The Intelligence Review | volume 3 | issue 6 |

The current state of Russian-Chinese relations
The current state of the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico
The Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu
The current state of the Russian Armed Forces
0 EDITED BY Dr. JOSEPH FITSANAKIS
FOREWORD BY Dr. JOHN NOMIKOS

The current state of Russian-Chinese relations
The current state of the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico
The Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu
The current state of the Russian Armed Forces
PUBLISHED BY THE
EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE
CHANTICLEER INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
EDITED BY Dr. JOSEPH FITSANAKIS
FOREWORD BY Dr. JOHN NOMIKOS

European Intelligence Academy www.euintelligenceacademy.eu
The European Intelligence Academy (EIA) was established in 2013 as an
international network of intelligence studies scholars, specialists and students,
who are dedicated to promoting research and scholarship across the European
Union (EU), as well as between the EU and other parts of the world. One
of the primary aims of the EIA network is to highlight the work of emerging
graduate and undergraduate scholars in the intelligence studies field, while
encouraging cooperation in research and scholarship between students of
intelligence. The EIA is an initiative of the Research Institute for European
and American Studies (RIEAS).
Chanticleer Intelligence Brief www.cibrief.org
The Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB) was established in 2015 as a studentled
initiative supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina
University (CCU) in Conway, South Carolina, United States. It operates as
an ancillary practicum for students in the National Security and Intelligence
Studies program who wish to cultivate and refine their ability to gather, present,
and analyze information in accordance with techniques used in the analytical
profession. The goal of the CIB is to train aspiring intelligence professionals in
the art of producing well-researched, impartial and factual analytical products.
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4

Table of Contents
Foreword page 7
Dr. John Nomikos
Introduction page 11
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
The Current and Projected State of Russian-Chinese Relations page 15
Connor Lewis
The Current and Projected State of the Sinaloa Cartel page 25
Madison Scholar
Will the Israeli Government of Benjamin Netanyahu Survive in 2019? page 31
Jared Ross
The Current and Projected State of the Russian Armed Forces page 39
Alex Clark
Biographical Notes on Contributors page 47
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6

Foreword
The Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS)
was founded in 2006 with the aim of promoting the understanding
of international affairs. Special attention is devoted to transatlantic
relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration,
international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian
foreign policy as well as policy-making on national and international
markets.
Last year, RIEAS founded The Journal of European and American Intelligence
Studies (JEAIS), an international academic-led scholarly publication that
focuses on the field of intelligence and related areas of study and
practice —such as terrorism and counterterrorism, homeland and
international security, geopolitics, and international relations. The
JEAIS has already published two issues and has become known as an
all-inclusive academic platform that allows junior and senior scholars
and practitioners from both the public and private sectors, to share
their knowledge, ideas and approach to intelligence studies.
In 2013, RIEAS launched the European Intelligence Academy (EIA)
project in order to promote the field of intelligence studies in European
academic institutions, in cooperation with the United States. The EIA
aims to advance the intelligence profession by setting standards, building
resources, sharing knowledge within the intelligence field, and promoting
a strong intelligence culture in European Union member states. It
also promotes cross-border research and scholarship cooperation
7

etween intelligence scholars in the EU and scholars in other parts
of the world. Furthermore, the EIA highlights the work of emerging
postgraduate and undergraduate scholars in the intelligence studies
field and provides a forum for them to exchange ideas and pursue
relevant research. Ultimately, one of the main goals of the EIA is to
connect young scholars who focus their undergraduate and postgraduate
studies on intelligence in Europe, the United States, and the
rest of the world.
With that in mind, I salute the sixth issue of The Intelligence Review, Vol.3,
No.6, April 2019, edited by Professor Joseph Fitsanakis of Coastal
Carolina University’s Intelligence and National Security Studies program,
and published by the EIA in association with the Chanticleer
Intelligence Brief. My heartfelt congratulations go to all the young
scholars whose work has been included in this seminal publication.
Dr. John Nomikos
Director, European Intelligence Academy
8

9

10

Introduction
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis
Associate Professor, Intelligence and National Security Studies program,
Coastal Carolina University
Deputy Director, European Intelligence Academy
From its very conception in 2015, the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief
(CIB) has represented a radical departure from traditional models of
instruction in the intelligence and national security studies field. Its
primary mission has always been to remove inspiring intelligence analysts
from the predictability of the instructional environment, and expose
them to the irregularity and randomness of real-life intelligence work.
In the four years of its existence, the CIB has helped over 100 aspiring
intelligence analysts learn how to grapple with the unpredictability of
having to assess, evaluate and often forecast national and international
developments that are unfolding in real time.
Upon joining the CIB, analysts join ‘Sections’ —teams of other analysts
who specialize in a common geographical region, or topic. They work
collaboratively to issue measurable periodic estimates on current events
that relate to their region. Additionally, each analyst is given the task
of answering a specific question about an ongoing development that
relates to his or her area of expertise. The following is an example of
a question posed to an analyst: “will there be another Palestinian uprising
11

in 2019?”. Another example is, “will the Venezuelan government of Nicolás
Maduro remain in power by December of this year?”. Inevitably, attempts to
provide comprehensive answers to these questions generate sets of
interrelated sub-questions, which occupy analysts for months at a time.
Throughout that intense period, analysts are expected to brief the
entire CIB analytical team on a weekly basis, and answer challenging
questions by their instructors and peers. They must do so while remaining
faithful to the diagnostic methods and briefing conventions of the
intelligence profession —a set of skills that forms the basis of their
evaluation by the course instructor.
In some cases, analysts are asked to produce what is known as ‘current
intelligence’, namely research that focuses on immediate concerns
and threats of an ongoing nature. In other cases, they are asked to
engage in ‘estimative intelligence’ —efforts to anticipate future
developments, with various degrees of certainty. The latter is arguably
the most challenging task of an intelligence analyst, and the one that
leaves his or her analytical products most open to dispute. These tasks
are extremely challenging for the junior analyst who is called to apply
the theoretical foundations of intelligence analysis to a real-life topic
that is unfolding daily, and sometimes hourly. As can be expected,
CIB analysts are startled and stimulated in equal measure during the
initial stages of their assignments. Gradually, however, they begin to
deepen their understanding of the topic that has been assigned to
them and to see the connections between it and many of the topics
that have been assigned to other analysts. More importantly, they
start to perceive patterns of interactivity between developments that
may initially seem disconnected and unrelated, and to make sense of
developments on a progressively wider scale.
As their perceptive capacity both deepens and widens, analysts begin
to display the unmistakable signs of analytical confidence. This can
be witnessed in their daring forecasts, which they issue with
increasingly high levels of confidence. Successful forecasts by CIB
analysts have included the anticipation of Venezuela’s announcement
of its voluntary withdrawal from the Organization of American
States, several weeks before it occurred on April 26, 2017, as well as
the stated expectation that Saudi Arabia would lift its ban on women
drivers many months before it the royal decree was announced in
September of 2017. Other analysts anticipated with remarkable accuracy
the results of the first round of the 2017 presidential election in France
(The Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 3), and the United States’ abandonment
12

