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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 4 ı April<br />

OPERATION AND NEW BUILD 220<br />

(Figure 9). As the allowable crack<br />

length is 4.9 inches and it is greater<br />

than 4 inches. Thus, brittle failure is<br />

not expected to occur.<br />

The evaluation against ductile failure<br />

showed that the allowable circumferential<br />

projection of the crack length<br />

is 16.36 inches (Figure 10). As this<br />

value is greater than 4 inches. It is not<br />

expected ductile failure to occur.<br />

These conditions were also<br />

evaluated with the R6 Failure<br />

Diagram, Figure 14. For this purpose,<br />

the following parameters were<br />

calcu lated:<br />

and<br />

.<br />

The results showed that this<br />

arrangement has structural integrity<br />

and can continue its operation. A<br />

critical condition is expected along<br />

the circumferential projection. There<br />

is a tendency to a fragile fracture. It is<br />

advisable to inspect this crack periodically.<br />

6.3 Unsafe helical crack<br />

A helical crack, which has a length<br />

of 18”, was postulated. Its components<br />

in the axial and circumferential directions<br />

are 7.19 inches and 16.5 inches,<br />

respectively. The reactor operates with<br />

100 % of the output power and the flow<br />

through the core is 107 %. The two<br />

headers of the RRC are in operation<br />

and 100 % of the flow of water has<br />

been passing through the core.<br />

The projection of the crack in the<br />

axial direction is evaluated with Figure<br />

7. The allowable crack length, in<br />

accordance with Fracture Mechanics,<br />

is 11.6 inches. It is bigger than<br />

7.19 inches. So, it is acceptable.<br />

Regarding the limit load collapse<br />

analysis, it was carried out with Figure<br />

8. The allowable crack length is<br />

11.11 inches. As, it is bigger than<br />

7.19 inches. It is accepted. These evaluations<br />

were completed with the Failure<br />

Assessment Diagram, Figure 15.<br />

In a second phase, the projection in<br />

the circumferential direction is evaluated,<br />

considering the principles of<br />

fracture mechanics. In accordance<br />

with Figure 9, the allowable crack<br />

length is 4.9 inches. This should not<br />

be accepted, because the crack projection<br />

(16.5 inches) is bigger than the<br />

allowable crack length.<br />

The same analysis was done with<br />

the Collapse Limit Load analysis. The<br />

allowable circumferential crack is<br />

16.36 inches. However, the crack<br />

projection is 16.5 inches. Under this<br />

condition, it can be accepted. In order<br />

to confirm these results, this situation<br />

was analyzed with the Failure Assessment<br />

Diagram. For this purpose,<br />

the following parameters were<br />

calcu lated:<br />

and<br />

.<br />

These values are located outside of<br />

the safe zone. It is illustrated in Figure<br />

16 and it is confirmed that the structural<br />

integrity of the riser has been<br />

compromised. It can be expected a<br />

failure in which brittle behavior will<br />

be predominant.<br />

7 Conclusions<br />

The helical or diagonal cracks that<br />

may take place on the riser close to the<br />

weld of the riser brace weld. It was<br />

considered that a torsional mode of<br />

vibration around the axial axis of the<br />

riser generated the loading conditions<br />

<strong>for</strong> the crack propagation. The operational<br />

loads that could take place were<br />

considered in the methodology, which<br />

was applied.<br />

It is considered that the system has<br />

enough structural integrity when the<br />

conditions that avoid ductile and<br />

brittle failures along the circumferential<br />

and axial directions are fulfilled.<br />

Otherwise, the component has to<br />

be repaired. One alternative is to<br />

substitute the damaged part. However,<br />

it should to be cut and a new replacement<br />

component should be<br />

welded. These operations should have<br />

to be done below the water level and<br />

during the outage of the nuclear<br />

power plant. Under these conditions,<br />

it is difficult to get a good quality in<br />

this job. It would be advisable to<br />

install a rein<strong>for</strong>cement structure, in<br />

such way that a compression load<br />

must be applied to avoid fracture<br />

mode I on the crack. Besides, torsion<br />

and bending have to <strong>for</strong> limited.<br />

Regarding the inspections, they<br />

have to be done periodically. Crack<br />

propagation has to be monitored and<br />

the structural integrity of the rein<strong>for</strong>cement<br />

frame has to be evaluated.<br />

Misalignments, deterioration and<br />

corrosion have to be avoided.<br />

Acknowledgements<br />

The authors kindly acknowledge the<br />

grant <strong>for</strong> the development of the<br />

Project 211704. It was awarded by the<br />

National Council of Science and<br />

Technology (CONACyT).<br />

Statement<br />

The conclusions and opinions stated<br />

in this paper do not represent the<br />

position of the National Commission<br />

on <strong>Nuclear</strong> Safety and Safeguards,<br />

where the co-author P. Ruiz-López is<br />

working as an employee. Although<br />

special care has been taken to maintain<br />

the accuracy of the in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />

and results, all the authors do not<br />

assume any responsibility on the<br />

consequences of its use. The use of<br />

particular mentions of countries,<br />

territories, companies, associations,<br />

products or methodologies do not<br />

imply any judgment or promotion by<br />

all the authors.<br />

References<br />

[1] K. B., Department of <strong>Nuclear</strong> Regulation, Atomic Energy<br />

