The Intelligence Review | volume 3 | issue 6 |
This volume is the product of a collaboration between the European Intelligence Academy (EIA) and the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB), a pre-professional body supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, South Carolina, United States. Four CIB analysts tackle some of the most pressing and timely questions confronting intelligence observers today. Topics in this issue include the current and projected state of Sino-Russian relations, as well as recent and projected developments relating to the state of Russia’s Armed Forces. There is also an essay that focuses on the current and projected state of the Sinaloa cartel, one of Mexico’s most prolific organized criminal groups, whose leader, Joaquín Guzmán (also known as el Chapo), is currently serving a life sentence in an American Supermax prison. Last but not least, the present compendium includes an analysis of the leadership prospects of Israel’s embattled Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
This volume is the product of a collaboration between the European Intelligence Academy (EIA) and the Chanticleer Intelligence Brief (CIB), a pre-professional body supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, South Carolina, United States. Four CIB analysts tackle some of the most pressing and timely questions confronting intelligence observers today. Topics in this issue include the current and projected state of Sino-Russian relations, as well as recent and projected developments relating to the state of Russia’s Armed Forces. There is also an essay that focuses on the current and projected state of the Sinaloa cartel, one of Mexico’s most prolific organized criminal groups, whose leader, Joaquín Guzmán (also known as el Chapo), is currently serving a life sentence in an American Supermax prison. Last but not least, the present compendium includes an analysis of the leadership prospects of Israel’s embattled Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
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<strong>The</strong> current state of Russian-Chinese relations<br />
<strong>The</strong> current state of the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico<br />
<strong>The</strong> Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu<br />
<strong>The</strong> current state of the Russian Armed Forces<br />
0 EDITED BY Dr. JOSEPH FITSANAKIS<br />
FOREWORD BY Dr. JOHN NOMIKOS
<strong>The</strong> current state of Russian-Chinese relations<br />
<strong>The</strong> current state of the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico<br />
<strong>The</strong> Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu<br />
<strong>The</strong> current state of the Russian Armed Forces<br />
PUBLISHED BY THE<br />
EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY<br />
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE<br />
CHANTICLEER INTELLIGENCE BRIEF<br />
EDITED BY Dr. JOSEPH FITSANAKIS<br />
FOREWORD BY Dr. JOHN NOMIKOS
European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy www.euintelligenceacademy.eu<br />
<strong>The</strong> European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy (EIA) was established in 2013 as an<br />
international network of intelligence studies scholars, specialists and students,<br />
who are dedicated to promoting research and scholarship across the European<br />
Union (EU), as well as between the EU and other parts of the world. One<br />
of the primary aims of the EIA network is to highlight the work of emerging<br />
graduate and undergraduate scholars in the intelligence studies field, while<br />
encouraging cooperation in research and scholarship between students of<br />
intelligence. <strong>The</strong> EIA is an initiative of the Research Institute for European<br />
and American Studies (RIEAS).<br />
Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief www.cibrief.org<br />
<strong>The</strong> Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief (CIB) was established in 2015 as a studentled<br />
initiative supported by the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina<br />
University (CCU) in Conway, South Carolina, United States. It operates as<br />
an ancillary practicum for students in the National Security and <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />
Studies program who wish to cultivate and refine their ability to gather, present,<br />
and analyze information in accordance with techniques used in the analytical<br />
profession. <strong>The</strong> goal of the CIB is to train aspiring intelligence professionals in<br />
the art of producing well-researched, impartial and factual analytical products.<br />
<strong>The</strong> European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy<br />
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and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer of this <strong>volume</strong>.<br />
2
4
Table of Contents<br />
Foreword page 7<br />
Dr. John Nomikos<br />
Introduction page 11<br />
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis<br />
<strong>The</strong> Current and Projected State of Russian-Chinese Relations page 15<br />
Connor Lewis<br />
<strong>The</strong> Current and Projected State of the Sinaloa Cartel page 25<br />
Madison Scholar<br />
Will the Israeli Government of Benjamin Netanyahu Survive in 2019? page 31<br />
Jared Ross<br />
<strong>The</strong> Current and Projected State of the Russian Armed Forces page 39<br />
Alex Clark<br />
Biographical Notes on Contributors page 47<br />
5
6
Foreword<br />
<strong>The</strong> Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS)<br />
was founded in 2006 with the aim of promoting the understanding<br />
of international affairs. Special attention is devoted to transatlantic<br />
relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration,<br />
international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian<br />
foreign policy as well as policy-making on national and international<br />
markets.<br />
Last year, RIEAS founded <strong>The</strong> Journal of European and American <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />
Studies (JEAIS), an international academic-led scholarly publication that<br />
focuses on the field of intelligence and related areas of study and<br />
practice —such as terrorism and counterterrorism, homeland and<br />
international security, geopolitics, and international relations. <strong>The</strong><br />
JEAIS has already published two <strong>issue</strong>s and has become known as an<br />
all-inclusive academic platform that allows junior and senior scholars<br />
and practitioners from both the public and private sectors, to share<br />
their knowledge, ideas and approach to intelligence studies.<br />
In 2013, RIEAS launched the European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy (EIA)<br />
project in order to promote the field of intelligence studies in European<br />
academic institutions, in cooperation with the United States. <strong>The</strong> EIA<br />
aims to advance the intelligence profession by setting standards, building<br />
resources, sharing knowledge within the intelligence field, and promoting<br />
a strong intelligence culture in European Union member states. It<br />
also promotes cross-border research and scholarship cooperation<br />
7
etween intelligence scholars in the EU and scholars in other parts<br />
of the world. Furthermore, the EIA highlights the work of emerging<br />
postgraduate and undergraduate scholars in the intelligence studies<br />
field and provides a forum for them to exchange ideas and pursue<br />
relevant research. Ultimately, one of the main goals of the EIA is to<br />
connect young scholars who focus their undergraduate and postgraduate<br />
studies on intelligence in Europe, the United States, and the<br />
rest of the world.<br />
With that in mind, I salute the sixth <strong>issue</strong> of <strong>The</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>Review</strong>, Vol.3,<br />
No.6, April 2019, edited by Professor Joseph Fitsanakis of Coastal<br />
Carolina University’s <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies program,<br />
and published by the EIA in association with the Chanticleer<br />
<strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief. My heartfelt congratulations go to all the young<br />
scholars whose work has been included in this seminal publication.<br />
Dr. John Nomikos<br />
Director, European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy<br />
8
9
10
Introduction<br />
Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis<br />
Associate Professor, <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies program,<br />
Coastal Carolina University<br />
Deputy Director, European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy<br />
From its very conception in 2015, the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief<br />
(CIB) has represented a radical departure from traditional models of<br />
instruction in the intelligence and national security studies field. Its<br />
primary mission has always been to remove inspiring intelligence analysts<br />
from the predictability of the instructional environment, and expose<br />
them to the irregularity and randomness of real-life intelligence work.<br />
In the four years of its existence, the CIB has helped over 100 aspiring<br />
intelligence analysts learn how to grapple with the unpredictability of<br />
having to assess, evaluate and often forecast national and international<br />
developments that are unfolding in real time.<br />
Upon joining the CIB, analysts join ‘Sections’ —teams of other analysts<br />
who specialize in a common geographical region, or topic. <strong>The</strong>y work<br />
collaboratively to <strong>issue</strong> measurable periodic estimates on current events<br />
that relate to their region. Additionally, each analyst is given the task<br />
of answering a specific question about an ongoing development that<br />
relates to his or her area of expertise. <strong>The</strong> following is an example of<br />
a question posed to an analyst: “will there be another Palestinian uprising<br />
11
in 2019?”. Another example is, “will the Venezuelan government of Nicolás<br />