of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran
nuclear deal (The Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 5).
At the conclusion of each semester, every CIB analyst produces a
brief —though markedly dense— analytical product that aims to
provide an informed and accurate answer to their analytical question.
The present compendium, issue 6 of The Intelligence Review, showcases
some of the best intelligence products written by CIB analysts in the
fall 2018 academic semester. It covers timely topics, such as the
current and projected state of Sino-Russian relations, as well as recent
and projected developments relating to the state of Russia’s Armed
Forces. There is also an essay that focuses on the current and
projected state of the Sinaloa cartel, one of Mexico’s most prolific
organized criminal groups, whose leader, Joaquín Guzmán (also known
as el Chapo), is currently serving a life sentence in an American Supermax
prison. Last but not least, the present compendium includes an analysis
of the leadership prospects of Israel’s embattled Prime Minister,
Benjamin Netanyahu, which showcases some of the estimative analytical
skills discussed above. These reports represent a small sample of the
CIB’s extensive and regular output. It is presented in the hope that
readers will benefit from the precision, astuteness and analytical clarity
of these very timely reports produced by a talented team of young analysts.
Since its founding, the CIB has developed from a student-led club to a
pre-professional body that operates as an ancillary practicum for students
in Coastal Carolina University’s Intelligence and National Security
Studies program. It has launched a website (www.cibrief.org), a
television program and radio show, and the present publication,
which is the result of a transatlantic cooperation between the CIB
and the European Intelligence Academy. During this time, CIB
alumni have joined the analytical divisions of numerous intelligence,
security and law enforcement agencies in the United States, while
many others are exercising their skills in the private sector. An
increasing number of CIB analysts have combined their regional
expertise with rigorous academic research and studies abroad, in
Africa, Central America, the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia,
the Far East, and Europe. These experiences have only helped to
improve the quality of the analytical output that is exhibited in these
pages. The quality of our output has also been enhanced by the
constructive critiques of current and former members of the United
States Intelligence Community. It is with their support, as well as with
the support of Coastal Carolina University and the European Intelligence
Academy, that we hope to continue our work in the future.
13

14

The Current and Projected State of
Russian-Chinese Relations
Connor Lewis
Since the downfall of Soviet global hegemony in 1989, the Sino-Russian
rapprochement has become a geopolitical phenomenon that has both
interested and puzzled Western scholars (Wishnick 2018: 355). Both
countries are recognized as great powers with a substantial influence
on international relations. For this reason, understanding the current
and projected state of the Sino-Russian relationship is paramount in
determining the current and future state of global politics.
During the past several months, Sino-Russian military, diplomatic,
and economic cooperation has appeared to strengthen exponentially.
Both Russia and China’s presidents have lauded their countries’ growing
bilateral ties and claimed that their relationship is at a historic “high
point” (Wood 2018). In addition, Chinese and Russian relations with
the United States (US) have become increasingly strained over trade
and foreign policy. Therefore, it is estimated with moderate-to-high
confidence that Sino-Russian relations currently resemble a strong,
amicable partnership that will continue to strengthen in the future if
tensions with the US escalate.
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Background
After decades of hostility during the Cold War, tensions between Moscow
and Beijing began to thaw during the Gorbachev-Xiaoping era. In the
second half of the 1980s, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping chose to focus less on their
countries’ respective ideological differences and instead look at the
bilateral relationship with more pragmatism (Yeung and Bjelakovic
2010:246). Due in part to the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union
and the West’s pressure on China over Tiananmen Square, the two
countries normalized relations between 1989 and 1991 (Yeung and
Bjelakovic 2010:246).
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia and China gradually
increased their bilateral cooperation in various fields; this would
eventually lead to their landmark Treaty of Good Neighborliness and
Friendly Cooperation in 2001 (Chase and Medeiros 2018:3). Four
years later, the two countries surprised the international community
by holding their first joint military exercise (Finn 2005). Since then,
Russia and China have signed multiple bilateral agreements and have
participated in several joint military exercises. These developments
demonstrate that the Sino-Russian relationship has undergone a
gradual, positive rise that has evolved into a strategic partnership in
the 21 st century (Yujun et al. 2018).
Vostok 2018
Sino-Russian military relations appeared to reach a new level of
cooperation this past September. On September 11, 2018, Chinese
troops participated alongside the Russian armed forces in the threeweek-long
Vostok military exercise —thought to be Russia’s largest
war games since the Soviet era (BBC 2018). According to Real Clear
Defense, the exercise consisted of roughly “297,000 Russian service
members, about 36,000 pieces of equipment, and more than 1,000
aircraft, complemented by 3,200 Chinese soldiers and an unknown
number of Mongolians” (Myers 2018). Although some speculate that
the Russians may have exaggerated their troop numbers (Galeotti
2018), even reduced figures would make this joint Sino-Russian
exercise the largest to date (Zhou 2018).
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Sino-Russian Diplomacy and the DPRK
A few weeks following the military exercise, Russian and Chinese
diplomats met in Moscow to discuss their support for North Korea
(DPRK) amid the country’s denuclearization negotiations with the
US (Jeong-ho 2018). The diplomats announced that they shared
support for a plan of “phased and synchronized measures” (Gehrke
2018), which would mean that the DPRK would receive gradual
sanctions relief as it takes steps in denuclearizing. This approach
directly contrasts the US position, which is to keep all sanctions in
place until after the DPRK has completely dismantled its nuclear
weapons program (Imran 2018). Despite American dissatisfaction
with the statements, Russia and China have stated that they will
continue to lend bilateral support for the DPRK throughout their
denuclearization talks with the US (Gehrke 2018).
Sino-Russian Energy and Trade Relations
In addition to military and diplomatic engagements, Sino-Russian
cooperation has recently accelerated in areas of energy and trade.
According to the Chinese General Administration of Customs
(GAC), Sino-Russian trade turnover reached $77 billion in September
and was projected to reach $100 billion by the end of December
(Guillar 2018). In January of 2019, the GAC released a statement
claiming that trade turnover between the two countries rose by nearly
30% throughout the previous year, amounting to a record $107.06
billion (Russia Today 2019b). Although this number is miniscule in
comparison to China’s trade with its other major trading partners,
including the US (Huasheng 2018), the unprecedented level of Sino-
Russian trade cooperation signaled that the two countries’ trade
relations may be healthier than expected.
Furthermore, the Russians cemented their position as China’s largest
energy supplier in 2018 through a new energy deal and the ongoing
construction of a natural-gas pipeline (Tass 2018). On November 29,
the Russian oil company Rosneft stated that it signed a one-year deal
with a state-run Chinese manufacturing company that will increase
Russian oil exports to China by roughly 48,197 barrels per day
(Griffin 2018). The Russians also projected that their construction of
the Power of Siberia —a natural gas pipeline that would transport
energy from Russia’s Far East directly to China— would be completed
by the end of the year (Pipoli 2018). Although the construction has
17

