices to increase the
probability of success in the execution and delivery
of new nuclear power plants.
The recent experience of nuclear construction projects
in the United States and Europe has demonstrated
repeated failures of construction management practices
in terms of their ability to deliver products on time and
within budget. Several corrective actions are urgently
needed: (a) completing greater portions of the detailed
design prior to construction; (b) using a proven supply
chain and skilled workforce; (c) incorporating manufacturers
and builders into design teams in the early
stages of the design process to assure that plant systems,
structures, and components are designed for efficient
construction and manufacturing to relevant standards;
(d) appointing a single primary contract manager with
proven expertise in managing multiple independent
subcontractors; (e) establishing a contracting structure
that ensures all contractors have a vested interest in the
success of the project; and (f) enabling a flexible
regulatory environment that can accommodate small,
unanticipated changes in design and construction in a
timely fashion.
(2) A shift away from primarily field construction of
cumbersome, highly site-dependent plants to more
serial manufacturing of standardized plants.
Opportunities exist to significantly reduce the capital
cost and shorten the construction schedule for new
nuclear power plants. First, the deployment of multiple,
standardized units, especially at a single site, affords
considerable learning from the construction of each
unit. In the United States and Europe, where productivity
at construction sites has been low, we also recommend
expanded use of factory production to take
advantage of the manufacturing sector’s higher productivity
when it comes to turning out complex systems,
structures, and components. The use of an array of
cross-cutting technologies, including modular construction
in factories and shipyards, advanced concrete
solutions (e.g., steel-plate composites, high-strength
reinforcement steel, ultra-high performance concrete),
seismic isolation technology, and advanced plant layouts
(e.g., embedment, offshore siting), could have
positive impacts on the cost and schedule of new
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 576
nuclear power plant construction. For less complex
systems, structures, and components, or at sites where
construction productivity is high (as in Asia), conventional
approaches may be the lowest-cost option.
We emphasize the broad applicability of these recommendations
across all reactor concepts and designs. Costcutting
opportunities are pertinent to evolutionary
Generation-III LWRs, SMRs, and Generation-IV reactors.
Without design standardization and innovations in
construction approaches, we do not believe the inherent
technological features of any of the advanced reactors
will produce the level of cost reductions needed to make
nuclear electricity competitive with other generation
options.
In addition to its high cost, the growth of nuclear energy
has been hindered by public concerns about the
consequences of severe accidents (such as occurred at
Fukushima, Japan in 2011) in traditional Generation-II
nuclear power plant designs. These concerns have led
some countries to renounce nuclear power entirely. To
address safety concerns, we recommend:
(3) A shift toward reactor designs that incorporate
inherent and passive safety features.
Core materials that have high chemical and physical
stability, high heat capacity, negative reactivity feedbacks,
and high retention of fission products, together
with engineered safety systems that require limited or
no emergency AC power and minimal external intervention,
will likely make operations simpler and more
tolerable to human errors. Such design evolution has
already occurred in some Generation-III LWRs and is
exhibited in new plants built in China, Russia, and the
United States. Passive safety designs can reduce the
probability that a severe accident occurs, while also
mitigating the offsite consequences in the event an
accident does occur. Such designs can also ease the
licensing of new plants and accelerate their deployment
in developed and developing countries. We judge
that advanced reactors like LWR-based SMRs (e.g.,
NuScale) and mature Generation-IV reactor concepts
(e.g., high-temperature gas reactors and sodium-cooled
fast reactors) also possess such features and are now
ready for commercial deployment. Further, our assessment
of the U.S. and international regulatory environments
suggests that the current regulatory system is
flexible enough to accommodate licensing of these
advanced reactor designs. Certain modifications to the
current regulatory framework could improve the
efficiency and efficacy of licensing reviews.
Lastly, key actions by policy makers are also needed to
capture the benefits of nuclear energy:
(4) Decarbonization policies should create a level
playing field that allows all low-carbon generation
technologies to compete on their merits.
Investors in nuclear innovation must see the possibility
of earning a profit based on selling their products at full
value, which should include factors such as the value of
reducing CO 2 emissions that are external to the market.
Policies that foreclose a role for nuclear energy discourage
investment in nuclear technology, may raise
the cost of decarbonization and slow progress toward
climate change mitigation goals. Germany’s own
experience with its Energiewende illustrates the
difficulty. Despite a massive investment in renewables,
greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector
have declined less than 20 % between 2007 and
2017 (German Environment Agency, 2017). Increased
generation from renewables has to a significant degree
been used to replace nuclear instead of reducing
emissions. Consequently, the government has
acknowledged that current measures are unlikely to
achieve the overall 40 % emissions reduction target by
2020 ( German Environment Agency, 2018). A more
effective approach in Germany and elsewhere would
seek to incorporate CO 2 emissions costs into the price of
electricity and thus allow for more equitable recognition
of the value of all climate-friendly energy technologies,
such as nuclear, hydro, wind, solar, and even fossil fuels
with carbon capture.
Historically, time-to-market and development costs for
new nuclear reactors have been too high, making them
fundamentally unattractive to private investors, and
leading some to advocate for direct government involvement
in the development of these technologies (Secretary
of Energy Advisory Board, 2016). Prototype Generation-IV
systems are currently being explored by the governments
of several countries, including China, which has deployed
high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) [Zhang &
al., 2016], Russia [Digges, 2016], and India [Patel, 2017],
both of which have deployed sodium-cooled fast reactors
(SFRs). For the U.S. and other market-oriented countries
we recommend an important, albeit more limited, role for
governments in the development and deployment of new
nuclear technologies, as follows:
(5) Governments should establish reactor sites where
companies can deploy prototype reactors for testing
and operation oriented to regulatory licensing.
Such sites should be open to diverse reactor concepts
chosen by the companies that are interested in testing
prototypes. The government should provide appropriate
supervision and support – including safety
protocols, infrastructure, environmental approvals,
and fuel-cycle services – and should also be directly
involved with all testing.
(6) Governments should establish funding programs
around prototype testing and commercial deployment
of advanced reactor designs using four
levers: (a) funding to share regulatory licensing
costs, (b) funding to share research and development
costs, (c) funding for the achievement of
specific technical milestones, and (d) funding for
initial new design prototypes or first-of-a-kind
reactors.
The MIT study did not address the disposal of radioactive
waste (or, more properly, spent nuclear fuel) or proliferation
risks. While these issues are universally considered
barriers to the expansion of nuclear energy use,
the political dimensions of finding solutions to waste
disposal and managing proliferation risks far outweigh the
technical challenges. We have reviewed recent studies of
the nuclear fuel cycle that focused on the management and
disposal of spent fuel (Blue Ribbon Commission on
America’s Nuclear Future, 2011) [Kazimi, et al., 2011]
[Wigeland & al., 2014] and have found their recommendations
to be valid. Briefly, there exist robust technical
solutions for spent fuel management, such as interim
storage in dry casks and permanent disposal in geological
repositories with excavated tunnels or deep boreholes –
the greater difficulty, historically, has been siting such
facilities. But the evidence suggests that these solutions
can be implemented through a well-managed, consensusbased
decision-making process, as has been demonstrated
in Finland (Fountain, 2017) and Sweden [Plumer, 2012].
Domestically, the U.S. government should follow th ese
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atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
examples and swiftly move on the recommendations for
spent fuel management that have been put before it.
The question of nuclear materials proliferation is more
complex. Adopting certain fuel cycle facilities such as
international fuel banks and centralized spent fuel repositories
can make the civilian nuclear fuel cycle unattractive
as a path to gaining nuclear weapons materials or
capability. At the same time, there is a desire on the part of
established nuclear countries to supply nuclear technologies
to newcomer countries, both because it constitutes
a business opportunity and as a means to gain considerable,
decades-long geopolitical influence in key
regions of the world. Currently Russia and, to a lesser
extent, China are aggressively pursuing opportunities to
supply nuclear energy technology to other countries. Some
have argued that if the United States and Western Europe
wish to pursue such opportunities and advance other
geo-political objectives while simultaneously sustaining
the non-proliferation and safety norms they has advocated
around the world, they have a compelling interest in maintaining
a robust domestic nuclear industry [Moniz, 2017]
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018)
[Aumeier & Allen, 2008].
Conclusions
Based on the findings that emerged from this study, we
contend that, as of today and for decades to come, the
main value of nuclear energy lies in its potential contribution
to decarbonizing the power sector. Further, we
conclude that cost is the main barrier to fully realizing this
value. Without cost reductions, nuclear energy will not
play a significant role. We find that that there are ways to
reduce nuclear energy’s cost, which the industry must
pursue aggressively and expeditiously. Lastly, we recognize
that government help, in the form of well-designed energy
and environmental policies and appropriate assistance in
the early stages of new nuclear system deployment, is
needed to realize the full potential of nuclear.
Acknowledgements
The study was conducted by a multidisciplinary team of
over twenty faculty, students and consultants, led by the
four authors of this paper. The study report can be
downloaded at the MIT Energy initiative website (https://
energy.mit.edu/research/future-nuclear-energy-carbonconstrained-world/).
We gratefully acknowledge the support
of our major sponsor The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
and important contributions from Shell, Électricité de
France (EDF), The David and Lucile Packard Foundation,
General Atomics, the Anthropocene Institute, MIT’s
International Policy Laboratory, Mr. Zach Pate, Mr. Neil
Rasmussen, and Dr. James Del Favero. We also thank the
Idaho National Laboratory, Dominion Engineering Inc.,
Blumont Engineering Solutions, Professor Giorgio Locatelli
from the University of Leeds, the Breakthrough Institute,
and Lucid Strategy for their generous in-kind contributions.
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Authors
Jacopo Buongiorno
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Michael Corradini
University of Wisconsin at Madison
John Parsons
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
David Petti
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Talks of an End to Germany’s
Nuclear Industry Premature
Roman Martinek
There now remains hardly anyone in Germany who has not yet dropped in the last few years a single line about how
the country is valiantly closing one by one its nuclear power plants. It was difficult to expect anything else, though, if
one keeps in mind that the accelerated phase-out of nuclear energy announced by the German political establishment
in 2011 became perhaps the most resonant energy policy decision in the country's recent history. At the same time, it is
often overlooked that the “Atomausstieg” (the name given to Germany’s denuclearization) is a like a hat that has a false
bottom to it: the issue of disconnection from the grid lying on the surface of public discourse, while behind it (or ‘under’
it, if you will) lies a number of deeper and more far-reaching questions.
Meanwhile, the consistency and maturity
of the decision itself to accelerate
the nuclear phase-out still raises
questions, especially if one takes into
account the situation in the German
nuclear industry that preceded the
events of March 2011 in Japan.
Professor Hans-Josef Allelein, director
for reactor safety at the Institute of
Energy and Climate Research in Julich,
recalls: “In Germany, before the accident
at Fukushima NPP, an agreement
was reached at the political level
to extend the operation of German
nuclear power plants for a period
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of 8 to 14 years. The decision that was
taken after Fukushima clearly comes
into conflict with this agreement. It
should be acknowledged that in 2011,
Chancellor Angela Merkel skillfully
played on the moods of the German
population and the German media,
taking advantage of this to forge a
coalition with the Social Democrats.
From my point of view, the decision
was practically unsupported by any
facts – that was simply power politics
on Merkel’s part”. According to the
expert, the government should not
have made any sudden movements,
succumbing to antinuclear sentiment
that swept across Western Europe
back then: “The national economy
and the population would have it
easier now if nuclear energy were
used further as planned and the
revenues in this case could be used to
address the implementation of the
“Energiewende”.
It is remarkable that the German
nuclear phase-out is taking place amid
the growing recognition by the international
community of the significance
of nuclear power in combating
climate change. As recently as in early
October, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) presented
its updated assessment, calling for
rapid, comprehensive and unprecedented
changes in all spheres of the
global community to limit global
warning to 1.5°C. In the 89 mitigation
scenarios considered by the IPCC,
cumulative nuclear generation increases,
on average by around 2.5
times by 2050. The London-based
World Nuclear Association points out
in this regard that the report also says
that “comparative risk assessment
shows health risks are low per unit of
electricity production”, if compared to
other low-carbon sources of energy.
Be it as it may, the fact is that
Germany still has seven NPPs in operation.
All of them shall be shut down
until the end of 2022 – like in the
‘Farewell’ Symphony by Joseph Haydn,
the seven remaining reactors will in
turn be leaving Germany’s podium of
electricity generation. And yet the
story of the nuclear industry in
Germany does not end upon closing of
the last industrial reactor. And the
point here is not only that the country’s
numerous research reactors will continue
their work regardless of the
course of the energy transition. It is
also important that to create not only
a greenfield, but even a brownfield on
an NPP site, simply disconnecting a
power plant from the grid is not
enough. It must be safely dismantled
and the nuclear waste generated over
the years of operation – removed or
safely disposed of. A task that will take
decades to accomplish.
Considering the ever growing
scope of work, it is extremely important
for Germany to maintain an
acceptable level of competence in the
nuclear industry – there should be
sufficient number of profile specialists
and educational institutions providing
for training of those. As paradoxical
and even tragic as it may sound,
decommissioning and dismantling of
NPPs is and will be carried out, among
others, by those who once built them.
In a word, the back-end of the nuclear
fuel cycle is not much of a lifeasserting
field in German realities.
Rainer Klute, head of the non-profit
association Nuklearia, which is engaged
in raising the public acceptance
of nuclear technologies, laments that
there are too few graduates specializing
in nuclear power engineering in
the country today. This does not surprise
him even taking into account the
demand for skills and competencies
that makes it possible to assess job
prospects in this sphere as fairly good.
“Who, being a young man, would
want to get a profession in which one
cannot create anything new that one
could take pride in and instead has to
be engaged in shutting down and dismantling
well-functioning facilities?
Does this seem like an attractive life
goal?” Klute asks rhetorically.
It cannot be ruled out that this is
one of the reasons why it is not only
domestic companies that participate in
NPP decommissioning projects in the
country – foreign energy companies
appear quite willing to provide their
services. One such example is Nukem
Technologies, which specializes in
radioactive waste (RW) and spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) management – in
2009, the engineering company with
its head office located in Alzenau was
acquired by a subsidiary of the Russian
state corporation Rosatom. In its technological
segment, Nukem Technologies
takes leading positions in the European
market: the company's project portfolio
includes, inter alia, the SNF
storage facility at Ignalina NPP in
Lithuania, a similar facility for the
decommissioned units 1 to 4 at
Kozloduy NPP in Bulgaria; in Germany,
Nukem is engaged in the decommissioning
of Philippsburg NPP.
In a consortium with the German
company Entsorgungswerk für Nuklearanlagen
(EWN), Nukem Technologies
participates in the works that are
currently underway at Biblis NPP – in
June 2017, the company was awarded
a corresponding bid. The plant was
shut down in 2011 among other facilities
that fell under the government’s
decision to immediately close eight
reactors in the wake of the Fukushima
accident. In 2017, decommissioning of
both units at Biblis NPP was completed,
followed by the start of dismantling
works. According to the
plant’s director Horst Kemmeter, this
process should take no less than 15
years. As of today, all nuclear fuel has
already been extracted from both
reactors – the last containers left the
NPP site this September, Kemmeter
said at a regular dialogue forum held
as part of the ‘Biblis transparent’
initiative. As for the role of the Nukem
and EWN consortium, the companies
will be responsible for dismantling
and disassembling four steam generators
per unit, the works launched in
October.
Active engagement of foreign
energy companies in back-end projects
in Germany is backed up by a
thesis that phasing out German
nuclear facilities can be accomplished
in the most safe and smooth manner if
one combines German and international
know-how, especially when it
comes to companies that are actively
developing the nuclear industry in
their own countries. Professor Thomas
Walter Tromm, head and spokesperson
of the Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Programme (NUSAFE) at the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology Energy Center,
notes: “I would point out that if we
consider foreign participation, we are
still dealing with companies that have
branches or offices in Germany”. As
regards the specific project at Biblis
NPP, in which Nukem participates
together with EWN, it should be
stressed that EWN is a 100% state
enterprise, that is, domestic knowhow
is in place here as well, the expert
says.
Given the array of work to be performed
as part of decommissioning
Germany’s NPPs, specialists will be
sure to have things to do for several
decades to come. The demand for
expertise in this area is therefore high,
creating, in turn, the need for measures
to maintain the necessary level of
expertise in the country in the midand
long term. “At the same time, it is
important to maintain competencies
not only among scientists, but also
among engineers who deal with
decommissioning in practice – this is
to be ensured, in particular, through
the dual education system (a form of
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 580
education where students acquire theoretical
knowledge at the university and
practical knowledge in the workplace –
author's note)”, believes Prof. Tromm.
“Further training of such specialists
can be carried out at the remaining
operating NPPs as well as within
decommissioning projects”.
Another critical topic for Germany
remains preserving the country’s
expert weight in the international
professional community after the last
Development on NIS Directive in Different
EU Countries in the Energy Sector
Stefan Loubichi
nuclear power reactor is shut down.
“This is an issue that the government
is also concerned with, as reflected in
the new edition of the government’s
energy research program”, says Prof.
Tromm. In resolving this issue, he
believes, one can count on the support
from the Helmholtz Association, as
well as universities that still continue
research in the field of reactor safety.
The German nuclear industry dates
back to the 1950s and 1960s, when
the first research reactors were commissioned.
For a country with a more
than half a century history of using
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
being able to remain an equal partner
in the international discussion shall
be not least a question of prestige.
The NIS Directive DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security of
network and information across the Union, better known as the NIS Directive, is the European way to ensure a high
level of security of network and information systems within the Union.
Author
Roman Martinek
Expert for Communication
Czech Republic
Member States have very different
levels of preparedness, which has led
to fragmented approaches across the
Union. This results in an unequal level
of protection of consumers and businesses,
and undermines the overall
level of security of network and information
systems within the Union.
Lack of common requirements on
operators of essential services and
digital service providers in turn makes
it impossible to set up a global and
effective mechanism for cooperation
at Union level.
By 9 November 2018, for each
sector and subsector referred to in
Annex II, Member States shall (according
to article 5 of the NIS Directve)
identify the operators of essential
services with an establishment on
their territory.
The criteria for the identification of
the operators of essential services
shall be as follows:
• An entity provides a service which
is essential for the maintenance of
critical societal and/or economic
activities;
• The provision of that service depends
on network and information
systems; and
• An incident would have significant
disruptive effects on the provision
of that service.
When determining the significance of
a disruptive effect as referred to in
point (c) of Article 5(2), Member
States shall (according to article 6
of the NIS Directive) take into
account at least the following crosssectoral
factors:
• The number of users relying on
the service provided by the entity
concerned;
• The dependency of other sectors
referred to in Annex II on the
service provided by that entity;
• The impact that incidents could
have, in terms of degree and duration,
on economic and societal
activities or public safety;
• The market share of that entity;
• The geographic spread with regard
to the area that could be affected
by an incident;
• The importance of the entity for
maintaining a sufficient level of the
service, taking into account the
availability of alternative means
for the provision of that service.
According to Article 8 of the NIS
Directive each Member State shall
designate one or more national competent
authorities on the security of
network and information systems
(‘competent authority’), covering at
least the sectors referred to in Annex II
and the services referred to in Annex
III. Member States may assign this role
to an existing authority or authorities.
The competent authorities shall
monitor the application of this Directive
at national level.
Each Member State shall designate
a national single point of contact
on the security of network and information
systems (‘single point of
contact’).
According to article 9 of the NIS
Directive each Member State shall
designate one or more CSIRTs (Computer
security incident response
teams) which shall comply with the
requirements set out in point (1) of
Annex I, covering at least the sectors
referred to in Annex II and the services
referred to in Annex III, responsible
for risk and incident handling in
accordance with a well-defined process.
A CSIRT may be established
within a competent authority.
The essential articles for operator
of essential services are aticle 14
and 15.
Member States shall (according to
article 14) ensure that operators of
essential services take appropriate
and proportionate technical and
organisational measures to manage
the risks posed to the security of
network and information systems
which they use in their operations.
Having regard to the state of the art,
those measures shall ensure a level of
security of network and information
systems appropriate to the risk posed.
As well Member States shall ensure
that operators of essential services
take appropriate measures to prevent
and minimise the impact of incidents
affecting the security of the network
and information systems used for the
provision of such essential services,
with a view to ensuring the continuity
of those services.
Member States shall ensure that
operators of essential services notify,
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without undue delay, the competent
authority or the CSIRT of incidents
having a significant impact on the
continuity of the essential services
they provide. Notifications shall
include information enabling the
competent authority or the CSIRT to
determine any cross-border impact of
the incident. Notification shall not
make the notifying party subject to
increased liability.
In order to determine the significance
of the impact of an incident, the
following parameters in particular
shall be taken into account:
• The number of users affected by
the disruption of the essential
service;
• The duration of the incident;
• The geographical spread with
regard to the area affected by the
incident.
According to article 15 of the NIS
Directive, Member States shall ensure
that the competent authorities have
the necessary powers and means to
assess the compliance of operators of
essential services with their obligations
under Article 14 and the effects
thereof on the security of network and
information systems.
Member States shall ensure
that the competent authorities have
the powers and means to require
operators of essential services to
provide:
• The information necessary to
assess the security of their network
and information systems,
including documented security
policies;
• Evidence of the effective implementation
of security policies,
such as the results of a security
audit carried out by the competent
authority or a qualified auditor
and, in the latter case, to make
the results thereof, including the
underlying evidence, available to
the competent authority.
In order to promote convergent
implementation of Article 14 (1)
and (2), Member States shall,
without imposing or discriminating
in favour of the use of a particular
type of technology, encourage the
use of European or internationally
accepted standards and specifications
relevant to the security
of network and information
systems.
By 9 May 2018, Member States
shall adopt and publish the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with this
Directive. They shall immediately
inform the Commission thereof. They
shall apply those measures from
10 May 2018.
According to Annex II there are the
following types of entities fort he
purposes of article 4:
1. Energy:
a. Electricity:
Electricity undertakings, distribution
system operators and transmission
system operators, all as
defined in article 2 2009/72/EC
b. Oil:
Operators of oil transmission pipelines,
Operators of oil production,
refining and treatment facilities,
storage and transmission
c. Gas:
Supply undertakings, Distribution
system operators, Transmission
system operators, Storage system
operators, LNG system operators,
LNG system operators, Operators
of natural gas refining and
treatment facilities, as defined in
Article 2 of Directive 2009/73/EC
2. Transport:
a. Air transport:
Air carriers, Airport managing
bodies, traffic management control
operators providing air traffic
control
b. Rail transport:
Infrastructure managers, railway
c. Water transport:
Inland, sea and coastal passenger
and freight water transport companies,
Managing bodies of ports,
Operators of vessel traffic services
d. Road transport:
Road authorities, Operators of
Intelligent Transport Systems
3. Banking:
Credit institutions
4. Financial market infrastructures:
Operators of trading venues, Central
counterparties (CCPs)
5. Health sector:
Health care settings (including
hospitals and private clinics),
Healthcare providers
6. Drinking water supply and distribution:
Suppliers and distributors of water
intended for human consumption
7. Digital Infrastructures:
IXPs, DNS service providers, TLD
name registries
NIS ImpIementation in France
The NIS Directive is partially transposed.
Implementation acts are:
Act Nr. 2018-133 of 26 th February
2018
Decree Nr. 2018-384 of 23 rd of May
2018.
The national strategy on the security
of network an information security
is available on: https://www.ssi.gouv.
fr/uploads/2015/10/strategie_
nationale_securite_numerique_fr.pdf
Single point of contact is:
Agence nationale de la sécurité des
systèmes d'information (ANSSI)
Boulevard de la Tour-Maubourg 51,
75700 Paris 07 SP
E-Mail: nis@ssi.gouv.fr
National Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT) is:
CSIRT France
E-Mail: cert-fr.cossi@ssi.gouv.fr
Phone: +33 1 71758468
According tot he decree of 23 rd of May
2018 the following sectors are identified
as essential services:
• Civil activities of the State,
• Judicial activities,
• Military activities of the State,
• Food,
• Electronic, audiovisual and information
communications,
• Energy,
• Space and research,
• Finance,
• Water management,
• Industry,
• Health,
• Transport.
Article 2 of the decree of 23 rd of May
2018 provides that the operators
shall be designated according to the
following criteria:
• The number of users depending on
the service;
• The dependence of the other sectors
of activity listed in the schedule to
this decree on the service;
• The consequences that an incident
could have, in terms of gravity, and
duration, on the functioning of the
economy or society or on public
safety;
• The operator's market share;
• The geographical scope with
regard to the area likely to be
affected by an incident;
• The importance of the operator to
ensure an adequate level of service,
taking into account the availability
of alternative means for the provision
of the service;
• Where applicable, sectoral factors.
The operators shall appoint a representative
that will be the point of
contact with the ANSSI.
Reporting obligations:
Operators of essential services must
report “without undue delay” to
the ANSSI any incident significantly
impacting the security of the network
and information systems.
The operators shall disclose within
three months from the date of their
appointment the list of the networks
and information systems listed in the
Act. The operators shall then send
once a year to the ANSSI an update of
that list. The operators also need to
keep this information at the disposal
of the ANSSI in case of inspection.
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 582
Sanctions:
There are three criminal for the operators
of essential services:
• Directors that do not comply with
the security rules, even after the
timeline specified in a formal
demand issued by the ANSSI shall
be punishable with a fine of
€100,000;
• Directors that do not comply with
their reporting obligation in case of
an incident shall be punishable
with a fine of €75,000;
• Directors that obstruct an investigation
shall be punishable with a
fine of €125,000.
NIS Implementation
in Sweden
The NIS Directive is transposed.
Implementation acts are:
Act (2018:000) “Information security
for certain operators of essential
services and digital service providers”
Ordinance (2018:000) “Information
security for certain operators of
essential services and digital service
providers”
The national strategy on the security
of network an information security
is available on:
https://www.government.se/
legal-documents/2017/11/
skr.-201617213/
Single point of contact is:
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
(MSB)
651 81 Karlstad
E-Mail: spoc.nis@msb.se
National Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT) is:
MSB/CERT-SE
E-Mail: cert@cert.se
Phone: +46 867 857 99
According tot he Swedish NIS
Directive law the following sectors
are identified as essential services:
• Energy,
• Transportation,
• Banking,
• Financial market infrastructure,
• Health care,
• Water management and digital
infrastructure.
Operators of essential services must
immediately report significant disruptions
to MSBT. The reporting
obligation must not have a negative
effect on correcting the disruption.
Specifications on what defines a
significant disruption are announced
in an ordinance/government agency
regulation.
MSB established detailed assessment
material to assist operators of
essential services in deciding whether
the directive is applicable to their
service. MSB presented a catalogue
of the identified criteria through a
regulation. Operators of essential
services are without delay obliged to
report to the supervisory authority.
Relevant regulatory authorities are:
• Energy sector: Swedish Energy
Agency
• Transportation sector: Swedish
Transport Agency
• Banking: Swedish Financial Supervisory
Authority
• Finance: Swedish Financial Supervisory
Authority
• Health care: Swedish Health and
Social Care Inspectorate
• Distribution of Drinking water:
The National Food Agency
• Digital infrastructure: Swedish
Post and Telecom Authority
• Digital services: Swedish Post and
Telecom Authority
Reporting obligations:
Operators of essential services must
immediately report significant disruptions
to the Swedish Civil Contingencies
Agency.
Sanctions:
If the relevant authority finds that
the supplier does not comply with the
act or ordinance they can instruct the
supplier to take actions.
The request can be combined
with a penalty fine. The MSB shall
decide on administrative fines from
5,000 SEK up to 10,000,000 SEK
for not complying with the
security requirements or incident
notification.
NIS Implementation
in the United Kingdom
The NIS Directive is transposed.
The implementation of the EU
Security of Networks and Information
Systems (NIS) Directive in May 2018
requires Competent Authorities (CAs)
to have the ability to assess the cyber
security of Operators of Essential
Services (OES).
In support of the UK NIS Directive
implementation, the NCSC is committed
to working with lead government
departments, regulators and
industry to develop a systematic
method of assessing the extent to which
an organisation is adequately managing
cyber security risks in relation
to the delivery of essential services.
This assessment method, otherwise
known as the Cyber Assessment
Framework (CAF), is intended to meet
both NIS Directive requirements and
wider CNI needs.
The implementation of the EU
Security of Networks and Information
Systems (NIS) Directive in May 2018
requires Competent Authorities (CAs)
to have the ability to assess the cyber
security of Operators of Essential
Services (OES).
In support of the UK NIS Directive
implementation, the NCSC is committed
to working with lead government
departments, regulators and
industry to develop a systematic
method of assessing the extent to
which an organisation is adequately
managing cyber security risks in
relation to the delivery of essential
services.
You find indicators of good practice
for four different objectives:
Objective A
A.1. Governance
A.2. Risk Management
A.3. Asset Management
Source: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/
guidance/caf-objective-a
Objective B
B.1. Service Protection Policies and
Processes
B.2. Identity and Access Control
B.3. Data Security
B.4. System Security
B.5. Resilient Networks and Systems
B.6. Staff Awareness and Training
Source: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/
guidance/caf-objective-b
Objective C
C.1. Security Monitoring
C.2. Proactive Securit Event Discovery
Source: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/
guidance/caf-objective-c
Objective D
D.1. Resource and Recovery Planning
D.2. Lessons Learned
Source: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/
guidance/caf-objective-d
The national strategy on the
security of network an information
security is available on:
https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/national-cyber-securitystrategy-2016-to-2021
Single Point of contact is:
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
E-Mail: UKSPOC@ncsc.gov.uk
Phone: +44 300 020 0973
National Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT) is as well the
National Cyber Security Centre
(NCSC)
In the UK unfortunately we find a
lot of different national competent
authorities for OES (=Operators of
Essential Services):
ENERGY – Electricity / Gas
England, Scotland and Wales:
Department for Business, Energy &
Industrial Strategy, / the Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets
E-Mail: nis.energy@beis.gov.uk
Phone: +44 20 7901 7000
Northern Ireland:
Department of Finance Northern
Ireland
E-Mail: nis.ca@finance-ni.gov.uk
ENERGY – Oil
England, Scotland and Wales:
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Development on NIS Directive in Different EU Countries in the Energy Sector ı Stefan Loubichi