Maduro remain in power by December of this year?”. Inevitably, attempts to<br />
provide comprehensive answers to these questions generate sets of<br />
interrelated sub-questions, which occupy analysts for months at a time.<br />
Throughout that intense period, analysts are expected to brief the<br />
entire CIB analytical team on a weekly basis, and answer challenging<br />
questions by their instructors and peers. <strong>The</strong>y must do so while remaining<br />
faithful to the diagnostic methods and briefing conventions of the<br />
intelligence profession —a set of skills that forms the basis of their<br />
evaluation by the course instructor.<br />
In some cases, analysts are asked to produce what is known as ‘current<br />
intelligence’, namely research that focuses on immediate concerns<br />
and threats of an ongoing nature. In other cases, they are asked to<br />
engage in ‘estimative intelligence’ —efforts to anticipate future<br />
developments, with various degrees of certainty. <strong>The</strong> latter is arguably<br />
the most challenging task of an intelligence analyst, and the one that<br />
leaves his or her analytical products most open to dispute. <strong>The</strong>se tasks<br />
are extremely challenging for the junior analyst who is called to apply<br />
the theoretical foundations of intelligence analysis to a real-life topic<br />
that is unfolding daily, and sometimes hourly. As can be expected,<br />
CIB analysts are startled and stimulated in equal measure during the<br />
initial stages of their assignments. Gradually, however, they begin to<br />
deepen their understanding of the topic that has been assigned to<br />
them and to see the connections between it and many of the topics<br />
that have been assigned to other analysts. More importantly, they<br />
start to perceive patterns of interactivity between developments that<br />
may initially seem disconnected and unrelated, and to make sense of<br />
developments on a progressively wider scale.<br />
As their perceptive capacity both deepens and widens, analysts begin<br />
to display the unmistakable signs of analytical confidence. This can<br />
be witnessed in their daring forecasts, which they <strong>issue</strong> with<br />
increasingly high levels of confidence. Successful forecasts by CIB<br />
analysts have included the anticipation of Venezuela’s announcement<br />
of its voluntary withdrawal from the Organization of American<br />
States, several weeks before it occurred on April 26, 2017, as well as<br />
the stated expectation that Saudi Arabia would lift its ban on women<br />
drivers many months before it the royal decree was announced in<br />
September of 2017. Other analysts anticipated with remarkable accuracy<br />
the results of the first round of the 2017 presidential election in France<br />
(<strong>The</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>Review</strong>, Vol. 2, No. 3), and the United States’ abandonment<br />
12
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran<br />
nuclear deal (<strong>The</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>Review</strong>, Vol. 3, No. 5).<br />
At the conclusion of each semester, every CIB analyst produces a<br />
brief —though markedly dense— analytical product that aims to<br />
provide an informed and accurate answer to their analytical question.<br />
<strong>The</strong> present compendium, <strong>issue</strong> 6 of <strong>The</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>Review</strong>, showcases<br />
some of the best intelligence products written by CIB analysts in the<br />
fall 2018 academic semester. It covers timely topics, such as the<br />
current and projected state of Sino-Russian relations, as well as recent<br />
and projected developments relating to the state of Russia’s Armed<br />
Forces. <strong>The</strong>re is also an essay that focuses on the current and<br />
projected state of the Sinaloa cartel, one of Mexico’s most prolific<br />
organized criminal groups, whose leader, Joaquín Guzmán (also known<br />
as el Chapo), is currently serving a life sentence in an American Supermax<br />
prison. Last but not least, the present compendium includes an analysis<br />
of the leadership prospects of Israel’s embattled Prime Minister,<br />
Benjamin Netanyahu, which showcases some of the estimative analytical<br />
skills discussed above. <strong>The</strong>se reports represent a small sample of the<br />
CIB’s extensive and regular output. It is presented in the hope that<br />
readers will benefit from the precision, astuteness and analytical clarity<br />
of these very timely reports produced by a talented team of young analysts.<br />
Since its founding, the CIB has developed from a student-led club to a<br />
pre-professional body that operates as an ancillary practicum for students<br />
in Coastal Carolina University’s <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security<br />
Studies program. It has launched a website (www.cibrief.org), a<br />
television program and radio show, and the present publication,<br />
which is the result of a transatlantic cooperation between the CIB<br />
and the European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy. During this time, CIB<br />
alumni have joined the analytical divisions of numerous intelligence,<br />
security and law enforcement agencies in the United States, while<br />
many others are exercising their skills in the private sector. An<br />
increasing number of CIB analysts have combined their regional<br />
expertise with rigorous academic research and studies abroad, in<br />
Africa, Central America, the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia,<br />
the Far East, and Europe. <strong>The</strong>se experiences have only helped to<br />
improve the quality of the analytical output that is exhibited in these<br />
pages. <strong>The</strong> quality of our output has also been enhanced by the<br />
constructive critiques of current and former members of the United<br />
States <strong>Intelligence</strong> Community. It is with their support, as well as with<br />
the support of Coastal Carolina University and the European <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />
Academy, that we hope to continue our work in the future.<br />
13
14
<strong>The</strong> Current and Projected State of<br />
Russian-Chinese Relations<br />
Connor Lewis<br />
Since the downfall of Soviet global hegemony in 1989, the Sino-Russian<br />
rapprochement has become a geopolitical phenomenon that has both<br />
interested and puzzled Western scholars (Wishnick 2018: 355). Both<br />
countries are recognized as great powers with a substantial influence<br />
on international relations. For this reason, understanding the current<br />
and projected state of the Sino-Russian relationship is paramount in<br />
determining the current and future state of global politics.<br />
During the past several months, Sino-Russian military, diplomatic,<br />
and economic cooperation has appeared to strengthen exponentially.<br />
Both Russia and China’s presidents have lauded their countries’ growing<br />
bilateral ties and claimed that their relationship is at a historic “high<br />
point” (Wood 2018). In addition, Chinese and Russian relations with<br />
the United States (US) have become increasingly strained over trade<br />
and foreign policy. <strong>The</strong>refore, it is estimated with moderate-to-high<br />
confidence that Sino-Russian relations currently resemble a strong,<br />
amicable partnership that will continue to strengthen in the future if<br />
tensions with the US escalate.<br />
15
Background<br />
After decades of hostility during the Cold War, tensions between Moscow<br />
and Beijing began to thaw during the Gorbachev-Xiaoping era. In the<br />
second half of the 1980s, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and<br />
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping chose to focus less on their<br />
countries’ respective ideological differences and instead look at the<br />
bilateral relationship with more pragmatism (Yeung and Bjelakovic<br />
2010:246). Due in part to the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union<br />
and the West’s pressure on China over Tiananmen Square, the two<br />
countries normalized relations between 1989 and 1991 (Yeung and<br />
Bjelakovic 2010:246).<br />
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia and China gradually<br />
increased their bilateral cooperation in various fields; this would<br />
eventually lead to their landmark Treaty of Good Neighborliness and<br />
Friendly Cooperation in 2001 (Chase and Medeiros 2018:3). Four<br />
years later, the two countries surprised the international community<br />
by holding their first joint military exercise (Finn 2005). Since then,<br />
Russia and China have signed multiple bilateral agreements and have<br />
participated in several joint military exercises. <strong>The</strong>se developments<br />
demonstrate that the Sino-Russian relationship has undergone a<br />
gradual, positive rise that has evolved into a strategic partnership in<br />
the 21 st century (Yujun et al. 2018).<br />
Vostok 2018<br />
Sino-Russian military relations appeared to reach a new level of<br />
cooperation this past September. On September 11, 2018, Chinese<br />
troops participated alongside the Russian armed forces in the threeweek-long<br />
Vostok military exercise —thought to be Russia’s largest<br />
war games since the Soviet era (BBC 2018). According to Real Clear<br />
Defense, the exercise consisted of roughly “297,000 Russian service<br />
members, about 36,000 pieces of equipment, and more than 1,000<br />
aircraft, complemented by 3,200 Chinese soldiers and an unknown<br />
number of Mongolians” (Myers 2018). Although some speculate that<br />
the Russians may have exaggerated their troop numbers (Galeotti<br />
2018), even reduced figures would make this joint Sino-Russian<br />
exercise the largest to date (Zhou 2018).<br />
16
Sino-Russian Diplomacy and the DPRK<br />
A few weeks following the military exercise, Russian and Chinese<br />
diplomats met in Moscow to discuss their support for North Korea<br />
(DPRK) amid the country’s denuclearization negotiations with the<br />