yet to be completed, Russia claimed in late February of 2019 that the
pipeline’s construction was 99% complete (Russia Today 2019a).
Russian officials also announced that they expect to begin exporting
natural gas to China through the pipeline beginning on December 1,
2019 (Kallanish Energy 2019).
Analysis
Sino-Russian synergy comes at a time when both countries’ relations
with the US are becoming increasingly strained. Russia’s economy has
been hit hard with US sanctions, and China continues to engage in
tense trade relations with Washington over tariffs. China and the US
have also been at odds over Beijing’s territorial claims in the South
China Sea, which has increased the likelihood of a Sino-American
military confrontation in the eastern Pacific.
China’s decision to participate in Vostok, the massive Russian
military exercise, may have been made in order to send a message to
Washington: we will not hesitate to align ourselves with the Russians
in the face of American pressure. The Chinese are highly concerned
about the America’s strategic military presence in the Pacific and
likely see the proximity of American bases to their borders as a
challenge to their national interests. Moreover, the US has continually
disregarded Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea by
sailing naval vessels into disputed waters (Zhenhua 2018). The
Chinese may be signaling that they do not view the Russians as an
imminent security threat and that they are willing to align themselves
with Moscow, if necessary.
Russia and China have also showed their willingness to cooperate
diplomatically, particularly regarding the potential for denuclearization
in the Korean Peninsula. Both countries affirmed their willingness to
support the DPRK after the country’s denuclearization talks with the
US stagnated in late 2018 and again in early 2019 (US New 2018).
Russia and China likely see the stagnation as an opportunity to pursue
their foreign policy objectives, which could be to oversee the
denuclearization process and mitigate the US’ influence in the region
(Jeong-ho 2018). Sino-Russian control over the denuclearization process
could lead to the DPRK’s weapons being transferred to Russia
and/or China instead of the US and its allies. This would allow Russia
and China to tout their ability to responsibly handle tense regional
dilemmas and appear as international peace brokers. Moreover, both
Russia and China appear to be disgruntled with the US’ status as an
18

international watchdog and would welcome the prospect of the
American led-global order being overturned in their favor (Maçães
2019). Lastly, it is also possible that Russia and China could make it
difficult for the US to verify the degree of the DPRK’s weapons
dismantlement if they were to take over the denuclearization process.
Additionally, both Russia and China have a mutual interest in seeing
the American military presence in South Korea (ROK) diminished.
The US has kept a substantial military presence in the ROK since the
Korean War in the early 1950s, relatively close to both Russia and
China’s borders. By bilaterally supporting the DPRK during the talks,
Russia and China can pursue their goal of mitigating American influence
in the region, particularly in the ROK. Following US President Donald
Trump’s second summit in Vietnam with the DPRK’s Chairman Kim
in late February, US defense officials announced that annual joint US-
ROK military exercises would cease in the upcoming spring (Kube et
al. 2019). Although the US claims this action is solely intended to ease
US-DPRK relations (Kube et al. 2019), Russia and China may view
their bilateral cooperation with the DPRK as having brought about
beneficial results.
In terms of economics, American sanctions imposed on Moscow and
Washington’s protectionist stance against Beijing may be incentivizing
Russia and China to bolster their trading and energy relations. Since
2014, sanctions implemented on Russia as a result of their annexation
of Crimea have taken a toll on the Russian economy (Guillar 2018).
The Russians have been forced to find new energy consumers outside
of the European Union (Guillar 2018). Although Moscow has been
wary of becoming Beijing’s ‘resource appendix’ (Lubina 2017:167),
Russia’s geographic location and its vast array of natural resources
makes the country a practical Chinese energy supplier.
The Trump Administration’s tough stance on Sino-American trade
policies has also incentivized the Chinese to find alternative trading
partners (Corera 2018). Russia has agreed to fill the US’ niche in some
of these industries. For example, the Chinese have turned to Russia
as a major soybean supplier after tariffs dissuaded the country to
continue their imports from the US (Grove and Kurmanaev 2019).
Both countries have also stated that they plan to work on enhancing
their relationship in rice, pork, poultry, and fish (Medetsky and
Durisin 2018). Although ongoing trade negotiations may ease Sino-
American tensions, the likelihood that Russia and China’s bilateral
cooperation will increase strengthens as their tensions with the US rise.
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Conclusion
The previous analysis indicates several reasons for the likely continuation
of increasing Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation. First, China may be
cooperating militarily with the Russians in order to deter what it sees
as American provocations in the South China Sea. The US has long
held a strategic military posture throughout the eastern Pacific region,
much to China’s dismay. It is likely that Chinese do no perceive the
Russians as an immediate threat, which incentivizes them to cooperate
with them militarily.
Second, Russia and China see the stagnation in the US’ denuclearization
talks with the DPRK as an opportunity to diplomatically pursue joint
foreign policy interests. The US’ decision to mitigate its military
exercises in the ROK may also signal to the Russians and Chinese
that their cooperation with the DPRK is proving fruitful. Lastly,
increasing their mutual economic cooperation allows Russia and
China to bolster their energy and trade markets without succumbing
to pressure from the US. Both countries are wary of the USdominated
world order, and their mutual economic cooperation allows
them to navigate around pressure from the US.
Although tensions with the US may not be the only factor causing
Russia and China to increase their bilateral cooperation, the present
analysis indicates that they likely are playing a major role. The
correlations indicated here suggest that American pressure may be the
primary reason behind the rise in Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation
in recent months. Therefore, it is estimated with a moderate-to-high
degree of confidence that Sino-Russian relations currently resemble
a strong partnership that will strengthen in the future if tensions with
the US continue to escalate.
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World News, 11 September, ,
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Chase, M., and Medeiros, E. (2017) “Chinese Perspectives on the
Sino-Russian Relationship”, The National Bureau of Asian Research,
no. 66, pp1–13.
Corera, G. (2018) “US-China Trade Row: What Has Happened so
Far?”, BBC World News, 18 September, , accessed on 2 December 2018.
Finn, P. (2005) “Chinese, Russian Militaries to Hold First Joint
Drills”, The Washington Post, 15 August, ,
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Galeotti, M. (2018) “Don’t Fear the Russian Military”, The Atlantic, 12
September, , accessed on 2
December 2018.
Gehrke, J. (2018) “Russia to Huddle with North Korea, China after
Pompeo Trip”, The Washington Examiner, 6 October, ,
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Griffin, R. (2018) “Russia, China Seek Greater Energy Cooperation
to Offset Political Risks”, S&P Global Platts, 29 November, ,
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Grove, T. and Kurmanaev, A. (2019) “A Surprise Winner from the
U.S.-China Trade Spat: Russian Soybean Farmers”, The Wall Street
Journal, 21 February, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-exploitsu-s-china-trade-tensions-to-sell-more-soybeans-11550745001>,
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1 November, ,
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ussia-call-for-corresponding-measur.html>, accessed on 14 October
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Side Before Denuclearization Talks with US”, The South China
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Jeong-ho, L. (2018) “China, Russia, North Korea Call for Adjusted
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11 October, ,
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Kallanish Energy (2019) “Gazprom’s Power of Siberia Will Supply
Gas Early”, Kallanish Energy, 19 February, ,
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Russia Today (2019a) “Power of Siberia: Russia’s 300km Gas
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,
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on 28 November 2018.
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24