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Department for Business, Energy &
Industrial Strategy, / Health & Safety
Executive
E-Mail: nis.cyber.incident@hse.gov.uk
Department of Finance Northern
Ireland
E-Mail: nis.ca@finance-ni.gov.uk
By 6 November 2018 the Department
for Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy gave the following implementation
update;
For the energy sector in England,
Wales and Scotland, BEIS shares Competent
Authority responsibilities with
Ofgem and HSE. In downstream gas and
electricity sector Ofgem delivers the
compliance functions under a Memorandum
of Understanding with BEIS. In
the oil and upstream gas sector the
compliance functions will be carried
out by HSE under an Agency Agreement
with BEIS. Both HSE and Ofgem have
been engaging closely with NCSC, the
BEIS NIS regulatory policy function,
and with industry in order to develop
further sector specific guidance.
This guidance will tailor the CAF to
the needs of energy sub sectors and will
provide further information about the
steps that Operators of Essential Services
(OES) should take in order to identify
their levels of cyber security, commence
the improvement journey to address
and manage cyber security risks, and be
compliant with the NIS regulations.
According to the view of the
Department for Business, Energy &
Industrial Strategy operators will need
time to adjust to the new framework.
They expect operators to undertake a
robust but realistic CAF self- assessment
supported by evidence. In the
first year, they do not expect to take
enforcement action on the basis of the
operator’s CAF self-assessment and
recognise development and improvement
will likely be needed, having
taken a risk-based approach.
Key dates fort he future would be
as follows:
• 31 October 2018: CAF version 2
was published on NCSC website
• End November 2018: publication
of HSE operational guidance for
the oil sector
• End November 2018: publication
of Ofgem Cyber Security Practices
guidance for the electricity and gas
sector, to be available on Ofgem
website.
• November 2018: DCMS returns notification
of number of OES in
scope of the regulations to the European
Commission and BEIS provides
a list of OES to GCHQ.
• Late November / mid-December
2018: sub-sector events to be held
with OES. HSE will launch its
operational guidance and provide
surgeries to launch the sub-sector
CAF self-assessments on 21 November.
Ofgem will focus on sub-sector
workshops between 10-11 December.
Invitations will be issued to
OES.
• From Q2 2019 or potentially earlier
depending on the CA: Competent
Authorities will review the selfassessment
evidence and improvement
plans; and establish a rolling
programme of inspections or thirdparty
assessments/validations of
OES own self-assessments. Please
refer to detailed guidance from
Ofgem or HSE for further details
on how and when you should
return your self-assessment.
Sanctions:
Financial penalties will only be levelled
as a last resort where it is assessed
appropriate risk mitigation measures
were not in place without good reason.
In addition, the maximum penalties
should be reserved for the most severe
cases, and it is expected that mitigating
factors (including steps taken to comply
with the NIS Directive, actions
taken to remedy any consequences)
and sector specific factors will be
taken into account by the competent
authority when deciding appropriate
regulatory response.
In the event of any enforcement
action by the competent authority, it
will notify the operator of impending
action, allow the operator an opportunity
to make representations, and
confirm the final decision and
reasoning of the competent authority.
NIS Implementation
in the Netherlands
The status of transposition is:
In progress
Implementation act is the Security
Network- and Information Systems
Act, 29 May 2018
The national strategy on the
security of network an information
security is available on: https://www.
nctv.nl/ncsa/index.aspx
Single point of contact is:
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
E-Mail: info@ncsc.nl
According to https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/implemen tation-nis-directive-
netherlands a National
Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT) has to be determined.
Although the Government
declared that the Minister of Economic
Affairs and Climate Policy is responsible
for the energy infrastructure.
OSE are obliged to notify immediately
the following events:
1. Incidents with significant consequences
for the continuity of the
essential service
2. Breaches of the security of network
and information systems which
may have significant consequences
for the continuity of the essential
service;
Sanctions:
There are 3 types of sanctions defined,
until now:
1. Up to EUR 5 million for any
breach of the draft implementation
act by essential service
operators,
2. A maximum of EUR 1 million for
failing to cooperate with a request
for further information from the
National Cyber Security Centre;
and
3. A maximum fine of EUR 1 million
for failure to adequately cooperate
with supervisory authorities
exercising their competencies.
Compared to other countries at the
moment the Netherlands has the
highest sanctions, but the lowest
level of clearly defined obligations.
NIS Implementation
in Hungary
The status of transposition is:
Partial transposition
Implementation acts are:
Act 134 of 2017 on modifying
certain interior related tasks and
corresponding laws
Government Decree 394/2017
(XII.13) on modifying government
decrees related to Act 134 of 2017 on
modifying certain interior related
tasks and corresponding laws
Hungary has as well identified
the following sectors: energy, transportation,
health, finance, info communication
technologies, water.
The national strategy on the
security of network an information
security is (officially) not yet adopted.
Single Point of contact is:
National Cyber Security Centre
(NCSC)
Dózsa György út 86/B Budapest
H-1068
E-Mail: spoc@govcert.hu
Phone: +36 206 9320
National competent authorities for all
sectors for OES is:
National Directorate General for
Disaster Management
E-Mail: kikfo@katved.gov.hu
Phone: +36 208 200 548
Contact Hours: 08:00 – 16:00
National Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT) is the same as
the single point of contact.
Operators of essential services
must immediately report extraordinary
incidents to the Directorate and
to other competent authorities as
defined by Hungarian laws and
regulations.
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 584
The reporting must include at least:
• The description and status of the
incident,
• The extent of the disruption,
• Contact details of the incident
response person appointed by the
provider,
• The aspects that define the effect of
the incident.
Section 9 (2) of Government Decree
65/2013 (III.8) specifies the amount
of administrative fines that may be
imposed on operators of essential
services for breach of any obligations
defined by the applicable laws.
The amount the administrative fine
ranges between HUF 100,000
(~EUR 330) and HUF 3,000,000
(~EUR 9,900).
The next step
Although the Implementation of the
NIS Directive is not sufficient finished
in all EU countries, the European
Commission continues to implement
further steps. In Annex 1 to COM
(2017) 477 finally we find the requirements
to be met by conformity assessment
bodies as follows:
1. A conformity assessment body
shall be established under national
law and have legal personality.
2. A conformity assessment body
shall be a third-party body independent
of the organisation or the
ICT products or services it assesses.
3. A body belonging to a business
association or professional federation
representing undertakings
involved in the design, manufacturing,
provision, assembly, use
or maintenance of ICT products or
services which it assesses, may, on
condition that its independence
and the absence of any conflict
of interest are demonstrated, be
considered a conformity assessment
body.
4. A conformity assessment body, its
top-level management and the
personnel responsible for carrying
out the conformity assessment
tasks shall neither be the designer,
manufacturer, supplier, installer,
purchaser, owner, user or maintainer
of the ICT product or service
which is assessed, nor shall it
be the authorised representative
of any of those parties. This shall
not preclude the use of assessed
products that are necessary for the
operations of the conformity assessment
body or the use of such
products for personal pur poses.
5. A conformity assessment body, its
top-level management and the
personnel responsible for carrying
out the conformity assessment
tasks shall not be directly involved
in the design, manufacture or
construction, the marketing, installation,
use or maintenance of
those ICT products or services, or
represent the parties engaged in
those activities. They shall not
engage in any activity that may
conflict with their independence of
judgement or integrity in relation
to conformity assessment activities
for which they are notified. This
shall apply, in particular, to consultancy
services.
6. Conformity assessment bodies
shall ensure that the activities of
their subsidiaries or subcontractors
do not affect the confidentiality,
objectivity or impartiality
of their conformity assessment
activities.
7. Conformity assessment bodies and
their personnel shall carry out the
conformity assessment activities
with the highest degree of professional
integrity and the requisite
technical competence in the
specific field and shall be free from
all pressures and inducements,
including of a financial nature,
which might influence their
judgement or the results of their
conformity assessment activities,
especially as regards persons or
groups of persons with an interest
in the results of those activities.
8. A conformity assessment body
shall be capable of carrying out all
the conformity assessment tasks
assigned to it under this Regulation,
whether those tasks are
carried out by the conformity
assessment body itself or on its
behalf and under its responsibility.
9. At all times and for each conformity
assessment procedure and each
kind, category or sub-category of
ICT products or services, a conformity
assessment body shall have
at its disposal the necessary:
a) Personnel with technical knowledge
and sufficient and appropriate
experience to perform the
conformity assessment tasks…
10. A conformity assessment body
shall have the means necessary to
perform the technical and administrative
tasks connected with the
conformity assessment activities in
an appropriate manner, and shall
have access to all necessary equipment
and facilities.
11. The personnel responsible for carrying
out conformity assessment
activities shall have the following:
a) Sound technical and vocational
training covering all the conformity
assessment activities;
b) Satisfactory knowledge of the requirements
of the assessments they
carry out and adequate authority
to carry out these assessments;
c) Appropriate knowledge and understanding
of the applicable requirements
and testing standards;
d) The ability to draw up certificates,
records and reports demonstrating
that assessments have been carried
out.
12. The impartiality of the conformity
assessment bodies, of their toplevel
management and of the
assessment personnel shall be
guaranteed.
13. The remuneration of the top-level
management and of the assessment
personnel of a conformity
assessment body shall not depend
on the number of assessments
carried out or on the results of
those assessments.
14. Conformity assessment bodies
shall take out liability insurance
unless liability is assumed by the
State in accordance with national
law, or the Member State itself is
directly responsible for the conformity
assessment.
15. The personnel of a conformity
assessment body shall observe professional
secrecy with regard to all
information obtained in carrying
out their tasks under this Regulation
or pursuant to any provision of
national law giving effect to it,
except in relation to the competent
authorities of the Member States in
which its activities are carried out.
16. Conformity assessment bodies
shall meet the requirements of
standard EN ISO/IEC 17065:2012.
17. Conformity assessment bodies
shall ensure that testing laboratories
used for conformity assessment
purposes meet the requirements
of standard EN ISO/IEC
17025:2005.
Only this Annex 1 would help us in the
field of independence in IT security. In
Germany, for example, it would be
possible at the moment, that in special
situations energy companies can do
their own § 8a verification. I don't
think that this is the way it should be.
Independent verification is only
possible with independent certification
bodies.
Author
Prof. h.c.(IUK) PhDr. Dipl.-Kfm./
Dipl.-Vw. Stefan Loubichi
Loubichi Business Consulting UG
(haftungsbeschränkt)
Associate expert to Kraftwerksschule
Essen and
Simulator Centre Essen
(GfS mbH / KSG mbH)
Grafenberger Allee 125
40237 Düsseldorf, Germany
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Development on NIS Directive in Different EU Countries in the Energy Sector ı Stefan Loubichi

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Schiedlich-friedlich? – Folgen des „Achmea“-Urteils des EuGH
auch für das ICSID-Schiedsgerichtsverfahren von Vattenfall?
Ulrike Feldmann
Am 6. März diesen Jahres hat der Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH, Große Kammer) ein folgenschweres und umstrittenes
Urteil zur Vereinbarkeit von Investitionsschutzklauseln mit Unionsrecht gefällt (Rechtssache C-284/16 - „Achmea“).
Das „Achmea“-Ausgangsverfahren
Aufgrund gesetzlicher Maßnahmen der Slowakischen
Republik (zeitweise geltendes Verbot der Gewinnausschüttung
aus privatem Krankenversicherungsgeschäft) sah sich
Achmea BV., die als Krankenversicherungsgesellschaft in
der Slowakei aktiv war, geschädigt und leitete ab Oktober
2008 ein Schiedsverfahren nach Art. 8 des Abkommens
zwischen den Niederlanden, der Tschechischen Republik
und der Slowakischen Republik über die Förderung des
gegenseitigen Schutzes von Investitionen ein. Als Schiedsort
für Streitigkeiten sieht das Abkommen Frankfurt am
Main vor, so dass auf das Verfahren deutsches Recht anzuwenden
war. Im Schiedsverfahren erhob die Slowakische
Republik die Einrede der Unzuständigkeit des Schiedsgerichts.
Als Begründung trug sie vor, dass aufgrund ihres
Beitritts zur EU der in Art. 8 Abs. 2 des o.g. Schiedsabkommens
vorgesehene Rückgriff auf ein Schiedsverfahren mit
dem Unionsrecht nicht vereinbar sei. Dieser Einwand
wurde in erster und zweiter Schieds gerichtsinstanz zurückgewiesen,
und die Slowakische Republik wurde verurteilt,
Schadensersatz an Achmea BV. zu leisten. Gegen die
Abweisung ihres Antrags auf Auf hebung des Schiedsspruchs
legte die Slowakische Republik Rechtsbeschwerde
beim Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in Karlsruhe ein.
Das Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des BGH
Zwar verneinte der BGH die Frage, ob Art. 344 AEUV
(Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der EU), wonach sich die
Mitgliedstaaten verpflichten, Streitig keiten über die Auslegung
oder Anwendung der Verträge nicht anders als
hierin vorgesehen zu regeln, einer Bestimmung in einer
internationalen Übereinkunft zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten
entgegensteht, die vorsieht, dass ein Investor eines
EU-Mitgliedstaates im Falle einer Streitigkeit über Investitionen
in einem andern EU-Mitgliedstaat gegen diesen ein
Verfahren vor ein Schiedsgericht bringen darf, dessen
Gerichtsbarkeit sich dieser Mitgliedstaat unterworfen hat.
Der BGH äußerte darüber hinaus sogar Zweifel an der
Anwendbarkeit des Art. 344 AEUV an sich:
Art. 344 AEUV betreffe nach Gegenstand und Zielsetzung
keine Streitigkeiten zwischen einem Einzelnen
und einem Mitgliedstaat.
Ferner betreffe Art. 344 AEUV nur Streitigkeiten
über die Auslegung und Anwendung der Verträge, nicht
aber Entscheidungen im Schiedsverfahren, die alleine
aufgrund von bilateralen Investitionsabkommen („BIT“-
Abkommen) gefällt worden seien.
Nicht zuletzt, so der BGH, könne aus der in Art. 344 AEUV
geschützten Autonomie des Rechtssystems der EU, deren
Wahrung der EuGH sichere, nicht gefolgert werden, dass
Art. 344 AEUV die Entscheidungskompetenz des EuGH für
jegliche Rechtsstreitigkeiten schütze, in der Unionsrecht zur
Anwendung kommen könne. Dies gelte nur insoweit, als die
Mitgliedstaaten die in den Unions verträgen vorge sehenen
Verfahren vor dem EuGH in Anspruch nehmen müssten. Dies
sei vorliegend nicht der Fall, da die Unions verträge kein
gerichtliches Verfahren vorsähen, das Inves toren wie
Achmea BV. ermögliche, gegenüber einem EU- Mitgliedstaat
den Schadensersatz anspruch aus einem „BIT“- Abkommen
vor den Unions gerichten geltend zu machen.
Trotz dieser und anderer Bedenken bezüglich der
Anwendbarkeit des Unionsrechts (auch im Hinblick auf
die Frage, ob Art. 267 AEUV oder das Diskriminierungsverbot
des Art. 18 Abs. 1 AEUV der im o.g. „BIT“-
Abkommen vereinbarten Schiedsgerichtsklausel überhaupt
entgegenstehen) legte der BGH gleichwohl dem
EuGH im Vorabentscheidungsverfahren nach Art. 267
AEUV die Frage der Vereinbarkeit von Schiedsgerichtsklauseln
mit Unionsrecht wegen der zahlreichen
bilateralen Investitionsschutzabkommen zwischen EU-
Mitgliedstaaten mit ähnlichen Schiedsgerichtsklauseln –
es gibt derzeit 196 dieser „BIT“-Abkommen, wobei die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland Partei solcher Abkommen
mit 14 anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten ist – vor.
Das Verfahren vor dem EuGH
Im Verfahren vor dem EuGH hatten neben den Parteien
wegen der grundsätzlichen Bedeutung des Rechtsstreits
15 EU-Mitgliedstaaten sowie die EU-Kommission Erklärungen
abgegeben.
Der Generalanwalt am EuGH Melchior Wathelet
hatte sich in seinem Schlussantrag vom 19.09.2017
zugunsten der Intra-EU Investitionsschutzklauseln ausgesprochen.
Wörtlich lautet sein Vorschlag unter Rn. 273
des Schlussantrags:
„Die Artikel 18, 267 und 344 AEUV sind dahin auszulegen,
dass sie der Anwendung eines Mechanismus zur
Beilegung von Streitigkeiten zwischen einem Investor und
einem Staat nicht entgegenstehen, der durch ein vor dem
Beitritt eines der Vertragsstaaten zur Europäischen Union
geschlossenes bilaterales Investitionsabkommen eingeführt
wurde und nach dem ein Investor eines Vertragsstaats bei
einer Streitigkeit über Investitionen in dem anderen Vertragsstaat
gegen Letzteren ein Verfahren vor einem Schiedsgericht
einleiten darf.“
Die tschechische, die ungarische sowie die polnische
Regierung erklärten sich mit dem Schlussantrag des
Generalanwalts nicht einverstanden und forderten eine
Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens, die das Gericht jedoch
zurückwies.
Das „Achmea“-Urteil des EuGH vom 6.03.2018
Da die Richter des EuGH in der überwiegenden Zahl der
Fälle den Schlussanträgen des Generalanwalts folgen,
dessen Schlussanträge unparteilich und unabhängig zu
erfolgen haben, kam das Urteil des EuGH eher überraschend.
Denn die Richter des EuGH sehen Schiedsgerichtsklauseln
wie die in Art. 8 des in Rede stehenden
„BIT“-Abkommens als mit dem EU-Recht unvereinbar an.
Artikel 267 und 344 AEUV seien dahingehend auszulegen,
dass sie, wie der EuGH in Rn. 60 wörtlich feststellt, „einer
Bestimmung in einer internationalen Übereinkunft
zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten wie Art. 8 des BIT entgegenstehen,
nach der ein Investor eines dieser Mitgliedstaaten
im Fall einer Streitigkeit über Investitionen in dem
anderen Mitgliedstaat gegen diesen ein Verfahren vor dem
Schiedsgericht einleiten darf, dessen Gerichtsbarkeit sich
dieser Mitgliedstaat unterworfen hat“. Das Unionsrecht sei
„als Teil des in jedem EU-Mitgliedstaat geltenden Rechts
als auch als einem internationalen Abkommen zwischen
585
SPOTLIGHT ON NUCLEAR LAW
Spotlight on Nuclear Law
Arbitrary-peaceful? Consequences of the “Achmea” decision of the ECJ also for the ICSID arbitration of Vattenfall? ı Ulrike Feldmann

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SPOTLIGHT ON NUCLEAR LAW 586
den EU-Mitgliedstaaten entsprungen anzusehen“. Für den
vorgelegten Rechtsstreit bedeute dies, dass das in Art. 8
des „BIT“-Abkommens vorgesehene Schiedsgericht ggf.
das Unionsrecht und insbesondere die Bestimmungen
über die Grundfreiheiten, u.a. Niederlassungsfreiheit und
Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit, auszulegen oder sogar anzuwenden
hätte (Rn. 42 des EuGH-Urteils).
Die Richter des EuGH sehen den BGH auch nicht als
„Gericht eines Mitgliedstaates“ iSv. Art. 267 AEUV an, da
das dem Rechtsstreit zugrundeliegende „BIT“-Abkommen
nicht Teil des in den Niederlanden und in der Slowakei
bestehenden Gerichtssystems sei. Folglich sei der BGH
auch nicht befugt, den EuGH um Vorabentscheidung nach
Art. 267 AEUV zu ersuchen.
Zwar erkennt der EuGH ausdrücklich die Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit
sowie die Patentgerichtsbarkeit an,
bemängelt jedoch im vorliegenden Fall, dass die Möglichkeit
der Zuweisung von Streitigkeiten durch das in Art. 8
des „BIT“-Abkommens vorgesehene Schiedsgericht zu
einer Einrichtung, die nicht Teil des Gerichtssystems der
Union ist, in einer Übereinkunft (dem „BIT“-Abkommen)
vorgesehen ist, die nicht von der Union, sondern von den
EU-Mitgliedstaaten geschlossen wurde. Der EuGH fürchtet
um die effektive Durchsetzung des Unionsrechts.
Das Urteil ist in der Presse bereits als „Generalabrechnung“
mit Schiedsgerichtsverfahren bezeichnet
und als Anlass für die Forderung genommen worden, den
„Irrweg der Investitionsschutz-Paralleljustiz im Internationalen
Recht“ zu beenden. Auf jeden Fall führt das
EuGH-Urteil zu großer Verunsicherung auf Seiten der an
„BIT“-Abkommen beteiligten EU-Mitgliedstaaten wie auch
auf Seiten der Investoren. Die Verunsicherung wird im
Übrigen dadurch verstärkt, dass die für den Intra-EU-
Investitionsschutz zuständige Fachebene der EU-Kommission
vor einigen Monaten angekündigt haben soll, dass die
EU-Kommission den Mitgliedstaaten voraussichtlich die
gemeinsame Aufhebung ihrer Investitionsschutzverträge
mit anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten vorschlagen wird, sofern
die EU-Kommissare den entsprechenden Vorschlag der
Kommissions-Fachebene unterstützen. Bekannt geworden
ist bislang allerdings nicht, ob das Ende schiedlichfriedlicher
Konfliktlösung bei Investitionsstreitigkeiten
tatsächlich von der EU-Kommission versucht wurde
einzuläuten.
Folgen für das ICSID-Verfahren von Vattenfall
Obschon das EuGH-Urteil vom 06.03.2018 sich expressis
verbis nur auf Übereinkommen zwischen EU-Mitgliedstaaten
bezieht, wird von verschiedenen Seiten (z.B.
EU-Kommission, Bundesregierung, Bundestags fraktionen)
die Frage aufgeworfen, ob das Urteil auch für Abkommen
wie z.B. die Energiecharta gilt, bei denen die EU selber
Vertragspartei ist. Die Energiecharta ist Grundlage des
Verfahrens ARB/12/12 der schwedischen Vattenfall AB
sowie der Kernkraftwerk Brunsbüttel GmbH & Co., der
Kernkraftwerk Krümmel GmbH sowie der Vattenfall Europe
Nuclear Energy GmbH (VENE) und der Vattenfall GmbH
vor dem Internationalen Zentrum zur Beilegung von
Investitionsstreitigkeiten/International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), das zur Weltbank in
Washington D.C. gehört. Das ICSID wurde 1965 durch die
ICSID-Konvention gegründet, der 153 Staaten angehören.
Gegenstand der Klage der o.g. 5 Gesellschaften vor dem
ICSID-Schiedsgericht ist die Frage, ob die 13. AtG-Novelle
gegen die Verpflichtungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
aus dem Vertrag über die Energiecharta verstößt.
Das ICSID-Schiedsgericht hatte seine Entscheidung
ursprünglich für das 1. Quartal 2018 angekündigt. Das
„Achmea“-Urteil hatte das Schiedsgericht jedoch bewogen,
eine Reihe zusätzlicher Fragen an die Parteien zu richten
und diese aufgefordert, bis zum 23. April 2018 (einschließlich
Fristverlängerung ) Stellung zu nehmen.
Durch das „Achmea“-Urteil sieht sich die EU-
Kommission in ihrer zuvor bereits vertretenen Auffassung
bestätigt, dass Intra-EU-Schiedsverfahren auf der Grundlage
des Energiechartavertrages gegen EU-Recht verstoßen.
Diese Auffassung wird von der deutschen
Bundesregierung offenbar geteilt (s. Bundestagsdrucksache
19/ 2174). Sie hat in ihrer schriftsätzlichen Antwort
an das ICSID-Schiedsgericht vorgetragen, dass der Rechtssatz
aus dem „Achmea“-Urteil auch für den Energiechartavertrag
gelten müsse, das Unionsrecht also nicht
zulasse, dass die drei Vattenfall Gesellschaften sowie die
beiden – mittelbar vom schwedischen Staate kontrol lierten
deutschen – Betreibergesellschaften als Unter nehmen
des EU-Mitgliedstaats Schweden den EU- Mitgliedstaat
Deutschland vor dem ICSID verklagen können.
Zwischenentscheidung des ICSID
Das Schiedsgericht hat in seiner – bisher unveröffentlichten
– Zwischenentscheidung vom 31. August 2018
diese Auffassung dem Vernehmen nach zurückgewiesen.
Anders als im „Achmea“-Fall handele es sich bei dem in
Rede stehenden Rechtsstreit nicht um ein bilaterales
Investitionsschutzabkommen zwischen Deutschland und
Schweden, sondern die Klägerinnen beriefen sich
auf die Investitionsschutzklausel im völkerrechtlichen
Energiecharta-Vertrag, dem neben Deutschland und
Schweden auch die EU beigetreten sei. Die EU könne, so
das Schiedsgericht, nicht über die Anwendbarkeit des
Energiecharta-Vertrages entscheiden, in dem sie selber
Vertragspartei sei.
Da neben der Klage der Vattenfall-Gesellschaften noch
weitere Verfahren verschiedener Unternehmen aufgrund
des Energiecharta-Vertrages gegen andere EU-Mitgliedstaaten
anhängig sind, hat das ICSID-Schiedsgericht dies
offenbar zum Anlass genommen, seine Rechtsauffassung
auffällig ausführlich zu begründen.
Ausblick
Nachdem insoweit die Frage der Bedeutung des
„ Achmea“-Urteils auf Verfahren nach dem Energie charta-
Vertrag vom ICSID-Schiedsgericht in Washington offenbar
geklärt wurde, ohne dass damit allerdings auch ein
„schiedlich-friedlicher“ Prozessausgang schon vorprogrammiert
wäre, dürfte einer endgültigen Entscheidung
des ICSID nun nichts mehr im Wege stehen. Die Bundesregierung
hat (s. Bundestagsdrucksache 19/2174) bereits
auf die Überprüfungsmöglichkeiten – Auslegung des
Schiedsspruchs, Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens bei
schwerwiegenden neuen Tatsachen sowie Aufhebung –
gemäß den Artikeln 51 – 53 ICSID-Konvention hingewiesen.
Eine Berufungsmöglichkeit besteht allerdings
nicht. Auch ist die Aufhebung eines Schiedsspruchs nur
unten den engen Voraussetzungen des Art. 53 ICSID-
Konvention möglich. Wird der Schiedsspruch nicht
aufgehoben, ist er zwischen den Parteien des Verfahrens
(inter partes) endgültig und bindend. Er kann im Falle des
Obsiegens von Vattenfall in allen ICSID-Vertragsstaaten
vollstreckt werden, und zwar in das Vermögen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, soweit dieses Vermögen
nicht hoheitlichen Zwecken zu dienen bestimmt ist.
Author
Ulrike Feldmann
Berlin, Germany
Spotlight on Nuclear Law
Arbitrary-peaceful? Consequences of the “Achmea” decision of the ECJ also for the ICSID arbitration of Vattenfall? ı Ulrike Feldmann

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Release-Category-Oriented Risk
Importance Measure in the Frame of
Preventive Nuclear Safety Barriers
Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul and Luca Ammirabilea
1 Introduction and outline In the regulatory framework regarding nuclear installations dedicated to
electricity production, one of the fundamental design principles consists of the so-called Defence-in-Depth [1]: a set of
multiple and independent barriers arranged in a series configuration by which undesired events should be intercepted
before yielding undesired consequences. These barriers can be either physical (fuel cladding, reactor cooling system,
containment structure, safety systems, etc.) or non-physical (surveillance procedures, emergency guidelines, etc.).
[11], Maintenance Rule [12] or Risk
Monitor [13]. These indicators look at
hierarchically order the plant SSCs
according to their impact on the overall
CDF or CDF variations depending
on the availability or failure of the
SSC.
In terms of mitigating severe accidents,
the number of safety barriers is
significantly lower: containment or
reactor building as a value type of
barrier, Severe Accident Management
Guidelines (SAMGs) as administrative,
and the use of several PRA
applications based on PRA Large
Early Release Frequency (LERF) as
figure of merit.
587
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY
| | Fig. 1.
Nuclear Safety Performance Pillars.
Most safety barriers rely on a deterministic
assessment, i.e., they have been
designed against predetermined challenging
events assumed in the initial
design or afterwards through Design
Modifications (see, e.g. [2] to [4]).
To provide with a single overview
of the entire list of measures taken to
achieve an adequate safety level of
performance and highlighting potential
areas of improvement, the different
safety related field of activities can
be arranged upon different safety
pillars (see Figure 1), each of them
involving the application of several
and different in nature fields of
activities.
For the sake of comparison, the
concept of nuclear safety barriers may
be generically extended to these fundamental
safety pillars and to their
comprised field of activities. In doing
so, each of them may be twofold classified
upon whether the activity is a
value (physical) or a practice (administrative),
and whether it aims at preventing,
correcting (i.e. controlling) or
mitigating (see Figure 2) an undesired
event. In addition to this, each
barrier put in place can also be
analysed and classified according to
weather it has been designed based on
deterministic or probabilistic grounds.
In terms of the safety approach
method, Probabilistic Risk/Safety
Assessment (PRA/PSA) applications
have been gradually incorporated into
the analysis of the safety barriers (see,
e.g. [5] and [6]), falling under the
general category of risk-informed
decision-making processes [7]. PRA
more extended figure of merit is the
Core Damage Frequency (CDF, sum of
the frequency of the scenarios considered
in a specific PRA model leading
to core damage). Risk indicators
are mostly based on CDF such as Fussell-Vesely’s
measure of importance
(F-V), Risk Achievement/Reduction
Worth (RAW/RDW), or simply the
CDF variation [8], meaning they are
designed to prevent core damage.
Some of the main applications where
CDF is an input are the Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP) [9], Mitigating
Systems Performance Indicators
( MSPI) [10], Safety Evaluations
related with Design Change Packages
| | Fig. 2.
Ranging of safety-related activities along an accident sequence.
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Release-Category-Oriented Risk Importance Measure in the Frame of Preventive Nuclear Safety Barriers ı Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul and Luca Ammirabilea

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 588
2 Analysis and classification
of nuclear safety
barriers
Coming back to Figure 1, the different
activities taken to ensure an adequate
safety level may be classified upon
three different areas or top-level
pillars of activities: Safety Design and
Performance, Management Improvement
and Safety Assessment.
If the IAEA design and operational
safety requirements safety standards
[14] and [15] are taken as a comprehensive
list, its 96 requirements
(removing 19 requirements not related
to the safety performance of the plant)
might be classified in 74 requirements
under the pillar of safety design
and performance, 11 requirements
addressing management improvement,
and 11 requirements under the category
of safety assessment.
• Safety Design and Performance
Within this safety pillar, the activities
directly affecting the safety
response of the plant are classified.
By directly it is meant that the
object of the activity is the humanmachine
system made up of safetyrelated
SSC and human actions
actuating on them. Such activities
comprise design technical specifications,
testing, maintenance,
design principles such as independency,
redundancy, etc., but
also emergency procedures, administrative
procedures such as
maintenance, surveillance and
inspection, etc.
Most nuclear countries have nowadays
implemented a set of common
standards regarding safety design
(see [14] and [15]), most of which
rely on a deterministic approach
even if probabilistic results are becoming
more and more integrated
into several aspects of the design.
The 74 IAEA safety-performancerelated
design and operational
requirements found on [14] and
[15] related to the safety design and
performance category may be in
turn classified and simplified as
follows:
• Fundamental design criteria
PP
Defence in depth underlying
criteria (multi-barriers, independency,
redundancy, etc.)
PP
Single-failure criterion
PP
SSC safety classification
PP
Assumed Postulated Initiating
Events (PIEs)
PP
Safety margins
• Safety procedures
PP
Abnormal and failure procedures
PP
Emergency procedures
PP
SAMGs
PP
Maintenance, surveillance and
inspections
PP
Operational limits and conditions
for safe operation
• Management Improvement
This top safety pillar groups those
activities indirectly modifying the
human- machine system safety performance.
By indirectly it is meant
that the object of the activity is not
the human- machine system performing
the safety function in
charge of preventing, correcting
(i.e. controlling) or mitigating the
adverse condition, but those activities
whose performance is expected
to ultimately impact that
system. The connection between
the object of a management improvement
activity and the humanmachine
system usually relies on
the performance analysis of different
aspects dealing with the human
organization or SSCs in charge of
performing the safety functions.
The importance of the available
tools for continuously improving
the safety performance of the plant
has long been stressed; see for
instance [16] and [17]. The most
relevant tools indirectly improving
the safety performance of the plant
are the followings:
• Operating Experience
• Nuclear Safety Culture
• Risk Oversight Process
• Performance Indicators
• PRA applications
• Trending and Performance
Analysis
• Corrective Action Program
• Benchmarking and Self-Assessment
• Observation program
• Safety Assessment
By safety assessment it is meant
any activity in charge of ensuring
that the plant meets with the
design safety requirements and
| | Fig. 3.
Relationship between the different Nuclear Safety Pillars.
verifies the conformity of the plant
with the quantitative safety design
objectives.
The most relevant activities dealing
with safety assessment are
hereafter indicated for clarification:
• Safety Analysis (analysis of
plant response against adverse
situations departing from normal
conditions):
PP
Probabilistic Safety (or Risk)
Assessment
PP
Deterministic Analysis
• External Reviews (e.g. IAEA,
WANO, INPO) and Independent
Oversight;
NPP safety performance can therefore
be schematically considered according
to Figure 2, where the actions directly
in charge of responding to adverse
conditions are carried out by the human-machine
system, the performance
of this system being in turn affected
by a set of management tools.
And as a cross-sectional set of activities,
the safety assessment tool which
applies at many different levels with
the aim of ensuring the compliance of
the NPP design and performance with
the expected safety design objectives.
As already introduced in section 1,
the different activities belonging to
the three safety pillars can be classified
upon whether they look at preventing
accident conditions – before
the accident occurs –, correcting the
accident – after the onset of the
accident – or mitigating the accident –
to limit the undesired consequences
once the core has partly or fully
damaged – (Figure 3). They can also
be classified in values and practices
depending on whether they look at
physically modifying or managing the
human-machine system respectively.
Table 1 arranges the fundamental
categories of activities under the three
different safety pillars according to
this twofold classification.
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Release-Category-Oriented Risk Importance Measure in the Frame of Preventive Nuclear Safety Barriers ı Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul and Luca Ammirabilea