US (Jeong-ho 2018). <strong>The</strong> diplomats announced that they shared<br />
support for a plan of “phased and synchronized measures” (Gehrke<br />
2018), which would mean that the DPRK would receive gradual<br />
sanctions relief as it takes steps in denuclearizing. This approach<br />
directly contrasts the US position, which is to keep all sanctions in<br />
place until after the DPRK has completely dismantled its nuclear<br />
weapons program (Imran 2018). Despite American dissatisfaction<br />
with the statements, Russia and China have stated that they will<br />
continue to lend bilateral support for the DPRK throughout their<br />
denuclearization talks with the US (Gehrke 2018).<br />
Sino-Russian Energy and Trade Relations<br />
In addition to military and diplomatic engagements, Sino-Russian<br />
cooperation has recently accelerated in areas of energy and trade.<br />
According to the Chinese General Administration of Customs<br />
(GAC), Sino-Russian trade turnover reached $77 billion in September<br />
and was projected to reach $100 billion by the end of December<br />
(Guillar 2018). In January of 2019, the GAC released a statement<br />
claiming that trade turnover between the two countries rose by nearly<br />
30% throughout the previous year, amounting to a record $107.06<br />
billion (Russia Today 2019b). Although this number is miniscule in<br />
comparison to China’s trade with its other major trading partners,<br />
including the US (Huasheng 2018), the unprecedented level of Sino-<br />
Russian trade cooperation signaled that the two countries’ trade<br />
relations may be healthier than expected.<br />
Furthermore, the Russians cemented their position as China’s largest<br />
energy supplier in 2018 through a new energy deal and the ongoing<br />
construction of a natural-gas pipeline (Tass 2018). On November 29,<br />
the Russian oil company Rosneft stated that it signed a one-year deal<br />
with a state-run Chinese manufacturing company that will increase<br />
Russian oil exports to China by roughly 48,197 barrels per day<br />
(Griffin 2018). <strong>The</strong> Russians also projected that their construction of<br />
the Power of Siberia —a natural gas pipeline that would transport<br />
energy from Russia’s Far East directly to China— would be completed<br />
by the end of the year (Pipoli 2018). Although the construction has<br />
17
yet to be completed, Russia claimed in late February of 2019 that the<br />
pipeline’s construction was 99% complete (Russia Today 2019a).<br />
Russian officials also announced that they expect to begin exporting<br />
natural gas to China through the pipeline beginning on December 1,<br />
2019 (Kallanish Energy 2019).<br />
Analysis<br />
Sino-Russian synergy comes at a time when both countries’ relations<br />
with the US are becoming increasingly strained. Russia’s economy has<br />
been hit hard with US sanctions, and China continues to engage in<br />
tense trade relations with Washington over tariffs. China and the US<br />
have also been at odds over Beijing’s territorial claims in the South<br />
China Sea, which has increased the likelihood of a Sino-American<br />
military confrontation in the eastern Pacific.<br />
China’s decision to participate in Vostok, the massive Russian<br />
military exercise, may have been made in order to send a message to<br />
Washington: we will not hesitate to align ourselves with the Russians<br />
in the face of American pressure. <strong>The</strong> Chinese are highly concerned<br />
about the America’s strategic military presence in the Pacific and<br />
likely see the proximity of American bases to their borders as a<br />
challenge to their national interests. Moreover, the US has continually<br />
disregarded Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea by<br />
sailing naval vessels into disputed waters (Zhenhua 2018). <strong>The</strong><br />
Chinese may be signaling that they do not view the Russians as an<br />
imminent security threat and that they are willing to align themselves<br />
with Moscow, if necessary.<br />
Russia and China have also showed their willingness to cooperate<br />
diplomatically, particularly regarding the potential for denuclearization<br />
in the Korean Peninsula. Both countries affirmed their willingness to<br />
support the DPRK after the country’s denuclearization talks with the<br />
US stagnated in late 2018 and again in early 2019 (US New 2018).<br />
Russia and China likely see the stagnation as an opportunity to pursue<br />
their foreign policy objectives, which could be to oversee the<br />
denuclearization process and mitigate the US’ influence in the region<br />
(Jeong-ho 2018). Sino-Russian control over the denuclearization process<br />
could lead to the DPRK’s weapons being transferred to Russia<br />
and/or China instead of the US and its allies. This would allow Russia<br />
and China to tout their ability to responsibly handle tense regional<br />
dilemmas and appear as international peace brokers. Moreover, both<br />
Russia and China appear to be disgruntled with the US’ status as an<br />
18
international watchdog and would welcome the prospect of the<br />
American led-global order being overturned in their favor (Maçães<br />
2019). Lastly, it is also possible that Russia and China could make it<br />
difficult for the US to verify the degree of the DPRK’s weapons<br />
dismantlement if they were to take over the denuclearization process.<br />
Additionally, both Russia and China have a mutual interest in seeing<br />
the American military presence in South Korea (ROK) diminished.<br />
<strong>The</strong> US has kept a substantial military presence in the ROK since the<br />
Korean War in the early 1950s, relatively close to both Russia and<br />
China’s borders. By bilaterally supporting the DPRK during the talks,<br />
Russia and China can pursue their goal of mitigating American influence<br />
in the region, particularly in the ROK. Following US President Donald<br />
Trump’s second summit in Vietnam with the DPRK’s Chairman Kim<br />
in late February, US defense officials announced that annual joint US-<br />
ROK military exercises would cease in the upcoming spring (Kube et<br />
al. 2019). Although the US claims this action is solely intended to ease<br />
US-DPRK relations (Kube et al. 2019), Russia and China may view<br />
their bilateral cooperation with the DPRK as having brought about<br />
beneficial results.<br />
In terms of economics, American sanctions imposed on Moscow and<br />
Washington’s protectionist stance against Beijing may be incentivizing<br />
Russia and China to bolster their trading and energy relations. Since<br />
2014, sanctions implemented on Russia as a result of their annexation<br />
of Crimea have taken a toll on the Russian economy (Guillar 2018).<br />
<strong>The</strong> Russians have been forced to find new energy consumers outside<br />
of the European Union (Guillar 2018). Although Moscow has been<br />
wary of becoming Beijing’s ‘resource appendix’ (Lubina 2017:167),<br />
Russia’s geographic location and its vast array of natural resources<br />
makes the country a practical Chinese energy supplier.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Trump Administration’s tough stance on Sino-American trade<br />
policies has also incentivized the Chinese to find alternative trading<br />
partners (Corera 2018). Russia has agreed to fill the US’ niche in some<br />
of these industries. For example, the Chinese have turned to Russia<br />
as a major soybean supplier after tariffs dissuaded the country to<br />
continue their imports from the US (Grove and Kurmanaev 2019).<br />
Both countries have also stated that they plan to work on enhancing<br />
their relationship in rice, pork, poultry, and fish (Medetsky and<br />
Durisin 2018). Although ongoing trade negotiations may ease Sino-<br />
American tensions, the likelihood that Russia and China’s bilateral<br />
cooperation will increase strengthens as their tensions with the US rise.<br />
19
Conclusion<br />
<strong>The</strong> previous analysis indicates several reasons for the likely continuation<br />
of increasing Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation. First, China may be<br />
cooperating militarily with the Russians in order to deter what it sees<br />
as American provocations in the South China Sea. <strong>The</strong> US has long<br />
held a strategic military posture throughout the eastern Pacific region,<br />
much to China’s dismay. It is likely that Chinese do no perceive the<br />
Russians as an immediate threat, which incentivizes them to cooperate<br />
with them militarily.<br />
Second, Russia and China see the stagnation in the US’ denuclearization<br />
talks with the DPRK as an opportunity to diplomatically pursue joint<br />
foreign policy interests. <strong>The</strong> US’ decision to mitigate its military<br />
exercises in the ROK may also signal to the Russians and Chinese<br />
that their cooperation with the DPRK is proving fruitful. Lastly,<br />
increasing their mutual economic cooperation allows Russia and<br />
China to bolster their energy and trade markets without succumbing<br />
to pressure from the US. Both countries are wary of the USdominated<br />
world order, and their mutual economic cooperation allows<br />
them to navigate around pressure from the US.<br />
Although tensions with the US may not be the only factor causing<br />
Russia and China to increase their bilateral cooperation, the present<br />
analysis indicates that they likely are playing a major role. <strong>The</strong><br />
correlations indicated here suggest that American pressure may be the<br />
primary reason behind the rise in Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation<br />
in recent months. <strong>The</strong>refore, it is estimated with a moderate-to-high<br />
degree of confidence that Sino-Russian relations currently resemble<br />
a strong partnership that will strengthen in the future if tensions with<br />
the US continue to escalate.<br />
20
Bibliography of References Cited<br />
BBC (2018) “Russia Begins Biggest War Games in Years”, BBC<br />
World News, 11 September, ,<br />
accessed on 2 December 2018.<br />
Chase, M., and Medeiros, E. (2017) “Chinese Perspectives on the<br />