The Current and Projected State of
the Sinaloa Cartel
Madison Scholar
It can be stated with moderate confidence that the Sinaloa cartel will split
apart as a result of the conviction of Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán. Under
Guzmán’s rule, the Sinaloa cartel has become one of the most powerful
cartels in Mexico. Guzmán alone was convicted of trafficking over $14
billion worth of drugs across the US-Mexico border (Grillo 2018). During
Guzmán’s trial, witnesses disclosed new information regarding the cartel’s
inner workings that may aid law enforcement in future counter-narcotics
operations. With Guzmán in prison, the Sinaloa faces internal conflict due
to lack of leadership. We see a pattern of disloyalty to Guzmán displayed
by prior members, betraying their organization’s leader for personal gain.
Guzmán unsuccessfully pled “not guilty” on 10 separate counts including
multiple murders and assaults, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and
instigating prison escapes (Kennedy 2017).
Background
The Sinaloa cartel controls territory across the Pacific Coastal region of
Mexico and in its home state of Sinaloa, Mexico (US Drug Enforcement
Administration 2017:2). Additionally, it maintains more international territory
than any other Mexican cartel, particularly in the US (US Drug Enforcement
Administration 2017:2). It distributes narcotics to hubs in major US cities
25

including Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago (US Drug Enforcement
Administration 2017:2). The Sinaloa cartel was formed after a split in the
Guadalajara cartel, which resulted because of the arrest of Felix Gallardo,
its head kingpin (Sommerlad 2018). When the Guadalajara cartel split, the
Sinaloa cartel was created and eventually taken over by Joaquín ‘El Chapo’
Guzmán along with Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada Garcia, his right hand man
(Sommerlad 2018). Throughout his reign, Guzmán escaped from prison
twice. The US had requested his extradition for years, arguing that Mexican
officials did not have the capability to keep Guzmán behind bars (Feuer and
Palmer 2018). On 8 January 2016, Guzmán was arrested for the third time
after escaping Mexico’s maximum security Puente Grande prison, where he
was supposed to serve a 20-year sentence (Sommerlad 2018). He was extradited
to the US soon after Mexican officials announced that his legal appeals were
exhausted (Williams 2017). He then awaited his trial in solitary confinement
in a maximum-security prison in Manhattan, New York (Riotta 2018).
Recent Developments
Guzmán’s trial began on 13 November 2018, when he pled “not guilty” to
10 charges that covered over 30 years of criminal activity (Riotta 2018). This
included multiple accounts of murder and assault, money laundering, narcotics
trafficking, instigating prison escapes, and others (Kennedy 2017). US District
Court Judge Brian Cogan headed the trial at the Brooklyn Federal Court in
New York (Hurowitz 2018b). The US Marshals Service took extreme security
measures to ensure protection of key witnesses and the 12 jurors, even
though Guzmán’s lawyer publicly stated that his client would not kill anyone
involved in the trial (Hurowitz 2018b). As part of a deal made with Mexican
officials, the US had agreed not to seek the death penalty for the case (Williams
2017). At the end of the two and a half month-long trial in February 2019,
Guzmán was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison (Moghe and Sanchez
2019). Authorities have not revealed where he will be jailed, but sources say
that it is likely he will go to the US’s most secure super-maximum security
(supermax) prison located in Florence, Colorado (Hanna 2019).
During the trial, US government prosecutors had access to numerous key
witnesses who had been previously extradited. Over 200 hours of testimony
were recorded from the 56 witnesses who spoke at the trial (Moghe and
Sanchez 2019). Jesus Zambada García, who was arrested in 2012 for
operating drug warehouses for the Sinaloa cartel, struck a deal with federal
authorities to testify against Guzmán in exchange for a shorter sentence
(Hurowitz 2018a). Zambada recalled details of numerous murders, which
alone is a charge that could have sentenced Guzmán to life in prison
(Hurowitz 2018a). Zambada also disclosed information regarding his brother,
Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada Garcia, who may hold equal responsibility for
leadership of the cartel (Hurowitz 2018a). Zambada claims his brother bought
26

protection from Mexican government officials and law enforcement, which
is why he has never been arrested (Hurowitz 2018a). He explained that he
personally met with García Luna, who was Mexican President Felipe
Calderòn’s head security official, in 2005 to exchange over $3 million for
protection (Hurowitz 2018a). Allegations of bribery intensified when Alex
Cifuentes, another close associate of the Sinaloa, testified that former
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto had taken a $100 million bribe from
Guzmán (Alexander 2019) in exchange for the drug kingpin’s freedom.
Cifuentes stated that after taking the bribe, President Nieto contacted
Guzmán to inform him that he no longer had to hide from Mexican
authorities (Alexander 2019). Mexican officials denied all accusations of
bribery, but the testimony exposed a potential corruption scandal of
monumental proportions at the very top of the Mexican government
(Alexander 2019). Throughout the trial, witness testimonies brought light
to new information about the inner workings of the cartel. Zambada was
the first of many to open up to authorities and disclosed some of the most
relevant information that led to Guzmán’s prosecution.
Without Guzmán, the cartel is suffering from lack of organization. If
Guzmán had a plan for succession after his death or arrest, it has fallen
through (Agren 2017). Iván and Jesús Guzmán, Guzmán’s sons, were not
ready to take over so soon, expecting that their father would be around
longer (Agren 2017). As a result, internal conflict over who will control the
cartel is at an all-time high. In February 2017, one of Guzmán’s closest
associates, Dámaso López Núñes, attempted to kill Ismael Zambada and
two of Guzmán’s sons, who were expected to take their father’s position
(Goi 2017). Núñes was arrested and extradited to the US in May 2017. He
too testified at the trial, attempting to expose Guzmán’s wife, Emma
Coronel Aispuro, for her assistance in one of Guzmán’s prison breaks
(McCoy 2019). Núñes serves as one of many examples of a member who
violently attempted to take leadership of the cartel. Additionally, Ismael
Zambada, who is believed to currently be in control of the cartel, is known
to be suffering from diabetes (Anon. 2018). Due to his illness, it is highly
likely that Ismael Zambada’s partial reign will end soon (Anon. 2018).
Starting around the time of Guzmán’s second arrest, internal attacks and
conflict caused a spike in violence throughout Mexico, particularly in the
state of Sinaloa (Goi 2017). The 2015 Mexico Peace Index ranked the state
of Sinaloa as the third most violent state in Mexico as a direct result of cartel
conflict (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015:15).
Analysis
Guzmán’s trial offered US authorities the opportunity to extract new
information from motivated members that not only reveal Guzmán’s
criminal life, but also some of the secrets of the cartel. Law enforcement can
27

use these new leads during future counter-narcotics missions. This pattern
of disloyalty showed us that numerous senior members are willing to
jeopardize the cartel’s secrets if it benefits them personally. We have also
seen in some cases, such as those of Jesus Zambada García and Dámaso
López Núñes, that loyalty to Guzmán and the Sinaloa cartel is quickly
diminishing. If law enforcement can continue to exploit the interests of
captured members, they may gain insight to help better-counteract the cartel.
Similarly to the Guadalajara cartel, who split up after the arrest of their
leader, the Sinaloa may face similar results without the uniting entity that
was Guzmán. The Sinaloa cartel functions similarly to a federation of allied
groups, with certain groups working in specific areas, also called factions
(Woody 2017). Guzmán often times mediated disputes and served as a
higher authority between the factions (Woody 2017). Without him, there is
nobody to prevent aggressive altercations that occur within the cartel,
resulting in violent internal conflict. This could potentially force members
to take sides and split apart.
Conclusion
The information revealed by the 56 witnesses in the trial gave law enforcement
an advantage and insight into the cartel’s inner workings. Additionally, unless
a new leader is established, the cartel will continue to struggle internally.
Guzmán will not be able to return to his position as mediator between the
factions because he will be serving a life sentence in a US prison. The
Guadalajara cartel is an example of what could happen to the Sinaloa and
shows us the potential effects of losing a key leader. Therefore, it can be
stated with moderate confidence that the Sinaloa cartel will split apart as a
result of the recent arrest and conviction of Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán.
28