Council, Taiwan, Recent Material Ageing Degradation<br />

Related Issues, Washington D.C.: The Fifth USNRC/TAEC<br />

Bilateral Technical Meeting, June 2007.<br />

[2] N. M. Cuahquentzi et al.: Evaluation of the Structural<br />

Integrity of the Jet Pumps of a Boiling Water Reactor<br />

under Hydrodynamic Loading, Defect and Diffusion Forum,<br />

vol. 348, pp. 261-270, 2014.<br />

[3] Inc. Computers and Structures: CSI Analysis Reference<br />

Manual <strong>for</strong> SAP2000, in ETABS, SAFE and CSiBridge, March<br />

2013.<br />

[4] R. D. Blevins: Flow Induced Vibrations, New Orleans, USA:<br />

Course ASME PD-146, 2012.<br />

[5] G. L. Stevens et al.: Jet pump flaw evaluation procedures,<br />

in 8 th <strong>International</strong> Conference on <strong>Nuclear</strong> Engineering,<br />

Baltimore, USA, April 2000.<br />

[6] EPRI: BWRVIP-41: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, in<br />

BWR Jet Pump Assembly Inspection and Flaw Evaluation<br />

Guidelines, USA, 1997.<br />

[7] G. E. Paredes et al: Severe Accident Simulation of the<br />

Laguna Verde <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Power</strong> Plant, Science and<br />

Technology of <strong>Nuclear</strong> Installations, vol. 2012, March.<br />

[8] R. C. Camargo et al: Análisis de transitorios operacionales<br />

con el Código RELAP/SCDAPSIM, Apoyo a las actividades<br />

del proceso de certificación para el simulador de la CNLV a<br />

condiciones de aumento de potencia, Comisión Nacional<br />

de Seguridad <strong>Nuclear</strong> y Salvaguardias, México, June 2003.<br />

[9] American Society of Mechanical Engineers: Section III,<br />

Division 1-Appendices. Rules <strong>for</strong> Construction of <strong>Nuclear</strong><br />

Facility Components, in Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,<br />

USA, ASME, 2007, pp. 301-302.<br />

[10] United States <strong>Nuclear</strong> Regulatory Commission: Technical<br />

Training Center, BWR/4 Technology Manual (R-104B),<br />

General Electric Systems, USA.<br />

[11] United States <strong>Nuclear</strong> Regulatory Commission: Technical<br />

Training Center, BWR/4 Technology Manual (R-304B),<br />

General Electric Systems, USA.<br />

[12] United States <strong>Nuclear</strong> Regulatory Commission: Technical<br />

Training Center, BWR/4 Technology Manual (R-504B),<br />

General Electric Systems, USA.<br />

[13] U.S. Atomic Energy Commission: Regulatory Guide 1.60<br />

Design Response Spectra <strong>for</strong> Seismic Design of <strong>Nuclear</strong><br />

<strong>Power</strong> Plants, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, USA,<br />

December 1973.<br />

[14] American Society of Mechanical Engineers: Section XI.<br />

Rules <strong>for</strong> Inservice Inspection of <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Power</strong> Plant<br />

Components, in Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, USA,<br />

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2007.<br />

[15] A. Zahoor: Ductile Fracture Handbook, Vol. 2, Electric<br />

<strong>Power</strong> Research Institute Report NP-6301, USA: EPRI,<br />

October 1990, pp. 6.1-1, 6.3-1.<br />

[16] A. Zahoor: Ductile Fracture Handbook, Vol. 1, Electric<br />

<strong>Power</strong> Research Institute Report NP-6301, USA: EPRI,<br />

October 1990, pp. 1-1, 1-4.<br />

Authors<br />

Pablo Ruiz-López, Ph.D.<br />

Comisión Nacional de Seguridad<br />

<strong>Nuclear</strong> y Salvaguardias<br />

Head of the Licensing Area<br />

México<br />

Luis Héctor Hernández-Gómez, Ph.D.<br />

Juan Cruz-Castro, M.Sc.<br />

Gilberto Soto-Mendoza, M.Sc.<br />

Juan Alfonso Beltrán-Fernánde, Ph.D.<br />

Guillermo Manuel Urriolagoitia-<br />

Calderón, Ph.D.<br />

S.E.P.I. Zacatenco, I.P.N.<br />

México<br />

Operation and New Build<br />

Failure Analysis of the Jet Pumps Riser in a Boiling Water Reactor-5 ı<br />

Pablo Ruiz-López, Luis Héctor Hernández-Gómez, Juan Cruz-Castro, Gilberto Soto-Mendoza, Juan Alfonso Beltrán-Fernánde and Guillermo Manuel Urriolagoitia-Calderón

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