Sino-Russian Relationship”, <strong>The</strong> National Bureau of Asian Research,<br />
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23
24
<strong>The</strong> Current and Projected State of<br />
the Sinaloa Cartel<br />
Madison Scholar<br />
It can be stated with moderate confidence that the Sinaloa cartel will split<br />
apart as a result of the conviction of Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán. Under<br />
Guzmán’s rule, the Sinaloa cartel has become one of the most powerful<br />
cartels in Mexico. Guzmán alone was convicted of trafficking over $14<br />
billion worth of drugs across the US-Mexico border (Grillo 2018). During<br />
Guzmán’s trial, witnesses disclosed new information regarding the cartel’s<br />
inner workings that may aid law enforcement in future counter-narcotics<br />
operations. With Guzmán in prison, the Sinaloa faces internal conflict due<br />
to lack of leadership. We see a pattern of disloyalty to Guzmán displayed<br />
by prior members, betraying their organization’s leader for personal gain.<br />
Guzmán unsuccessfully pled “not guilty” on 10 separate counts including<br />
multiple murders and assaults, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and<br />
instigating prison escapes (Kennedy 2017).<br />
Background<br />
<strong>The</strong> Sinaloa cartel controls territory across the Pacific Coastal region of<br />
Mexico and in its home state of Sinaloa, Mexico (US Drug Enforcement<br />
Administration 2017:2). Additionally, it maintains more international territory<br />
than any other Mexican cartel, particularly in the US (US Drug Enforcement<br />
Administration 2017:2). It distributes narcotics to hubs in major US cities<br />
25
including Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago (US Drug Enforcement<br />
Administration 2017:2). <strong>The</strong> Sinaloa cartel was formed after a split in the<br />
Guadalajara cartel, which resulted because of the arrest of Felix Gallardo,<br />
its head kingpin (Sommerlad 2018). When the Guadalajara cartel split, the<br />
Sinaloa cartel was created and eventually taken over by Joaquín ‘El Chapo’<br />
Guzmán along with Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada Garcia, his right hand man<br />
(Sommerlad 2018). Throughout his reign, Guzmán escaped from prison<br />
twice. <strong>The</strong> US had requested his extradition for years, arguing that Mexican<br />
officials did not have the capability to keep Guzmán behind bars (Feuer and<br />
Palmer 2018). On 8 January 2016, Guzmán was arrested for the third time<br />
after escaping Mexico’s maximum security Puente Grande prison, where he<br />
was supposed to serve a 20-year sentence (Sommerlad 2018). He was extradited<br />
to the US soon after Mexican officials announced that his legal appeals were<br />
exhausted (Williams 2017). He then awaited his trial in solitary confinement<br />
in a maximum-security prison in Manhattan, New York (Riotta 2018).<br />
Recent Developments<br />
Guzmán’s trial began on 13 November 2018, when he pled “not guilty” to<br />
10 charges that covered over 30 years of criminal activity (Riotta 2018). This<br />
included multiple accounts of murder and assault, money laundering, narcotics<br />
trafficking, instigating prison escapes, and others (Kennedy 2017). US District<br />
Court Judge Brian Cogan headed the trial at the Brooklyn Federal Court in<br />
New York (Hurowitz 2018b). <strong>The</strong> US Marshals Service took extreme security<br />
measures to ensure protection of key witnesses and the 12 jurors, even<br />
though Guzmán’s lawyer publicly stated that his client would not kill anyone<br />
involved in the trial (Hurowitz 2018b). As part of a deal made with Mexican<br />
officials, the US had agreed not to seek the death penalty for the case (Williams<br />
2017). At the end of the two and a half month-long trial in February 2019,<br />
Guzmán was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison (Moghe and Sanchez<br />
2019). Authorities have not revealed where he will be jailed, but sources say<br />
that it is likely he will go to the US’s most secure super-maximum security<br />
(supermax) prison located in Florence, Colorado (Hanna 2019).<br />
During the trial, US government prosecutors had access to numerous key<br />
witnesses who had been previously extradited. Over 200 hours of testimony<br />
were recorded from the 56 witnesses who spoke at the trial (Moghe and<br />
Sanchez 2019). Jesus Zambada García, who was arrested in 2012 for<br />
operating drug warehouses for the Sinaloa cartel, struck a deal with federal<br />
authorities to testify against Guzmán in exchange for a shorter sentence<br />
(Hurowitz 2018a). Zambada recalled details of numerous murders, which<br />
alone is a charge that could have sentenced Guzmán to life in prison<br />
(Hurowitz 2018a). Zambada also disclosed information regarding his brother,<br />
Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada Garcia, who may hold equal responsibility for<br />
leadership of the cartel (Hurowitz 2018a). Zambada claims his brother bought<br />
26
protection from Mexican government officials and law enforcement, which<br />
is why he has never been arrested (Hurowitz 2018a). He explained that he<br />
personally met with García Luna, who was Mexican President Felipe<br />
Calderòn’s head security official, in 2005 to exchange over $3 million for<br />
protection (Hurowitz 2018a). Allegations of bribery intensified when Alex<br />
Cifuentes, another close associate of the Sinaloa, testified that former<br />
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto had taken a $100 million bribe from<br />
Guzmán (Alexander 2019) in exchange for the drug kingpin’s freedom.<br />
Cifuentes stated that after taking the bribe, President Nieto contacted<br />
Guzmán to inform him that he no longer had to hide from Mexican<br />
authorities (Alexander 2019). Mexican officials denied all accusations of<br />
bribery, but the testimony exposed a potential corruption scandal of<br />
monumental proportions at the very top of the Mexican government<br />
(Alexander 2019). Throughout the trial, witness testimonies brought light<br />
to new information about the inner workings of the cartel. Zambada was<br />
the first of many to open up to authorities and disclosed some of the most<br />
relevant information that led to Guzmán’s prosecution.<br />
Without Guzmán, the cartel is suffering from lack of organization. If<br />
Guzmán had a plan for succession after his death or arrest, it has fallen<br />
through (Agren 2017). Iván and Jesús Guzmán, Guzmán’s sons, were not<br />
ready to take over so soon, expecting that their father would be around<br />
longer (Agren 2017). As a result, internal conflict over who will control the<br />
cartel is at an all-time high. In February 2017, one of Guzmán’s closest<br />
associates, Dámaso López Núñes, attempted to kill Ismael Zambada and<br />
two of Guzmán’s sons, who were expected to take their father’s position<br />
(Goi 2017). Núñes was arrested and extradited to the US in May 2017. He<br />
too testified at the trial, attempting to expose Guzmán’s wife, Emma<br />
Coronel Aispuro, for her assistance in one of Guzmán’s prison breaks<br />
(McCoy 2019). Núñes serves as one of many examples of a member who<br />
violently attempted to take leadership of the cartel. Additionally, Ismael<br />
Zambada, who is believed to currently be in control of the cartel, is known<br />
to be suffering from diabetes (Anon. 2018). Due to his illness, it is highly<br />
likely that Ismael Zambada’s partial reign will end soon (Anon. 2018).<br />
Starting around the time of Guzmán’s second arrest, internal attacks and<br />
conflict caused a spike in violence throughout Mexico, particularly in the<br />
state of Sinaloa (Goi 2017). <strong>The</strong> 2015 Mexico Peace Index ranked the state<br />
of Sinaloa as the third most violent state in Mexico as a direct result of cartel<br />
conflict (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015:15).<br />
Analysis<br />
Guzmán’s trial offered US authorities the opportunity to extract new<br />
information from motivated members that not only reveal Guzmán’s<br />
criminal life, but also some of the secrets of the cartel. Law enforcement can<br />
27
use these new leads during future counter-narcotics missions. This pattern<br />
of disloyalty showed us that numerous senior members are willing to<br />
jeopardize the cartel’s secrets if it benefits them personally. We have also<br />
seen in some cases, such as those of Jesus Zambada García and Dámaso<br />
López Núñes, that loyalty to Guzmán and the Sinaloa cartel is quickly<br />
diminishing. If law enforcement can continue to exploit the interests of<br />
captured members, they may gain insight to help better-counteract the cartel.<br />
Similarly to the Guadalajara cartel, who split up after the arrest of their<br />
leader, the Sinaloa may face similar results without the uniting entity that<br />
was Guzmán. <strong>The</strong> Sinaloa cartel functions similarly to a federation of allied<br />
groups, with certain groups working in specific areas, also called factions<br />
(Woody 2017). Guzmán often times mediated disputes and served as a<br />
higher authority between the factions (Woody 2017). Without him, there is<br />
nobody to prevent aggressive altercations that occur within the cartel,<br />
resulting in violent internal conflict. This could potentially force members<br />
to take sides and split apart.<br />
Conclusion<br />
<strong>The</strong> information revealed by the 56 witnesses in the trial gave law enforcement<br />
an advantage and insight into the cartel’s inner workings. Additionally, unless<br />
a new leader is established, the cartel will continue to struggle internally.<br />
Guzmán will not be able to return to his position as mediator between the<br />
factions because he will be serving a life sentence in a US prison. <strong>The</strong><br />
Guadalajara cartel is an example of what could happen to the Sinaloa and<br />
shows us the potential effects of losing a key leader. <strong>The</strong>refore, it can be<br />
stated with moderate confidence that the Sinaloa cartel will split apart as a<br />