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Prevention Correction Mitigation
Values
Practices
DiD criteria
Single-failure criterion
Safety-classification-driven design criteria
PIEs
LCOs
Safety Analysis
Abnormal and failure procedures
Risk Monitor
Maintenance, surveillance and inspections
Maintenance Rule PRA applications
OE
Nuclear Safety Culture
ROP
Trending and Performance Analysis
Corrective Action Program
External Reviews
| | Tab. 1.
Arrangement of the NPP safety activities.
Table 2 lists these barriers along
with their type and underlying safety
approach.
3 Risk-based mitigating
safety barriers
After the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear
accident, considerable efforts have
been put in place to provide nuclear
plants with new equipment to mitigate
beyond-core-melt accidents, see
e.g. [18]. These efforts resulted in
Safety Margins
DiD physical barriers
Single-failure criterion
Safety-classification-driven design criteria
Safety Systems
Emergency procedures
Safety barriers / activities Type Criteria
DiD criteria
Single-failure
Safety classification
PIEs
Prevention
Correction
Mitigation 1 D, P 1
Prevention
Correction
Prevention
Correction
Mitigation 1
Prevention
Correction
Mitigation 1
Safety Margins Correction D
Maintenance, Surveillance and Inspections Prevention D, P 2
Maintenance Rule Prevention P
Limit Condition for Operation (LCO) Prevention D
Abnormal, failure and EPGs
Prevention
Correction
PRA applications Prevention P
OE Prevention D
Nuclear Safety Culture Prevention D
ROP Prevention P
Trending and Performance Analysis Prevention D
CAP Prevention P
External Reviewers Prevention D, P
Safety Systems Correction D
Physical Barriers
Correction
Mitigation
Mitigating Equipment Mitigation D, P
Safety Analysis
Correction
Mitigation
SAMGs Mitigation D
| | Tab. 2.
Criteria and rationale / parameter underlying the safety barriers / activities.
backfitted mitigating systems, fixed or
portable, in charge of maintaining
the cooling capability of the fuel in
the reactor vessel core, reducing the
flammable gases and transferring
the heat outside the containment or
reactor building.
As shown in the former tables, the
majority of safety barriers look at preventing
the occurrence of an accident.
As shown in Table 2, the majority of
the prevention safety barriers have
D
D
D, P
D
D
D, P
DiD physical barriers
Safety-classification design criteria 1
PIEs 1
Mitigating equipment 1
SAMGs
been designed taking account only
design safety criteria. When a probabilistic
safety approach is instead considered
among the safety criteria in
designing such prevention safety
barriers, the underlying figures of
merit are based on the Core Damage
Frequency (CDF) and the Large Early
Release Frequency (LERF) and Large
Release Frequency (LRF). This will be
the case, for instance, of design improvements
aimed at improving the
safety response of a system featuring a
significant contribution to the CDF,
such as passive Reactor Coolant Pump
seals preventing a coolant leakage
during Extended Loss of Alternate
Current scenarios.
LERF/LRF comprises those accidents
resulting in a radioactive release
higher than a specific magnitude
threshold (depending on the national
regulatory framework, this value can
be 3 %, 10 %, etc., of the initial volatile
fission products stored in the fuel
assemblies and released to the environment,
see e.g. Ref. [19]) at a
certain time, i.e. LERF, or no matter
the releasing time, i.e. LRF (as for
the timing threshold magnitude, it
depends on the national dispositions
as well).
International recommendations
for existing plants do not usually
specify maximum LERF frequencies.
For new plants, these categories of
events are required to be practically
eliminated, see e.g. [20] and [21].
The extended practice is to regulate
on the LERF/LRF variations caused
by design changes in plant and
inspection findings. For instance, the
Spanish Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear
sets acceptable ranges for backfitting
designs, see Figure 4 (where FGLT
and FGL stand for LERF and LRF
respectively) as described in [22]
adapted from [11]) and Table 3 aimed
at classifying performance indexes
1) Only in some limited,
more recent designs
2) Only in limited NPPs
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 589
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Release-Category-Oriented Risk Importance Measure in the Frame of Preventive Nuclear Safety Barriers ı Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul and Luca Ammirabilea

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 590
| | Fig. 4.
Example of backfitting design acceptance according to Level 2
figures-of-merit.
and findings within the US NRC ROP
safety barrier [23].
It is important to note that LERF/
LRF figures-of-merit only include a
small set of sequences featuring the
highest consequences of the whole
spectrum of severe accidents. This
means that most of the accidents
leading to radioactive releases will
not be taken into account in
mitigating- oriented risk-based preventive
measures.
3.1 Discussion on LERF/LRF
figures of merit
Nuclear safety design approach of
existing 2 nd generation NPPs was
purely based on deterministic principles.
Such approach put the stress
on a set of few dominant envelop
scenarios driving the entire safety
design of the plant. Due to the deterministic
nature of the design approach,
the selection of the scenarios
was limited to those challenging the
plant the most. However and as
Colour Importance CD probability increase
(ΔCD)
initially revealed by the TMI-2 nuclear
accident, there were other scenarios
not foreseen in the design whose
damage could be lower yet featuring
higher frequencies of occurrence.
Such approach solely relying on a
set of preconceived, deterministic,
bounding yet limited set of accidents
was the gap to be bridged by a
prob abilistic approach. Probabilistic
analysis sets an objective traceable
basis for identifying accidents that
challenge the plant the most in terms
of risk, i.e. frequency versus consequences.
If the consequence is fixed
for a given set of scenarios, then the
risk directly shifts to the frequency.
This is performed by the Level 1 PRA
considering one single type of consequence,
i.e. code damage, thereby
focusing only on the different accident
frequencies. By ordering the accidents
upon their featured frequencies, any
Level 1 PRA application would prioritize
safety improvements according
to their impact on the total risk, that is
to say, according to a reduction on the
core damage frequency.
The inclusion of a probabilistic
approach therefore opened the spectrum
of accidents to be considered for
safety purposes to also those less
challenging in terms of damage progression,
but more frequent, in the
end, featuring a high level of risk. By
applying such comprehensive tool to
safety, the key concept was put on
lowering the total risk rather than
addressing specific bounding accidents.
As a matter of fact, safety
efforts directed towards double-ended
guillotine Large Break LOCAs were
expanded to comprise also other less
challenging accidents like Small Break
LOCAs, Loss of Off-site Power
scenarios, etc. In other words, safety
design reoriented the initial bias that
focused safety onto a specific preselected
frame of accidents towards
objective, frequency-driven accidents,
where any pre-assessment whatsoever
on the spectrum of accidents (other
than a low frequency screening-out
value) was not applicable anymore.
Coming back to the concept of
risk, and focusing on Level 2 PRA, the
figures of merit driving any potential
Large Early Release probability increase
(ΔLER)
Green Very low ΔCD < 10 -6 ΔLER < 10 -7
White Low – moderate 10 -6 < ΔCD < 10 -5 10 -7 < ΔLER < 10 -6
Yellow Significant 10 -5 < ΔCD < 10 -4 10 -6 < ΔLER < 10 -5
Red High 10 -4 < ΔCD 10 -5 < ΔLER
| | Tab. 3.
MSPIs and findings classification included in US NRC ROP system [23].
design improvement in terms of prevention
are limited to the large and
early release frequencies. Such large
and early in terms of radioactive
releases mean the most challenging
bounding severe accidents. In terms of
Level 1 PRA, to limit the figure of
merit to large and early releases
would be as if taking from the entire
spectrum of accidents leading to core
damage only those featuring early
occurrence and extended core damage.
As a conclusion, the implementation
of PRA tools derived in a broader
spectrum of accidents leading to core
damage accounted for when looking
at prioritizing efforts towards nuclear
safety improvements. But this shift
of prioritizing safety improvements
towards SSCs according to their contribution
to core damage has not been
translated to the severe accident field,
i.e., LERF and LRF continues to focus
the attention on the consequence of
the accident no matter how frequent
they are likely to occur, therefore
missing two important pieces of information
from a safety perspective
( already accounted for in Level 1 PRA
scenarios), namely (i) that less severe
accidents – whether in terms of magnitude
or time – are still severe accidents;
and partially drawn from the
first issue, (ii) that the more frequent
the scenario is, the more attention
should be paid to as the higher its risk
will likely be (because the undesired
consequences will still be unacceptably
high).
Furthermore, and in accordance
with the ALARA principle, it will be
convenient to track all the scenarios
that derive into a radioactive release;
otherwise, most of the sequences
would remain out of control in the
range from core damage to the source
term release. For example, if 50 % of
the CDF evolves into a source term
release, and LERF and LRF contributes
in 5 % to the source term, this means
that 95 % of the scenarios involving
source term release to the environment
are not keeping tracked by any of
the safety indicators and practices,
meaning that 47.5 % of the accidents
leading to core damage will not be
susceptible to direct safety improvements
of any kind.
4 Level 2 PRA.
Methodology and
insights
In order to have a better understanding
of the new metrics proposed,
let us review some insights related
with Level 2 PRA.
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Figure 5 depicts the level 2 PRA
flowchart, where at the top, first
row, the main prescriptive tasks are
indicated. The rest of the methodology
is intended just to step from one
task to the next one, i.e., they are userdependent:
• First stage. First binning process.
As a back-end methodology, Level 2
starts from the results coming from
Level 1 (first main block), and after
asking the sequences about the
containment systems performance
not included in Level 1 (through
the so-called Bridge Trees, BT in
the flowchart), the outputs are
classified into Plant Damage States
(PDSs) through the use of the PDS
Logic Tree (PDS LT) which classifies
the sequences according to
their equal evolution in the containment.
• Second stage (prescriptive). This
is the Level 2 itself: given that containment
and Reactor Pressure
Vessel (RPV) phenomena are
subjected to a high degree of
uncertainty, one PDS may evolve in
different manners (this means that
in the absence of epistemic uncertainties,
one PDS would obviously
mean one Release Category). Containment
Event Tree (CET), also
named Accident Progression Event
Tree (APET), is the white box
through which analyzing and
propagating the input sequences
(PDS) to the output sequences
( Release Categories, RCs).
• Third stage. Given the large number
of outputs coming from the
CET, it is suitable to reclassify them
according to a similar released
source term characterisation.
This is done by the RC Logic Tree
( RC LT).
• Fourth stage. In order to obtain
the source term associated to each
RC, the most frequent sequence is
chosen as representative for the RC
and simulated with a severeaccident
system simulation code
such as MELCOR, MAAP or ASTEC,
which gives us the RC characterization
(in terms of time, magnitude,
and composition).
• Fifth stage. An eventual filtering
process is applied to compute the
LERF and LRF categories by focusing
only in those RCs meeting with
certain criteria regarding timing
(early) and magnitude (large).
5 Severe-accident risk
significant measure
In order to fill this gap, a new indicator
related with all the sequences
| | Fig. 5.
Level 2 PRA flowchart.
deriving in a source term release is
proposed to be incorporated into the
probabilistic safety measures applied
at the prevention level.
The indicator is just an adaptation
of the Fussell-Vesely importance
measure, defined as the relative contribution
to the reference risk of all
the minimal cut sets belonging to one
basic event:
(1)
where MCS stands for Minimum Cut
Set, and BE is the Basic Event belonging
to the SSC under analysis. In this
case, the importance would have to be
propagated to the source term release.
If the source term magnitude is not
taken into account – assuming that
even a small, not-early release, e.g.
TMI-2, still leads to high undesired
consequence, the risk associated to
one specific sequence, will only be
driven by its frequency.
When attempting to convert a
sequence into a source release in
terms of relative frequency, from a
mere quantitative point of view, this
index should only replace p(MCS) by
p(RC), where RC is the release category,
i.e. the sum of all accidents
featuring similar source term characterisation
in timing, magnitude and
fission product chemical speciation:
(2)
where RCF stands for the total Release
Categories Frequency.
But there are several reasons to
maintain p(MCS) in the equation:
• Since p(MCS) is the Core Damage
indicator, it is convenient to keep
this term in order to track its
associated frequency.
• p(MCS) and p(RC) are independent.
• p(RC) has a significant uncertainty;
this is not the case for
p(MCS).
• Calculation of p(MCS) can be
computed by a probabilistic computer
software, while the RCs can
be computed by a different way (in
a non-integrated L1 – L2 PRA).
• P(RC) is a parameter related not
with the BE but with the PDS.
Therefore, it is suitable to implement
p(RC) as a weighting factor of
p(MCS). Furthermore, considering
that one MCS is split into different
PDSs and that one PDS is related with
a specific CET layout (thus a specific
RC conditional frequency (here
named f c )), then:
(3)
If MCSs are extended to the containment
system consideration, i.e., after
the BTs have been applied, then one
interface MCS, here named MCS*,
will be related with one PDS. Further,
if it is considered that in order to
obtain a fraction corresponding to
the total RC frequency, the denominator
should be the Source Terms
Fre quency (STF), by removing the
non-failure categories associated
frequency the following final equation
is obtained:
(4)
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 591
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 592
6 Summary
and conclusions
Activities and countermeasures related
to nuclear safety currently
include results coming both from
deterministic and probabilistic analyses.
These activities can be arranged
in three categories depending on
whether they are implemented before
the accident begins (prevention),
once the accident has already started
(correction, i.e. control) or after the
fuel has been damaged (mitigation).
By analysing the fundamental set of
nuclear safety activities, a gap has
been identified in the prevention area
applied to the field of severe accidents.
This gap consists of limiting riskoriented
measures related to accidents
involving core damage to only
those leading to the worst consequences,
hence to driven risk as a
consequence-driven concept rather
than as a frequency-driven, just like
applied in the solid field of Level 1
PRA. Furthermore, by applying such
approach the frequency of the remaining
accidents deriving in lower yet still
highly significant radioactive releases
is not being tracked. This means that
any risk-informed decision making
will not take into account this set of
severe accidents which in the end
contribute the most to the radioactive
releases given the relative low values
features by LERF/LRF categories.
In addition, safety improvements to
reduce that residual risk brought by
the radioactive release accidents other
than LERF/LRF will not be considered
as no figure of merit exists to follow
them up.
A new metrics to be used in riskdecision
making processes looking at
the field of severe accidents has been
suggested. This importance measure
is based on the Fussell-Vesely factor
as currently used for core damage
applications. This risk importance
measure does not limit to the most
challenging accidents from the consequence
stand point but it comprises
the entire set of accidents leading to
radioactive releases according to their
featured frequency, just as the equivalent
Level 1 PRA figure of merit of CDF
does. This risk importance measure
will allow prioritizing safety improvements
in the field of severe accidents
according to the contribution to the
total radioactive releases, hence shifting
from a consequence-driven to a
frequency-driven indicator. In addition,
the remaining severe accidents
not falling under LERF/LRF and
featuring a much larger frequency of
radioactive releases will not be
neglected in the assessment process of
any potential safety improvement and
design modification looking at improving
the plant response against
severe accidents.
References
[1] International Nuclear Safety Advisory
Group (INSAG), Defence in Depth in
Nuclear Safety, INSAG-10 (1996).
[2] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Modifications to Nuclear Power
Plants, IAEA NS-G-2.3 (2001).
[3] United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Code of Federal
Regulations, 10 CFR 50.59
(last reviewed on 2017).
[4] Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, Guía de
Seguridad 1.11, Modificaciones de
diseño en centrales nucleares (2002).
[5] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Applications of Probabilistic
Safety Assessment (PSA) for nuclear
power plants, 2001.
[6] Wu, J.S., Apostolakis, G. E., Experience
with probabilistic risk assessment in the
nuclear power industry, Journal of
Hazardous Materials, Vol. 29, Issue 3,
1992.
[7] Zio E., Pedroni N., Panorama des
processus décisionnels tenant compte
du risque, Cahiers de la Sécurité
Industrielle, Fondation pour une
Culture de Sécurité Industrielle, 2012.
[8] Cheok, M.C., Parry, G.W., Sherry, R.R.,
Use of importance measures in riskinformed
regulatory applications,
Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, Vol. 60, Issue 3, 1998.
[9] Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
Reactor Oversight Process, NUREG-1649
(2006).
[10] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Operational safety performance
indicators for nuclear power plants,
IAEA-TECDOC-1141, 2000.
[11] United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, An approach for using
probabilistic risk assessment in riskinformed
decisions on plant specific
changes to the licensing basis,
Regulatory Guide 1.174, 2011.
[12] Yingli Zhu, Criteria for Assessing the
Quality of Nuclear Probabilistic Risk
Assessments, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (2004).
[13] Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Risk
Monitors. The State of the Art in their
Development and Use at Nuclear Power
Plants, NEA/CSNI/R(2004)20, 2004.
[14] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:
Design, SSR-2/1, Rev.1, 2016.
[15] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:
Commissioning and Operation, SSR-
2/2, 2011.
[16] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), The Management System
for Nuclear Installations, GS-G-3.5,
2009.
[17] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Leadership and Management
for Safety, GSR Part 2, 2016.
[18] ENSREG EU stress tests and follow-up,
visited on 16 July 2018,
http://www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests.
[19] B. Chaumont, E. Raimond, L2 PSA
methods harmonization, 3 rd European
Review Meeting on Severe Accident
Research (ERMSAR), Nesseber
(Bulgaria), 2008.
[20] Nuclear Energy Agency Organisation
For Economic Co-Operation And
Development (OECD), Implementation
of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power
Plants, NEA No. 7248, 2016.
[21] International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Considerations on the
Application of the IAEA Safety
Requirements for the Design of Nuclear
Power Plants, IAEA-TECDOC-1791,
2016.
[22] Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN),
Criterios básicos para la realización de
aplicaciones de los Análisis Probabilistas
de Seguridad, Guía de Seguridad 1.14,
2007.
[23] https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/
operating/oversight.html,
visited on 16 July 2018.
Authors
Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul
Luca Ammirabile
European Commission
DG Joint Research Centre – JRC
Directorate G – Nuclear Safety
& Security
Unit G.I.4 Reactor Safety &
Emergency Preparedness
Westerduinweg 3
1755 LE Petten,
The Netherlands
Environment and Safety
Release-Category-Oriented Risk Importance Measure in the Frame of Preventive Nuclear Safety Barriers ı Juan Carlos de la Rosa Blul and Luca Ammirabilea