References Cited
Agren, D. (2017) “Mexico After El Chapo: New Generation Fights for
Control of the Cartel”, The Guardian, 5 May , accessed
on 28 November 2018.
Alexander, H. (2019) “Mexico’s Former President Enrique Pena Nieto ‘Took
$100M Bribe From El Chapo’”, The Telegraph, 16 January , accessed on 19 February 2019.
Anonymous (2018) “As El Chapo’s Day In Court Begins, El Mayo Fights
to Control the Sinaloa Cartel”, Mexico News Daily, 5 November , accessed on
27 November 2018.
Feuer, A., and Palmer, E. (2018) “Inside El Chapo’s Vast Network: What
We Know After the Trial’s First Week”, The New York Times,18 November
,
accessed on 27 November 2018.
Goi, L. (2017) “Internal Cartel Conflict Could be Behind Spike in Western
Mexico Violence”, InSight Crime, 9 February ,
accessed on 27 November 2018.
Grillo, I. (2018) “Inside the Trial of Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman, the World’s
Most Infamous Drug Baron”, Time, 10 May , accessed on 26 November 2018.
Hanna, J. (2019) “El Chapo is Likely Going to the Same Prison Where
Ted Kaczynski and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Are Held”, CNN, 13 February
,
accessed on 19 February 2019.
Hurowitz, N. (2018a) “El Chapo Trial: Witness Alleges Presidential Bribes,
Cartel Brutality”, Rolling Stone, 21 November ,
accessed on 27 November 2018.
Hurowitz, N. (2018b) “Inside El Chapo Trial Jury Selection”, Rolling Stone,
8 November , accessed on 26 November 2018.
Institute for Economics and Peace (2015) “Mexico Peace Index”, Institute
for Economics and Peace, Sydney, Australia.
Kennedy, M. (2017) “Notorious Drug Lord ‘El Chapo’ Pleads Not Guilty
to Federal Charges”, National Public Radio, 20 January , accessed on 27 November
2018.
McCoy, K. (2019) “Witness Implicates El Chapo’s Wife in the Alleged Drug
Lord’s Most Daring Prison Escape”, USA Today, 23 January

www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/01/23/el-chapo-lieutenantimplicates-alleged-drug-lord-wife-daring-prison-escape/2647039002/>,
accessed on 19 February 2019.
Moghe, S., and Sanchez, R. (2019) “Mexican Drug Lord Joaquin ‘El
Chapo’ Guzman is Found Guilty on All Counts”, CNN, 13 February
, accessed on 19 February 2019.
Riotta, C. (2018) “El Chapo trial: Live Updates: Latest Witness in Joaquin
Guzman Case to Remain Anonymous Due to Security Fears”, The Independent,
26 November < https://www.news2.fr/2018/11/27/el-chapo-trial-liveupdates-latest-witness-in-joaquin-guzman-case-to-remain-anonymousdue-to-security-fears/>,
accessed on 26 November 2018.
Sommerlad, J. (2018) “El Chapo: Who Is the Mexican Drug Baron and
Sinaloa Cartel Kingpin and How Was He Brought to Justice?”, The
Independent, 13 November ,
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US Drug Enforcement Administration (2017) “National Drug Threat
Assessment”, United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington,
DC, United States.
Williams, P. (2017) “Why El Chapo’s Extradition From Mexico Surprised
US Officials”, NBC News, 21 January ,
accessed on 27 November 2018.
Woody, C. (2017) “El Chapo Guzman’s Powerful Sinaloa Cartel is Withering
While He Sits in a US Jail”, Business Insider, 3 July ,
accessed on 27 November 2018.
30

Will the Government of Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Survive
in 2019?
Jared Ross
Benjamin Netanyahu was first elected as Prime Minister of Israel in
1996. He served for one term before losing to Ehud Barak. After he
lost his first election as an incumbent, he served from “1999 [to] 2002
as a consultant to high tech companies and public speaker, 2002-2003
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2003-2005 Minister of Finance, 2005-
2009 Chairman of Likud, Leader of the Opposition” (Prime
Minister’s Office n.d.). From August to December of 2018, the Prime
Minister has been dealing with bribery allegations; and on November
14, 2018, he lost his Defense Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, over a
ceasefire agreement with Hamas. Despite these two issues,
Netanyahu was able to maintain his position as prime minister
through the end of 2018. However; Netanyahu and his coalition
government agreed to disband and call for early elections. The early
election will be held on April 9, 2019. It is estimated with moderate
to high confidence that Benjamin Netanyahu will be re-elected as
Prime Minister in 2019.
31

The Structure of Israel’s Government
The government of Israel is a Parliamentary Democracy. It is made
up of an Executive Branch, a Legislative Branch, and a Judiciary
Branch. “The system is based on the principle of separation of
powers, in which the executive branch (the government) is subject to
the confidence of the legislative branch (the Knesset) and the
independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by law” (Israel Ministry
of Foreign Affairs n.d.). The current President of Israel is Reuven
Rivlin; the president also holds the title as being the head of state.
The president holds a number of powers. The president has the
power to “pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction
or commutation thereof” (The Knesset n.d.). The president also has
the power to “sign every Law, other than a Law relating to its powers”
(The Knesset n.d.). In addition to these powers, the president has the
responsibilities of “opening the first meeting of the first session of a
new Knesset, receiving the credentials of new ambassadors of foreign
states, approving the appointment of civil and religious judges”
(Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). Israel also has a prime
minster, and the current one is Benjamin Netanyahu. The prime
minister is the head of the Executive Branch of the Israeli
government. The prime minister’s powers consist of “the head of the
Israeli government and chief executive of the state” (Anon. n.d.).
Under the prime minister, the Executive Branch has 26 additional
ministers who oversee the various sectors of Israel.
The Legislative Branch of Israel is called The Knesset. The Knesset
has the power to “exclusive authority to enact laws. The Knesset may
pass laws on any subject and in any matter, as long as a proposed law
does not contradict an existing basic law, and the legislative process
is carried out as required by the law” (The Knesset n.d.). The Knesset
is a unicameral house that is made up one hundred and twenty seats.
The Knesset also has a speaker who “represents the Knesset in its
contacts with external bodies, and is also in charge of the Knesset
Administration, the Knesset Secretariat and the preparation and
implementation of the Knesset's budget” (The Knesset n.d.). The
Knesset is also made up of different parties who hold different
numbers of seats. Currently, the majority party in the Knesset is the
Likud Party, which currently holds 30 seats. The second biggest party
is the Zionist Union, which controls 24 seats, and is also the main
opposition party. Altogether, there are 11 political parties with seats
32