result of the recent arrest and conviction of Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán.<br />
28
References Cited<br />
Agren, D. (2017) “Mexico After El Chapo: New Generation Fights for<br />
Control of the Cartel”, <strong>The</strong> Guardian, 5 May , accessed<br />
on 28 November 2018.<br />
Alexander, H. (2019) “Mexico’s Former President Enrique Pena Nieto ‘Took<br />
$100M Bribe From El Chapo’”, <strong>The</strong> Telegraph, 16 January , accessed on 19 February 2019.<br />
Anonymous (2018) “As El Chapo’s Day In Court Begins, El Mayo Fights<br />
to Control the Sinaloa Cartel”, Mexico News Daily, 5 November , accessed on<br />
27 November 2018.<br />
Feuer, A., and Palmer, E. (2018) “Inside El Chapo’s Vast Network: What<br />
We Know After the Trial’s First Week”, <strong>The</strong> New York Times,18 November<br />
,<br />
accessed on 27 November 2018.<br />
Goi, L. (2017) “Internal Cartel Conflict Could be Behind Spike in Western<br />
Mexico Violence”, InSight Crime, 9 February ,<br />
accessed on 27 November 2018.<br />
Grillo, I. (2018) “Inside the Trial of Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman, the World’s<br />
Most Infamous Drug Baron”, Time, 10 May , accessed on 26 November 2018.<br />
Hanna, J. (2019) “El Chapo is Likely Going to the Same Prison Where<br />
Ted Kaczynski and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Are Held”, CNN, 13 February<br />
,<br />
accessed on 19 February 2019.<br />
Hurowitz, N. (2018a) “El Chapo Trial: Witness Alleges Presidential Bribes,<br />
Cartel Brutality”, Rolling Stone, 21 November ,<br />
accessed on 27 November 2018.<br />
Hurowitz, N. (2018b) “Inside El Chapo Trial Jury Selection”, Rolling Stone,<br />
8 November , accessed on 26 November 2018.<br />
Institute for Economics and Peace (2015) “Mexico Peace Index”, Institute<br />
for Economics and Peace, Sydney, Australia.<br />
Kennedy, M. (2017) “Notorious Drug Lord ‘El Chapo’ Pleads Not Guilty<br />
to Federal Charges”, National Public Radio, 20 January , accessed on 27 November<br />
2018.<br />
McCoy, K. (2019) “Witness Implicates El Chapo’s Wife in the Alleged Drug<br />
Lord’s Most Daring Prison Escape”, USA Today, 23 January
www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/01/23/el-chapo-lieutenantimplicates-alleged-drug-lord-wife-daring-prison-escape/2647039002/>,<br />
accessed on 19 February 2019.<br />
Moghe, S., and Sanchez, R. (2019) “Mexican Drug Lord Joaquin ‘El<br />
Chapo’ Guzman is Found Guilty on All Counts”, CNN, 13 February<br />
, accessed on 19 February 2019.<br />
Riotta, C. (2018) “El Chapo trial: Live Updates: Latest Witness in Joaquin<br />
Guzman Case to Remain Anonymous Due to Security Fears”, <strong>The</strong> Independent,<br />
26 November < https://www.news2.fr/2018/11/27/el-chapo-trial-liveupdates-latest-witness-in-joaquin-guzman-case-to-remain-anonymousdue-to-security-fears/>,<br />
accessed on 26 November 2018.<br />
Sommerlad, J. (2018) “El Chapo: Who Is the Mexican Drug Baron and<br />
Sinaloa Cartel Kingpin and How Was He Brought to Justice?”, <strong>The</strong><br />
Independent, 13 November ,<br />
accessed on 27 November 2018.<br />
US Drug Enforcement Administration (2017) “National Drug Threat<br />
Assessment”, United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington,<br />
DC, United States.<br />
Williams, P. (2017) “Why El Chapo’s Extradition From Mexico Surprised<br />
US Officials”, NBC News, 21 January ,<br />
accessed on 27 November 2018.<br />
Woody, C. (2017) “El Chapo Guzman’s Powerful Sinaloa Cartel is Withering<br />
While He Sits in a US Jail”, Business Insider, 3 July ,<br />
accessed on 27 November 2018.<br />
30
Will the Government of Israeli Prime<br />
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Survive<br />
in 2019?<br />
Jared Ross<br />
Benjamin Netanyahu was first elected as Prime Minister of Israel in<br />
1996. He served for one term before losing to Ehud Barak. After he<br />
lost his first election as an incumbent, he served from “1999 [to] 2002<br />
as a consultant to high tech companies and public speaker, 2002-2003<br />
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2003-2005 Minister of Finance, 2005-<br />
2009 Chairman of Likud, Leader of the Opposition” (Prime<br />
Minister’s Office n.d.). From August to December of 2018, the Prime<br />
Minister has been dealing with bribery allegations; and on November<br />
14, 2018, he lost his Defense Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, over a<br />
ceasefire agreement with Hamas. Despite these two <strong>issue</strong>s,<br />
Netanyahu was able to maintain his position as prime minister<br />
through the end of 2018. However; Netanyahu and his coalition<br />
government agreed to disband and call for early elections. <strong>The</strong> early<br />
election will be held on April 9, 2019. It is estimated with moderate<br />
to high confidence that Benjamin Netanyahu will be re-elected as<br />
Prime Minister in 2019.<br />
31
<strong>The</strong> Structure of Israel’s Government<br />
<strong>The</strong> government of Israel is a Parliamentary Democracy. It is made<br />
up of an Executive Branch, a Legislative Branch, and a Judiciary<br />
Branch. “<strong>The</strong> system is based on the principle of separation of<br />
powers, in which the executive branch (the government) is subject to<br />
the confidence of the legislative branch (the Knesset) and the<br />
independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by law” (Israel Ministry<br />
of Foreign Affairs n.d.). <strong>The</strong> current President of Israel is Reuven<br />
Rivlin; the president also holds the title as being the head of state.<br />
<strong>The</strong> president holds a number of powers. <strong>The</strong> president has the<br />
power to “pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction<br />
or commutation thereof” (<strong>The</strong> Knesset n.d.). <strong>The</strong> president also has<br />
the power to “sign every Law, other than a Law relating to its powers”<br />
(<strong>The</strong> Knesset n.d.). In addition to these powers, the president has the<br />
responsibilities of “opening the first meeting of the first session of a<br />
new Knesset, receiving the credentials of new ambassadors of foreign<br />
states, approving the appointment of civil and religious judges”<br />
(Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). Israel also has a prime<br />
minster, and the current one is Benjamin Netanyahu. <strong>The</strong> prime<br />
minister is the head of the Executive Branch of the Israeli<br />
government. <strong>The</strong> prime minister’s powers consist of “the head of the<br />
Israeli government and chief executive of the state” (Anon. n.d.).<br />
Under the prime minister, the Executive Branch has 26 additional<br />
ministers who oversee the various sectors of Israel.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Legislative Branch of Israel is called <strong>The</strong> Knesset. <strong>The</strong> Knesset<br />
has the power to “exclusive authority to enact laws. <strong>The</strong> Knesset may<br />
pass laws on any subject and in any matter, as long as a proposed law<br />
does not contradict an existing basic law, and the legislative process<br />
is carried out as required by the law” (<strong>The</strong> Knesset n.d.). <strong>The</strong> Knesset<br />
is a unicameral house that is made up one hundred and twenty seats.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset also has a speaker who “represents the Knesset in its<br />
contacts with external bodies, and is also in charge of the Knesset<br />
Administration, the Knesset Secretariat and the preparation and<br />
implementation of the Knesset's budget” (<strong>The</strong> Knesset n.d.). <strong>The</strong><br />
Knesset is also made up of different parties who hold different<br />
numbers of seats. Currently, the majority party in the Knesset is the<br />
Likud Party, which currently holds 30 seats. <strong>The</strong> second biggest party<br />
is the Zionist Union, which controls 24 seats, and is also the main<br />
opposition party. Altogether, there are 11 political parties with seats<br />
32
in the current Knesset. <strong>The</strong> Judiciary branch is made up of different<br />
courts. <strong>The</strong> Supreme Court of Israel holds the highest judicial powers.<br />
According to the Knesset website, “the Supreme Court hears appeals<br />
against the authorities of the state and other public bodies, and it has<br />
broad discretionary authority to rule on matters in which it considers<br />
it necessary to grant relief in the interests of justice” (<strong>The</strong> Knesset<br />
n.d.). <strong>The</strong> Judiciary Branch is also made up of “<strong>The</strong> District Courts<br />
of Law, the Magistrates Courts (the first instance) —and in general,<br />
the Court of Traffic Offenses, Family Courts and Juvenile Courts,<br />
National Labor Court, Regional Labor Courts” (Israeli Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs n.d.). Israel also has religious courts. “<strong>The</strong>re are<br />
religious courts of the four main religious denominations: Jewish,<br />
Muslim, Christian and Druze. Each religious court can only try cases<br />
applying to members of its own religious community” (Ministry of<br />
Foreign Affairs n.d.).<br />
Netanyahu’s Government<br />
Benjamin Netanyahu has been the Prime Minister of Israel since<br />
2009. <strong>The</strong> current government is made up of a coalition of the Likud<br />
Party, the Kulanu Party, the Habayit Hayehudi Party, the Shas Party,<br />
the United Torah Judaism Party, and —until November 14, 2018—<br />
the Yisrael Beiteinu Party. That was so until Avigdor Lieberman, the<br />
head of the party within the coalition resigned as defense minister<br />
and pulled his party out of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government.<br />
According to reports, there were two reasons why he pulled out of<br />
the government; the first was the agreed upon ceasefire with Hamas.<br />
Mr. Lieberman was quoted as saying: “we are buying quiet for the<br />
short term at the price of serious damage to national security in the<br />
long term" (Anon. 2018a). <strong>The</strong> second reason for his resignation was<br />