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Position des Arbeitskreises „Szenarienentwicklung“
zur Thematik:
Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen und
Umgang mit unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla,
J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf und J. Wollrath
Zusammenfassung Die Sicherheitsanforderungen [BMU 10] verlangen bei der Analyse von zukünftigen
Entwicklungen eines Endlagers und Endlagerstandortes die Unterscheidung hinsichtlich der Wahrscheinlichkeit ihres
Eintretens. Darüber hinaus forderte die nach dem Standortauswahlgesetz [STA 13] in 2013 eingesetzte Endlagerkommission
in ihrem Abschluss bericht [KOM 16] die Überprüfung der Einteilung in die Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
„wahrscheinliche“, „weniger wahrscheinliche“ und „unwahrscheinliche“ Entwicklungen und der Trennung in
„ wahrscheinliche“ und „weniger wahrscheinliche“ Entwicklungen.
In der Vergangenheit wurden in
Vorhaben zur Szenarienentwicklung
zwar wahrscheinliche und weniger
wahrscheinliche Szenarien abgeleitet
und auch das menschliche Eindringen
in ein Endlager untersucht, jedoch
keine unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
berücksichtigt.
Der Arbeitskreis „Szenarienentwicklung“
(AKS) hat sich mit der Einteilung
von Entwicklungen in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen,
der Ableitung
von unwahrscheinlichen Szenarien
sowie mit deren Behandlung auseinandergesetzt
und die folgende
Position formuliert:
Der AKS vertritt die Auffassung,
dass die Einteilung von Entwicklungen
in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
eine übliche Vorgehensweise ist und
dass eine solche Klassifizierung einen
wesentlichen Aspekt für die Optimierung
der Endlagerauslegung und die
Zusammenstellung von Argumenten
im Rahmen des Langzeitsicherheitsnachweises
darstellt sowie für die
allgemeine Diskussion ein hilfreiches
Unterscheidungsmerkmal sein kann.
Insgesamt ist die Einteilung in drei
Klassen ausreichend. Um eine weitere
Differenzierung in Klassen vorzunehmen,
sind verlässliche Daten notwendig,
die oftmals nicht vorliegen.
Die quantitative Vorgabe von Wahrscheinlichkeiten
für alle Aspekte der
unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen hält
der AKS für nicht praktikabel.
Nach Auffassung des AKS ist eine
umfassende, systematische Erfassung
von unwahrscheinlichen Szenarien
nicht möglich. Aus diesem Grund
empfiehlt der AKS, unwahrschein liche
Szenarien getrennt von einer systematischen
Entwicklung wahrscheinlicher
und weniger wahrscheinlicher Szenarien
zu behandeln.
In den Sicherheitsanforderungen
[BMU 10] wird für unwahrscheinliche
Entwicklungen, die zu hohen Strahlenexpositionen
führen können, eine
Optimierungsprüfung dahingehend
gefordert, ob eine Reduzierung der
Auswirkungen mit vertretbarem Aufwand
möglich ist. Hier vertritt der
AKS die Auffassung, dass Entwicklungen
im Zusammenhang mit Ereignissen
und Prozessen, die aufgrund
der Anwendung von Ausschlusskriterien
und Mindestanforderungen
im Standortauswahlverfahren am
zu untersuchenden Endlagerstandort
ausgeschlossen werden, im Rahmen
der geforderten Optimierungsprüfung
nicht weiter zu berücksichtigen
sind.
Der AKS hält es für zwingend
notwendig, eine Unterscheidung
zwischen unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
mit einer Restwahrscheinlichkeit
und ausgeschlossenen
Entwicklungen vorzunehmen.
Der AKS stützt die Festlegungen
in den Sicherheitsanforderungen
[BMU 10], für unwahrscheinliche
Szenarien und Szenarien aufgrund
eines unbeabsichtigten menschlichen
Eindringens in ein Endlager auf
Grenzwerte für zumutbare Risiken
oder zumutbare Strahlenexpositionen
zu verzichten.
Stattdessen schlägt der AKS vor,
über folgende Optionen unwahrscheinliche
Entwicklungen mit einer
Restwahrscheinlichkeit abzuleiten:
• Unwahrscheinliche Ereignisse und
Prozesse, die im Rahmen der
Einteilung in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
identifiziert wurden.
• Unwahrscheinliche Ausprägung
von Ereignissen und Prozessen,
die auf die Barrieren des Endlagersystems
wirken.
• Gleichzeitiges Versagen mehrerer
technischer Komponenten aufgrund
voneinander unabhängiger
Ursachen.
Über den Optimierungsgedanken
hinaus erscheint es nach Ansicht des
AKS zu Anschauungszwecken praktikabel,
eine begrenzte Auswahl von
unwahrscheinlichen Szenarien und/
oder What-If Fällen zusammenzustellen
und die Robustheit des Endlagersystems
und einzelner Komponenten
zu testen und darzustellen.
Für die What-If Fälle sind keine regulatorischen
Vorgaben notwendig.
Motivation/Sachstand
zur Thematik
Die Szenarienentwicklung ist die
Ableitung von potenziellen Entwicklungen
eines Endlagers für radioaktive
Abfälle, die hinsichtlich ihres
Eintretens, gemäß den Sicherheitsanforderungen
des Bundesministeriums
für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und
nukleare Sicherheit (BMU) [BMU 10]
in die folgenden Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
eingeteilt werden:
• wahrscheinlich,
• weniger wahrscheinlich und
• unwahrscheinlich.
Die im Jahr 2013 nach dem Standortauswahlgesetz
eingesetzte Kommission
„Lagerung hoch radioaktiver Abfallstoffe“
(im Folgenden kurz Kommission
genannt) hat unter anderem
diskutiert, ob die bestehenden Sicherheitsanforderungen
[BMU 10] dem
Stand von Wissenschaft und Technik
entsprechen. Eine Empfehlung mit
593
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 594
direktem Bezug zur Szenarienentwicklung
[KOM 16] lautet:
„Überprüfung der Einteilung in
die Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen „wahrscheinliche
Entwicklungen“, „weniger
wahrscheinliche Entwicklungen“ und
„unwahrscheinliche Entwicklungen“,
insbesondere ob die Trennung in
„ wahrscheinliche Entwicklungen“ und
„weniger wahrscheinliche Entwicklungen“
gerechtfertigt ist.“
Über die nationalen Empfehlungen
hinaus sind Szenarien und damit
verbundene Wahrscheinlichkeitsbetrachtungen
auch Gegenstand der
internationalen Fachdiskussion. Der
internationale Stand wurde 2015 auf
dem IGSC Scenario Development
Workshop OECD/NEA vorgestellt und
erläutert [NEA 16]. In der Vergangenheit
sind in verschiedenen nationalen
Vorhaben bereits Arbeiten wie z. B.
„Überprüfung und Bewertung des
bereits verfügbaren Instrumentariums
für eine sicherheitliche Bewertung
von Endlagern für HAW“
( ISIBEL) [BUH 08], „Vorläufige
Sicher heitsanalyse für den Standort
Gorleben“ (VSG) [BEU 12] und
„ Methodik und Anwendungsbezug
eines Sicherheits- und Nachweis konzeptes
für ein HAW-Endlager im Tonstein“
(ANSICHT) [LOM 15, LOM 18]
im Zusammenhang mit Szenarienentwicklungen
durchgeführt worden.
Der Fokus in diesen Vorhaben lag
auf der Zusammenstellung von wirtsgesteinsspezifischen
FEP-Katalogen
(Features, Events and Processes) und
einer darauf basierenden transparenten
und nachvollziehbaren Methodik
zur Ableitung von Szenarien. Die
zugrunde liegende Methodik in den
genannten Vorhaben war lediglich auf
die Ableitung wahrscheinlicher und
weniger wahrscheinlicher Szenarien
ausgerichtet. Die unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen wurden bisher nicht
betrachtet.
Das vorliegende Positionspapier
befasst sich im Wesentlichen mit dem
Umgang mit unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen.
Darüber hinaus wird
allgemein auf unterschiedliche zu
betrachtende Entwicklungen sowie
deren Einteilung und auf die o. g.
Überprüfungsforderung der Kommission
eingegangen.
Nationale und internationale
Regularien / Empfehlungen
Nationale Anforderungen
und Empfehlungen
Die Sicherheitsanforderungen [BMU
10] sind maßgeblich für die Nachweisführung
der Einhaltung des
vorgegebenen Sicherheitsniveaus zur
Erfüllung der atomrechtlichen Anforderungen
an ein Endlager für wärmeentwickelnde
radioaktive Abfälle in
tiefen geologischen Formationen. In
den Sicherheitsanforderungen wird
eine Reihe von Vorgaben zur Berücksichtigung
und Behandlung unterschiedlich
wahrscheinlicher Entwicklungen
gemacht.
So werden für die wahrscheinlichen
und weniger wahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen einzuhaltende zusätzliche
effektive Dosisgrenzwerte für
Einzelpersonen der Bevölkerung
festgelegt (Absatz 6.2 und 6.3 in
[BMU 10]). Für unwahrscheinliche
Entwicklungen sowie für Entwicklungen
aufgrund eines unbeabsichtigten
menschlichen Eindringens in ein
Endlager wird auf die Festlegung
von Werten für zumutbare Risiken
oder zumutbare Strahlenexpositionen
verzichtet (Absatz 6.4 und 6.5 in
[BMU 10]).
In Absatz 7.2 in [BMU 10] werden
Forderungen nach einer umfassenden
Identifizierung und Analyse sicherheitsrelevanter
Szenarien und deren
Einordnung in die vorgegebenen
Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen erhoben.
In nachgeordneten Anforderungen
werden für wahrscheinliche und
weniger wahrscheinliche Entwicklungen
spezifische Nachweise zur
Einhaltung der Dosisgrenzwerte
( Absatz 7.2.2 in [BMU 10]) und zum
Ausschluss der Kritikalität (Absatz
7.2.4 in [BMU 10]) gefordert. Für
wahrscheinliche Entwicklungen sind
spezifische Nachweise zur Integrität
des einschlusswirksamen Gebirgsbereiches
und der geotechnischen
Barrieren über den Nachweiszeitraum
(Absatz 7.2.1 und 7.2.3 in [BMU 10])
zu erbringen. Weiterhin ist ein
Nachweis zur Handhabbarkeit der
Abfallbehälter bei einer eventuellen
Bergung in der Nachverschlussphase
aus dem stillgelegten und verschlossenen
Endlager für einen Zeitraum
von 500 Jahren (Absatz 8.6 in
[BMU 10]) zu führen.
Begriffsbestimmungen zu unterschiedlich
wahrscheinlichen
Ent wicklungen [BMU 10]:
„Wahrscheinliche Entwicklungen
sind die für diesen Standort prognostizierten
normalen Entwicklungen
und für vergleichbare
Standorte oder ähnliche geolo gische
Situationen normalerweise beobachtete
Entwicklungen. Dabei ist
für die technischen Komponenten
des Endlagers die als normal prognostizierte
Entwicklung ihrer
Eigenschaften zugrunde zu legen.
Falls eine quantitative Angabe zur
Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit einer
bestimmten Entwicklung möglich
ist, und ihre Eintritts wahrscheinlichkeit
bezogen auf den Nachweiszeitraum
mindestens 10 % beträgt,
gilt diese als wahr schein liche Entwicklung.“
„Weniger wahrscheinliche Entwicklungen
sind solche, die für diesen
Standort unter ungünstigen geologischen
oder klimatischen Annahmen
eintreten können und die
bei vergleichbaren Standorten oder
vergleichbaren geologischen Situationen
selten aufgetreten sind. Für
die technischen Komponenten des
Endlagers ist dabei eine als normal
prognostizierte Entwicklung ihrer
Eigenschaften bei Eintreten der
jeweiligen geologischen Entwicklung
zugrunde zu legen. Außerdem sind
auch von der normalen Entwicklung
ab weichende ungünstige Entwicklungen
der Eigenschaften der technischen
Komponenten zu untersuchen.
Rückwirkungen auf das
geologische Umfeld sind zu
betrachten. Abgesehen von diesen
Rückwirkungen sind dabei die
jeweilig erwarteten geologischen
Entwicklungen zu berücksich tigen.
Innerhalb einer derartigen Entwicklung
ist das gleichzeitige
Auftreten mehrerer unabhängiger
Fehler nicht zu unterstellen. Falls
eine quantitative Angabe zur
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer bestimmten
Entwicklung oder einer ungünstigen
Entwicklung der Eigenschaften
einer technischen Komponente
möglich ist, sind diese hier
zu betrachten, wenn diese Wahrscheinlichkeit
bezogen auf den
Nachweiszeitraum mindestens 1 %
beträgt.“
„Unwahrscheinliche Entwicklungen
sind Entwicklungen, deren Eintreten
am Standort selbst unter ungünstigen
Annahmen nicht erwartet
wird und die bei ver gleichbaren
Standorten oder vergleichbaren
geologischen Situationen nicht
beobachtet wurden. Zustände und
Entwicklungen für technische
Komponenten, die durch zu
treffende Maßnahmen praktisch
ausgeschlossen werden können
sowie das gleichzeitige unabhängige
Versagen von meh reren Komponenten
werden den unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen zugeordnet.“
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Dem Begriff Entwicklung kommen
in den Sicherheitsanforderungen /
BMU 10/ verschiedene Bedeutungen
zu:
1. Beschreibung von Prozessen an
einem bestimmten Ort über einen
bestimmten Zeitraum.
2. Szenarium, das Wechselwirkungen
von verschiedenen Prozessen beschreibt.
Die jeweilige Wortbedeutung erschließt
sich aus dem Sinnzusammenhang.
Hier sollte dennoch aus der
Sicht des AKS zur Vermeidung
von Missverständnissen eine klarere
sprachliche Abgrenzung der genannten
verschiedenen Bedeutungen im
Zuge einer Aktualisierung der Sicherheitsanforderungen
vorgenommen
werden.
Darüber hinaus hat sich die Entsorgungskommission
(ESK) mit der
Thematik „Einordnung von Entwicklungen
in Wahrscheinlichkeits klassen“
und dem „unbeabsichtigten menschlichen
Eindringen in ein Endlager“
auseinandergesetzt und entsprechende
Empfehlungen bzw. Leitlinien verfasst
[ESK 12a, ESK 12b].
Internationale Regelungen /
Empfehlungen
Auch internationale Regelungen bzw.
Empfehlungen differenzieren hinsichtlich
Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten.
So geben die von der Western
European Nuclear Regulators Association
(WENRA) ausgegebenen Safety
Reference Level (SRL) die Durchführung
einer Szenarienentwicklung
bzw. -analyse vor, die mögliche FEP
inklusive derjenigen Ereignisse mit
einer geringen Wahrscheinlichkeit zu
berücksichtigen hat, die die Sicherheit
eines Endlagersystems gefährden
[WEN 14].
Den von der WENRA erarbeiteten
SRL liegen die Empfehlungen der
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) [IAEA 11] und [IAEA 12] zugrunde.
Herauszustellen ist allerdings
noch die folgende Empfehlung der
IAEA in Bezug auf den Vergleich von
kalkulierten Werten mit vorgegebenen
Grenzwerten oder Risiken, die u.
a. bei sehr seltenen Ereignissen mit
Vorsicht zu behandeln sind ([IAEA
11]):
“The robustness of the disposal
system can be demonstrated, however,
by making an assessment of reference
events that are typical of very low
frequency natural events.”
Die o. g. Aussagen werden in
gleicher Weise durch die Ergebnisse
des internationalen Workshops der
OECD/NEA zur Szenarienentwicklung
gestützt [NEA 16]. Aus den Ergebnissen
bzw. Vergleichen wird deutlich,
dass nahezu alle Nationen eine Klassifizierung
der zu untersuchenden
Szenarien vornehmen. Darüber hinaus
berücksichtigen die Nationen,
bis auf sehr wenige Ausnahmen, unwahrscheinliche
Entwicklungen. Bei
den Ausnahmen handelt es sich um
Nationen, die in den entsprechenden
Regularien Schwellwerte für Wahrscheinlichkeiten
(probability cut-offs)
vorgeben, unter denen z. B. sehr unwahrscheinliche
FEP und Szenarien
nicht weiter zu berücksichtigen sind.
So brauchen exemplarisch, gemäß der
Regularien in der Tschechischen Republik,
Szenarien mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit
von 10 -7 pro Jahr nicht
weiter betrachtet werden [NEA 16].
Unwahrscheinliche Szenarien
und Einteilung
von Entwicklungen
In der Realität wird ein Endlagersystem
nur eine Entwicklung durchlaufen,
die aufgrund von Prognoseunsicherheiten
nicht exakt bestimmt
werden kann. Aus diesem Grund hat
die Szenarienentwicklung alle für das
Endlagersystem sicherheitstechnisch
relevanten potenziellen FEP zu erfassen.
Die so erfassten FEP haben unterschiedliche
Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten,
die in den Szenarien berücksichtigt
werden müssen.
Von den meisten Nationen, die sich
mit der Endlagerung von radioaktiven
Abfällen auseinandersetzen, werden
unterschiedliche Szenarien in den
Sicherheitsanalysen zugrunde gelegt.
Ausgehend von einer wahrscheinlichen
Entwicklung des Endlagersystems
werden davon abweichende
Szenarien identifiziert. Die Nomenklatur
der unterschiedlichen Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
variiert dabei
(vgl. Tabelle 3 in [NEA 16]). Wahrscheinliche
Szenarien werden z. B.
als Normalentwicklung, Referenzszenarium,
erwartete Entwicklung,
Nominalszenarium und Hauptszenarium
bezeichnet. Davon abweichende
Szenarien erhalten z. B. die Bezeichnung
alternative Szenarien, weniger
wahrscheinliche Szenarien, zusätzliche
Szenarien und Nebenszenarien.
Szenarien, die gemäß [NEA 16] z. B.
zur Untersuchung oder Demonstration
der Systemrobustheit herangezogen
werden, werden als What-If
Szenarien oder What-If Fälle, sehr
unwahrscheinliche Szenarien oder
übrige Szenarien bezeichnet.
Die in deutschen Vorhaben [BUH
08, BEU 12] und [LOM 15, LOM 18]
entwickelte Methode sieht die
Entwicklung eines Referenzszenariums
und davon abweichender alternativer
Szenarien, die wahrscheinlich
oder weniger wahrscheinlich sein
können, vor. Sowohl die Ableitung des
Referenzszenariums als auch der
Alternativszenarien erfolgt unter Zugrundelegung
einer systematischen
Vorgehensweise, die die Berücksichtigung
von spezifischen Ansatzpunkten
vorgibt. Die Übertragung
dieser Methode zur Ableitung von
unwahrscheinlichen Szenarien ist
nur eingeschränkt möglich. Der AKS
empfiehlt, unwahrscheinliche Szenarien
getrennt von einer systematischen
Entwicklung wahrscheinlicher
und weniger wahrscheinlicher
Szenarien zu behandeln (s. u.).
Die Sicherheitsanforderungen sind
aus Sicht des AKS bezüglich des
Begriffes unwahrscheinliche Szenarien
und deren geforderter Behandlung
mehrdeutig. Im Folgenden wird
auf zu klärende Fragen im Zusammenhang
mit den Anforderungen zur
Behandlung von unwahrscheinlichen
Szenarien näher eingegangen. Die
wesentlichen Ergebnisse des AKS zur
jeweiligen Fragestellung sind im
weiteren Verlauf unterhalb der zu
klärenden Fragen eingefügt.
Ableitung von unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen
Unter Berücksichtigung der o. g. Begriffsbestimmung
zu unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen aus [BMU 10]
lässt sich eine Charakterisierung
von Entwicklungen (unwahrscheinlich
und nicht unwahrscheinlich)
gemäß der Abbildung 1 vornehmen.
Um eine Einordnung nach diesem
Schema vornehmen zu können,
müssen eine Reihe von Fragen geklärt
werden. Zunächst erfolgt eine Fokussierung
auf die (a) Begrifflichkeiten
im Entscheidungsablauf (Abbildung
1). Anschließend wird auf die (b) Verknüpfungen
der Entscheidungsfelder
eingegangen. Darüber hinaus wird
eine zusätzliche Option für die
Ableitung von unwahrscheinlichen
Szenarien vorgeschlagen.
a) Begrifflichkeiten
im Entscheidungsablauf:
• Was heißt: „vergleichbarer
Standort“ bzw. „vergleichbare
geolo gische Situation“ (Entscheidungsfeld
1.3)?
Vergleichbare Standorte sind
solche, die eine ähnliche Ent wicklungsgeschichte
durchlaufen haben
und dadurch eine ähnliche geologische
Situation aufweisen. Eine
Ver gleichbarkeit ist auch gegeben,
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 595
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 596
| | Abbildung 1
Darstellung eines qualitativen Entscheidungsablaufes zur Ableitung von unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen unter Berücksichtigung der Begriffsbestimmung
gemäß [BMU 10] (Entscheidungsfelder sind durch nummerierte Symbole von 1.1 bis 1.5 gekennzeichnet).
wenn Hinweise für die Möglichkeit
des Auftretens ähnlicher Entwicklungen
in der Zukunft vorliegen.
• Welcher Zeitraum in der Vergangenheit
ist für das Auftreten
von Prozessen am Vergleichsstandort
zu betrachten (Entscheidungsfeld
1.3)?
Die Wahl des zu betrachtenden
Zeitraums ist in Abhängigkeit vom
jeweiligen betrachteten Prozess zu
treffen. Beispiele hierfür sind die
Prozesse Halokinese und Inlandvereisung.
Für den Prozess der
Halokinese ist der Zeitraum von
der Ablagerung der betrachteten
Salzformation bis zur Gegenwart
(ca. 250 Mio. Jahre für Salzformationen
des Zechsteins) zu betrachten,
während für den Prozess
der Inlandvereisung das Quartär
(ca. 2 Mio. Jahre) zu betrachten
ist.
• Was heißt: Die Entwicklung
kann durch Maßnahmen praktisch
ausgeschlossen werden
(Entscheidungsfeld 1.4)?
Praktisch ausgeschlossen bedeutet,
dass trotz getroffener Maßnahmen
immer noch eine Restwahrscheinlichkeit
bestehen kann,
dass die betrachtete Entwicklung
eintritt. Es bedeutet nicht notwendiger
Weise: vollständig ausschließbar.
• Was ist unter einer Komponente
zu verstehen (Entscheidungsfeld
1.1)?
Eine Komponente ist ein Bestandteil
des Endlagersystems, sie kann
natürlichen oder technischen Ursprungs
sein.
• Was bedeutet: gleichzeitiges
unabhängiges Versagen von
mehreren Komponenten (Entscheidungsfeld
1.5)?
Innerhalb einer kurzen Zeitspanne
erfüllen mehrere Komponenten
aufgrund voneinander unabhängiger
Ursachen ihre Sicherheitsfunktion
nicht mehr.
b) Verknüpfung
In Abbildung 1 werden Verknüpfungen
zwischen Entscheidungsfeldern
dargestellt. Diese Verknüpfungen stellen
keine kausalen Zusammenhänge
dar, sondern Entscheidungswege. Die
Definition zu unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen [BMU 10] lässt aus
der Sicht des AKS hinsichtlich der
technischen Komponenten mehrere
Interpretationen zu, die zu unterschiedlichen
Entscheidungsabläufen
führen können. Der dargestellte Entscheidungsbaum
in Abbildung 1 ist
eine Interpretationsmöglichkeit. Der
AKS empfiehlt, die Definition in
den Sicherheitsanforderungen entsprechend
zu konkretisieren.
Aus den Verknüpfungen ergibt
sich, dass geologische Prozesse, die
nicht am Standort selbst und an vergleichbaren
Standorten oder geologischen
Situationen erwartet werden,
als unwahrscheinliche Prozesse zu
behandeln sind (linker Strang in
Abbildung 1). Nach Auffassung des
AKS ist eine umfassende Identifizierung
derartiger Prozesse nicht
möglich.
Hinsichtlich der technischen Komponenten
(rechter Strang in Abbildung
1) sind die beiden Kriterien
nach zu treffenden Maßnahmen und
nach Unterstellung eines gleichzeitigen
unabhängigen Versagens von
mehreren Komponenten zur Einordnung
von unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen vorgesehen. Aus der
Sicht des AKS sind diese Kriterien ausreichend.
Zusammenfassend ergeben sich
gemäß der Abbildung 1 die folgenden
Aspekte, die für die Ableitung von
unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
essenziell sind:
• Unwahrscheinliche Prozesse
• Kombination des unabhängigen
Versagens mehrerer technischer
Komponenten
Darüber hinaus schlägt der AKS vor,
dass die unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
auch dadurch abgeleitet
werden können, dass für FEP mit
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
einem wahrscheinlichen oder weniger
wahrscheinlichen Eintreten eine unwahrscheinliche
Ausprägung unterstellt
wird.
Allgemein ist es für die Entwicklung
von Szenarien essenziell, die
einwirkenden FEP hinsichtlich ihres
Eintretens und ihrer Ausprägung
zu charakterisieren. So ergibt sich
bei einer Vorgehensweise gemäß
[BUH 08, BEU 12 und LOM 15,
LOM 18] das Referenzszenarium aus
der Berücksichtigung der wahrscheinlichen
FEP, die die Sicherheitsfunktionen
des Endlagersystems
direkt beeinträch tigen und die
Mobilisierung bzw. den Transport
von Radionukliden aus den Abfällen
bestimmen. Für diese FEP wird im
Referenzszenarium die wahrscheinliche
Ausprägung zugrunde gelegt.
Zur Ableitung von unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen könnten z. B.
die o. g. wahrscheinlichen FEP mit
direkter Beeinträchtigung von Initial-
Barrieren und der Mobili sierung bzw.
dem Transport von Radionukliden aus
dem Referenz szenarium herangezogen
werden. Für diese FEP sind
dann potenzielle unwahrscheinliche
Ausprägungen zugrunde zu legen.
Analog könnten aus der Methodik
zur Ableitung von Alternativszenarien
unwahrscheinliche Entwicklungen
abgeleitet werden.
Nach dem Klassifizierungsschema
zur Einordnung von Entwicklungen in
Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen [ESK 12a,
BEU 13] ist das FEP mit der geringsten
Wahrscheinlichkeit bestimmend (soweit
die FEP voneinander unabhängig
sind). Das bedeutet, es wird das Referenzszenarium
herangezogen und
für die entsprechenden FEP wird
die unwahrscheinliche Ausprägung
betrachtet. Insgesamt ist dieses
Szenarium dann als unwahrscheinlich
zu charakterisieren. Die Bewertung
der Konsequenzen kann ebenfalls zur
Darstellung der Robustheit des Endlagersystems
dienen. Werden die
als unwahrscheinlich eingestuften
Szenarien mit Modellierung oder
Berechnung dargestellt, bietet sich
zudem die Möglichkeit eines direkten
Vergleiches mit dem zu Grunde
gelegten Referenzszenarium.
Umgang mit unwahrscheinlichen
Szenarien
Neben der Charakterisierung von
unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
beinhalten die Sicherheitsanforderungen
Vorgaben, wie mit resultierenden
Szenarien im Sicherheitsnachweis
weiter zu verfahren ist (Absatz
6.4 in [BMU 10]).
| | Abbildung 2
Grafische Darstellung der Sicherheitsanforderung zum Umgang mit unwahrscheinlichen Szenarien gemäß
/BMU 10/ (Entscheidungsfelder sind durch nummerierte Symbole von 2.1 bis 2.3 gekennzeichnet).
| | Abbildung 3
Einteilung der unterschiedlichen Szenarien nach Wahrscheinlichkeiten bzw. Charakterisierungsmerkmalen.
Die Abbildung 2 zeigt eine
gra fische Interpretation der Sicherheitsanforderung
zum Umgang mit
unwahrscheinlichen Szenarien.
Auf die normative Fragestellung
zu hohen Strahlenexpositionen
( Entscheidungsfeld 2.1) wird nicht
ein gegangen. Aus der Sicht des
AKS sind die folgenden Fragen zu
klären:
• Was ist ein vertretbarer Aufwand
(Entscheidungsfeld 2.2)?
Es existieren keine Kriterien oder
Richtgrößen zur Beurteilung des
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 597
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 598
Klimaänderung
(aus [PAC 15] entnommen)
vertretbaren Aufwands. Dieser erscheint
aus der Sicht des AKS dann
gegeben, wenn hierdurch die möglichen
Auswirkungen auf Mensch
und Umwelt merklich abgeschwächt
würden und die Umsetzung
der damit verbundenen
Maßnahmen technisch machbar
und finanzierbar ist. Mögliche Auswirkungen
auf Mensch und Umwelt
bei Eintreten anderer (wahrscheinlicherer)
Szenarien dürfen
durch die Maßnahmen nicht
erhöht werden. Risiken in der
Betriebsphase dürfen gleichfalls
nicht erhöht werden.
• Welche anderen Entwicklungen
sind gemeint (Entscheidungsfeld
2.3)?
Mit der Formulierung wird auf die
Möglichkeit hingewiesen, dass
durch vorgesehene Maßnahmen
eine Optimierung hinsichtlich anderer
Entwicklungen behindert
wird. Diese anderen Entwicklungen
können dabei wahrscheinlich,
weniger wahrscheinlich oder auch
unwahrscheinlich sein.
Abgrenzung
Der AKS hält es für zwingend notwendig,
eine Unterscheidung zwischen
unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
mit einer Restwahrscheinlichkeit und
ausgeschlossenen Entwicklungen
(siehe Abbildung 3) vorzunehmen.
Planungsrechnung
(aus [ZIM 68] entnommen)
Eine quantitative Vorgabe von Kriterien
hält der AKS für nicht praktikabel.
Stattdessen schlägt der AKS
vor, methodisch über folgende
Optionen unwahrscheinliche Entwicklungen
mit einer Restwahrscheinlichkeit
abzuleiten unter der
Voraussetzung, dass diese nicht
bereits im Rahmen des Standortauswahlverfahrens
im Zusammenhang
mit den Ausschlusskriterien ausgeschlossen
wurden:
• Unwahrscheinliche Ereignisse und
Prozesse, die im Rahmen der
Einteilung in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
identifiziert wurden.
• Unwahrscheinliche Ausprägung
von Ereignissen und Prozessen,
die auf die Barrieren des Endlagersystems
wirken.
• Gleichzeitiges Versagen mehrerer
technischer Komponenten aufgrund
voneinander unabhängiger
Ursachen.
Optimierung
Insgesamt vertritt der AKS die Auffassung,
dass die Optimierung des
Endlagersystems eine wesentliche
übergeordnete Zielsetzung ist und zur
steten Aufgabe während der Entwicklungsphasen
eines Endlagers gehört.
Gemäß den Sicherheitsanforderungen
wird jedoch u. U. eine Optimierung
des Endlagersystems gegen
Prozesse verfolgt, die selbst unter
Endlager
(aus [ROS 89] entnommen)
virtually certain, 99–100 % Ereignis ist völlig sicher (100 %) Very likely or certain (p = 1)
extremely likely, 95–100 %
very likely, 90–100 %
likely, 66–100 %
more likely than not,
>50–100 %
Ereignis ist außerordentlich
wahrscheinlich (90 – 99 %)
Ereignis ist sehr wahrscheinlich
(80 – 95 %)
Ereignis ist recht wahrscheinlich
(70 – 90 %)
Ereignis ist wahrscheinlich
(60 – 80 %)
Less than certain,
but reasonably likely (10 -1 )
Not likely, but cannot be ruled
out (10 -2 )
Probably will not occur (10 -3 )
Very unlikely, based on reliable
data (10 -4 )
about as likely as not, 33–66 % Ereignis ist sehr möglich (50 – 70 %) Extremly unlikely (10 -5 )
unlikely, 0–33 %
very unlikely, 0–10 %
extremely unlikely, 0–5 %
exceptionally unlikely, 0–1 %
Ereignis ist durchaus möglich
(40 – 60 %)
Ereignis ist immerhin möglich
(30 – 50 %)
Ereignis ist unwahrscheinlich
(20 – 40 %)
Ereignis ist recht unwahrscheinlich
(10 – 30 %)
Ereignis ist sehr unwahrscheinlich
(5 – 20 %)
Ereignis ist außerordentlich
unwahrscheinlich (1 – 10 %)
Ereignis ist völlig unmöglich (0 %)
Physically possible, but almost
certain not to occur (10 -6 )
Assumed to be physically
impossible, based on the currently
available data (0)
| | Tabelle 1
Gegenüberstellung von Beispielen zur Zuordnung von quantitativen zu qualitativen Wahrscheinlichkeitsangaben
ungünstigen Annahmen nicht am
Standort über den Nachweiszeitraum
zu erwarten sind. Daher sollten diejenigen
Prozesse, die auf Naturereignissen
basieren und durch Auswahlkriterien
am entsprechenden
Standort ausgeschlossen wurden,
nicht weiter behandelt werden. Aus
der Sicht des AKS sollten die Sicherheitsanforderungen
in Bezug auf die
Optimierung des Endlagersystems im
Zusammenhang mit unwahrscheinlichen
Prozessen und Szenarien mit
Restwahrscheinlichkeiten konkretisiert
werden.
Hier sollte generell die Forderung
erhoben werden, dass sich durch Optimierungsmaßnahmen
zum Schutz
vor den Auswirkungen unwahrscheinlicher
Entwicklungen keine Beeinträchtigungen
hinsichtlich der wahrscheinlichen
oder weniger wahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen ergeben
dürfen.
Über den Optimierungsgedanken
hinaus erscheint es nach Ansicht des
AKS zu Anschauungszwecken praktikabel,
eine begrenzte Auswahl von
unwahrscheinlichen und/oder What-
If Fällen zusammenzustellen und die
Robustheit des Endlagersystems und
einzelner Komponenten zu testen und
darzustellen. Der AKS ist jedoch nicht
der Auffassung, dass hierzu regulatorische
Vorgaben erforderlich sind.
Einteilung von Entwicklungen
Unter Berücksichtigung der gemachten
Ausführungen, des Positionspapiers
zum menschlichen Ein dringen
(HI-Szenarien) [AKS 08] und der
Sicherheitsanforderungen [BMU 10]
ergibt sich aus Sicht des AKS für die
Einteilung der Szenarien das in
Abbildung 3 dargestellte Schema.
Der AKS stützt die Festlegungen
in den Sicherheitsanforderungen
[BMU 10], für unwahrscheinliche
Szenarien und Szenarien aufgrund
eines unbeabsichtigten menschlichen
Eindringens in ein Endlager auf
Grenzwerte für zumutbare Risiken
oder zumutbare Strahlenexpositionen
zu verzichten.
Mit Bezug auf die eingangs erwähnte
Fragestellung der Kommission
zur Einteilung von Entwicklungen
in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
ist festzustellen, dass eine solche
Einteilung auch in anderen Fachbzw.
Wissensbereichen vorge nommen
wird.
Die Tabelle 1 beinhaltet Beispiele
von Zuordnungen von qualitativen
zu quantitativen Wahrscheinlichkeitsangaben.
Auffällig ist hierbei, dass
im Vergleich zu den genannten
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Entwicklungen in den Sicher heitsanforde
rungen deutlich mehr als drei
Klassen vorkommen und sowohl die
qualita tive Beschreibung als auch
Wert zuweisung erheblich abweicht.
Die Einordnung in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen
erscheint insgesamt
subjektiv geprägt unter Berücksichtigung
der jeweiligen zu beurteilenden
Problem- bzw. Aufgabenstellung.
Aus dem dargelegten Sachverhalt
kommt der AKS zu dem Schluss, dass
die Einteilung von Entwicklungen in
Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen eine übliche
Vorgehensweise ist und dass eine
solche Klassifizierung im Rahmen des
Langzeitsicherheitsnachweises einen
wesentlichen Aspekt für die Zusammenstellung
von Argumenten darstellt
sowie für die allgemeine Diskussion
ein hilfreiches Unterscheidungsmerkmal
sein kann. Diese Aussage bezieht
sich auch auf die Unterscheidung von
wahrscheinlichen und weniger wahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen. Insgesamt
ist die Einteilung in drei Klassen
durchführbar. Um eine weitere Differenzierung
in Klassen vorzunehmen,
sind verlässliche Daten notwendig, die
oftmals nicht vor liegen. Darüber hinaus
ist aus der Sicht des AKS für die
Diskussion von Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten
eine Vielzahl von Klassen
nicht praktikabel.
Fazit
Die Betrachtung von möglichen Entwicklungen,
die ein Endlagersystem
zukünftig durchlaufen kann, ist ein
wesentlicher Bestandteil im Rahmen
eines Sicherheitsnachweises. Als Voraussetzung
für eine solche Betrachtung
ist es essenziell, den regulatorischen
Rahmen vorzugeben. Insgesamt
stellen die Sicherheitsanforderungen
/BMU 10/ eine solide Grundlage
für die Ableitung von Entwicklungen
und den Umgang mit ihnen
dar. Die Unterteilung der darin geforderten
verschiedenen zu betrachtenden
Entwicklungen ist nicht nur üblich,
sondern kommt einer strukturierten
Vorgehensweise in der weiteren
Beurteilung entgegen. Der AKS
empfiehlt, unwahrscheinliche Szenarien
getrennt von einer systematischen
Entwicklung wahrscheinlicher
und weniger wahrscheinlicher
Szenarien zu behandeln, und hat
einen Vorschlag zur Ableitung von
unwahrscheinlichen Entwicklungen
erarbeitet. Dieser Vorschlag enthält
KONTEC 2019
vom 27. - 29. März 2019 in Dresden
neben den beiden durch die Sicherheitsanforderungen
vorgezeichneten
Vorgehensweisen einen ergänzenden
Ansatz.
Der AKS schlägt vor, unwahrscheinliche
Entwicklungen anhand
ihrer Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit in
residuale und auszuschließende Entwicklungen
einzuteilen.
Im Folgenden wird in allgemeiner
Form skizziert, welche inhaltlichen
Merkmale von Anforderungen hinsichtlich
Beschreibung, Ableitung,
Umgang und Abgrenzung der zu betrachtenden
Entwicklungen und insbesondere
unwahrscheinlicher Entwicklungen
aus der Sicht des AKS als
wesentlich erachtet werden. Der AKS
ist sich dessen bewusst, dass die o. g.
inhaltlichen Merkmale sich vermutlich
nicht in allen Punkten in dem erforderlichen
Detaillierungsgrad ausgestalten
lassen:
• Die Begriffsbestimmungen zu
unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen
sind klar, unmissverständlich und
eindeutig zu formulieren.
• Der Interpretationsspielraum bei
der Deutung von Begrifflichkeiten
ist dabei soweit wie möglich zu
reduzieren.
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DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 599
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Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 600
• Der Einfluss durch subjektive
Beurteilung bzw. Auslegung von
Anforderungen sollte durch entsprechende
Vorgaben so gering
wie möglich gehalten werden.
• Der Umgang mit den Entwicklungen
muss praktikabel sein.
• Die Abgrenzung der Entwick lungen
untereinander muss eindeutig sein.
Die Übergänge zwischen den einzelnen
Entwicklungen sollten nach
Möglichkeit keine bzw. nur geringe
Überlappungsbereiche aufweisen.
• Insbesondere eine Argumentation
zur Identifizierung auszuschließen
der Entwicklungen aus
der Gruppe der unwahrscheinlichen
Entwicklungen unter
Berücksichtigung des Nachweiszeitraumes
ist vorzusehen.
Referenzen
[AKS 08]
[BEU 12]
[BEU 13]
[BMU 10]
[BUH 08]
Arbeitskreis “Szenarienentwicklung”
(AKS): Position des Arbeitskreises
„Szenarienentwicklung“,
Behandlung des menschlichen Eindringens
in ein Endlager für radioaktive
Abfälle in tiefen geologischen
Formationen. atw – Internationale
Zeitschrift für Kernenergie,
Bd. 53, Heft 8/9 August/
September, 2008.
Beuth, T., Bracke, G., Buhmann, D.,
Dresbach, C., Keller, S., Krone, J.,
Lommerzheim, A., Mönig, J.,
Mrugalla, S., Rübel, A., Wolf, J.:
Szenarienentwicklung, Methodik
und Anwendung, Bericht zum
Arbeitspaket 8, Vorläufige Sicherheitsanalyse
für den Standort
Gorleben. Bundesanstalt für
Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe
(BGR), DBE TECHNOLOGY GmbH
(DBETEC), Gesellschaft für
Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS) mbH, GRS-284, 239 S., ISBN
978-3-939355-60-1, Gesellschaft
für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS) mbH: Köln, 2012.
Beuth, T.: Vorschlag zur Einordnung
von Szenarien für tiefe geologische
Endlager in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen.
GRS-296, 39 S.,
ISBN 978-3-939355-75-5, Gesellschaft
für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS) mbH: Köln, 2013.
Bundesministerium für Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit
(BMU): Sicherheitsanforderungen
an die Endlagerung
wärmeentwickelnder radioaktiver
Abfälle. 22 S.: Bonn,
30. September 2010.
Buhmann, D., Mönig, J., Wolf, J.,
Heusermann, S., Keller, S., Weber,
J. R., Bollingerfehr, W., Filbert, W.,
Kreienmeyer, M., Krone, J., Tholen,
M.: Zusammenfassender Abschlussbericht,
Überprüfung und
Bewertung des Instrumentariums
für eine sicherheitliche Bewertung
von Endlagern für HAW (Projekt
ISIBEL). Gesellschaft für
Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS) mbH, DBE TECHNOLOGY
GmbH (DBETEC), Bundesanstalt
für Geo wissenschaften und Rohstoffe
(BGR), TEC-09-2008-AB:
Braunschweig, April 2008.
[ESK 12a] Entsorgungskommission (ESK):
Empfehlung der Entsorgungskommission;
Leitlinie zur Einordnung
von Entwicklungen in Wahrscheinlichkeitsklassen;
Revidierte
Fassung vom 13.11.2012 nach
Verabschiedung durch die ESK
im Umlaufverfahren (diese
Fassung ersetzt die Fassung vom
21.06.2012). Bonn, 13. November
2012.
[ESK 12b] Entsorgungskommission (ESK):
Empfehlung der Entsorgungskommission;
Leitlinie zum menschlichen
Eindringen in ein Endlager
für radioaktive Abfälle; Fassung
vom 26.04.2012. Bonn, 26. April
2012.
[IAEA 11]
[IAEA 12]
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA): Disposal of Radioactive
Waste. IAEA Specific Safety
Requirements, SSR-5, 62 S., ISBN
978-92-0-103010-8: Vienna, 2011.
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA): The Safety Case
and Safety Assessment for the
Disposal of Radioactive Waste.
IAEA Safety Standards Series,
Specific Safety Guide SSG-23, ISBN
978-92-0-128310-8: Vienna, 2012.
[KOM 16] Kommission Lagerung hoch radioaktiver
Abfallstoffe: Abschlussbericht
der Kommission Lagerung
hoch radioaktiver Abfallstoffe.
K-Drs. 268, 683 S.: Berlin,
30. August 2016.
[LOM 15]
[LOM 18]
[NEA 16]
[PAC 15]
Lommerzheim, A., Bebiolka, A.,
Jahn, S., Jobmann, M., Meleshyn,
A., Mrugalla, S., Rheinhold, K.,
Rübel, A., Stark, L.: Szenarienentwicklung
für das Endlagerstandortmodell
NORD, Methodik und
Anwendung, Projekt ANSICHT. DBE
TECHNOLOGY GmbH (DBETEC),
Technischer Bericht, TEC-17-2014-
AP, 92 S.: Peine, 30. Juni 2015.
Lommerzheim, A., Jobmann, M.,
Meleshyn, A., Mrugalla, S., Rübel,
A., Stark, L.: Safety Concept, FEP
Catalogue, and Scenario Development
as Fundamentals of Longterm
Safety Demonstration for
High-Level Waste Repositories in
German Clay Formations. In: Norris,
S., Neeft, E.A.C., van Geet, M. (E.)
(Hrsg.): Multiple Roles of Clays in
Radioactive Waste Confinement.
SP482, S. SP482.6, DOI 10.1144/
SP482.6, Geological Society,
London, Special Publications,
2018.
Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development –
Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-
NEA): Scenario Development
Workshop Synopsis, Integration
Group for the Safety Case. NEA/
RWM/R(2015)3, 2016.
Pachauri, R. K., Meyer, L. (Hrsg.):
Climate change 2014, Synthesis
report, Contribution of Working
Groups I, II and III to the Fifth
[ROS 89]
[STA 13]
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate
Change. Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), 151 S.,
ISBN 978-92-9169-143-2: Geneva,
Switzerland, 2015.
Ross, B.: Scenarios for repository
safety analysis. Engineering
Geology, Bd. 26, Nr. 4, S. 285–299,
DOI 10.1016/0013-
7952(89)90018-5, 1989.
Gesetz zur Suche und Auswahl
eines Standortes für ein Endlager
für Wärme entwickelnde radioaktive
Abfälle (Standortauswahlgesetz
– StandAG) in der Fassung
vom 23. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I 2013,
Nr. 41, S. 2553).
[WEN 14] Working Group on Waste and
Decommissioning (WGWD)
(Hrsg.): Radioactive Waste Disposal
Facilities Safety Reference Levels.
Western European Nuclear
Regulators Association (WENRA),
22. Dezember 2014.
[ZIM 68]
Authors
Zimmermann, W.: Planungsrechnung,
Optimierungsrechnungen,
Wirtschaftlichkeitsrechnungen,
Netzplantechnik. Das moderne
Industrieunternehmen, Betriebswirtschaft
für Ingenieure, ISBN
9783663009252, Vieweg+-
Teubner Verlag: Wiesbaden, 1968.
Bundesgesellschaft für
Endlagerung mbH (BGE):
Orzechowski, J.; Stolzenberg, G.;
Wollrath, J.
BGE TECHNOLOGY GmbH
(BGE TEC):
Lommerzheim, A.
Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften
und Rohstoffe (BGR):
Mrugalla, S.
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH:
Beuth, T.; Bracke, G.; Mayer, K.-M.;
Mönig, J.; Rübel, A.; Wolf, J.
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie,
Institut für Nukleare Entsorgung
(KIT-INE):
Metz, V.
Technische Universität Clausthal,
Institut für Endlagerforschung
(TUC-IELF):
Chaudry, S.; Plischke, E.; Röhlig, K.-J.
Anschrift des Verfassers:
Arbeitskreis
„Szenarienentwicklung“
Kontakt: Gesellschaft für Anlagenund
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS)
gGmbH
Bereich Stilllegung und Entsorgung
Schwertnergasse 1
50667 Köln, Deutschland
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Position paper: Probability Classes and Handling of Improbable Developments ı
T. Beuth, G. Bracke, S. Chaudry, A. Lommerzheim, K.-M. Mayer, V. Metz, J. Mönig, S. Mrugalla, J. Orzechowski, E. Plischke, K.-J. Röhlig, A. Rübel, G. Stolzenberg, J. Wolf and J. Wollrath