in the current Knesset. The Judiciary branch is made up of different
courts. The Supreme Court of Israel holds the highest judicial powers.
According to the Knesset website, “the Supreme Court hears appeals
against the authorities of the state and other public bodies, and it has
broad discretionary authority to rule on matters in which it considers
it necessary to grant relief in the interests of justice” (The Knesset
n.d.). The Judiciary Branch is also made up of “The District Courts
of Law, the Magistrates Courts (the first instance) —and in general,
the Court of Traffic Offenses, Family Courts and Juvenile Courts,
National Labor Court, Regional Labor Courts” (Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs n.d.). Israel also has religious courts. “There are
religious courts of the four main religious denominations: Jewish,
Muslim, Christian and Druze. Each religious court can only try cases
applying to members of its own religious community” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs n.d.).
Netanyahu’s Government
Benjamin Netanyahu has been the Prime Minister of Israel since
2009. The current government is made up of a coalition of the Likud
Party, the Kulanu Party, the Habayit Hayehudi Party, the Shas Party,
the United Torah Judaism Party, and —until November 14, 2018—
the Yisrael Beiteinu Party. That was so until Avigdor Lieberman, the
head of the party within the coalition resigned as defense minister
and pulled his party out of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government.
According to reports, there were two reasons why he pulled out of
the government; the first was the agreed upon ceasefire with Hamas.
Mr. Lieberman was quoted as saying: “we are buying quiet for the
short term at the price of serious damage to national security in the
long term" (Anon. 2018a). The second reason for his resignation was
that the Israeli government allowed fuel and money into the Gaza
Strip from Qatar: “Mr. Lieberman revealed he had similarly opposed
recent decisions to allow into Gaza fuel for the territory's power plant
and $15m in cash from Qatar intended to fund the salaries of unpaid
civil servants” (Anon. 2018b). The decision by Mr. Lieberman to pull
out of the coalition proved impossible to overcome due to the slim
lead it left the government in the Knesset. In late December 2018,
Netanyahu and his coalition unanimously agreed to call for early
elections. These early elections will take place on April 9, 2019.
33

Analysis
The two biggest threats that could cause Prime Minister Netanyahu
to lose the upcoming elections are bribery charges and his very slim
majority hold on seats in the Knesset. There are three sets of corruption
allegations against Prime Minister Netanyahu. The first corruption
investigation took place from 2014-2017 and focused on the fact that
the prime minister also oversaw the Office of Communications. Netanyahu
allegedly influenced regulators “so that Bezeq, an Israeli telecom company
owned by his friend Shaul Elovitch, benefitted financially” (Nota 2018).
The second set of allegations center of claims “that the prime minister
received unlawfully expensive gifts from friends” (Nota 2018). The third
allegation is that Netanyahu “secretly attempted to negotiate a deal
with the publisher of one of Israel’s daily newspapers in which
negative news coverage was reduced in exchange for limiting of the
distribution of a rival paper” (Nota 2018).
Prime Minister Netanyahu has denied all allegations. A further threat
to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government is the current hold on seats
in the Knesset by his coalition parties. They currently hold 61 out of
the 120 seats. If the government loses the majority of seats then the
opposition can enact Article 28 of Basic Law, which “determines that
the expression of no-confidence in the Government shall be done by
means of a resolution of the Knesset” (The Knesset n.d.). The Prime
Minister almost lost his majority in November of last year, when
Israeli Education Minister Naftali Bennett threatened to leave the
coalition if he was not given the Defense Minister position. He
recanted after a meeting with Netanyahu and was quoted at a press
conference saying “[i]t’s better that the prime minister beats me in a
political battle than [the Hamas leader, Ismail] Haniya beats Israel”
(Holmes 2018).
The potential threat to Netanyahu’s bid to win a fourth term as Prime
Minister comes in the form of a merger of the two main opposition
parties to his Likud Party. The two parties that merged together are
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) and the new Hosen L'Yisrael (Israel
Resilience). The two men who will be heading up the ticket, known
as the “Blue and White Ticket” are Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid.
Both of these parties can be described as center-left. The Yesh Atid
platform states that the party seeks to “fight against political
corruption, advocate for the sharing of the national burden, support
the right and responsibilities of all Israeli citizens, to bring down the
34

cost of living, etc.” (Yesh Atid n.d). Moreover, it states that the party
aims to “bring about a diplomatic agreement between Israel and the
Arab world” (Yesh Atid n.d.). According to the Security Doctrine
manifesto of Yesh Atid, the party aims to do this by “possessing
overwhelming strength” (Yesh Atid n.d.). Similarly; the Hosen
L’Yisrael party aims to do the same thing, which is the main reason
why the two parties merged. The agreement between the two parties
states that “the deal struck between the two party leaders means that
Gantz would be prime minister for two and a half years, with Lapid
becoming prime minister after that, if they form the next
government” (Levinson and Lis 2019). Additionally; the merger was
a response to the merging of the Jewish Home Party with the Otzma
Yehudit Party. The agreement to merge the two parties cost
Netanyahu two ministerial seats for the next coalition government,
should he win. It also appears that the Otzma Yehudit Party is not
the only party that has been absorbed by, or merged with, with the
Jewish Home. An article in The Times of Israel states that it has also
merged with the “far-right National Union” Party and is in the
process of merging with “Eli Yishai’s Yachad” Party. These mergers
are an attempt to ensure that Netanyahu has enough seats and
influence to form a new coalition, should he win the election.
Conclusion
Despite the corruption allegations and the slim majority hold over
Knesset seats, Prime Minister Netanyahu resisted the call for early
elections until late December 2018. The analysis seems to indicate
that he faces a potentially difficult election on April 9. However; it is
essential to point out that Netanyahu has faced worse odds in the
past and still won. The most relevant example of this is when he was
running for Prime Minister in 1996. He came back and won after
being down by 31 points due to the attacks on the Jaffa Road bus
bombings, allegedly by Hamas suicide bombers, which killed 45
people. The belief that Israel’s national security was more important
than a peace agreement with the Palestinians won over the voters and
made him prime minister. This message still resonates very strongly
with many in Israel and despite the Blue and White Ticket sharing
similar beliefs it is estimated with moderate to high confidence that
Netanyahu will win in his re-election bid on April 9, 2019, unless he
is indicted by the pending corruption allegations against him before
that date.
35