that the Israeli government allowed fuel and money into the Gaza<br />
Strip from Qatar: “Mr. Lieberman revealed he had similarly opposed<br />
recent decisions to allow into Gaza fuel for the territory's power plant<br />
and $15m in cash from Qatar intended to fund the salaries of unpaid<br />
civil servants” (Anon. 2018b). <strong>The</strong> decision by Mr. Lieberman to pull<br />
out of the coalition proved impossible to overcome due to the slim<br />
lead it left the government in the Knesset. In late December 2018,<br />
Netanyahu and his coalition unanimously agreed to call for early<br />
elections. <strong>The</strong>se early elections will take place on April 9, 2019.<br />
33
Analysis<br />
<strong>The</strong> two biggest threats that could cause Prime Minister Netanyahu<br />
to lose the upcoming elections are bribery charges and his very slim<br />
majority hold on seats in the Knesset. <strong>The</strong>re are three sets of corruption<br />
allegations against Prime Minister Netanyahu. <strong>The</strong> first corruption<br />
investigation took place from 2014-2017 and focused on the fact that<br />
the prime minister also oversaw the Office of Communications. Netanyahu<br />
allegedly influenced regulators “so that Bezeq, an Israeli telecom company<br />
owned by his friend Shaul Elovitch, benefitted financially” (Nota 2018).<br />
<strong>The</strong> second set of allegations center of claims “that the prime minister<br />
received unlawfully expensive gifts from friends” (Nota 2018). <strong>The</strong> third<br />
allegation is that Netanyahu “secretly attempted to negotiate a deal<br />
with the publisher of one of Israel’s daily newspapers in which<br />
negative news coverage was reduced in exchange for limiting of the<br />
distribution of a rival paper” (Nota 2018).<br />
Prime Minister Netanyahu has denied all allegations. A further threat<br />
to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government is the current hold on seats<br />
in the Knesset by his coalition parties. <strong>The</strong>y currently hold 61 out of<br />
the 120 seats. If the government loses the majority of seats then the<br />
opposition can enact Article 28 of Basic Law, which “determines that<br />
the expression of no-confidence in the Government shall be done by<br />
means of a resolution of the Knesset” (<strong>The</strong> Knesset n.d.). <strong>The</strong> Prime<br />
Minister almost lost his majority in November of last year, when<br />
Israeli Education Minister Naftali Bennett threatened to leave the<br />
coalition if he was not given the Defense Minister position. He<br />
recanted after a meeting with Netanyahu and was quoted at a press<br />
conference saying “[i]t’s better that the prime minister beats me in a<br />
political battle than [the Hamas leader, Ismail] Haniya beats Israel”<br />
(Holmes 2018).<br />
<strong>The</strong> potential threat to Netanyahu’s bid to win a fourth term as Prime<br />
Minister comes in the form of a merger of the two main opposition<br />
parties to his Likud Party. <strong>The</strong> two parties that merged together are<br />
Yesh Atid (<strong>The</strong>re Is a Future) and the new Hosen L'Yisrael (Israel<br />
Resilience). <strong>The</strong> two men who will be heading up the ticket, known<br />
as the “Blue and White Ticket” are Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid.<br />
Both of these parties can be described as center-left. <strong>The</strong> Yesh Atid<br />
platform states that the party seeks to “fight against political<br />
corruption, advocate for the sharing of the national burden, support<br />
the right and responsibilities of all Israeli citizens, to bring down the<br />
34
cost of living, etc.” (Yesh Atid n.d). Moreover, it states that the party<br />
aims to “bring about a diplomatic agreement between Israel and the<br />
Arab world” (Yesh Atid n.d.). According to the Security Doctrine<br />
manifesto of Yesh Atid, the party aims to do this by “possessing<br />
overwhelming strength” (Yesh Atid n.d.). Similarly; the Hosen<br />
L’Yisrael party aims to do the same thing, which is the main reason<br />
why the two parties merged. <strong>The</strong> agreement between the two parties<br />
states that “the deal struck between the two party leaders means that<br />
Gantz would be prime minister for two and a half years, with Lapid<br />
becoming prime minister after that, if they form the next<br />
government” (Levinson and Lis 2019). Additionally; the merger was<br />
a response to the merging of the Jewish Home Party with the Otzma<br />
Yehudit Party. <strong>The</strong> agreement to merge the two parties cost<br />
Netanyahu two ministerial seats for the next coalition government,<br />
should he win. It also appears that the Otzma Yehudit Party is not<br />
the only party that has been absorbed by, or merged with, with the<br />
Jewish Home. An article in <strong>The</strong> Times of Israel states that it has also<br />
merged with the “far-right National Union” Party and is in the<br />
process of merging with “Eli Yishai’s Yachad” Party. <strong>The</strong>se mergers<br />
are an attempt to ensure that Netanyahu has enough seats and<br />
influence to form a new coalition, should he win the election.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Despite the corruption allegations and the slim majority hold over<br />
Knesset seats, Prime Minister Netanyahu resisted the call for early<br />
elections until late December 2018. <strong>The</strong> analysis seems to indicate<br />
that he faces a potentially difficult election on April 9. However; it is<br />
essential to point out that Netanyahu has faced worse odds in the<br />
past and still won. <strong>The</strong> most relevant example of this is when he was<br />
running for Prime Minister in 1996. He came back and won after<br />
being down by 31 points due to the attacks on the Jaffa Road bus<br />
bombings, allegedly by Hamas suicide bombers, which killed 45<br />
people. <strong>The</strong> belief that Israel’s national security was more important<br />
than a peace agreement with the Palestinians won over the voters and<br />
made him prime minister. This message still resonates very strongly<br />
with many in Israel and despite the Blue and White Ticket sharing<br />
similar beliefs it is estimated with moderate to high confidence that<br />
Netanyahu will win in his re-election bid on April 9, 2019, unless he<br />
is indicted by the pending corruption allegations against him before<br />
that date.<br />
35
References Cited<br />
Anonymous (2012) “Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid”, , accessed on 23 February 2019.<br />
Anonymous (2018a) “Benjamin Netanyahu Rejects Calls for Election<br />
and Takes Defence Portfolio”, <strong>The</strong> Guardian, 18 November,<br />
,<br />
accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
Anonymous (2018b) “Israel Defence Minister Lieberman Resigns<br />
Over Gaza Ceasefire”, BBC, London, 14 November, , accessed on 3 December<br />
2018.<br />
Anonymous (n.d.) “Israeli Politics: Prime Ministers (1948-present)”,<br />
Jewish Virtual Library, ,<br />
accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
Fulbright, A. (2019) “Netanyahu Promises Jewish Home 2 Ministries<br />
to Join With Extremist Party”, <strong>The</strong> Times of Israel, 20 February,<br />
, accessed on 23 February<br />
2019.<br />
Holmes, O. (2018) “Israeli Education Minister Vows not to Resign in<br />
Reprieve for Netanyahu”, <strong>The</strong> Guardian, 19 November, ,<br />
accessed on 3 December 2018<br />
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.) “Israeli Democracy: How<br />
Does It Work”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Givat Ram,<br />
Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.) “<strong>The</strong> State: Political<br />
Structure”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Givat Ram,<br />
Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on<br />
3 December 2018.<br />
Kirk, M. (2016) “Netanyahu’s War”, Public Broadcasting Service,<br />
Arlington, Virginia, first broadcast on 5 January.<br />
Levinson, C., and Lis, J. (2019) “Political Bombshell as Gantz,<br />
Lapid Join Forces to Replace Netanyahu”, <strong>The</strong> Guardian, 21<br />
February,
political-bombshell-as-gantz-lapid-join-forces-to-replace-netanyahu-<br />
1.6957403>, accessed on 23 February 2019.<br />
News Corps Australia Network (2018) “Israel’s Netanyahu Says<br />
Coalition Agrees ‘Unanimously’ to Disband Government, Hold<br />
New Election”, ABC, 25 December, , accessed on 23 February 2019.<br />
Nota, B. (2018) “Israeli Authorities Recommend Charges of Bribery,<br />
Fraud for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu”, ABC News, 3<br />
December, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
Prime Minister’s Office (n.d.) “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu”,<br />
Prime Minister’s Office, Hakirya, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset (n.d.) “Basic Law: <strong>The</strong> President of the State (1964)”,<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset (n.d.) “Currently Functioning Parliamentary Groups”,<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset (n.d.) “Knesset Speaker’s Role”, <strong>The</strong> Knesset, Givat<br />
Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset (n.d.) “Motion of No-Confidence in the Government”,<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset (n.d.) “Powers and Functions of the Knesset”, <strong>The</strong><br />
Knesset, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Knesset (n.d.) “<strong>The</strong> Supreme Court”, <strong>The</strong> Knesset, Givat Ram,<br />
Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018.<br />
37
38
<strong>The</strong> Current and Projected State of<br />
the Russian Armed Forces<br />
Alex Clark<br />
<strong>The</strong> Russian Armed Forces have been working diligently to not be<br />
seen as an outdated military from the Soviet era, but to be recognized<br />
as a modern and advanced force capable of competing against any<br />
adversary. Correspondingly, the Russian Federation has been<br />
asserting its military bravado in conflicts around the world. Some of<br />