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Der Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen:
Eine interdisziplinäre Aufgabe
für Nachwuchskräfte
David Anton, Manuel Reichardt, Thomas Hassel und Harald Budelmann
1 Einleitung Nur wenige Monate nach der Havarie des japanischen Kernkraftwerks Fukushima Daiichi im
März 2011 wurde von der deutschen Bundesregierung der schrittweise Ausstieg aus der kommerziellen Nutzung der
Kernenergie bis spätestens Ende 2022 beschlossen. Anfang des Jahres 2018 befanden sich nach [3] in Deutschland
noch sieben Kernreaktoren im Leistungsbetrieb. Entsprechend [4] wurde bei drei Leistungsreaktoren der Betrieb
eingestellt, während sich 23 Leistungs- bzw. Prototypreaktoren bereits in Stilllegung befinden. Mit dem Inkrafttreten
des „Gesetzes zur Neuordnung der Verantwortung in der kerntechnischen Entsorgung” im Juni 2017 wurde der „Fonds
zur Finan zierung der kerntechnischen Entsorgung“ errichtet. Durch die Bildung des Fonds durch die Betreiber und den
damit verbundenen Übergang der Verantwortlichkeit für die Reststoffe an den Bund ist der Weg für den von den
Betreibern verantworteten Rückbau koordiniert gestaltet.
Beim Rückbau von Kernkraft werken
müssen vielfältige Rand bedingungen
und Anforderungen beachtet werden,
die neben den rechtlichen insbesondere
auch komplexe verfah -
rens- und strahlenschutztechnische
Aspekte berühren. Wesentlich ist in
diesem Zusammenhang auch die Aufgabe
des fachgerechten Umgangs
mit den beim Rückbau anfallenden
Materialien. Mit Schacht Konrad befindet
sich bereits ein planfestgestelltes
Endlager für Abfälle mit vernachlässigbarer
Wärmeentwicklung
in der Errichtung. Jedoch sind Ort
und Zeitpunkt für die Inbetriebnahme
eines Endlagers für hoch radioaktive,
Wärme entwickelnde Abfälle in
Deutschland bis heute noch relativ
ungewiss.
Sowohl für den Rückbau der zahlreichen
Kernkraftwerke als auch
für den fachgerechten Umgang mit
den dabei anfallenden radioaktiven
Abfällen wird Fachpersonal der unterschiedlichsten
Disziplinen benötigt.
Die große Komplexität der Gesamtaufgabe
erfordert darüber hinaus eine
interdisziplinäre Herangehensweise
an die jeweiligen Einzelaspekte.
Im folgenden Artikel wird daher
am Beispiel des Rückbaus von Kernkraftwerken
schlaglichtartig anhand
der vielfältigen Herausforderungen
auf die große Bedeutung des Kompetenzerhalts
hingewiesen. Für die
erfolgreiche Durchführung der zahlreich
anstehenden Rückbauprojekte
ist dies dringend erforderlich – die
Notwendigkeit fachspezifischer Ausbildungswege,
Forschungsarbeiten
und der Weitergabe von Erfahrungen
an junge Nachwuchskräfte bleibt auch
deutlich über das Jahr 2022 hinaus
bestehen. Zudem kann die Kompetenz
im Bereich des Rückbaus auch
zukünftig im internationalen Maßstab
genutzt werden.
Die folgenden Ausführungen
geben die wesentlichen Inhalte einer
Bachelorarbeit mit dem Titel Der
Rückbau von Leichtwasserreaktoren
unter verfahrens- und strahlenschutztechnischen
Gesichtspunkten wieder,
die im Rahmen des Forschungsprojektes
ENTRIA – Entsorgungsoptionen
für radioaktive Reststoffe: Interdisziplinäre
Analysen und Entwicklung von
Bewertungsgrundlagen an der TU
Braunschweig in Kooperation mit der
LU Hannover angefertigt wurde.
2 Herausforderungen und
Randbedingungen
Die Entwicklung eines Rückbaukonzeptes
für eine kerntechnische Anlage
nimmt idealerweise schon mit der
Inbetriebnahme ihren Anfang. Bis
zur Durchführung der einzelnen
Rückbaumaßnahmen durchläuft das
Rückbaukonzept mehrere Iterationsschritte,
in denen der Detailgrad zunehmend
erhöht wird.
Die Ausarbeitung des Konzeptes
für eine Rückbaumaßnahme wird
wesentlich durch die vorliegenden
Randbedingungen beeinflusst, wie
z. B. durch die gewählte Rückbaustrategie,
den Reaktortyp, die räumliche
Struktur, die vorhandene Infrastruktur,
die radiologische Situation
oder weitere strahlenschutztechnische
Aspekte in der kerntechnischen
Anlage. Weitere Randbedingungen
lassen sich [24] entnehmen.
Die einzelnen Randbedingungen
sind nicht isoliert voneinander zu
betrachten, sondern stehen in vielfachen
Wechselwirkungen und sind
dabei häufig individuell vom jeweiligen
Stilllegungsprojekt abhängig.
Die Erstellung eines universell
anwend baren Rückbaukonzeptes ist
daher nicht möglich und muss vielmehr
unter Berücksichtigung der
vorlie genden Gegebenheiten für jede
kerntechnische Anlage individuell
erstellt bzw. angepasst werden.
2.1 Stilllegungsziel und
Rückbaustrategie
Der Rückbau einer kerntechnischen
Anlage ist abgeschlossen, sobald diese
aus dem Geltungsbereich des Atomgesetzes
(AtG) entlassen ist. Eine
Möglichkeit besteht im kompletten
Rückbau der kerntechnischen Anlage
bis hin zur Wiederherstellung der
sprichwörtlichen „Grünen Wiese“.
Alternativ können Gebäudestrukturen
auf dem Gelände verbleiben,
freigegeben und einer anderen
Nutzung zugeführt werden.
Zur Erreichung des Stilllegungsziels
standen in Deutschland bisher
grundsätzlich zwei unterschiedliche
Rückbaustrategien zur Verfügung:
der direkte Rückbau und der sichere
Einschluss mit anschließendem
Rückbau. Mit Inkrafttreten des o. g.
Gesetzes zur Neuordnung der Verantwortung
in der kerntechnischen
Entsorgung wurde das AtG u. a. dahingehend
geändert, dass der sichere
Einschluss als Option für noch stillzulegende
bzw. rückzubauende Anlagen
ausgeschlossen ist. Für die Zukunft
entfällt damit zumindest in Deutschland
die Abwägung zwischen dem
direkten Rückbau und dem sicheren
Einschluss des jeweiligen Kraftwerks.
Für einzelne Komponenten der Anlage
sind aus strahlenschutztechnischen
Gründen jedoch Ausnahmen
möglich. Die betreffenden Komponenten
werden ausgebaut und erst im
Anschluss an eine Abklinglagerung
zerlegt. Dieses Vorgehen bietet sich
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DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 602
z. B. für Reaktordruckbehälter (RDB)
und die Dampferzeuger aus Druckwasserreaktoren
an und wird z. B.
im KKW Greifswald in Lubmin verfolgt.
Dem Rückbau der kerntechnischen
Anlage ist die Nachbetriebsphase
vorangestellt, die sich an die Leistungs
betriebsphase anschließt und bis
zur Erteilung der Stilllegungsgenehmigung
andauert. In diesem
Zeitraum können nach immer noch
gültiger Betriebsgenehmigung bereits
vorbereitende Maßnahmen getroffen
werden, wie. z. B die Entladung des
Brennstoffs aus dem RDB.
2.2 Anlagenart
Weltweit sind verschiedenste Reaktorkonzepte
in Betrieb. In Deutschland
werden als Leistungs- und Prototypreaktoren
fast ausschließlich Leichtwasserreaktoren
(LWR) eingesetzt,
in denen leichtes Wasser (H 2 O) als
Moderator und zugleich als Kühlmittel
verwendet wird. Der Einfluss
des Reaktortyps auf das Rückbaukonzept
kann gut an einem wesentlichen
Unterschied zwischen Siedewasser-
(SWR) und Druckwasserreaktoren
(DWR) verdeutlicht werden.
Sowohl im SWR als auch im DWR
befinden sich die Brennstäbe im RDB.
Im SWR verdampft das Kühlmittel
direkt und wird über den Wasser-
Dampf-Kreislauf in die Turbine geleitet,
die an einen Generator gekoppelt
ist. Neben den durch Aktivierung entstandenen
Radionukliden führt das
Kühlmittel auch freigewordene Spaltprodukte
mit sich, sodass alle Komponenten
des Kreislaufs kontaminiert
werden. Aus diesem Grund muss bei
SWR das Maschinenhaus, welches
Rohrleitungen, Generator und Kondensator
umgibt, ebenfalls als
Kontrollbereich ausgewiesen werden.
Im Unterschied zu SWR werden
DWR mit zwei separaten Kreisläufen
ausgeführt. Das Kühlmittel führt die
Wärme aus dem RDB ab und transportiert
sie über den Primärkreislauf zu
den Dampferzeugern. In den Dampferzeugern,
der Schnittstelle zwischen
Primär- und Sekundärkreislauf, verdampft
das Speisewasser des Sekundärkreislaufs
und wird über diesen in
die Turbine geführt. Durch diesen
konstruktiven Unterschied beschränkt
sich die Kontamination in DWR
lediglich auf die Komponenten des
Primärkreislaufs.
Auch weitere Bestandteile des
Kraftwerks sind jeweils reaktor- bzw.
anlagenspezifisch auslegt und begründen
jeweils eigene Randbedingungen
für deren Rückbau.
2.3 Kontamination und
Aktivierung
Genauso wie der Leistungsbetrieb ist
der Rückbau einer kerntechnischen
Anlage unvermeidbar mit dem
Umgang mit aktivierten und/oder
kontaminierten Materialien verbunden.
Hiervon können unterschiedliche
Strahlenbelastungen ausgehen.
Die Aktivierung von Materialien
tritt durch die Absorption von Neutronen
ein. Durch diese Wechselwirkung
mit Neutronen werden die bestrahlten
Materialien selbst radioaktiv. Betroffen
sind hiervon hauptsächlich die
Kernbereiche des RDB, seine Einbauten
und der den RDB umgebende
biologische Schild. Eine Dekontamination
aktivierter Materialien ist
nicht möglich, weshalb diese als
radio aktiver Abfall entsorgt werden
müssen. Als Kontamination bezeichnet
man im Gegensatz dazu u. a. die
Anlagerung von Radionukliden an
Oberflächen. Kontaminierte Oberflächen
können durch Dekontaminationsmaßnahmen
zum größten Teil
von Radionukliden befreit werden.
Durch Dekontaminationsmaßnahmen
kann erreicht werden, dass die
nuklidspezifischen Freigabewerte der
Strahlenschutzverordnung (StrlSchV)
unterschritten werden. Die Materialien
verlassen in diesem Fall den
Geltungsbereich des AtG sowie
die strahlenschutzrechtliche Überwachung
und werden freigemessen.
Den rechtlichen Rahmen zur Freigabe
bildet aktuell (s. u.) § 29 StrlSchV.
Die Möglichkeiten der weiteren Verwendung
oder Verwertung bzw. der
Entsorgung sind jeweils abhängig von
der gewählten Freigabeoption. Die
Freigabe von Materialien ist ein entscheidendes
Werkzeug zur Reduktion
des endzulagernden Abfallvolumens.
Beim Rückbau von kerntech nischen
Anlagen entstehen ver schiedene
Materialströme. Unter Anwendung
von Dekontaminationsmaßnahmen
kann die Masse des endzulagernden
radio aktiven Abfalls erheblich verringert
werden. Ent sprechend [2] reduziert
sich beispielhaft die Masse des
endzulagernden radioaktiven Abfalls
für den Rückbau eines DWR-Referenzkraftwerks
durch Dekontamination auf
nur etwa 2,6 % der Gesamtmasse des
Kontroll bereichs. Neben dem Reaktortyp
und der Größe des KKW beeinflusst
auch die Rückbaustrategie die Menge
des endzulagernden Abfalls erheblich
(s. o.).
2.4 Strahlenschutz
Ein weiterer wesentlicher Aspekt
beim Rückbau eines KKW ist der
Strahlenschutz. Insbesondere für
Nachwuchskräfte können die verschiedenen
Dosisbegriffe (Energiedosis,
Organdosis, effektive Dosis,
Ortsdosis, Personendosis etc.) und
die vielfältigen Regelungen zunächst
irritierend wirken.
Zum Schutz von Mensch und Umwelt
vor Schäden durch ionisierende
Strahlung ist der Umgang mit radioaktiven
Stoffen gesetzlich geregelt.
Aktuell wird in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland die EURATOM-Richtlinie
2013/59/EURATOM in nationales
Recht umgesetzt. Ein wesentlicher
Bestandteil dessen ist das „Gesetz zur
Neuordnung des Rechts zum Schutz
vor der schädlichen Wirkung ionisierender
Strahlung“. Ein Großteil der
rechtlichen Vorschriften zum Strahlenschutz
in kerntechnischen Anlagen
war bisher in der StrlSchV enthalten,
die sich an den Empfehlungen der
Internationalen Strahlenschutzkommission
(International Commission
on Radiological Protection, ICRP), der
ICRP Publikation 103 [5] orientieren.
Im Strahlenschutz gelten im Allgemeinen
die drei Grundsätze Rechtfertigung,
Dosisbegrenzung und Optimierung.
Durch die Beachtung dieser
Prinzipien sollen deterministische
Schäden vermieden und stochastische
Schäden eingegrenzt werden.
Für beruflich strahlenexponierte
Personen werden größere effektive
bzw. Organdosen zugelassen als für
Einzelpersonen der Bevölkerung. In
kerntechnischen Anlagen werden
Strahlenschutzbereiche ausgewiesen,
die in Überwachungs-, Kontroll- und
Sperrbereich eingeteilt sind. Die Einteilung
orientiert sich an der möglichen
Strahlenexposition, die eine
Person im jeweiligen Bereich erfahren
könnte. Die Grenzwerte für beruflich
strahlenexponierte Personen geben
jedoch keine unmittelbare Information
über die tatsächlich vorhandene
Strahlenexposition. Auch für
den Rückbau besteht eine wesentliche
Herausforderung für den Strahlenschutz
darin, die Schutzmaßnahmen
unter gleichzeitiger Beachtung der
Randbedingungen und der Wirtschaftlichkeit
der gewählten Maßnahmen
zu optimieren. International
wird diese Optimierungsaufgabe auch
als ALARA-Prinzip (as low as reasonably
achievable) bezeichnet.
2.5 Verfahrenstechnik
Ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der Erarbeitung
eines Rückbaukonzeptes ist
die Auswahl einer Zerlegetechnik für
die vorgesehene Rückbaumaßnahme.
Hierzu steht eine Vielzahl bereits
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bewährter thermischer und mechanischer
Verfahren zur Verfügung. Die
Auswahl einer geeigneten Zerlegetechnik
geschieht ebenfalls unter
Berücksichtigung der vorliegenden
Randbedingungen, auf deren Grundlage
sich die Zerlegetechniken nach
ihrer technischen Eignung und unter
strahlenschutztechnischen Gesichtspunkten
bewerten lassen. Die technischen
Eigenschaften umfassen u. a.
die trennbare Materialart und -stärke,
die Schnittgeschwindigkeit, die Eignung
zur fernhantierten Manipulation
sowie zum Unterwassereinsatz
und die Prozessrobustheit. Zu den
strahlenschutztechnischen Aspekten
gehören z. B. die Art und Menge des
erzeugten Abfalls, die Bewährtheit
der Zerlegetechnik, die Universalität
und deren Rüst- und Wartungsaufwand.
Die folgenden Beispiele bereits
durchgeführter Rückbaumaßnahmen
an RDB verdeutlichen die Vielfalt
bereits verfügbarer technischer Verfahren.
Trockene Zerlegung
im KKW Würgassen
Das Rückbaukonzept des KKW Würgassen
sah eine trockene Zerlegung
des RDB in Einbaulage vor. Der Rückbau
wurde mit dem Entfernen des
Reaktordruckbehälterdeckels und der
Entnahme der Einbauten aus dem
RDB eingeleitet.
Nach der Trockenlegung wurde
die Innenseite des RDB durch Hochdruckwasserstrahlen
dekontaminiert
und anschließend aus strahlenschutztechnischen
Gründen lackiert: Der
Lack hatte die Aufgabe, verbliebene
Kon taminationen zu binden und
die Freisetzung von kontaminierten
Aero solen während der Zerlegung
zu reduzieren. Zudem wurde der
RDB zur Strahlenabschirmung mit
Wasser gefüllt und der Füllstand
jeweils an den Zerlegefortschritt angepasst.
Die Zerlegung des RDB begann
am Flansch, dem oberen Ende des
zylindrischen Bereichs, auf den
der Reaktordruckbehälterdeckel aufgesetzt
und mit dem dieser verschraubt
wird. Von dort wurde der
RDB von oben nach unten entsprechend
des Schnittplans in insgesamt
252 Segmente geteilt.
Für die Segmentierung des Flansches
kam eine Bandsäge zum
Einsatz. Der zylindrische Teil des
RDB wurde fernbedient durch Wasserabrasivsuspensionsstrahlschneiden
in kleine Teile geschnitten. Anschließend
wurde die Bodenkalotte aus
ihrer Einbaulage gehoben und mit
Hilfe thermischer Verfahren zerlegt.
Die Segmente des Reaktordruckbehälterdeckels,
des Flansches, des
oberen zylindrischen Bereiches und
der Bodenkalotte konnten nach erfolgter
Dekontamination freigegeben
werden. Die restlichen Segmente
mussten endlagergerecht konditioniert
und der Zwischenlagerung am
Standort zugeführt werden.
Zur Vermeidung der Ausbreitung
von Aerosolen fand die trockene
Zerlegung des RDB in einem luftdicht
abgeschlossenen Arbeitsbereich mit
Absaug- und Filtervorrichtung statt.
Unterwasserzerlegung
im Japan Power Demonstration
Reactor (JPDR)
Der Rückbau des RDB im JPDR fand
unter Wasser in Einbaulage statt. Die
besondere Herausforderung lag daher
in der fernbedienten Zerlegung geometrisch
komplexer Strukturen im
Unterwassereinsatz und unter beengten
räumlichen Verhältnissen.
Zuerst wurde der RDB vollständig
freigestellt und seine inneren Einbauten
durch Plasmaschneiden im RDB
fernbedient unter Wasser zerlegt, aus
diesem entnommen und in Stahlcontainern
verpackt. Um den RDB
herum wurde für dessen Rückbau ein
Wasserbecken errichtet, das für die
Zerlegearbeiten mit Wasser geflutet
wurde. Das Wasser diente der Strahlenabschirmung
und zugleich der
Aufnahme der entstehenden Hydrosole.
Die Errichtung des Beckens im
Strahlungsfeld des RDB war allerdings
mit einem hohen technischen
Aufwand verbunden.
Für die fernbediente Zerlegung
des RDB und seines bis zu 270 mm
dicken Flansches wurde die dafür
entwickelte Technik „Arc Saw“ angewendet,
die dem Kontakt-Lichtbogen-
Metall-Trennschleifen (CAMG) entspricht.
Bei diesem Verfahren werden
Hydrosole freigesetzt, was für eine
ausreichende Sichtfähigkeit zusätzliche
Absaug- und Filteranlagen erforderlich
machte.
Die Schnittstücke wurden über
eine fernbediente Einrichtung aus
dem Arbeitsbereich entnommen,
woraufhin diese der Konditionierung
zugeführt wurden.
Abklinglagerung
im KKW Greifswald (KGR)
Im Gegensatz zur direkten Zerlegung
in den beiden vorherigen Beispielen
wird im Rückbaukonzept von fünf
RDB des KGR vor der Zerlegung eine
Abklinglagerung vorgesehen.
Zu den vorbereitenden Maßnahmen
für den Ausbau gehörte
das vollständige Freistellen der RDB
und die Demontage der Einbauten,
die einer separaten Behandlung
zugeführt wurden.
Nach dem Ausbau der RDB aus
ihrer Einbauposition wurden sie
mittels Schwerlasttransporter zur Abklinglagerung
in das Zwischenlager
Nord (ZLN) verbracht, das sich direkt
am Standort des KGR befindet.
Die RDB mussten für den Transport
und die Zwischenlagerung an
stark aktivierten Bereichen abgeschirmt
werden.
Während der mehrjährigen Abklinglagerung
verliert die Komponente
an Aktivität, wodurch die
spätere Zerlegung des RDB verfahrens-
und strahlenschutztechnisch
vereinfacht wird. Die Durchführung
eines solchen Rückbaukonzeptes setzt
voraus, dass die Infrastruktur und die
räumliche Struktur des KKW einen
Ausbau des RDB zulassen. Außerdem
bedingt das Konzept die Verfügbarkeit
von ausreichend Lagerkapazität.
Beim Ausschleusen der RDB muss
zudem sichergestellt werden, dass
keine Radionuklide in die Umwelt
gelangen.
2.6 Entsorgung der
radioaktiven Abfälle
Neben den vielfältigen Herausforderungen
in den Phasen der Planung
und Umsetzung des Rückbaukonzeptes
ergibt sich eine weitere wichtige
Aufgabenstellung aus der Entsorgung
der durch die Kernenergienutzung
entstandenen radioaktiven Abfälle. In
Deutschland wird zwischen Wärme
entwickelnden Abfällen und Abfällen
mit vernachlässigbarer Wärmeentwicklung
unterschieden.
Die hochradioaktiven, Wärme entwickelnden
Abfälle setzen sich in
Deutschland vor allem aus bestrahlten
Brennelementen und den verglasten
Abfällen aus der Wiederaufarbeitung
zusammen. Die radioaktiven Abfälle
aus dem Rückbau kerntechnischer
Anlagen gehören zu den schwachund
mittelradioaktiven Abfällen mit
vernachlässigbarer Wärmeentwicklung.
Für diese ist eine Endlagerung
im planfestgestellten Schacht Konrad
vorgesehen. Die radioaktiven Abfälle
mit vernachlässigbarer Wärmeentwicklung
nehmen nach [16] weniger
als 1 % des Aktivitätsgehalts, jedoch
etwa 90 % des Abfallvolumens ein.
Schacht Konrad befindet sich derzeit
noch im Ausbau zu einem Endlager,
sodass die radioaktiven Abfälle aktuell
noch zwischengelagert werden
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 603
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: An Interdisciplinary Task for Junior Staff ı David Anton, Manuel Reichardt, Thomas Hassel and Harald Budelmann

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 604
müssen. Mit der Fertigstellung des
betriebsbereiten Endlagers wird nach
[6] im Jahr 2027 gerechnet.
Bevor der radioaktive Abfall in
das Endlager verbracht werden
kann, muss dieser konditioniert
und verpackt werden. Durch die Konditionierung
sollen die Anforderungen
der chemischen Stabilität,
Verfestigung und Abwesenheit von
freiem Wasser erfüllt werden. Zusätzlich
kann durch die Konditionierung
eine Volumenreduktion des Abfalls
erreicht werden. Die Verpackung des
radioaktiven Abfalls ist abhängig von
dessen Aktivität und Volumen und hat
die Aufgabe, die Radionuklide sicher
einzuschließen und eine bessere
Handhabbarkeit zu gewährleisten.
3 Resümee
In den vorherigen Abschnitten werden
einige Herausforderungen und
Randbedingungen skizziert, die mit
dem Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen
einhergehen. Im Vergleich zum
Rückbau konventioneller Anlagen
werden die Arbeiten in kerntechnischen
Anlagen durch die radiologische
Belastung erheblich erschwert.
Das Rückbaukonzept muss unter
Berücksichtigung der vielfältigen
Randbedingungen für jede kerntechnische
Anlage individuell erarbeitet
bzw. angepasst werden.
Die Vielseitigkeit der Herausforderungen
im Zusammenhang mit dem
Rückbau kerntechnischer Anlagen
und der Zwischen- bzw. Endlagerung
der radioaktiven Abfälle unterstreicht
die Notwendigkeit einer interdisziplinären
Herangehensweise. Aus rein
technischer Sicht werden für den
erfolgreichen Rückbau nicht nur
fundierte Kenntnisse in der Verfahrenstechnik
und im Strahlenschutz
benötigt, sondern insbesondere auch
auf dem Gebiet der Kerntechnik.
Wegen der großen Anzahl an anstehenden
Rückbauprojekten und noch
ungeklärten Fragen der Zwischenund
Endlagerung der hochradioaktiven
Abfälle wird das Themenfeld
der kerntechnischen Entsorgung
generationenübergreifend präsent
sein. Eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung
schließt damit beispielsweise auch gesellschaftswissenschaftliche,
ethische
und rechtliche Aspekte mit ein, sodass
Spannungsfelder entstehen, die
unterschiedlichste Fachgebiete disziplinär
und interdisziplinär fordern
und transdisziplinär in die Gesellschaft
ausstrahlen müssen. Ein Abriss
über Spannungsfelder, die bei der
Erarbeitung eines Entsorgungskonzeptes
für radioaktive Reststoffe
aufkommen, wird im ENTRIA-Memorandum
[30] gegeben.
Für die erfolgreiche Bewältigung
dieser Aufgabe ist es unabdingbar, die
Entsorgungsforschung und den Nachwuchs
an jungen Fachkräften nach
dem Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie
noch langzeitig zu fördern, um das
Wissen und bereits gewonnene Erfahrungen
weiterzugeben. Jedoch
werden schon heute nur noch wenige
Studierende in der Kerntechnik ausgebildet,
sodass sich nur wenige
Studienangebote mit Bezug zur Kerntechnik
finden lassen. Darüber hinaus
wird in traditionellen technischen
Studiengängen wie dem Maschinenbau
oder Bauingenieurwesen nur
vereinzelt und randständig auf die
vielseitigen Herausforderungen des
Rückbaus und der kerntechnischen
Entsorgung aufmerksam gemacht.
Die wenigen Masterstudiengänge,
die den Rückbau kerntechnischer-
Anlagen thematisieren, sind meist
sehr spezifisch aufgestellt.
Aus der persönlichen Erfahrung:
Aus den vorgenannten Gründen ist es
beispielsweise für mich, David Anton,
als Absolvent des interdisziplinär
angelegten Bachelorstudiengangs
Umweltingenieurwesen, schwierig,
eine Zulassung zu diesen Masterstudiengängen
zu erhalten bzw. die
Zulassung ist mit umfangreichen
Auflagen verbunden.
Für die Hochschulausbildung wäre
es aus meiner Sicht wünschenswert,
die Aufmerksamkeit auch vermehrt
auf den Rückbau kerntechnischer
Anlagen und die Entsorgung radioaktiver
Abfälle zu lenken und dies
durch interdisziplinäre Studienangebote
zu untermauern. Ein Beispiel
für solche Ansätze ist die interdisziplinäre
Ringvorlesung „Kernenergie
und Brennstoffkreislauf“, gehalten
von ENTRIA-Wissenschaftlern unterschiedlicher
Fachrichtungen.
Ich selbst wurde eher zufällig
auf das Gebiet der Kerntechnik aufmerksam,
weil ich über eine Tätigkeit
als studentische Hilfskraft am Institut
für Baustoffe, Massivbau und Brandschutz
(iBMB) der TU Braunschweig
in Kontakt mit Forschungsarbeiten
zum bereits erwähnten Verbund projekt
ENTRIA gekommen bin. Schließlich
verfasste ich die überblicksartig
wiedergegebene Bachelorarbeit, die
gemeinsam vom iBMB und dem
Unterwassertech nikum am Institut
für Werkstoffkunde an der LU Hannover
betreut und geprüft wurde.
In diesem Zusammenhang möchte
ich abschließend den Beteiligten
des Forschungsprojektes ENTRIA
für die Betreuung meiner Bachelorarbeit
und besonders für das Heranführen
an dieses komplexe aber auch
sehr interessante Themenfeld meinen
Dank aussprechen.
Referenzen
[1] Anton, David: Der Rückbau von Leichtwasserreaktoren
unter verfahrens- und
strahlenschutztechnischen Gesichtspunkten.
Technische Universität Braunschweig,
Bachelorarbeit, 2016
[2] “Arbeitskreis Abfallmanagement” VGB
PowerTech e. V. (Hrsg.): Entsorgung von
Kernkraftwerken : Eine technisch
gelöste Aufgabe. Essen : 2011
[3] Bundesamt für kerntechnische Entsorgungssicherheit:
Kerntechnische
Anlagen in Deutschland “In Betrieb“.
URL: https://www.bfe.bund.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/BfE/DE/
berichte/kt/kernanlagen-betrieb.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7.
Stand: Januar 2018;
Zugriff: 30. August 2018
[4] Bundesamt für kerntechnische Entsorgungssicherheit:
Kerntechnische
Anlagen in Deutschland “In Stilllegung“.
URL: https://www.bfe.bund.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/BfE/DE/
berichte/kt/kernanlagen-stilllegung.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=14.
Stand: April 2018;
Zugriff: 30. August 2018
[5] Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz: Die
Empfehlungen der Internationalen
Strahlenschutzkommission (ICRP) von
2007 : ICRP-Veröffentlichung 103
verabschiedet im März 2007;
BfS-Schriften; 47/09. 2009
[6] Bundesgesellschaft für Endlagerung:
Meldung – BGE : 31. März 2018: Einblicke
Nr. 2 unter dem Titel „Konrad.
Einblicke: Fertigstellung 2027 – was
passiert nun?“ URL: https://
www.bge.de/de/meldungen/2018/3/
einblicke-nr-2-veroeffentlicht.
Stand: 31. März 2018;
Zugriff: 30. August 2018
[7] Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz,
Bau und Reaktorsicherheit:
Bundeskabinett beschließt neues
Strahlenschutzgesetz. URL: http://
www.bmub.bund.de/pressemitteilung/
bundeskabinett-beschliesst-neuesstrahlenschutzgesetz/?tx_
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=2471.
Stand: 25. Januar 2017;
Zugriff: 30. August 2018
[8] Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz,
Bau und Reaktorsicherheit:
Bundesrat macht den Weg frei für
modernes Strahlenschutzrecht.
URL: http://www.bmub.bund.de/
pressemitteilung/bundesrat-machtden-weg-frei-fuer-modernesstrahlenschutzrecht/.
Stand: 12. Mai
2017; Zugriff: 30. August 2018
[9] Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz,
Bau und Reaktorsicherheit:
Neue europäische Vorgaben sollen
umfassenden Strahlenschutz gewährleisten.
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: An Interdisciplinary Task for Junior Staff ı David Anton, Manuel Reichardt, Thomas Hassel and Harald Budelmann