References Cited
Anonymous (2012) “Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid”, , accessed on 23 February 2019.
Anonymous (2018a) “Benjamin Netanyahu Rejects Calls for Election
and Takes Defence Portfolio”, The Guardian, 18 November,
,
accessed on 3 December 2018.
Anonymous (2018b) “Israel Defence Minister Lieberman Resigns
Over Gaza Ceasefire”, BBC, London, 14 November, , accessed on 3 December
2018.
Anonymous (n.d.) “Israeli Politics: Prime Ministers (1948-present)”,
Jewish Virtual Library, ,
accessed on 3 December 2018.
Fulbright, A. (2019) “Netanyahu Promises Jewish Home 2 Ministries
to Join With Extremist Party”, The Times of Israel, 20 February,
, accessed on 23 February
2019.
Holmes, O. (2018) “Israeli Education Minister Vows not to Resign in
Reprieve for Netanyahu”, The Guardian, 19 November, ,
accessed on 3 December 2018
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.) “Israeli Democracy: How
Does It Work”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Givat Ram,
Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.) “The State: Political
Structure”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Givat Ram,
Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on
3 December 2018.
Kirk, M. (2016) “Netanyahu’s War”, Public Broadcasting Service,
Arlington, Virginia, first broadcast on 5 January.
Levinson, C., and Lis, J. (2019) “Political Bombshell as Gantz,
Lapid Join Forces to Replace Netanyahu”, The Guardian, 21
February,

political-bombshell-as-gantz-lapid-join-forces-to-replace-netanyahu-
1.6957403>, accessed on 23 February 2019.
News Corps Australia Network (2018) “Israel’s Netanyahu Says
Coalition Agrees ‘Unanimously’ to Disband Government, Hold
New Election”, ABC, 25 December, , accessed on 23 February 2019.
Nota, B. (2018) “Israeli Authorities Recommend Charges of Bribery,
Fraud for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu”, ABC News, 3
December, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
Prime Minister’s Office (n.d.) “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu”,
Prime Minister’s Office, Hakirya, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
The Knesset (n.d.) “Basic Law: The President of the State (1964)”,
The Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
The Knesset (n.d.) “Currently Functioning Parliamentary Groups”,
The Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
The Knesset (n.d.) “Knesset Speaker’s Role”, The Knesset, Givat
Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
The Knesset (n.d.) “Motion of No-Confidence in the Government”,
The Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
The Knesset (n.d.) “Powers and Functions of the Knesset”, The
Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
The Knesset (n.d.) “The Supreme Court”, The Knesset, Givat Ram,
Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.
37

38

The Current and Projected State of
the Russian Armed Forces
Alex Clark
The Russian Armed Forces have been working diligently to not be
seen as an outdated military from the Soviet era, but to be recognized
as a modern and advanced force capable of competing against any
adversary. Correspondingly, the Russian Federation has been
asserting its military bravado in conflicts around the world. Some of
these conflicts have sparked political as well as military responses by
Moscow, with some resulting in increasingly hostile relationships. As
a result, it can be asserted with moderate confidence that the Russian
government will continue to modernize and make advances in all
branches and arsenals of its Armed Forces. This includes a complete
modernization of all aspects of the Armed Forces as well as the
additions of technologically advanced weaponry to Russia’s arsenal.
Background
The Russian Federation came about as a result of the collapse of its
predecessor, the Soviet Union, on December 25, 1991. Since that
time, Russia’s military has undergone years of neglect and no longer
projects the image of a global superpower; however, Russia’s Armed
39

Forces are currently in the midst of a historic overhaul (Masters
2015). Russia has been rebuilding its Armed Forces to limit its
geopolitical losses during the period of its weak status. The
modernization of Russia’s Armed Forces took a major leap forward
in 2008, when Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov
proclaimed a new stage of military reforms (US Congress 2011:1).
The envisioned evolution of the Armed Forces under Serdyukov’s
plan involved a complete restructuring and modernization of the
entire military. His series of vigorous reforms resulted in the most
radical transformation of the country’s military since the creation of
the Red Army in 1918 (Defense and Security Section 2012:3). The
reforms focused on improvements in several different areas. One
major area of focus was on transforming the military from a force
designed for protracted large-scale conventional military conflicts
into a more modern, compact, technology-driven force —a military
redesigned to secure operational aims with intensity and swiftness
(Giles 2017). A major aspect of the restructuring has involved training
troops to move and maintain in large numbers following rapid
deployment without showing signs of decreased performance over time.
Russia has shown significant progress in military drills and even more
so during ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, starting in 2014, and Syria in
2015. Russia has taken full advantage of these conflicts by conducting
training exercises in an active battlefield to maximize the troops’
exposure to operating conditions. The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria
have also served as testing grounds for a host of modern
advancements in weaponry and equipment, including electronic
warfare systems, reactive armor, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
systems and much more (Giles 2017). For several years, therefore,
Russia has continued to unveil and test new weapons and equipment
as a means of reforming its military and modernizing its Armed Forces.
Recent Developments
In October 2018, the commencement of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)-led military exercise Trident-Juncture in Norway,
sparked Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold a meeting with top
military and law enforcement officials to discuss Moscow’s concerns
and potential responses surrounding the exercise. President Putin stated
during the meeting that, along with unveiling previously commissioned
weaponry, Russia’s arsenal would be further modernized to ensure
protection from any potential threat (Anon. 2018). Sergei Shoigu,
40

Russia’s Minister of Defense, also discussed additional weapons
hardware that the Northern Fleet would be acquiring, which included
five new warships and support vessels, as well as 15 new aircraft by
the end of the year (Anon. 2018). Since that meeting, the Russian
Armed Forces have not acquired the promised new warships,
however they did receive fifty new aircraft by the end of 2018 (Anon.
2019a). Additionally, Russia also began conducting military exercises
within close proximity to the NATO drills, a move that furtherincreased
tensions.
On October 20, 2018, United States President Trump announced
Washington’s intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a result of Russia’s alleged violation
of the terms of the Treaty. The alleged breach stems from Russia’s
newly tested missile, Novator 9M729, which has the capability to
enable Russia to launch missile strikes from a range of 500 km to
5,500 km, which is forbidden by the INF Treaty (US Congress
2018:2). Russia has denied the accusations, asserting that the Novator
missile does not violate the prohibited range, and has accused the
United States of violating the Treaty with a component of its missile
defense system. On February 2, 2019, the US and Russia finalized
their decision to withdraw from the Treaty, thus suspending all their
obligations under the INF (Anon. 2019b). The withdrawal from the
INF Treaty has amplified friction between the two rival nations and
has created the conditions for potential conflict with other nations
unassociated with the Treaty. Having abandoned the Treaty, the US
has indicated its intent to place nuclear weapons in several European
countries. On February 19, President Vladimir Putin warned the US
and Europe that Russia would be forced to create and deploy
weaponry to be used against nations that pose a direct threat to
Moscow. President Putin went on to state that Russia’s new missiles
would be pointed at the US if Washington were to expand its nuclear
missile network into Europe (Ferris-Rotman 2019).
On March 1, 2018, President Putin boasted during his state-of-thenation
address about the conventional and nuclear capabilities of
Russia’s newest hypersonic arsenal addition, the Avangard glide
missile. The first hypersonic missile to be tested was the Kinzhal
cruise missile, which was launched from an airplane and has the
potential to maneuver at a speed of Mach 5, according to the Missile
Defense Advocacy Alliance group (Maza 2018). The second missile,
the Avangard, is designed to be launched from an intercontinental
41