these conflicts have sparked political as well as military responses by<br />
Moscow, with some resulting in increasingly hostile relationships. As<br />
a result, it can be asserted with moderate confidence that the Russian<br />
government will continue to modernize and make advances in all<br />
branches and arsenals of its Armed Forces. This includes a complete<br />
modernization of all aspects of the Armed Forces as well as the<br />
additions of technologically advanced weaponry to Russia’s arsenal.<br />
Background<br />
<strong>The</strong> Russian Federation came about as a result of the collapse of its<br />
predecessor, the Soviet Union, on December 25, 1991. Since that<br />
time, Russia’s military has undergone years of neglect and no longer<br />
projects the image of a global superpower; however, Russia’s Armed<br />
39
Forces are currently in the midst of a historic overhaul (Masters<br />
2015). Russia has been rebuilding its Armed Forces to limit its<br />
geopolitical losses during the period of its weak status. <strong>The</strong><br />
modernization of Russia’s Armed Forces took a major leap forward<br />
in 2008, when Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov<br />
proclaimed a new stage of military reforms (US Congress 2011:1).<br />
<strong>The</strong> envisioned evolution of the Armed Forces under Serdyukov’s<br />
plan involved a complete restructuring and modernization of the<br />
entire military. His series of vigorous reforms resulted in the most<br />
radical transformation of the country’s military since the creation of<br />
the Red Army in 1918 (Defense and Security Section 2012:3). <strong>The</strong><br />
reforms focused on improvements in several different areas. One<br />
major area of focus was on transforming the military from a force<br />
designed for protracted large-scale conventional military conflicts<br />
into a more modern, compact, technology-driven force —a military<br />
redesigned to secure operational aims with intensity and swiftness<br />
(Giles 2017). A major aspect of the restructuring has involved training<br />
troops to move and maintain in large numbers following rapid<br />
deployment without showing signs of decreased performance over time.<br />
Russia has shown significant progress in military drills and even more<br />
so during ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, starting in 2014, and Syria in<br />
2015. Russia has taken full advantage of these conflicts by conducting<br />
training exercises in an active battlefield to maximize the troops’<br />
exposure to operating conditions. <strong>The</strong> conflicts in Ukraine and Syria<br />
have also served as testing grounds for a host of modern<br />
advancements in weaponry and equipment, including electronic<br />
warfare systems, reactive armor, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)<br />
systems and much more (Giles 2017). For several years, therefore,<br />
Russia has continued to unveil and test new weapons and equipment<br />
as a means of reforming its military and modernizing its Armed Forces.<br />
Recent Developments<br />
In October 2018, the commencement of the North Atlantic Treaty<br />
Organization (NATO)-led military exercise Trident-Juncture in Norway,<br />
sparked Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold a meeting with top<br />
military and law enforcement officials to discuss Moscow’s concerns<br />
and potential responses surrounding the exercise. President Putin stated<br />
during the meeting that, along with unveiling previously commissioned<br />
weaponry, Russia’s arsenal would be further modernized to ensure<br />
protection from any potential threat (Anon. 2018). Sergei Shoigu,<br />
40
Russia’s Minister of Defense, also discussed additional weapons<br />
hardware that the Northern Fleet would be acquiring, which included<br />
five new warships and support vessels, as well as 15 new aircraft by<br />
the end of the year (Anon. 2018). Since that meeting, the Russian<br />
Armed Forces have not acquired the promised new warships,<br />
however they did receive fifty new aircraft by the end of 2018 (Anon.<br />
2019a). Additionally, Russia also began conducting military exercises<br />
within close proximity to the NATO drills, a move that furtherincreased<br />
tensions.<br />
On October 20, 2018, United States President Trump announced<br />
Washington’s intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range<br />
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a result of Russia’s alleged violation<br />
of the terms of the Treaty. <strong>The</strong> alleged breach stems from Russia’s<br />
newly tested missile, Novator 9M729, which has the capability to<br />
enable Russia to launch missile strikes from a range of 500 km to<br />
5,500 km, which is forbidden by the INF Treaty (US Congress<br />
2018:2). Russia has denied the accusations, asserting that the Novator<br />
missile does not violate the prohibited range, and has accused the<br />
United States of violating the Treaty with a component of its missile<br />
defense system. On February 2, 2019, the US and Russia finalized<br />
their decision to withdraw from the Treaty, thus suspending all their<br />
obligations under the INF (Anon. 2019b). <strong>The</strong> withdrawal from the<br />
INF Treaty has amplified friction between the two rival nations and<br />
has created the conditions for potential conflict with other nations<br />
unassociated with the Treaty. Having abandoned the Treaty, the US<br />
has indicated its intent to place nuclear weapons in several European<br />
countries. On February 19, President Vladimir Putin warned the US<br />
and Europe that Russia would be forced to create and deploy<br />
weaponry to be used against nations that pose a direct threat to<br />
Moscow. President Putin went on to state that Russia’s new missiles<br />
would be pointed at the US if Washington were to expand its nuclear<br />
missile network into Europe (Ferris-Rotman 2019).<br />
On March 1, 2018, President Putin boasted during his state-of-thenation<br />
address about the conventional and nuclear capabilities of<br />
Russia’s newest hypersonic arsenal addition, the Avangard glide<br />
missile. <strong>The</strong> first hypersonic missile to be tested was the Kinzhal<br />
cruise missile, which was launched from an airplane and has the<br />
potential to maneuver at a speed of Mach 5, according to the Missile<br />
Defense Advocacy Alliance group (Maza 2018). <strong>The</strong> second missile,<br />
the Avangard, is designed to be launched from an intercontinental<br />
41
allistic missile and can operate at speeds closer to Mach 20<br />
(Majumdar 2018). <strong>The</strong> newest missile to be successfully developed<br />
was announced on February 20, 2019, and is called the Tsirkon. This<br />
hypersonic missile is launched from a ship or submarine and can<br />
travel approximately two miles per second, moving at a speed of<br />
Mach 9 with a range of 1,000 km (Reid 2019). <strong>The</strong>se highly advanced<br />
missiles have caused concerns among US defense planners, because<br />
the missile defense system currently in place in the US is believed to<br />
be unable to defend against such fast and maneuverable missiles.<br />
Analysis<br />
Even though Russia was informed and briefed about the NATO<br />
exercise ahead of time, Moscow still expressed irritation at the close<br />
proximity of the drills, which were held in a region of Norway that<br />
borders Russia. This, on top of a number of military conflicts in<br />
which Russia is involved, such as Ukraine and Syria, have caused<br />
President Putin to make public pronouncements ensuring Russians<br />
that the country’s Armed Forces would undergo major modernization.<br />
Furthermore, the NATO exercise pushed forward the announcement<br />
of the new additions to Russia’s arsenal. This development is reflective<br />
of the seriousness of Putin’s commitment to the transformation of<br />
the Armed Forces. <strong>The</strong> Russian president deemed it necessary to inform,<br />
not just his country’s military leadership, but all Russians and Russia’s<br />
adversaries, about these changes. <strong>The</strong> subsequent incorporation of<br />
new vehicles and other equipment into the military demonstrates that<br />
Russia has since taken steps in the direction of modernization.<br />
<strong>The</strong> dissolution of the INF Treaty brings with it the potential of<br />
monumental instability worldwide, by encouraging the proliferation<br />
of nuclear weapons both in Russia and the US. In addition,<br />
Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF has put regions like<br />
Europe, which are not affiliated with the Treaty, in danger of<br />
suffering a counter-strike from Russia for being suspected by<br />
Moscow of hosting US missiles (Astakhova and Osborn 2018). At<br />
the same time, the termination of the INF Treaty encourages both<br />
the modernization and advancement of the Russian Armed Forces,<br />
by prompting them to develop more modern, technologically<br />
advanced nuclear missiles similar to the type of missile that prompted<br />
the initial debate on alleged INF violations.<br />
42
Russia’s development and testing of multiple types of hypersonic<br />
weaponry is at a level substantially greater than the two other main<br />
competitors in this category, namely the US and China. Russia’s<br />
missile innovation —for example its creation of a nuclear weapon<br />
that travls with the unparalleled speed of Mach 20— generates a<br />
perceived advantage over its adversaries. Russia’s advancement of<br />
this type of weaponry is important to the overall evolution of its<br />
Armed Forces. But, such hypersonic weapons are not easy nor cheap<br />
to make, and will pose a challenge, especially considering Russia’s<br />
weakened economy. <strong>The</strong> current US-led sanctions that target Russia’s<br />
economic infrastructure, including its banking and energy sectors, are<br />
limiting the state’s income and have a detrimental effect on the<br />
government’s defense budget. Russia’s defense budget dropped 17<br />
percent in 2018, making this the first time since 1998 that Russia<br />