Call for Papers
VGB Congress 2019
Innovation in Power Generation
4 and 5 September 2019, Salzburg, Austria
Submit your presentation proposal now!
Innovations are a constant feature of our industry, in our day-to-day business and in
activities involving a long-term planning horizon alike. They are an important means
of reacting to challenges and processes of change. Our goal is to find, develop and
implement technically clever and efficient solutions, because life without the secured
generation and storage of power and heat is unimaginable.
Innovations in power and heat supply are therefore the central themes for the VGB
Congress to be held in Salzburg, Austria on 4 and 5 September 2019.
Topical political, strategic and energy sector related issues will be discussed in the
plenary session on the first day of the congress.
Your Contact
Angela Langen and Ines Moors
E-mail
vgb-congress@vgb.org
Phone
+49 201 8128-310/-274
The second day will focus on your topics relating to:
ı Generation and storage technologies for the future
ı Flexibility options in generation and storage of power and heat
ı Digitalisation in power generation
ı Lessons learned in projects and O&M
ı Optimisation, monitoring and diagnosis
ı Training and education
ı Mothballing and decommissioning of plants
Use your speech to present innovative concepts, developments and solutions
at the VGB Congress 2019, the knowledge-sharing platform for the technical aspects
of the future energy supply.
Selected papers will also be published in the renowned journal VGB POWERTECH,
allowing you to reach an wider readership.
The accompanying exhibition gives operators, manufacturers and service providers
the opportunity to maintain and develop their industry network.
Conference languages
German and English,
simultaneous interpreting service
will be provided.
Please submit your proposal online:
www.vgb.org/kongress_2019_call_for_papers.html
no later than 14 December 2018
VGB PowerTech e.V.
Deilbachtal 173
45257 Essen
Germany
Are you interested in participating as an exhibitor?
Contact: Angela Langen
E-mail: angela.langen@vgb.org
Phone: +49 201 8128-310
VGB PowerTech Service GmbH
Deilbachtal 173
45257 Essen
Germany

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 606
URL: http://www.bmub.
bund.de/themen/atomenergiestrahlenschutz/strahlenschutz/
rechtsvorschriften-technische-regeln/
regelungen-der-eu/. Stand: 05. Dezember
2013; Zugriff: 30. August 2018
[10] Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz
und nukleare Sicherheit: Gesetz
zur Neuordnung des Rechts zum Schutz
vor der schädlichen Wirkung ionisierender
Strahlung | Laws | BMU. URL:
https://www.bmu.de/en/law/
gesetz-zur-neuordnung-des-rechtszum-schutz-vor-der-schaedlichenwirkung-ionisierender-strahlung.
Stand: 27. Juni 2017;
Zugriff: 31. August 2017
[11] Bundesrat: Drucksache 768/16
(16.12.2016) : Gesetz zur Neuordnung
der Verantwortung in der kerntechnischen
Entsorgung. Bundesanzeiger
Verlag GmbH, ISSN 0720-2946
[12] Bundesrat: Plenarprotokoll 957 :
BUNDESRAT : Stenografischer Bericht :
957. Sitzung : Berlin, Freitag, den 12.
Mai 2017. URL: http://www.bundesrat.
de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/
plenarprotokolle/2017/
Plenarprotokoll-957.pdf?__blob=
publicationFile&v=2.
Zugriff: 31. August 2018
[13] Deutsches Atomforum e. V. (Hrsg.):
Stilllegung und Rückbau von Kernkraftwerken.
2013
[14] Deutsches Atomforum e. V. (Hrsg.):
Endlagerung von schwach- und mittelradioaktiven
Stoffen. 2014
[15] Deutsches Atomforum e. V. (Hrsg.): Der
Reaktorunfall in Fukushima Daiichi :
Folge fehlerhafter Auslegung und
unzureichender Sicherheitstechnik.
URL: http://www.kernenergie.de/
kernenergie-wAssets/docs/service/
024reaktorunfall_fukushima.pdf.
Stand: März 2015;
Zugriff: 31. August 2018
[16] Deutsches Atomforum e. V. (Hrsg.):
Endlagerung hochradioaktiver Abfälle.
2015
[17] Deutsches Atomforum e. V. (Hrsg.):
Zwischenlagerung radioaktiver Abfälle
in Deutschland. 2015
Strahlenschutz e.V. zur Umsetzung der
Direktive 2013/59/Euratom. URL:
http://www.fs-ev.org/fileadmin/
user_upload/09_Themen/EU_BSS/
FS-Stellungnahme_zu_den_EU_BSS_
final.pdf. Zugriff: 31. August 2018
[22] Fujiki, Kazuo ; Kamike, Kouzou ; Seiki,
Yoshihiro ; Yokota, Mitsuo: Techniques
and experiences in Decommissioning of
Japan power demonstration reactor. In:
Société francaise d’énergie nucléaire
(Hrsg.): International Conference on
Dismantling of Nuclear Facilities :
Policies – Techniques. 29.09.-
02.10.1992 in Avignon. Paris, 1993,
S. 219-232
[23] Japan Atomic Energy Agency: JPDR
( Japan Power Demonstration Reactor).
URL: https://www.jaea.go.jp/
english/04/ntokai/decommissioning/
01/decommissioning_01_01_02.html.
Zugriff: 22. Juni 2016
[24] Kaulard, Jörg ; Brendebach, Boris ;
Strub, Erik: Strahlenschutzaspekte
gängiger Abbau- und Dekontaminationstechniken
(GRS-270). URL: https://
www.grs.de/sites/default/files/pdf/
GRS-270.pdf. Stand: 2010;
Zugriff: 31. August 2018
[25] Klimmek, Peter ; E.ON (Hrsg.): AKW
Würgassen : Das Rückbaufinale. URL:
https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=McZz_r1QXWo. Stand: 11.
Mai 2015; Zugriff: 31. August 2018
[26] Klimmek, Peter ; E.ON (Hrsg.): AKW
Würgassen : Zerlegung des Reaktordruckgefäßes.
URL: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=
TBbHcma8Q9c. Stand: 11. Mai 2015;
Zugriff: 31. August 2018
[27] Kremer, Guido: Weiterentwicklung von
Verfahren zur Kontakt-Lichtbogen-
Metall-Bearbeitung. Leibniz Universität
Hannover, Dissertation, 2008
[28] Krieger, Hanno: Grundlagen der Strahlungsphysik
und des Strahlenschutzes.
Wiesbaden : Vieweg+Teubner Verlag,
2012
[29] Neles, Julia Mareike ; Pistner, Christoph
(Hrsg.): Eine Technik für die Zukunft?.
Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag,
2012
[37] Wilde, Felix: Rückbau kerntechnischer
Anlagen. Fachhochschule Stuttgart,
Diplomarbeit, GRIN Verlag, 2006
[38] Zahoransky, Richard (Hrsg.): Energietechnik
: Systeme zur Energieumwandlung.
Kompaktwissen für Studium und
Beruf. Wiesbaden : Vieweg+Teubner
Verlag, 2010
[39] Ziegler, Albert ; Allelein, Hans-Josef
(Hrsg.): Reaktortechnik : Physikalischtechnische
Grundlagen. Berlin ;
Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag, 2013
Authors
David Anton
Dipl.-Ing. Manuel Reichardt
Dr.-Ing. Thomas Hassel
Bereichsleiter Unterwassertechnikum
Hannover (UWTH)
Institut für Werkstoffkunde
Unterwassertechnikum
am Institut für Werkstoffkunde
Produktionstechnisches Zentrum
Hannover, UWTH
Lise-Meitner-Str. 1
30823 Garbsen, Deutschland
Professor Dr.-Ing.
Harald Budelmann
Technische Universität
Braunschweig
Institut für Baustoffe, Massivbau
und Brandschutz
Fachgebiet Baustoffe
Beethovenstraße 52
38106 Braunschweig, Deutschland
[18] Entsorgungswerk für Nuklearanlagen
(EWN). URL: http://www.ewngmbh.de/.
Stand: 1. September 2015;
Zugriff: 18. Juni 2016
[19] E.ON Kernkraft GmbH: Vom Kernkraftwerk
zur “Grünen Wiese“ : Stilllegung
und Rückbau des Kernkraftwerks
Würgassen. URL: http://www.eon.com/
content/dam/eon-com/
Geschaeftsfelder/Nuclear/assetprofiles/wuergassen-power-plant/
rueckbau_wuergassen_010403.pdf.
Stand: August 2008;
Zugriff: 12. Juni 2016
[20] E.ON Kernkraft GmbH: Kernkraftwerk
Würgassen : 12 Jahre erfolgreicher
Rückbau. URL: http://www.eon.com/
content/dam/eon-com/
Geschaeftsfelder/Nuclear/assetprofiles/wuergassen-power-plant/
KKW_12J_Rueckbau.pdf.
Zugriff: 13. Juni 2016
[21] Fachverband für Strahlenschutz e.V.:
Stellungnahme des Deutsch-Schweizerischen
Fachverbandes für
[30] Röhlig, Klaus-Jürgen et al.: ENTRIA
2014 : Memorandum zur Entsorgung
hochradioaktiver Reststoffe. Hannover
[31] Stolz, Werner: Radioaktivität : Grundlagen
– Messung – Anwendung. 5. Aufl.
Wiesbaden : B. G. Teubner Verlag/
GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 2005
[32] Thierfeldt, S. ; Schartmann, F. ; Brenk
Systemplanung GmbH (Hrsg.): Stilllegung
und Rückbau kerntechnischer
Anlagen. Aachen : 2009
[33] Atomgesetz. In: Umweltrecht. 25. Auflage
München : Beck-Texte im dtv, 2015
[34] Vogt, Hans-Gerrit ; Schultz, Heinrich:
Grundzüge des praktischen Strahlenschutzes.
München ; Wien :Carl Hanser
Verlag, 2011
[35] Volkmer, Martin ; Deutsches Atomforum
e. V. (Hrsg.): Radioaktivität und
Strahlenschutz. Berlin : 2012
[36] Volkmer, Martin ; Deutsches Atomforum
e. V. (Hrsg.): Kernenergie Basiswissen.
Berlin: 2013
Decommissioning and Waste Management
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: An Interdisciplinary Task for Junior Staff ı David Anton, Manuel Reichardt, Thomas Hassel and Harald Budelmann

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Kurchatov Institute’s Critical Assemblies
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy
Since its establishment, the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (now National Research Centre “Kurchatov
Institute”) was always involved in R&D on nuclear reactors for various applications. This activity required dedicated
critical facilities (whose number, design and purpose naturally varied with time).
This paper reviews the status of the
Kurchatov Institute’s experimental
park that includes more than ten
critical assemblies intended for R&D
for power (VVER, RBMK, HTGR), ship
and space reactors.
1 Introduction
Even the very first critical experiments
Igor Kurchatov has performed in 1946
in the institute that now bears his
name have confirmed unique advantages
offered by so-called “zero power”
reactors, or critical assemblies [1],
that were widely used in experiments
ever since. Thanks to their experimentfriendly
range of kinetic response to
varying critical conditions, as well as
to their largely power-invariant neutronic
parameters, critical assemblies
enable realistic simulation of in-core
neutronic processes.
In 1953, the Kurchatov Institute has
launched its first critical assembly
simulating a power reactor core to
identify water-cooled and -moderated
reactor parameters, such as critical
mass, efficiency of control rods and
temperature effects [2].
Since then, the Kurchatov Institute
has performed thousands of experiments
with uranium systems moderated
by water, hydrogen-containing
substances (zirconium hydride, polyethylene
and their combinations),
beryllium and graphite, with wideranging
U-235 enrichments (to 96 %)
and moderator-to-uranium nuclear
concentrations’ ratios (Figure 1)
[3, 4].
Experiments simulating future
reactor core as accurately as possible
to assess the key reactor parameters
with minimal error had a long-lasting
significance. As time went on, other
research centres and even some plants
and design organizations have joined
the Kurchatov Institute in performing
critical experiments, since these have
often been nothing else than fabrication
quality tests and designer
customization of actual cores. Such
experiments yielded a major share of
total criticality data; however, they
often cannot be used for software improvement
even at the state of the art.
On the other hand, experiments
with critical assemblies having simple
geometry, well-described composition
and hence relatively low measuring
errors (mostly due to uncertain
knowledge of these very geometry
and composition) yielded the “gold
data pool” that enabled – and still
contributes to – further development
and improvement of computational
software.
2 Benchmark experiments
and international
databases
Selection of reference – or benchmark
– experiments performed on simple
critical systems were launched in the
1960ies in order to ultimately produce
a database to underlay reactor software
verification (that proceeded
from limited data arrays for many
years).
For example, measurements of
critical parameters of uniform U-
water bundles consisting of U dioxide
rods performed at temperatures
ranging between 20 and 280 °C can
illustrate this class of experiments.
These measurements – suggested by
the author and performed by the
research team he headed in the Kurchatov
Institute in late 1970ies [5] –
were unique in the world practice, as
it turned out later. In these experiments,
high excess reactivity that
varied with the critical assembly
heatup in a pressure vessel was compensated
by the central core section
moving relative to a fixed circle of
rods. Critical size of “unexcited” uniform
lattices were identified by aligning
the moving core section with the
fixed one; i.e. in fact the temperature
when “correct-geometry” cores became
exactly critical was actually
measured. Figure 2 shows respective
data for hexagonal lattices consisting
of rods enriched to 10% of U-235 at
three different ratios of hydrogen and
U-235.
In 1992, the U.S. Department of
Energy has initiated – and Idaho
National Laboratory has suggested
and implemented – a new data
selection approach called Criticality
Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project
( CSBEP) [6, 7], whose main idea
was to collect all available – and
meeting some specific requirements
Revised version of a
paper presented at
the RRFM 2018,
11 - 15 May 2018 in
Munich, Germany
| | Fig. 1.
235 U enrichment and moderator-to- 235 U uranium nuclear concentrations’
ratio in critical experiments performed in the Kurchatov Institute.
| | Fig. 2.
Critical radius of hexagonal fuel rod bundles
depending on temperature:
1 – • – rH / r5 = 49; 2 – p – 331; 3 – i – 614
(points = experiment; lines = computation).
– experimental criticality data, convert
them into some standard format
and organize their evaluation by
independent experts. In 1995, this
initiative has developed into the International
Criticality Safety Benchmark
Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) performed
under the auspices of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in order
to preserve the hard-won data of
the 20 th century’s “nuclear legacy”
607
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atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 608
(including military experimental data
that were declassified at that time)
and to prevent their irretrievable loss
with the demise of their authors.
The rate of data contribution to
the ICSBEP database was at its highest
in late 1990ies – early 2000ies, and
naturally died out by 2010, when
archive data fit for the project came
to the end. By 2014, this database
included data on over 5000 configurations
of critical (and even some subcritical)
systems provided by 20 countries,
including Russia, which joined
the project in 1994 and became its
second largest (after the United
States) contributor providing over
15% of its total data (this share is
much higher if we consider uranium
systems only).
At the same time, the imperative
need to preserve all reactor physics
experimental data, including measuring
methods and techniques became
increasingly obvious. Therefore, in
1999 the Nuclear Science Committee
of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
(NSC/NEA/OECD) has launched its
International Reactor Physics Experiment
Evaluation Project (IRPhEP)
[7], as a logical follow-up and extension
of the ICSBEP. In 2003, the
IRPhEP became NEA’s official project
aiming to compile a pre-evaluated
reactor physics benchmark dataset to
be used for next-generation reactor
design and safety evaluation. As of
2014, the IRPhEP database included
the data yielded by 136 experiments
performed on 48 critical assemblies in
20 countries (including Russia and
the Kurchatov Institute) [8].
3 Neutronic experiments
and critical assemblies of
the Kurchatov Institute
Most of Russian critical experiments
of relatively simple geometry and
composition were performed between
1960ies and early 1980ies by just four
nuclear research centres to develop
various reactors and other facilities
required at the time. The IPPE has
mostly focused on U and Pu fast
neutron systems (and, to a smaller
extent, on liquid-salt and uraniumwater
ones), while VNIIEF and VNIITF,
starting from late 1990ies, have
published the data of a large series of
critical experiments that involved a
quasi-homogeneous assemblies of
simple geometry with highly enriched
metallic U and Pu-239. The Kurchatov
Institute, as mentioned above, has
performed experiments with uranium
systems moderated by water, hydrogen-containing
substances (zirconium
hydride, polyethylene and their combinations),
beryllium and graphite.
Below follows a brief overview of
Kurchatov Institute’s critical experiments
from their “golden age” to the
present day, including the evolution of
relevant experimental base, whose
current status is shown in Table 1 [9].
NPP reactors
NPP reactor research developed along
several lines. Critical experiments
with water-moderated assemblies to
validate VVER reactor physics have
started in 1950ies from several assemblies,
allowing for full-scale study of
VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactor
cores.
An important achievement regarding
VVER lattices were high-precision
experiments performed under scientific
guidance and supervision of the
Kurchatov Institute in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia on ZR-6 and LR-0
critical assemblies, respectively. It
should be noted that ZR-6 experiments
have set a pattern for many
experimental groups, since they have
included a detailed study of how the
uncertainties associated with core
geometry, composition, etc., impact
on neutronic parameters [10].
Today the Kurchatov Institute has
three critical assemblies (P, SK-phys
and V-1000) tailored to solve the
tasks of evolutionary development
of VVERs, including their very latest
generation, so-called SUPER-VVER.
The list of experiments already performed
or planned on these assemblies
includes:
• spectral shift simulation;
• identification of neutronic parameters
of systems containing various
fuels (U-Gd, U-Er; recovered U,
ceramic- or steel-clad “tolerant”
fuel, etc.);
• effect of higher steam content on
multiplication properties of the
core (for larger VVERs);
• identification of neutronic parameters
of systems with square lattices
(TVS-K fuel for PWRs).
Multiple critical experiments were
also performed with U-graphite
assemblies, allowing for varied fuel
content (metallic U or uranium
dioxide), U-235 enrichment (from the
natural level to 2.4%), lattice pitch
and water content into channels
Assembly name Assembly type Thermal power, kW Physical startup year Remark
SF-1 U – H 2 O 0.1 1961 Modernized in 1996
Efir-2M U – H 2 O 0.1 1973 Long-term shut-down
SF-7 U – H 2 O 0.1 1975 Modernized with life extension to 2029
Maket U – D 2 O 0.1 1977 Reconstructed in 1983
Grog U – C 0.1 1980 Long-term shut-down
Astra U – C 0.1 1981 Modernization with electric heat-up planned
RBMK U – C 0.02 1982
Narcisse-M2 U – ZrH x 0.01 1983 Permanent shut-down
PIK (phys.model) U – H 2 O 0.1 1983
Delta U – H 2 O 0.1 1985 Modernized with life extension to 2029
V-1000 U – H 2 O 0.2 1986 Life extended to 2029
P U – H 2 O 0.2 1987 Modernized with life extension to 2029
Kvant U – H 2 O 1.0 1990
SK-phys U – H 2 O 0.6 1997
RP-50 (Aksamit) U – H 2 O – ZrH x 0.1 2013
| | Tab. 1.
Kurchatov Institute’s critical assemblies as of 2017.
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atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
– including the experiments with less
graphite per cell and erbium burnable
poison. The RBMK assembly con tinues
to provide scientific support to operating
RBMK reactors (that generate a
half of the country’s total electricity)
to further improve their safety and
economy (tests of new scram rods
and profiled assemblies, subcriticality
tests, etc.). Testing at the Kurchatov
Institute’s RBMK assembly is a mandatory
prerequisite for any component
to be loaded into the core of
operating RBMK-1000.
High-temperature gas-cooled
reactors
Since early 1980ies, the Kurchatov
Institute operates its Grog and Astra
critical assemblies intended for simulation
of high-temperature gas-cooled
reactors (HTGRs) and other uraniumgraphite
reactors of varied core
geometry, structure and composition,
with spherical and cylindrical fuel
elements enriched up to 21 % of
U-235.
In particular, multiple experiments
were initially performed at the Astra
to validate some safety parameters of
Russian HTGR designs (VG-400, VGM
and others). Later, international projects
such as GT-MHR (Russia and
USA) and RBMR (South Africa) used
the Astra for high-precision experiments
with circular cores.
Astra’s plans for the next few years
(so-called Hot Astra Project) are as
follows:
• equipment modification and experiments
with electric heatup;
• compilation of a new database to
validate multi-physical approaches
to future reactor designs.
Ship and space reactors
However, most systems explored in
the Kurchatov Institute belong to
small nuclear facilities intended for
various applications [11]. Respective
critical assemblies were moderated
by water, zirconium hydride or beryllium,
consisted of different fuel rods
enriched from 5 to 96 % of U-235, and
had hydrogen-to-U-235 concentration
ratios and temperatures ranging from
25 to 1000 and from 20 to 300 °C,
respectively. For the very first time,
the Kurchatov Institute has published
its criticality data related to hydrogenand
beryllium-moderated assemblies
of simple geometry at the 3 rd Geneva
Conference on Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy. Subsequent publications
were somewhat sporadic.
Nevertheless, many of these experiments
had simple geometry and
well-described fuel composition, and
were therefore included in the benchmark
database.
As regards ship reactor experiments,
starting from the early 1960ies,
the Kurchatov Institute has deployed
eight universal critical assemblies,
including a high-temperature one
(with working coolant temperature of
300 °C and pressure of up to 200 kg/
cm 2 ) and a high-flux one (with neutron
flux of up to ~10 9 cm -2 ×s -1 . The
latter – Kvant – is currently in high
demand as a reference thermal neutron
source for calibration of in-core
detectors, irradiation of test samples,
etc. Today four of these assemblies
(SF-1, SF-7, Delta and Kvant) will
continue operating to minimize computer
simulation errors and to confirm
full-scale core parameters.
For space reactor experiments, the
Kurchatov Institute previously had
the Narcisse critical assembly, where
it has performed comprehensive
experiments simulating the reactors
with direct conversion of heat to
electricity. Presently the Institute is
actively operating its new critical
assembly launched in 2013 – the only
one built in this century to meet
the new requirements of the space
industry [12]. Intended for study of
the RP-50 thermionic converter, this
assembly uses highly enriched fuel
(96 % of U-235), control rods with
B-10-enriched boron carbide, and
metallic beryllium/beryllium oxide
reflectors (Figure 3). Current plans
are to start moderating this assembly
with zirconium hydride instead of
water.
It should be noted that the data
yielded by these – and other – experiments
performed at almost all critical
assemblies of the Kurchatov Institute
have been included in ICSBEP and
IRPhEP international database.
Conclusion
National Research Centre “Kurchatov
Institute” preserves all capacities –
such as assemblies, nuclear fuel,
instrumentation and qualified personnel
– necessary for critical experiments.
Such experiments – though
not very numerous, but highly accurate
and well documented – stay in
demand due to continued development
of new reactor facilities and
assurance of safe operation of existing
ones. These trends correspond to
world practices, where the successfully
developing IRPhEP Project
does not focus on preserving and consolidating
the available data only, but
also identifies areas that need new
| | Fig. 3.
Critical assembly simulating RP-50 thermionic converter.
data, as well as plans for further
experiments.
Multiple start-ups of VVERs-1000
confirm that Russian experts, including
the Kurchatov ones, are in good
position to contribute to this expanding
international base of multiphysical
(i.e. neutronic plus thermohydraulic)
experimental benchmark
data.
References
1. I.V. Kurchatov, I.S. Panasyuk. In: Some
papers of I.V. Kurchatov Institute of
Atomic Energy. Energoatomizdat,
Moscow, 1982, pp. 7-26 (in Russian).
2. G.A. Gladkov, Yu.V. Nikolski. USSR’s first
water-water critical assemblies.
Atomnaya Energiya, v. 90, Issue 2,
February 2001, pp. 88-90 (in Russian).
3. A.Yu. Gagarinski. Critical benchmark
experiments in RRC Kurchatov Institute.
Atomnaya Energiya, v. 84, Issue 6, June
1998, pp. 495-501 (in Russian).
4. A.A. Bykov, A.Yu. Gagarinski, E.S. Glushkov
et al. Programs of Experiments with
Critical Assemblies at the Russian
Research Centre “Kurchatov Institute”.
Nuclear Science and Engineering,
v. 145, 181-187 (2003).
5. A.Yu. Gagarinski, N.A. Lazukov, D.A.
Mastin et al. Reactivity temperature
effects in uniform U-water critical
assemblies in the range of 20-280 °C.
Voprosy Atomnoi Nauki I Techniki,
Issue 5(18), Moscow, NIKIET, 1981,
pp. 113–117 (in Russian).
6. J. Blair Briggs. The Activities of International
Criticality Safety Benchmark
Evaluation Project (ICSBEP). Journal of
Nuclear Science and Technology,
Suppl. 2, pp. 1427-1432, August 2002.
7. J. Blair Briggs, John D. Bess, Jim
Gulliford. Integral Benchmark Data for
Nuclear Data Testing through the ICSBEP
& IRPhEP. International Conference on
Nuclear Data for Science and Technology,
INL/CON-12-26696, March 2013.
8. John D. Bess, J. Blair Briggs, Jim
Guilford, Ian Hill. Current Status of the
IRPhEP and ICSBEP (August 2014).
THTR Conference, Portland, Oregon,
August 4008, 2014.
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AMNT 2018
9. M.V. Kovalchuk, V.I. Ilgisonis, Ya.I.
Strombach, A.S. Kurski, D.V. Andreev.
Development of experimental reactor
base in NRC Kurchatov Institute: from
the start of F-1 to the 60 th jubilee of
IR-8. Voprosy Atomnoi Nauki I Techniki,
Issue 3, 2017, pp. 4–17 (in Russian).
10. Experimental Studies of the Physics of
VVER-Type Uranium-Water Lattices. In:
Proc. Temporary International Team,
v.1, Academial Kiado, Budapest, 1984.
11. A.Yu. Gagarinskiy. High-precision neutronic
experiments in NRC Kurchatov
Institute. Atomnaya Energiya, v. 120,
Issue 4, 2016, pp. 191-197 (in Russian).
12. V.A. Usov, N.P. Moroz, G.V. Kompaniets.
Basic results of physical startup tests of
the AKSAMIT critical assembly
simulating RP-50 thermionic converter.
In: Innovative nuclear energy designs
and technologies, NIKIET, October
2014.
Authors
Andrej Yurjewitsch Gagarinskiy
National Research Centre
“Kurchatov Institute”
Moscow, Russian Federation
Kurchatov square,
123182 Moscow, Russia
49 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2018)
Key Topic | Enhanced Safety & Operation Excellence
Focus Session
“International Operational Experience”
Ludger Mohrbach
The following report summarises the presentations of the Focus International Operational Experience presented at
the 49 th AMNT 2018, Berlin, 29 to 30 May 2018. The other Focus, Topical and Technical Sessions will be covered in
further issues of atw.
Today, 449 nuclear units with nearly
400 GW of net capacity produce about
11% of all world-wide electricity,
equivalent to about 4.5 % of all human
energy consumption.
In the coming years, nuclear capacities
and production will slowly rise,
as six to ten units are earmarked for
commissioning in every coming year,
over-compensating capacity losses.
Most of these units provide
depend able baseload power, but in
markets with volatile in-feeds also
increasingly grid services and peakload
power, for which nuclear plants
are technically well equipped.
Correspondingly, this focus session
covered six exemplary facets from
nuclear power plant operation:
• Results of the QUENCH-LOCA
experiments (improving the
knowledge base on fuel performance
under accident conditions),
• Practical aspects of safeguards,
• Employments effects of nuclear
(in comparison to other power
generation technologies),
• The new QP-data bank (“Quality
Products”) for lubricants and other
consumables in nuclear power
plants,
• Flood protection for nuclear sites,
and
• Benefits of simulator training.
The first presentation, titled Summary
of the QUENCH-LOCA Ex perimental
Programme was pro vided by
Dr. Andreas Wensauer, PreussenElektra,
Hannover, inter alia member of the
working panel “Reactor Core” of the
operator’s association VGB. This panel
has been the operator’s representative
body for the monitoring of these
tests, performed at the KIT Karlsruhe
Institute for Technology since 2010 (see
Große/Walter/Stuckert/Steinbrück)
and designed to re-validate the “LOCA
Criteria”, i.e. to investigate the burst
behavior of modern fuel claddings
under Loss-Of-Coolant-Accident conditions
and high burn-ups.
The results have significantly improved
the knowledge base for hydrogenation-
and oxidation-driven fuel
cladding embrittlement for cladding
materials Zry-4, M5 and Optimized
ZIRLO under these conditions, thus
delivering a valuable extra input for
the embrittlement behavior criteria
definition like “maximum cladding
temperature” and “equivalent cladding
reacted”, as such defined as early
as 1973 by the US-Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for the modelling of fuel
behavior under hypothetical Loss-of-
Coolant-Accident conditions.
The second contribution to the
session came from Dr. Irmgard
Niemeyer, Forschungszentrum Jülich
GmbH, who reported on Practical
Safeguards in Nuclear Power Plants.
Mass balancing of nuclear, especially
fissile material inventories is
an obligation for every operator underlying
the regulation of the United
Nations “Non-Proliferation Treaty”,
ratified in 1974, amended afterwards
and effective now in 191 states. The
UN has entitled the International
Atomic Energy Agency IAEA with the
task to supervise compliance with
these rules, effectively applying safeguards
on each site, e.g. by regular
inspections and continuous monitoring.
Within the EU, EURATOM has
taken over responsibility.
In general, one (announced) physical
inventory verification per site per
year, amended by random inspections
and further announced inspections
for MOX and spent fuel transfers to
dry storage facilities. Main surveillance
instruments are seals and
cameras, but also advanced technologies
like “Digital Cerenkov Viewing
Devices” for spent fuel pool verifications
or laser curtains.
In order to minimize effort and
costs for both inspectors and the
inspected, the operators of nuclear
installations (especially nuclear power
plants) have qualified – and will subsequently
increasingly apply – automated
processes and online data transmission.
Several applications have already
been developed, including internetbased
transmission of seal and camera
data, thus saving physical inspections.
As third contribution Comparison
of Employment Effects of Low-
Carbon Generation Technologies
had been intended to be presented by
Dr. ­Geoffrey Rothwell, OECD-Nuclear
Energy Agency, Paris.
AMNT 2018
Focus Session “International Operational Experience” ı Ludger Mohrbach