allistic missile and can operate at speeds closer to Mach 20
(Majumdar 2018). The newest missile to be successfully developed
was announced on February 20, 2019, and is called the Tsirkon. This
hypersonic missile is launched from a ship or submarine and can
travel approximately two miles per second, moving at a speed of
Mach 9 with a range of 1,000 km (Reid 2019). These highly advanced
missiles have caused concerns among US defense planners, because
the missile defense system currently in place in the US is believed to
be unable to defend against such fast and maneuverable missiles.
Analysis
Even though Russia was informed and briefed about the NATO
exercise ahead of time, Moscow still expressed irritation at the close
proximity of the drills, which were held in a region of Norway that
borders Russia. This, on top of a number of military conflicts in
which Russia is involved, such as Ukraine and Syria, have caused
President Putin to make public pronouncements ensuring Russians
that the country’s Armed Forces would undergo major modernization.
Furthermore, the NATO exercise pushed forward the announcement
of the new additions to Russia’s arsenal. This development is reflective
of the seriousness of Putin’s commitment to the transformation of
the Armed Forces. The Russian president deemed it necessary to inform,
not just his country’s military leadership, but all Russians and Russia’s
adversaries, about these changes. The subsequent incorporation of
new vehicles and other equipment into the military demonstrates that
Russia has since taken steps in the direction of modernization.
The dissolution of the INF Treaty brings with it the potential of
monumental instability worldwide, by encouraging the proliferation
of nuclear weapons both in Russia and the US. In addition,
Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF has put regions like
Europe, which are not affiliated with the Treaty, in danger of
suffering a counter-strike from Russia for being suspected by
Moscow of hosting US missiles (Astakhova and Osborn 2018). At
the same time, the termination of the INF Treaty encourages both
the modernization and advancement of the Russian Armed Forces,
by prompting them to develop more modern, technologically
advanced nuclear missiles similar to the type of missile that prompted
the initial debate on alleged INF violations.
42

Russia’s development and testing of multiple types of hypersonic
weaponry is at a level substantially greater than the two other main
competitors in this category, namely the US and China. Russia’s
missile innovation —for example its creation of a nuclear weapon
that travls with the unparalleled speed of Mach 20— generates a
perceived advantage over its adversaries. Russia’s advancement of
this type of weaponry is important to the overall evolution of its
Armed Forces. But, such hypersonic weapons are not easy nor cheap
to make, and will pose a challenge, especially considering Russia’s
weakened economy. The current US-led sanctions that target Russia’s
economic infrastructure, including its banking and energy sectors, are
limiting the state’s income and have a detrimental effect on the
government’s defense budget. Russia’s defense budget dropped 17
percent in 2018, making this the first time since 1998 that Russia
reduced its military spending (Kottasová 2018). This reduction in
military spending could significantly halt the testing and production
of more advanced weapons and poses challenge’s to Moscow’s
defense planning.
Conclusion
The Russian government has been working relentlessly to modernize
its Armed Forces through a wide array of tactics. Considering all the
recent developments mentioned above, including the ongoing
economic sanctions and decreased levels of defense spending, an
analyst would do well to shy away from issuing high-confidence
estimates. Major developments in the past year, combined with the
effects of sanctions on Russia’s economy, lead to the assertion with
moderate confidence that the Russian government will continue to
modernize its weapons arsenal and implement technological
advancements to all branches of the Armed Forces.
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References Cited
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Biographical Notes on Contributors
ALEX CLARK, from Long Island, New York, is a junior Intelligence and
National Security major at Coastal Carolina University. At the conclusion
of his first semester in the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief, he was elected
to serve as the organization’s Communications Officer. He currently serves
as the CIB’s Chief Operations Officer and head of the Russia Desk. In the
fall of 2018 Alex was awarded the CIB’s Intelligence Forecast Award for
having the most successful analytical forecast record of the semester.
Alex’s research interests include the Russian language, Russian military
capabilities, and human intelligence (HUMINT). He is also a member of
the National Society of Leadership and Success.
CONNOR LEWIS, from Chantilly, Virginia, majored in Intelligence and
National Security Studies at Coastal Carolina University, from which he
graduated in December of 2018. As a member of the Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief, Connor studied the development of Sino-Russian relations and the
significance of Sino-Russian relations for the United States. In November of
2018, he was selected to present his research findings at the 5 th Annual
Chanticleer Intelligence Brief Symposium in Conway, South Carolina. He
also appeared as a guest on the fourth episode of the CIB Intelligence
Report and was awarded the program’s Intelligence Analysis Award in
December of 2018 for delivering the highest-quality oral analytical
product during the semester. Connor is currently working as a technical
production hand for various events in and around the Washington Metro Area
and is seeking employment in the National Security community.
JARED ROSS, from Pineville, North Carolina, graduated from Rock Hill
High School in 2013 and transferred to Coastal Carolina University from
York Technical College in January of 2016. He joined the Chanticleer
Intelligence Brief soon afterwards and has been a member and analyst
ever since. In addition to his Intelligence and National Security Studies
major, he is minoring in Political Science. In the Chanticleer Intelligence
Brief, he has researched the security aspects of the ongoing dispute
between the two main Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah. He has also
researched the dynamics of the national politics of Israel, as well as the
internal politics of Fatah in the West Bank. In 2018, Jared was a panelist
at the 5 th Annual Chanticleer Intelligence Brief Symposium in Conway,
South Carolina. After graduating, his goal is to go into the Navy and work
for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
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MADISON SCHOLAR, from Marietta, Georgia, is a senior Intelligence and
National Security major at Coastal Carolina University. In the fall of 2018,
Madison was accepted into the University of Manchester, where she will
continue her education and pursue a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict
Resolution in the spring of 2019. In May 2018, Madison was elected to
serve as the Chief of Operations for the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief,
where she also served as the head of the America’s desk. In the same
semester, she was awarded the Regional Expert Award for her expertise
on the topic of the Sinaloa Cartel. Madison’s research interests include
illegal narcotics trafficking, Mexican cartels, and marijuana legalization
in the United States. In December 2018, she was accepted into the Dyer
Fellows program, where she pursued in depth research on the security
effects of marijuana legalization. In the same semester, she was selected
as a panelist at the 5 th annual Chanticleer Intelligence Brief Symposium,
where she spoke about her analysis on the ‘El Chapo’ trial. In January
2019, Madison also received the Intelligence Student of the Year award
from the Intelligence and National Security Studies program at Coastal
Carolina University.
JOSEPH FITSANAKIS, PhD, is Associate Professor of Politics in the
Intelligence and National Security Studies program at Coastal Carolina
University, where he teaches courses on intelligence operations,
intelligence communications, national security, intelligence analysis, and
intelligence in the Cold War, among other subjects. Before joining Coastal,
Dr. Fitsanakis founded the Security and Intelligence Studies program at
King University, where he also directed the King Institute for Security and
Intelligence Studies. He has written extensively on subjects such as
international espionage, intelligence tradecraft, counterintelligence,
wiretapping, cyber-espionage, transnational crime and intelligence reform.
He is a frequent media commentator, syndicated columnist, and senior
editor at intelNews.org, an ACI-indexed scholarly blog that is cataloged
through the United States Library of Congress.
JOHN NOMIKOS, PhD, is Director at the Research Institute for European
and American Studies (RIEAS), Chairman of the Mediterranean Council
for Intelligence Studies (MCIS), Chairman of the Greek Intelligence Studies
Association (GISA), Chairman of the European Intelligence Academy (EIA), and
Founding Editor of the Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence
(JMBI) and the Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies. He
is Assistant Professor at Webster University (Athens Campus) and Visiting
Scholar at the John Naisbitt University in Serbia and the University of Rome
(Tre) in Italy. He was previously Adjunct Professor at the Department of
International Relations at the University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus).
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