reduced its military spending (Kottasová 2018). This reduction in<br />
military spending could significantly halt the testing and production<br />
of more advanced weapons and poses challenge’s to Moscow’s<br />
defense planning.<br />
Conclusion<br />
<strong>The</strong> Russian government has been working relentlessly to modernize<br />
its Armed Forces through a wide array of tactics. Considering all the<br />
recent developments mentioned above, including the ongoing<br />
economic sanctions and decreased levels of defense spending, an<br />
analyst would do well to shy away from issuing high-confidence<br />
estimates. Major developments in the past year, combined with the<br />
effects of sanctions on Russia’s economy, lead to the assertion with<br />
moderate confidence that the Russian government will continue to<br />
modernize its weapons arsenal and implement technological<br />
advancements to all branches of the Armed Forces.<br />
43
References Cited<br />
Anonymous (2019a) “Russian Air Force Got 50 New Combat Aircraft<br />
in 2018”, Defense Blog, 13 January , accessed<br />
on 20 February 2019.<br />
Anonymous (2018) “Russia Threatens Response to Huge NATO<br />
Exercise, Says its New Weapons Will Be Unrivaled Anywhere”,<br />
Military Times, 25 October ,<br />
accessed on 1 December 2018.<br />
Anonymous (2019b) “<strong>The</strong> Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty<br />
at a Glance”, Arms Control Association, 02 February , accessed on 22<br />
February 2019.<br />
Astakhova, O., and Osborn, A. (2018) “Russia Will Target European<br />
Countries if <strong>The</strong>y Host US Nuclear Missiles: Putin”, Reuters, 24<br />
October ,<br />
accessed on 2 December 2018.<br />
Defense and Security Section (2012) “Military Reform: Toward the<br />
New Look of the Russian Army”, Defense and Security Section,<br />
Moscow, Russia.<br />
Ferris-Rotman, A. (2019) “Putin Warns New Weapons Will Point<br />
Toward US if Missiles are Deployed in Europe”, <strong>The</strong> Washington<br />
Post, 20 February , accessed on 21 February 2019.<br />
Giles, K. (2017) “Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military”,<br />
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 May ,<br />
accessed on 30 November 2018.<br />
Kottasová, I. (2018) “Russian Military Spending Drops for the First<br />
Time in 20 Years”, CNN Money, 02 May , accessed on 22 February 2019.<br />
Majumdar, D. (2018) “We Now Know How Russia's New Avangard<br />
Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapon Will Launch”, <strong>The</strong> National Interest,<br />
20 March
know-how-russias-new-avangard-hypersonic-boost-glide-25003>,<br />
accessed on 2 December 2018.<br />
Masters, J. (2015) “<strong>The</strong> Russian Military”, Council on Foreign<br />
Relations, 28 September , accessed on 30 November 2018.<br />
Maza, C. (2018) “How Advanced are Russia’s Hypersonic Weapons?<br />
Moscow Investigates Leak of Classified Information on Missile<br />
Technology”, NewsWeek, 24 July ,<br />
accessed on 1 December 2018.<br />
Reid, D. (2019) “Putin Confirms Development of Hypersonic<br />
Cruise Missile Called Tsirkon”, CNBC, 20 February ,<br />
accessed on 21 February 2019.<br />
Tass News Agency (2018) “Russia Cuts Military Spending for First<br />
Time Over Past 19 Years - Report”, Russian News Agency, , accessed on 2 December 2018.<br />
US Congress (2018) Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range<br />
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, Nuclear<br />
Weapons Policy Committee of Congress, United States Congress,<br />
Washington, DC, United States.<br />
US Congress (2011) Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy, Russian<br />
and Eurasian Affairs Committee of Congress, United States<br />
Congress, Washington, DC, United States.<br />
.<br />
45
46
Biographical Notes on Contributors<br />
ALEX CLARK, from Long Island, New York, is a junior <strong>Intelligence</strong> and<br />
National Security major at Coastal Carolina University. At the conclusion<br />
of his first semester in the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief, he was elected<br />
to serve as the organization’s Communications Officer. He currently serves<br />
as the CIB’s Chief Operations Officer and head of the Russia Desk. In the<br />
fall of 2018 Alex was awarded the CIB’s <strong>Intelligence</strong> Forecast Award for<br />
having the most successful analytical forecast record of the semester.<br />
Alex’s research interests include the Russian language, Russian military<br />
capabilities, and human intelligence (HUMINT). He is also a member of<br />
the National Society of Leadership and Success.<br />
CONNOR LEWIS, from Chantilly, Virginia, majored in <strong>Intelligence</strong> and<br />
National Security Studies at Coastal Carolina University, from which he<br />
graduated in December of 2018. As a member of the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />
Brief, Connor studied the development of Sino-Russian relations and the<br />
significance of Sino-Russian relations for the United States. In November of<br />
2018, he was selected to present his research findings at the 5 th Annual<br />
Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief Symposium in Conway, South Carolina. He<br />
also appeared as a guest on the fourth episode of the CIB <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />
Report and was awarded the program’s <strong>Intelligence</strong> Analysis Award in<br />
December of 2018 for delivering the highest-quality oral analytical<br />
product during the semester. Connor is currently working as a technical<br />
production hand for various events in and around the Washington Metro Area<br />
and is seeking employment in the National Security community.<br />
JARED ROSS, from Pineville, North Carolina, graduated from Rock Hill<br />
High School in 2013 and transferred to Coastal Carolina University from<br />
York Technical College in January of 2016. He joined the Chanticleer<br />
<strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief soon afterwards and has been a member and analyst<br />
ever since. In addition to his <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies<br />
major, he is minoring in Political Science. In the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />
Brief, he has researched the security aspects of the ongoing dispute<br />
between the two main Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah. He has also<br />
researched the dynamics of the national politics of Israel, as well as the<br />
internal politics of Fatah in the West Bank. In 2018, Jared was a panelist<br />
at the 5 th Annual Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief Symposium in Conway,<br />
South Carolina. After graduating, his goal is to go into the Navy and work<br />
for the Office of Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>.<br />
47
MADISON SCHOLAR, from Marietta, Georgia, is a senior <strong>Intelligence</strong> and<br />
National Security major at Coastal Carolina University. In the fall of 2018,<br />
Madison was accepted into the University of Manchester, where she will<br />
continue her education and pursue a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict<br />
Resolution in the spring of 2019. In May 2018, Madison was elected to<br />
serve as the Chief of Operations for the Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief,<br />
where she also served as the head of the America’s desk. In the same<br />
semester, she was awarded the Regional Expert Award for her expertise<br />
on the topic of the Sinaloa Cartel. Madison’s research interests include<br />
illegal narcotics trafficking, Mexican cartels, and marijuana legalization<br />
in the United States. In December 2018, she was accepted into the Dyer<br />
Fellows program, where she pursued in depth research on the security<br />
effects of marijuana legalization. In the same semester, she was selected<br />
as a panelist at the 5 th annual Chanticleer <strong>Intelligence</strong> Brief Symposium,<br />
where she spoke about her analysis on the ‘El Chapo’ trial. In January<br />
2019, Madison also received the <strong>Intelligence</strong> Student of the Year award<br />
from the <strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies program at Coastal<br />
Carolina University.<br />
JOSEPH FITSANAKIS, PhD, is Associate Professor of Politics in the<br />
<strong>Intelligence</strong> and National Security Studies program at Coastal Carolina<br />
University, where he teaches courses on intelligence operations,<br />
intelligence communications, national security, intelligence analysis, and<br />
intelligence in the Cold War, among other subjects. Before joining Coastal,<br />
Dr. Fitsanakis founded the Security and <strong>Intelligence</strong> Studies program at<br />
King University, where he also directed the King Institute for Security and<br />
<strong>Intelligence</strong> Studies. He has written extensively on subjects such as<br />
international espionage, intelligence tradecraft, counterintelligence,<br />
wiretapping, cyber-espionage, transnational crime and intelligence reform.<br />
He is a frequent media commentator, syndicated columnist, and senior<br />
editor at intelNews.org, an ACI-indexed scholarly blog that is cataloged<br />
through the United States Library of Congress.<br />
JOHN NOMIKOS, PhD, is Director at the Research Institute for European<br />
and American Studies (RIEAS), Chairman of the Mediterranean Council<br />
for <strong>Intelligence</strong> Studies (MCIS), Chairman of the Greek <strong>Intelligence</strong> Studies<br />
Association (GISA), Chairman of the European <strong>Intelligence</strong> Academy (EIA), and<br />
Founding Editor of the Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />
(JMBI) and the Journal of European and American <strong>Intelligence</strong> Studies. He<br />
is Assistant Professor at Webster University (Athens Campus) and Visiting<br />
Scholar at the John Naisbitt University in Serbia and the University of Rome<br />
(Tre) in Italy. He was previously Adjunct Professor at the Department of<br />
International Relations at the University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus).<br />
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