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atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
612
AMNT 2018
This first-of-a-kind study had
found a remarkable advantage of
nuclear power production, often overlooked
in public discussion: The fact
that practically all of the money spent
for a nuclear kWh remains within
the domestic value chain, because
uranium mining requires only less
than 2 % of the production cost,
whereas all the rest can be attributed
to high-tech components, spare
parts, services and mostly high-paid
domestic jobs.
With other types of electricity
generation, much more than half of
each Euro spent for a kWh goes to fuel
providers (lignite, hard coal, even
more extensively in the case of gas) or
assembly-line produced hardware
(solar, also wind). Because of this
(economic) effect and because of its
easy upfront fuel storage potential in
the fuel production process, nuclear
is in practice a “domestic” energy
source, with all the benefits for its
owners and customers. This significant
quality has always been
underestimated in public discussions
and underweighted in power option
scenarios.
Nevertheless, the presentation was
embargoed shortly before the event,
and the trip to Berlin for its author was
denied on short notice.
However, the organizer could refer
to a corresponding press release from
WNN “www.World-Nuclear-News.or/
NN-Jobs-for-two-centuries-in-nuclear”,
from 15 September 2017, quoting:
“Some 200.000 job-years of employment
are created by each 1000
MWe of nuclear capacity constructed,
according to a new study by the
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and
the IAEA”.
The press release also quotes a
2010 study by D Harker and
P Hirschboeck, who found the job
intensity of nuclear to be half of
( photovoltaic) solar, comparable to
small hydro and concentrating solar,
but ten times higher in comparison to
combined cycle gas or wind energy.
After the break, the session continued
with the presentation of a new
practical tool for the Application of
Lubricants and other Consumables
in Nuclear Power Plants: The new
VGB QP-Data Bank, presented by
Dr. Fred Böttcher, EnBW Kernkraft,
Neckarwestheim, and co-authored by
Dr. rer. nat. Dittmar Rutschow, VGB
PowerTech e.V., Essen.
In this data bank all documentation
for the application of today about
1500 lubricants, detergents, fluids
and other consumables (e.g. markers,
degreasing agents, abrasives, testing
agents, sealings) in nuclear power
plants is collected and provided for
day-to-day quick-notice application.
The data bank follows similar external
installations (by manufacturers), it is
fed by the operators themselves on
a non-profit base, and available to
all contributing VGB members. For
detailed information either the
authors or the chairman of the VGB
working group “Chemistry in Nuclear
Power Plants”, Dr. Timo Stoll, Kernkraftwerk
Emsland, can be contacted.
In principle, the data bank is also open
for non-nuclear applications. Furthermore,
the VGB chemistry laboratory
offers specimen tests for a reasonable
remuneration.
The fifth contribution covered
Recent Developments for the Flood
Protection Design Concerning
Nuclear Power Plants, authored by
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jürgen Jensen ( presenter)
and MSc Sebastian Niehüser, both
Universität Siegen, Dipl.-Ing. Katrin
Borowski, RWE Nuclear, Essen, and
Dr. Thomas Tittel, PreussenElektra,
Hannover.
Triggered by the Fukushima event,
nuclear sites around the world have
been re-evaluated also in terms of
their flooding resilience, both on
coastal or river sites. In Europe the
“EU Stress test” has found no deficiencies
in nuclear site protection in any
way comparable to Fukushima’s 10m
ground height above sea level and a
14m-high tsunami.
In Germany, the parallel “RSK-
Safety Check” performed in 2011
came to the same conclusion, furthermore
it identified extra robustness
levels for each site.
Prof. Jensen gave an overview on
the historic development and today’s
state-of-the-art, incorporating recent
scientific evidence on increasing rainfall
consequences and sea level rise
due to global warming. Governing
effect of course is the increased
probability and intensity of gale force
wind events with corresponding precipitation,
requiring site-specific and
prospective analyses. In consequence,
levee heights and qualities are and
will have to be increased and improved
continuously on every coast
and river bank, requiring investments
and careful maintenance.
Quantifying the “necessary” height
of flood protection installations
should, however, not only be based
on probabilistic calculations using
historical data, but should take also
into account the “physically based
upper limits”.
The last contribution Benefits of
Simulator Training was presented by
Dipl.-Ing. Dietmar Dusmann, Simulatorzentrum
KSG/ GfS, Essen.
In Germany the simulator training
for practically all nuclear power plants
has traditionally been pooled in Essen,
for the last decades in a purpose-build
simulator center building in Essen-
Kupferdreh. The operators of the
Dutch plant Borssele have also delegated
their simulator training to this
installation.
All regular education and retraining
is performed at the training
center, which thus could centralize
and continuously develop and
advance its expertise, including
development of components, simulator
software and control room
procedures, the latter including
human- factor related issues and
beyond- design accident management
procedures.
In this capacity the center has
gathered unique and world-class
simulator know-how, now increasingly
also available for non-nuclear
applications, as the German nuclear
units will continuously be released
from regulator oversight in the course
of the phase-out programme decided
by the government.
Author
Dr. Ludger Mohrbach
Head Nuclaer Power Plants
VGB PowerTech e.V.
Deilbachtal 173
45257 Essen, Germany
AMNT 2018
Focus Session “International Operational Experience” ı Ludger Mohrbach

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Inside
613
Vielfalt der Kerntechnik
Die KTG Junge Generation auf der
Nachwuchstagung 2018 in Garching
Atomei genannt – ermöglicht. Er wurde 1957 als erste
kerntechnische Anlage Deutschlands erbaut, im Jahr
2000 abgeschaltet und 2004 durch den danebenstehende
FRM-ll mit einer höheren Leistung ersetzt. Die Außenhülle
des alten FRM ist heute denkmalgeschützt.
Im FRM-II wurden sowohl dessen technische Konzeption
als auch aktuelle Forschungsarbeiten und
Anwendungen z. B. in der Medizin vorgestellt. Neben der
Herstellung von Radiopharmaka können bspw. mit
Neutronenstrahlen materialtechnische Untersuchungen
und Visualisierungen (ähnlich wie bei einem Röntgenbild)
durchgeführt werden.
KTG INSIDE
Wie in jedem Jahr lud die Junge Generation innerhalb
der KTG auch 2018 junge Nachwuchswissenschaftler,
Studenten und interessierte Mitarbeiter von Unternehmen
aus der Kerntechnik ein, um ihnen die Möglichkeit zu
geben, interessante Vorträge zu verschiedensten Themen
zu hören und an Führungen durch unterschiedlichste
Einrichtungen teilzunehmen.
Das vielseitige Programm der diesjährigen Nachwuchstagung
ermöglichte den Teilnehmern in diesem Jahr einen
breiten Überblick über die Anwendung von Strahlung von
der Kerntechnik über die Fusion bis hin zur Medizin.
Eröffnet wurde die Tagung durch Vorträge zu den
Forschungsreaktoren FRM (alt) und II in Garching sowie
zu den Aufgaben einer Behörde im Strahlenschutz.
Die Vorträge wurden mit der einmaligen Möglichkeit
kombiniert, nacheinander beide Forschungsanlagen zu
besichtigen. Unter anderem wurden tiefe Einblicke in die
Geschichte, Bauweise und den Rückbau des Forschungsreaktors
München (FRM) in Garching bei München – auch
Zusätzlich konnte das Fusionsexperiment Asdex
Upgrade im benachbarten Max-Planck-Institut für
Plasmaphysik (IPP) besichtigt werden. Aufgrund der
Gruppengröße konnten Bereiche und Anlagenteile gezeigt
werden, die sonst bei Führungen nicht oder nur kurzzeitig
besichtigt werden.
Im Brückenschlag zur zweiten Sektion am Folgetag,
welche sich zu Beginn neuen modularen Reaktor konzepten
und deren sicherheitstechnischer Einordnung widmete,
wurde die Rechenkette der Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH vorgestellt. Außerdem
wurde durch das Institut für Kernenergetik und Energiesysteme
der Universität Stuttgart ein neues Sicherheitssystem
zur Wärmeabfuhr im Sicherheitsbehälter von Kernkraftwerken
präsentiert. Geschlossen wurde diese Sektion
vom Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) mit der
Darstellung des aktuellen Stands der Fusionsforschung.
In der abschließenden dritten Sektion standen die
Strahlentherapie und deren aktuellen Anwendungen im
KTG Inside

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
KTG INSIDE
614
KTG Inside
Verantwortlich
für den Inhalt:
Die Autoren.
Lektorat:
Natalija Cobanov,
Kerntechnische
Gesellschaft e. V.
(KTG)
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin
T: +49 30 498555-50
F: +49 30 498555-51
E-Mail:
natalija.cobanov@
ktg.org
www.ktg.org
Vordergrund. Einleitend bildeten zwei Vorträge zur grundlegenden
Sicherheitstechnik im Strahlenschutz und den
Nebeneffekten von Neutronen in der Strahlentherapie den
Fokus. Der dritte Vortrag der Sektion widmete sich der
Anwendung von Strahlung am Menschen und einem
abschließenden Rundgang durch das Rinecker Protonentherapie
Center (RPTC).
Hierbei hatten die Teilnehmer die Möglichkeit, eine
der größten Protonentherapieanlagen zu besichtigen, die
derzeit in der Krebstherapie eingesetzt wird. Unter
anderem durften die Behandlungs- und vor allem die
gigantischen Technikräume mit den Gantrys besichtigt
und in Aktion erlebt werden. Bei den Gantrys handelt es
sich um 150 Tonnen schwere, um die Horizontalachse
360° drehbare tonnenförmige Stahlkonstruktionen von elf
Metern Durchmesser, die starke Magnete zur genauen
Ausrichtung des Protonenstrahls enthalten. Innerhalb
dieses Hohlkörpers wird der Patient auf einer Konturmatratze,
die einer Liege aus Kohlefaser aufliegt, fixiert.
Unser Dank gilt den Referenten, dem Team vom IPP in
Garching, des FRM (alt) und FRM-II, der GRS gGmbH
sowie dem RPTC für die interessanten Beiträge und die
Unterstützung!
Florian Gremme und Thomas Romming
JUNGE GENERATION
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Carsten George
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90 Jahre | 1928
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86 Jahre | 1932
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Essen,
82 Jahre | 1937
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79 Jahre | 1940
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Laudenbach
78 Jahre | 1941
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Heiligkreuzsteinach
26. Dr. Heinrich Pierer von Esch, Erlangen
77 Jahre | 1942
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Stutensee
76 Jahre | 1943
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Seeheim-Jugenheim
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75 Jahre | 1944
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70 Jahre | 1949
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NEWS
Top
To fight climate change,
environmentalists say yes
to nuclear power
(nei) The Boston Globe highlighted a
recent report by the Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS) stressing
nuclear energy’s role in reducing
carbon emissions. In the editorial, the
Globe noted that the urgency of protecting
the climate swayed UCS to
support conditional measures to preserve
nuclear plants, which supply
nearly 20 percent of U.S. electricity
and more than 56 percent of the
nation’s clean energy.
In the report, the group outlined a
hard truth about the future. With
climate change accelerating, as a
new U.N. report underscored, the
time to be fussy about how to reduce
emissions has passed.
What’s New? A really big deal in
the energy and environment D.C.
scene. The Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS) released a report
today acknowledging the impact that
nuclear plant closures have on climate
and air quality, and in it the organization
advocated for policies such as
those adopted in states like Illinois,
New York, Connecticut and New
Jersey in recent years to preserve well
run, financially challenged nuclear
plants. The report explicitly recognizes
the need for nuclear power to
play a substantial role in decarbonization
efforts.
Fast Facts
• Out of the 21 nuclear plants (16.3
GW) UCS identifies as “at-risk”, 5
have already announced retirement.
They note that this involves
17 states where there are at-risk
plants that likely will need some
sort of policy to save them, and the
at-risk retirements could go from
16.3 GW to 28.7 GW with lower
natural gas prices.
• The report offers three key policy
prescriptions for preserving at-risk
plants: (1) a carbon tax; (2) a clean
energy standard; and (3) a set
of principles for state-based zero
emission credit (ZEC) programs in
the states.
UCS’ commitment to nuclear safety
is unwavering in this report. Policy
remedies it advocates must be limited
to plants operating at the highest
levels of safety.
Why it Matters: This is a big deal for
UCS and the climate community. Prior
to this report, UCS had remained silent
on any climate impacts asso ciated with
nuclear plant closures. With this report
UCS recognizes the utility of a clean
energy standard, as opposed to merely
a renewable portfolio standard, and
advocates that well-run nuclear plants
receive credit for their low- emissions
benefits through federal low-carbon
policies or through state-based, ZEC
style of programs that are already
being deployed to help save plants.
What NEI’s President and CEO
Maria Korsnick has to say about this
report: “This is a forward leaning
moment for an organization of significant
influence in America’s climate
and science community. There is
increasing consensus across broad
cross- sections of American political,
environmental, security and energy
experts that nuclear energy is critical
to resilient, reliable and clean power.
This UCS report is explicit in recognizing
the scale of contributions
nuclear power makes to mitigate
against carbon and pollutants. It adds
significantly to increasing momentum
for recognizing the role nuclear plays
in America’s clean energy future.
“Enacting technology-neutral policies
and establishing programs that
credit nuclear for its 24/7, clean and
reliable attributes will ensure the
viability and economic success of
America’s largest source of clean
energy. Industry experts have long
warned of the severe consequences
that plant closures would have on the
environment. We join UCS in urging
policymakers to take actions that will
preserve the nuclear fleet and open
doors for new nuclear construction
and innovation in nuclear technology.”
The Big Picture: This report joins a
notably growing chorus of key voices
sounding the alarm that the loss of
nuclear energy would make it far more
challenging to constrain carbon emissions
and protect our environment.
| | www.nei.org
World
Atomic Society calls for
action on future of nuclear
research in Europe
(nucnet) Europe risks losing much of
its nuclear research capacity because
of a “crisis in political vision” on
energy issues and limited public
funds, the European Atomic Energy
Society says in a position paper
published today.
The paper says investment is
needed to enable advanced nuclear
research and a renewed programme
of public engagement is needed to
allow a more balanced view of
Europe’s future energy mix, particularly
considering the need for
decarbonisation.
It says the successful development
of new nuclear technologies can only
be achieved by research laboratories
with appropriate infrastructure and
with cooperation and support by
the industry. This requires “stable
and dedicated funding programmes
from national, European and private
sources”.
This, in turn, needs a change of
political attitudes towards nuclear,
focusing on the long-term societal
benefits of a low-carbon, energy
dense, stable baseload technology
that is complementary to renewable
technologies.
According to the EAES, the investments
needed would be considerably
smaller than subsidies supporting
the deployment and commissioning
of renewable technologies.
The paper says that with limited
public funds available both nationally
and in Europe, research
institutions are increasingly relying on
industrial support. This support,
however, is decreasing, and in such
a political environment, utilities
prefer to invest in extending nuclear
reactor lifetimes, rather than investing
in new-build.
“Vendors are finding it difficult to
invest in new nuclear technologies
and are relying on proven designs
and plants. This is resulting in a lack of
innovation and poor public perception,
despite an exemplary safety
record,” the paper says.
News

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
It says the gradual loss of nuclear
skills within Europe is well documented,
with an ageing workforce
and challenges in attracting the best
graduates into the industry.
“This will result in a lack of competitiveness
with respect to other
nuclear players in the world and a lack
of understanding of our nuclear
legacy.”
There are instruments available
to stimulate nuclear research in
Europe, with nuclear energy listed as
a supported technology within the
European Strategic Energy Technology
Plan (SET-Plan). The Horizon
2020 framework programme has
funds dedicated to activities related to
the Euratom Treaty.
However, Euratom funds are
only sufficient to maintain a modest
R&D programme in selected areas.
Moreover, there is a risk that these
funds will have little impact if they
are not appropriately supported
by a clear policy at member state
level, the paper says.
US: Cost of nuclear generation
reaches nearly 10-year low
(nei) A new Nuclear Energy Institute
study shows that the nuclear industry
has reduced its total generating
costs by 19 percent since their peak in
2012. These reductions in cost are so
dramatic that 2017 total generating
costs of $33.50 per megawatt-hour
(MWh) have gone down to almost
what they were nearly 10 years ago in
2008 ($32.75 per MWh).
“Through the Delivering the
Nuclear Promise campaign and other
initiatives, Operations the hardworking men and
women of the nuclear industry have
done an amazing job reducing costs
wherever they find them,” NEI Vice
have remained flat compared to the past decade.
President of Policy Development and
Public Affairs John Kotek said. “As we
continue to face economic headwinds
in markets which do not properly
compensate nuclear plants, the
industry has been doing its part to
reduce costs to remain com petitive.”
“Some things are in urgent need of
change if we are to keep the nation’s
nuclear plants running and enjoy
their contribution to a reliable,
resilient and low-carbon grid. Namely,
we need to put in place market
reforms that fairly compensate
nuclear similar to those already in
place in New York, Illinois and
other states.”
Other findings of the Nuclear Costs
in Context study include:
• The average total generating costs
for nuclear in 2017 of $33.50 per
MWh, represents a 3.3 percent
reduction from 2016.
• The 19 percent reduction in costs
since 2012 includes a 41 percent
reduction in capital expenditures,
a 17 percent reduction in fuel
costs, and a 9 percent reduction
in operating costs.
The report warns that despite these
reduced prices, several nuclear power
plants have been closed in recent
years because of economic pressures.
Since 2013, seven nuclear reactors
(Crystal River 3 in Florida, San Onofre
2 and 3 in California, Kewaunee in
Wisconsin, Vermont Yankee, Fort
Calhoun in Nebraska, and Oyster
Creek in New Jersey) have shut
down permanently. Another 12
reactors have announced their
permanent shutdown. If all these
closures are taken together, they
represent a massive loss of carbonfree
electricity generation for the
country: 55.5 million tons of carbon
dioxide (CO 2 ) avoided annually. That
is the equivalent of the carbon emissions
avoided by approximately
14,000 wind turbines per year or
the electricity used by 8 million
homes per year.
Operations costs increased over the last twelve years from $19.25 per MWh in 2002 to $20.43 per MWh
in 2017. Operations costs have declined 9.8 percent from the peak in 2011.
This increase in operations costs was not driven by any single category. Operations costs in the 2002-2008
period are similar to where money was being spent in the 2009-2017 period. However, operations costs
The chart below breaks down operations spending over the last 11 years.
$ Billions (in 2017 dollars)
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Work Management (WM)
Training (TR)
Support Services (SS)
Nuclear Industry Operations Cost, 2006-2017
Operations (OP)
Fuel Management (NF)
Materials and Services (MS)
| | US: Cost of nuclear generation reaches nearly 10-year low (NEI).
Loss Prevention (LP)
Engineering (ENG)
Source: Electric Utility Cost Group
The report cites various factors as
contributing to premature closure of
these plants including:
• sustained low natural gas prices,
which suppress prices in power
markets
• relatively low growth in electricity
demand
• federal and state mandates for
renewable generation which suppress
prices, particularly during
off-peak hours when wind generation
is highest and the electricity is
needed the least
• market designs that do not
compensate nuclear plants for the
value they provide to the grid.
Certain states have implemented
plans that recognize and place a value
on nuclear’s contributions. New York,
Illinois, New Jersey and Connecticut
have enacted policies that will
compensate nuclear plants for their
environmental attributes, ensuring
that a total of 12 reactors in these
states will not be forced to shut down
prematurely.
Closed nuclear plants are often
replaced with natural gas power
plants which produce substantial
amounts of CO 2 and come with a
bigger price tag than existing nuclear
plants. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, new
natural gas-fired plants come with a
levelized cost of $48 per MWh compared
to existing nuclear’s cost of
$33.50 per MWh.
Cost information in the study was
collected by the Electric Utility Cost
Group with prior years converted to
2017 dollars for accurate historical
comparison.
| | www.nei.org
IAEA showcases global
coordination on Small,
Medium Sized or Modular
Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)
(iaea) The International Atomic
Energy Agency’s (IAEA) expanding
international coordination on the
safe and secure development and
deployment of small, medium sized or
modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) has
come into focus with new publications
and expert meetings on these emerging
technologies.
Significant advances have been
made in recent years on SMRs, some
of which will use pre-fabricated
systems and components to shorten
construction schedules and offer
greater flexibility and affordability
than traditional nuclear power plants.
Some 50 SMR concepts are at various
stages of development around the
617
NEWS
Fuel
Fuel costs represent approximately 20 percent of the total generating cost. Fuel costs experienced a
relatively rapid increase from 2009 to 2013. This was largely the result of an escalation in uranium prices,
News

atw Vol. 63 (2018) | Issue 11/12 ı November/December
Operating Results July 2018
618
NEWS
Plant name Country Nominal
capacity
Type
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated. gross
[MWh]
Month Year Since
commissioning
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Month Year Month Year
OL1 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 716 636 758 3 676 095 258 330 281 96.22 80.22 93.88 78.84 94.05 79.41
OL2 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 687 606 170 4 258 260 248 557 441 92.34 92.13 90.12 91.04 88.56 90.99
KCB Borssele PWR NL 512 484 744 368 003 2 171 801 160 378 720 99.91 84.46 99.91 83.93 96.58 83.53
KKB 1 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 744 276 474 1 217 418 125 963 505 100.00 63.38 100.00 63.12 97.71 62.90
KKB 2 Beznau 1,7) PWR CH 380 365 538 194 981 1 811 079 132 975 952 72.31 93.81 71.03 93.59 68.56 93.61
KKG Gösgen 7) PWR CH 1060 1010 744 773 627 4 802 648 309 997 235 100.00 89.85 99.99 89.29 98.10 89.07
KKM Mühleberg BWR CH 390 373 744 269 800 1 930 260 126 268 405 100.00 99.63 99.97 99.32 92.98 97.29
CNT-I Trillo PWR ES 1066 1003 744 785 052 4 375 007 243 399 431 100.00 81.93 100.00 81.51 98.13 80.22
Dukovany B1 1,2) PWR CZ 500 473 652 305 764 1 866 343 110 496 825 87.63 74.41 84.40 73.71 82.20 73.38
Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 744 360 276 1 807 746 106 430 284 100.00 72.46 99.74 71.69 96.85 71.07
Dukovany B3 PWR CZ 500 473 744 357 268 2 378 998 105 001 425 100.00 95.48 99.45 95.12 96.04 93.53
Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 530 254 145 2 293 598 105 565 339 71.24 91.39 70.34 90.97 68.32 90.17
Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 744 796 140 3 916 116 110 397 410 100.00 71.73 99.66 71.41 98.90 71.20
Temelin B2 2) PWR CZ 1080 1030 0 0 4 661 537 106 151 483 0 84.84 0 84.81 0 84.85
Doel 1 2) PWR BE 454 433 0 0 1 229 715 135 444 462 0 53.08 0 53.05 0 53.23
Doel 2 2) PWR BE 454 433 0 0 1 549 672 133 801 939 0 66.85 0 66.64 0 66.97
Doel 3 2) PWR BE 1056 1006 154 116 819 116 819 251 286 041 20.73 3.03 14.55 2.13 14.55 2.13
Doel 4 PWR BE 1084 1033 744 798 104 5 492 676 260 038 518 100.00 99.25 100.00 99.07 97.78 98.57
Tihange 1 PWR BE 1009 962 744 717 709 5 101 230 295 940 106 100.00 99.66 98.87 99.36 95.54 99.64
Tihange 2 PWR BE 1055 1008 691 684 179 5 271 687 254 221 225 92.89 98.96 88.55 97.98 87.39 98.78
Tihange 3 2) PWR BE 1089 1038 0 0 2 332 443 271 227 273 0 42.02 0 41.97 0 42.07
Operating Results July 2018
Plant name
Type
Nominal
capacity
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year
commissioning
KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 744 1 002 201 5 663 244 345 855 303 100.00 83.92 94.23 79.45 90.59 74.91
KKE Emsland 4) DWR 1406 1335 744 1 028 789 6 385 489 341 708 772 100.00 91.02 99.72 90.83 98.35 89.27
KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 740 988 782 5 972 523 372 600 102 99.40 87.63 98.55 85.57 92.24 81.56
KRB C Gundremmingen SWR 1344 1288 744 976 015 5 472 761 326 052 654 100.00 83.48 99.40 82.81 97.11 79.58
KKI-2 Isar 1,2,4) DWR 1485 1410 365 484 346 6 813 318 348 411 641 49.04 92.55 46.73 92.20 43.52 89.89
KKP-2 Philippsburg DWR 1468 1402 744 1 038 977 5 948 826 361 116 342 100.00 84.03 100.00 83.87 93.58 78.36
GKN-II Neckarwestheim DWR 1400 1310 744 996 350 6 957 650 327 080 784 100.00 100.00 98.04 99.61 95.74 97.91
| | IAEA showcases global coordination on Small, Medium Sized or Modular
Nuclear Reactors (SMRs).
world, with commercial operations
expected to begin in the coming years.
Following an IAEA meeting in
September on SMR design and technology,
energy experts from around
Europe gathered at the Agency’s
Vienna headquarters for a workshop
earlier this month to discuss infrastructure,
economic and finance
aspects of SMRs. The meetings are
part of an ongoing SMR project
involving the IAEA Departments of
Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Safety and
Security and Technical Cooperation.
In addition, representatives of regulatory
authorities and other stakeholders
also met this month at the
IAEA’s SMR Regulators’ Forum, which
exchanges experiences on SMR regulatory
reviews.
“Many IAEA Member States are
interested in the development and
deployment of SMRs as a cleaner
alternative to fossil fuels and for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions,”
said IAEA Deputy Director General
Mikhail Chudakov, Head of the
Department of Nuclear Energy. “The
IAEA’s flurry of recent activities on
SMRs is part of our efforts to respond
to Member State requests for assistance
on this exciting emerging technology.”
The IAEA recently released two
new publications on SMRs: Deployment
Indicators for Small Modular
Reactors, which provides Member
States with a methodology for evaluating
the potential deployment of
SMRs in their national energy
systems; and an updated edition of
Advances in Small Modular Reactor
Technology Developments, which
provides a concise overview of the
latest status of SMR designs around
the world and is intended as a
supplement to the IAEA’s Advanced
Reactor Information System (ARIS).
SMRs have the potential to meet
the needs of a wide range of users and
News

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Operating Results August 2018
Plant name Country Nominal
capacity
Type
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated. gross
[MWh]
Month Year Since
commissioning
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Month Year Month Year
OL1 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 744 669 103 4 345 198 258 999 384 100.00 82.75 99.92 81.53 98.83 81.89
OL2 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 744 666 612 4 924 872 249 224 053 100.00 93.13 100.00 92.19 97.39 91.80
KCB Borssele 3) PWR NL 512 484 87 42 413 2 214 214 160 421 133 12.04 75.22 12.02 74.76 11.13 74.29
KKB 1 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 744 252 974 1 470 392 126 216 479 100.00 68.05 96.15 67.33 89.13 66.25
KKB 2 Beznau 1,7) PWR CH 380 365 744 262 373 2 073 452 133 238 325 100.00 94.60 100.00 94.40 92.51 93.47
KKG Gösgen 7) PWR CH 1060 1010 744 772 515 5 575 163 310 769 750 100.00 91.14 99.94 90.65 97.96 90.20
KKM Mühleberg 1,2) BWR CH 390 373 432 139 480 2 069 740 126 407 885 58.07 94.32 56.45 93.85 48.07 91.01
CNT-I Trillo PWR ES 1066 1003 744 785 558 5 160 565 244 184 989 100.00 84.24 100.00 83.87 98.22 82.51
Dukovany B1 PWR CZ 500 473 744 359 880 2 226 223 110 856 705 100.00 77.67 100.00 77.06 96.74 76.36
Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 744 358 886 2 166 632 106 789 170 100.00 75.97 100.00 75.30 96.48 74.31
Dukovany B3 PWR CZ 500 473 744 355 026 2 734 024 105 356 451 100.00 96.06 99.98 95.74 95.44 93.78
Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 738 356 094 2 649 692 105 921 433 99.19 92.39 98.67 91.96 95.72 90.88
Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 744 797 599 4 713 715 111 195 009 100.00 75.34 99.67 75.02 99.08 74.76
Temelin B2 2) PWR CZ 1080 1030 47 36 816 4 698 353 106 188 299 6.32 74.82 6.32 74.79 4.58 74.61
Doel 1 2) PWR BE 454 433 0 0 1 229 715 135 444 462 0 46.31 0 46.28 0 46.44
Doel 2 2) PWR BE 454 433 0 0 1 549 672 133 801 939 0 58.32 0 58.14 0 58.43
Doel 3 3) PWR BE 1056 1006 668 697 467 814 287 251 983 508 89.79 14.10 88.55 13.15 88.35 13.13
Doel 4 2) PWR BE 1084 1033 138 146 133 5 638 809 260 184 650 18.53 88.95 18.38 88.78 17.88 88.27
Tihange 1 PWR BE 1009 962 744 728 677 5 829 907 296 668 783 100.00 99.70 99.97 99.44 97.06 99.31
Tihange 2 2) PWR BE 1055 1008 426 430 706 5 702 393 254 651 930 57.29 93.64 56.16 92.64 55.07 93.20
Tihange 3 3) PWR BE 1089 1038 0 0 2 332 443 271 227 273 0 36.66 0 36.62 0 36.70
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Operating Results August 2018
Plant name
Type
Nominal
capacity
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year
commissioning
KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 739 954 469 6 617 713 346 809 772 99.30 85.88 92.74 81.15 86.10 76.34
KKE Emsland DWR 1406 1335 744 1 032 112 7 417 601 342 740 884 100.00 92.16 100.00 92.00 98.62 90.47
KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 744 1 004 431 6 976 954 373 604 533 100.00 89.21 100.00 87.41 93.68 83.11
KRB C Gundremmingen SWR 1344 1288 744 977 634 6 450 395 327 030 288 100.00 85.59 100.00 85.00 97.24 81.83
KKI-2 Isar DWR 1485 1410 726 1 036 464 7 849 782 349 448 105 97.55 93.19 97.30 92.85 93.38 90.33
KKP-2 Philippsburg DWR 1468 1402 735.75 943 960 6 892 786 362 060 302 98.89 85.92 98.32 85.71 84.51 79.15
GKN-II Neckarwestheim 2) DWR 1400 1310 740 957 150 7 914 800 328 037 934 99.42 99.93 99.32 99.57 91.80 97.13
to be low carbon replacements for
ageing fossil fuel fired power plants.
They display enhanced safety features
and are suitable for non-electric applications,
such as cooling, heating and
water desalination. SMRs also offer
options for countries with smaller
electricity grids as well as regions with
less developed infrastructure and for
energy systems that combine nuclear
and alternative sources, including
renewables.
SMRs require less upfront capital
per unit, but their electricity generating
cost will probably be higher than
that of large reactors. Their costs will
be weighed against alternatives and
competitiveness will need to be pursued
through economies of scale. An
expeditious deployment of SMRs will
involve the development of a resilient
supply chain, human resources and a
robust regulatory framework.
“There are safety and security
considerations that have to be taken
into account at all stages of the
development and implementation of
SMR projects,” IAEA Deputy Director
General Juan Carlos Lentijo, Head of
the Department of Safety and Security.
“The IAEA safety standards and
security guidance provide a framework
that can support in this regard.”
| | www.iaea.org
ENSREG approves first peer
review report on ageing
management
(nucnet) The European Nuclear Safety
Regulators Group (ENSREG) has
approved the first topical peer review
report on ageing management of
nuclear power plants and research
reactors.
The peer review concluded that
there are “no major deficiencies”
in European approaches to ageing
management. However, it identified
areas where further work would
improve ageing management.
The review concluded that
ageing management programmes
for research reactors are not
regulated or implemented as systematically
and comprehensively as for
commercial nuclear plants. This
may be justified by the variety of
research reactor designs and their
potentially lower risk significance
compared to commercial plants, but
further attention is needed from both
regulators and licensees the review
said.
*)
Net-based values
(Czech and Swiss
nuclear power
plants gross-based)
1)
Refueling
2)
Inspection
3)
Repair
4)
Stretch-out-operation
5)
Stretch-in-operation
6)
Hereof traction supply
7)
Incl. steam supply
8)
New nominal
capacity since
January 2016
9)
Data for the Leibstadt
(CH) NPP will
be published in a
further issue of atw
BWR: Boiling
Water Reactor
PWR: Pressurised
Water Reactor
Source: VGB
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The review was carried out in 16
EU member states and three non-EU
member states – Norway, Switzerland
and Ukraine – with commercial
nuclear power plants or research
reactors.
The peer review process will
continue with national action plans,
to be produced by September 2019,
that address the peer review results,
Ensreg said.
The review was the first in a series
of peer reviews into nuclear safety in
Europe that will take place every six
years, in accordance with the EU’s
revised nuclear safety directive.
Ensreg said it was largely inspired
by stress tests carried out after
the March 2011 accident at the
Fukushima- Daiichi nuclear power
station in Japan.
The review process was developed
by Ensreg, an independent, expert
advisory group with members from
all EU countries.
A public meeting will be held in
Brussels on 22 November to present
the results of the review.
The peer review report is online:
https://bit.ly/2JpUTWi
| | www.ensreg.eu
IAEA launches international
training course on protecting
nuclear facilities from
cyber-attacks
(iaea) The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) has introduced
a new international training course
(ITC) on protecting nuclear facilities
from cyber-attacks, highlighting the
Agency’s role in supporting national
efforts to strengthen nuclear security.
The inaugural course, Protecting
Computer-Based Systems in Nuclear
Security Regimes, was held earlier
this month. It brought together 37
participants from 13 countries for two
weeks of immersive training on best
practices in computer security.
Developed together with the U.S.
Department of Energy’s National
Nuclear Security Administration
( NNSA) and hosted by the Idaho National
Laboratory in the United States,
it was the first in what will be a series
of IAEA information and computer
security ITCs focusing on raising
awareness of the threat posed by
cyber-attacks, and their potential
impact on nuclear facilities.
The course offered participants a
chance to test their skills on mockups
of actual state-of-the-art digital
systems common in today’s nuclear
facilities, which use digital technologies
to provide functions that
| | Dominion files to extend Surry operating license to 80 years.
support safe operations, security,
material accountancy and control,
and pro tection of sensitive information.
“Everyone with responsibility for
nuclear security must have a thorough
understanding of the vulnerabilities
of their systems – they must know
how to prevent and mitigate possible
cyber-attacks on those systems,” said
Raja Adnan, Director of the IAEA’s
Division of Nuclear Security. “The
IAEA offers a range of training courses
in computer security to help ensure
that governments and organizations
have the necessary technical, regulatory
and other tools to succeed
when faced with highly skilled
adversaries.”
In developing the course, cybersecurity
experts from the IAEA and
the Department of Energy National
Laboratories – Idaho National Laboratory,
Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, and Los Alamos National
Laboratory – designed a learning
environment that replicated equipment
typically found in a nuclear
facility.
“The hands-on lab environment,
presentations, and exercises were
conducted in a manner that allowed
participants of varied experience to
gain the full benefit of the training,”
said James Byrne, a participant from
EDF Energy in the United Kingdom.
“It was a valuable training experience
that provided me with many cyber
security insights that will be helpful
for me when I return to work.”
| | www.iaea.org
Reactors
Dominion files to extend
Surry operating license
to 80 years
(nei) Dominion Energy’s twin-reactor
Surry Power Station will continue to
provide carbon-free electricity to
more than 400,000 homes in Virginia
through the middle of the century,
once the company’s application for
a second renewed 20-year operating
license is approved by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Dominion’s submittal, filed Tuesday,
is the third “second license renewal”
application to be sent by nuclear
utilities to the NRC this year, reflecting
the industry’s increasing interest in
sustaining the future of its reactor fleet.
“Our application to renew Surry
Power Station’s licenses for another
20-year period is good news for our
customers, the regional economy and
the environment,” said Dan Stoddard,
Dominion Energy’s Chief Nuclear
Officer in an Oct. 16 press release.
“Our customers will benefit from
continuing to receive safe, reliable,
affordable, and clean electricity
from the station through 2053.”
“Renewing the operation of Surry also
positions Virginia for economic
growth and will help the Commonwealth
remain a leader in the production
of clean energy among
other states in the mid-Atlantic and
South,” Stoddard added. “It supports
more than 900 high-paying jobs at
the station and produces additional
economic and tax benefits.”
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All U.S. nuclear reactors are
initially licensed to operate for 40
years, with NRC regulations allowing
for licenses to be renewed for 20 years
at a time. The reactor license renewal
process is well established. It entails
a rigorous NRC review of reactor
licensees’ plans for managing all plant
structures and components for safe
long-term operations throughout the
renewal period.
The NRC agrees with the industry
that there are no technological
limitations on restricting the operating
lifetime of well-maintained nuclear
reactors. Licensees have the discretion
to decide whether to pursue extended
operations based on economic and
other considerations.
Since the first 20-year license
renewal was issued in 2000, nearly all
the 98 operating reactors in the
U.S. fleet have obtained their initial
license extensions – Surry’s was
obtained in 2003. The remaining
few reactors have applications under
review or pending submittal. Even
so, half of these reactors are expected
to reach the end of their 60-year
extended periods by 2040, and all
by 2050.
The continued operation of
America’s nuclear fleet is vital to
ensuring an adequate supply of clean,
carbon-free energy. Nuclear plants are
the largest source of carbon-free
electricity in the country. An NEI
study finds that if all operating U.S.
reactors were to run for 80 years
instead of 60, a cumulative total of
about 3.5 billion tons of CO 2 emissions
would be avoided through
2050.
The first SLR application was
submitted by Florida Power and Light
in January 2018 for its Turkey Point
Nuclear Plant in Florida, followed
by Exelon’s filing in July for Peach
Bottom Atomic Power Station in
Pennsylvania. Including the two
Surry units, there are now six reactors
in the vanguard of the SLR program,
with more to come.
“The Peach Bottom SLR application
has been an excellent example
of industry cooperation. We could
not have submitted a high quality
application without EPRI and
DOE research, and the Nuclear
Energy Institute leading the way
on inter facing with the NRC on
this process,” Exelon Vice President
for Licensing and Decommissioning
Mike Gallagher said. “We look
forward to safely and efficiently
operating Peach Bottom for many
years to come.”
The NRC has committed to completing
SLR application reviews within
an 18-month period, and is piloting
this review schedule with one of the
initial license renewal applications
under way.
The success of the program to date,
including the NRC’s expedited review
schedule, has resulted in the industry’s
increasing confidence in the process.
As shown by industry surveys
conducted in 2017 and 2018, more
than half of nuclear plant licensees
now want to pursue SLR applications
(see accompanying chart).
Among them is Dominion Energy,
which already announced its intention
to file an SLR application for
its two North Anna Power Station
units in Louisa County by 2020.
Additional announcements are expected
in 2019.
More than half of the operating
reactor fleet is anticipated to pursue
license renewals to operate for 80
years.
| | www.nei.org
Modification work results in
capacity increase at Finland’s
Loviisa reactors
(nucnet) The net capacity of both
nuclear power units at the Loviisa
nuclear power station in Finland is
now 507 MW (net) after modification
and improvement work carried out
during recent outages.
Both units have seen their net
capacity increase from the original
design net capacity as the result of
modifications and improvement work
since they began commercial operation.
According to the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s reactor
database, the units’ original design
net capacity was 420 MW.
Fortum said the most recent
outages included “the most challenging”
work in the Loviisa station’s
history, both in terms of workload and
how demanding the work was.
Unit 1 returned to commercial
operation on 18 October after an
annual outage that lasted just over
26 days. Earlier, Unit 2 returned to
service on 21 September after an
outage that lasted nearly 47 days.
Loviisa-2 underwent an extensive
outage that involved the standard
periodic inspections performed
every eight years in addition to
the plant modification and improvement
work.
Loviisa-1 underwent a shorter
refuelling outage, but modification
and improvement work waswere also
carried out, Fortum told NucNet.
Several safety improvements were
implemented for both units, including
improvements to critical safety functions,
maintenance work on the main
generators and the replacement of
generator stators.
Fortum and Rolls-Royce signed
an agreement in May 2014 for the
modernisation of the most critical
safety automation systems on both
units at Loviisa. The work done by
Rolls-Royce included the design,
licensing, installation and commissioning
of the new safety systems.
Both Loviisa units are pressurised
water reactors supplied by Russia.
Unit 1 began commercial operation
in May 1977 and Unit 2 in January
1981.
In 2017, the load factor at Loviisa
was 92.9%, among the best in the
world for PWR plants. The plant
produced a total of 8.16 TWh of
electricity, which is more than 10%
of Finland’s total electricity production.
In 2017, Fortum invested about
€ 90 m in the Loviisa nuclear station.
| | www.fortum.com
Anglesey hearings mark
beginning of six-month
Wylfa Newydd planning
examination
(nucnet) Three days of hearings have
being held as part of a six-month
formal examination of plans to build
two UK Advanced Boiling Water
Reactors at the Wylfa Newydd
nuclear power station on the isle
of Anglesey in North Wales.
The hearings began on 23 October
as part of Horizon Nuclear Power’s
development consent order application
for the station, which will
generate enough power for about
five million homes.
A five-member panel will consider
and make a recommendation on the
proposed power station to business
secretary Greg Clark.
Mr Clark will then decide whether
to grant planning permission to build
the main power station and other
off-site integral developments.
As the host local authority,
Anglesey Council said it will play a
key role in the examination process,
ensuring that the Wylfa Newydd
plans are scrutinised and challenged
to secure the best possible outcome
for the Island.
Council leader Llinos Medi said:
“The Wylfa Newydd power station
is a huge energy infrastructure
project of national significance. The
sheer scale and complexity of the
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DOD and a private reactor development
company to start working on a
project next year. And keep a watch
out for the submission of microreactor
applications to the NRC
sometime before 2021.
| | www.nei.org
Company News
| | Anglesey hearings mark beginning of six-month Wylfa Newydd planning examination
application cannot be underestimated
and its examination is vital.”
A big move toward small:
Micro-reactors and the
Pentagon
(nei) What’s New? The Pentagon,
with the support of Congress, is
exploring the potential for the
deployment of micro-reactors at its
defense installations. These reactors
could run for years, independent of
the grid, to provide secure, reliable
power and sustain defense functions,
including during an extended blackout.
The Nuclear Energy Institute
has released a Roadmap on what
steps are needed for deployment.
Fast Facts
The U.S. Congress and U.S. Department
of Defense (DOD) have been
interested in the use of small reactors
for nearly a decade. Deployment of
micro-reactors for DOD could happen
in as soon as five to seven years,
replace conventional diesel generators
or coal boilers with a new source
of electricity that would operate independently
of the power grid, and run
cleanly and quietly for years, with
long intervals between re-fuelings.
DOD manages more than 500 fixed
installations and is the single largest
energy consumer in the U.S.
These reactors are quite small with
military installations likely exploring
technology in the one to 10 megawatts-electric
range. Many military
bases will need multiple microreactors.
They could desalinate water,
generate hydrogen for fuel, and power
computer installations. The main
challenges are licensing, regulatory
and business issues, not technology.
NEI’s Roadmap for Micro-Reactor
Deployment lays out the necessary
steps, describes the timeline, and
offers recommendations for facilitating
micro-reactor deployment for
the military.
NEI anticipates that the reactors
would be licensed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. They would
be powered by uranium of a type
that the government already has in
inventory, although the uranium
would have to be processed into the
proper fuel form. While the focus of
the roadmap is for military use, such
reactors would also be useful in small
communities off the grid, and in
remote mining operations.
What NEI’s Marc Nichol, director
of new reactor deployment, has to say
about this technology: “Small reactors
are one of the most promising new
nuclear technologies to emerge in
decades. Energy is important to our
national security; it must be reliable
and resilient so that it’s there when
our men and women in uniform
need it. Micro-reactors can enhance
our capabilities by providing that
resilient, 24/7 energy.”
What DoD’s Troy Warshel, director
of operations at the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Operational Energy, has to say: “Ultimately
our goal is resilience. And
what does resilience mean for the
Department of Defense? It means for
our critical missions, when we flip the
switch – there’s power. We see nuclear
energy as a huge potential partner in
achieving our resilience goals.”
The Big Picture: The Pentagon’s
interest in the technology signals
strong confidence in nuclear energy to
meet the Pentagon’s energy resilience
goals. Through the National Defense
Authorization Act the President has
directed the Secretary of Energy to
develop a report on a pilot program
for deploying micro-reactors at
national security facilities. His signature
on the bill points to the
Administration’s confidence in the nuclear
industry to support the country’s
national security interests.
What to Look for Next: Within the
next year, the Department of Energy
will develop a report on a pilot program
for deploying micro-reactors at
national security facilities. Also, look
for a formal engagement between
Framatome and Entergy sign
contract for accident tolerant
fuel coated cladding delivery
to ANO
(framatome) Framatome signed a
contract with Entergy to deliver and
insert lead use fuel rods that utilize
chromium-coated rods into Unit 1
at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO).
Chromium coating is a feature of
the accident tolerant fuel design
that Framatome has been developing
for several years as a part of the
Department of Energy’s (DOE)
Enhanced Accident Tolerant Fuel
(EATF) program. This work also
builds on several years of collaboration
with its European partners,
CEA and EDF in France, as well as
Goesgen Nuclear Power Plant in
Switzerland. Entergy will insert the
lead use rods in fall 2019.
“Our team has decades of
experience researching, developing
and advancing nuclear fuel technologies,”
said Bob Freeman, vice
president of Contracts and Services
for the Fuel Business Unit of
Framatome in the U.S. “Our enhanced
accident tolerant fuel design builds
on this experience and provides
operators more time to respond
in the event of an emergency, while
improving fuel performance during
normal operations.”
The addition of a chromium
coating to the fuel’s existing alloy
cladding offers advantages, including
improved resistance to oxidation at
high temperatures, reduced hydrogen
generation in accident conditions, and
increased wear and debris resistance
in normal operations.
“Maintaining operational excellence,
while safely producing lowcost,
carbon- free electricity, is at the
core of what we do at Entergy,” said
John Elnitsky, senior vice president,
Engineering and Technical Services
at Entergy Nuclear. “These chro miumcoated
rods will not only help
improve fuel reliability for our
customers but will also advance
this important technology for our
industry.”
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Since 2014, the experienced
experts at Framatome have driven
the company’s program, building on
the collective knowledge, skills and
expertise of nuclear professionals
from utilities, U.S. and French Institute
national labs, universities and
industry organizations around the
world. Support from DOE has allowed
Framatome to significantly beat its
initial target of 2023 to deploy this
technology, further protecting and
advancing nuclear power.
| | www.framatome.com
US: Framatome signs contract
to deliver ATRIUM 11 fuel to
Talen Energy’s Susquehanna
Station
(framatome) Framatome signed a
contract with Talen Energy’s
Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC, to supply
its advanced ATRIUM 11 fuel
design. The company will deliver the
first of six fuel reloads – consisting of
approximately 300 fuel assemblies –
in January 2021 to the site located
in Berwick, Pennsylvania.
Framatome has supplied Susquehanna
Nuclear with fuel for every
reload since 1983 under a series of
competitively awarded contracts. To
date, Framatome has delivered more
than 10,500 fuel assemblies to
Susquehanna and supported Talen
Energy in reducing generating costs
through new, more efficient fuel
designs, shifting operations to longer
cycles and increasing plant output
to 120 percent of the initial rated
power.
“Our team at Framatome brings
together the highest level of expertise
and experience to deliver exceptional
performance for our customers,” said
Lionel Gaiffe, senior executive vice
president in charge of the Fuel
Business Unit of Framatome. “Our
new ATRIUM 11 product helps
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) facilities
meet and adapt to technically
demanding operating requirements
so that they may continue to safely
and reliably generate electricity.”
ATRIUM 11 is Framatome’s latest
BWR fuel, featuring an 11x11 rod
array, which offers increased safety
and fuel cycle savings. The unique
geometry of ATRIUM 11 inherently
increases the amount of energy
extracted from the fuel while reducing
the power demand on individual
fuel rods. As a result, customers can
buy less uranium to meet cycle energy
targets and increase power maneuvering
agility to adapt to an evolving
regional generation mix. A number
of innovative protective features also
help ensure failure-free operation
over the life of the fuel.
Framatome’s fuel fabrication
facility in Richland, Washington,
which has been in operation for nearly
50 years, will manufacture the fuel
assemblies that Susquehanna will use.
The company also manufactures
ATRIUM 11 in Lingen, Germany.
Susquehanna Nuclear is the
second customer to choose ATRIUM
11 fuel in the U.S., and the design is
currently operating in five reactors
around the world. Two reactors in
Europe received reload batches of
ATRIUM 11 in early 2018.
With a combined output of
2,600 MW-electric, the dual-unit
Susquehanna site sits on 2,100 acres
and is one of the largest nuclear
generation facilities in the United
States. Its two BWRs, which came
into commercial operation in 1984
and 1985, respectively, produce
enough power to meet the needs of
approximately two million homes.
The plant provides jobs for nearly
1,000 full-time employees.
| | www.framatome.com
Orano and the CEA provide
demonstration of an innovative
waste vitrification
technology for Fukushima
nuclear site
Vitrification proven technology may
be part of the solution for waste
treatment on the Fukushima nuclear
site. Since April 27th 2018, ANADEC,
the CEA and Orano are working
on a project to evaluate the compatibility
of the In-can vitrification
process developed by the CEA, to
treat nuclear waste from Fukushima
Daiichi water treatment, such as
sludge and mineral adsorbents.
This project is divided in two main
parts:
• Durable waste form conditioning
matrix formulations and studies,
laboratory scale (100 gr), bench
scale (1kg) and near-industrial
scale (100 kg) tests are led in
France at the CEA Marcoule laboratories
and technological platforms,
• Feasibility studies for process
implementation, operation and
maintenance principles and waste
disposal are led by Orano teams.
Laboratory tests and part of bench
scale tests have already been performed
with success and nearindustrial
scale tests are under way.
Feasibility studies will follow, in
order to deliver complete results
before end march 2019.
In this project, technical and
commercial interfaces in Japan are
ensured by ANADEC, a joint venture
between Orano and ATOX, a Japanese
company specialized in nuclear
services and maintenance.
The CEA and Orano have developed
vitrification processes and
operated industrial vitrification
facilities in France and abroad for
more than 40 years, with rare
expertise on formulation and longterm
behavior of glasses for encapsulation
of nuclear waste.
| | orano.group
First Westinghouse AP1000
plant sanmen 1 begins
commercial operation
(westinghouse) Westinghouse Electric
Company and its customers, China
State Nuclear Power Technology
Corporation (SNPTC) and CNNC
Sanmen Nuclear Power Company
Limited (SMNPC) announced today
that the world’s first AP1000 plant
located in Sanmen, Zhejiang Province,
China, is fully operational.
“Many years have been dedicated
to successfully bringing the first
AP1000 unit to life,” said José
Emeterio Gutiérrez, Westinghouse
president and chief executive officer.
He added, “Our Westinghouse design
and technology is now live and generating
safe, clean energy.”
The AP1000 plant, a Generation
III+ two-loop pressurized water
reactor (PWR), is considered the most
advanced commercially available
plant, offering an industry-leading
design. The AP1000 plant features a
passive safety design, harnessing
the laws of nature including gravity
and convection to support safe
and efficient plant performance. The
AP1000 plant is designed to safely and
automatically shut down without
operator action for up to 72 hours in
the event of a design-basis incident.
Additionally, Sanmen 1 and the
AP1000 fleet effectively incorporate
Westinghouse’s leading digital
instrumentation and controls that
enhance the reliability of plant control
and safety systems through an integrated,
plant-wide approach.
The global AP1000 fleet is comprised
of Sanmen 1 as well as five
additional nuclear power plants
progressing through construction,
testing and start-up. The projects
progressing through testing and
start-up include a second unit in
Sanmen, Zhejiang Province, and two
units in Haiyang, Shandong Province,
all in China. Additionally, there are
623
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NEWS
two units currently under construction
at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant near Waynesboro,
Georgia, USA. Westinghouse is providing
the design, critical equipment,
training and testing for each of the
units.
| | www.westinghousenuclear.com
Rosatom: The first large-scale
NPP construction project in
Uzbekistan launched
(rosatom) The event marked the beginning
of site surveys to determine
the best location for construction:
Geo technical drilling is currently
underway at one of the sites, preselected
for the project based on seismological,
geological, environmental
and economic feasibility studies.
Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat
Mirziyoyev and Russia’s President
Vladimir Putin have launched the
drilling by pressing a symbolic button.
The Uzbekistan nuclear power
plant will be the first large-capacity
NPP in the Central Asia. The project
envisages building two Generation
III+ power units based on VVER-1200
reactors. Thanks to its enhanced
reliability and modern design, the
facility will be fully compliant with the
IAEA safety standards.
“Uzbekistan and Russia have been
cooperating in nuclear for more than
half a century, and we are proud that
Uzbekistan has chosen the Russian
technology to build its first nuclear
plant,” Rosatom’s Director General
Alexey Likhachev said, speaking at the
event.
As of now, natural gas accounts for
nearly 84% of Uzbekistan’s energy
mix. The local government seeks to
replace some of its gas power plants
with nuclear generation. Doing so will
help in raising Uzbekistan’s natural
gas exports and make its energy mix
‘greener’.
On October 19, 2018, Rosatom, the
Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan
and the Nuclear Energy Development
Agency (Uzatom) signed a memorandum
on cooperation in workforce
training for the country’s nuclear
power sector and related industries.
The memorandum also provides for
a branch of the National Research
Nuclear University (MEPhI) to be set
up in Tashkent. These agreements will
help Uzbekistan in developing nuclear
infrastructure to operate the NPP
safely.
General Director of Uzatom
Zhurabek Mirzamakhmudov, and
Alexey Likhachev also signed a memorandum
of understanding to raise
public awareness regarding nuclear
power in Uzbekistan.
Likhachev told reporters that
the contract for construction of
Uzbekistan’s first nuclear power
plant could be signed as soon as the
spring of 2019.
| | www.rosatom.ru
Market data
(All information is supplied without
guarantee.)
Nuclear Fuel Supply
Market Data
Information in current (nominal)
U.S.-$. No inflation adjustment of
prices on a base year. Separative work
data for the formerly “secondary
market”. Uranium prices [US-$/lb
U 3 O 8 ; 1 lb = 453.53 g; 1 lb U 3 O 8 =
0.385 kg U]. Conversion prices [US-$/
kg U], Separative work [US-$/SWU
(Separative work unit)].
2014
• Uranium: 28.10–42.00
• Conversion: 7.25–11.00
• Separative work: 86.00–98.00
2015
• Uranium: 35.00–39.75
• Conversion: 6.25–9.50
• Separative work: 58.00–92.00
2016
• Uranium: 18.75–35.25
• Conversion: 5.50–6.75
• Separative work: 47.00–62.00
2017
• Uranium: 19.25–26.50
• Conversion: 4.50–6.75
• Separative work: 39.00–50.00
2018
January 2018
• Uranium: 21.75–24.00
• Conversion: 6.00–7.00
• Separative work: 38.00–42.00
February 2018
• Uranium: 21.25–22.50
• Conversion: 6.25–7.25
• Separative work: 37.00–40.00
March 2018
• Uranium: 20.50–22.25
• Conversion: 6.50–7.50
• Separative work: 36.00–39.00
April 2018
• Uranium: 20.00–21.75
• Conversion: 7.50–8.50
• Separative work: 36.00–39.00
May 2018
• Uranium: 21.75–22.80
• Conversion: 8.00–8.75
• Separative work: 36.00–39.00
June 2018
• Uranium: 22.50–23.75
• Conversion: 8.50–9.50
• Separative work: 35.00–38.00
July 2018
• Uranium: 23.00–25.90
• Conversion: 9.00–10.50
• Separative work: 34.00–38.00
August 2018
• Uranium: 25.50–26.50
• Conversion: 11.00–14.00
• Separative work: 34.00–38.00
| | Source: Energy Intelligence
www.energyintel.com
Cross-border Price
for Hard Coal
Cross-border price for hard coal in
[€/t TCE] and orders in [t TCE] for
use in power plants (TCE: tonnes of
coal equivalent, German border):
2012: 93.02; 27,453,635
2013: 79.12, 31,637,166
2014: 72.94, 30,591,663
2015: 67.90; 28,919,230
2016: 67.07; 29,787,178
2017: 91.28, 25,739,010
2018
I. quarter: 89.88; 5,838,003
II. quarter: 88.8258; 4,341,359
Source: BAFA, some data provisional
www.bafa.de
EEX Trading Results
September 2018
(eex) In September 2018, the
European Energy Exchange (EEX)
increased volumes on its power
derivatives markets by 42% to
377.1 TWh (September 2017:
265.8 TWh) and, as a result, reached
the highest monthly volume since
November 2016. In particular, record
volumes in Phelix-DE Futures
(232.8 TWh) and Phelix-AT Futures
(0.5 TWh) as well as in Futures for
the Italy (62.1 TWh) and Spain
(12.2 TWh) contributed to this
development. Furthermore, volumes
in power options increased by 60 %
to 12.2 TWh (September 2017:
7.7 TWh). The September volume
comprised 204.6 TWh traded at EEX
via Trade Registration with subsequent
clearing. Clearing and settlement
of all exchange transactions was
executed by European Commodity
Clearing (ECC).
On the EEX markets for emission
allowances, the total trading volume
increased by 69 % to 317.0 million
tonnes of CO 2 in September
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NEWS
625
| | Uranium spot market prices from 1980 to 2018 and from 2008 to 2018. The price range is shown.
In years with U.S. trade restrictions the unrestricted uranium spot market price is shown.
| | Separative work and conversion market price ranges from 2008 to 2018. The price range is shown.
)1
In December 2009 Energy Intelligence changed the method of calculation for spot market prices. The change results in virtual price leaps.
(Sep tember 2017: 187.8 million
tonnes of CO 2 ). The EUA derivatives
market accounted for a major share of
the total volume with 94.5 million
tonnes of CO 2 traded in EUA Futures
and 149.7 million tonnes of CO 2
traded in EUA Options. Primary
market auctions contributed
68.6 million tonnes of CO 2 to the
total volume.
The Settlement Price for base load
contract (Phelix Futures) with
delivery in 2019 amounted to
53.71 €/MWh. The Settlement
Price for peak load contract (Phelix
Futures) with delivery in 2019
amounted to 65.65 €/MWh.
The EUA price with delivery in
December 2018 amounted to
18.91/25.24 €/ EUA (min./max.).
October 2018
(eex) In October 2018, the European
Energy Exchange (EEX) increased
volumes on its power derivatives
markets by 30% to 339.3 TWh
( October 2017: 261,3 TWh). In particular,
the 4-fold increase in Phelix-
DE Futures to 204.4 TWh as well as
power futures for Italy (60.9 TWh,
+42%) and Spain (9.1 TWh, +32%)
contributed to this development. EEX
recorded a positive trend also in the
smaller markets: In power futures for
Great Britain, at 125,070 MWh, EEX
recorded the highest trading volume
since the launch of these products. In
the Dutch markets, volumes increased
by 18% to 2.1 TWh (October 2017:
1.8 TWh). The October volume comprised
185.0 TWh traded at EEX via
Trade Registration with subsequent
clearing. Clearing and settlement of
all exchange transactions was executed
by European Commodity Clearing
(ECC).
On the EEX markets for emission
allowances, the total trading volume
increased by 70% to 241.5 million
tonnes of CO 2 in October (October
2017: 142.3 million tonnes of CO 2 ). In
particular, this increase is driven by
the EUA Options with 89.6 million
tonnes of CO 2 traded in October.
Primary market auctions contributed
87.6 million tonnes of CO 2 to the total
volume.
The Settlement Price for base load
contract (Phelix Futures) with
delivery in 2019 amounted to
49.10 €/MWh. The Settlement
Price for peak load contract (Phelix
Futures) with delivery in 2019
amounted to 60.30 €/MWh.
The EUA price with delivery in
December 2018 amounted to
16.20/22.15 €/ EUA (min./max.).
| | www.eex.com
MWV Crude Oil/
Product Prices
August 2018
(mwv) According to information
and calculations by the Association
of the German Petroleum Industry
MWV e.V. in August 2018 the prices
for super fuel, fuel oil and heating
oil noted slightly higher compared
with the pre vious month July 2018.
The average gas station prices for
Euro super consisted of 149.44 €Cent
( June 2018: 147.45 €Cent, approx.
+1.35 % in brackets: each information
for pre vious month or rather previous
month comparison), for diesel fuel of
130.03 €Cent (128.92; +1.11 %) and
for heating oil (HEL) of 69.03 €Cent
(67.15 €Cent, +1.88 %).
Worldwide crude oil prices
(monthly average price OPEC/Brent/
WTI, Source: U.S. EIA) were slightly
lower, approx. -2.60 % (+1.48 %) in
August 2018 compared to July 2018.
The market showed a stable
development with slightly lower
prices; each in US-$/bbl: OPEC
basket: 72.26(73,27); UK-Brent:
72.53 (74.25); West Texas Intermediate
(WTI): 68.06 (70.98).
| | www.mwv.de
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626
Brexit and Trump Among Fresh
Challenges for Nuclear in Year Ahead
NUCLEAR TODAY
John Shepherd is a
UK-based energy
writer and editor-inchief
of Energy
Storage Publishing.
Links to reference
sources:
UK commitment
to SMRs –
https://bit.ly/2PO0hIc
President Trump’s
Iran statement –
https://bit.ly/2yNtB82
IAEA report –
https://bit.ly/2xlpbnl
John Shepherd
As 2018 draws to a close, there have been several developments that will mean the new year dawning with fresh
uncertainties on the horizon for the global nuclear energy industry.
The clock that ticks towards 2019 is also counting down
towards the departure of the UK from the European Union
on 29 March – and nuclear is part of the biggest headache
facing UK leaders because of the uncertainties that still
surround Brexit.
As I write, a ‘deal’ over the UK’s future relationship with
the remaining states of the EU has yet to be done. Under a
‘no deal’ scenario, the UK will no longer be a member of
the Euratom Research and Training Programme, no longer
a member of Fusion for Energy and therefore unable to
collaborate on the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (Iter) project through the EU.
Adding to the UK’s dilemma is the fact that its electricity
and gas markets have become increasingly connected with
continental Europe over the years and a large proportion
of power is piped to the UK through underwater electricity
cables and gas pipelines.
Analysts say Brexit may have no impact on the UK’s
ability to use these interconnectors, but a divorce from the
EU is unlikely to make it easier to ensure essential power is
delivered in the event of wider European shortages. Which
is why nuclear has come under increasing focus to help
shore up security of energy supply.
In the first week of November, UK nuclear energy
minister Richard Harrington invited developers to submit
design proposals for small modular nuclear reactors. The
minister said the goal was “to identify potential risks with
proposals early on, reducing investment risks for potential
backers”. Support for SMRs in the UK has been gathering
pace among policymakers in recent years and now appears
to be in even sharper focus.
It is unclear how investors will view post-Brexit, which
is why Harrington also unveiled a £ 32 million (approximately
€ 37 m) ‘advanced manufacturing and construction
programme’, to allow companies to bid for funds to test
new technologies, which he said would “iron out potential
flaws before they start producing at scale”.
In a related development, the UK signed a bilateral
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Canada. This was
the third such agreement signed by the UK in 2018 in
readiness for Brexit and it will allow both sides to continue
what the UK said was “mutually beneficial” civil nuclear
cooperation after Euratom arrangements cease to apply
in the UK.
But fears over the potential impact of a no-deal divorce
from the EU on the UK’s nuclear industry have been rightly
raised by the Nuclear Industry Association (NIA). According
to the NIA, the industry generates around a fifth of all
electricity used in the UK, directly employs more than
63,000 professionals and has the support of more than
70 % of the public. In 2016, nuclear activities directly
contributed £6.4 billion to gross domestic product in the
UK. There is much at stake!
NIA chief executive Tom Greatrex has said “the movement
of people, goods, and services are essential to civil
nuclear” as for other industry sectors, but he has bemoaned
the “lack of detail from government on how this would
work in a no deal scenario”, saying it is “critical this is fully
detailed before March 2019”.
Further uncertainty facing global nuclear in 2019
comes from the US, where the Trump administration has
announced a new policy framework for curtailing civil
nuclear commerce with China. According to the US Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI), the move follows “concerns over
Chinese diversion of sensitive technologies to military and
other unauthorised uses”.
The NEI has warned the new policy framework risks
“commercial harms” to the industry at home and abroad.
In addition to blocking transfers to China of advanced
reactor and non light water small reactor technology, the
NEI said the framework “will establish a presumption of
denial for transfers to the China General Nuclear Power
Group, a Chinese energy company that constructs and
operates nuclear power plants, and for all new technology
transfers” after 1 January 2018.
President Trump has also risked the further destabilisation
of the international civil nuclear order by formally
terminating US participation in the Iran nuclear deal
( officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action – JCPOA). As of 5 November 2018, the last set of US
sanctions lifted under the existing “terrible nuclear deal”
would come back into force, the President said.
The JCPOA was designed to end years of tension and
fears about military aspects of Iran’s nuclear activities. All
other signatories to the agreement have said it is working
and that they want to keep it in place, without the US if
necessary. But President Trump’s decision to pull out risks
undoing all that has been achieved.
The US decision also puts confidence in nuclear safeguards
at risk, because the actions of the Trump administration
are effectively an attack on the credibility of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has been
tasked with monitoring Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA
deal. If the so-called leader of the free world cannot trust in
the work of the IAEA to establish nuclear transparency in
Iran, but can trust the promises of North Korea to scale
down its secret nuclear programme, the whole world has a
problem.
However, it would be wrong to suggest there is doom
and gloom for nuclear everywhere we look.
According to a recent report from the IAEA, nuclear
power still generates almost 11 % of the world’s electricity
– amounting to one-third of our planet’s low-carbon
electricity. Global electricity demand is expected to almost
double by 2050, so nuclear still has everything to play for.
Author
John Shepherd
Shepherd Communications
3 Brooklands
West Sussex BN43 5FE, United Kingdom
Nuclear Today
Brexit and Trump Among Fresh Challenges for Nuclear in Year Ahead ı John Shepherd

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